Tjaart Jurgens Maré Doctor Legum Universiteit van die Vrystaat
Tjaart Jurgens Maré Doctor Legum Universiteit van die Vrystaat Tjaart Jurgens Maré Doctor Legum Universiteit van die Vrystaat
155 Die oorweging van publieke en privaatbelange gaan hoë eise aan die Konstitutisonele Hof stel en antwoorde sal nie maklik verskaf kan word nie. Geen wonder nie dat elf regters sake in die Konstitusionele Hof moet aanhoor! Wat die Konstitusionele Hof se enorme taak verder bemoeilik, is die feit dat elke en iedere uitspraak fyn deur die media, die akademici en die gemeenskap dopgehou word en kritiek blyk nou eenmaal nie by ons ou volkie te ontbreek nie! Van toentertyd het die slagspreuk dat die beste stuurlui aan wal staan, gegeld. Dit is egter maklik om in die leunstoel te sit en kritiek te lewer, of om onder die boom te sit terwyl die ander in die hitte van die stryd die wa deur die drif moet trek. P J Visser spreek die onderstaande kritiek teen die Konstitusionele Hof se uitspraak in Gardener v Whitaker339 uit. Sonder om oor die meriete van die saak te oordeel, word die volgende genoem : ʼn Lasteraksie is deur die stadsklerk van Oos-Londen teen ʼn raadslid ingestel op grond van ʼn bewering dat die stadsklerk opsetlik die raadslede mislei het. Visser kritiseer vir regter Froneman soos volg : “The Court, per Froneman J, proceeded from the very general and radical assumption that -340 all aspects of the common law, including the present state of law of defamation, should, in cases that come before the courts, be scrutinised to decide whether they accord with the demands of the constitution” 341 Daar kan ook verwys word na die volgende aanhaling : 339 1995(2) SA 672 (E). 340 Visser, 1995:745. 341 Sien Visser, 1995:745. 342 Visser, 1995:747 “There are different forms of free floating interpretation which all to a greater or lesser extent place the Constitution at the mercy of the interpreter and allow him to use it like a ventriloquist’s dummy (CF the remark by Van Dijkhorst J in De Klerk v Du Plessis supra 46[A] See, however, the word of caution and warning - if it was really seriously meant and not merely intended as window dressing to camouflage actual practice - uttered by Kentridge A J in S V Zuma 1995(2) SA 642(CC) 62) ‘But it cannot be too strongly stressed that the Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean’). These free floating methods of interpretation may be described as ‘generous’, ‘liberal’, ‘purposive’, ‘benevolent’ etcetera and there are apparently subtle differences between them depending on the measure of distortion of the literal meaning of words that they achieve in a particular case.” 342
156 Dit is duidelik dat die aandster in die hemelruim op ʼn donker nag nie duidelik raakgesien word nie. Dit is dan ook geen wonder dat die kritiek van Visser kommentaar sou uitlok nie. 343 In die artikel “The ‘Constitutional Attack on Private Law’ Are the Fears Well Founded?” antwoord Gretchen Carpenter en Christo Botha soos volg op Visser se kritiek : en “Professor O H Visser is very concerned about what he perceives as an assault on the domain of private law by the court in Gardener v Whitaker .... ‘ Unfortunately his criticism of the judgement is composed mainly of broadsides and inside remarks rather than well-founded legal argument. His reference to a ‘total onslaught’ and to a ‘constitutional’ attack on private law’ is emotional and politically loaded language that is reminiscent of the ‘old order’. It may be appropriate to confrontational rhetoric, but certainly not to an academic discussion.” 344 “Visser avers that judges interpreting the new Constitution are free to use what he terms ‘endless methods of interpreting it in order to achieve the desired results’. It sounds rather as if he accusing the judiciary of throwing integrity overboard and reducing that process of adjudication to a search for pretexts for subjective decisions which cannot stand proper scrutiny. If this is so, it is a very serious charge. He returns to this tack later, stating rather sarcastically that judges and academics writing on constitutional interpretation seem to feel that anything goes as long as the result is politically correct. This is an unwarranted attack on the integrity and good faith of both judges and commentators, unsupported as it is by any evidence whatsoever.” Dit gaan hier nie oor ʼn te kort aan die bekwaamhede van die regbank nie, maar veel eerder oor ʼn wanbegrip van die regsvormingsproses. Dit is duidelik dat regter Froneman weet waaroor dit gaan. Hyself het immers in Matiso v The Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison met die kwessie te doen gehad. 345 Vergelyk ook regter Kentridge se siening oor die interpretasie van die Grondwet in S v Zuma 346 343 Bepaal Artikel 16 van die Handves van Menseregte dan nie dat elkeen die reg op vryheid van uitdrukking het nie , waarby ingesluit is (a) die vryheid om inligting of idees te ontvang of oor te dra; en (b) akademiese vryheid van wetenskaplike navorsing. 