Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport - Rdes.it
Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport - Rdes.it
Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport - Rdes.it
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
ISSN 1825-6678<strong>Rivista</strong> <strong>di</strong><strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> <strong>ed</strong> <strong>Economia</strong> <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong>Quadrimestrale Anno Secondo Fascicolo 2/2006EDUS LAW INTERNATIONAL
<strong>Rivista</strong> <strong>di</strong><strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> <strong>ed</strong> <strong>Economia</strong> <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong>Quadrimestrale Anno Secondo Fascicolo 2/2006EDUS LAW INTERNATIONAL
<strong>Rivista</strong> <strong>di</strong> <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> <strong>ed</strong> <strong>Economia</strong> <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong>www.rdes.<strong>it</strong>Pubblicata in AvellinoR<strong>ed</strong>azione: Centro <strong>di</strong> <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> e Business <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong>Via M. Capozzi 25 – 83100 Avellino – Tel. 347-6040661/0032-486-421544Ruhlplein 6 Overijse – Belgio – Tel. Fax 0032-2-7671305Proprietario <strong>ed</strong> e<strong>di</strong>tore: Michele Colucci, Edus Law InternationalProvider: Aruba S.p.A. P.zza Garibal<strong>di</strong> 8 – 52010 Soci (AR)url: www.aruba.<strong>it</strong>Testata registrata presso il Tribunale <strong>di</strong> Avellino al n° 431 del 24/3/2005Direttore: Avv. Michele ColucciDirettore responsabile: Avv. Marco Longobar<strong>di</strong>Sp<strong>ed</strong>. in A. P. Tab. D – Aut. DCB/AV/71/2005 – Valida dal 9/5/2005L’abbonamento annuale alla <strong>Rivista</strong> è <strong>di</strong> 75 Euro, il prezzo del singolo numero è <strong>di</strong> 25Euro.Per abbonarsi è sufficiente inoltrare una richiesta al seguente in<strong>di</strong>rizzo e-mail:info@rdes.<strong>it</strong>
R<strong>ed</strong>azioneDirettore:Direttore responsabile:Vice Direttore:Capi r<strong>ed</strong>attori:Assistente <strong>di</strong> r<strong>ed</strong>azione:Michele ColucciMarco Longobar<strong>di</strong>Nicola BosioRaul Caruso (<strong>Economia</strong>)Lina Musumarra (<strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong>)Antonella FrattiniCom<strong>it</strong>ato Scientifico:Prof. Roger Blanpain (Univers<strong>it</strong>à Cattolica <strong>di</strong> Leuven – Belgio)Prof. Luigi Campiglio (Univers<strong>it</strong>à Cattolica del Sacro cuore <strong>di</strong> Milano – Italia)Prof. Paul De Grauwe (Univers<strong>it</strong>à Cattolica <strong>di</strong> Leuven – Belgio)Prof. Frank Hendrickx (Univers<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> Tilburg – Paesi Bassi)Prof. Filippo Lubrano (Univers<strong>it</strong>à LUISS “Guido Carli” <strong>di</strong> Roma – Italia)Prof. Paolo Moro (Univers<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> Padova – Italia)Prof. Giovanni Sciancalepore (Univers<strong>it</strong>à degli Stu<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> Salerno – Italia)Prof. Salvatore Sica (Univers<strong>it</strong>à degli Stu<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> Salerno – Italia)Prof. Pasquale Stanzione (Univers<strong>it</strong>à degli Stu<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> Salerno – Italia)Prof. Maria José Vaccaro (Univers<strong>it</strong>à degli Stu<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> Salerno – Italia)Com<strong>it</strong>ato <strong>di</strong> r<strong>ed</strong>azione:Paolo Amato, Vincenzo Bassi, Michele Bernasconi, Alessia Ciranna, Enrico CrocettiBernar<strong>di</strong>, Virgilio D’Antonio, Giovanni Di Cola, F<strong>ed</strong>erica Fuc<strong>it</strong>o, Mattia Grassani,Leo Grosso, Domenico Gullo, Paolo Lombar<strong>di</strong>, Marica Longini, Enrico Lubrano,Gaetano Manzi, Ettore Mazzilli, Anna Lisa Melillo, Sergio Messina, GianpaoloMonteneri, Omar Ongaro, Giacinto Pelosi, Giuseppe Persico, Stefano Sartori,Ruggero Stincar<strong>di</strong>ni, Michele Signorini, Corrado Spina, Davide Tondani
INDICEL’AUTONOMIA E LA SPECIFICITÀ DELLO SPORTNELL’UNIONE EUROPEAAlla ricerca <strong>di</strong> norme sportive necessarie, proporzionali e <strong>di</strong> «buon senso»<strong>di</strong> Michele Colucci ..………..…………………………….………… 15Introduzione ………………………………………..….……….. 151. Autonomia delle autor<strong>it</strong>à sportive e specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> sport 172. Le eccezioni al <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario ..………..….……….. 192.1. La composizione delle squadre nazionali ..…..….…….. 192.2. Il sistema dei trasferimenti …………………..….…….. 202.2.1 Il principio: sentenza Bosman ……………..….……….. 202.2.2 La deroga: sentenza Lethonen ……………..….……….. 232.3. La selezione degli atleti: la sentenza Deliège ..….…….. 242.4. Gli agenti dei calciatori: la sentenza Piau ....….…….... 253. Regole puramente sportive ……………..….……….. 273.1. La sentenza Meca Me<strong>di</strong>na …………………..….…….. 273.1.1 I fatti e l’analisi del Tribunale <strong>di</strong> Primo Grado..….…….... 273.1.2 L’analisi della Corte ……..…………………..….…….. 294. Lo scenario dopo la sentenza Meca Me<strong>di</strong>na ….……….. 32L’ALLENATORE DILETTANTE NON PUÒ ESSERE LAVORATORESUBORDINATONota a Sentenza Corte <strong>di</strong> Appello <strong>di</strong> Venezia, Sez. Lavoro, 21 marzo2006, n. 173<strong>di</strong> Mattia Grassani ..………..…………………………….…………. 351. L’inquadramento della fattispecie ………………………… 352. Il lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato, il lavoro autonomo e l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> allenatore<strong>di</strong>lettante: la reale volontà delle parti .……………..…. 423. La natura giuri<strong>di</strong>ca del rapporto tra associazione sportiva <strong>ed</strong>allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante. La null<strong>it</strong>à del contratto per non mer<strong>it</strong>evolezzadell’interesse giuri<strong>di</strong>co .……………………..……. 504. Conclusioni …………………………………………….…. 53
I SEGNI DISTINTIVI DELLE SOCIETÀ DI CALCIO TRAMARCHIO FORTE, MARCHIO DEBOLE E SECONDARYMEANING: IL CASO SALERNITANANota a Trib. Napoli, sez. specializzata proprietà industriale, ord. 15febbraio 2006 e Trib. Napoli, sez. specializzata proprietà industriale,(reclamo) ord. coll. 18 aprile 2006<strong>di</strong> Angelo Maietta ..………..…………………………….………… 551. Il caso ……………………………………..………………. 552. Marchi «forti» e marchi «deboli»: amb<strong>it</strong>i <strong>di</strong> tutela ………. 562.1. …(segue) il «rafforzamento» del marchio «debole»: il secondarymeaning ...……..………………………….……….. 603. Rilievi conclusivi ……………………………………….…. 64THE IMPACT OF FOOTBALL POINT SYSTEMS ON THECOMPETITIVE BALANCE: EVIDENCE FROM SOME EUROPEANFOOTBALL LEAGUESby Ferda Halicioglu .………..…………………………….………. 67Introduction ………………………………………..….……….. 671. Outcome of uncertainty and compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in professionalteam sports .……………………………….……….. 682. Measurement of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in professional teamsports ……………….…………………………….………. 703. Football point systems and compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance: empiricalevidence …………….…………………………….………. 714. Conclu<strong>di</strong>ng remarks ……………………………...……… 75COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL:COMPARISON BY ADAPTING MEASURES: NATIONALMEASURE OF SEASONAL IMBALANCE AND TOP 3by Kelly Goossens .……………………………………….………… 77Introduction ………………………………………..….……….. 771. Concept of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance ……………………..…..… 822. Measures of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance ……………………..…..… 853. Data, us<strong>ed</strong> measures and results ……………………..…..… 944. Conclusions …………………………………………..…..… 118
UMBERTO LAGO, ALESSANDRO BARONCELLI, STEFAN SZYMANSKI (a cura <strong>di</strong>),IL BUSINESS DEL CALCIO, SUCCESSI SPORTIVI E ROVESCIFINANZIARI, EGEA, MILANO, 2004Recensione <strong>di</strong> Raul Caruso ……………………………….………… 123GIURISPRUDENZA COMUNITARIACORTE DI GIUSTIZIA CAUSA C-519/04DAVID MECA-MEDINA E IGOR MAJCEN / COMMISSIONE DELLECOMUNITÀ EUROPEE ………………………….…….…….…….. 133GIURISPRUDENZA INTERNAZIONALESENTENZA DEL TRIBUNALE DI CHARLEROI CAUSA G-14CHARLEROI C. FIFA …….…...…………………………….…….. 151TAS: VERTENZA FIFA/AMA CIRCA LA PROPORZIONALITÀDELLE SANZIONI PER DOPINGCAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA …….…………………….. 201
RIVISTA DI ISSN 1825-6678DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA DELLO SPORT Vol. II, Fasc. 2, 2006L’AUTONOMIA E LA SPECIFICITÀ DELLO SPORTNELL’UNIONE EUROPEAAlla ricerca <strong>di</strong> norme sportive necessarie, proporzionali e <strong>di</strong> «buonsenso»<strong>di</strong> Michele Colucci*SOMMARIO: Introduzione – 1. Autonomia delle autor<strong>it</strong>à sportive e specific<strong>it</strong>à<strong>dello</strong> sport – 2. Le eccezioni al <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario – 2.1. Lacomposizione delle squadre nazionali – 2.2. Il sistema dei trasferimenti– 2.2.1. Il principio: sentenza Bosman – 2.2.2. La deroga: sentenzaLethonen – 2.3. La selezione degli atleti: la sentenza Deliège – 2.4.Gli agenti dei calciatori: la sentenza Piau – 3. Regole puramentesportive – 3.1. La sentenza Meca Me<strong>di</strong>na – 3.1.1. I fatti e l’analisi delTribunale <strong>di</strong> Primo Grado – 3.1.2. L’analisi della Corte – 4. Lo scenariodopo la sentenza Meca Me<strong>di</strong>naIntroduzioneAutonomia e specific<strong>it</strong>à sono ormai da anni le riven<strong>di</strong>cazioni principali delleorganizzazioni sportive a livello europeo. La loro giustificazione si può farrisalire al ruolo sociale e culturale <strong>dello</strong> sport e alla sua capac<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> coinvolgereallo stesso tempo migliaia <strong>di</strong> professionisti e milioni <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>lettanti.In quanto attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica, lo sport è stato esaminato a più ripres<strong>ed</strong>alle ist<strong>it</strong>uzioni comun<strong>it</strong>arie alla luce dei principi fondamentali sanc<strong>it</strong>i neiTrattati. Sono stati tanti e tali gli interventi della Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia e dellaCommissione europea in questa materia che le organizzazioni sportive____________________*Membro del Servizio Giuri<strong>di</strong>co della Commissione europea. Le opinioni espresse nel presentearticolo sono personali e non possono essere rifer<strong>it</strong>e all’Ist<strong>it</strong>uzione cui l’autore appartiene.E-mail: info@colucci.eu.L’autore ringrazia Filippo Amato, Antonio Aresu, Elsa De Persio, per i loro preziosi commenti.
16 Michele Coluccireclamano da tempo una maggiore sicurezza giuri<strong>di</strong>ca ovvero un quadronormativo chiaro all’interno del quale potersi muovere senza il rischio <strong>di</strong>incorrere in sanzioni. 1La Commissione europea, da parte sua, ha raccolto tale richiesta e,in occasione della Conferenza interministeriale del 27-28 novembre 2006,ha ufficialmente avviato i lavori per la preparazione <strong>di</strong> un «Libro Biancosullo sport», basato sulla consultazione dei <strong>di</strong>versi operatori del settore. Ilfine è <strong>di</strong> proporre idee per azioni che possano essere svolte a livellocomun<strong>it</strong>ario e <strong>di</strong> fornire delle linee guida per gli operatori del settore. 2 IlLibro Bianco, è bene sottolinearlo, ha un valore pol<strong>it</strong>ico importante perin<strong>di</strong>rizzare l’azione comun<strong>it</strong>aria, ma non è un atto giuri<strong>di</strong>co vincolante.Non essendovi nel Trattato CE una <strong>di</strong>sposizione particolare sullosport, le ist<strong>it</strong>uzioni comun<strong>it</strong>arie hanno esaminato le regolamentazioni sportiveattraverso le norme <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comune del mercato interno e prendendocomunque in considerazione la specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> sport. 3 Nel corso degli anni,infatti, la Corte ha in<strong>di</strong>viduato <strong>di</strong>verse deroghe al <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario,escludendo dalla sua applicazione le regolamentazioni aventi un carattere«puramente sportivo».Con la sentenza Meca Me<strong>di</strong>na, 4 però, i giu<strong>di</strong>ci comun<strong>it</strong>ari hannoaffermato che anche una regolamentazione come quella in materia <strong>di</strong> doping,può essere in contrasto con il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario, in particolare con le regolein materia <strong>di</strong> concorrenza, qualora le sanzioni da essa previste non sianogiustificate da un obiettivo leg<strong>it</strong>timo o non siano proporzionali al suoconseguimento.Dopo una breve analisi del concetto <strong>di</strong> autonomia e <strong>di</strong> specific<strong>it</strong>à<strong>dello</strong> sport, nel presente contributo sarà esaminata la giurisprudenza rilevant<strong>ed</strong>ella Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia per in<strong>di</strong>viduare le deroghe al <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario____________________1J.L. ARNAUT, Rapporto in<strong>di</strong>pendente sullo <strong>Sport</strong>, versione finale, ottobre 2006, <strong>di</strong>sponibile suls<strong>it</strong>o www.independentfootballreview.com/doc/Full_Report_EN.pdf (20 novembre 2006).2Conferenza interministeriale: The EU and <strong>Sport</strong>: matching expectations, Bruxelles, 27-28novembre 2006. Le conclusioni della Conferenza sono <strong>di</strong>sponibili sul s<strong>it</strong>o: www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/conclusions/vko48/en_GB/1164793529443 (1° <strong>di</strong>cembre 2006).3Un riferimento allo <strong>Sport</strong> <strong>ed</strong> alla sua specific<strong>it</strong>à è contenuto nell’art. III-282 del Trattato cheadotta una Cost<strong>it</strong>uzione per l’Europa, firmato dai Capi <strong>di</strong> Stato e <strong>di</strong> Governo dei Paesi Membridell’Unione europea il 29 ottobre 2004.Il processo <strong>di</strong> ratifica del Trattato è, allo stato attuale, sospeso dopo l’es<strong>it</strong>o del refendum per lasua ratifica in Francia e nei Paesi Bassi. Ai sensi dell’art. III-282: “L’Unione contribuisce allapromozione dei profili europei <strong>dello</strong> sport, tenendo conto delle sue specific<strong>it</strong>à, delle sue strutturefondate sul volontariato e della sua funzione sociale e <strong>ed</strong>ucativa”. Il testo completo del Trattatoè pubblicato in GUUE C 310 del 16 Dicembre 2004.4Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza del 18 luglio 2006, causa C-519/04, David Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na e IgorMajcen contro Commissione delle Comun<strong>it</strong>à europee, non ancora pubblicata.
L’autonomia e la specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong> nell’Unione Europea 17già esistenti in questo settore e per cercare <strong>di</strong> delineare lo scenario futuro<strong>dello</strong> sport a livello europeo.Si partirà dalla considerazione che le ist<strong>it</strong>uzioni comun<strong>it</strong>arieperseguono lo scopo <strong>di</strong> proteggere i <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti dei c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>ni garant<strong>it</strong>i dal TrattatoCE piuttosto che quello <strong>di</strong> destabilizzare il mondo <strong>dello</strong> sport. 51. Autonomia delle autor<strong>it</strong>à sportive e specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> sportLe autor<strong>it</strong>à sportive, siano esse f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni o leghe, sono «autonome» nelsenso che esse godono <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>screzional<strong>it</strong>à soprattutto nella regolamentazion<strong>ed</strong>ella propria organizzazione e nella determinazione delle «regole del gioco»cui fanno riferimento. Si tratta, però, <strong>di</strong> un’autonomia «con<strong>di</strong>zionata», inquanto soggetta al rispetto delle norme <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to nazionale e <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>tocomun<strong>it</strong>ario.In Italia la legge 17 ottobre 2003 n. 280 pone come lim<strong>it</strong>e a una«insostenibile assoluta autonomia dell’or<strong>di</strong>namento giuri<strong>di</strong>co il rispettoeffettivo dei <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti inviolabili dell’uomo» 6 ovvero «i casi <strong>di</strong> rilevanza perl’or<strong>di</strong>namento giuri<strong>di</strong>co della Repubblica <strong>di</strong> s<strong>it</strong>uazioni giuri<strong>di</strong>che soggettiveconnesse con l’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo». 7 Il rapporto tra or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivoe or<strong>di</strong>namenti sovraor<strong>di</strong>nati è così un rapporto <strong>di</strong> autonomia, ma anche <strong>di</strong>supremazia. 8A livello comun<strong>it</strong>ario, invece, il ruolo delle autor<strong>it</strong>à sportive è statoriconosciuto da parte del Consiglio europeo nella Dichiarazione <strong>di</strong> Nizzadel 2000 che, tuttavia, offre soltanto un’in<strong>di</strong>cazione pol<strong>it</strong>ica su come debbanoessere affrontati alcuni temi legati allo sport. 9Nella Dichiarazione i Capi <strong>di</strong> Stato e <strong>di</strong> Governo degli Stati membrihanno riconosciuto il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to delle associazioni sportive a organizzarsi in via____________________5A tal propos<strong>it</strong>o L. GRAD ha affermato: «Le rôle de l’Union européenne est moins de déréglementerl’activ<strong>it</strong>é sportive que d’év<strong>it</strong>er que des excès de liberté ne dérèglent le système. A cet égard, ellereste fidèle aux doctrines qu’elle a toujours défendues, selon lesquelles la liberté des échangeset le laisser-faire ne doivent pas engendrer le laisser-aller». L. Grad, Le sport dans le dro<strong>it</strong> del’Union européenne. Exception, dérogations, spécific<strong>it</strong>és et dro<strong>it</strong> commun, in Revue des AffairesEuropéennes, A. M. Mysd publisher, 2001-2002/3, 288.6Cfr. P. MORO, Giustizia sportiva e <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti processuali, in La Giustizia <strong>Sport</strong>iva, AA. VV., Expertae<strong>di</strong>zioni, Rimini, 2004, 8.7Art. 1 della Legge 17 ottobre 2003 n. 280. Conversione in legge, con mo<strong>di</strong>ficazioni, del D. L. 19agosto 2003, n. 220, recante <strong>di</strong>sposizioni in materia <strong>di</strong> giustizia sportiva.8Per approfon<strong>di</strong>menti ve<strong>di</strong> E. ALLORIO, La plural<strong>it</strong>à degli or<strong>di</strong>namenti giuri<strong>di</strong>ci e l’accertamentogiu<strong>di</strong>ziale, in Riv. Dir. Civ., I, 1955, 254-268.9Consiglio europeo <strong>di</strong> Nizza, 7-9 <strong>di</strong>cembre 2000, Conclusioni della Presidenza. Il testo completodella Dichiarazione sullo <strong>Sport</strong> è <strong>di</strong>sponibile sul s<strong>it</strong>o www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/<strong>it</strong>/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.i0.htm (2 Dicembre 2006).
18 Michele Colucciautonoma per mezzo <strong>di</strong> adeguate strutture associative e nel modo da esser<strong>it</strong>enuto più conforme ai loro obiettivi. 10L’autonomia delle organizzazioni sportive è strettamente correlataalle caratteristiche e alle funzioni proprie <strong>dello</strong> sport, 11 nel senso che – comeaffermato dalla Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia nella sentenza Deliège 12 – in seno allef<strong>ed</strong>erazioni si r<strong>it</strong>rovano normalmente riun<strong>it</strong>e le conoscenze e l’esperienzanecessarie per emanare delle norme sportive.Nella Dichiarazione si legge, poi, che «la Comun<strong>it</strong>à deve tener contodelle funzioni <strong>dello</strong> sport al fine <strong>di</strong> rispettare e <strong>di</strong> promuovere l’etica e lasolidarietà necessarie a preservarne il ruolo sociale». 13 Nel fare ciò,ovviamente, lo sport professionale dovrà essere ben <strong>di</strong>stinto da quello<strong>di</strong>lettantistico, dal momento che non tutte le regole applicabili al primovalgono per il secondo.Il problema è dunque valutare come il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario possa essereapplicato allo sport, rectius allo sport in quanto attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica, 14 purtenendo conto dei tratti specifici che la caratterizzano. La Corte <strong>di</strong> giustizia– come v<strong>ed</strong>remo nei paragrafi che seguono – ha affrontato la questione nella____________________10Non solo, il Consiglio ha ammesso che, data la coesistenza dei vari livelli della pratica sportiva,dallo sport amatoriale allo sport professionistico, le f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni sportive svolgono una funzionesociale importantissima in determinate materie come: la formazione dei giovani, la tutela dellasalute degli sportivi, la lotta contro il doping, la lotta contro la violenza e le manifestazionirazziste o xenofobe. Tali funzioni sociali comportano responsabil<strong>it</strong>à particolari per le f<strong>ed</strong>erazionie cost<strong>it</strong>uiscono il riconoscimento della loro competenza sull’organizzazione delle competizioni.11La Commissione ne ha in<strong>di</strong>viduate cinque: l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva è un ottimo strumento perequilibrare la formazione in<strong>di</strong>viduale e lo sviluppo umano a qualsiasi età (funzione <strong>ed</strong>ucativa);l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à fisica rappresenta un’occasione <strong>di</strong> migliorare la salute dei c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>ni e <strong>di</strong> lottare in modoefficace contro alcune malattie, quali le affezioni car<strong>di</strong>ache o il cancro; può contribuire a preservarela salute e la qual<strong>it</strong>à della v<strong>it</strong>a fino ad un’età inoltrata (funzione <strong>di</strong> san<strong>it</strong>à pubblica); lo sport èuno strumento appropriato per promuovere una società più solidale, per lottare contro l’intolleranzae il razzismo, la violenza, l’abuso <strong>di</strong> alcol o l’assunzione <strong>di</strong> stupefacenti; lo sport può contribuireall’integrazione delle persone escluse dal mercato del lavoro (funzione sociale); la pratica sportivaconsente ai c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>ni <strong>di</strong> ra<strong>di</strong>carsi maggiormente nel rispettivo terr<strong>it</strong>orio, <strong>di</strong> conoscerlo più a fondo,<strong>di</strong> integrarvisi meglio, e, per quanto riguarda l’ambiente, <strong>di</strong> proteggere tale terr<strong>it</strong>orio in modopiù efficace (funzione culturale); la pratica sportiva è una componente importante del tempolibero e dei <strong>di</strong>vertimenti a livello sia in<strong>di</strong>viduale che collettivo (funzione lu<strong>di</strong>ca). Commissioneeuropea, Evoluzione e prospettive dell’azione comun<strong>it</strong>aria nel settore <strong>dello</strong> sport, documento <strong>di</strong>lavoro dei servizi della Commissione (1998), <strong>di</strong>sponibile sul s<strong>it</strong>o ec.europa.eu/sport/action_sports/historique/docs/doc_evol_<strong>it</strong>.pdf (30 ottobre 2006).12Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza del 11 aprile 2000, cause riun<strong>it</strong>e C 51/96 e C 191/97, ChristelleDeliège contro Ligue francophone de judo et <strong>di</strong>sciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judoASBL, Union européenne de judo (C-51/96) e François Pacquée (C-191/97), Raccolta, 2000,I-2549, punto 68.13Dichiarazione sullo <strong>Sport</strong> allegata al Trattato <strong>di</strong> Nizza, c<strong>it</strong>., punti 7 -9.14Sempre nella sentenza Deliège, c<strong>it</strong>., la Corte ha stabil<strong>it</strong>o che «ai fini dell’applicazione del<strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario non rileva la classificazione dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva come “professionale” o“<strong>di</strong>lettantistica” ma quanto piuttosto la sua natura economica o meno», punti 49 e ss..
L’autonomia e la specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong> nell’Unione Europea 19sua giurisprudenza fornendo esempi <strong>di</strong> tale specific<strong>it</strong>à.2. Le eccezioni al <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario2.1. La composizione delle squadre nazionaliGià nella prima sentenza del 1974 in materia <strong>di</strong> sport, la Corte ha in<strong>di</strong>viduatouna prima deroga al <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario con riferimento alla composizion<strong>ed</strong>elle squadre nazionali. In particolare, nella causa Walrave, 15 essa è statachiamata a stabilire la compatibil<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> una <strong>di</strong>sposizione del regolamentodell’Union Cicliste Internationale con le norme <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario inmateria <strong>di</strong> libera circolazione dei lavoratori.Con riferimento ai campionati mon<strong>di</strong>ali <strong>di</strong> mezzofondo, una special<strong>it</strong>àdella pista oggi non più praticata in cui si correva <strong>di</strong>etro moto <strong>di</strong> grossacilindrata su <strong>di</strong>stanze attorno ai 100 chilometri, la norma controversaprev<strong>ed</strong>eva che gli allenatori dovessero avere la stessa c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>nanza deicorridori.In tale occasione, i giu<strong>di</strong>ci hanno fissato dei principi fondamentaliripresi in tutte le sentenze successive rilevanti nella materia. Innanz<strong>it</strong>uttol’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva è <strong>di</strong>sciplinata dal <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario solo in quanto siaconfigurabile come attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica ai sensi del Trattato CE. 16 Esula,peraltro, dal <strong>di</strong>vieto <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>scriminazione a motivo della nazional<strong>it</strong>à sanc<strong>it</strong>odall’art. 39 CE, paragrafo 2, la composizione <strong>di</strong> squadre sportive e, inparticolare, delle rappresentative nazionali, operata esclusivamente in basea cr<strong>it</strong>eri tecnico-sportivi.Nella fattispecie si tratta – come sottolineato dalla Corte – <strong>di</strong> unaquestione «puramente sportiva» e, pertanto, non era possibile consideraretale attiv<strong>it</strong>à sotto il profilo economico. Tale interpretazione derogatoria,comunque, deve essere applicata in maniera restr<strong>it</strong>tiva e non può estendersioltre i lim<strong>it</strong>i ben precisi del settore cui si riferisce. 17Essa ha così affermato che lo sport a livello professionistico noncost<strong>it</strong>uisce un’eccezione in termini assoluti al <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario, in quanto____________________15Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza del 12 Dicembre 1974, causa 36/74, B. N. O. Walrave, l. J. N.Koch contro Association Union Cycliste Internationale, Koninklijke N<strong>ed</strong>erlandsche Wielren Uniee F<strong>ed</strong>eracion Espanola Ciclismo, Raccolta,1974, 1405.16Cfr. Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza del 14 luglio 1976, causa 13/76, Donà c. Mantero, Raccolta,1976, p. 1333, punto 12; sentenza del 15 <strong>di</strong>cembre 1995, causa C 415/93, Union royale belge dessociétés de football association ASBL e altri contro Jean-Marc Bosman e altri, Raccolta, 1995,p. I 4921, punto 73; sentenza Deliège, c<strong>it</strong>., punto 41, e sentenza del 13 aprile 2000, causaC 176/96, Lehtonen e Castors Braine, Raccolta, 1996, p. I 2681, punto 32.17Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza Walrave, c<strong>it</strong>., punti 7 -10.
