ANDREA SCHIMMENTI - Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia ...

ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to understand Donald Davidson’s thesis about
the place of mental in a physicalistic conception of the world.
Davidson’s concept of mental, that is part of an explanatory theory of
ordinary life and intentional action, criticizes reductionistic tradition.
According to Davidson, causal efficacy of mental events in physical world,
and autonomy of these events from natural laws, are not necessarily
contradictory ideas. In this sense, Davidson thinks that efficacy of thinking
and intention in material world can be reconciled with freedom of reason
from natural laws. It is possible to sustain the idea of mental causality
without defending reductionism, for causal efficacy of mental does not
need to be supported by strict laws, or identities between types or mental
and physical proprieties.
Davidson’s idea about mental was defined by some philosophers as a
dualistic concept, for considering that irreducibility of intentionality to
natural laws makes the mental into an autonomous dominion. Others think
that Davidson’s idea of mental leads to epiphenomenalism or
eliminativism, for characterizing mental as causally inefficacious in
physical world.
Davidson´s important contribution was his refined try to develop a
holistic theory of mind and action, to support our understanding of relation
between our beliefs, desires, intentions, and our actions. In this sense, his
work showed that causality cannot be excluded from set of concept that
we use to offer descriptions and explanations of relation between our
mental states and our actions.
Keywords: mind, naturalism, physicalism, causality, reductionism.