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Tjaart Jurgens Maré Doctor Legum Universiteit van die Vrystaat

Tjaart Jurgens Maré Doctor Legum Universiteit van die Vrystaat

Tjaart Jurgens Maré Doctor Legum Universiteit van die Vrystaat

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Baxter maak in sy werk "Administrative Law" <strong>die</strong> stelling dat <strong>die</strong> omwentelinge ʼn<br />

<strong>die</strong>pgaande invloed op <strong>die</strong> Engelse Administratiefreg op drie terreine gehad het. Hy sê -<br />

“1. First, the basis for judicial review of administrative action was finally clarified.<br />

With the abolition of Star Chamber, the Kings Bench was able to ‘step into the<br />

breach’ as general supervisor of administrative authorities. Parliament had,<br />

however, established its political supremacy over the crown, and its unrivalled<br />

sovereignty was an inevitable result of the constitutional contest. The<br />

common-law judges, whose allegiance lay with Parliament, had therefore to<br />

limit the rationale of judicial review. They could no longer speak of<br />

‘controlling’ Acts of Parliament. Instead they had to justify their interference<br />

by referring to the will of Parliament : by reviewing administrative action, they<br />

asserted, they were simply ensuring that the will of Parliament had been<br />

carried out, no less and no more. This remains the rationale for judicial<br />

review to the present day, both in England and in South Africa. It is both the<br />

strength and the weakness of judicial review, the courts are able to claim the<br />

backing of Parliament in their orders, yet in applying the law they are tied to<br />

construction of so-called ‘parliamentary intent’ and they have no business<br />

imposing other standards upon the administration.<br />

2. Secondly, a process was set in motion whereby ministers of the Crown<br />

became answerable to Parliament. In substance, if not in form, the crown had<br />

become the agent of Parliament. For as long as Parliament retained its<br />

political superiority over the executive, this convention of ministerial<br />

responsibility remained an important method of controlling the policies<br />

formulated and applied by the executive, and of the merits of discretionary<br />

administrative action. It had the effect of complementing judicial supervision,<br />

and it encouraged judges to restrict the scope of judicial review.<br />

3. Thirdly, English lawyers developed a deep suspicion for the concept of<br />

special administrative courts. The Stuart claims of divine right and to<br />

‘inherent’ prerogative powers had been defeated and all manifestations of<br />

these pretensions were eliminated. It has been suggested that ‘the<br />

destruction of the royal bureaucracy in 1640-1 can be regarded as the most<br />

decisive single event in the whole of British history’ 58 . Any prospect of a<br />

specialist jurisdiction developing within the administration was scotched and<br />

the sanctity of the courts of general jurisdiction was guaranteed. Hostility to<br />

special administrative tribunals and courts led Dicey to place the ‘ordinary’<br />

courts of law at the centre of his formulation of the Rule of Law, and his<br />

condemnation of systems of administrative courts had a profound effect upon<br />

58 Hill, 1967:76 aangehaal in Kahn-Freund 1979.<br />

28

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