Jaarboek no. 89. 2010/2011 - Koninklijke Maatschappij voor ...
Jaarboek no. 89. 2010/2011 - Koninklijke Maatschappij voor ...
Jaarboek no. 89. 2010/2011 - Koninklijke Maatschappij voor ...
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games <strong>no</strong>t only nicely demonstrates the <strong>no</strong>nlocal<br />
behavior of quantum mechanics, but it also suggests<br />
concrete experiments that enable to ΄prove΄<br />
the <strong>no</strong>nlocal behavior of Nature.<br />
Quantum Cryptography<br />
The aim of quantum cryptography is to make use of<br />
the quantum mechanical behavior of Nature for the<br />
design of cryptographic schemes. The most wellk<strong>no</strong>wn<br />
example is quantum key distribution (QKD).<br />
QKD enables two parties, Alice and Bob, who do <strong>no</strong>t<br />
share any secret information, to agree on a secret<br />
key K, such that an eavesdropper Eve, who can listen<br />
into the whole conversation, learns (nearly)<br />
<strong>no</strong> information on K. The secret key K can then for<br />
instance be used as an encryption key to encrypt a<br />
message that Alice wants to securely communicate<br />
to Bob. Without quantum mechanics, the above task<br />
of key distribution is k<strong>no</strong>wn to be impossible, unless<br />
Eve’s capabilities are restricted (like her computing<br />
power). QKD works as follows. Alice chooses two<br />
sequences x1,...,xn and θ1,...,θn of random bits. For<br />
every i, she then prepares a qubit in state Hθi |xi> (i.e.<br />
|xi> if θi=0 and H θi |xi> if θi=1) and sends that qubit to<br />
Figure 4<br />
The BB84 quantum key distribution scheme.<br />
Natuurkundige <strong>voor</strong>drachten I Nieuwe reeks 89<br />
Quantum Information<br />
Bob. Bob chooses a sequence θi’,...,θn’ of random bits<br />
and measures (for every i) the i-th qubit in the computational<br />
basis if θi’=0 and in the Hadamard basis<br />
if θi’=1. Let x1’,...,xn’ be the resulting bits that Bob<br />
observes. From the elementary properties of the<br />
computational and Hadamard bases, as discussed<br />
earlier, it follows that xi=xi’ whenever θi=θi’ (and xi<br />
and xi’ are independent otherwise). Furthermore,<br />
the intuition is that if Eve tries to gain information<br />
on xi by measuring H θ i | x i> (when it is communicated<br />
to Bob), then, because she does <strong>no</strong>t k<strong>no</strong>w θi, it<br />
is likely that she uses the wrong basis and that way<br />
destroys information on xi; this may then be <strong>no</strong>ticed<br />
by Bob (in case θi=θi’). The scheme proceeds as follows.<br />
Alice and Bob exchange their choices of θ1,...,θn<br />
and θ1’,...,θn’, and they dismiss all positions i with<br />
θi≈θi’. Therefore, for all the remaining i-s, xi is supposed<br />
to coincide with xi’ (but may <strong>no</strong>t be so due to<br />
interference by Eve). Next, Alice and Bob exchange<br />
xi and xi’ for a random subset of the i-s, and verify<br />
that xi=xi ’ for these i-s. If there are too many errors,<br />
then Alice and Bob conclude that an eavesdropper<br />
Eve has been interfering with the communicated<br />
qubits, and they abort. Otherwise, they conclude<br />
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