20 Michele Colucciquest’ultimo non trova applicazione solo nel caso in cui le connotazionisportive <strong>di</strong> una determinata attiv<strong>it</strong>à prevalgano su quelle economiche.Nella stessa sentenza, la Corte si è preoccupata <strong>di</strong> enunciare dueprincipi fondamentali che mer<strong>it</strong>ano <strong>di</strong> essere ricordati per il loro contenutoancora attuale.In primo luogo, il <strong>di</strong>vieto <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>scriminazione sanc<strong>it</strong>o dall’art. 39, CE,paragrafo 2, riguarda non solo gli atti dell’autor<strong>it</strong>à pubblica, ma le norme <strong>di</strong>qualsiasi natura <strong>di</strong>rette a <strong>di</strong>sciplinare collettivamente il lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato ela prestazione <strong>di</strong> servizi, anche quelle stabil<strong>it</strong>e da associazioni o organisminon <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to pubblico, come le f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni sportive, nell’esercizio dellaloro autonomia giuri<strong>di</strong>ca. Ciò al fine <strong>di</strong> garantire un’applicazione uniform<strong>ed</strong>el <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario in tutti gli Stati Membri.Il principio <strong>di</strong> non <strong>di</strong>scriminazione, inoltre, cost<strong>it</strong>uisce un parametroinderogabile per qualsiasi regolamentazione sopranazionale e per qualsiasirapporto giuri<strong>di</strong>co da esso <strong>di</strong>sciplinato, purché questo, in considerazione siadel luogo in cui sorge sia <strong>di</strong> quello in cui <strong>di</strong>spiega i suoi effetti, possa esserericondotto al terr<strong>it</strong>orio della Comun<strong>it</strong>à.In altre parole, il fatto che certe f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni siano internazionali nonè sufficiente per sottrarle all’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario.Nella stessa ottica, con la sentenza Donà c. Mantero 18 i giu<strong>di</strong>ci hanno<strong>di</strong>chiarato incompatibili con il Trattato CE le norme della F<strong>ed</strong>erazione ItalianaGiuoco Calcio che riservano ai soli c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>ni <strong>it</strong>aliani il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to <strong>di</strong> partecipare,come professionisti o semiprofessionisti, a incontri <strong>di</strong> calcio.Tali norme possono essere giustificate solo sulla base <strong>di</strong> motivi noneconomici, inerenti al carattere <strong>ed</strong> alla «fisionomia specifica <strong>di</strong> detti incontri»e in considerazione della loro natura «puramente sportiva», come nel caso<strong>di</strong> part<strong>it</strong>e fra rappresentative <strong>di</strong> due Paesi. 192.2. Il sistema dei trasferimenti2.2.1 Il principio: sentenza BosmanLa Corte, in segu<strong>it</strong>o, ha esaminato a più riprese i <strong>di</strong>fferenti fattori suscettibili<strong>di</strong> giustificare deroghe al principio <strong>di</strong> libera circolazione degli atleti nell’amb<strong>it</strong>odei trasferimenti internazionali in virtù della leg<strong>it</strong>tim<strong>it</strong>à degli obiettivipersegu<strong>it</strong>i dalle f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni internazionali.____________________18Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza Donà c. Mantero, c<strong>it</strong>..19Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, Ibidem, punto 14.
L’autonomia e la specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong> nell’Unione Europea 21Nella sentenza Bosman, 20 i giu<strong>di</strong>ci comun<strong>it</strong>ari hanno r<strong>it</strong>enuto contrarieall’art. 39 CE le norme emanate da associazioni sportive secondo le quali uncalciatore professionista c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>no <strong>di</strong> uno Stato membro, alla scadenza delcontratto che lo vincolava a una società, poteva essere ingaggiato da unasocietà <strong>di</strong> un altro Stato membro solo se questa avesse versato all’altraun’indenn<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> trasferimento, <strong>di</strong> formazione o <strong>di</strong> promozione. 21Tali norme erano idonee a lim<strong>it</strong>are la libera circolazione dei calciatoriche volessero svolgere la loro attiv<strong>it</strong>à in un altro Stato membro poichéimpe<strong>di</strong>vano loro <strong>di</strong> lasciare le società <strong>di</strong> appartenenza ovvero li <strong>di</strong>ssuadevanodal farlo, anche dopo la scadenza del contratto <strong>di</strong> lavoro. Esse non potevanocost<strong>it</strong>uire un mezzo adeguato per conseguire obiettivi leg<strong>it</strong>timi, come laconservazione dell’equilibrio finanziario e sportivo fra le società e il sostegnodella ricerca <strong>di</strong> calciatori <strong>di</strong> talento e della formazione dei giovani calciatori.Le <strong>di</strong>sposizioni controverse, infatti, non impe<strong>di</strong>vano alle societàeconomicamente più forti <strong>di</strong> procurarsi i servizi dei migliori calciatori néimpe<strong>di</strong>vano che i mezzi finanziari <strong>di</strong>sponibili cost<strong>it</strong>uissero un elementodecisivo nella competizione sportiva e che l’equilibrio fra le società nerisultasse notevolmente alterato. 22In secondo luogo, le indenn<strong>it</strong>à in questione si caratterizzavano perincertezza e aleatorietà e, comunque, non avevano alcun rapporto con lespese effettivamente sostenute dalle società per formare giovani calciatori.Gli stessi scopi, poi, potevano essere consegu<strong>it</strong>i in modo altrettanto efficacecon altri mezzi che non intralciavano la libera circolazione dei lavoratori. 23La Corte ha anche <strong>di</strong>chiarato contrarie all’art. 39 CE le normeemanate da associazioni sportive secondo le quali, nelle part<strong>it</strong>e dellecompetizioni che esse organizzavano, le società calcistiche potevano schieraresolo un numero lim<strong>it</strong>ato <strong>di</strong> calciatori professionisti c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>ni <strong>di</strong> altri Statimembri.Inoltre, le norme controverse, che non riguardavano competizionifra rappresentative nazionali, ma si applicavano a tutti gli incontri ufficialifra società calcistiche, non potevano essere giustificate da motivi noneconomici, attinenti unicamente allo sport in sé e per sé, come la preservazion<strong>ed</strong>el legame tra<strong>di</strong>zionale fra ogni società calcistica e il proprio Paese, poiché____________________20Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, c<strong>it</strong>..21Per un’analisi della sentenza Bosman alla luce del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to della concorrenza ve<strong>di</strong> A. PAPPALARDO,Le dro<strong>it</strong> de la concurrence et le sport professionnel par équipe: quelques appréciations cr<strong>it</strong>iquessur la notion de marché en cause, en marge de l’ affaire Bosman, in Revue du Marché UniqueEuropéen n. 1, 1996, 57.22Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, Bosman, c<strong>it</strong>., punto 108.23Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustiza, Ibidem, punto 109.
22 Michele Colucci– secondo la Corte – il legame fra una società calcistica e lo Stato membronel quale essa si era stabil<strong>it</strong>a non poteva considerarsi inerente all’attiv<strong>it</strong>àsportiva.Nella stessa ottica, la Corte ha rifiutato le tesi secondo cui tali<strong>di</strong>sposizioni potevano essere giustificate dalla cost<strong>it</strong>uzione <strong>di</strong> un’adeguatariserva <strong>di</strong> calciatori nazionali che potesse consentire alle squadre nazionali<strong>di</strong> mettere in campo i migliori calciatori. Infatti anche se le squadre nazionalidevono essere composte <strong>di</strong> calciatori c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>ni del Paese interessato, questinon devono essere necessariamente qualificati per le società <strong>di</strong> tale Paese.Lo stesso vale per la conservazione dell’equilibrio sportivo fra lesocietà, poiché nessuna norma lim<strong>it</strong>ava e lim<strong>it</strong>a la facoltà delle squadre piùfacoltose <strong>di</strong> ingaggiare i migliori calciatori nazionali.Dall’esame attento della sentenza e dei principi fondamentali in essacontenuti, un dato fondamentale emerge: la Corte non ha deregolamentato <strong>it</strong>rasferimenti, ma al contrario, essa ha solo r<strong>it</strong>enuto che le regole sportivecontroverse fossero eccessivamente vincolanti per i calciatori o comunqueinadeguate agli obiettivi leg<strong>it</strong>timi persegu<strong>it</strong>i.A tal propos<strong>it</strong>o, un’autorevole dottrina 24 ha osservato che il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>tocomun<strong>it</strong>ario non impone la libertà totale, ma il massimo <strong>di</strong> libertà per gliatleti e non ammette delle restrizioni eccessive ovvero non giustificate allacircolazione degli sportivi.Sulla base <strong>di</strong> queste considerazioni, le organizzazioni sportive hannomo<strong>di</strong>ficato le loro regolamentazioni, <strong>di</strong> concerto con le ist<strong>it</strong>uzioni comun<strong>it</strong>arie,ponendo ulteriori lim<strong>it</strong>i alla libera circolazione degli atleti, lim<strong>it</strong>i che sonostati accettati dalla Commissione europea perché giustificati da ragionisportive.In particolare, la versione attuale del Regolamento FIFA sullo Statuse sui Trasferimenti dei Calciatori, 25 contiene, <strong>di</strong> fatto, le in<strong>di</strong>cazioniprovenienti dalla Commissione europea in uno scambio epistolare con laFédération Internationale de Football (<strong>di</strong> qui in poi FIFA). 26 Esso includ<strong>ed</strong>ei «principi» relativi alla formazione dei calciatori nel caso <strong>di</strong> trasferimento<strong>di</strong> atleti aventi meno <strong>di</strong> 23 anni; prev<strong>ed</strong>e meccanismi <strong>di</strong> solidarietà a favore____________________24L. GRAD ha affermato con una frase ad effetto che «Le juge n’a pas rejeté la spécific<strong>it</strong>é sportive,il a dénoncé un trop de spécific<strong>it</strong>é qui devient le cheval de Troie d’intérêts économiques désireuxde se soustraire au jeu du marché» in Le sport dans le dro<strong>it</strong> de l’Union européenne. Exception,dérogations, spécific<strong>it</strong>és et dro<strong>it</strong> commun, c<strong>it</strong>., 288.25La versione <strong>it</strong>aliana del Regolamento FIFA sullo Status e sui Trasferimenti dei Calciatori è<strong>di</strong>sponibile sul s<strong>it</strong>o www.rdes.<strong>it</strong> (2 <strong>di</strong>cembre 2006).26Per un’analisi dettagliata del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to della concorrenza applicato al mondo <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong> si rinviaa A. EGGER e C. STIX-HACKL, <strong>Sport</strong>s and Compet<strong>it</strong>ion Law: A Never-en<strong>di</strong>ng Story?, in E.C.L.R.2002, Sweet & Maxwell, 81.
L’autonomia e la specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong> nell’Unione Europea 23dei club che, <strong>di</strong> fatto, formano gli atleti; infine, stabilisce un periodo protettodurante il quale le parti non possono risolvere il contratto se non <strong>di</strong>etro ilpagamento <strong>di</strong> una indenn<strong>it</strong>à, al fine <strong>di</strong> garantire una certa stabil<strong>it</strong>à contrattuale.Nonostante le vivaci cr<strong>it</strong>iche da parte delle autor<strong>it</strong>à sportive, <strong>di</strong>ecianni dopo la sua emanazione, la sentenza Bosman dovrebbe essere consideratacome l’evento che ha permesso <strong>di</strong> riformare il mondo del calcio a livellomon<strong>di</strong>ale, ma non <strong>di</strong> deregolamentarlo.A tal propos<strong>it</strong>o, è opportuno ricordare che la Commissione europeain quell’occasione si è lim<strong>it</strong>ata a verificare che le proposte avanzate dallaFIFA fossero compatibili con il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario. Infatti l’ist<strong>it</strong>uzionecomun<strong>it</strong>aria non può entrare nel mer<strong>it</strong>o dei dettagli tecnici, né negoziare unaccordo e, soprattutto, essa non può dare delle garanzie sulla compatibil<strong>it</strong>ào meno con il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario <strong>di</strong> una determinata regolamentazione. 272.2.2 La deroga: sentenza LethonenLa Corte ha affermato, nella sentenza Bosman, che <strong>di</strong> fatto la cosiddetta«eccezione sportiva» esiste solo con riferimento a regole puramente sportivee dagli obiettivi leg<strong>it</strong>timi. Sulla base <strong>di</strong> questo principio, nella sentenzaLethonen 28 essa ha r<strong>it</strong>enuto che essa può essere evocata nel caso <strong>di</strong>trasferimenti <strong>di</strong> atleti in corso <strong>di</strong> stagione.Nella fattispecie il ricorrente, cestista professionista, ha chiesto allaCorte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia <strong>di</strong> pronunciarsi sulla compatibil<strong>it</strong>à tra il principio dellalibera circolazione dei lavoratori e <strong>di</strong>sposizioni regolamentari <strong>di</strong> unaf<strong>ed</strong>erazione sportiva che vietano ad una società <strong>di</strong> schierare in campo ungiocatore in una competizione nel caso in cui fosse stato ingaggiato dopouna certa data.Secondo i giu<strong>di</strong>ci, la partecipazione dei giocatori a incontri cost<strong>it</strong>uiscel’essenza della loro attiv<strong>it</strong>à, per cui una norma che vi ponga dei lim<strong>it</strong>i restringele possibil<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> impiego dei giocatori interessati. Così, norme che vietinoalle società nazionali <strong>di</strong> schierare in campo, in occasione delle part<strong>it</strong>e delcampionato, i giocatori <strong>di</strong> pallacanestro provenienti da altri Stati membri,ingaggiati dopo una certa data, cost<strong>it</strong>uiscono certamente un ostacolo allalibera circolazione dei lavoratori.Tuttavia, tale ostacolo può essere giustificato da ragioni noneconomiche, attinenti unicamente allo sport in sé.____________________27Cfr. Y. LE LOSTECQUE, Le transferts de joueurs, in Revue des Affaires européennes, A. Mys <strong>ed</strong>.,2001-2002/3, 329.28Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza Lehtonen e Castors Braine, c<strong>it</strong>..
24 Michele ColucciInfatti la fissazione <strong>di</strong> termini può mirare a ev<strong>it</strong>are <strong>di</strong> falsare laregolar<strong>it</strong>à delle competizioni, se non ecc<strong>ed</strong>e quanto necessario per conseguiretale scopo.In questo caso, la necess<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> garantire sicurezza alle competizionisportive giustifica una deroga al principio <strong>di</strong> libera circolazione dei lavoratori.2.3. La selezione degli atleti: la sentenza DeliègeNella sentenza Deliège, 29 la Corte ha in<strong>di</strong>viduato un’ulteriore deroga alTrattato CE in materia <strong>di</strong> sport. La ricorrente, una judoka esclusa da unacompetizione internazionale <strong>di</strong> judo da parte della f<strong>ed</strong>erazione nazionalebelga in base ai piazzamenti ottenuti nelle gare sportive prec<strong>ed</strong>enti, ha r<strong>it</strong>enutoche il requis<strong>it</strong>o del possesso <strong>di</strong> un’autorizzazione o <strong>di</strong> un provve<strong>di</strong>mento <strong>di</strong>selezione necessario – secondo le norme f<strong>ed</strong>erali – per poter concorrere inuna competizione internazionale violasse i suoi <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti in materia <strong>di</strong> liberaprestazione dei servizi ai sensi dell’art. 49 CE.Invest<strong>it</strong>a in via pregiu<strong>di</strong>ziale della controversia, la Corte ha ricordatoinnanz<strong>it</strong>utto che se le norme controverse hanno inev<strong>it</strong>abilmente l’effetto <strong>di</strong>lim<strong>it</strong>are il numero <strong>di</strong> partecipanti a un torneo, tale lim<strong>it</strong>azione è inerente allosvolgimento <strong>di</strong> una importante competizione sportiva internazionale, cheimplica necessariamente l’adozione <strong>di</strong> certe <strong>di</strong>sposizioni o <strong>di</strong> taluni cr<strong>it</strong>eri <strong>di</strong>selezione.Spetta naturalmente ai soggetti interessati, come gli organizzatoridei tornei, le f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni sportive o, ancora, le associazioni <strong>di</strong> atletiprofessionisti, emanare le norme appropriate <strong>ed</strong> effettuare la selezione inforza <strong>di</strong> esse. 30A questo propos<strong>it</strong>o, continua la Corte, “le norme <strong>di</strong> selezionecontroverse nelle cause principali si applicano tanto alle competizioniorganizzate all’interno della Comun<strong>it</strong>à quanto ai tornei che si svolgonoall’esterno <strong>di</strong> essa e riguardano nel contempo c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>ni degli Stati membrie c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>ni <strong>di</strong> Paesi terzi. 31 ”La posizione della Corte è che il principio <strong>di</strong> selezione è proprio<strong>dello</strong> sport e non può essere considerato un ostacolo alla libera prestazion<strong>ed</strong>ei servizi: ovviamente solo se la selezione è <strong>di</strong>scriminatoria potrà esseresanzionata alla luce del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario.____________________29Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza dell’11 aprile 2000, cause riun<strong>it</strong>e C-51/96 e C-191/97, ChristelleDeliège contro Ligue francophone de judo et <strong>di</strong>sciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judoASBL, Union européenne de judo e François Pacquée, Raccolta, 2000, I-2549.30Corte <strong>di</strong> Gius<strong>it</strong>izia, Ibidem, punto 67.31Corte <strong>di</strong> Gius<strong>it</strong>izia, Ibidem, punto 68.
L’autonomia e la specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong> nell’Unione Europea 25In questa sentenza, essa non ha analizzato gli effetti anticoncorrenzialidella norma controversa, ma si è concentrata esclusivamente sulla sua naturasportiva (la selezione degli atleti), per affermare che essa non rientranell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario a meno che non vi sia<strong>di</strong>scriminazione. 32La soluzione adottata dalla Corte nella sentenza Deliège è assimilabilealla sua giurisprudenza Keck et M<strong>it</strong>houard 33 nella quale essa ha esclusol’applicazione dell’art. 30 CE a provve<strong>di</strong>menti che lim<strong>it</strong>ano o vietano talunemodal<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> ven<strong>di</strong>ta, purché essi valgano per tutti gli operatori interessatiche eserc<strong>it</strong>ano la loro attiv<strong>it</strong>à nel terr<strong>it</strong>orio nazionale e incidano in ugualemisura, in <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to come in fatto, sullo smercio dei prodotti nazionali e deiprodotti provenienti da altri Stati membri del mercato interno a meno chenon vi sia <strong>di</strong>scriminazione. 34Lo sport, quin<strong>di</strong>, può essere oggetto <strong>di</strong> deroga rispetto al <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>tocomun<strong>it</strong>ario, ma solo sulla base <strong>di</strong> cr<strong>it</strong>eri giuri<strong>di</strong>ci che la Corte ha già stabil<strong>it</strong>onella sua giurisprudenza per altri settori.2.4. Gli agenti dei calciatori: la sentenza PiauNella sentenza Piau, 35 il Tribunale <strong>di</strong> Primo Grado ha esaminato lacompatibil<strong>it</strong>à del Regolamento FIFA sugli agenti dei calciatori con gli artt.81 e 82 CE, nella misura in cui detto regolamento con<strong>di</strong>ziona il rilascio dellalicenza <strong>di</strong> agente al superamento <strong>di</strong> un esame <strong>di</strong> idone<strong>it</strong>à e al depos<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> unagaranzia bancaria. 36Esso ha stabil<strong>it</strong>o, innanz<strong>it</strong>utto, che quella degli agenti <strong>di</strong> calciatori èun’attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica <strong>di</strong> prestazione <strong>di</strong> servizi e non un’attiv<strong>it</strong>à peculiare almondo <strong>dello</strong> sport nel senso defin<strong>it</strong>o dalla giurisprudenza della Corte.Il regolamento adottato dalla Fédération Internationale de Football(<strong>di</strong> qui in poi FIFA) cost<strong>it</strong>uisce una decisione <strong>di</strong> associazione <strong>di</strong> imprese nelsenso dell’art. 81, n. 1, CE e, dal momento che produce effetti nella Comun<strong>it</strong>à,esso deve essere conforme alle norme comun<strong>it</strong>arie in materia <strong>di</strong> concorrenza.Poiché esso è stato adottato dalla FIFA motu proprio e non in virtù____________________32Cfr. IÑAKI AGIRREAZKUENAGA, Función social y perspectiva económica del deporte en el marcocomun<strong>it</strong>ario: especial referencia a los casos Lehtonen y Deliege, in Rev. de Admin. Púb., n. 152,2000, 109-124.33Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza del 24 novembre 1993, cause riun<strong>it</strong>e C-267/91 e C-268/91, Raccolta1993, I-6097.34Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, Ibidem, punto 16.35Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza del 26 gennaio 2005, Laurent Piau contro Commissione delleComun<strong>it</strong>à europee, causa T-193/02, Raccolta, 2005, II-209.
26 Michele Colucci<strong>di</strong> poteri normativi che le sarebbero stati delegati da autor<strong>it</strong>à pubbliche pereserc<strong>it</strong>are un comp<strong>it</strong>o riconosciuto <strong>di</strong> interesse generale riguardante l’attiv<strong>it</strong>àsportiva e poichè il regolamento ha un impatto sulle libertà fondamentaligarant<strong>it</strong>e dal Trattato, secondo il Tribunale, esso non può essere prima facier<strong>it</strong>enuto compatibile con il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario.La licenza <strong>di</strong> agente <strong>di</strong> giocatori, imposta dal regolamento FIFA, perpoter esec<strong>it</strong>are detta professione, cost<strong>it</strong>uisce una barriera all’accesso a taleattiv<strong>it</strong>à economica e incide necessariamente sullo svolgimento dellaconcorrenza.Tuttavia «da un lato, la FIFA persegue un duplice obiettivo <strong>di</strong>professionalizzazione e <strong>di</strong> moralizzazione dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> agente <strong>di</strong> giocatorial fine <strong>di</strong> proteggere questi ultimi, data la brev<strong>it</strong>à della loro carriera e,dall’altro, la concorrenza non è eliminata dal sistema della licenza». 37 Dettosistema sembra dunque comportare una selezione qual<strong>it</strong>ativa, adatta asod<strong>di</strong>sfare l’obiettivo <strong>di</strong> professionalizzazione dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> agente <strong>di</strong>giocatori, piuttosto che una restrizione quant<strong>it</strong>ativa all’attiv<strong>it</strong>à stessa.Poiché le attuali con<strong>di</strong>zioni <strong>di</strong> esercizio dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> agente <strong>di</strong>giocatori sono contrassegnate da un’assenza quasi generale <strong>di</strong>regolamentazioni nazionali e dalla mancanza <strong>di</strong> organizzazione collettivadegli agenti <strong>di</strong> giocatori, le restrizioni derivanti dal carattere obbligatoriodella licenza potrebbero beneficiare <strong>di</strong> una deroga ex art. 81, n. 3, CE. 38 Inparticolare, il regolamento potrebbe fruire <strong>di</strong> un’esenzione in conform<strong>it</strong>à atale <strong>di</strong>sposizione, ove si constati che contribuisce a promuovere il progressoeconomico, riserva agli utilizzatori una congrua parte dell’utile che ne derivae non impone restrizioni che non siano in<strong>di</strong>spensabili per raggiungere taliobiettivi e non elimina la concorrenza.Inoltre, contrariamente a quanto sostenuto dalla Commissione,secondo cui l’art. 82 CE non sarebbe applicabile nella fattispecie, perché laFIFA non sarebbe un operatore economico sul mercato della consulenza aigiocatori, 39 il Tribunale ha r<strong>it</strong>enuto che la FIFA agisce su detto mercatotram<strong>it</strong>e i suoi membri, ossia le f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni nazionali e le società, che sono leacquirenti effettive dei servizi degli agenti dei giocatori.____________________36C. MOMÈGE, Le Tribunal précise dans l’affaire Piau les recours contre les décisionsd’engagements, Concurrences, in Rev. des Dro<strong>it</strong>s de la Concur., n. 2, 2005, 90-91; E. PEDILARCO,Regolamento FIFA e <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario della concorrenza, in Dir. pubbl. comp. <strong>ed</strong> europeo,2005, 871-875; F. RIZZO, «Activ<strong>it</strong>é des agents de joueurs: la réglementation FIFA validée par leTPICE», in Revue Lamy de la Concurrence: Dro<strong>it</strong>, Economie, Régulation, n. 6, 2006, 119-122.37Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza Piau, c<strong>it</strong>., punto 102.38Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza Piau, c<strong>it</strong>., punti 103-104.39Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza Piau, c<strong>it</strong>., punto 68.
L’autonomia e la specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong> nell’Unione Europea 27Dato il carattere obbligatorio del regolamento adottato dalla FIFA,le associazioni nazionali che ne sono membri e le società che esse raggruppanoappaiono durevolmente vincolate nei loro comportamenti da regole cheaccettano e che gli altri soggetti (giocatori e agenti <strong>di</strong> giocatori) non possonotrasgre<strong>di</strong>re senza incorrere in sanzioni che, nel caso particolare degli agenti<strong>di</strong> giocatori, possono arrivare fino all’espulsione dal mercato.Ciò configura, a parere del Tribunale, una posizione dominantecollettiva delle società sul mercato delle prestazioni <strong>di</strong> servizi da parte degliagenti <strong>di</strong> giocatori, poiché sono le società, tram<strong>it</strong>e la regolamentazione cuiaderiscono, che impongono le con<strong>di</strong>zioni <strong>di</strong> prestazione <strong>di</strong> detti servizi.Tuttavia, i giu<strong>di</strong>ci hanno precisato che il regolamento FIFA noncost<strong>it</strong>uisce abuso <strong>di</strong> posizione dominante, posto che esso è suscettibile <strong>di</strong>sod<strong>di</strong>sfare le con<strong>di</strong>zioni enunciate all’art. 81, n. 3, CE. 403. Regole puramente sportive3.1. La sentenza Meca Me<strong>di</strong>naCon la sentenza Meca Me<strong>di</strong>na la Corte ha stabil<strong>it</strong>o in che misura norme«puramente sportive» ovvero che vertono sulla regolar<strong>it</strong>à <strong>ed</strong> il funzionamento<strong>di</strong> una competizione, sull’integr<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> sport e sull’equilibrio compet<strong>it</strong>ivo,sono compatibili con il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario della concorrenza.Si tratta <strong>di</strong> una sentenza importante sia sul piano processuale sia suquello sostanziale: 41 per la prima volta, infatti, la Corte ha avuto la possibil<strong>it</strong>à<strong>di</strong> giu<strong>di</strong>care nel settore <strong>dello</strong> sport a segu<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> ricorso presentato dalle particontro una sentenza del Tribunale <strong>di</strong> Primo Grado anziché in via pregiu<strong>di</strong>zialesu ricorso dei giu<strong>di</strong>ci nazionali ex. art. 177 CE; inoltre, essa è intervenutasul mer<strong>it</strong>o della questione controversa chiarendola e provocando unaevoluzione importante della sua giurisprudenza.3.1.1 I fatti e l’analisi del Tribunale <strong>di</strong> Primo GradoPer meglio comprenderne l’importanza <strong>di</strong> questa sentenza e i sui riflessi sulfuturo <strong>dello</strong> sport, è opportuno analizzare brevemente i fatti dellacontroversia.____________________40Cfr. G. AUNEAU, Conséquences de l’application du dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire de la concurrence ausecteur du <strong>Sport</strong>, in Rev. de Jur. Comm., 1998, 157.41Ve<strong>di</strong> in tal senso M. WATHELET, L’arrêt Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na et Majen: plus qu’un coup dans l’eau, inJurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Bruxelles, 2006/41, 1799.
