Hazar Raporu - Issue 02 - Winter 2012

that there is still a deal to be made with the
Kremlin, as the establishment of relations
may facilitate the integration of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia into Georgia. As the
first step in this direction, Ivanishvili has
placed Georgia’s former ambassador to
Moscow Zurab Abashidze in a new post,
Special Representative for Relations with
Russia, reporting directly to the Georgian
Prime Minister. 16 Ivanishvili also expressed
hope that Moscow would reciprocate. It
seems likely that with such steps Tbilisi
will be able to test whether or not Russia
has changed its approach towards Georgia
under the terms of this new political
reality. The Prime Minister’s decision to
introduce this post also demonstrates his –
and the Georgian government’s - readiness
to create a new independent channel of
relations, communication and dialogue
with Russia. Whatever the result of this
political flirtation with Moscow, finding
the middle path between confrontation
and capitulation will be one of the
Ivanishvili government’s toughest tasks.
A s for relations with Georgia’s immediate
neighbors in the aftermath of the elections, unless
there is a radical strategic and paradigmatic
shift in its foreign policy orientation, it is unlikely
that Georgia will change its strategic relations
with close partners like Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Strategic relations between Baku and Tbilisi have
never been dependent on political personalities,
Chatham House Expert Comment. October 2, 2012 Available
at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/
view/186067
16 Civil Georgia. PM Appoints Special Envoy for Relations
with Russia. November 12,2012 Available at: http://www.civil.
ge/eng/article.phpid=25407
and the status quo is likely to continue,
especially given the two countries’ shared
concerns over issues such as ethnic
separatism and challenges arising from
an assertive Russian policy in the region.
Similarly, it is expected that both countries
will continue to reject any Moscow-driven
integration initiatives that might compromise
national sovereignty. In addition,
T he Georgian political and social elite are
cognizant of the fact that Azerbaijan provided
much-needed energy supplies to Georgia during
its standoff with Russia; it also understands
importance of Turkey as a stabilizing security
actor in the South Caucasus.
Provided that the election produces a
smooth transition of power in Tbilisi,
Ankara and Baku may benefit from having
a predictable and stable neighbor.
Having said this, what may change in
Georgian-Azerbaijani relations is the
current dynamic of Georgian energy
dependence on Baku. In order to fulfill his
pre-election promise related of reduced
gas and electricity expenses, Ivanishvili
believes that with more predictable
and stable Georgian-Russian relations,
Tbilisi will be able to pursue further
diversification of its foreign and economic
relations. There are naïve expectations
that in such a scenario, Tbilisi may obtain
a cheaper price for Russian gas and
electricity. Under these circumstances,
Baku may find itself with less economic
and energy leverage over Tbilisi that it
currently enjoys. A recent statement by
Georgia’s new Energy Minister Kakhi
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