Tjaart Jurgens Maré Doctor Legum Universiteit van die Vrystaat

Tjaart Jurgens Maré Doctor Legum Universiteit van die Vrystaat Tjaart Jurgens Maré Doctor Legum Universiteit van die Vrystaat

etd.uovs.ac.za
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Hoofstuk 2 DIE ONTWIKKELING VAN DIE BEGRIP “ADMINISTRATIEWE GEREGTIGHEID” IN DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG, MET VERWYSING NA DIE NUWE KONSTITUSIONELE BEDELING 1. ADMINISTRATIEWE GEREGTIGHEID In Hoofstuk 2 word daar eerstens stilgestaan by die ontwikkeling van die begrip administratiewe geregtigheid aan die hand van die vroeë Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, met ander woorde, die reg voor die inwerkingtreding van die Interim-Grondwet. Tweedens word gekyk na die begrip “administratiewe geregtigheid” met spesifieke verwysing na die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling. In aansluiting by Hoofstuk 1, kan daar veral verwys word na wat Rubenfield in ʼn artikel “Freedom and Time” 92 sê : 92 Rubenfield, 1998:291-311. 93 Derrida, 1994:54. “We can never govern ourselves here and now, by our present voice. Past and future are always present in this voice, tearing apart its immediacy, rendering impossible even in principle, even as regulative ideal, the conception of self-government as government by our present will. Firstly, who are we - we who are to govern ourselves through a democratic process of will-formation? This we cannot announce itself, not in its own present voice, because a prior determination of its boundaries, its rules of inclusion and exclusion, is necessary to identify an expression of its will as an expression of its will. Selfgovernment requires the determination of this we to have already inscribed itself into the governing institutions of a going polity. This we will have been the product of a history, a constitutional struggle, a struggle for law - usually at the cost of considerable blood and fortune. (All this would be as true for a world government as it is for nationstates). We who are to govern ourselves cannot define ourselves in the here and now, we must inherit our identity. To be who we are, therefore, we must be governed by the past. This is the significance of Derrida’s statement that ‘the being of what we are is first of all inheritance, whether we like it or know it or not’.” 93 45

2. DIE ONTWIKKELING VAN DIE BEGRIP “ADMINISTRATIEWE GEREGTIGHEID” IN DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG Om die ontwikkeling van administratiewe geregtigheid teen die agtergrond van die Suid- Afrikaanse Reg beter te kan verstaan, is dit onvermydelik om nie vir ʼn wyle stil te staan by die gemenereg nie. 2.1 GEMENEREG 94 Van der Merwe, 1992:730. 95 Russell, 1996:122. Van der Merwe maak die volgende opmerking : “Die gebrekkige bronnemodel is nie die volle verhaal nie. Wat ontbreek is die vestiging van ʼn breër regsteoretiese model aan die hand waarvan die gemenereg en die gepaard gaande gemenereg vinding na die aard daarvan gepeil kan word. Wat is dit wat nagevolg word wanneer verklaar word, ʼn studie van die gemenereg gaan onderneem word? Hoe verwerf die navorser kennis omtrent dit waaruit die gemenereg bestaan? Eers wanneer hierdie vrae aangespreek is, kan die gesagswaarde van die onderskeie kenbronne van die gemenereg en die geldigheid van regsvindingsmetodes ten aansien van die gemenereg na behore geskat word.” 94 Daar word groot gewag gemaak dat ons die trotse erfgename is van die Europese romanistiese regstradisie, wat deur Engelsregtelike persepsie en “modifications” (in die “growth of every living system of law” onafwendbaar) tot gemenereg omvorm is. In sy boek skryf Bertrand Russell95 die volgende oor Plato : “It has always been correct to praise Plato, but not to understand him. This is the common fate of great men”. Dit wil voorkom ook die lot van die Suid-Afrikaanse gemenereg te wees. Wetgewing en regspraak moet egter as bronne benut word. Die kundige regsbeoefenaar moet vertroud wees met die vaardighede wat wetsuitleg en die toepassing van die presedentestelsel verg. Wanneer die regsbeoefenaar die gemeneregbronne toepas, veroorloof die persoon hom/haarself meer as net ʼn tikkie intellektuele permissiwiteit en vertoon die resultaat van die bronnebenutting meermale een of meer van die gebreke wat ʼn regsgeleerde so hard probeer om uit sy/haar denkmondering te weer : selektiewe bepaling van gesagswaarde, oppervlakkigheid, denkspronge en ʼn gebrek aan konsekwentheid. Regsgeleerdes het na meer as ʼn anderhalfeeu van gerapporteerde regspraak en amper ʼn eeu van inheemse akademiese regsbeoefening in Suid-Afrika, steeds nie ʼn teoretiese bronnemodel vir die gemenereg ontwikkel nie. Hierdie teoretiese 46

Hoofstuk 2<br />

DIE ONTWIKKELING VAN DIE BEGRIP “ADMINISTRATIEWE<br />

GEREGTIGHEID” IN DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG, MET<br />

VERWYSING NA DIE NUWE KONSTITUSIONELE BEDELING<br />

1. ADMINISTRATIEWE GEREGTIGHEID<br />

In Hoofstuk 2 word daar eerstens stilgestaan by <strong>die</strong> ontwikkeling <strong>van</strong> <strong>die</strong> begrip<br />

administratiewe geregtigheid aan <strong>die</strong> hand <strong>van</strong> <strong>die</strong> vroeë Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, met ander<br />

woorde, <strong>die</strong> reg voor <strong>die</strong> inwerkingtreding <strong>van</strong> <strong>die</strong> Interim-Grondwet.<br />

Tweedens word gekyk na <strong>die</strong> begrip “administratiewe geregtigheid” met spesifieke<br />

verwysing na <strong>die</strong> nuwe konstitusionele bedeling.<br />

In aansluiting by Hoofstuk 1, kan daar veral verwys word na wat Rubenfield in ʼn artikel<br />

“Freedom and Time” 92 sê :<br />

92 Rubenfield, 1998:291-311.<br />

93 Derrida, 1994:54.<br />

“We can never govern ourselves here and now, by our present voice. Past and future<br />

are always present in this voice, tearing apart its immediacy, rendering impossible<br />

even in principle, even as regulative ideal, the conception of self-government as<br />

government by our present will.<br />

Firstly, who are we - we who are to govern ourselves through a democratic process of<br />

will-formation? This we cannot announce itself, not in its own present voice, because<br />

a prior determination of its boundaries, its rules of inclusion and exclusion, is<br />

necessary to identify an expression of its will as an expression of its will. Selfgovernment<br />

requires the determination of this we to have already inscribed itself into<br />

the governing institutions of a going polity. This we will have been the product of a<br />

history, a constitutional struggle, a struggle for law - usually at the cost of considerable<br />

blood and fortune. (All this would be as true for a world government as it is for nationstates).<br />

We who are to govern ourselves cannot define ourselves in the here and<br />

now, we must inherit our identity. To be who we are, therefore, we must be governed<br />

by the past. This is the significance of Derrida’s statement that ‘the being of what we<br />

are is first of all inheritance, whether we like it or know it or not’.” 93<br />

45

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