Hazar Raporu - Issue 02 - Winter 2012

from its activities in Russia will decrease
three-fold, and it will also lose 25% of
its production base. The question is,
then, why the British oil major, which
has about 20% of its oil and gas assets in
the Russian public company, is choosing
to abandon a profitable and developing
investment and become a minority
shareholder of state-controlled Rosneft
A further question that has been raised is
why AAR did not buy the 50% share of
TNK-BP and become the sole owner of
the company by outbidding the Rosneft
offer
The analyses and commentaries from
media outlets and political pundits alike
are missing one fundamental point:
the current deal is politically beneficial
for both Moscow and BP, as opposed
to financially. With Russia’s direct
participation on its board, will BP now
have a political response to Baku and
SOCAR following two years of tension
over key decisions about existing and
upcoming gas projects And has Moscow
in turn finally found the best way to
impede the Southern Gas Corridor
(SGC) and Shah Deniz (SD) projects in
which BP is a leading player
Or perhaps, Putin and Sechin have
acknowledged that whether they like
it or not, in the long-term, Caspian
gas will be strategically important for
European markets – and if so, why not
profit from it Gazprom has sale and
purchase agreements with the South East
European and Balkans markets, but those
agreements do not go beyond 2022.
A ll of the markets that rely exclusively
on Gazprom do not want to deepen their gas
import dependence on Gazprom, and are
eagerly awaiting the SD exports.
It may also be the case that Gazprom’s
traditionally monopolist position is at
odds with Russia’s vision for itself in
a “WTO-world”. As consumer choice
increases (via LNG, shale gas, and East
Mediterranean gas), it could well be that
Russia’s strategists have realized that
they need to upgrade their portfolio of
options.
There is a fear that Rosneft or any of
its subsidiaries might, through the BP
connection, get involved in the upstream
and midstream projects such as Shah
Deniz and the Southern Gas Corridor.
The outcome is obvious: Russian
manipulation of the entire project would
be inevitable. In an interview with the
Wall Street Journal, Sechin claimed
that Rosneft is creating an investment
fund with a completely new, probably
international, credit-financial structure,
based on its current resources. ‘An
investment group, an investment holding
will never be out of place in general;
and in some cases will be necessary for
Rosneft as for any major company. It can
be interpreted differently. Within this
so-called investment group Rosneft or its
daughter gas company can easily make
joint investment in the upstream and
midstream projects in the region.
In his recent statement, Sechin stated
that he supports the further development
of Gazprom’s export monopoly.
Interestingly, he mentioned that he does
not exclude the possibility that Rosneft
could export gas in collaboration with
Gazprom in the future. What he was
likely referring to is the creation of a
single export channel in Russia working
in close alignment with Gazprom.
Furthermore, Sechin specifically does not
rule out involvement in gas business in
the future, e.g. through selling Gazprom’s
gas. One can assume that BP, as a TAP
shareholder, would allow its strategic
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