28 Michele ColucciI Sigg. Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na e Majcen sono due atleti professionisti chepraticano il nuoto <strong>di</strong> lunga <strong>di</strong>stanza. In occasione delle competizioni <strong>di</strong> Coppadel mondo <strong>di</strong> questa <strong>di</strong>sciplina sono risultati pos<strong>it</strong>ivi al test contro ilnandrolone (un anabolizzante). 42Dopo essere stati sospesi per due anni dalle competizioni sportivehanno chiesto l’accertamento dell’incompatibil<strong>it</strong>à delle <strong>di</strong>sposizioniregolamentari in materia <strong>di</strong> doping del Com<strong>it</strong>ato Olimpico Internazionale(Com<strong>it</strong>é International Olympique, <strong>di</strong> qui in poi CIO) e applicate dallaF<strong>ed</strong>erazione Internazionale Nuoto (Fédération Internationale de Natation,<strong>di</strong> qui in poi FINA), con le norme comun<strong>it</strong>arie in materia <strong>di</strong> concorrenza e <strong>di</strong>libera prestazione dei servizi. 43In particolare, tali atleti hanno contestato le regole in materia <strong>di</strong> dopingladdove prev<strong>ed</strong>ono un livello <strong>di</strong> tolleranza al nandrolone eccessivamentebasso prima che tale sostanza possa essere considerata come sostanzadopante.Secondo i ricorrenti tale soglia avrebbe scarse basi scientifiche epotrebbe condurre all’esclusione <strong>di</strong> atleti innocenti o semplicementenegligenti. Nella fattispecie, il superamento accertato della soglia <strong>di</strong> tolleranzaavrebbe potuto derivare dalla consumazione <strong>di</strong> un piatto contenente carne<strong>di</strong> verro. L’applicazione <strong>di</strong> questa normativa avrebbe condotto alla violazion<strong>ed</strong>elle libertà economiche degli atleti, garant<strong>it</strong>e in particolare dall’art. 49 CEin materia <strong>di</strong> libera prestazione dei servizi, e, dal punto <strong>di</strong> vista del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>todella concorrenza, alla violazione dei <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti che gli atleti possono invocare anorma degli artt. 81 CE e 82 CE.Il Tribunale <strong>di</strong> Primo Grado ha analizzato il regolamento sportivoalla luce degli obiettivi che si prefigge: garantire la correttezza dellecompetizioni e il fair play. In quest’ottica, ha r<strong>it</strong>enuto <strong>di</strong> classificarlo come«puramente sportivo» e, quin<strong>di</strong>, al <strong>di</strong> fuori dell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione degliartt. 39 CE e 49 CE. 44Il Tribunale ha ulteriormente r<strong>it</strong>enuto che, non essendo qualificabilecome attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica ai sensi delle <strong>di</strong>sposizioni del Trattato in materia <strong>di</strong>libera prestazione <strong>di</strong> servizi, detto regolamento sportivo è parimenti estraneoai rapporti economici che interessano la concorrenza e, <strong>di</strong> conseguenza, nonrientra neppure nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione degli artt. 81 CE <strong>ed</strong> 82 CE.____________________42Per un quadro completo della pol<strong>it</strong>ica comun<strong>it</strong>aria in materia <strong>di</strong> doping ve<strong>di</strong> J.C. LAPOUBLE,L’Europe et le dopage, in Revue des Affaires Européennes, 2001-2002/3, A. M. Mys <strong>ed</strong>., 390.43Commissione Europea, caso COMP/38158, Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na e Majcen/CIO.44Cfr. P. I. COLOMO, The Application of EC Treaty Rules to <strong>Sport</strong>: the Approach of the EuropeanCourt of First Instance in the Meca Me<strong>di</strong>na and Piau cases, in Entertainment and <strong>Sport</strong>s LawJournal, January 2006, <strong>di</strong>sponibile su go.warwick.ac.uk/eslj/issues/volume3/number2/colomo
L’autonomia e la specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong> nell’Unione Europea 293.1.2 L’analisi della CorteNell’esaminare la controversia in appello la Corte ha innanz<strong>it</strong>utto riba<strong>di</strong>toun principio costante della sua giurisprudenza: considerati gli obiettivi dellaComun<strong>it</strong>à, l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva è <strong>di</strong>sciplinata dal <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario in quantosia configurabile come attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica ai sensi dell’art. 2 CE. 45Di conseguenza, quando essa riveste il carattere <strong>di</strong> una prestazione<strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato o <strong>di</strong> una prestazione <strong>di</strong> servizi retribu<strong>it</strong>a, come nelcaso dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à degli sportivi professionisti o semiprofessionisti, essa rientranell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione degli artt. 39 CE e ss. in materia <strong>di</strong> liberacircolazione delle persone o degli artt. 49 CE e ss. sulla libera prestazion<strong>ed</strong>ei servizi. 46Tali <strong>di</strong>sposizioni comun<strong>it</strong>arie non <strong>di</strong>sciplinano soltanto gli atti delleautor<strong>it</strong>à pubbliche, ma anche quelli emanati dalle f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni sportive quandoregolamentano il lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato e le prestazioni <strong>di</strong> servizi. 47La Corte ha riconosciuto, innanz<strong>it</strong>utto, la <strong>di</strong>fficoltà <strong>di</strong> separare gliaspetti economici un’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva da quelli meramente sportivi.Allo stesso tempo, ha sottolineato che i <strong>di</strong>vieti contenuti nelle norm<strong>ed</strong>el Trattato sopra richiamate non riguardano le regole che vertono suquestioni che interessano esclusivamente lo sport e che, come tali, sonoestranee all’attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica. 48In altre parole, le norme e la prassi giustificate da motivi noneconomici e che riguardano la natura e il contesto «specifici» <strong>di</strong> talunecompetizioni sportive non sono contrarie alle <strong>di</strong>sposizioni comun<strong>it</strong>arie sullalibera circolazione delle persone e dei servizi. 49Tuttavia, questo principio importante deve essere interpretato inmaniera restr<strong>it</strong>tiva e non può essere invocato per escludere un’intera attiv<strong>it</strong>àsportiva dalla sfera d’applicazione del Trattato, 50 né, soprattutto, per escluderetout court l’applicazione degli articoli 81 e 82 CE alle cosiddette norme“puramente sportive”.In un passaggio fondamentale e alquanto controverso 51 della sua____________________(7 <strong>di</strong>cembre 2006).45Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza Meca Me<strong>di</strong>na, c<strong>it</strong>., punto 22.46Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza Meca Me<strong>di</strong>na, c<strong>it</strong>., punto 23.47Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, c<strong>it</strong>ate sentenze Deliège, punto 47, nonché Lethonen e Castors Braine, punto35.48Cfr. in tal senso, Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza Walrave e Koch, c<strong>it</strong>., punto 8.49Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza Donà, punti 14 e 15, c<strong>it</strong>..50Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, c<strong>it</strong>ate sentenze Bosman, punto 76, e Deliège, punto 43.51Cfr. G. INFANTINO, Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na: Un passo in<strong>di</strong>etro per il Mo<strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong>ivo Europeo e laSpecific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong>?, <strong>di</strong>sponibile sul s<strong>it</strong>o www.uefa.com/Multime<strong>di</strong>aFiles/Download/uefa/
30 Michele Coluccisentenza, infatti, la Corte ha affermato che anche se tali norme noncost<strong>it</strong>uiscono restrizioni alla libera circolazione, perché sono «puramentesportive» 52 e, come tali, estranee all’attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica, una siffattacircostanza non implica né che l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva interessata si sottragganecessariamente all’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione degli artt. 81 CE e 82 CE né chele dette norme non sod<strong>di</strong>sfino i presupposti d’applicazione propri dei dettiarticoli.Su queste basi la Corte ha annullato la sentenza del Tribunale <strong>di</strong>primo grado, posto che tale sentenza non ha escluso l’applicabil<strong>it</strong>à degliarticoli 81 e 82 CE alle regole in questione, in considerazione del fatto cheesse cost<strong>it</strong>uissero norme “puramente sportive”.Nell’analisi del mer<strong>it</strong>o, tuttavia, la Corte ha ricordato che lacompatibil<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> una regolamentazione con le norme comun<strong>it</strong>arie in materia<strong>di</strong> concorrenza non può essere valutata in astratto. 53 Secondo giurisprudenzacostante, infatti, non ogni accordo tra imprese o ogni decisione <strong>di</strong> unaassociazione <strong>di</strong> imprese che restringa la libertà d’azione delle parti o <strong>di</strong> una<strong>di</strong> esse ricade necessariamente sotto il <strong>di</strong>vieto sanc<strong>it</strong>o all’art. 81, n. 1, CE. 54Sulla base della sentenza Wouters 55 la Corte ha stabil<strong>it</strong>o che ai finidell’applicazione <strong>di</strong> tale <strong>di</strong>sposizione ad un caso <strong>di</strong> specie, occorre innanz<strong>it</strong>uttotener conto del «contesto globale» in cui la decisione dell’associazione <strong>di</strong>imprese in questione è stata adottata o <strong>di</strong>spiega i suoi effetti e, più inparticolare, dei suoi obiettivi. Inoltre, occorre verificare se gli effetti restr<strong>it</strong>tividella concorrenza che ne derivano attengono al perseguimento <strong>di</strong> tali obiettivie se siano ad essi proporzionati. 56____________________KeyTopics/480784_DOWNLOAD.pdf (2 <strong>di</strong>cembre 2006). L’autore soffermandosi sul contenutodella sentenza ha rilevato mancanza <strong>di</strong> logic<strong>it</strong>à nell’analisi della Corte.52Sentenza Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na, c<strong>it</strong>. punto 31. Si attira l’attenzione del lettore sul fatto che la versionefrancese della sentenza rec<strong>it</strong>a: “Aussi, à supposer même que ces règles ne const<strong>it</strong>uent pas desrestrictions à la libre circulation parce qu’elles portent sur des questions intéressant uniquementle sport et sont en tant que telles, étrangères à l’activ<strong>it</strong>é économique, cette circonstance n’impliqueni que l’activ<strong>it</strong>é sportive concernée échappe nécessairement au champ d’application des articles81 CE et 82 CE, ni que les<strong>di</strong>tes règles ne rempliraient pas les con<strong>di</strong>tions d’application propresaux <strong>di</strong>ts articles”.53Ibidem, punto 42.54Sentenza 15 settembre 1998, cause riun<strong>it</strong>e T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 e T-388/94, EuropeanNight Services e altri c. Commissione, punto 136; v. anche sentenza 17 novembre 1987, cause142/84 e 156/84, BAT e Reynolds c. Commissione, Raccolta, 4487, punto 38 e sentenza 18settembre 2001, T-112/99, Métropole Télévision c. Commissione, Raccolta, II-2459, punto 76.55Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza del 19 febbraio 2002, causa C-309/99, J. C. J. Wouters, J. W.Savelbergh e Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV contro Algemene Raad van de N<strong>ed</strong>erlandseOrde van Advocaten, con l’intervento <strong>di</strong>: Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap,Raccolta, 2002, I-1577.56Sentenza Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na, c<strong>it</strong>. punto 42. Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia sentenza del 19 febbraio 2002. causa
L’autonomia e la specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong> nell’Unione Europea 31L’obiettivo della norma controversa è la lotta al doping in vista <strong>di</strong>uno svolgimento leale della competizione sportiva; essa include la necess<strong>it</strong>à<strong>di</strong> assicurare la par<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> chances tra gli atleti, la loro salute, l’integr<strong>it</strong>à el’obiettiv<strong>it</strong>à della competizione nonché i valori etici nello sport.Dato che per garantire l’esecuzione del <strong>di</strong>vieto del doping sononecessarie sanzioni, l’effetto <strong>di</strong> queste ultime sulla libertà d’azione degli atletiva considerato, in linea <strong>di</strong> principio, come inerente alle regole antidoping.Quin<strong>di</strong>, anche qualora si r<strong>it</strong>enga che la regolamentazione antidopingvada considerata una decisione <strong>di</strong> associazioni <strong>di</strong> imprese che lim<strong>it</strong>a la libertàd’azione dei ricorrenti, essa non può, tuttavia, cost<strong>it</strong>uire necessariamenteuna restrizione <strong>di</strong> concorrenza incompatibile con il mercato comune ai sensidell’art. 81 CE, perché è giustificata da un obiettivo leg<strong>it</strong>timo.Una lim<strong>it</strong>azione del genere riguarda l’organizzazione e il correttosvolgimento della competizione sportiva, <strong>ed</strong> è proprio finalizzata ad assicurareun sano spir<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> emulazione tra gli atleti.La Corte ha r<strong>it</strong>enuto, poi, che la natura repressiva dellaregolamentazione antidoping controversa e la grav<strong>it</strong>à delle sanzioni applicabiliin caso <strong>di</strong> sua violazione sono in grado <strong>di</strong> produrre effetti negativi sullaconcorrenza. Infatti nel caso in cui tali sanzioni si avverassero immotivate,esse potrebbero comportare l’ingiustificata esclusione dell’atleta dallecompetizioni e dunque falsare le con<strong>di</strong>zioni <strong>di</strong> esercizio dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à inquestione.Di conseguenza, per potersi sottrarre al <strong>di</strong>vieto sanc<strong>it</strong>o dall’art. 81,n. 1, CE, le restrizioni imposte da tale regolamentazione devono lim<strong>it</strong>arsi aquanto è necessario per assicurare il corretto svolgimento della competizionesportiva. 57Una regolamentazione del genere potrebbe infatti risultare eccessiva,da un lato nella determinazione delle con<strong>di</strong>zioni atte a fissare la linea <strong>di</strong>demarcazione tra le s<strong>it</strong>uazioni che rientrano nel doping sanzionabile e quelleche non vi rientrano, e dall’altro nella sever<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> dette sanzioni.Sulla base <strong>di</strong> queste considerazioni e poiché i ricorrenti non hannoprecisato il livello <strong>di</strong> soglia <strong>di</strong> tolleranza in questione, i giu<strong>di</strong>ci hanno r<strong>it</strong>enutoche le norme controverse non vanno al <strong>di</strong> là <strong>di</strong> quanto necessario perassicurare lo svolgimento e il corretto funzionamento delle competizionisportive e che le sanzioni irrogate non sono sproporzionate.____________________C-309/99, J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh e Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV controAlgemene Raad van de N<strong>ed</strong>erlandse Orde van Advocaten, con l’intervento <strong>di</strong>: Raad van de Baliesvan de Europese Gemeenschap, Raccolta, 2002, I-1577.57Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, sentenza Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na, c<strong>it</strong>., punto 47.
32 Michele Colucci4. Lo scenario dopo la sentenza Meca Me<strong>di</strong>naL’analisi della giurisprudenza della Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia ha <strong>di</strong>mostrato che losport a livello comun<strong>it</strong>ario non è sinonimo <strong>di</strong> eccezione in senso assoluto,ma può essere senz’altro oggetto <strong>di</strong> deroghe.In futuro l’autonomia delle organizzazioni sportive nazionali e<strong>di</strong>nternazionali, nonché la specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> sport, continueranno ad essere presein considerazione dalla Commissione europea e dalla Corte <strong>di</strong> Giustizia, masempre nel rispetto dei <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti e delle libertà garant<strong>it</strong>e nel Trattato.In altri termini, le f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni sportive e le leghe saranno responsabilidell’organizzazione e dei regolamenti delle rispettive <strong>di</strong>scipline, ma dovrannoispirarsi al principio della ragionevolezza e della proporzional<strong>it</strong>à, anche nelcaso <strong>di</strong> norme «puramente sportive».Infatti, a segu<strong>it</strong>o della sentenza Meca Me<strong>di</strong>na, in<strong>di</strong>pendentement<strong>ed</strong>all’impatto economico sul mercato che determinate misure sportive potrannoavere, esse dovranno essere proporzionate al conseguimento <strong>di</strong> obiettivileg<strong>it</strong>timi per essere compatibili con le <strong>di</strong>sposizioni rilevanti in materia <strong>di</strong>concorrenza.In particolare, tutte le sanzioni <strong>di</strong>sciplinari in amb<strong>it</strong>o sportivo potrannoessere oggetto <strong>di</strong> ricorso sia alle autor<strong>it</strong>à nazionali sia a quelle comun<strong>it</strong>arie.Esse, invero, potranno essere defin<strong>it</strong>e come delle «misure o con<strong>di</strong>zioni perl’esercizio <strong>di</strong> un’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva» e, quin<strong>di</strong>, impe<strong>di</strong>re a un atleta <strong>di</strong> lavorareo a un club <strong>di</strong> partecipare a competizioni sportive con gravi conseguenzeeconomiche.In quest’ottica anche la formulazione <strong>di</strong> un calendario internazionaleche prev<strong>ed</strong>a una serie f<strong>it</strong>ta <strong>di</strong> incontri e la decisione <strong>di</strong> ridurre il numero <strong>di</strong>club in un campionato nazionale potrebbero essere sottoposte al vaglio delleautor<strong>it</strong>à competenti per stabilire se esse si lim<strong>it</strong>ano allo stretto necessarioper proteggere la competizione sportiva.Se si guarda, inoltre, alla storia dei nostri giorni, le stesse sanzionisportive che comportano la retrocessione <strong>di</strong> una squadra in una serie inferioreovvero una penalizzazione in classifica, potrebbero essere r<strong>it</strong>enute dellemisure non «proporzionate» ai sensi della normativa sulla concorrenza.La loro compatibil<strong>it</strong>à con il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario, tuttavia, non potràessere valutata in astratto o in termini generali, ma caso per caso e sulla base<strong>di</strong> elementi che possano effettivamente giustificare dei ricorsi al giu<strong>di</strong>ceor<strong>di</strong>nario in via pregiu<strong>di</strong>ziale o <strong>di</strong>rettamente alla Commissione europea inmateria <strong>di</strong> concorrenza.Peraltro, dal momento che tutte le regolamentazioni sportive
L’autonomia e la specific<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong> nell’Unione Europea 33internazionali e nazionali sono state pensate <strong>ed</strong> emanate soprattutto a <strong>di</strong>fesadell’equilibrio delle competizioni e degli interessi degli affiliati, occorreràche le stesse f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni le rielaborino anche alla luce delle decisioni pres<strong>ed</strong>alle ist<strong>it</strong>uzioni comun<strong>it</strong>arie.Esse non dovranno necessariamente stravolgere le proprie norme,ma dovranno concepirle in maniera tale da prendere in considerazione i <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>tidei c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>ni comun<strong>it</strong>ari e i principi alla base <strong>di</strong> una concorrenza sportiva, maanche «economica» leale.Lo sport, infatti, ha bisogno <strong>di</strong> norme cre<strong>di</strong>bili che prendano inconsiderazione gli interessi <strong>di</strong> tutte le parti interessate, che siano logiche eproporzionali al fine persegu<strong>it</strong>o e che, magari, si ispirino a semplici regole«<strong>di</strong> buon senso».
RIVISTA DI ISSN 1825-6678DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA DELLO SPORT Vol. II, Fasc. 2, 2006L’ALLENATORE DILETTANTE NON PUO’ ESSERELAVORATORE SUBORDINATONota a Sentenza Corte <strong>di</strong> Appello <strong>di</strong> Venezia, Sez. Lavoro,21 marzo 2006, n. 173<strong>di</strong> Mattia Grassani*SOMMARIO: 1. L’inquadramento della fattispecie – 2. Il lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato, illavoro autonomo e l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante: la reale volontàdelle parti – 3. La natura giuri<strong>di</strong>ca del rapporto tra associazione sportiva<strong>ed</strong> allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante. La null<strong>it</strong>à del contratto per non mer<strong>it</strong>e volezzadell’interesse giuri<strong>di</strong>co – 4. Conclusioni1. L’inquadramento della fattispecieLa decisione del Giu<strong>di</strong>ce del lavoro <strong>di</strong> Belluno, che ha riconosciuto la naturasubor<strong>di</strong>nata del rapporto intercorso tra l’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante <strong>ed</strong> una societàpartecipante al campionato <strong>di</strong> 1° categoria regionale del Veneto, riformatadalla sentenza in commento, presta il fianco a <strong>di</strong>versi rilievi cr<strong>it</strong>ici sia in tema<strong>di</strong> ricostruzione generale della fattispecie, sia in or<strong>di</strong>ne alle motivazion<strong>it</strong>ecniche addotte a supporto.Sotto il primo profilo emerge in modo evidente la lacuna <strong>di</strong> fondo,cioè l’omessa valutazione, da parte dell’organo <strong>di</strong> prime cure, della normativaf<strong>ed</strong>erale che <strong>di</strong>sciplina i rapporti tra società partecipanti ai campionatiorganizzati dalla Lega Nazionale Dilettanti (<strong>di</strong> segu<strong>it</strong>o LND) e allenatoriper queste tesserati.____________________*Docente <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to <strong>dello</strong> sport presso le Univers<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> Bologna, Firenze, Milano e Cagliari. Èavvocato specializzato in <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to sportivo, t<strong>it</strong>olare dell’omonimo stu<strong>di</strong>o legale associato, con s<strong>ed</strong>ein Bologna.
36 Mattia GrassaniLa circostanza, pacifica, che la compagine convenuta, all’epoca deifatti, non partecipasse ad un campionato “professionistico”, comportaspecifici effetti giuri<strong>di</strong>ci, come del resto già r<strong>it</strong>enuto dal primo giu<strong>di</strong>cante; inprimis l’inapplicabil<strong>it</strong>à, al caso <strong>di</strong> specie, della normativa <strong>di</strong> cui alla L. n.91/1981, atteso che essa si rivolge alle posizioni giuri<strong>di</strong>che delle formazionimil<strong>it</strong>anti in amb<strong>it</strong>o professionistico (A, B, C-1 e C-2), le quali tesseranoatleti e tecnici (appunto) “professionisti”.Di qui l’esigenza <strong>di</strong> in<strong>di</strong>viduare una <strong>di</strong>versa fonte regolatrice dellafattispecie in esame, al fine precipuo <strong>di</strong> verificare la correttezza dellaricostruzione - rinvio ai principi <strong>ed</strong> alle <strong>di</strong>sposizioni in materia <strong>di</strong> rapporto <strong>di</strong>lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato - operata dal Collegio <strong>di</strong> appello, attesa, come si v<strong>ed</strong>rà,la viziata ricostruzione logico – giuri<strong>di</strong>ca del giu<strong>di</strong>ce <strong>di</strong> prime cure.Ma è proprio questo il punto nodale: l’assenza, per gli allenatori nonprofessionisti che prestino attiv<strong>it</strong>à formativa in favore <strong>di</strong> società associatealla LND, <strong>di</strong> una normativa statuale speciale (come quella, invece, previstaper i giocatori “professionisti”, ex L. 23 marzo 1981, n. 91), è <strong>di</strong> per sécon<strong>di</strong>zione sufficiente, ai fini della risoluzione delle controversie che possonosorgere con le rispettive società <strong>di</strong> appartenenza, per far ricorso alle normegenerali in materia <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato?O, piuttosto, è necessario un ulteriore sforzo interpretativo tendentea in<strong>di</strong>viduare, magari al <strong>di</strong> fuori del libro V del co<strong>di</strong>ce civile (quello de<strong>di</strong>catoal lavoro), un’altra <strong>di</strong>sciplina che meglio si adatti a regolamentare la specific<strong>it</strong>àdella relazione de qua?Giova in propos<strong>it</strong>o osservare come, in<strong>di</strong>pendentemente dalla rispostaal ques<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> cui sopra, preliminarmente sia d’obbligo - <strong>ed</strong> è questa la primagrave lacuna che si rinviene nella motivazione del primo giu<strong>di</strong>ce - prendereatto della circostanza che esiste una normativa (calcistica) f<strong>ed</strong>erale relativa(anche) alle società <strong>di</strong> calcio “non professionistiche” nonché ai rispettiv<strong>it</strong>esserati, e <strong>di</strong> conseguenza tenerne conto in s<strong>ed</strong>e <strong>di</strong> inquadramento giuri<strong>di</strong>co.Tanto il Giu<strong>di</strong>ce monocratico non ha posto in essere e su questoaspetto la Corte <strong>di</strong> Appello ha mosso le sue ra<strong>di</strong>cali censure che hanno portatoall’accoglimento del gravame.Del resto, sotto il profilo delle fonti del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to tale <strong>di</strong>sciplina speciale,volontariamente accettata dalle parti, non poteva essere ignorata, atteso chela stessa è prevista, richiamata e presupposta da <strong>di</strong>verse <strong>di</strong>sposizioni <strong>di</strong> legge:per tutte v<strong>ed</strong>asi l’art. 16 del d.lgs. n. 242/99 che così <strong>di</strong>spone: «Le F<strong>ed</strong>erazionisportive nazionali sono rette da norme statutarie e regolamentari …».Per quanto nell’o<strong>di</strong>erno esame si debba far fronte alle previsionilavoristiche dell’intesa negoziale esistente tra un allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante (<strong>di</strong> 3°
L’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non può essere lavoratore subor<strong>di</strong>nato 37categoria) <strong>ed</strong> una squadra partecipante ad un campionato regionale (1°categoria), in primis, appare, comunque, necessario proc<strong>ed</strong>ere ad una<strong>di</strong>samina del rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato tout court: ciò in quanto, perlegge, si presume tale il rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro intercorrente tra qualsivogliasportivo (professionista) e la società, essendo, invece, tassative e lim<strong>it</strong>ate leipotesi <strong>di</strong> lavoro autonomo.Ciò nell’ottica <strong>di</strong> comprendere le <strong>di</strong>fferenze sussistenti tra il rapporto<strong>di</strong> lavoro <strong>di</strong>sciplinato ad hoc per l’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo e gli innumerevoli,<strong>di</strong>versi, rapporti che non <strong>di</strong>spongono <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>scipline legislative o collettivespecifiche, ma <strong>di</strong> semplici <strong>di</strong>rettive emanate dalla FIGC o dalla LNDattraverso la propria potestà regolamentare (norme organizzative interne,regolamento <strong>di</strong> lega e comunicati ufficiali).Il cosiddetto or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo è, come già affermato e recep<strong>it</strong>odalla normativa nazionale, un or<strong>di</strong>namento che, ancorché irrilevante rispettoa quello statale, deve considerarsi ad ogni effetto giuri<strong>di</strong>co. 1 Ciò determinal’applicazione delle norme <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to sostanziale (e processuale) or<strong>di</strong>nario invia sussi<strong>di</strong>aria rispetto alle <strong>di</strong>verse normative <strong>di</strong> settore, che declinano spessola loro applicabil<strong>it</strong>à proprio perché non omnicomprensive delle s<strong>it</strong>uazionigiuri<strong>di</strong>che, in particolare <strong>di</strong> quelle negoziali, che si sviluppano nella praticasportiva. Non solo con riferimento allo sport <strong>di</strong>lettantistico, per il quale ci siimmerge completamente nel <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to civile, data la vacanza <strong>di</strong> una <strong>di</strong>sciplinaadeguata e certa, ma, anche, con riferimento allo sport professionistico, peril quale, per quanto attiene alle s<strong>it</strong>uazioni <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato <strong>ed</strong> autonomo,sono intervenuti <strong>di</strong>versi provve<strong>di</strong>menti normativi.Il legislatore sportivo non qualifica, a priori, la natura del rapportotra le società e le altre figure degli sportivi professionisti – allenatori, <strong>di</strong>rettor<strong>it</strong>ecnico-sportivi, preparatori atletici – e ciò ha indotto la dottrina e lagiurisprudenza a sostenere che il lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato non sia presunto, masia «l’ipotesi tipicamente ricorrente», 2 data la <strong>di</strong>versa attiv<strong>it</strong>à lavorativasvolta, caratterizzata da un profondo inserimento nell’organizzazione dellasocietà, con la conseguenza che la natura del rapporto «dovrà essere accertata<strong>di</strong> volta in volta, attraverso l’applicazione dei cr<strong>it</strong>eri forn<strong>it</strong>i dal <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>tocomune del lavoro».In estrema sintesi:____________________1Ciò in base all’ormai recep<strong>it</strong>o principio della plural<strong>it</strong>à degli or<strong>di</strong>namenti giuri<strong>di</strong>ci teorizzato daS. ROMANO, nell’Or<strong>di</strong>namento giuri<strong>di</strong>co, Sansoni, Firenze, 1945.2W. BIGIAVI, <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> <strong>Sport</strong>ivo, UTET, Torino, 1998; S. MAZZAMUTO, in Ist<strong>it</strong>uzioni <strong>di</strong> <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> Privato,Giappichelli, Torino, 1997; F. MAZZIOTTI, <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> Del Lavoro, Napoli, 1998; R. SCOGNAMIGLIO,<strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> del Lavoro, Napoli, 1990.
