preferences. Massive fiscal incetives, stimulus packages and government interventions onlyworsen functioning of the market further. 43On the contrary, Yoshikawa states that the fiscal policy in the 1990s promotedeconomic growth and successfully avoided even bigger slumps in the economy. In 1992-1994the economy would have experienced a zero or negative growth if there hadn´t been increasedgovernment expenditures. 44The crisis of the financial system with its peak in 1997 played an important role in theunfavourable development of the economy. The volume of bad loans of all Japanese banksalmost doubled compared with 1996, to JPY 13.3 trill. In 1998 bad loans represented 5.4% ofall loans and this share was still growing (up to 8.0% in 2002). Credit banks and banks offeringlong-term loans had the biggest volume of NPLs, about 8-10% of all loans. In case of municipaland regional banks this share fluctuated around 4-6% before 2000. 45 Due to worseningeconomic results, banks started to go bankrupt in large numbers. After the collapse of mortgagecompanies and credit co-operatives in previous years, now it was the turn of big banks andother financial institutions. In the end of 1997 e.g. two big companies trading in securities,Sanyo Securities and Yamaichi Securities and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (in 1996 the 10 thbiggest municipal bank in the country) went bankrupt. 46 Banking houses had to face a fastdecline in the price of securities (index Nikkei 225 fell to the level lower than after bubbledissolution – see figure 1) and outflow of deposits and worries about an overall crisis of thefinancial system grew.Consequences of problems in the financial sector were far reaching. According to theIMF: “a long-term stagnation of the economy weakened the financial sector and the crisis of thefinancial sector in the late 1990s retrospectively had a negative impact on the real economicactivity and restricted the efficiency of economic policy.“ 47 This worsened the mediating role ofbanks and led to the decrease in the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. In 1997Japan experienced a so-called credit crunch, i.e. the situation when undercapitalized banks areneither able nor willing to offer a sufficient amount of new loans to companies. 48 In the effort tomaintain their capital-adequacy ratio 49 banks started to reduce the amount of newly offeredloans. This was a big problem for the business sector, particularly SMEs which were dependenton these loans.The central bank cannot solve a credit crunch by increasing the money supply, sincethis increase would lead only to the increase in bank reserves. Theoretically ideal, however, afinancially and time very demanding solution, is revival of the financial sector. But both theBOJ and the government were reluctant about this for a long time. The fact that manybusinesses suffered from the decline in the value of their own assets and worsening of their ownbalance, which meant that they had to economize and accept restructuralization programmes,43 Powell, B. (2002): Explaining Japan´s Recession, p. 41.44 Yoshikawa, H. (2002): Japan´s Lost Decade, p. 17.45 IMF (2003) Japan: Financial System Stability Assessment, p. 10.46 Crisis in more details, see e.g. Nakaso, H. (2001): The financial crisis in Japan during the1990s: how the Bank of Japan responded and the lessons learnt.47 IMF (2003): Japan: Financial System Stability Assessment, p. 12-13.48 In the situatuion of a credit crunch the interest doesn´t clear the credit market, demand forloans exceeds their supply.49 BIS defines the capital-adequacy ratio as a ratio between the level of own capital and riskassets. Internationally active banks must maintain the indicator at a minimum level of 8% foroperations in foreign markets and 4% for activities in the domestic market. If the indicator falls,banks must reduce the volume of their loans. For more details see the websites of the BasleCommittee on Banking Supervision www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm.MEDZINÁRODNÉ VZŤAHY, 2012, 4 ○ 143
made the situation even worse. Therefore businesses themselves partially reduced the demandfor loans.Opinions of academicians on the existence, causes and impacts of the credit crunchdiffer considerably. According to Yoshikawa, a long unsolved increase in the volume of badloans and with this connected credit crunch was the main factor, which indirectly caused asubstantial decline in private fixed investments and the 2 nd recession in the 1990s. 50 But e.g.Hayashi and Prescott claim, that a long-term stagnation cannot be explained by a credit crunchbecause of growing possibilities of internal and other than bank funding of Japanese firms. 51In 1998 the government decided to solve the situation by crisis measures and financialsupport of problematic banks. In 1998 JPY 60 trill., which is 12% of the GDP, were allocatedfor the support of banks. 52 The central bank also tried to increase the liquidity in the financialsector by purchasing government bonds and securities from commercial banks. Under the acton emergency measures for financial stabilization, a reconstruction programme for banks wasannounced and was amended by a plan of deregulation and reforms of the whole financialsystem. This plan known as a Big Bang was announced already in the end of 1996; however,laws necessary for its implementation were approved only in June 1998. New deregulationmeasures should have: 1) eliminated the barriers against foreign financial institutions active inthe Japanese market, 2) liberalized all foreign operations of financial and business stakeholders,3) strengthened the supervision over financial institutions, 4) eliminated restrictions for creationof financial holdings prohibited after the World War II, 5) supported competitive environmentin insurance, 6) reformed accounting systems in businesses, and 7) strengthened BOJautonomy. The main aim of this ambitious plan was to create a competitive, market-orientedfinancial system and open it to foreign competition. The new financial system should have been“free, fair and global”. 