Hazar Raporu - Issue 02 - Winter 2012

of the state, the essential vector of
its development, or its geopolitical
orientation. This seems true to an extent
for Georgia’s new government; the present
leaders may not agree among themselves
on many issues, but so far it seems that
they share a common core goal in relation
to the protection of national interests.
Like Saakashvili, Ivanishvili has repeatedly
claimed – both before and after the
elections - that he will keep Georgia on the
course towards NATO membership and
integration with EU, while also continuing
efforts to (re)integrate the self-proclaimed
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
However, some cautious Western
observers are not convinced, 12 as it
remains unclear how the new government
can achieve reconciliation with Russia
without sacrificing Georgia’s national
interests. Citing some of Ivanishvili’s more
erratic coalition partners and alleged links
to Kremlin authorities, critics are framing
the Georgian Dream victory as the first
step toward a Ukraine-like backslide into
the Russian orbit. 13 However, Ivanishvili’s
Georgian Dream does not accept that
good relations with Europe and Russia
are mutually exclusive. Moreover, despite
criticism, new government officials
are convinced that they will be able to
normalize diplomatic relations with
Moscow, while Georgia will continue to
refrain from formal diplomatic relations
12 See: Simon Saradzhyan. Rebalancing Georgian Foreign
Policy. The National Interest. November 8, 2012 Available at:
http://www.nationalinterest.org/commentary/rebalancinggeorgian-foreign-policy-7705
13 Michael Cecire. For Georgia’s Ivanishvili, Interests
Will Guide Russia Policy. World Politics review. October, 8
2012. Available at: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/
articles/12397/for-georgias-ivanishvili-interests-will-guiderussia-policy
with Moscow as long as Russia maintains
“embassies” in the administrative capitals
of the two separatist regions. 14 At the
same time, the new government has also
declared that Georgia will “definitely”
remain committed to Geneva talks, which
were launched after the 2008 August
War with Russia. These talks will be held
with mediation from the EU, OSCE and
UN, involving negotiators from Georgia,
Russia, the United States, as well as
representatives from the separatist entities
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Meanwhile, as the newly emerging and
sometimes contradictory foreign policy
stance increases the climate of uncertainty,
many regional analysts claim that
Ivanishvili’s choice of foreign policy team
suggests he plans to tone down the heated
rhetoric that has characterized bilateral
relations with Russia. Accordingly, he
will try to adopt a more pragmatic, less
ideologically driven and balanced line
with Moscow, and to improve economic
and cultural ties with Tbilisi’s northern
neighbor. As a “pragmatic dreamer” he
also recognizes the economic and other
benefits of normalizing relations with
Russia, and hopes to recover trade and
transportation links, notably with the
reopening of the Russian market for
Georgian wine and mineral water. As
one analyst pointed out: “an initial turn
to Russia with Ivanishvili would bring a
more immediate economic benefit than
a re-engagement with the non-committal
West under any Saakashvili-inspired
system” 15 . Moreover, Ivanishvili believes
14 RFE/RL. Tbilisi Says No Diplomatic Ties With Russia
While It Occupies Georgian Territory. Available at: http://
www.rferl.org/content/georgia-foreign-minister-russia-occupies-territory-no-diplomatic-relations/24752066.html
15 James Nixey. Update: Georgia Post-Election Analysis.
130 128