Hazar Raporu - Issue 02 - Winter 2012

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To be more specific, a project embracing purely Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan would appear to offer the best prospect of progress (Georgia, although not an ECO member, should also be included, as the essential geographical link between Turkey and Azerbaijan). If, at a later stage, there were a fundamental internal transformation in Iran, with a consequent reorientation of its foreign policies, it could always be brought into the fold. In the meantime, the four states, (‘TAKT’ for short) all have reasonably good mutual relations, without controversial ideological commitments. Broadly, they all pursue compatible goals – in particular, fuller integration into the global economic system, rather than opposition to it. Such a project would appear to have gained credibility thanks to developments in the oil and gas field over past year, notably the emergence of the Trans- Anatolian gas pipeline project (TANAP) as a real alternative to existing systems, most of which depend on either Russia or Iran. This could lead to the revitalisation of the long-discussed Nabucco project as a new source of gas supply to central and eastern Europe. An essential part of TANAP would be a trans-Caspian gas pipeline connecting Turkmenistan with Azerbaijan, which would vastly increase the available supply. To achieve this, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are reported to have agreed that a trans-Caspian pipeline could go ahead without awaiting or prejudicing the final delimitation of sectoral borders – implying that the project would not be held hostage to possible vetoes by Russia or Iran, or to disagreements between Baku and Ashkabad over their offshore boundaries. 20 Kazakhstan was apparently not included among the initial partners in TANAP, but was said to be interested in increasing its oil and gas exports via Azerbaijan. More broadly, it was reported to be emerging as Turkey’s most important economic partner in the region, with the establishment of a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council by the two countries in October 2012. Hence, could be expected to play an important role in a potential TAKT alignment. 21 This is not to suggest the emergence of TAKT as an economic grouping within ECO would be problem free. Much would need to be done to improve overland as well as trans-Caspian transport links between the participating states, and facilitating trade outside the energy field. Although the trans-Caspian pipeline would clearly reduce Russia’s role in the Caspian energy game, the TAKT countries, as always, would need to be very cautious in relations with their powerful northern neighbour. Nonetheless, such an alignment within ECO offered the prospect that the organisation – or at least a part of it – could develop a more effective international role than it has had so far. 20 Vladimir Socor, ‘Turkey Seeks Opportunity in Trans-Caspian Pipeline Project’, Eurasian Daily Monitor, Vol.9, No.164, 11 September 2012. 21 Richard Weitz, ‘Kazakhstan-Turkey Presidential Summit Deepens Economic Ties’, ibid, Vol.9, No.191, 19 October 2012. 118 116
BP-Rosneft Deal: Implications & Intentions Gulmira Rzayeva Energy Expert Recent weeks have seen much news and analysis by Russian, UK and other international commentators on the TNK-BP takeover, which will make the Russian-listed company Rosneft one of the world’s biggest oil producers. T hough listed, Rosneft is state-controlled - over 70% of its equity is controlled by the Russian government. It is estimated that the new Rosneft will register at 23 billion barrels of oil reserves, on par with ExxonMobil or Brazilian Petrobras; however its daily production output is just over 4 million barrels per day, which is significantly more than Exxon or Petrobras. When Rosneft finalizes the TNK-BP acquisition, its net debt will be more than $70 billion, double the EBITDA estimate for this year. Rosneft is buying out BP’s 50% stake in TNK-BP, while BP is taking a 12.84% equity share in Rosneft. BP is purchasing 5.66% of Rosneft equity shares for 4.88 billion USD ($8 per share), bringing its total share in Rosneft to 19.75%. This will give BP the right to assign two members to the Rosneft board. Presumably one of them will be David Pitty, Head of BP Russia, and the other Robert Dudley, who memorably had to leave Russia in 2008 when tensions with BP’s former partners in TNK-BP were at their peak – now it is likely that he will be returning to help the Russian state run one of its main economic pillars. There are a number of indicators regarding the possible appointment of a Rosneft representative to BP’s board. T he appointment of a Russian director to BP’s 15-strong board would be a first in the company’s 104-year history. It has not been ruled out that the representative in question will be Igor Sechin - Putin’s close associate and energy tsar. Moving from fighting capitalism in the Angolan jungle to sitting on the board of BP would represent a remarkable career trajectory for Sechin. Opinions are split across the expert communities as to whether the deal is financially profitable for both Rosneft and BP. BP’s annual income from TNK- BP production was USD 3 billion. After selling its share, the company’s income CASPIAN REPORT 119 117
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HAZAR RAPORU Yayıncı: Hazar Strat
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HAZAR RAPORU Orta Asya Bölgesi’n
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Stratejik Projeksiyon: Avrasya’da
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kendisini Urumçi, Çin’e götür
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kazanmasında ve bölgenin petrol k
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parçasıdır. Kuşbakışı perspe
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olmalı ve Bakü Havaalanı rekabet
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Kalkınma için Bölgesel İşbirli
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Dünya Ticaret Örgütü verisi mev
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ve Türkmenistan’ı kapsayan bir
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10,0 5,0 0,0 -5,0 -10,0 dönemine g
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eskisinden daha rahat borçlanabili
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BP - Rosneft Anlaşması: Beklentil
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grubu, bir yatırım holdingi hiçb
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Avrupa Birliği’nin Geleceği: Mi
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Bu kuşkusuz çok yakın vadede ger
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Gürcistan Parlamento Seçimleri So
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Hristiyan Demokratlar, Yeni Sağcı
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Gürcistan Dış Politikası: Seçi
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B ununla birlikte Gürcistan politi
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Kuzey Kafkasya’da Güvenlik ve İ
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irbirine açık tutmaları, ulaşı
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“Freedom Support Act”a 907’nc
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Ermenistan’ı Rusya’nın mandas
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için bu fiyatın 330 dolara çıka
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ve Pf P-Barış İçin Ortaklık pr
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SSCB’nin tasfiyesi sonrasında b
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ittifaka dönüşümü, Soğuk Sava
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projeleri ile realize etmeyi hedefl
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çıkan olaylar da enerji jeopoliti
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aşlattığı yeni dış politikas
Page 67 and 68: Tunus, Mısır, Libya, Körfez ülk
Page 69 and 70: DEĞERLENDİRMELER Dr. Şener Aktü
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Page 73 and 74: Ama Ulusçuluğun, Milliyetçilik o
Page 75 and 76: E ğer bu çözüm gerçekleşirse,
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Page 87 and 88: DEĞERLENDİRMELER Prof. Dr. Fuat K
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Page 93 and 94: unun tam tersi durum yaşanıyor. A
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Page 97 and 98: artık yasak değil, grup toplantı
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Page 101: hazar strateji enstitüsü H A S E
Page 104 and 105: Strategic Assessment of Euro-Asian
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Page 108 and 109: Azerbaijan: Potential Catalyst for
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Page 114 and 115: (CENTO). Five years later, in 1964,
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Page 122 and 123: Obama’s Challenge With Economy Yr
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Page 126 and 127: The Aftermath of Georgia’s Parlia
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Page 130 and 131: of the state, the essential vector
Page 132 and 133: Kaladze revealed that all agreement
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Hazar Raporu - Issue 02 - Winter 2012

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