Tjaart Jurgens Maré Doctor Legum Universiteit van die Vrystaat

941 Currie en Klaaren, 2001:174.
462
Geen regstreekse verwysing na administratiewe optrede wat vaag en verwarrend is,
word in PAJA gemaak nie. Die hersiening van sulke optrede sal stellig ook gedek
word deur die algemene hersieningsbevoegheid, wat in Subartikel 2(i) van PAJA
verleen word. Dit wil ook voorkom of hierdie bepaling daarvoor voorsiening kan
maak, dat howe nuwe hersieningsgronde kan ontwikkel.
Dit blyk dat die wetgewer se doel vir die insluiting van die spesifieke “sambreel”klousule
was om hersieningsgronde wat per abuis uitgelaat was, te dek, of om howe
toe te laat om nuwe hersieningsgronde daar te stel.
Currie en Klaaren 941 is die volgende opinie toegedaan :
“Our submission is that, on a purposive interpretation, section 6(2)(i) has
to be interpreted as part of an act with the purpose of giving effect to the
rights in Section 33 of the Constitution, and not to the Constitution in
general. The Section 33 rights permit review of administrative action on
grounds of lawfulness, procedural fairness and reasonableness. They do
not exhaust the possibilities of a constitutional challenge to administrative
action. Administrative action could violate any of the other provisions of
the Bill of Rights, for example, legislation giving effect to Section 33
should not overreach itself and seek to control (and, through procedural
provisions such as Section 7(1) to limit) any constitutional challenge to
administrative action. The AJA provides statutory causes of action
substituting for direct constitutional challenges within the scope of
application of the right to administrative justice”.
Daar sal waarskynlik lank bespiegel word wat die eintlike verdienste vir die
daarstelling van Artikel 6(2)(i) sou wees.