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Anais do IHC'2001 - Departamento de Informática e Estatística - UFSC

Anais do IHC'2001 - Departamento de Informática e Estatística - UFSC

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<strong>Anais</strong> <strong>do</strong> IHC’2001 - IV Workshop sobre Fatores Humanos em Sistemas Computacionais 233<br />

3. what type of mouse interaction protocol to implement to direct learners attention<br />

towards the essential aspects of a concept.” [Sedig et al., 2001, p. 55].<br />

The next section will advance some steps in the direction of answering the above<br />

questions, resorting to a semiotic analysis of the ST interface.<br />

A Semiotic Account of the Super Tangrams’ Interface<br />

The primary theoretical reference of this analysis will be a number of sign classifications<br />

proposed by Peirce [Peirce, 1931-58]. Consolidated accounts of the main aspects of<br />

Peircean Semiotics [Nöth, 1998; Danesi & Perron, 1999] have been used to organize our<br />

analysis and to lead us more effectively to some interesting conclusions.<br />

HCI literature <strong>do</strong>es not provi<strong>de</strong> as many instances of sound semiotic accounts as the<br />

generalized use of such words as icons, indices and symbols would lead us to believe. In<br />

contemporary Semiotics, these terms have technical meanings that originate from one of<br />

the numerous dimensions of sign classifications proposed by Peirce, namely that which<br />

relates different possibilities of representations (representamina) to three universal<br />

phenomenological categories (firstness, secondness, and thirdness). Peirce proposed that<br />

these radical categories could be used to organize all human experience in the world.<br />

Firstness is the category of immediate perception that seizes the presence of phenomena,<br />

but <strong>do</strong>es not relate them to anything else. An example of firstness is the perceptual quality<br />

of redness that emanates from whatever is red. Secondness is the category of association<br />

between two phenomena. Examples of secondness are the (causal) association between rain<br />

and wetness and the (contiguity) association between roads and vehicles. Thirdness is the<br />

category of chained associations, among three or more different phenomena. An example<br />

of thirdness is the (inferential) association that binds the proverbial mortality of Socrates<br />

with his being human and with humans being mortal, found in most introductory lessons to<br />

<strong>de</strong>ductive reasoning. However, thirdness may occur in non-syllogistic chains of<br />

associations such as is the case with the relation between cars, roads and traveling, for<br />

example.<br />

Before we proceed with semiotic <strong>de</strong>finitions, we should go back to our theme and examine<br />

DCM and RDCM interfaces as implemented in ST. We are led to conjecture that<br />

appropriate visual representations of <strong>do</strong>main concepts should typically figure in<br />

associations that fall in the category of thirdness (or, for the sake of simplification,<br />

argumental chains of association). Should they fail to <strong>do</strong> so, and yield only associations of<br />

secondness (or, once again for the sake of simplification, mere relatedness), the progressive<br />

path from visual to algebraic concept formulations would be impossible to achieve. The<br />

lack of correspon<strong>de</strong>nce between a pair of phenomena (say the current location of a polygon<br />

and a given trajectory of the mouse on screen) and a third one (in this case the length and<br />

direction of a vector originating in the polygon) is precisely what has been reported to be<br />

missing in the learning of children who used the DOM interface.<br />

The three Peircean categories have been used in their day to build a complex philosophical<br />

framework, within which Peirce investigated even the most basic principles of scientific<br />

discovery. Therefore, applying them to the analysis of signs present in different stages of<br />

cognitive or epistemic evolution is not an original en<strong>de</strong>avor. It leads us to interesting<br />

realizations about the history of scientific knowledge, as in the case of Men<strong>de</strong>l’s findings<br />

about the principles of heredity [Dennet, 1995]. The path that led Men<strong>de</strong>l from his

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