53In harmony with the intentions of the “Big Bang”, in June 1998 the government set upa Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA), whose main mission was supervision of moneyinstitutions and situation monitoring in the financial sector. Another new authority was theFinancial Reconstruction Commission (FRC), whose task was to study FSA analyses andsearch for adequate solutions to problems of indebted financial institutions.3.2 Impacts of the crisis in South-East AsiaJapanese economic crisis was also influenced by financial crisis in countries of South-East Asia (1997-1998), as there were tight trading and financial links with these countries fromthe past. From a territorial point of view South-East Asian share (including China) in Japaneseexport reached almost 40% in the 1990s, however, in 1998 it fell to 33.2% (share of import fellto 34.9%). 54 Effects of the crises could be seen only in the end of 1997 and in 1998, when thegrowth in export to hit countries slowed down. Asian countries were also an important partnerin the field of capital. In 1997 Japanese direct foreign investments in Asia represented almostJPY 1.5 trill. (20% of total Japanese direct foreign investments). In 1998 they fell to JPY 0.84trillion and in 1999 to less than JPY 0.8 trillion. While many foreign investors decided to finishtheir activity here due to worsening business conditions, many Japanese businesses decided tostay because of close links. According to the METI only 2% of Japanese investors left till the50 Yoshikawa, H. (2002): Japan´s Lost Decade, p. 24-25, 49-82.51 Hayashi, F. – Prescott, E. (2002): The 1990s in Japan: a Lost Decade.52 IMF (1999): Japan: Staff Country Report for the 1999 Article IV Consultation, p. 18.53 For more details see e.g. official websites on reforms: Financial System Reform, availablefrom http://www.fsa.go.jp/p_mof/english/big-bang/big-bang.htm.54 Callen, T. – McKibbin, W. J. (2001): Policies and Prospects in Japan and The Implicationsfor the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 12, 13.144 ○ MEDZINÁRODNÉ VZŤAHY, 2012, 4
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ObsahPôvodné vedecké článkyZEN
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ContentOriginal scientific papersZE
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epublikou a Indickou republikou? Za
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spočiatku javí iba ako malá sekt
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Z kulturologického hľadiska tento
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6. LEHMANNOVÁ, Z. a kol.(2010): Pa
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krajiny 2 . Zatiaľ čo pri cle pla
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Textilv ekonomike (P SA /P TA ). 7
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TextilAnalyzujme teraz rozdiely v d
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P Ô V O D N Ý V E D E C K Ý Č L
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dohody, ktorú členský štát uza
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Na základe návrhu Európskej komi
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do svojej výlučnej kompetencie, n
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6. Stanovisko Generálneho advokát
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a jadrovým programom. Takmer úpln
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Južná Kórea sa ďalej rozvíjala
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Napätie medzi obomi štátmi na K
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Graf 2: Štruktúra tvorby HDP KĽD
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a luxusného tovaru. Rada bezpečno
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Osobitnú skupinu ŠEZ tvoria zóny
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systému na potraviny a iný priemy
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7. SINGH, L. 2012. India and North
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D I S K U S I AVÝVOJ MULTILATERÁL
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chybět příslušné pravomoce k u
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socialistickou federativní sověts
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uzavírat bilaterální dohody mezi
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2 Stěžejní multilaterální obch
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Pod záštitou UNCTAD byl během ro
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Celní úmluva ATA karnet pro doča
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těchto práv jednotlivými státy
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zejména na nastolování obchodu v
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33. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OP
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D I S K U S I AFAKTORY ROZVOJA A RA
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tradície a pomerne ľahko sa dost
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1979 ajatollách Chomejní povolil
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moslimských krajín - vytvárať n
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nachádzali v Pakistane, kde v úlo
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jedna skupina argumentuje množstvo
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28. OLCOTT, M. BRILL (2012). Centra
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planéty Zem, je možné identifiko
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vysokohorských ľadovcov a snehove
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populácie človeka. Len v roku 200
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1 Funkcia ropného trhuPodľa zákl
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