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mento humano com relação ao oportunismo, é previsto por MOSCHANDREAS (idem, p.
42), à semelhança do que Dugger argumentou de forma mais geral (vide o tópico anterior
desta seção):
Recognizing, [...] that not all individuals are inclined to act opportunistically all of
the time implies that other motives may be significant, at least for some individuals
and for some of the time, raises serious doubts regarding the efficiency of internal
systems built on the assumption of universal opportunism. Such systems
incorporate auditing, monitoring, and the adoption of administrative lines of
authority and subordination that may have serious adverse effects on the work
'atmosphere', encouraging perfunctory, rather than cooperative, behavior. More
seriously, perhaps, the lack of trust and confidence associated with the expectation
of opportunism may actually encourage individuals to behave in the postulated
opportunistic fashion. 183
Pela segunda via, Moschandreas argumenta que a ubiqüidade do oportunismo
alegada por Williamson é quebrada dentro da TCT, fragilizando sua consistência. Isso
porque seria de se esperar sua utilização de forma simétrica, ou seja, que estivesse presente
em todos os agentes relevantes tratados no modelo, e isso não é feito. Tal assimetria está
expressa em duas hipóteses (idem, p. 49): "the implicit assumption that top officers will not
behave opportunistically toward their subordinates although the same officers may or may
not be expected to behave opportunistically toward their shareholders. [...] [And] the
explicit [...] assumption that top officers running large M-forms will strive to profit
183 JACOBY (1990, p. 334) reforça tal argumento: "It [the presumption of innate
opportunism] leads to a proliferation of control structures - supervision, rules, and deferred rewards
- intended to inhibit opportunism. These create resentment and distrust among employees, who
correctly perceive the controls as expressions of their employer's distrust. Expectations fulfil
themselves when worker resentment breeds opportunism and the employer is forced to implement
additional controls, now with the conviction that his initial beliefs were justified." HODGSON
(1988, p. 210-1) também insiste neste ponto: "Even a hierarchical and non-participatory firm
involves a measure of trust between its agents [...]. If trust and cooperation are functional to the
efficiency of the firm, then a form of organization or regime in which they were promoted could
well be superior in terms of performance. Whilst all firms embody trust and loyalty in some
measure, firms which promote these attributes to a greater degree are more likely to be efficient
[...]. The firm, by engendering loyalty and trust to some degree, encourages people to act
differently. Without this ability to generate more cohesive and less atomistic behaviour the firm
would not be able to function [...]. No recognition is made (by Williamson) of the effect of the
institutional environment in moulding actions and beliefs [...]. It is not being suggested that
capitalist or other firms are institutions of benevolence and philanthropy - far from it. What is being
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