Hazar Raporu - Issue 02 - Winter 2012

To be more specific, a project embracing
purely Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan would appear to
offer the best prospect of progress
(Georgia, although not an ECO member,
should also be included, as the essential
geographical link between Turkey and
Azerbaijan). If, at a later stage, there were
a fundamental internal transformation
in Iran, with a consequent reorientation
of its foreign policies, it could always be
brought into the fold. In the meantime,
the four states, (‘TAKT’ for short) all have
reasonably good mutual relations, without
controversial ideological commitments.
Broadly, they all pursue compatible goals
– in particular, fuller integration into
the global economic system, rather than
opposition to it.
Such a project would appear to have
gained credibility thanks to developments
in the oil and gas field over past year,
notably the emergence of the Trans-
Anatolian gas pipeline project (TANAP)
as a real alternative to existing systems,
most of which depend on either Russia or
Iran. This could lead to the revitalisation
of the long-discussed Nabucco project
as a new source of gas supply to central
and eastern Europe. An essential part
of TANAP would be a trans-Caspian
gas pipeline connecting Turkmenistan
with Azerbaijan, which would vastly
increase the available supply. To achieve
this, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
are reported to have agreed that a
trans-Caspian pipeline could go ahead
without awaiting or prejudicing the
final delimitation of sectoral borders –
implying that the project would not be
held hostage to possible vetoes by Russia
or Iran, or to disagreements between
Baku and Ashkabad over their offshore
boundaries. 20 Kazakhstan was apparently
not included among the initial partners
in TANAP, but was said to be interested
in increasing its oil and gas exports via
Azerbaijan. More broadly, it was reported
to be emerging as Turkey’s most important
economic partner in the region, with the
establishment of a High Level Strategic
Cooperation Council by the two countries
in October 2012. Hence, could be
expected to play an important role in a
potential TAKT alignment. 21
This is not to suggest the emergence of
TAKT as an economic grouping within
ECO would be problem free. Much
would need to be done to improve
overland as well as trans-Caspian
transport links between the participating
states, and facilitating trade outside the
energy field. Although the trans-Caspian
pipeline would clearly reduce Russia’s
role in the Caspian energy game, the
TAKT countries, as always, would need
to be very cautious in relations with
their powerful northern neighbour.
Nonetheless, such an alignment within
ECO offered the prospect that the
organisation – or at least a part of
it – could develop a more effective
international role than it has had so far.
20 Vladimir Socor, ‘Turkey Seeks Opportunity in Trans-Caspian
Pipeline Project’, Eurasian Daily Monitor, Vol.9, No.164,
11 September 2012.
21 Richard Weitz, ‘Kazakhstan-Turkey Presidential Summit
Deepens Economic Ties’, ibid, Vol.9, No.191, 19 October 2012.
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