Hazar Raporu - Issue 02 - Winter 2012

partner Rosneft to sell gas to/via TAP.
That scenario will result in competition
for Azerbaijani gas within the project and
the market (e.e. Italian).
Moreover, from the broader geopolitical
perspective, this enables Moscow to
threaten - or participate profitably in - the
Euro-Atlantic energy security concept
which NATO (among others) has been
promoting. Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan have significant energy
resources and are competing with Russia
for the same lucrative and strategically
significant markets. In some scenarios,
these countries could act as Russian
partners and help Russia realize its
broader energy strategy on the Eurasian
continent - which could lead to a Eurasian
energy producers’ consortium under
Russian patronage.
It is clear that such a consortium would
benefit Russia, but it is less obvious how
it might benefit the other participants.
In order to realize such a long-term
strategy, Russia would have to make a
strong case and provide real incentives
to potential participants. Several of those
countries have no desire to return to a
de-facto USSR; they have built successful
independent national energy policies over
the last 20 years. How will Russia use a
seat on the BP board to further its longterm
strategic aims Perhaps we should
work on the assumption that those aims
will evolve as Russia’s leadership prepares
for the post-Putin era later in this decade.
Geopolitical speculation aside, there are
possible positive implications for SGC
and SD. Overall Rosneft (and Russia) are
better operational and strategic partners
for BP than the AAR oligarchs. With the
Macondo aftermath and other challenges,
BP management has been stretched. It
could be, that without the AAR tantrums,
the BP board will make better decisions
on behalf of their shareholders. Thus in
this sense, it is entirely possible that in
terms of focus and priority, Azerbaijan
and SGC could benefit (indirectly) from
the deal.
A s for Russia, its long-awaited accession to
the WTO marks a real milestone, achieved in
the face of the nationalist rhetoric propagated by
the elite.
Sakhalin and now Rosneft are huge
upstream joint ventures in Russia with
significant foreign participation. Despite
his military and no doubt Marxist
education and early career, it seems
likely that Sechin has been reading Adam
Smith over the last 20 years; now he finds
himself responsible for delivering a longterm
sustainable future for Russian oil in
a bilateral and reciprocal world. Maybe
BP and Azerbaijan should be considering
opportunities outside the former Soviet
Union for joint investment with the new
Rosneft, allowing everyone to move away
from the Soviet legacy of gas pipeline
squabbles.
From Azerbaijan’s strategic viewpoint,
there is no doubt that SGC & SD
represent vital national interests. Maybe
Russia will gradually shift its energy
strategy to a more WTO and market
oriented one - but maybe it won’t. There
is no doubt that we are now entering a
new stage of energy geopolitics in the
region, and particularly a new stage for
the SGC. Non-technical risks to the
project remain significant, and show
little sign of decreasing in the next few
months. Indeed we are (as the Chinese
saying goes) living in some particularly
interesting times.
CASPIAN REPORT
121 119