skönsmässigt beslutsfattande i processrättsliga frågor

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trasted to mandatory rules. Its aim is to examine the (potential) tensionbetween the national and Union developments and if possible suggestways of relieving this tension.The thesis argues that EU law influence is liable to hamper the Swedishreforms in fulfilling their purpose and that their effect may instead beto further the impact of substantive EU law in Swedish courts. It alsoargues that the flexibility-driven reforms have structural effects on theallocation of normative powers between Member State and Union andbetween the legislative power and the judiciary, which the legislator so farhas failed to take into account. It forwards these arguments by answeringthree research questions: Firstly, it asks what constitutes a discretionaryrule, how, from a linguistic point of view, such rules are framed and whythe Swedish legislator chooses to regulate civil procedure through discretionaryrather than mandatory rules. Secondly, it asks how the exerciseof discretion in Swedish courts, as well as the legislative power to introducediscretionary procedural rules, is affected by Union law, especiallyas interpreted and developed by the CJEU. Thirdly, it asks if and howincreased elements of judicial discretion bring about a redistribution ofnormative control over the procedure before Swedish civil courts.The definition and purpose of discretion in civil procedureFor the context of civil procedure, discretionary rules are defined as rulesaddressed to the court and concerning an action to be taken (or not taken)by it, where the rule leaves the court a discretion to choose between twoor more lawful courses of action, and where the court’s choice is determinantfor the continued course of the procedure. Discretionary rulesare thereby distinguished from rules addressed to the parties (binding ornon-binding) as well as from mandatory rules for the court.The thesis distinguishes between two subcategories of discretionaryrules, which can be termed classic discretionary and interpretive discretionaryrules respectively. Rules belonging to the former category typicallystate that subject to the fulfillment of certain criteria, the court maytake (or omit) a certain action. Rules in the latter category are characterizedby broadly-framed or purposefully vague conditions which requirejudges to exercise discretion in establishing whether conditions for takinga certain action are at all fulfilled. However, whether or not a rule confersdiscretion upon the courts is not considered a matter of mere lexicalinterpretation. Thus, the definition of “discretionary rules” also includes260

rules that, albeit mandatory in language, in fact do confer a discretionaccording to the generally accepted interpretation in case law or travauxpréparatoires. As a consequence, the thesis recognises that a rule can confera stronger or a weaker discretion upon the judge, which also entailsthat the distinction between discretionary and mandatory rules should beperceived as a difference of degree rather than one of kind.The stated purpose of the legislative preference for discretion is vague.It appears that flexibility rather early on in the development acquired theposition of an aim in itself, rendering further justification of the trendunnecessary. However, two main strands of argument can be discerned.First, the travaux préparatoires claim that increased flexibility allows thecourt to deal with easy cases swiftly and allocate more time and resourcesto the most complex cases, thus using its budget in a more efficientway. There is however little evidence to suggest that the introduction ofdiscretion actually does lead to less costly or time-consuming court procedures.Secondly, a more flexible code can also, according to the travauxpréparatoires, be less burdened by detailed regulation and thereby betterstand the test of time, as it can be adapted to changing societal practiseswithout calling for legislative amendments. Less detailed rules are alsoconsidered more accessible to non-lawyers (the general public and presumptiveparties).There is little in the preparatory works to suggest that the above-mentioneddifference between classic and interpretive discretion has been thesubject of consideration on the part of the legislator. However, this distinctionhas been found to carry practical significance as the study showsthat the choice between classic and interpretive discretion is relevant forhigher courts’ ability or at least propensity to review lower courts’ exerciseof discretion. Where interpretive discretion has been conferred upon thecourts, higher courts on appeal have not hesitated to review the exerciseof discretion in lower courts and at times even substitute that court’sassessment for its own. However, the use of classic discretionary rulesseems to have given rise to a more cautious approach, where appeal courtshave often, if not entirely consistently, satisfied themselves that the lowercourts’ decisions have been within the bounds of their competence butrefrained from reviewing the actual exercise of discretion within thosebounds. This does not seem to have been intended or even anticipated bythe legislator, and consequently has not been considered in the formulationof new discretionary rules.261

trasted to mandatory rules. Its aim is to examine the (potential) tension

between the national and Union developments and if possible suggest

ways of relieving this tension.

The thesis argues that EU law influence is liable to hamper the Swedish

reforms in fulfilling their purpose and that their effect may instead be

to further the impact of substantive EU law in Swedish courts. It also

argues that the flexibility-driven reforms have structural effects on the

allocation of normative powers between Member State and Union and

between the legislative power and the judiciary, which the legislator so far

has failed to take into account. It forwards these arguments by answering

three research questions: Firstly, it asks what constitutes a discretionary

rule, how, from a linguistic point of view, such rules are framed and why

the Swedish legislator chooses to regulate civil procedure through discretionary

rather than mandatory rules. Secondly, it asks how the exercise

of discretion in Swedish courts, as well as the legislative power to introduce

discretionary procedural rules, is affected by Union law, especially

as interpreted and developed by the CJEU. Thirdly, it asks if and how

increased elements of judicial discretion bring about a redistribution of

normative control over the procedure before Swedish civil courts.

The definition and purpose of discretion in civil procedure

For the context of civil procedure, discretionary rules are defined as rules

addressed to the court and concerning an action to be taken (or not taken)

by it, where the rule leaves the court a discretion to choose between two

or more lawful courses of action, and where the court’s choice is determinant

for the continued course of the procedure. Discretionary rules

are thereby distinguished from rules addressed to the parties (binding or

non-binding) as well as from mandatory rules for the court.

The thesis distinguishes between two subcategories of discretionary

rules, which can be termed classic discretionary and interpretive discretionary

rules respectively. Rules belonging to the former category typically

state that subject to the fulfillment of certain criteria, the court may

take (or omit) a certain action. Rules in the latter category are characterized

by broadly-framed or purposefully vague conditions which require

judges to exercise discretion in establishing whether conditions for taking

a certain action are at all fulfilled. However, whether or not a rule confers

discretion upon the courts is not considered a matter of mere lexical

interpretation. Thus, the definition of “discretionary rules” also includes

260

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