38 Mattia Grassania) il contratto <strong>di</strong> lavoro sportivo, pur essendo un contratto a tempodeterminato, è stato <strong>di</strong>sciplinato in modo <strong>di</strong>fforme al fine <strong>di</strong> adeguarloalle esigenze del mondo sportivo, attraverso la normativa del contrattoa termine introdotto dalla L. n. 230/1962, ora sost<strong>it</strong>u<strong>it</strong>a dal d. lgs n.368/2001.b) Il contratto collettivo <strong>di</strong> lavoro è <strong>di</strong>venuto strumento <strong>di</strong>regolamentazione del trattamento economico e normativo dei contrattiin<strong>di</strong>viduali, cui si ricorre anche in àmb<strong>it</strong>o sportivo, per regolare i rapportidegli sportivi professionisti. 3c) Infine, è <strong>di</strong> necessaria importanza, nonché <strong>di</strong> specifico capo <strong>di</strong>argomentazione nella <strong>di</strong>samina del caso <strong>di</strong> specie, la L. n. 91/81, che haintrodotto una normativa specifica per il lavoro sportivo professionistico,ivi compresa la figura dell’allenatore <strong>di</strong> calcio.La L. n. 91/81, nonostante se ne r<strong>it</strong>enga necessaria una revisione, haconsegu<strong>it</strong>o risultati importanti, almeno per buona parte del periodo <strong>di</strong> vigenza.Precisamente, ha forn<strong>it</strong>o la definizione <strong>di</strong> professionismo sportivo,che mancava fino ad allora, regolando, per la prima volta, il contratto <strong>di</strong>lavoro sportivo, inteso come quell’accordo che dà luogo al rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavorointercorrente tra società e sportivi professionisti, introducendo <strong>di</strong>verse forme<strong>di</strong> tutela per entrambe le categorie.Ha reso obbligatoria, infatti, la tutela san<strong>it</strong>aria, l’indenn<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>preparazione e promozione (ora sost<strong>it</strong>u<strong>it</strong>a con il premio <strong>di</strong> addestramento e<strong>di</strong> formazione tecnica), le assicurazioni contro gli infortuni, il trattamentopensionistico, e soprattutto ha abol<strong>it</strong>o il «vincolo sportivo», che fino a quelmomento aveva fatto del calciatore e dell’allenatore, i soggetti privilegiati<strong>di</strong> codesto intervento legislativo, un’autentica «merce <strong>di</strong> scambio».Un ulteriore obiettivo della legge era la qualificazione giuri<strong>di</strong>ca delrapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro tra le società e gli sportivi professionisti (atleti, <strong>di</strong>rettor<strong>it</strong>ecnico-sportivi, allenatori, preparatori atletici) scopo, questo, solo in parterealizzato, riferendosi il legislatore esclusivamente al rapporto tra società<strong>ed</strong> atleti, e non a quello con gli altri professionisti e soprattutto con esclusione____________________3Il contratto collettivo degli allenatori professionisti <strong>di</strong> calcio, regolante il loro trattamentoeconomico e normativo, è stipulato dall’Associazione Italiana Allenatori <strong>di</strong> Calcio (AIAC), checost<strong>it</strong>uisce il cosiddetto sindacato degli allenatori, con le società sportive professionistiche, <strong>ed</strong> èmodellato su un Contratto – Tipo cost<strong>it</strong>uente il mo<strong>dello</strong> contrattuale cui si deve uniformarel’accordo in<strong>di</strong>viduale. La m<strong>ed</strong>esima <strong>di</strong>sciplina non può essere estesa all’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante, laquale dovrà essere in<strong>di</strong>viduata sulla scorta del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to sostanziale or<strong>di</strong>nario. Come in<strong>di</strong>viduato,infatti, dal Regolamento del Settore Tecnico della FIGC, gli allenatori si <strong>di</strong>vidono in professionistie <strong>di</strong>lettanti <strong>di</strong> calcio, a seconda dei livelli <strong>di</strong> preparazione con i relativi esami sostenuti che liv<strong>ed</strong>ono via via configurati come allenatori <strong>di</strong> 3°, 2°, 1° categoria.
L’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non può essere lavoratore subor<strong>di</strong>nato 39del grande mondo del <strong>di</strong>lettantismo, base cost<strong>it</strong>utiva e serbatoio inesauribil<strong>ed</strong>ello sport professionistico.Il quadro normativo, per quanto dai contorni defin<strong>it</strong>i nello sportprofessionistico, <strong>di</strong>viene assai precario <strong>ed</strong> affidato ai vari regolamenti <strong>di</strong>settore quando l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à agonistica non è più sotto i riflettori, nonostante,come nella controversia commentata, siano stati il regolamento organizzativointerno e quello <strong>di</strong> Lega a determinare la pronuncia del Collegio. Il tuttome<strong>di</strong>ante attribuzione al rapporto tra l’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante e la formazionenon professionistica della natura giuri<strong>di</strong>ca <strong>di</strong> contratto <strong>di</strong> allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante,nomen iuris in<strong>di</strong>viduato dalle parti, senza con ciò richiamare né esplic<strong>it</strong>amentené implic<strong>it</strong>amente la normativa inerente al contratto <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato esancendone per ciò solo la null<strong>it</strong>à per non mer<strong>it</strong>evolezza dell’interessegiuri<strong>di</strong>co da tutelare con siffatto negozio.È, comunque, innegabile che, con la L. n. 91/81, si sia giunti, nella<strong>di</strong>sciplina <strong>dello</strong> sport professionistico, ad un’effettiva tutela della «personal<strong>it</strong>à»<strong>dello</strong> sportivo fino a quel momento inesistente, nonchè ad una piùsod<strong>di</strong>sfacente valorizzazione dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à agonistica, grazie alla maggioretrasparenza dell’organizzazione e gestione dei sodalizi sportivi. Tale riflessolo si è avuto anche nel mondo <strong>di</strong>lettantistico, per quanto debba r<strong>it</strong>enersi,come correttamente in<strong>di</strong>viduato dal Tribunale in primo grado, l’inapplicabil<strong>it</strong>àdella precisata normativa, idonea comunque ad in<strong>di</strong>viduare, al suo art. 2, la<strong>di</strong>stinzione ist<strong>it</strong>uzionale tra attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>lettantesca e attiv<strong>it</strong>à professionistica.In altre parole, la base dell’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo risulta cost<strong>it</strong>u<strong>it</strong>a, alivello periferico, da una variegata costellazione <strong>di</strong> associazioni e societàsportive che possono essere <strong>di</strong> tipo <strong>di</strong>lettantistico e professionistico.Le società <strong>di</strong>lettantistiche sono per lo più cost<strong>it</strong>u<strong>it</strong>e sotto forma <strong>di</strong>associazioni non riconosciute <strong>ed</strong> operano secondo le <strong>di</strong>sposizioni del co<strong>di</strong>cecivile. A segu<strong>it</strong>o del riconoscimento da parte delle f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni, sono peròassoggettate alla <strong>di</strong>sciplina <strong>ed</strong> ai controlli (anche <strong>di</strong> natura finanziaria) che ilCONI e le f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni <strong>di</strong>spongono nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o della specifica <strong>di</strong>sciplina <strong>di</strong>riferimento. Esse, proprio perché <strong>di</strong> carattere <strong>di</strong>lettantistico, non possonostipulare contratti con atleti professionisti.Le società professionistiche sono invece leg<strong>it</strong>timate ad assumere atletiprofessionisti stipulando con essi contratti a t<strong>it</strong>olo oneroso, ma solo acon<strong>di</strong>zione che siano cost<strong>it</strong>u<strong>it</strong>e nella «forma <strong>di</strong> società per azioni o <strong>di</strong> societàa responsabil<strong>it</strong>à lim<strong>it</strong>ata» (art. 10, co. 1, l. 91/81).Questa <strong>di</strong>stinzione deve essere operata anche per gli atleti, coloroche effettivamente praticano l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva. Il <strong>di</strong>scrimen tra <strong>di</strong>lettanti eprofessionisti è rappresentato proprio dal rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro intercorrente
40 Mattia Grassanicon la società/associazione sportiva. Dilettanti, e non subor<strong>di</strong>nato è il relativorapporto, sono gli atleti (ivi compresi gli allenatori) vincolati ad una societàda un contratto non <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato che prev<strong>ed</strong>a una retribuzioneavente natura <strong>di</strong> corrispettivo rispetto all’attiv<strong>it</strong>à svolta.Lo sport è dunque imbrigliato da una f<strong>it</strong>ta rete <strong>di</strong> norme <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>topos<strong>it</strong>ivo volte ad assicurarne la promozione e lo sviluppo, in conform<strong>it</strong>àall’interesse pubblicistico, sussunto tra le final<strong>it</strong>à <strong>dello</strong> Stato, <strong>di</strong> promozionee <strong>di</strong> sviluppo della pratica sportiva. L’apparente libertà dell’or<strong>di</strong>namento<strong>di</strong>lettantistico è però frustrata dalla <strong>di</strong>screzional<strong>it</strong>à del potere giuris<strong>di</strong>zionale,che non è soltanto bouche de la loi, ma interviene, oltre che a ius <strong>di</strong>cere, aius facere, demandando all’in<strong>di</strong>viduale intervento dell’organo giuris<strong>di</strong>zionalecompetente la definizione delle controversie tra i soggetti giuri<strong>di</strong>cidell’or<strong>di</strong>namento, i cui rapporti trovano regolamentazione esclusivamentenella loro fase patologica.Questo è precisamente il caso <strong>di</strong> specie.Tra un allenatore <strong>di</strong> 3° categoria <strong>ed</strong> un associazione sportiva<strong>di</strong>lettantistica (ovviamente non riconosciuta) «era stato stipulato un accordoverbale <strong>di</strong> collaborazione biennale per lo svolgimento dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>allenatore della squadra della società, mil<strong>it</strong>ante nel campionato <strong>di</strong> 1°categoria». Il rapporto, però, veniva risolto pochi mesi dopo la stipula.Il giu<strong>di</strong>ce <strong>di</strong> prime cure, secondo la normativa <strong>di</strong> settore che devenecessariamente conformarsi al regolamento della LND (art. 42, co. 1),avrebbe dovuto <strong>di</strong>chiarare come non subor<strong>di</strong>nato il rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro degliallenatori <strong>di</strong>lettanti nelle categorie regionali, il quale «deve intendersi a t<strong>it</strong>ologratu<strong>it</strong>o e gli eventuali accor<strong>di</strong> economici tra le parti devono essere stipulatiin forma scr<strong>it</strong>ta». Invece, «accertato che il ricorrente [l’allenatore] avevasvolto in favore dell’associazione calcistica resistente attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> allenator<strong>ed</strong>ella prima squadra» e che «non incideva sulla vali<strong>di</strong>tà del contrattostipulato oralmente la previsione dell’art. 42, comma 2, del Regolamentodella Lega Nazionale Dilettanti», il Tribunale <strong>di</strong> Belluno ha stabil<strong>it</strong>o che ilrapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro «andava qualificato come <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato essendoemerso dalle testimonianze assunte che la prestazione era inser<strong>it</strong>afunzionalmente <strong>ed</strong> organicamente nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à lavorativa dellaconvenuta e svolta me<strong>di</strong>ante utilizzo delle strutture <strong>di</strong> questa e senzaautonoma organizzazione <strong>di</strong> impresa».L’argumentum principis che ha portato all’inammissibileragionamento meta-giuri<strong>di</strong>co, opportunamente riformato in appello, si èfondato sul travisamento della normativa <strong>di</strong> settore, in combinato <strong>di</strong>spostocon l’art. 1322 c.c., nemmeno preso in considerazione. Infatti, l’inapplicabil<strong>it</strong>à
L’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non può essere lavoratore subor<strong>di</strong>nato 41dell’art. 42 del Regolamento LND <strong>di</strong>scenderebbe da tre or<strong>di</strong>ni <strong>di</strong> ragioni:i) «all’inosservanza del requis<strong>it</strong>o formale non era ricondotta alcunasanzione <strong>di</strong> null<strong>it</strong>à del contratto»;ii) «l’autonomia regolamentare confer<strong>it</strong>a all’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivorilevava all’interno <strong>di</strong> detto or<strong>di</strong>namento e nel rapporto tral’associazione e gli associati»;iii) tale autonomia «non poteva incidere nell’àmb<strong>it</strong>o dei rapportiintersoggettivi tra privati, rapporti soggetti alle generali <strong>di</strong>sposizionidell’or<strong>di</strong>namento anche sotto il profilo probatorio con ammissibil<strong>it</strong>àdella prova testimoniale ex artt. 2721 c.c. e ss., senza incontrare illim<strong>it</strong>e <strong>di</strong> cui all’art. 2725 c.c.».La r<strong>ed</strong>uctio ad aequ<strong>it</strong>atem, nel senso storico del termine, effettuatacon la statuizione in commento, si inserisce proprio nel cuore <strong>di</strong> un’altraquestione para<strong>di</strong>gmatica che attanaglia il rapporto tra l’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivoe quello statale, ossia quella relativa alla vali<strong>di</strong>tà nell’or<strong>di</strong>namento statal<strong>ed</strong>egli accor<strong>di</strong> economici riguardanti la corresponsione <strong>di</strong> compensi conl’inosservanza o contro il <strong>di</strong>vieto <strong>di</strong> norme dell’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo.L’orientamento della Suprema Corte sul tema è stato quello <strong>di</strong> r<strong>it</strong>enereche in materia negoziale esista una riserva <strong>di</strong> legge, sia pure parziale, a favor<strong>ed</strong>ell’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo, nel senso che le parti possono liberament<strong>ed</strong>eterminare il contenuto <strong>di</strong> tali contratti, ancorché atipici, sempreché glistessi siano <strong>di</strong>retti a realizzare interessi mer<strong>it</strong>evoli <strong>di</strong> tutela secondol’or<strong>di</strong>namento giuri<strong>di</strong>co (art. 1322 c.c.).La normativa dell’or<strong>di</strong>namento giuri<strong>di</strong>co sportivo contenuta neiregolamenti delle f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni sportive, rifer<strong>it</strong>a ai rapporti negoziali, ha tuttaviaefficacia soltanto all’interno dell’or<strong>di</strong>namento giuri<strong>di</strong>co sportivo e non anchenell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> quello statale e, pertanto, il contratto concluso in violazione<strong>di</strong> un <strong>di</strong>vieto stabil<strong>it</strong>o da una norma <strong>di</strong> un regolamento f<strong>ed</strong>erale non puòsolamente per questo essere <strong>di</strong>chiarato nullo nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o dell’or<strong>di</strong>namentogiuri<strong>di</strong>co statale, siccome contrario ad una norma imperativa (arg. ex art.1418, co. 1, c.c., cosiddetta “null<strong>it</strong>à virtuale”).4Evidente appare, come, nel caso <strong>di</strong> specie, l’obbligatorietà della formascr<strong>it</strong>ta non sia stata ottemperata, così come sia stata violata la norma cheimpone la gratu<strong>it</strong>à dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante, salvo la corresponsione<strong>di</strong> una somma, all’epoca non superiore a 10 milioni <strong>di</strong> lire, a t<strong>it</strong>olo <strong>di</strong> rimborsospese. E così è venuta meno la mer<strong>it</strong>evolezza dell’interesse richiesta per latutela dell’autonomia contrattuale delle parti.Su queste premesse si fonda la successiva analisi della sentenza.
42 Mattia Grassani2. Il lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato, il lavoro autonomo e l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> allenatore<strong>di</strong>lettante: la reale volontà delle parti.Innumerevoli sono i contratti esistenti, <strong>di</strong>sciplinati e non <strong>di</strong>sciplinati dallalegge. Tra questi vi è il contratto <strong>di</strong> lavoro, che cost<strong>it</strong>uisce e regola il rapportogiuri<strong>di</strong>co tra il lavoratore <strong>ed</strong> il datore <strong>di</strong> lavoro.È bene comprendere quale sia quello subor<strong>di</strong>nato, onde valutare econcludere che l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non si scosta dalla <strong>di</strong>sciplinadel lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato esclusivamente per il <strong>di</strong>fferente nomen iuris, maproprio per la <strong>di</strong>vers<strong>it</strong>à intrinseca delle regole poste a fondamento delcontratto tipico <strong>di</strong>sciplinato (il primo, infatti, per essere tutelato abbisognadella mer<strong>it</strong>evolezza dell’interesse persegu<strong>it</strong>o). 5Il regime subor<strong>di</strong>nato è <strong>di</strong>sciplinato dall’art. 2094 c.c. che rec<strong>it</strong>a: «èprestatore <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato chi si obbliga me<strong>di</strong>ante retribuzione acollaborare nell’impresa, prestando il proprio lavoro intellettuale o manualealle <strong>di</strong>pendenze e sotto la <strong>di</strong>rezione dell’impren<strong>di</strong>tore»; l’art. 2094 c.c. siriferisce al rapporto alle <strong>di</strong>pendenze <strong>di</strong> un’impresa, che cost<strong>it</strong>uisce il mo<strong>dello</strong>,ma poi l’art. 2239 c.c. estende la <strong>di</strong>sciplina, in quanto compatibile, a tutti irapporti anche con datori non impren<strong>di</strong>tori (lavoro domestico).Essenza della subor<strong>di</strong>nazione sono la <strong>di</strong>pendenza, la soggezione alpotere <strong>di</strong>rettivo del datore <strong>di</strong> lavoro e la continu<strong>it</strong>à del rapporto. Quest’ultimarappresenta la messa a <strong>di</strong>sposizione continua del lavoratore a favore della____________________4Cass. civ., sez. I, 28 luglio 1981, n. 4845; Cass. civ., sez. III, 23 febbraio 2004, n. 3545, secondola quale le violazioni <strong>di</strong> norme dell’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo non possono non riflettersi sulla vali<strong>di</strong>tà<strong>di</strong> un contratto concluso tra soggetti assoggettati alle regole del detto or<strong>di</strong>namento anche perl’or<strong>di</strong>namento <strong>dello</strong> Stato, poiché se esse non ne determinano <strong>di</strong>rettamente la null<strong>it</strong>à per violazione<strong>di</strong> norme imperative (art. 1418 c.c.) incidono necessariamente sulla funzional<strong>it</strong>à del contrattom<strong>ed</strong>esimo, vale a <strong>di</strong>re sulla sua idone<strong>it</strong>à a realizzare un interesse mer<strong>it</strong>evole <strong>di</strong> tutela secondol’or<strong>di</strong>namento giuri<strong>di</strong>co (art. 1322, co. 2, c.c.). Non può quin<strong>di</strong> r<strong>it</strong>enersi idoneo, sotto il profilodella mer<strong>it</strong>evolezza della tutela dell’interesse persegu<strong>it</strong>o dai contraenti, un contratto posto inessere in frode alle regole dell’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo, e senza l’osservanza delle prescrizioniformali all’uopo richieste, e, come tale, inidoneo ad attuare la sua funzione proprio inquell’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo nel quale detta funzione deve esplicarsi.5La <strong>di</strong>fficoltà <strong>di</strong> inquadramento dell’o<strong>di</strong>erna fattispecie, che ha fatto propendere il giu<strong>di</strong>c<strong>ed</strong>’appello per la compensazione integrale delle spese, senza che queste seguissero, come è regola,la soccombenza, è ulteriormente rafforzata da alcuni prec<strong>ed</strong>enti in materia, nei quali il vincologiuri<strong>di</strong>co intercorrente tra società/associazione e tesserato non è <strong>di</strong> così cristallina definizione.Infatti, in giurisprudenza, per la necess<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> tale indagine, da svolgersi avvalendosi dei cr<strong>it</strong>eriforn<strong>it</strong>i dal <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comune del lavoro, si rinvia a Cass. civ., sez. lavoro, 28 <strong>di</strong>cembre 1996, n.11540; Cass. civ., sez. lav., 11 aprile 1998, n. 4207. Per le modal<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> svolgimento <strong>di</strong> tale indagine,si v<strong>ed</strong>a Pret. Napoli, 14 febbraio 1995, secondo cui «al fine <strong>di</strong> accertare se un rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoropossa ricondursi al genus della subor<strong>di</strong>nazione ovvero a quello del lavoro autonomo devecompiersi un’indagine, circa, sia la volontà negoziale manifestata dalle parti, sia le modal<strong>it</strong>àconcretamente assunte nel corso del suo svolgimento».
