Tjaart Jurgens Maré Doctor Legum Universiteit van die Vrystaat

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gelaat vir sogenaamde “simple justice between man and man” 416 , maar die houding
van ons howe was deurgaans tot dusver dat ʼn ooreenkoms nie aanvegbaar is bloot
op grond van onbillikheid wat dit vir een van die partye mag inhou nie. 417
Daar is ook vroeër in hierdie proefskrif verwys na die stryd wat die billikheidsbegrip
moes voer om ʼn onafhanklike bestaansreg in die administratiefreg as
hersieningsgrond te kan verkry.
In sommige uitsprake voor 1988 is aanvaar dat aansprake op die nakoming van
verpligtings “which would cause some great inequity and would amount to
unconscionable conduct” met die exceptio doli generalis afgeweer kan word. Dit is
egter altyd beklemtoon dat die exceptio nie ingespan kan word bloot op grond van
onbillikheid op sigself nie. 418
In die uitspraak in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Limited v De Ornelas419 bevind
die Hoogste Hof van Appèl dat die exceptio doli generalis nie deel gevorm het van
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg nie. Die kroon is gespan toe die meerderheid van die hof
te kenne gegee het dat ons howe op die huidige stand van sake van die reg nie
bevoeg was om ʼn kontrakparty op billikheidsgronde alleen vry te skeld van die
nakoming van sy verpligtinge nie.
Ongeveer 10 jaar na die Bank of Lisbon-saak het die Regskommissie se verslag
rakende “Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts”
die lig gesien. 420 In die verslag word wetgewing aanbeveel “to provide that a court
may determine whether contractual terms are unreasonable, unconscionable or
oppressive and to issue appropriate orders if contracts are unreasonable,
unconscionable or oppressive.” 421
ʼn Algemene billikheidsvereiste sou derhalwe met “unreasonableness,
unconscionableness or oppressiveness” as kriteria dien ten opsigte van alle
ooreenkomste waarop die wetgewing van toepassing sou wees. Die kommissie het
416 Volgens Benson v S A Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986(1) SA 776 (A) op 783D en Van Zyl 1986:110; Van Zyl 1988:272-290 bevat 'n insiggewende
algemene uiteensetting van die rol van billikheid in die regspleging.
417 In Wells v South African Alumenite Co 1927 AD 69 op 73 het hoofregter Innes onomwonde te kenne gegee dat “nou doubt the condition is hard and
aerous, but if people sign such condition they must in the absence of fraud, be held to them. Public Policy so demands.”
418 Die duidelikste uiteensetting van hierdie benadering verskyn in Paddock Motors (Pty) Limited v Ingesund 1976(3) SA 16 (A) 28 E-G waar Appèlregter
Jansen opgemerk het:“We have been referred to no authority indicating that the exceptio could be employed to alter the terms of the true agreement validly
entered into between the parties.”
419 1988(3) SA 580 (A).
420 Suid-Afrikaanse Regskommissie (Verslag : Projek 48) 1998:213-223.).
421 Die voorgestelde Artikel 1, wat die nodige kontraktuele veranderinge statutêr moes aanbring, lui soos volg “
“If a court is of the opinion that
(a) the way in which a contract between the parties or a term thereof come into being; or (b) the form on the content of a contract; or (c) the execution of
a contract; or (d) the enforcement of a contract, is unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive, the court may declare that the alleged contract -
(aa) did not come into existence; or (bb) come into existence, existed for a period, and then, before action was brought, come to an end; or
(cc) is in existence at the time action is brought, and it may then -
(i) limit the sphere of operation and/or the period of operation of the contract, and/or (ii) suspend the operation of the contract for a specified period or until
specified circumstances are present; or (iii) make such other order as may in the opinion of the court be necessary to prevent the effect of the contract
being unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive to any of the parties.”