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verso: revoluflii în oglindæ (mirroring revolutions)
turi orizontale“. Comuniøtii øi anticomuniøtii cæzuseræ de acord cæ direcfliunea
fabricilor trebuie preluatæ de organisme autodirijate. A început lupta pentru
putere în cadrul producfliei.
În cea de a doua jumætate a lui 1981 devenise clar: conducerea comunistæ
trebuie sæ aleagæ. Fie semneazæ încæ o înflelegere cu Solidaritatea, al cærei
obiect ar fi deja împærflirea puterii, fie restaureazæ cu forfla situaflia dinainte
de august 1980. Comuniøtii n-au avut nici curajul, nici imaginaflia de a oferi
un nou pact adversarului lor. Dar n-au mai fost în stare nici sæ fie vioara întîi
în restaurarea ordinii. Pe 13 decembrie, secretarul general Jaruzelski, care
era øi prim-ministru, executase un puci împotriva lui însuøi, cedînd puterea
absolutæ juntei conduse de nimeni altcineva decît de el. Militanflii Solidaritæflii
furæ arestafli cu miile. Uzina navalæ din Gdańsk a fost îngenuncheatæ cu tancuri.
Rafale de tir continuu uciseræ greviøtii de la mina Wujek.
Solidaritatea a pierdut aceastæ bætælie. A trebuit sæ treacæ în ilegalitate.
Ea n-a putut fi însæ anihilatæ. Ani buni dupæ decretarea stærii de asediu, ea
mai avea încæ peste o sutæ de mii de membri cotizanfli. Ziarele øi manifestele
ei circulau într-un tiraj de zeci de mii de exemplare. Solidaritatea mai era
încæ în stare sæ organizeze demonstraflii øi greve de masæ – øi, de asemenea,
sæ stopeze acfliuni de revoltæ. Jaruzelski a trebuit sæ recunoascæ: nu poate
descalifica rezistenfla færæ reforme politice øi economice. În 1987 a decis sæ
riøte. A supus unui referendum popular programul sæu de reforme. Solidaritatea
øi-a sfætuit adepflii sæ voteze „nu!“. Referendumul a eøuat. N-a mai
încæput nicio îndoialæ despre ce s-ar întîmpla dacæ miøcarea de
rezistenflæ ar cere adepflilor ei sæ boicoteze urmætoarele alegeri
pentru locurile din Seim. Pentru a evita înfrîngerea totalæ, Jaruzelski
a decis sæ revinæ la masa tratativelor.
La acea datæ, în fruntea Partidului Comunist al Uniunii Sovietice
era deja Gorbaciov. Perestroika, marea încercare de a scoate
Uniunea Sovieticæ din criza în care intrase, era deja începutæ. Trebuie reamintit
cæ aceastæ crizæ nu s-a datorat numai agoniei interne a imperiului
(spafliul dintre graniflele statului sovietic). Imperiul din afaræ (flærile dependente
de URSS) a ajuns, la rîndul sæu, sæ poatæ fi controlat tot mai anevoie. Polonia
arætase cæ o miøcare de rezistenflæ, capabilæ oricînd sæ mobilizeze mase
de oameni, era posibilæ. Cehoslovacia, Ungaria øi RDG-ul au demonstrat,
la rîndul lor, cæ potenflialul disident e de gæsit øi în alte pærfli. Gorbaciov a înfleles
cæ trebuie sæ cedeze. Acesta e meritul sæu istoric. Oricum, a trebuit sæ cedeze.
La nouæ ani dupæ „august“, a luat naøtere øi cel de-al doilea acord, care la
doar un an dupæ evenimentele din 1980 fusese încæ imposibil. Acest al doilea
acord a fæcut ireversibilæ demantelarea regimului de partid-stat. Solidaritatea
a cîøtigat ræzboiul.
Toate semnele aratæ însæ cæ a pierdut, în schimb, pacea.