L’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non può essere lavoratore subor<strong>di</strong>nato 43controparte. Secondo parte della dottrina, <strong>di</strong>pendenza e soggezione sarebberoequivalenti: lavorare alle <strong>di</strong>pendenze significherebbe lavorare sotto la<strong>di</strong>rezione. Non v’è dubbio che siano complementari, ma a ciascuno puòessere attribu<strong>it</strong>o un significato in parte <strong>di</strong>verso dall’altro.Per in<strong>di</strong>viduare il concetto <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>pendenza, parte della dottrina hafatto ricorso alla subor<strong>di</strong>nazione socio-economica, intendendo per essal’estrane<strong>it</strong>à del lavoratore rispetto ai mezzi <strong>di</strong> produzione e rispetto alrisultato.L’estrane<strong>it</strong>à rispetto ai mezzi <strong>di</strong> produzione in<strong>di</strong>ca il carattereesclusivamente personale della prestazione <strong>di</strong> lavoro e che questa si svolgasenza prevalente ausilio <strong>di</strong> un cap<strong>it</strong>ale proprio o <strong>di</strong> lavoro altrui; dunque, illavoratore <strong>di</strong>pende dagli strumenti <strong>di</strong> lavoro e <strong>di</strong> produzione del datore.L’estrane<strong>it</strong>à rispetto al risultato, invece, in<strong>di</strong>ca che è il datore adorganizzare l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à del prestatore e che questi non si obbliga a fornire ilrisultato, ma solo a svolgere <strong>di</strong>ligentemente le mansioni affidategli.La prestazione <strong>di</strong> lavoro va inser<strong>it</strong>a nell’organizzazione aziendal<strong>ed</strong>el datore, che, così, può effettuarne la <strong>di</strong>rezione continua, cui il lavoratoreè assoggettato come sanc<strong>it</strong>o dall’art. 2094 c.c.Si tratta <strong>di</strong> un assoggettamento <strong>di</strong> tipo gerarchico, come appar<strong>ed</strong>all’art. 2086 c.c., secondo cui l’impren<strong>di</strong>tore è il capo dell’impresa e da lui<strong>di</strong>pendono gerarchicamente i suoi collaboratori. In tal modo, il lavoratore,qualunque sia la sua qualifica, è sottoposto alle <strong>di</strong>rettive e alle istruzioniimpart<strong>it</strong>e dal datore (impren<strong>di</strong>tore o non impren<strong>di</strong>tore) e dai collaboratoricon qualifica superiore.L’art. 2094 c.c. fa, inoltre, riferimento alla retribuzione, la quale, puressendo speciale rispetto ad ogni altro tipo <strong>di</strong> corrispettivo, non è elementoidoneo a qualificare la fattispecie <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato, in quanto è ad essaesterna, rientrando nella sfera degli effetti: solo una volta accertata la naturasubor<strong>di</strong>nata del rapporto, ad esso dovrà applicarsi la retribuzione, sempreche il contratto non sia a t<strong>it</strong>olo gratu<strong>it</strong>o. La scarsa importanza attribu<strong>it</strong>a allapresenza o meno <strong>di</strong> retribuzione sottolinea la non necessarietà <strong>di</strong> siffattoelemento alla configurazione <strong>di</strong> un rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato, il quale,come visto, necess<strong>it</strong>a <strong>di</strong> altri fondamentali requis<strong>it</strong>i, non presenti nel caso <strong>di</strong>specie.Al <strong>di</strong> là dell’obbligo della forma vincolata non rispettata, <strong>di</strong> cui si ègià detto, che secondo la società appellante sarebbe <strong>di</strong>scesa dal combinato<strong>di</strong>sposto dell’art. 42, co. 2, Regolamento LND e dell’art. 1352 c.c., conconseguente null<strong>it</strong>à ex art. 1418 c.c. del negozio, in quanto il contratto sarebbestato privo <strong>di</strong> un elemento essenziale del contratto (la forma in quanto richiesta
44 Mattia Grassani«a pena <strong>di</strong> null<strong>it</strong>à», per quanto tale espressione non si rinvenga nellanormativa <strong>di</strong> settore), ciò che appare decisivo ad eliminare qualsiasi dubbiocirca la natura non subor<strong>di</strong>nata del rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro è, come si legge inmotivazione, il «semplice impegno connaturato alla prestazione».L’oral<strong>it</strong>à del contratto, infatti, rimanda ex se l’in<strong>di</strong>viduazion<strong>ed</strong>ell’oggetto del rapporto tra associazioni sportive – che sono associazioni<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to privato e come tali leg<strong>it</strong>timate «sia ad atti <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to privato che adatti amministrativi a seconda dei rapporti che ne sono oggetto (Cass. 4399/99)» – <strong>ed</strong> allenatori ai protocolli <strong>di</strong> intesa tra società <strong>ed</strong> allenatori. Per cui«oggetto del rapporto tra società <strong>ed</strong> allenatori è quello dell’insegnamentoe dell’addestramento allo sport del calcio anche me<strong>di</strong>ante il conseguimento<strong>di</strong> risultati utili». Inoltre, «l’allenatore dà atto alla società che tutte leprestazioni derivanti dal presente accordo hanno carattere <strong>di</strong>lettantistico eperciò verranno rese senza che ciò comporti alcun vincolo <strong>di</strong> lavorosubor<strong>di</strong>nato». Infine, «la società riconosce e garantisce all’allenatorenell’espletamento delle sue funzioni relative al presente accordo, autonomia,iniziativa e <strong>di</strong>screzional<strong>it</strong>à».In questo modo, l’allenatore non è mai alle <strong>di</strong>pendenze del datore <strong>di</strong>lavoro, in quanto ha autonomia, non è soggetto ad alcun potere <strong>di</strong>rettivo invirtù dell’iniziativa che gli è riconosciuta, e non ha un rapporto continuativoche lo lega alla società.Da tale oggettiva ricostruzione <strong>di</strong>scende la necess<strong>it</strong>à e necessarietàdei risultati utili (il lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato prev<strong>ed</strong>e l’estrane<strong>it</strong>à del lavoratore daqualsivoglia risultato), pena l’allontanamento unilaterale dell’allenatore dallasua attiv<strong>it</strong>à. Per cui l’allenatore che si impegni ad allenare una squadra <strong>di</strong>calcio è consapevole sia delle proprie funzioni (raggiungere i risultati con imezzi, gli strumenti e gli atleti che egli r<strong>it</strong>iene necessari) sia dei rischi (incaso <strong>di</strong> risultati negativi la sua panchina «salta»).Il <strong>di</strong>fetto <strong>di</strong> continu<strong>it</strong>à non deve, in ulteriore analisi, lasciare aperte leporte allo spiraglio della subor<strong>di</strong>nazione per l’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante attraversolo stratagemma <strong>di</strong> collegare la subor<strong>di</strong>nazione al contratto a termine. 6____________________6A tal propos<strong>it</strong>o, si r<strong>it</strong>iene opportuno sintetizzare in nota la <strong>di</strong>sciplina del «rapporto» tra allenatori<strong>di</strong>lettanti <strong>ed</strong> associazioni sportive, già riportato in sentenza ma comunque necessaria per il lettoreal fine <strong>di</strong> una migliore comprensione dell’elaborato.I rapporti fra società iscr<strong>it</strong>te ad i campionati organizzati dalla Lega Nazionale Dilettanti <strong>ed</strong>allenatori sono regolate da appos<strong>it</strong>o Accordo Collettivo, frutto dell’intesa fra LND <strong>ed</strong> AIAC,entrato in vigore nel lontano 1 luglio 1985, peraltro <strong>di</strong>sdettato dalla LND. La prima <strong>di</strong>stinzioneeffettuata nel documento riguarda lo status del tecnico; i professionisti, infatti, sono soggetti aprescrizioni molto <strong>di</strong>fferenti rispetto ai <strong>di</strong>lettanti.Il rapporto tra l’allenatore professionista <strong>ed</strong> il sodalizio della LND si cost<strong>it</strong>uisce esclusivamentecon la stipulazione <strong>di</strong> contratto in forma scr<strong>it</strong>ta scadente al termine <strong>di</strong> ogni stagione. Gli accor<strong>di</strong>
L’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non può essere lavoratore subor<strong>di</strong>nato 45Infatti, sebbene il contratto <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato possa essere anchea tempo determinato, effetto del ricorso del datore a forme flessibili <strong>di</strong>utilizzazione della forza-lavoro come, appunto, il contratto a termine, il parttimee il contratto <strong>di</strong> formazione e lavoro, ciò non integra la fattispecie delleprestazioni oggetto del provve<strong>di</strong>mento commentato.Innanz<strong>it</strong>utto, l’esercizio del potere del datore <strong>di</strong> utilizzare le nuoveforme d’impiego flessibile della forza-lavoro non è libero, ma sottoposto alcontrollo amministrativo (Ispettorato del lavoro) o sindacale.In secondo luogo, il contratto a termine o a tempo determinato,prima dell’entrata in vigore del d. lgs. n. 368/2001, è stato regolato dalla L.n. 230 del 1962 che sanciva le ipotesi tassative <strong>di</strong> apposizione del termine,oltre ad estendere al lavoratore lo stesso trattamento, purché compatibile,previsto per il lavoratore a tempo indeterminato.È interessante la normativa previgente, superata soltanto da un nuovotesto legislativo che però non ha alterato la sostanza della prec<strong>ed</strong>ente, poichési possono meglio mettere a fuoco le <strong>di</strong>vergenze del lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato conquello dell’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante, ma soprattutto le fondamenta sulle quali èstata eretta la torre normativa della L. 91 del 1981 e le successive <strong>di</strong>sciplin<strong>ed</strong>el settore professionistico fino all’introduzione <strong>dello</strong> scopo <strong>di</strong> lucro (1996).____________________dovranno, pertanto, essere ri<strong>di</strong>scussi <strong>di</strong> anno in anno; si tratta <strong>di</strong> una scelta certamente pocogarantistica nei confronti del prestatore d’opera, ma che, imp<strong>ed</strong>endo al club <strong>di</strong> impegnarsi alungo termine, contribuisce, <strong>di</strong> fatto, a non gravare eccessivamente le casse societarie con impegnia lungo termine. E’ previsto, inoltre, che nel caso in cui il tecnico responsabile della primasquadra venga esonerato dalla società prima che abbia inizio il Campionato, quest’ultimo abbiafacoltà <strong>di</strong> risolvere il contratto entro il termine massimo della fine del girone <strong>di</strong> andata delcampionato stesso. Tra le prescrizioni contenute nell’Accordo Collettivo v’è anche l’espresso<strong>di</strong>vieto per gli allenatori <strong>di</strong> trattare, sia <strong>di</strong>rettamente che in<strong>di</strong>rettamente, il trasferimento <strong>di</strong>calciatori, anche se sollec<strong>it</strong>ati dal club <strong>di</strong> appartenenza, fermo restando, naturalmente, il dovere<strong>di</strong> fornire alla società stessa i pareri tecnici che potranno essere loro richiesti.Circa il trattamento economico, questo, in base alle prescrizioni dell’art. 7, dovrà intendersicome compenso globale annuo, da determinarsi, peraltro, con accor<strong>di</strong> separati tra le parti contraenti,ogni stagione sportiva, me<strong>di</strong>ante fissazione dei minimi inderogabili. La somma concordata saràcorrisposta in 12 rate mensili eguali, scadenti alla fine <strong>di</strong> ogni mese. Quanto all’eventuale indenn<strong>it</strong>à<strong>di</strong> fine contratto, invece, la cifra pattu<strong>it</strong>a deve essere corrisposta entro il 15 luglio successivo allascadenza dell’accordo <strong>di</strong> prestazione sportiva, contestualmente alla sottoscrizione da part<strong>ed</strong>ell’allenatore della ricevuta liberatoria comprovante l’avvenuta corresponsione <strong>di</strong> ogni spettanzaal 30 giugno. Rispetto ai professionisti, come già anticipato, i tecnici <strong>di</strong>lettanti subiscono un<strong>di</strong>fferente trattamento. Per questi, infatti, non si parla <strong>di</strong> emolumenti contrattuali da corrispondersimensilmente (come, tra l’altro, ben esposto dalla <strong>di</strong>fesa della società appellante), bensì, <strong>di</strong> uncosiddetto premio <strong>di</strong> tesseramento, fissato annualmente dalla LND in accordo con l’AIAC, ch<strong>ed</strong>ovrà essere corrisposto sempre integralmente anche in caso <strong>di</strong> esonero, fatte salve solo le ipotesi<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>missioni dell’allenatore o irrogazione <strong>di</strong> sanzioni. I r<strong>ed</strong>attori si sono, peraltro, premurati <strong>di</strong>inserire, nell’art. 5 del testo integrativo che ci occupa, l’espressa in<strong>di</strong>cazione che tutte le prestazioniderivanti dal presente accordo hanno carattere <strong>di</strong>lettantistico e, pertanto, vengono rese senza checiò comporti alcun vincolo <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato.
46 Mattia GrassaniEssa non fissava la durata precisa del contratto, che <strong>di</strong>fficilmentenella prassi ha superato il periodo <strong>di</strong> un anno.Queste le ipotesi contemplate:1) Le attiv<strong>it</strong>à stagionali, determinate con appos<strong>it</strong>o decreto presidenziale(d.p.r. 1525/1963).2) La sost<strong>it</strong>uzione <strong>di</strong> lavoratori assenti con il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to alla conservazione delposto (in caso <strong>di</strong> malattia, gravidanza, infortunio, servizio mil<strong>it</strong>are).In caso <strong>di</strong> morte del lavoratore assente, la giurisprudenza sostiene che siestingua il rapporto a termine con il sost<strong>it</strong>uto, ma se il datore non facessevalere l’estinzione, la continuazione del rapporto non sarebbe più infunzione della sost<strong>it</strong>uzione, con conseguente trasformazione del rapportoa termine in rapporto a tempo indeterminato.3) Le lavorazioni a fasi successive che richi<strong>ed</strong>ono manodopera specializzata<strong>di</strong>versa da quella normalmente impiegata, e che siano <strong>di</strong> durata lim<strong>it</strong>ata.4) L’esecuzione <strong>di</strong> un’attiv<strong>it</strong>à aziendale defin<strong>it</strong>a e pr<strong>ed</strong>eterminata nel tempoavente carattere straor<strong>di</strong>nario <strong>ed</strong> occasionale che, secondo lagiurisprudenza, si configura quando l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à non rientra nellaprogrammazione aziendale e non sia preve<strong>di</strong>bile.5) Specifici spettacoli o programmi ra<strong>di</strong>ofonici o televisivi.6) Servizi operativi <strong>di</strong> terra e <strong>di</strong> volo da parte d’aziende <strong>di</strong> trasporto aereoo esercenti i servizi aeroportuali per un periodo massimo <strong>di</strong> sei mesicompresi tra aprile <strong>ed</strong> ottobre d’ogni anno.Ulteriore ipotesi era quella delle punte stagionali introdotta per ilsettore del turismo e del commercio dalla L. 18 del 1978, poi, estesa a tuttii settori economici dall’art. 8 della L. 17 del 1983. Le punte stagionaliconsistono nell’intensificarsi delle attiv<strong>it</strong>à aziendali, in determinati perio<strong>di</strong>dell’anno, si pensi all’aumento dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à commerciale nel periodo natalizio.In tali perio<strong>di</strong> dell’anno, i contratti a termine dovevano essere autorizzati,salvo che nel settore aereo e aeroportuale, dall’ispettorato del lavoro.Il contratto a tempo determinato doveva essere r<strong>ed</strong>atto in formascr<strong>it</strong>ta, necessaria per concordare l’apposizione del termine, e la mancanza<strong>di</strong> essa determinava la null<strong>it</strong>à dell’apposizione del termine, con conseguentemutamento del contratto in tempo indeterminato; ugualmente, secondol’in<strong>di</strong>rizzo giurisprudenziale prevalente, la conclusione del contratto a terminefuori dai casi tassativi e da quelli previsti dai contratti collettivi comportavalo stesso effetto.La L. n. 230/1962 prev<strong>ed</strong>eva la possibil<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> proroga del contratto,per una volta sola, per la m<strong>ed</strong>esima durata del rapporto iniziale, e con riguardoalla stessa attiv<strong>it</strong>à, ma era sempre necessario il consenso del lavoratore.
L’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non può essere lavoratore subor<strong>di</strong>nato 47A tutela dei lavoratori a termine, il legislatore con l’art. 12 della L. n.196/1997, riportato nel decreto n. 368 del 2001 (art. 5), ha stabil<strong>it</strong>o il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>todel lavoratore ad una maggiorazione <strong>di</strong> retribuzione, qualora il rapporto <strong>di</strong>lavoro continui non oltre venti giorni dopo la decorrenza del termine inizialeo della proroga, nella misura del 20% fino al decimo giorno e del 40% per i<strong>di</strong>eci giorni successivi. Se il rapporto si protrae dopo il ventesimo giorno nelcaso <strong>di</strong> contratto inferiore a sei mesi ovvero dopo il trentesimo giorno nelcaso <strong>di</strong> durata superiore a sei mesi, si verifica la trasformazione del contratto,con efficacia ex nunc, in contratto a tempo indeterminato. La L. del 1997stabilisce ancora, che, qualora il lavoratore venisse riassunto a termine entroun periodo <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>eci ovvero venti giorni dalla scadenza del contratto <strong>di</strong> durata,rispettivamente, inferiore o superiore ai sei mesi, il secondo contratto siconsiderava a tempo indeterminato, e che, quando si trattasse <strong>di</strong> dueassunzioni successive a termine, vale a <strong>di</strong>re senza soluzione <strong>di</strong> continu<strong>it</strong>à trail primo <strong>ed</strong> il secondo contratto, il rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro si considerava a tempoindeterminato dalla data <strong>di</strong> stipulazione del primo contratto.Anche il contratto a tempo determinato, se si fosse voluta tenereaperta la porta della subor<strong>di</strong>nazione per l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante,aggrappandosi al termine espresso, è inidoneo non soltanto a contenere lapr<strong>ed</strong>etta figura lavorativa atipica, ma ad<strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>tura a prestare parti della propria<strong>di</strong>sciplina ad un’analisi più puntuale <strong>di</strong> quella orale <strong>di</strong> cui si tratta.Come visto in questa sintetica analisi della subor<strong>di</strong>nazione consideratanel contratto a tempo indeterminato <strong>ed</strong> a tempo determinato, l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non trova c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>nanza nella consacrata forma <strong>di</strong> lavoroprevista dal legislatore a eccessiva e sperequata tutela del lavoratore. D’altrocanto, assai <strong>di</strong>fficoltoso apparirebbe anche l’inquadramento della <strong>di</strong>sciplinadell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante all’interno della macro figura del lavoroautonomo. 7Il contratto <strong>di</strong> lavoro autonomo, secondo l’art. 2222 c.c., si ha«quando una persona si obbliga a compiere verso corrispettivo un’opera oun servizio, con lavoro prevalentemente proprio e senza vincolo <strong>di</strong> subor<strong>di</strong>na-____________________7Da segnalare, per quanto attiene alla <strong>di</strong>sciplina dell’allenatore professionista, Cass., sez. lav.,17 gennaio 1996, n. 354, secondo cui anche ai sensi della l. 23 marzo 1981, n. 91, è configurabileun rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro autonomo tra un allenatore sportivo professionista <strong>ed</strong> una società sportiva,come confermato dall’art. 3, co. 2, che, in relazione alla posizione degli atleti professionisti,prev<strong>ed</strong>e ipotesi <strong>di</strong> lavoro autonomo. Né può escludersi la coesistenza <strong>di</strong> un rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavorosubor<strong>di</strong>nato e <strong>di</strong> uno <strong>di</strong> lavoro autonomo, se sono ben <strong>di</strong>stinte le prestazioni e i compensi relativiai due <strong>di</strong>versi rapporti contrattuali, con la conseguenza che, in caso <strong>di</strong> recesso della societàsportiva da amb<strong>ed</strong>ue i rapporti, la stessa per il rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro autonomo è tenuta, a normadell’art. 2237 c.c., solo al compenso per l’opera prestata dal collaboratore, in<strong>di</strong>pendentement<strong>ed</strong>alla causa del recesso.
48 Mattia Grassanizione nei confronti del comm<strong>it</strong>tente». La prevalenza <strong>di</strong> lavoro personale,anziché dell’organizzazione dei mezzi necessari e la gestione a proprio rischio,come avviene nell’appalto, fa del prestatore autonomo non un impren<strong>di</strong>tore,come l’appaltatore, ma un lavoratore più vicino alla categoria dei lavoratorisubor<strong>di</strong>nati.Ovviamente, il lavoratore svolge la sua attiv<strong>it</strong>à con mezzi propri e,quin<strong>di</strong>, ha una propria organizzazione, ma questa non deve essere prevalenterispetto al lavoro personale.Carattere essenziale è l’autonomia, vale a <strong>di</strong>re l’assenza del vincolodella subor<strong>di</strong>nazione, ciò significando che il compimento dell’opera o delservizio non è assoggettato al potere <strong>di</strong>rettivo del comm<strong>it</strong>tente, che puòsolo controllare che l’esecuzione del lavoro avvenga secondo le con<strong>di</strong>zionistabil<strong>it</strong>e nel contratto e a regola d’arte (art. 2224 c.c.). Altro elementofondamentale appare la prestazione <strong>di</strong> lavoro non continua, ma occasionale,un<strong>it</strong>aria e svolta dal lavoratore con mezzi propri.Anche in questo caso, il rapporto <strong>di</strong> allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non puòcarpire la propria <strong>di</strong>sciplina dalla sovraestesa normativa. Il suo lavoro nonviene organizzato con mezzi propri, ma con quelli forn<strong>it</strong>i dalla società: laprestazione è continua (non continuativa) e non presenta i caratteri dellaoccasional<strong>it</strong>à.In una parola, è un hobby che l’allenatore svolge in orari stabil<strong>it</strong>i e<strong>di</strong>n giorni stabil<strong>it</strong>i, ma per puro <strong>di</strong>vertimento e senza scopo <strong>di</strong> lucro (quelloche percepisce, infatti, è un semplice rimborso spese-premio <strong>di</strong> tesseramento).Infine, l’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non può essere considerato – nonavendone i caratteri, (per quanto quest’ultima sia la figura più assimilabile aquella esaminata) – un lavoratore cosiddetto «parasubor<strong>di</strong>nato», il cuicontratto viene defin<strong>it</strong>o come «un rapporto <strong>di</strong> collaborazione che si concretain una prestazione <strong>di</strong> opera continuativa e coor<strong>di</strong>nata, prevalentementepersonale, anche se non a carattere subor<strong>di</strong>nato» (art. 409, co. 3, c.p.c.);esempi <strong>di</strong> tale rapporto sono quelli <strong>di</strong> agenzia e rappresentanza commerciale.L’elemento che più <strong>di</strong> ogni altro lo <strong>di</strong>fferenzia dal lavoro autonomoè quello della continu<strong>it</strong>à: si è in presenza <strong>di</strong> una collaborazione e <strong>di</strong> prestazioninon spora<strong>di</strong>che <strong>ed</strong> occasionali, ma perio<strong>di</strong>che.Il carattere della continu<strong>it</strong>à consente d’inquadrare nellaparasubor<strong>di</strong>nazione tutte le ipotesi <strong>di</strong> contratti d’opera atipici, in quanto aprestazioni perio<strong>di</strong>che. La prestazione <strong>di</strong> lavoro, poi, deve essere coor<strong>di</strong>natacon l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à del comm<strong>it</strong>tente, il che equivale ad un inserimento funzional<strong>ed</strong>elle prestazioni perio<strong>di</strong>che nell’organizzazione <strong>di</strong> questi e deve essereprevalentemente personale, il che comporta che vi può essere solo una piccola
L’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non può essere lavoratore subor<strong>di</strong>nato 49organizzazione, altrimenti il lavoratore sarebbe un impren<strong>di</strong>tore.Gli elementi <strong>di</strong>fferenziali in questo caso sono cost<strong>it</strong>u<strong>it</strong>i dalla perio<strong>di</strong>c<strong>it</strong>àdella prestazione, non presente nel caso <strong>di</strong> specie, e dal coor<strong>di</strong>namento conl’attiv<strong>it</strong>à del comm<strong>it</strong>tente. Nell’ipotesi in commento, l’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettantenon coor<strong>di</strong>na la propria attiv<strong>it</strong>à con quella della società, la qualesemplicemente ha optato per l’affidamento a questi della conduzione tecnicoagonisticadella prima squadra, attribuendogli ogni potere attinente alla<strong>di</strong>sciplina da mantenere tra gli atleti, alle <strong>di</strong>sposizioni tattiche da impartireper affrontare al meglio le <strong>di</strong>verse competizioni sportive, nonché la sceltadel parco giocatori.È giusto a questo punto in<strong>di</strong>viduare la reale volontà delle parti, perdare, se possibile, c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>nanza ad un contratto atipico attraverso la valvoladell’art. 1322 c.c.La chiara volontà delle parti é stata nel senso <strong>di</strong> configurare il rapportonon come lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato ma, alla luce delle superiori considerazioni, <strong>di</strong>allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante, non solo quin<strong>di</strong> attraverso la semplice <strong>di</strong>vers<strong>it</strong>à delnomen iuris, ove l’allenatore, per tutta la durata del rapporto, non è maistato sottoposto al potere datoriale né si era impegnato a mettersi a totale<strong>di</strong>sposizione della datrice, alla quale, inoltre, non era contrattualmentenemmeno riconosciuto il potere <strong>di</strong>sciplinare.L’allenatore <strong>di</strong> 3° categoria era stato ingaggiato per mettere a<strong>di</strong>sposizione della associazione le sue capac<strong>it</strong>à tecnico-tattiche e su talideterminazioni la società era tenuta al rispetto delle sue decisioni, agli orarida lui stabil<strong>it</strong>i per gli allenamenti <strong>ed</strong> ai suoi meto<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> addestramento, <strong>di</strong>etro,certamente, il percepimento del premio <strong>di</strong> tesseramento, pr<strong>ed</strong>eterminato dallanormativa <strong>di</strong> settore, corrisposto in ratei perio<strong>di</strong>ci soltanto a t<strong>it</strong>olo <strong>di</strong> rimborsospese e non <strong>di</strong> compenso per l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à svolta. In<strong>di</strong>pendentemente dallaquant<strong>it</strong>à e dalla qual<strong>it</strong>à dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à svolta.Le ricordate prestazioni, che l’appellato ha messo a <strong>di</strong>sposizion<strong>ed</strong>ella associazione in base al contratto orale negoziato, sono da ricondurrequin<strong>di</strong> nell’àmb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> un rapporto atipico che soltanto una grave aberrazionegiuri<strong>di</strong>ca ha inquadrato nell’alveo della subor<strong>di</strong>nazione (<strong>ed</strong> anche del lavoroautonomo o parasubor<strong>di</strong>nato), essendo l’appellato in tutto e per tutto avulsoda qualsivoglia potere decisionale della compagine per cui era tesserato.In altri termini, il rapporto era caratterizzato da un vincolo personal<strong>ed</strong>ell’allenatore nei confronti della associazione sportiva, verso la quale si eraimpegnato a raggiungere, al termine della stagione, un risultato giu<strong>di</strong>catopos<strong>it</strong>ivo e sod<strong>di</strong>sfacente dal sodalizio. Le scelte tecniche, <strong>di</strong> impiego degliatleti messi dal sodalizio a <strong>di</strong>sposizione dell’allenatore, la natura e l’intens<strong>it</strong>à
50 Mattia Grassanidegli allenamenti, i r<strong>it</strong>iri e tutta la attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> preparazione delle gare agonisticheerano a lui attribu<strong>it</strong>e in via esclusiva.3. La natura giuri<strong>di</strong>ca del rapporto tra associazione sportiva <strong>ed</strong> allenatore<strong>di</strong>lettante. La null<strong>it</strong>à del contratto per non mer<strong>it</strong>evolezza dell’interessegiuri<strong>di</strong>coSe esiste, dunque, una normativa f<strong>ed</strong>erale, va da sé che essa non può essereposta nel nulla e, <strong>di</strong> fatto, abrogata senza che, per converso, se ne esplic<strong>it</strong>inole ragioni giuri<strong>di</strong>che. Né può <strong>di</strong>chiararsi nullo un contratto, ancorché orale,ove non si esplic<strong>it</strong>ino i motivi che hanno condotto i giu<strong>di</strong>ci ad assumere tal<strong>ed</strong>eterminazione.Né, tanto meno, si può sostenere che la mancata applicazione dellapr<strong>ed</strong>etta normativa sia dovuta al fatto che l’organo giu<strong>di</strong>cante la valuti, seppurincidentalmente, illeg<strong>it</strong>tima perché in contrasto con le <strong>di</strong>sposizioni <strong>di</strong> rangoprimario dell’or<strong>di</strong>namento generale (quelle appunto in tema <strong>di</strong> lavoro). Masoprattutto, è contrad<strong>di</strong>ttorio <strong>ed</strong> illogico che un giu<strong>di</strong>ce (il Tribunale <strong>di</strong>Belluno), da un lato abbia paventato la null<strong>it</strong>à del contratto e dall’altro, nonapplicando le norme f<strong>ed</strong>erali, abbia statu<strong>it</strong>o sulla natura <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>natodell’allenatore, condannando la associazione sportiva al pagamento degli«emolumenti» (premio) residui concordati verbalmente.Singolare, d’altro canto, è come abbia potuto il giu<strong>di</strong>ce del lavoro,sebbene l’orientamento della giurisprudenza sia contrastante e contrastato,<strong>di</strong>chiararsi competente, là dove la competenza sarebbe dovuta essere o delgiu<strong>di</strong>ce or<strong>di</strong>nario o <strong>di</strong> organi interni.Da un lato, infatti, la sussunzione della fattispecie in esame nelloschema del contratto avrebbe dovuto implicare come necessaria conseguenzache la tutela dell’allenatore - che non è (più) un lavoratore - si sarebbe dovutaesplicare nelle forme e nei mo<strong>di</strong> previsti dal libro IV del co<strong>di</strong>ce civile,comportando ciò alcune <strong>di</strong>fferenze con il sistema delineato dal giu<strong>di</strong>ce <strong>di</strong>prime cure. Di qui un auspicabile insegnamento per il futuro.Innanz<strong>it</strong>utto, vertendosi in tema <strong>di</strong> rapporti contrattuali, lacompetenza a conoscere in via giuris<strong>di</strong>zionale delle controversie che possonosorgere tra allenatori <strong>ed</strong> associazioni sportive <strong>di</strong>lettanti dovrà spettare alGiu<strong>di</strong>ce or<strong>di</strong>nario, competente per valore, e non più al Giu<strong>di</strong>ce del lavoro,rilevato che non ricorre alcuna delle ipotesi <strong>di</strong> cui all’art. 409 c.p.c.In secondo luogo, sul piano probatorio dovrà spettare al deb<strong>it</strong>or<strong>ed</strong>ella prestazione richiesta (nel caso che ci occupa la società) dare la provache l’inadempimento o il r<strong>it</strong>ardo è stato determinato da impossibil<strong>it</strong>à derivante
L’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non può essere lavoratore subor<strong>di</strong>nato 51da causa a lui non imputabile.Infine, sotto il profilo previdenziale nessun onere graverà sulle società,posto che, non essendoci alcuna subor<strong>di</strong>nazione, non sorgerà neanche ilcorrelato rapporto contributivo.Dall’altro lato, sussiste la competenza del Collegio Arb<strong>it</strong>rale pressola LND (tutela interna al sistema) alla risoluzione della controversia.Esaur<strong>it</strong>a la premessa <strong>di</strong> fondo, le <strong>di</strong>sposizioni f<strong>ed</strong>erali su cui occorrefocalizzare l’indagine sono gli artt. 29 e 94 ter delle NOIF in combinato<strong>di</strong>sposto con l’art. 42, comma 2, del regolamento della lega nazionale<strong>di</strong>lettanti.Agli allenatori tesserati possono essere corrisposti solo indenn<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>trasferta e rimborsi forfetari <strong>di</strong> spese, nonché “voci premiali” inerenti,<strong>di</strong>rettamente o in<strong>di</strong>rettamente, all’impegno agonistico.I dati pacifici che emergono dalle <strong>di</strong>sposizioni <strong>di</strong>anzi c<strong>it</strong>ate sono che:a) gli allenatori <strong>di</strong>lettanti svolgono la loro attiv<strong>it</strong>à senza remunerazione oaltre util<strong>it</strong>à materiali, ma al solo fine della pratica <strong>dello</strong> sport;b) quello che intercorre con la società non va considerato un rapporto <strong>di</strong>lavoro, sia esso in forma autonoma o subor<strong>di</strong>nata;c) è vietato qualsiasi emolumento che possa essere ricondotto ad uncontratto <strong>di</strong> lavoro;d) agli allenatori possono essere corrisposti solo - <strong>ed</strong> entro certi lim<strong>it</strong>iprestabil<strong>it</strong>i - indenn<strong>it</strong>à, rimborsi spese e voci premiali;e) sono vietati e nulli ad ogni effetto gli accor<strong>di</strong> e le convenzioni <strong>di</strong> carattereeconomico fra società <strong>ed</strong> allenatori <strong>di</strong>lettanti, nonché quelli che siano,comunque, in contrasto con le <strong>di</strong>sposizioni delle presenti norme.Per cui l’egida del Libro V del co<strong>di</strong>ce civile necessariamente nonvale per il rapporto intercorrente tra allenatore e società per effetto dellenorme f<strong>ed</strong>erali, le quali espressamente sanciscono che non c’è (rectius, nonpuò esserci) un rapporto <strong>di</strong> lavoro tra un allenatore <strong>ed</strong> una società<strong>di</strong>lettantistica.L’elemento determinante l’intercorrenza <strong>di</strong> un rapporto tra allenatoree società sportiva è forn<strong>it</strong>o dal tesseramento, vincolo che lega il primo allaseconda per la durata <strong>di</strong> un anno e sempre rinnovabile.Dall’analisi delle <strong>di</strong>sposizioni f<strong>ed</strong>erali in prec<strong>ed</strong>enza richiamate sipuò ragionevolmente affermare che quella relazione, poiché ha alla base unaccordo o una convenzione (tra i due soggetti interessati) che <strong>di</strong>sciplina(anche) aspetti <strong>di</strong> natura patrimoniale in quanto suscettibili <strong>di</strong> valutazioneeconomica (quale la erogazione <strong>di</strong> indenn<strong>it</strong>à, rimborsi e premi), vadaricondotta nell’alveo della figura del contratto, rilevato che <strong>di</strong> esso presenta
52 Mattia Grassan<strong>it</strong>utti i requis<strong>it</strong>i tipici.Siffatta conclusione trova una puntuale conferma, per quanto riguardai calciatori, nella nuova formulazione dell’art. 94 ter delle NOIF che, dopoaver riba<strong>di</strong>to al comma 1 che «Per i calciatori/calciatrici tesserati con societàpartecipanti ai campionati nazionali della LND è esclusa, …, ogni forma<strong>di</strong> lavoro autonomo o subor<strong>di</strong>nato», al comma successivo stabilisce che«gli stessi (cfr. calciatori) devono tuttavia sottoscrivere, su appos<strong>it</strong>o modulo,accor<strong>di</strong> economici annuali …». Questo è quanto si legge nel sopra richiamatoprotocollo <strong>di</strong> intesa tra società <strong>ed</strong> allenatori, per i quali anche è da escludersiqualsivoglia forma <strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato <strong>ed</strong> autonomo e soprattutto che gliaccor<strong>di</strong> economici, nella misura <strong>di</strong> rimborsi e premio <strong>di</strong> tesseramento, debbanoessere appos<strong>it</strong>amente scr<strong>it</strong>ti e sottoscr<strong>it</strong>ti dalle parti.Del resto, sotto il profilo della compatibil<strong>it</strong>à con le norm<strong>ed</strong>ell’or<strong>di</strong>namento giuri<strong>di</strong>co stuatale, va evidenziato che tali accor<strong>di</strong> economicialtro non sono che una forma <strong>di</strong> manifestazione dell’autonomia privata checon la norma (<strong>di</strong> chiusura) dell’art. 1322 c.c. attribuisce alle parti la facoltà<strong>di</strong> concludere contratti che non appartengono ai tipi aventi una <strong>di</strong>sciplinaparticolare, purché siano <strong>di</strong>retti a realizzare interessi mer<strong>it</strong>evoli <strong>di</strong> tutelasecondo l’or<strong>di</strong>namento giuri<strong>di</strong>co.Proprio sotto tale profilo assume rilevanza l’accordo negoziale incommento, poiché non entra nella tutela accordata dall’art. 1322 c.c. «Orala Corte r<strong>it</strong>iene <strong>di</strong> aderire all’insegnamento della Suprema Corte che haaffermato, tenuto conto che la potestà regolamentare confer<strong>it</strong>aall’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo, ai sensi dell’art. 5 della legge 15 febbraio 1942,n. 426 si riferisce all’àmb<strong>it</strong>o amministrativo interno, “che l’inosservanza<strong>di</strong> prescrizioni tassative dettate dai regolamenti f<strong>ed</strong>erali non cost<strong>it</strong>uisceragione <strong>di</strong> null<strong>it</strong>à per violazione <strong>di</strong> legge a norma dell’art. 1418 c.c., tenutoconto che la potestà regolamentare confer<strong>it</strong>a all’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo aisensi della normativa <strong>di</strong> riferimento riguarda l’àmb<strong>it</strong>o amministrativointerno e non quello dei rapporti intersoggettivi privati e comportal’invali<strong>di</strong>tà dei contratti stipulati in violazione <strong>di</strong> quella potestà solo aisensi dell’art. 1322 c.c., in quanto, sebbene lec<strong>it</strong>i per l’or<strong>di</strong>namento statalesono tuttavia inidonei a realizzare i loro effetti mancando un interessemer<strong>it</strong>evole <strong>di</strong> tutela, non potendo essi svolgere alcuna funzione nel campodell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva” (Cass. 1855/99)». 8Non può infatti r<strong>it</strong>enersi idoneo, sotto il profilo della mer<strong>it</strong>evolezzadella tutela dell’interesse persegu<strong>it</strong>o dai contraenti, un contratto posto inessere in frode alle regole dell’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo, e senza l’osservanza____________________8Per una più esaustiva e recente analisi Cass. civ., sez. III, 23 febbraio 2004, n. 3545.
