Hazar Raporu - Issue 02 - Winter 2012

Kaladze revealed that all agreements and
contracts 17 issued by the previous government
will be reviewed, providing a good case in
point 18 . However, the change of government
in Georgia will not change the situation of
Azerbaijani business and investments in
Georgia. SOCAR has recently acquired Itera-
Georgia, enabling it to sell gas directly on the
Georgian market (except in the capital city) is
useful indicator of this trend.
T he positive dynamic of bilateral relations
was confirmed in a statement by SOCAR’s
President, Rovnag Abdullaev.
He reported that Prime Minister Ivanishvili
had met with the head of SOCAR’s
Georgian subsidiary and the Azerbaijan
ambassador, “and values SOCAR’s
investments in Georgia highly” 19 . In
addition, on November 9, PM Ivanishvili
met SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev
himself, and once again confirmed the
strategic nature of Georgian-Azerbaijani
relations. He also stressed he was satisfied
with the agreement with SOCAR, stating
that the gas tariffs for the population were
artificially increased inside the country. 20
17 According to ABC.az website Georgian citizens pay
$0.107 per kWt of electricity versus $0.072 in Azerbaijan and
$0.06 in Armenia. In Russia, depending on the region, rate for
the population ranges from $0.13 to $0.06 per kWt. See link
here: http://abc.az/eng/news/main/69155.html
18 Radio “Commersant,”Kakhi Kaladze is ready to begin
talks with the Russian side on energy imports. Available at:
http://www.commersant.ge/eng/id=3532
19 Azerbaijan’s SOCAR acquires Georgian gas supplier.
Reuters. November 1, 2012 Available at: http://www.reuters.
com/article/2012/11/01/azerbaijan-gas-georgia-idUS-
L5E8M18P020121101
20 GEORGIA ONLINE. Georgian PM meets SOCAR
President. November 10,2012 Available at: http://georgiaonline.ge/news/a1/economy/1352580419.php
Conclusion
As the Georgian government seeks out the
possibility for a new leaf in Tbilisi-Moscow
relations, most Georgians still remain
deeply anti-Russian, as Russia still occupies
20% of Georgia’s internationally territory.
In like of this fact, it seems unlikely that the
new government will succeed in changing
Georgia’s pro-Western aspirations and its
strategic relations with regional allies. Euro-
Atlantic integration is mostly a consensus
issue in Georgia. Conversely, as Michel
Cecire rightly noted “despite ordinary
Georgians’ largely positive feelings toward
Russians, support for a pro-Moscow foreign
policy is a politically punishable offense in
Georgia, as evidenced by the now-lifeless
political careers of previous opposition
leaders who have sought accommodation
with the Kremlin.”
Nonetheless, for the sake of mending ties
with Moscow, it may be tempting to return
to the policy of balance with Russia pursued
by former Georgian President Edward
Shevardnadze. In such a scenario, there is a
risk that Georgia would drift from its path
towards Euro Atlantic integration, and in
that sense, relevant institutional reforms
might falter. Similarly, it would be mission
impossible for Georgian diplomacy to
achieve Tbilisi’s new goals, most notably
to convince Moscow that Georgia’s NATO
membership is an acceptable objective.
Although it remains to be seen whether
Georgia will be able to bargain the best deal
out of this delicate situation, one thing is
certain - Georgia’s place in the region, and
its relations with both Russia and the West
are entering a crucial new phase. Put simply
put, it’s make or break time for Georgia.
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