344 Carpenter en Botha, :1996:128 345 1994(4) SA 592 (SE) op 597 I - 598 D. Regter Froneman stel dit soos volg: “The values and principles contained in the Constitution are, and could only be, formulated and expressed in wide and general terms, because they are to be of general application. In terms of the Constitution the Courts bear the responsibility of giving specific content to those values and principles in any given situation. In doing so Judges will invariably ‘create law’. For those steeped in the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty the notion of Judges creating law and not merely interpreting and applying the law is an uncomfortable one. Whether that traditional view was ever correct is debatable, but the danger exists that it will inhibit Judges from doing what they are called upon to do in terms of the Constitution. This does not mean that Judges should now suddenly enter into an orgy of judicial lawmaking, but that they should recognise that their function of judicial review, based on the supremacy of the constitution, should not be hidden under the guise of simply seeking and giving expression to the will of the majority in Parliament” 346 1995(2) SA 642 (CC) op 652I-653B. “While we must always be conscious of the value underlying the Constitution, it is nonetheless our task to interpret a written instrument. I am well aware of the fallacy of supposing that general language must have a single objective meaning. Nor is it easy to avoid the influence of one’s personal intellectual and moral perceptives. But it cannot be too strongly stressed that the Constitution does not mean whatever we might
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155<br />
Die oorweging <strong>van</strong> publieke en privaatbelange gaan hoë eise aan <strong>die</strong> Konstitutisonele Hof<br />
stel en antwoorde sal nie maklik verskaf kan word nie. Geen wonder nie dat elf regters<br />
sake in <strong>die</strong> Konstitusionele Hof moet aanhoor!<br />
Wat <strong>die</strong> Konstitusionele Hof se enorme taak verder bemoeilik, is <strong>die</strong> feit dat elke en iedere<br />
uitspraak fyn deur <strong>die</strong> media, <strong>die</strong> akademici en <strong>die</strong> gemeenskap dopgehou word en kritiek<br />
blyk nou eenmaal nie by ons ou volkie te ontbreek nie! Van toentertyd het <strong>die</strong> slagspreuk<br />
dat <strong>die</strong> beste stuurlui aan wal staan, gegeld.<br />
Dit is egter maklik om in <strong>die</strong> leunstoel te sit en kritiek te lewer, of om onder <strong>die</strong> boom te sit<br />
terwyl <strong>die</strong> ander in <strong>die</strong> hitte <strong>van</strong> <strong>die</strong> stryd <strong>die</strong> wa deur <strong>die</strong> drif moet trek. P J Visser spreek<br />
<strong>die</strong> onderstaande kritiek teen <strong>die</strong> Konstitusionele Hof se uitspraak in Gardener v<br />
Whitaker339 uit. Sonder om oor <strong>die</strong> meriete <strong>van</strong> <strong>die</strong> saak te oordeel, word <strong>die</strong> volgende<br />
genoem :<br />
ʼn Lasteraksie is deur <strong>die</strong> stadsklerk <strong>van</strong> Oos-Londen teen ʼn raadslid ingestel op grond <strong>van</strong><br />
ʼn bewering dat <strong>die</strong> stadsklerk opsetlik <strong>die</strong> raadslede mislei het.<br />
Visser kritiseer vir regter Froneman soos volg :<br />
“The Court, per Froneman J, proceeded from the very general and radical assumption<br />
that -340 all aspects of the common law, including the present state of law of defamation,<br />
should, in cases that come before the courts, be scrutinised to decide whether they<br />
accord with the demands of the constitution” 341<br />
Daar kan ook verwys word na <strong>die</strong> volgende aanhaling :<br />
339 1995(2) SA 672 (E).<br />
340 Visser, 1995:745.<br />
341 Sien Visser, 1995:745.<br />
342 Visser, 1995:747<br />
“There are different forms of free floating interpretation which all to a greater or lesser<br />
extent place the Constitution at the mercy of the interpreter and allow him to use it like<br />
a ventriloquist’s dummy (CF the remark by Van Dijkhorst J in De Klerk v Du Plessis<br />
supra 46[A] See, however, the word of caution and warning - if it was really seriously<br />
meant and not merely intended as window dressing to camouflage actual practice -<br />
uttered by Kentridge A J in S V Zuma 1995(2) SA 642(CC) 62) ‘But it cannot be too<br />
strongly stressed that the Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to<br />
mean’). These free floating methods of interpretation may be described as ‘generous’,<br />
‘liberal’, ‘purposive’, ‘benevolent’ etcetera and there are apparently subtle differences<br />
between them depending on the measure of distortion of the literal meaning of words<br />
that they achieve in a particular case.” 342
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