L’allenatore <strong>di</strong>lettante non può essere lavoratore subor<strong>di</strong>nato 53delle prescrizioni formali all’uopo richieste e, come tale, inidoneo ad attuarela sua funzione proprio in quell’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo nel quale detta funzion<strong>ed</strong>eve esplicarsi.4. ConclusioniAppare, in defin<strong>it</strong>iva, più che corretta e <strong>di</strong>fficilmente censurabile la valutazion<strong>ed</strong>el giu<strong>di</strong>ce <strong>di</strong> appello che ha riformato sul punto della subor<strong>di</strong>nazione ilrapporto negoziale intercorrente tra una società <strong>di</strong>lettantistica <strong>ed</strong> un allenatorenon professionista.Per cui, l’opera dei giu<strong>di</strong>canti che si <strong>di</strong>chiarino competenti, senzaaverne t<strong>it</strong>olo, rischierebbe <strong>di</strong> annacquare l’or<strong>di</strong>namento sportivo conilleg<strong>it</strong>time prevaricazioni <strong>di</strong> quello statuale, attraverso il potere giu<strong>di</strong>ziario<strong>di</strong>fficilmente contrastabile senza un’adeguata, e quanto mai necessaria,normativa precisa interna.Nel caso in esame la Corte d’Appello <strong>di</strong> Venezia ha salvato lanormativa sportiva, ma non è detto che tali interventi riparatori possanosempre porre rime<strong>di</strong>o al problema anche in futuro, soprattutto se alla bas<strong>ed</strong>ell’applicazione delle norme non vi siano altre previsioni della m<strong>ed</strong>esimascala gerarchica, ma l’interpretazione estensiva fondata sui principi generalidell’or<strong>di</strong>namento giuri<strong>di</strong>co (or<strong>di</strong>nario e non sportivo).Si comprende ictu oculi come il prec<strong>ed</strong>ente giurisprudenziale nelsettore <strong>di</strong>lettantistico sia uno strumento potentissimo <strong>di</strong> normazione e <strong>di</strong>orientamento delle successive, inev<strong>it</strong>abili e numerose controversie traassociazioni e tesserati. Se la sentenza del Tribunale <strong>di</strong> Belluno fosse stataconfermata in appello si sarebbe ottenuto un pericoloso giu<strong>di</strong>cato – attesal’esigu<strong>it</strong>à delle pronunce in tal senso 9 – in grado <strong>di</strong> scar<strong>di</strong>nare dall’internol’autonomia normativa della Lega nazionale <strong>di</strong>lettanti, <strong>di</strong>venendo unprec<strong>ed</strong>ente invocabile per relationem in analogia legis anche da altri compartidell’infin<strong>it</strong>o movimento <strong>di</strong>lettantistico. E soprattutto avrebbe contribu<strong>it</strong>o aparalizzare l’efficacia delle altre norme che soprassi<strong>ed</strong>ono all’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportivae ne coor<strong>di</strong>nano lo svolgimento.Quanto sopra senza considerare i nefasti effetti, <strong>di</strong> natura impos<strong>it</strong>ivae contributiva, su decine <strong>di</strong> migliaia <strong>di</strong> società, la cui stessa sopravvivenzasarebbe stata messa a dura prova.____________________9Trib. Ancona, 4 luglio 2001, n. 147: in questo caso, però, l’accordo che vincolava l’allenatoread una squadra del Campionato Nazionale Dilettanti, aveva la forma scr<strong>it</strong>ta, così come richiestodal Regolamento.
RIVISTA DI ISSN 1825-6678DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA DELLO SPORT Vol. II, Fasc. 2, 2006I SEGNI DISTINTIVI DELLE SOCIETÀ DI CALCIO TRAMARCHIO FORTE, MARCHIO DEBOLE E SECONDARYMEANING: IL CASO SALERNITANANota a Trib. Napoli, sez. specializzata proprietà industriale, ord. 15febbraio 2006 e Trib. Napoli, sez. specializzata proprietà industriale,(reclamo) ord. coll. 18 aprile 2006<strong>di</strong> Angelo Maietta*SOMMARIO: 1. Il caso – 2. Marchi «forti» e marchi «deboli»: amb<strong>it</strong>i <strong>di</strong> tutela– 2.1. …(segue) il «rafforzamento» del marchio «debole»: il secondarymeaning – 3. Rilievi conclusivi1. Il casoLa vicenda in rassegna riguarda il ricorso proposto dalla società <strong>di</strong> calcio“Salern<strong>it</strong>ana <strong>Sport</strong> s.p.a.” in liquidazione contro la società “Salern<strong>it</strong>ana Calcio1919 s.p.a.” relativo alla violazione da parte <strong>di</strong> quest’ultima <strong>di</strong> una serie <strong>di</strong><strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti <strong>di</strong> privativa industriale e, in particolare, l’appropriazione indeb<strong>it</strong>a delmarchio Salern<strong>it</strong>ana, dei colori sociali granata, dei relativi segni <strong>di</strong>stintivi,delle opere dell’ingegno, dell’immagine e <strong>di</strong> tutti i valori aziendali connessi,ivi compresi l’avviamento e la clientela.Chi<strong>ed</strong>eva, pertanto, previo l’accertamento della t<strong>it</strong>olar<strong>it</strong>à deirichiamati <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti, l’inib<strong>it</strong>oria ex art. 124 del co<strong>di</strong>ce della proprietà industriale 1<strong>di</strong> tutto quanto cost<strong>it</strong>uisse violazione dei m<strong>ed</strong>esimi.Il proce<strong>di</strong>mento veniva incar<strong>di</strong>nato r<strong>it</strong>ualmente con atto <strong>di</strong> c<strong>it</strong>azione____________________*Avvocato e professore a contratto <strong>di</strong> <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> Privato presso l’Univers<strong>it</strong>à degli Stu<strong>di</strong> “Suor OrsolaBenincasa” <strong>di</strong> Napoli; avvocato fiduciario dell’Associazione Italiana Calciatori.1Per un primo commento al provve<strong>di</strong>mento in menzione si rinvia a AA.VV., Il co<strong>di</strong>ce Marzanodella proprietà industriale, in Il <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> Ind., numero monografico, 1/2005.
56 Angelo Maiettaa cui sono segu<strong>it</strong>e le istanze cautelari inib<strong>it</strong>orie in corso <strong>di</strong> causa <strong>di</strong>nanzi allasezione specializzata in materia <strong>di</strong> proprietà industriale ex d.lgs. 168/03. 2Il Giu<strong>di</strong>ce <strong>di</strong> prime cure, pur rigettando l’istanza cautelare in punto<strong>di</strong> periculum in mora, ha affermato la sussistenza del fumus boni juris inor<strong>di</strong>ne alla fondatezza della domanda dell’attore argomentando, seppur nonesplic<strong>it</strong>amente, in or<strong>di</strong>ne alla tutela del marchio e della denominazioneSalern<strong>it</strong>ana, come se tali segni assurgessero a rango <strong>di</strong> marchio c.d. forte. 3Avverso tale pronuncia <strong>di</strong> rigetto (sul solo periculum) veniva propostoreclamo al Collegio dalla ricorrente Salern<strong>it</strong>ana <strong>Sport</strong> in liquidazione; ilTribunale rigettava il reclamo per infondatezza del m<strong>ed</strong>esimo e si pronunciavaanche sul fumus, atteso che sia il reclamo che la <strong>di</strong>fesa della resistenteinvestivano anche tale profilo che, pertanto, ne imponeva la trattazione.Il Collegio ha affermato che alcuna tutela «forte» poteva esserericonosciuta alla denominazione e al marchio Salern<strong>it</strong>ana, atteso che lam<strong>ed</strong>esima «presenta tutte le caratteristiche del marchio debole» e che alcunaprospettazione era stata fatta dalla reclamante in mer<strong>it</strong>o alla «possibil<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>un rafforzamento per secondary meaning.»2. Marchi «forti» e marchi «deboli»: amb<strong>it</strong>i <strong>di</strong> tutela.Le due pronunce in commento offrono spunti <strong>di</strong> interesse all’interprete in____________________2Sulle sezioni specializzate in materia <strong>di</strong> proprietà industriale si v<strong>ed</strong>ano le sempre puntualiosservazioni <strong>di</strong> G. CASABURI, L’ist<strong>it</strong>uzione delle sezioni specializzate per la proprietà industriale<strong>ed</strong> intellettuale. (Prime) istruzioni per l’uso, in Il <strong>di</strong>r. ind., 2003, 405 ss; Id., L’ist<strong>it</strong>uzione dellesezioni specializzate per la proprietà industriale <strong>ed</strong> intellettuale, in Riv. Dir. ind., 2003, I, 251.Più specificamente sul processo industrialistico, G. CASABURI, Il Co<strong>di</strong>ce <strong>ed</strong> il processoindustrialistico: frammenti per un primo commento, in Il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to ind., 2005, 57-68.3Si legge nella motivazione del Giu<strong>di</strong>ce <strong>di</strong> prime cure che «posto che risulta incontestato che lasocietà attrice sia t<strong>it</strong>olare del marchio registrato “Salern<strong>it</strong>ana” (circostanza non documentatama non contestata dalla convenuta) oltre che dei marchi “carta granata” e dell’ippocamporaffigurato in uno scudetto recante la scr<strong>it</strong>ta 1919, è avviso <strong>di</strong> questo giu<strong>di</strong>ce che non mer<strong>it</strong>iparticolari approfon<strong>di</strong>menti l’affermazione della sua somiglianza (se non, ad<strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>tura,dell’uguaglianza) con la denominazione sociale della convenuta e con il suo marchio “Salern<strong>it</strong>ana1919”. Comune ad entrambi i segni <strong>di</strong>stintivi è il “cuore” grafico e cromatico cost<strong>it</strong>u<strong>it</strong>o dallaparola “Salern<strong>it</strong>ana” e dall’uso del colore granata, la cui funzione in<strong>di</strong>vidualizzante in relazioneall’ident<strong>it</strong>à dei “servizi” prodotti dall’attiv<strong>it</strong>à impren<strong>di</strong>toriale è indub<strong>it</strong>abile, così come innegabileè anche il pericolo <strong>di</strong> confusione per il pubblico, pericolo che va evidentemente valutato anchein termini prospettici e, quin<strong>di</strong>, in funzione della possibile progressione della “vecchia”Salern<strong>it</strong>ana verso le serie calcistiche superiori, identiche o vicine a quelle cui dovesse trovarsia partecipare la “nuova” Salern<strong>it</strong>ana. Non va poi trascurato che il marchio del quale si siaottenuta la registrazione in mala f<strong>ed</strong>e… è nullo… e che, almeno nella presente fase cautelare,appare <strong>di</strong>fficilmente sostenibile… che la “nuova” Salern<strong>it</strong>ana non sapesse della esistenza della“vecchia” Salern<strong>it</strong>ana e delle sue privative». (Trib. Napoli, sez. specializzata proprietà industriale,ord. 15 febbraio 2006). In dottrina, sui c.d. nuovi marchi, si v<strong>ed</strong>a l’interessante <strong>ed</strong> agile volumetto
Il caso Salern<strong>it</strong>ana 57or<strong>di</strong>ne alla corretta qualificazione dei segni <strong>di</strong>stintivi 4 delle società <strong>di</strong> calcioe, in particolare, del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to <strong>di</strong> privativa sul marchio d’impresa e dei connessi<strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti ancillari.La materia è stata oggetto <strong>di</strong> un rior<strong>di</strong>no normativo <strong>di</strong> notevoleimportanza con il d.lgs. 10 febbraio 2005, n. 30, meglio conosciuto comeCo<strong>di</strong>ce della Proprietà Industriale 5 il quale, abrogando l’insieme <strong>di</strong> norm<strong>ed</strong>ettate in materia, ha forn<strong>it</strong>o un punto certo <strong>di</strong> riferimento per chi si avvicinaalla <strong>di</strong>sciplina industrialistica.Le decisioni del Tribunale <strong>di</strong> Napoli si contrappongono in or<strong>di</strong>nealla qualificazione del marchio Salern<strong>it</strong>ana, riconosciuto, sia pur incidentertantum, come «forte» dal Magistrato <strong>di</strong> prime cure e come «debole» dalCollegio e, per esso, dal Giu<strong>di</strong>ce relatore. 6Ad avviso <strong>di</strong> chi scrive, la seconda pronuncia è da con<strong>di</strong>viderepienamente e non soltanto per la qualificazione del marchio così come operata,ma per la ricostruzione sistematica dell’argomento e per aver correttamenteevidenziato che, quantunque fosse stato riconducibile un <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to <strong>di</strong> privativaalla società reclamante, lo stesso andava affermato ricorrendo alrafforzamento del marchio per secondary meaning, 7 prospettiva quest’ultima,però, non addotta dalla reclamante.Com’è noto la <strong>di</strong>stinzione tra marchio forte e marchio debole non ènormativamente <strong>di</strong>sciplinata, ma trova c<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>nanza nell’or<strong>di</strong>namentogiuri<strong>di</strong>co per elaborazione giurisprudenziale; in particolare, è stato osservatoche un marchio è da r<strong>it</strong>enersi «forte» allorché il suo potere in<strong>di</strong>vidualizzant<strong>ed</strong>eriva dalla creazione immaginifica del contenuto ideologico espressivo 8 ,mentre è da r<strong>it</strong>enersi «debole» quel marchio che cost<strong>it</strong>uisce la semplice____________________<strong>di</strong> S. SANDRI, S. RIZZO, I nuovi marchi. Forme, colori, odori, suoni <strong>ed</strong> altro, Ipsoa, Milano, 2002.4Sui segni <strong>di</strong>stintivi la letteratura è amplissima; a t<strong>it</strong>olo esemplificativo si v<strong>ed</strong>ano tra i contributipiù recenti A. VANZETTI, V. DI CATALDO, Manuale <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to industriale, Giuffrè, Milano, ult. <strong>ed</strong>.,passim; V. DI CATALDO, I segni <strong>di</strong>stintivi, Giuffè, Milano, 1993, passim; AUTERI, voce Segni <strong>di</strong>stintividell’impresa, in Enciclope<strong>di</strong>a giuri<strong>di</strong>ca Treccani, vol. XXVIII, Roma, 1992, passim; M. RICOLFI,I segni <strong>di</strong>stintivi dell’impresa. <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> interno e comun<strong>it</strong>ario, Giappichelli, Torino, 1999, passim.5Un primo commento <strong>di</strong> or<strong>di</strong>ne generale è rinvenibile in G. FLORIDIA, Il co<strong>di</strong>ce della proprietàindustriale: <strong>di</strong>sposizioni generali e principi fondamentali, in Il <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to ind., 2005, I, 11-17.6In dottrina, con riferimento alla <strong>di</strong>stinzione tra marchio forte e marchio debole si v<strong>ed</strong>ano, pertutti T. ASCARELLI, Teoria della concorrenza e dei beni immateriali, Giuffrè, Milano, 1960, 443nonché N. ABRIANI, G. COTTINO, M. RICOLFI, <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> Industriale, in Trattato <strong>di</strong> <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> Commerciale,C<strong>ed</strong>am, Padova, 2001, 43. In giurisprudenza, Cass. 27 febbraio 2004, n. 3984; Cass. 18 febbraio2000, n. 1820 in Giur. It., 2001, 89; Cass. 25 settembre 1998, n. 9617, in Giur. It., 1999, 1228 ein Riv. Dir. ind., 1999, 227; Cass. 23 febbraio 1998, n. 1929, in Giur. It., 1999, 1237 e in Giust.Civ., 1998, I, 1915; Cass. 26 giugno 1996, n. 5924.7In argomento si v<strong>ed</strong>a il puntuale contributo <strong>di</strong> M. BIONDETTI, Il “secondary meaning”nella<strong>di</strong>sciplina <strong>it</strong>aliana dei marchi d’impresa, in Il <strong>di</strong>r. ind., 2001, I, 329-337.8Cass., 3 <strong>di</strong>cembre 1987, n. 8979, in Giur. It., 1988, I, 1, c. 1154.
