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Acest fenomen e atît de pregnant astæzi, încît, încetul cu încetul, ceea ce place
mulflimii devine sinonim cu „incorect“, iar asta într-o asemenea mæsuræ încît
pînæ øi János Kis numeøte de-a dreptul „retrograde“ toate mæsurile de bunæstare
socialæ considerate „progresiste“ øi egalizatoare, pur øi simplu pentru
cæ ortodoxia economico-politicæ dominantæ obiønuieøte sæ-øi încrunte
sprîncenele cînd aude de ele.
În Ungaria de azi, elitiøtii liberali obiønuiesc sæ numeascæ orice pas înspre redistribuflia
[socialæ a bogæfliei] „pomanæ“, de parcæ consiliile ce-øi asumæ asemenea
paøi ar da „pomanæ“ din ce-i al lor, øi nu numai ar returna muncitorilor
o micæ parte din plusvaloarea produsæ de aceøtia. Aceøti paøi pot fi desigur
folositori øi lucizi sau pæguboøi øi færæ logicæ; imaginea „pomenii“ creeazæ însæ
iluzia cæ un tatæ sever, dar bun – clasa dominantæ întreflesutæ cu statul – ar
ceda revendicærilor isterice, nemæsurate øi ilegitime ale fiilor sæi risipitori øi
ale fiicelor sale risipitoare. Nici simpatia generalæ, nici lipsa ei nu sînt criterii
ale politicilor economice øi sociale corecte, dar ca democrafli ar trebui sæ
avem grijæ cînd spunem cæ majoritatea cetæflenilor republicii pot gîndi, din
principiu, numai eronat. În spiritul vechii vorbe a juriøtilor in dubio pro reo
(în cazurile îndoielnice sæ aducem o decizie favorabilæ inculpatului), eu zic:
in dubio pro plebe (în cazurile îndoielnice sæ aducem o decizie favorabilæ
mulflimilor).
Rædæcinile platonice ale elitismului liberal sînt evidente: problemele trebuie
soluflionate de specialiøti, prin argumentare raflionalæ, iar opinia poporului
(sau cum se zice azi extrem de øarmant în flara noastræ: „masei“) nu conteazæ
– ea e numai o simplæ opinie øi, ca atare, este neîntemeiatæ. Asta e
uneori adeværat, alteori nu. Simpla provenienflæ popularæ a unei viziuni nu
e încæ un argument împotriva ei, mai e nevoie øi de altele. Ca-ntotdeauna,
vederile elitiste dominante astæzi (la noi masiv iozefist-luministe, respectiv
cu un iz de despotism luminat) au caracter de modæ øi sînt conformiste.
Acum patruzeci, cincizeci de ani mai domnea încæ ortodoxia keynesianæ;
lacunele comerciale øi bugetare, datoriile de stat øi inflaflia nu erau considerate
ca fiind atît de grave ca azi, øi dacæ cineva s-ar fi îngrijorat din acest motiv,
se spunea cæ progresul tehnologic, cererea extinsæ øi creøterile de populaflie
vor rezolva, pe termen lung, aceste probleme, iar dacæ nu, in the long run
we’re all dead, cum zicea Keynes, pe termen lung sîntem morfli cu toflii. Reglarea
anticiclicæ a cererii (extinderea cererii) aratæ ca fiind corectæ sau incorectæ
în funcflie de convingerile ce dominæ pe moment în „cercurile de
influenflæ“ – la asta se adæugæ ulterior „argumentele raflionale“.
