Sergio Amadeu da Silveira - Cidadania e Redes Digitais

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c i t i z e n s h i p a n d d i g i t a l n e t w o r k s
relationships of mutual reinforcement or mutual dependence. We can distinguish
the relationships between positive forms — based on collaboration and oriented to
mutual benefit — or negative ones — parasitism or depredation. These relationships
have a fundamental role in the creation of new digital species that are spreading the
center of power, taking the system back to the citizen. In order for this positive dynamics
to be passed on, a digital ecosystem must develop an infrastructure oriented
to services that are public resources. In this sense, a digital ecosystem is defined as
a digital self-organizing structure oriented to the creation of a digital environment
distributed in a network. It is characterized by a series of elements: shared knowledge,
open technologies, standards and protocols, solidarity cooperation and new
business models.
The implementation of such digital environment has the structure of procommons,
which Benkler defines as institutional spaces in which one can exercise a certain
degree of freedom regarding the restrictions imposed by the markets. These
restrictions appear, frequently, as property relationships, which define who has control
over which resources, and what the relationships between agents due to the
possession or lack of a determined asset or resource are. This does not mean that the
common assets are anarchic spaces, but that agents can perform thereon with a different
logic than that of the market, avoiding the paradoxes produced in the Theory
of Games when an agent seeks the maximization of the utility expected of their
decisions. In other words, that is what happens when one performs in strategic environments,
wherein various agents perform in a manner in which the decisions of one
of them depend on the decisions of the others, following the rules of the parametric
environments, those wherein the world and the set of possibilities already given are
not modifiable by the decisions of other subjects 3 . The use of the common assets can
3. An example based on the model of the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) can by enlightening.
It is a cattle-raising community wherein the pastures and water are commons, in which each owner
shall desire to increment their personal benefit by increasing their cattle, maximizing their gains, and
therefore, their profit. But if all others do the same, the commons (pastures and water) will wear out,
and all cattle raisers of the community will end in misery. Without agreeing with the conclusions
extracted by Hardin from this mental experience, it is important to notice that the sum of individual
benefits does not automatically lead to a collective benefit. In this case, the appearance of the rules for
an individual (parametric) rationality converts this strategy into an absolutely illogical and counterproductive
action from the collective (strategic) point of view. From this latter perspective, one gets
a greater benefit when cooperating and when the personal benefit is restricted. This problem demonstrates
the failure of the egoistical strategies in face of the cooperative strategies under certain circum-
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