58 Angelo Maiettamo<strong>di</strong>fica <strong>di</strong> un nome <strong>di</strong> uso comune o che presenta un alto grado <strong>di</strong>collegamento concettuale tra il marchio e la denominazione generica delprodotto. 9Tale <strong>di</strong>stinzione, in punto <strong>di</strong> tutela, consente <strong>di</strong> impe<strong>di</strong>re in manierapiù o meno agevole la possibil<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> illec<strong>it</strong>a utilizzazione o appropriazion<strong>ed</strong>el segno e, consequenzialmente, <strong>dello</strong> sviamento <strong>di</strong> clientela. 10 Apertisverbis, se un marchio è forte non sarà possibile utilizzare denominazioni aconsonanza similare e la protezione sarà «allargata» anche a quelle variazionio mo<strong>di</strong>ficazioni che lasciano, però, sussistere l’ident<strong>it</strong>à sostanziale del cuor<strong>ed</strong>el marchio, 11 mentre se un marchio è debole, la tutela sarà molto più lim<strong>it</strong>ataal punto che anche una minima variazione sarà sufficiente ad escludere laconfon<strong>di</strong>bil<strong>it</strong>à tra i segni. 12In tale contesto argomentativo si innestano le due decisioni in rassegna<strong>ed</strong> in particolare la seconda che, <strong>di</strong>versamente da quanto stabil<strong>it</strong>o dal Giu<strong>di</strong>ce<strong>di</strong> prime cure, ha correttamente affermato la «debolezza» del marchioSalern<strong>it</strong>ana atteso che «la denominazione in parola è esplic<strong>it</strong>amente rifer<strong>it</strong>aalla c<strong>it</strong>tà <strong>di</strong> Salerno <strong>di</strong> cui la società ricorrente è (era) t<strong>it</strong>olare della localesquadra calcistica. Si tratta, anzi, proprio della parola che in<strong>di</strong>ca lac<strong>it</strong>ta<strong>di</strong>nanza della c<strong>it</strong>tà campana. Gli elementi figurativi sono sicuramentesecondari, in una percezione d’insieme, rispetto a quello denominativosuin<strong>di</strong>cato.»Più chiaramente, secondo il Collegio partenopeo la denominazione«Salern<strong>it</strong>ana», essendo espressione chiara <strong>di</strong> un legame <strong>di</strong>retto tra la squadra<strong>di</strong> calcio della c<strong>it</strong>tà <strong>di</strong> Salerno e la c<strong>it</strong>tà m<strong>ed</strong>esima «senza alcuna elaborazionecreativa», deve r<strong>it</strong>enersi come un dato notorio 13 come tale percep<strong>it</strong>o dai____________________9Cass., 19 novembre 1978, n. 6081 in Giur. Ann. Dir. Ind., 1978, n. 1018; Cass., 30 gennaio1985, n. 573, in Giur. It., 1986, I, 1, c. 947.10N. ABRIANI, Contenuto e requis<strong>it</strong>i del marchio. Acquisto del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to, in Trattato <strong>di</strong> <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong>Commerciale, C<strong>ed</strong>am, Padova, 2001, 43.11Cass., 27 febbraio 2004, n. 3984; conf. Cass., 14 luglio 1987, n. 6128, in Giur. Ann. Dir. ind.,1987, n. 2101; Trib. Napoli, 8 novembre 1996, in Il <strong>di</strong>r. ind., 1997, 193; App. Milano, 11 luglio1997, in Giur. Ann. Dir. ind., 1998, n. 3766.12ex multiis, Cass., 26 giugno 1996, n. 5924, in Rep. Giur. It., 1996, voce Marchi.13Cass. 31 maggio 2005, n. 11609 secondo cui «Il fatto notorio, derogando al principio <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ivo<strong>ed</strong> a quello del contrad<strong>di</strong>ttorio e dando luogo a prove non forn<strong>it</strong>e dalle parti e relative a fatti daesse non vagliati e controllati, dev’essere inteso in senso rigoroso, cioè come fatto acquis<strong>it</strong>o contale grado <strong>di</strong> certezza da apparire indub<strong>it</strong>abile <strong>ed</strong> incontestabile, e non quale evento o s<strong>it</strong>uazioneoggetto della mera conoscenza del singolo giu<strong>di</strong>ce. Conseguentemente, per aversi fatto notoriooccorre, in primo luogo, che si tratti <strong>di</strong> un fatto che si imponga all’osservazione <strong>ed</strong> alla percezion<strong>ed</strong>ella collettiv<strong>it</strong>à, <strong>di</strong> modo che questa possa compiere per suo conto la valutazione cr<strong>it</strong>icanecessaria per riscontrarlo, sicchè al giu<strong>di</strong>ce non resti che constatarne gli effetti e valutarlosoltanto ai fini delle conseguenze giuri<strong>di</strong>che che ne derivano; in secondo luogo, occorre che s<strong>it</strong>ratti <strong>di</strong> un fatto <strong>di</strong> comune conoscenza, anche se lim<strong>it</strong>atamente al luogo ove esso è invocato, o
Il caso Salern<strong>it</strong>ana 59tifosi che cost<strong>it</strong>uiscono il pubblico <strong>di</strong> riferimento 14 per la qual cosa tal<strong>ed</strong>enominazione <strong>di</strong>venta esattamente l’immagine speculare del marchio debole,così come innanzi defin<strong>it</strong>o. Id est, l’elemento <strong>di</strong>fferenziale, seppur minimo,delle parole «calcio 1919» è stato r<strong>it</strong>enuto sufficiente per la negazione dellaprivativa rinvenendo l’original<strong>it</strong>à e la capac<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>stintiva «non soltantodall’aver posto in sequenza logica due parole tra loro non collegate… maanche dall’aver creato una sequenza anomala rispetto all’uso corrente dellalingua <strong>it</strong>aliana» e tanto sod<strong>di</strong>sfa il dettato giurisprudenziale in materia <strong>di</strong>marchi «deboli».Ad analoga conclusione si giunge anche argomentando sullacircostanza che il marchio Salern<strong>it</strong>ana è un toponimo che già <strong>di</strong> per sé soloescluderebbe un <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to <strong>di</strong> privativa ai sensi dell’art. 13, comma primo, Co<strong>di</strong>c<strong>ed</strong>ella proprietà industriale, salvo a <strong>di</strong>mostrare che lo stesso sia «scollegato»dal mero dato geografico <strong>di</strong> guisa che, in tale ultimo caso, potrebbe cost<strong>it</strong>uirevalido marchio. 15Nella vicenda in esame, però, alcun elemento in tal senso è statoforn<strong>it</strong>o <strong>ed</strong> anzi, così come puntualmente riscontrato dal Collegio, «vi è unaprofonda interazione tra denominazione, squadra <strong>di</strong> calcio e c<strong>it</strong>tà» per laqual cosa alcuna tutela poteva essere invocata.Va, pertanto, con<strong>di</strong>visa la decisione sul reclamo del Collegio anchenel punto in cui il m<strong>ed</strong>esimo riscontra l’assenza <strong>di</strong> prospettazione del possibilerafforzamento del marchio «debole» Salern<strong>it</strong>ana per secondary meaning 16con ciò imp<strong>ed</strong>endo una analisi sul punto, salvo ad incorrere nella sanzion<strong>ed</strong>ell’ultrapetizione.____________________perchè appartiene alla cultura me<strong>di</strong>a della collettiv<strong>it</strong>à, ivi stanziata, o perchè le sue ripercussionisono tanto ampie <strong>ed</strong> imme<strong>di</strong>ate che la collettiv<strong>it</strong>à ne faccia esperienza comune anche in vistadella sua incidenza sull’interesse pubblico che spinge ciascuno dei componenti della collettiv<strong>it</strong>àstessa a conoscerlo. Anche il fatto tecnico, sia pure a livelli semplicizzati, può <strong>di</strong>ventare notorio,allorquando la collettiv<strong>it</strong>à sia perio<strong>di</strong>camente sensibilizzata sul punto dalla stampa e dagli altrimezzi <strong>di</strong> comunicazione <strong>di</strong> massa o da altre forme pubblic<strong>it</strong>arie.»14Cass., 26 marzo 2004, n. 6080 in Il <strong>di</strong>r. ind., 2004, 534.15In tal senso Cass., 11 agosto 1998, n. 7861, in Arch. civ., 1998, 1227, secondo cui «anche unadenominazione geografica può essere inser<strong>it</strong>a in un marchio e dare luogo ad un marchio “forte”,purché l’insieme del segno, in concreto, faccia desumere la avvenuta trasposizione del messaggiodal piano <strong>di</strong> riferimento al luogo a quello della in<strong>di</strong>vidualizzazione del prodotto, sicché,prevalendo le componenti <strong>di</strong> original<strong>it</strong>à e fantasia, l’uso del toponimo non adempia ad unafunzione meramente descr<strong>it</strong>tiva.» Conf. Cass., 23 novembre 1992, n. 12506, in Arch. Civ., 1993,426.16La giurisprudenza sul punto è costante; si v<strong>ed</strong>a, tra le tante, Cass., 09 novembre 2000, n.14560, in Giust. civ., 2000, I, 3114 per la quale «in tema <strong>di</strong> registrazione <strong>di</strong> marchi, il cosiddettosecondary meaning (cioè il fatto dell’acquis<strong>it</strong>a <strong>di</strong>stintiv<strong>it</strong>à nel tempo sulla base dell’uso <strong>di</strong> unsegno, originariamente sprovvisto <strong>di</strong> capac<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>stintive per generic<strong>it</strong>à, mera descr<strong>it</strong>tiv<strong>it</strong>à omancanza <strong>di</strong> original<strong>it</strong>à), per poter essere d<strong>ed</strong>otto <strong>ed</strong> esaminato, deve essere esplic<strong>it</strong>amenteallegato, quanto meno in via subor<strong>di</strong>nata, in quanto contrad<strong>di</strong>ce la domanda <strong>di</strong> registrazione.»
60 Angelo Maietta2.1. …(segue) il «rafforzamento» del marchio «debole»: il secondarymeaningIl fenomeno del secondary meaning nasce nel <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to anglo-americano 17 eriguarda i marchi cost<strong>it</strong>u<strong>it</strong>i da parole all’origine prive <strong>di</strong> carattere <strong>di</strong>stintivoperché <strong>di</strong> uso frequente nel linguaggio comune o, comunque, insuscettibili<strong>di</strong> assurgere a rango <strong>di</strong> marchio d’impresa attesane la loro generic<strong>it</strong>à. 18L’ist<strong>it</strong>uto in parola consiste nel far acquisire ad un termine inizialmentegenerico un secondo, più forte, significato (secondary meaning) che consentea quella denominazione <strong>di</strong> essere percep<strong>it</strong>a nel pubblico dei consumatoricon una valenza ultronea anche in virtù dell’uso che se ne faccia da part<strong>ed</strong>ell’impren<strong>di</strong>tore fino al punto <strong>di</strong> riuscire a contrad<strong>di</strong>stinguere il prodottosu cui è apposto.Il secondary meaning, pertanto, trova terreno fertile per la suaapplicazione proprio allorché si <strong>di</strong>scute <strong>di</strong> marchi «deboli»; invero, com’èstato autorevolmente affermato marchio forte e marchio debole rappresentanoi due poli estremi <strong>di</strong> una scala all’interno della quale si gradua, secondo unclimax ascendente, la capac<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>stintiva e la conseguente estensione dellatutela accordata al segno. Si deve, peraltro, constatare come la collocazion<strong>ed</strong>el segno all’interno <strong>di</strong> questa scala ideale non soltanto si riveli talora inconcreto <strong>di</strong>sagevole, ma possa altresì variare a segu<strong>it</strong>o dell’uso che ne siafatto e della notorietà che abbia progressivamente acquis<strong>it</strong>o: 19 è il casodell’ist<strong>it</strong>uto in parola.La giurisprudenza ha da tempo ammesso tale «scalata» del marchiodebole 20 anche sulla scorta <strong>di</strong> penetranti opinioni dottrinali 21 tanto da fornirel’occasione al legislatore <strong>di</strong> co<strong>di</strong>ficare il fenomeno del secondary meaning____________________17Per la dottrina americana si consiglia la lettura <strong>di</strong> CALLMANN, The law of unfair compet<strong>it</strong>ion,Mundelein, 1967, 367; per la dottrina inglese v. MC CARTHY, Trade marks and unfair compet<strong>it</strong>ion,Rochester, 1994, passim; KERLY, Law of trade marks and trade names, London, 1972, 16 ss..18In tal senso, M. BIONDETTI, Il “secondary meaning” nella <strong>di</strong>sciplina <strong>it</strong>aliana dei marchid’impresa,c<strong>it</strong>., in Il <strong>di</strong>r. ind., 2001, 329.19Così testualmente N. ABRIANI, Contenuto e requis<strong>it</strong>i del marchio. Acquisto del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to, c<strong>it</strong>., 45.20Cass., 25 settembre 1998, n. 9617, in Giur. Ann. Dir. ind., 1998, n. 3736; Cass., 22 febbraio1994, n. 1724, ivi, 1994, n. 3021; App. Roma, 24 novembre 1997, ivi, 1998, n. 3783, Trib.Milano, 15 ottobre 1987, in Giur. Ann. Dir. ind., 1987, n. 2203; App. Milano, 20 maggio 1986, inRiv. Dir. ind., 1987, II, 321; Trib. Roma, 25 febbraio 1988, in Giur. Ann. Dir. ind.,1988, n. 2299;App. Bologna, 15 settembre 1988, ivi, 1989, n. 2383; Trib. Napoli, 21 maggio 1997 (ord.), in Il<strong>di</strong>r. ind., 1997, 1027; Trib. Milano, 8 aprile 1991, in Giur. Ann. Dir. ind., 1991, 446.21SORDELLI, Marchio e secondary meaning, Giuffrè, Milano, 1979, passim; OLIVIERI, Il “secondarymeaning”, in MARASÀ, MASI, OLIVIERI, SPADA, SPOLIDORO, STELLA RICHTER, Commento tematicoalla legge marchi, 201 ss; GUGLIELMETTI, Il secondary meaning e l’opportun<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> una sua (lim<strong>it</strong>ata)tutela in s<strong>ed</strong>e <strong>di</strong> riforma della legge <strong>it</strong>aliana marchi, in Riv. Dir. ind., 1973, I, 39 ss.
Il caso Salern<strong>it</strong>ana 61nella legge marchi prima all’art. 19 <strong>ed</strong> all’art. 47 bis 22 e nel co<strong>di</strong>ce dellaproprietà industriale poi, laddove si legge all’art. 13, comma secondo, che«… possono cost<strong>it</strong>uire oggetto <strong>di</strong> registrazione come marchio d’impresa isegni che prima della domanda <strong>di</strong> registrazione, a segu<strong>it</strong>o dell’uso che nesia stato fatto, abbiano acquistato carattere <strong>di</strong>stintivo.»La norma non deve, però, indurre a r<strong>it</strong>enere che ogni e qualsiasiparola o segno possa assurgere a rango <strong>di</strong> marchio tutelabile sulla scorta <strong>di</strong>un uso costante che ne sia stato fatto ma, al fine <strong>di</strong> poter sortire «l’effettorafforzante», il giu<strong>di</strong>zio va riservato anche alla effettiva percezione che quellaparola o quel segno abbia nel pubblico dei consumatori. 23Apertis verbis, perché si possa <strong>di</strong>scutere <strong>di</strong> rafforzamento del marchioper secondary meaning occorre la presenza <strong>di</strong> due fattori, uno oggettivoconsistente nella utilizzazione, da parte dell’impren<strong>di</strong>tore, costante e re<strong>it</strong>eratadella parola, ancorché descr<strong>it</strong>tiva, priva <strong>di</strong> carattere <strong>di</strong>stintivo e l’altro,soggettivo, della percezione nel pubblico dei consumatori <strong>di</strong> quella parolacome un quid in<strong>di</strong>vidualizzante. 24Orbene, tornando alla vicenda che ci occupa, è stato correttamenteosservato dal Collegio che, proprio la qualificazione del marchio Salern<strong>it</strong>ana<strong>Sport</strong> come «debole» avrebbe imposto alla ricorrente che lamentava laviolazione dei <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti <strong>di</strong> privativa sul m<strong>ed</strong>esimo, l’onere <strong>di</strong> allegazione <strong>di</strong>elementi tali da giustificare tale pretesa ovvero la <strong>di</strong>mostrazione dell’avvenutorafforzamento del proprio marchio debole per secondary meaning. 25Su tale specifico punto, l’interprete deve indagare come sia possibile____________________22In argomento si rinvia a R. BICHI, L’art. 47 bis della legge marchi e l’uso riabil<strong>it</strong>ante delmarchio, in Riv. Dir. Ind., 1995, 104 ss.23App. Torino, 28 <strong>di</strong>cembre 2002, in Giur. It., 2003, 10 secondo cui «è escluso il fenomeno delsecondary meaning, quando non sia <strong>di</strong>mostrato che l’espressione <strong>di</strong> uso comune o generale, purmantenendo il suo significato originario, con l’andare del tempo abbia assunto un ulteriore,secondario significato, <strong>di</strong> segno <strong>di</strong>stintivo della provenienza dei prodotti dalla impresa, pereffetto dell’uso intenso, accompagnato da una penetrante pubblic<strong>it</strong>à e dalla conseguenteassociazione creatasi nella mente dei consumatori.»24In tal senso App. Milano, 18 novembre 1997, in Il <strong>di</strong>r. ind., 1999, 131 ss. con nota <strong>di</strong> G.BONELLI, Riabil<strong>it</strong>azione e rafforzamento del marchio: spunti <strong>di</strong> riflessione.25La pronuncia in rassegna si pone, relativamente alla prova della sussistenza dell’effettorafforzante, sulla scia <strong>di</strong> una monol<strong>it</strong>ica giurisprudenza sia <strong>di</strong> mer<strong>it</strong>o che <strong>di</strong> leg<strong>it</strong>tim<strong>it</strong>à. A tal fine,si v<strong>ed</strong>ano, ex multiis, App. Torino, 15 novembre 2002, in Giur. Mer., 2003, I, 1373 secondo cui«incombe sulla parte che lo invoca la prova del fenomeno del secondary meaning, in forza delquale una espressione <strong>di</strong> uso comune e generale, pur mantenendo il significato originario, acquistaulteriore capac<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>stintiva della provenienza dei prodotti <strong>di</strong> una impresa per effetto dell’usointenso da questa praticato sul mercato; tale prova non pò essere forn<strong>it</strong>a attraverso una consulenzatecnica <strong>di</strong> parte <strong>di</strong> carattere demoscopico, svolta dopo l’inizio della causa, lim<strong>it</strong>ata a un campione<strong>di</strong> persone intervistate nei pressi dei punti ven<strong>di</strong>ta del prodotto, circoscr<strong>it</strong>ta nel tempo e articolatasu domande basate più che altro a rilevare la valutazione <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>stintiv<strong>it</strong>à del nome generico e nonl’acquisizione della particolare efficacia <strong>di</strong>stintiva in forza <strong>di</strong> acquisizione <strong>di</strong> secondo significato.»
62 Angelo Maiettala <strong>di</strong>mostrazione <strong>di</strong> tale «secondo significato» affinché l’impren<strong>di</strong>tore possabeneficiare della tutela rafforzata riservata al marchio forte o registrato. 26La dottrina americana 27 ha sugger<strong>it</strong>o tre <strong>di</strong>mensioni identificativ<strong>ed</strong>el fenomeno e più precisamente: 1) adeguato tempo nell’uso; 2) estensionegeografica dell’uso; 3) intens<strong>it</strong>à dell’uso e dei mezzi pubblic<strong>it</strong>ari e possibil<strong>it</strong>àche il pubblico riconosca effettivamente il segno usato come marchio.In punto <strong>di</strong> onere probatorio la questione non è facilmente risolvibile;invero, se per un verso, il fattore oggettivo ovvero l’uso adeguato nel tempoe l’estensione geografica dell’uso possono essere facilmente <strong>di</strong>mostrati conl’allegazione <strong>di</strong> copiosi investimenti pubblic<strong>it</strong>ari e <strong>di</strong> penetranti campagne <strong>di</strong><strong>di</strong>stribuzione del prodotto 28 o del servizio che il marchio contrad<strong>di</strong>stingue,la prova che il pubblico percepisca quel segno o quella parola come marchio<strong>di</strong>stintivo <strong>di</strong> quella determinata s<strong>it</strong>uazione <strong>di</strong> t<strong>it</strong>olar<strong>it</strong>à, rischia <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>ventareuna probatio <strong>di</strong>abolica atteso che, il mezzo dell’indagine demoscopia nonpare essere considerato dalla giurisprudenza, elemento idoneo da solo aprovare la richiamata circostanza. 29____________________Nello stesso filone interpretativo Trib. Torino, 1 ottobre 2004 (ord.), in Il <strong>di</strong>r. ind., 2005, 617;Trib. Napoli, 5 luglio 2002 (ord.), in Il <strong>di</strong>r. ind., 2003, 131.26L’equiparazione della tutela riservata al marchio forte o registrato a segu<strong>it</strong>o della «convalida»del marchio debole per l’uso fattone, è stata affermata da Cass., 19 aprile 2000, n. 5091 secondocui «nel sistema della legge marchi, la <strong>di</strong>stinzione tra marchi forti e marchi deboli non si specificaulteriormente, quanto ai marchi forti, a seconda che tale natura sia originaria oppure acquis<strong>it</strong>acon l’uso <strong>di</strong> mercato, onde, in presenza <strong>di</strong> un fenomeno <strong>di</strong> “secondary meaning”, va riconosciutaal marchio “originariamente” debole la stessa tutela accordata ai marchi “originariamente”forti e l’accertamento della relativa contraffazione va effettuato secondo i cr<strong>it</strong>eri che presi<strong>ed</strong>onoalla tutela del marchio forte, atteso che il segno risultante in origine caratterizzato da unaminor capac<strong>it</strong>à in<strong>di</strong>vidualizzante, una volta pervenuto alla convalidazione dovuta all’uso,abbisogna della più rigorosa tutela riconosciuta al marchio forte, in mancanza della qualeanche le lievi mo<strong>di</strong>ficazioni che il marchio debole deve invece tollerare otterrebbero l’effetto <strong>di</strong>frustrare il risultato consegu<strong>it</strong>o attraverso l’uso <strong>di</strong> mercato.»27L’opinione è <strong>di</strong> KATH I. HANCOCK, Three <strong>di</strong>mension in 2 (f) evidence, in TradeMark Reporter,1955, 1157.28Per completezza espos<strong>it</strong>iva, giova precisare che l’esperienza angloamericana sul punto è moltomeno rigorosa rispetto al <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to interno atteso che, nelle richiamate esperienze straniere, lagiurisprudenza ha ammesso il consolidarsi del secondary meaning anche dopo brevi periodo <strong>di</strong>utilizzo del segno riconoscendo come sufficienti ai fini della prova, brevi <strong>ed</strong> intense campagnepubblic<strong>it</strong>arie sviluppate in uno spazio geografico molto vasto premiando gli sforzi economici egli investimenti <strong>di</strong> cap<strong>it</strong>ale sostenuti dall’impren<strong>di</strong>tore. Una ampia rassegna della giurisprudenzaanglo americana è rinvenibile in MC CARTHY, Time requir<strong>ed</strong> to develop secondary meaning, inTrade marks and unfair compet<strong>it</strong>ion, Rochester, 1994.29M. BIONDETTI, Il “secondary meaning” nella <strong>di</strong>sciplina <strong>it</strong>aliana dei marchi d’impresa, c<strong>it</strong>., 334sostiene che le indagini demoscopiche possono essere riconosciute come fonte <strong>di</strong> prova rigorosasolo allorché siano segnate da alcuni fondamentali e rigi<strong>di</strong> passaggi che lo stesso Autore segnalain: 1) l’identificazione del campione rappresentativo <strong>di</strong> tutti i possibili acquirenti del prodottodel cui marchio si <strong>di</strong>scute; 2) la corretta formulazione delle domande da proporre al pubblico <strong>di</strong>riferimento, ponendo particolare attenzione nell’ev<strong>it</strong>are <strong>di</strong> influenzare o suggerire le
Il caso Salern<strong>it</strong>ana 63Invero, tale strumento probatorio si espone a cr<strong>it</strong>iche puntuali anch<strong>ed</strong>a parte della dottrina 30 che, <strong>di</strong>versamente dalle opinioni straniere, r<strong>it</strong>ienel’indagine demoscopia non sempre adeguata, specie se si tratta <strong>di</strong> «rafforzare»marchi deboli, suggerendo il ricorso ad in<strong>di</strong>ci rivelatori più agili. 31Ad avviso <strong>di</strong> chi scrive, la percezione consumeristica del marchiodovrebbe essere indagata caso per caso non potendosi ricorrere in astratto acr<strong>it</strong>eri prestabil<strong>it</strong>i; nella vicenda oggetto <strong>di</strong> commento, ad esempio, l’indagin<strong>ed</strong>emoscopica potrebbe essere davvero l’unica prova certa della notorietàdel marchio e del suo carattere <strong>di</strong>stintivo attesa la fortissima <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>dello</strong>sport del calcio in tutto il Paese laddove la squadra <strong>di</strong> calcio è ent<strong>it</strong>à, spesso,in<strong>di</strong>vidualizzante del luogo omonimo e non viceversa.Diversamente, invece, potrebbe non rivelarsi adeguata un’indagin<strong>ed</strong>emoscopica su elementi <strong>di</strong> caratterizzazione <strong>di</strong> prodotti <strong>di</strong> consumo la cui<strong>di</strong>ffusione potrebbe avere solo amb<strong>it</strong>o locale e, pur avendo forte penetrazionenel pubblico dei consumatori, tale elemento rimarrebbe circoscr<strong>it</strong>to ad un’areageografica lim<strong>it</strong>ata che, a <strong>di</strong>rla con la dottrina americana, non attrae a sél’aspetto tri<strong>di</strong>mensionale del secondary meaning.Quanto, infine, alla decorrenza degli effetti del fenomeno riabil<strong>it</strong>anteo rafforzante del secondary meaning, sembra opportuno aderire all’opinione<strong>di</strong> chi 32 esclude la retroattiv<strong>it</strong>à alla data <strong>di</strong> registrazione del marchiooriginariamente nullo ma successivamente r<strong>it</strong>enuto valido in virtù del«secondo significato» atteso che sarebbe eccessivamente ingiusto per chi hausato lec<strong>it</strong>amente quel segno o quella parola durante il periodo <strong>di</strong> «limbo»del marchio, dover subire conseguenze pregiu<strong>di</strong>zievoli in forza <strong>di</strong> uncomportamento che sarebbe affetto da sopraggiunta illice<strong>it</strong>à senza sua colpa.Analogamente, sembra eccessivo richi<strong>ed</strong>ere all’impren<strong>di</strong>tore cheriven<strong>di</strong>chi la capac<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>stintiva per secondary meaning la prova certa della«nasc<strong>it</strong>a» <strong>di</strong> tale effetto rafforzante, perché tale circostanza imporrebbe unmon<strong>it</strong>oraggio sicuramente poco agevole <strong>di</strong> s<strong>it</strong>uazioni <strong>di</strong> mercato mutevoliper definizione, per la qual cosa, come sugger<strong>it</strong>o da attenta dottrina, la data____________________risposte pregiu<strong>di</strong>cando, in tal modo, la libera valutazione del consumatore; 3) l’attenta sceltadegli intervistatori, al fine <strong>di</strong> garantire un’attiv<strong>it</strong>à il più possibile imparziale e trasparente, 4)l’utilizzo <strong>di</strong> meto<strong>di</strong> rigi<strong>di</strong> e scientifici.30Alcune interessanti argomentazioni in argomento sono propinate da C. BELLOMUNNO, Qualeprova per il secondary meaning?, in Notiziario dell’Or<strong>di</strong>ne dei Consulenti in Proprietà industriale,1996, 19.31È l’opinione espressa da G. BONELLI, Riabil<strong>it</strong>azione e rafforzamento del marchio: spunti <strong>di</strong>riflessione, c<strong>it</strong>., 131.32A. VANZETTI, La nuova legge marchi, Giuffrè, Milano, 1993, p. 152; V. DI CATALDO, I segni<strong>di</strong>stintivi, Giuffrè, Milano, 1993, 82; G. SENA, Il nuovo <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to dei marchi, Giuffrè, Milano, 1998,48.
64 Angelo Maiettadell’acquisto della capac<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>stintiva <strong>di</strong>fficilmente potrà essere in<strong>di</strong>viduatain un momento preciso, con l’effetto che la tutela accordata dalla norma alt<strong>it</strong>olare <strong>di</strong> un marchio in fase <strong>di</strong> sanatoria rischia <strong>di</strong> rimanere con<strong>di</strong>zionataall’iniziativa giu<strong>di</strong>ziaria dei concorrenti; 33 tanto più un marchio debole onullo avrà modo, nel tempo, <strong>di</strong> rafforzarsi o <strong>di</strong> riabil<strong>it</strong>arsi, nell’inerzia deiconcorrenti, tanto più la <strong>di</strong>fesa dei <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti ad esso connessi troverà maggioripossibil<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> successo, cioè a <strong>di</strong>re che esiste un rapporto inversamenteproporzionale tra il rafforzamento per secondary meaning e l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à illec<strong>it</strong>a<strong>di</strong> appropriazione: prima quest’ultima si concretizza più <strong>di</strong>fficile sarà la provadell’effetto rafforzativo.3. Rilievi conclusiviLe pronunce del Tribunale partenopeo hanno dato luogo a due considerazioni<strong>di</strong> massima; una prima valutazione inerisce alla circostanza che, ragionandocon il pensiero del Collegio, il marchio denominativo <strong>di</strong> una società <strong>di</strong> calcioè da qualificarsi marchio «debole» e, si riba<strong>di</strong>sce, tale impostazione èpienamente con<strong>di</strong>visibile in virtù della frequente derivazione, salvo taluneeccezioni (Juventus, Inter, Sampdoria, ecc.), della denominazione dalcorrispondente toponimo. 34La seconda valutazione, più pregnante, riguarda l’ist<strong>it</strong>uto delsecondary meaning: il fenomeno cambia, ad avviso <strong>dello</strong> scrivente,l’impostazione iniziale della privativa sui segni <strong>di</strong>stintivi svincolandosidall’iniziale momento <strong>di</strong> nov<strong>it</strong>à e <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>stintiv<strong>it</strong>à per spostare l’asse <strong>di</strong>concentrazione sulla «risposta» del mercato e, per esso, dei consumatori <strong>di</strong>fronte ad un segno o una parola quantunque comune.Expressis verbis, si potrebbe argomentare che la funzione <strong>di</strong> approcciostatico del marchio ovvero la verifica dei suoi elementi <strong>di</strong> nov<strong>it</strong>à tali dapoterne giustificare la tutela si trasforma in una <strong>di</strong>mensione evolutiva,<strong>di</strong>namica che quanto più trova estensione e penetrazione nel pubblico, tantopiù beneficia della tutela riconosciuta dall’or<strong>di</strong>namento giuri<strong>di</strong>co.Id est, cambia anche il ruolo del consumatore o del pubblico in generaleche da soggetto passivo dell’immagine impren<strong>di</strong>toriale, <strong>di</strong>venta elementoattivo, determinante per il riconoscimento <strong>di</strong> una capac<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>stintiva e <strong>di</strong>valore aggiunto <strong>di</strong> un segno, <strong>di</strong> una parola o <strong>di</strong> quant’altro si presta adassurgere a rango <strong>di</strong> marchio tutelabile.____________________33Il suggerimento è <strong>di</strong> A. VANZETTI, La nuova legge marchi, c<strong>it</strong>., 152.34Tale circostanza, secondo Trib. Napoli, sez. specializzata proprietà industriale, ord. coll. 18aprile 2006, fa si ché «alcuna squadra (rectius, società <strong>di</strong> riferimento) può pretendere il monopoliosu quella denominazione.»