În comparaflie cu elitismul, populismul (de la noi øi din alte flæri est-europene)
nu e adeværat, nici credibil, nici autentic. Guvernul actual e pentru micøorarea
impozitelor, antibirocratic øi împotriva politicii de partid (criticînd „ræzboiul
de destabilizare“ dus de opoziflie) – împotriva acestei politici, opoziflia,
etichetatæ drept „populistæ“, propune ca soluflii micøorarea impozitelor,
scæderea numærului funcflionarilor øi spune adio „politicilor exclusive de partid“
øi reproøeazæ „ræzboiul de destabilizare“ dus de adversar, care distruge
„unitatea naflionalæ“. Dreapta „populistæ“ est-europeanæ nu e populistæ, deøi
– la fel ca adversarul ei – ea doreøte sæ cîøtige simpatia alegætorilor prin tot
felul de gæselnifle propagandistice. Reprezentanflii marelui capital au decis cæ
trebuie redus efectivul lucrætorilor publici øi al funcflionarilor, aøa cæ toate partidele
s-au apucat sæ se îngrefloøeze de birocraflia de pe urma cærora træiesc.
Totu-i o glumæ proastæ.
Cu toate astea, rædæcina acestui elitism liberal færæ niciun duøman real e convingerea
extrem de simplæ cæ schimbærile istorice ale naturii umane pot fi
Liberal elitists in Hungary today have a habit of terming all re-distributive
measures “handouts”, as if governments undertaking such measures would
“hand out” their own goods and not just give part of the surplus value produced
by laborers back to the people. These measures might obviously be
feasible and rational, or unfeasible and irrational; nevertheless, the concept
of “handout” as such makes things look as if the severe but benign father
(the ruling class closely bound to the state) were making concessions to the
unjustified, even measureless and hysterical demands of the prodigal sons
(and daughters). “Popularity” and “unpopularity” are not criteria of proper
economic and social politics; nevertheless, as democrats we refrain from saying
that the majority of the citizens of the republic can only be wrong. In the
spirit of the old saying: in dubio pro reo (to decide in favor of the accused in
ambiguous cases) I’d say, in dubio pro plebe (to decide in favor of the people
in ambiguous cases).
The Platonic roots of liberal elitism are obvious: matters need to be settled
through rational reasoning by professionals; the opinion of the people
(or the “mob” as it is nowadays fashionable to say in Hungary) does not matter
– being mere opinion and as such completely unfounded. This might apply at
times, but not always. The popular origin of certain views is not a valid argument
against them – further arguments are needed. Ruling elitist views on the
other hand (in Hungary with Josephinist, enlightened imperialist touches) are
– as always – fashionable and conformist. Forty or fifty years ago the ruling
views were those of Keynesian orthodoxy, under which commercial and state
budget deficits, state debt, and inflation were not considered as dramatic as
they are today, and the worrying ones were told that technical development,
increasing demand and growing population would fix the problem in the long
run, or if not, in the long run we’re all dead, Keynes used to say. The anti-cyclical
regulation of demand (extension of demand) seems to be appropriate
or inappropriate, depending on the ruling view among “influential circles”
– “rational arguments” are subsequently added to these views.
Unlike elitism, Hungarian (and other East European) forms of populism are not
authentic. Against the tax-reducing, anti-bureaucratic, and anti-party policy
of the government (directed against the “subversive activities” of the opposition),
the opposition, labeled “populist”, recommends the remedy of tax
reduction, a staff cut-back in public offices, a farewell to “party policy”,
resenting the “subversive activities” of the adversary because they “divide”
the nation. The “populist” right wing in Eastern Europe is actually not populist,
although – alike its adversary – it tries to win the graces of the electorate
through all kinds of rhetorical means. The representatives of high finance
declared the number of public servants and public officers needs to be
reduced; consequently parties started hating the bureaucracy that supports
them. It is a bad joke.
Nevertheless, the genuine origins of liberal elitism that has no real adversary
– and this is related to the simplified and slightly discolored Platonic heritage
– is rooted in the extremely simple conviction that the historical changes of
human nature can be disregarded, and thus it is possible to decide outside
the historical-social context what is rational and what is not. The least problem
with this is that it puts into brackets the development, which begins
with Kant, of the philosophy of history and of the human and social sciences,
as well as the entire sociology and anthropology.
Rational decisions are thus decisions on market optimums, the silent condition
to which is that state intervention not reduce profit among given limits in
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