„Sindicatul independent, autodirijat“ pornise ca o miøcare îmbræfliøînd întreaga
societate. În schimb, dupæ 1989, el s-a descompus în partide aflate în
concurenflæ. El promisese cæ fiecare individ øi grup va fi protejat de comunitatea
socialæ autonomæ, pentru a nu mai fi expus consecinflelor defavorizante
ale deciziilor de stat. Dupæ 1989, guvernul Solidaritæflii a trebuit sæ execute
una dintre cele mai dureroase operafliuni de stabilizare economicæ ale istoriei.
Majoritatea conducætorilor øi membrilor Solidaritæflii visaseræ la o lume
în care ordinea producfliei øi a redistribuirii [bogæfliei sociale] se bazeazæ pe
asocierea liberæ a unor unitæfli autonome – dupæ 1989, guvernul Solidaritæflii
a trebuit sæ înceapæ trecerea la o economie de piaflæ capitalistæ. Ce s-a întîmplat
cu idealurile Solidaritæflii?
Communists and anti-communists agreed independent entities had to take
over the leadership of enterprises. The fight for workplace power began.
By the second half of 1981, the communist leadership was clearly facing
a choice. They could sign a second agreement with the Solidarity, this time
on sharing political power, or restore by force the state of affairs that had
reigned before August 1980. Polish communists had neither the wits nor
the guts to offer their opponent a new deal. Nevertheless they were also incapable
of reinforcing the old order by themselves. On the 13th of December,
General Secretary and Prime Minister Jaruzelski performed a self-directed
coup d’État, passing the power to the junta he had led. Thousands of Solidarity
activists were arrested. Tanks broke into the Gdan’sk shipyard. The strikers
in Wujek mines ended up as victims of line-firings.
The Solidarity had lost the battle. It had to go underground.
Yet they could not destroy it. Years after the state of war set-in, the Solidarity
still gathered over a hundred thousand active members. Its newspapers and
pamphlets circulated by the tens of thousands of copies. It had the power to
initiate public demonstrations and strikes – but also to stop them if needed.
Jaruzelski had to acknowledge that without thorough economic and political
reforms, he was helpless in the face of the resistance. In 1987 he decided to
take the risk. He issued a reform program and organized a referendum.
The Solidarity told people to vote negatively, and the referendum failed.
There were no doubts about the outcome of the Solidarity’s eventual call for a
boycott of the next parliamentary elections. To avoid the blow,
Jaruzelski returned to the path of negotiations.
By this time, Gorbachev was leader of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. The perestroika, the great Soviet attempt
at surviving the crisis, was in full bloom. The crisis was due to
more than the agony of the inner empire (the area within the
borders of the Soviet state); the outer empire (dependant countries) was also
becoming increasingly difficult to control. Poland had demonstrated that gathering
massive opposition was not impossible in the region. Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and the GDR also showed signs of oppositionist potential. Gorbachev
understood he had to give in. This is his historical merit. Yet, he had to give in.
Nine years after August 1980, the second agreement – the one aborted in ’81
and the one that triggered the decay of the communist regime – was reached.
The Solidarity had won the war.
All the same, it had apparently simultaneously lost peace.
The “independent, self-governing trade union” emerged as a genuine social
movement, but after 1989, fragmented into a host of competing parties.
It promised, as a self-organized social community, to protect each group and
individual against the negative effects of state measures; nevertheless, after
1989 its own government performed one of the most painful operations of
economic stabilization in history. Its leaders and the majority of its members
dreamed of a system wherein the order of production and redistribution
[of social wealth] were built upon the free association of self-managing units;
yet, after 1989 its own government initiated the shift towards a capitalist market
economy. What had happened to the ideals of the Solidarity?
There are two possible answers to this question. According to the first, the
said ideals are still valid, but under the circumstances – the pressure of the
international capitalist environment – the movement could not sustain them.
Thus, another historical chance for overcoming the so-called false opposition
between private capitalism and state socialism was lost.
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