Il caso Salern<strong>it</strong>ana 65La vicenda giu<strong>di</strong>ziaria in rassegna, sebbene, sia consent<strong>it</strong>o, pocovalorizzata dalla ricorrente Salern<strong>it</strong>ana <strong>Sport</strong>, lascia intrav<strong>ed</strong>ere tra le righ<strong>ed</strong>ella motivazione del Collegio esattamente la prospettiva segnalata che, a<strong>di</strong>re il vero, risulta <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>fficile aggettivazione nel senso <strong>di</strong> doverla r<strong>it</strong>enereuna opportun<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> maggiore attenzione per il mercato o come un pericolo<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>struzione <strong>di</strong> un sistema, <strong>di</strong> recente riformato, che tanti sforzi protettiviha profuso.In conclusione, nell’esprimere con<strong>di</strong>visione per l’inquadramentosistematico effettuato dal Collegio partenopeo, corretto interprete <strong>dello</strong>spir<strong>it</strong>o legislativo e dell’ormai consolidato orientamento in materia <strong>di</strong> marchioforte e debole, si r<strong>it</strong>iene che il ricorso al secondary meaning debba esserevalutato casisticamente e secondo indagini rigorose <strong>di</strong> reale sussistenza <strong>di</strong>taluni elementi, con<strong>di</strong>videndo l’opinione <strong>di</strong> quella dottrina 35 e <strong>di</strong> talunagiurisprudenza secondo la quale l’indagine demoscopica, 36 pur apprezzatada alcuni autori, sia un delicato «utensile giuri<strong>di</strong>co» che, se usato conapprossimazione, rischia <strong>di</strong> «squilibrare» importanti segmenti impren<strong>di</strong>toriali,ancor più se si ricorre allo strumento della tutela inib<strong>it</strong>oria richiesta in via <strong>di</strong>urgenza. 37____________________35Esprime preoccupazioni analoghe, con riferimento alle nuove possibil<strong>it</strong>à promozionali delmarchio debole me<strong>di</strong>ante internet, con conseguenti ripercussioni negative sui «precari equilibri<strong>di</strong> mercato», anche M. BIONDETTI, Il “secondary meaning” nella <strong>di</strong>sciplina <strong>it</strong>aliana dei marchid’impresa, c<strong>it</strong>., 336.36App. Bologna, 26 ottobre 2000, in Il <strong>di</strong>r. ind., 2001, p. 247 secondo cui «una volta r<strong>it</strong>enuto chel’in<strong>di</strong>viduazione del concetto <strong>di</strong> consumatore me<strong>di</strong>o non può essere collegata alla in<strong>di</strong>viduazion<strong>ed</strong>ella me<strong>di</strong>a dei consumatori che assumono un determinato atteggiamento nei confronti <strong>di</strong> undeterminato prodotto e che tale in<strong>di</strong>viduazione è il frutto <strong>di</strong> una operazione squis<strong>it</strong>amentegiu<strong>di</strong>ziale che in<strong>di</strong>vidua “a priori” il grado <strong>di</strong> intelligenza, prudenza <strong>ed</strong> informazione che sideve attribuire ad (e pretendere da) un consumatore per valutare la decettiv<strong>it</strong>à del marchio, èevidente che la delega che il giu<strong>di</strong>ce dovrebbe dare all’”equipe” demoscopica incaricata <strong>di</strong>compiere l’indagine <strong>di</strong>retta a tale final<strong>it</strong>à violerebbe quelli che sono essenzialmente i lim<strong>it</strong>i <strong>dello</strong>strumento processuale, e cioè i lim<strong>it</strong>i <strong>di</strong> una valutazione sotto il profilo tecnico <strong>di</strong> fatti giàacquis<strong>it</strong>i con esclusione <strong>di</strong> qualsiasi giu<strong>di</strong>zio rimesso alla competenza giuri<strong>di</strong>ca o valutativa delgiu<strong>di</strong>ce.»37In tal senso si v<strong>ed</strong>a Trib. Napoli , 05 luglio 2002, n. 1829 (ord.), in Il <strong>di</strong>r. ind., 2003, 131secondo cui «pur potendo un segno privo <strong>di</strong> capac<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>stintiva, o comunque dotato <strong>di</strong> scarsacapac<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>stintiva, perdere il carattere descr<strong>it</strong>tivo e generico, acquistando o rafforzando lacapac<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>stintiva, non si può fare luogo alla tutela esclusiva se il fenomeno del secondarymeaning, ora <strong>di</strong>sciplinato dagli artt. 19 e soprattutto 47-bis l.m., non sia provato con rigore econ mezzi verosimilmente incompatibili con la sommarietà del r<strong>it</strong>o cautelare come sono adesempio le indagini demoscopiche.»
RIVISTA DI ISSN 1825-6678DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA DELLO SPORT Vol. II, Fasc. 2, 2006THE IMPACT OF FOOTBALL POINT SYSTEMS ON THECOMPETITIVE BALANCE: EVIDENCE FROM SOMEEUROPEAN FOOTBALL LEAGUESby Ferda Halicioglu*SOMMARIO: Introduction. – 1. Outcome of uncertainty and compet<strong>it</strong>ive balancein professional team sports. – 2. Measurement of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balancein professional team sports. – 3. Football point systems and compet<strong>it</strong>ivebalance: empirical evidence. – 4. Conclu<strong>di</strong>ng remarks.CLASSIFICATION JEL: C40, D40, L83IntroductionFootball is the most popular professional team sport, world wide. Accor<strong>di</strong>ngto the world’s football governing body, F<strong>ed</strong>eration International de FootballAssociation (FIFA), there are more than two hundr<strong>ed</strong> million active footballplayers. In recent decades, <strong>it</strong> has also become a multi billion dollar globalindustry. It has been generating substantial revenues for private in<strong>di</strong>vidualsand clubs, as well as national and international organisations. The footballindustry generates about 3% of world trade. 1 Given <strong>it</strong>s industrial size and <strong>it</strong>spopular<strong>it</strong>y, research in the economics of football has been rather lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> incomparison to other economic activ<strong>it</strong>ies. Football economics has been____________________*Department of Economics, Ye<strong>di</strong>tepe Univers<strong>it</strong>y Istanbul, Turkey, fhalicioglu@ye<strong>di</strong>tepe.<strong>ed</strong>u.tr.I would like to thank Raul Caruso for advice and two referees of this journal for their valuablecomments. Usual <strong>di</strong>sclaimer applies.1S. SZYMANSKI, Economics of <strong>Sport</strong>: Introduction, The Ec. J., vol. 111, 2001, 1-3.
68 Ferda Haliciogluresearch<strong>ed</strong> as a sub-<strong>di</strong>scipline of professional team sports. The first detaile<strong>di</strong>nsight of football economics treat<strong>ed</strong> football teams as compet<strong>it</strong>ive firms. 2The existing l<strong>it</strong>erature in professional team sports is, by and large,bas<strong>ed</strong> on issues relat<strong>ed</strong> to the demand for sports, transfer market, marketstructure, broadcasting revenues, etc. 3 The pol<strong>it</strong>ical economy <strong>di</strong>mensionsof football have also been research<strong>ed</strong>, since football has been consider<strong>ed</strong> avehicle in many countries for the expression of nationalism, and for thepromotion of an in<strong>di</strong>vidual nation’s power and status internally. 4 Nevertheless,<strong>it</strong> is still a considerably under-research<strong>ed</strong> field, especially in the case of impactsof the point system on the degree of football compet<strong>it</strong>ion. 5 This paper seeksfor a statistical rationale for the introduction of a new point system, in orderto increase the level of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance, which is relat<strong>ed</strong> to the revenuemaximization.1. Outcome of Uncertainty and Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in Professional Team<strong>Sport</strong>sOutcome of uncertainty in professional team sports is one of the fundamentalconcepts in the economics of professional team sports but, at the same time,<strong>it</strong> is very elusive to measure <strong>it</strong>. It is <strong>di</strong>rectly link<strong>ed</strong> to the gate revenues as,when the probabil<strong>it</strong>y of e<strong>it</strong>her team in professional contest approaches one,gate receipts fall substantially. 6 Outcome of uncertainty in football is in<strong>it</strong>iallydefin<strong>ed</strong> in two broad terms: short-run uncertainty, which is bas<strong>ed</strong> on theconcept of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance w<strong>it</strong>hin a season and <strong>it</strong> increases the demandfor football; and long-run uncertainty, which refers to the extent of dominationover time of the number of league championship compet<strong>it</strong>ors by one or afew clubs and <strong>it</strong> r<strong>ed</strong>uces interest of spectators substantially. 7____________________2P. J. SLOANE, The Economics of Professional Football: The Football Club as Util<strong>it</strong>y Maximiser,Scot. J. Pol. Ec., vol. 17, 121-146.3For comprehensive <strong>di</strong>scussions of these issues, see for example, P. DOWNWARD and A. DAWSON,The Economics of Professional Team <strong>Sport</strong>s, Cambridge Univers<strong>it</strong>y Press, Cambridge, 2000. R.SANDY, P. SLOANE, and M. S. ROSENTRAUB, The Economics of <strong>Sport</strong>s: an International Perspective,Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2004.4For a detail<strong>ed</strong> review, see S. SZYMANSKI, The Assessment: the Economics of <strong>Sport</strong>, Ox. Rev. Ec.Pol., vol. 19, 2004, 467-477.5There exist only two stu<strong>di</strong>es. G.NEWSON, Three Points for a Win: Has <strong>it</strong> Made any Difference?,The Mathematical Gazette, Vol. 68, 1984, 87-91. F. HALICIOGLU, Do We Ne<strong>ed</strong> a New Point Systemin Professional Football Leagues?, A Research Paper Present<strong>ed</strong> at International Conference inEconomics IV, Economic Research Centre, Middle East Technical Univers<strong>it</strong>y, Ankara, 2000.6See S. ROTTENBERG, The Baseball Players’ Labour market, J. Pol. Ec., June, 1956, 243-258. M.EL-HODIRI and J. QUIRK, An Economic Model of Professional Team <strong>Sport</strong>s Leagues, J. Pol. Ec.,vol. 33, 1971, 1302-1319.7P. J. SLOANE, The Economics of Professional Football: The Football Club as Util<strong>it</strong>y
The impact of football point systems on the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance 69One should also point out that outcome of uncertainty is a significantfactor in certain football matches, but <strong>it</strong> is less important as determinant ofaggregate attendances. Moreover, any attempt to produce closer compet<strong>it</strong>ionto increase match uncertainty of outcome w<strong>it</strong>h the intention of increasinggate attendances may be undesirable from the perspective of in<strong>di</strong>vidual clubs,as supporters, apparently, like to watch high plac<strong>ed</strong> teams, particularly whentheir team is likely to win. 8 It is argu<strong>ed</strong> that two teams engage in a jointproduction when they play a football match. Therefore, the public will beworse off when the outcome of a game is easily pre<strong>di</strong>ct<strong>ed</strong> than if the game istight. To this end, the governing body of football leagues should facil<strong>it</strong>atethe appropriate tools in order to increase the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in a footballleague. 9 The ne<strong>ed</strong> for compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance has also been recognis<strong>ed</strong> by theEuropean Court of Justice in the case Bosman ruling. This ruling recommendsthat a professional league can flourish only if there is not too glaring animbalance between the clubs taking part and the clubs should share the incomegenerat<strong>ed</strong> fairly. There are basically two main approaches in analysing theconcept of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in professional team sports. The first approachis link<strong>ed</strong> to the professional sports leagues in USA. North Americanprofessional sports leagues are less compet<strong>it</strong>ive since there is no relegationor promotion between the separate <strong>di</strong>visions. League governing bo<strong>di</strong>esre<strong>di</strong>stribute the income of club teams in order to maintain a compet<strong>it</strong>ivebalance. 10 The second approach is a more European approach and <strong>it</strong> isbas<strong>ed</strong> on the seasonal promotion and relegation. There is no <strong>di</strong>rectintervention of promoting the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance or fair share ofbroadcasting revenues, except some general <strong>di</strong>rective such as Bosmanruling. 11 There is a general misconception in the economics of professionalteam sports that “compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance” and “outcome of uncertainty”concepts are essentially the same phenomenon. In fact, they are rather<strong>di</strong>fferent. The former concept refers to a league structure that has relativelyequal playing strength between league members. The latter is relat<strong>ed</strong> to a____________________Maximiser, c<strong>it</strong>.8See N. JENNETH, Attendances, Uncertainty of Outcome and Policy in Scottish Football League,Scot. J. Pol. Ec., vol. 33, 1984, 176-198. D. A. PEEL and D. THOMAS, Outcome Uncertainty andthe Demand for Football: an Analysis of Match Attendances in the English Football League,Scottish Journal of Pol<strong>it</strong>ical Economy, vol. 35, 1998, 242-249.9R. H. KONING, Balance in Compet<strong>it</strong>ion in Dutch Soccer, The Statistician, vol. 49, 2000, 419-431.10The legal framework of compet<strong>it</strong>ion in the north American professional sports leagues is<strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong> in M. A. FLYNN and R. J. GILBERT, The Analysis of Professional <strong>Sport</strong>s Leagues AsJoint Ventures, The Ec. J., vol.111, 2001, 27-45.11See T. HOEHN and S. SZYMANSKI, The Americanization of European Football, Ec. Pol., vol. 28,2000, 205-240.
70 Ferda Halicioglus<strong>it</strong>uation where a given contest w<strong>it</strong>hin a league structure has a degree ofunpre<strong>di</strong>ctabil<strong>it</strong>y about the result and, by extension, that the compet<strong>it</strong>ion, asa whole, does not have a pr<strong>ed</strong>etermin<strong>ed</strong> winner at the outset of compet<strong>it</strong>ion. 12This work, therefore, will concentrate on the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance w<strong>it</strong>h aview of measuring the impacts of alternative points systems on the compet<strong>it</strong>ivebalance in professional football leagues.2. Measurement of Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in Professional Team <strong>Sport</strong>sThere is no clear-cut approach or technique to measure the compet<strong>it</strong>ivebalance in a football league due to <strong>it</strong>s ambigu<strong>it</strong>y. There is an analogy thatthere are as many ways to measure compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance as there are to quantifythe money supply. 13 The existing l<strong>it</strong>erature suggests that one can measurein<strong>di</strong>rectly the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in football leagues by employing someproxy variables, such as the standard deviation of win percentages, the rangeof win percentages, the Gini coefficient of win percentages, standard deviationof league points, <strong>di</strong>fference in goals scor<strong>ed</strong>, <strong>di</strong>fference in league ranking,etc. 14 Each of these measurement techniques has <strong>it</strong>s own advantages or<strong>di</strong>sadvantages; therefore <strong>it</strong> is not possible to assume that any select<strong>ed</strong>technique for the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance will fully measure the level ofcompet<strong>it</strong>iveness in professional football leagues. However, the seasonal“coefficient variation” (CV) of end-of-season points approach to measurethe compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance can be us<strong>ed</strong> as a reasonable proxy for the degree ofcompet<strong>it</strong>iveness in a football league, provi<strong>di</strong>ng all games are play<strong>ed</strong> and nopoints are d<strong>ed</strong>uct<strong>ed</strong>. 15The usefulness of the CV values for the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in a footballleague is bas<strong>ed</strong> on the simple idea that <strong>di</strong>spersion of the final stan<strong>di</strong>ng points____________________12See D. FORREST and R. SIMMONS, Outcome Uncertainty and Attendance in <strong>Sport</strong>: the Case ofEnglish Soccer, The Statistician, vol. 51, 2002, 229-241.13Different measurements of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in professional sports leagues are analys<strong>ed</strong> and<strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong> in extensively in A. ZIMBALIST, Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in <strong>Sport</strong>s League, J. Sp. Ec., vol.3, 2002, 111-121, B. R. HUMPHREYS, Alternative Measures of Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in <strong>Sport</strong>sLeagues, J. Sp. Ec., vol. 3 , 2002, 133-148 and A. SANDERSON, The Many Dimensions of Compet<strong>it</strong>iveBalance, J. Sp. Ec., vol. 3, 2002, 204-228.14For detail<strong>ed</strong> <strong>di</strong>scussion of these issues see, J. A. CAIRNS, The Demand for Professional Team<strong>Sport</strong>s, Br<strong>it</strong>. Rev. Ec. Iss., vol. 12, 1990, 1-12. J. BORLAND and R. MACDONALD, Demand for <strong>Sport</strong>,Ox. Rev. Ec. Pol., vol. 19, 2003, 479-501.15See N. KARACAN, Turkiye Futbol Liginde Rekabet Derecesi Artiyor mu, Azaliyor mu ? Istatistikbir Yaklasim, Iktisat Fakultesi Dergisi, vol. 26, 1967, 82-94.; J. A. CAIRNS, Evaluating Changesin League Structure: the Organization of the Scottish Football League, App. Ec., vol. 19, 1987,259-275. H. KONING, Balance in Compet<strong>it</strong>ion in Dutch Soccer, c<strong>it</strong>. The measurement of CV is asfollows: CV=s/X, where s stands for standard deviation and X is average value.
The impact of football point systems on the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance 71is a <strong>di</strong>rect result of the compet<strong>it</strong>iveness that takes place between the footballteams in seasons. This approach assumes that each football team hasstatistically got an equal chance of winning the championship at the beginningof a season. Therefore, the <strong>di</strong>spersion of total points at any time will followa normal <strong>di</strong>stribution. The CV values provide better plausible comparisonsof the seasonal compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance levels than the absolute standarddeviations (s) of the end-of-season points in the case of possible changes inleague structures over seasons, such as the number of teams in a contest orthe points award<strong>ed</strong> for a win or draw. It is clear that this approach does notconsider any other factor that may have an impact on the level of compet<strong>it</strong>ivebalance for the sake of simplic<strong>it</strong>y. The CV value for a season lies between 0and 1. These values reflect the extreme compet<strong>it</strong>ion points. If the CV valueis 0, <strong>it</strong> implies perfect compet<strong>it</strong>ion in a league. If there is N team in a league,then all teams will have exactly the same strength. Each team will haveequal wins, draws and losses in a season. Therefore, all the teams will finisha season w<strong>it</strong>h the same points and the championship contest may be decid<strong>ed</strong>by a draw assuming that all else are equal. Outcome of uncertainty over thechampionship and any game will not be pre<strong>di</strong>ct<strong>ed</strong> in any way. The spectatorsof this league will watch very exc<strong>it</strong>ing games over a season. In the secondextreme case, N teams are rank<strong>ed</strong> from each other on the basis of theirabsolute strength. As a result, there will be no compet<strong>it</strong>ion at all between theteams. There will be no uncertainty of outcome in matches or thechampionship contest. Moreover, no game will end up w<strong>it</strong>h a draw. At theend of a season, the champion team would have won all the matches andwould have finish<strong>ed</strong> the league w<strong>it</strong>h the maximum number of points possible.The runner up would have beaten all the other teams except thechampion. This analysis can be extend<strong>ed</strong> to the other teams in the league inthe same manner accor<strong>di</strong>ng to their absolute strength. Similarly the team atthe bottom of a league would have lost all of <strong>it</strong>s games. From an impartialfan’s point of view, atten<strong>di</strong>ng or watching a game may not bring about anyexc<strong>it</strong>ement in the case of this extreme s<strong>it</strong>uation.3. Football Point Systems and Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance: Empirical EvidenceFIFA sets the rules and regulations in football leagues for <strong>it</strong>s members, w<strong>it</strong>hview to maximising the total revenues of this industry. Football is one ofoldest team sports in the world and <strong>it</strong>s basic rules have not chang<strong>ed</strong> sincethe establishment of FIFA. Most of the basic rules of football, such as th<strong>ed</strong>uration of game, the number of players in teams, the size of football p<strong>it</strong>ches,
72 Ferda Haliciogluthe height and width of goal posts, etc, which may have an impact on theoutcome of uncertainty on football games, are essentially the same. To thisend, the football rules and regulations are fairly stagnant. A major change inthe point awar<strong>di</strong>ng system, however, took place in the 1980s. The old pointsystem (OPS) in which two points for a win, one point for a draw, wasreplac<strong>ed</strong> by the current point system (CPS), which awards three points for awin and one point for a draw. The new point system was introduc<strong>ed</strong> in theseason of 1981-82 in the English football leagues and was gradually adopt<strong>ed</strong>by the rest of the world. The rationale for the new regulations was presumablythat more reward for winning games would encourage more attacking gamesand hence would increase the demand for football. 16 The impacts of the newpoint system on the level of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in football leagues seem<strong>ed</strong>to be inconclusive accor<strong>di</strong>ng to one empirical study. 17Regar<strong>di</strong>ng the importance of outcome uncertainty and compet<strong>it</strong>ivebalance concepts in the professional football leagues, this paper proposes anew point system that may stimulate higher level of compet<strong>it</strong>ion amongstthe football teams. The empirical evidence for the new point system proposalis bas<strong>ed</strong> on the CV values and the other factors influencing the compet<strong>it</strong>ivebalance assum<strong>ed</strong> to be constant for the sake of simplic<strong>it</strong>y.Let’s assume, in<strong>it</strong>ially, that there is a hypothetical football leagueconsisting of 18 teams and all matches are play<strong>ed</strong> on a two-tier basis in aseason. The level of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in this league can be measur<strong>ed</strong> bycomputing the maximum CV values alternative point systems. For example,if the OPS is in use, then the maximum CV value will be 0.610. Similarly,the CV value for the CPS is comput<strong>ed</strong> and that is also 0.610. Accor<strong>di</strong>ng tothese extreme values of the CV, one can conclude that there is no statistical<strong>di</strong>fference at the level of the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in applying e<strong>it</strong>her the OPSor the CPS. To this end, one can argue that policy strategy of FIFA forincreasing the degree of compet<strong>it</strong>ion between the teams has fail<strong>ed</strong> statistically.Now, let’s assume some alternative point systems and compute theCV values for the above hypothetical football league in a similar manner.Alternative point system one (APS1) is bas<strong>ed</strong> on three points for a win, twopoints for a draw and one point for a loss. Alternative point system two(APS2) refers to three points for a win, two points for a draw and nil pointsfor a loss. Alternative point system three (APS3) is bas<strong>ed</strong> on four points fora win, two points for a draw and one point for a loss. The maximum CV____________________16G. NEWSON, Three Points for a Win: Has <strong>it</strong> Made any Difference?, c<strong>it</strong>.17See for example, F. HALICIOGLU, The Degree of Football Compet<strong>it</strong>ion in the European FootballLeagues: a Statistical Approach, <strong>Sport</strong>s in the C<strong>it</strong>y Conference Procee<strong>di</strong>ngs, vol. 1, 1998, 189-205.
74 Ferda Haliciogluaverage the French league seems to be the most compet<strong>it</strong>ive league and theItalian league is the least compet<strong>it</strong>ive, as far as the CPS is concern<strong>ed</strong>.Comparing the leagues in terms of the APS1, the Spanish leaguebecomes the most compet<strong>it</strong>ive which is closely follow<strong>ed</strong> by the French league.This is further statistical evidence that APS1 may stimulate higher degree ofcompet<strong>it</strong>ion. On CV ranking of the countries under <strong>di</strong>fferent point systemsthe Italian league is always at the bottom except for the APS3, which putsthe Italian league into third place. It is possible to extend the list of alternativepoint systems w<strong>it</strong>h <strong>di</strong>fferent combinations of awards points for a win, adraw or a loss and some of those new point systems may produce evenlower CV values. For example, one may argue that away wins should bereward<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h more points than home wins or that the draws w<strong>it</strong>h goalsshould be given more points than the draws w<strong>it</strong>hout goals. Even thoughgoal is a joint product in football matches but <strong>it</strong> does not necessarily suggestthat the games w<strong>it</strong>h goals are more exc<strong>it</strong>ing than the ones, which are goalless,as far as impartial fans are concern<strong>ed</strong>.However, on the whole, <strong>it</strong> is plausible to suggest that if a new pointsystem was introduc<strong>ed</strong> into a football league w<strong>it</strong>h a view to raising the levelof compet<strong>it</strong>iveness, <strong>it</strong> should be the one that provides at least statisticallyhigher level of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance than the existing one. Clearly, strategyof the football teams against the implement<strong>ed</strong> point system will varysignificantly from one point system to another, on the basis of their leaguepos<strong>it</strong>ion and the importance of each single game. Therefore, <strong>it</strong> is not possibleto pre<strong>di</strong>ct the in<strong>di</strong>vidual behaviour of the football teams.Table 2. Comput<strong>ed</strong> CV values in <strong>di</strong>fferent point systems in some European football leaguesPoint systems and countries Season Season Season Season Season 5 season’s1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 averagePanel AEngland -PremiershipOld Point System 0,361 0,270 0,286 0,238 0,281 0,267Current Point System 0,294 0,291 0,321 0,364 0,306 0,295Alternative Point System 1 0,130 0,135 0,143 0,119 0,140 0,133Alternative Point System 2 0,237 0,252 0,259 0,214 0,261 0,245Alternative Point System 3 0,170 0,169 0,185 0,155 0,178 0,171Panel BFrance -Ligue 1Old Point System 0,242 0,212 0,208 0,203 0,155 0,204
The impact of football point systems on the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance 75Point systems and countries Season Season Season Season Season 5 season’s1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 averageCurrent Point System 0,268 0,231 0,226 0,220 0,173 0,223Alternative Point System 1 0,121 0,106 0,104 0,101 0,077 0,101Alternative Point System 2 0,222 0,197 0,196 0,192 0,146 0,190Alternative Point System 3 0,155 0,134 0,130 0,127 0,100 0,129Panel CGermany - BundesligaOld Point System 0,283 0,361 0,361 0,361 0,361 0,361Current Point System 0,303 0,361 0,361 0,361 0,361 0,361Alternative Point System 1 0,141 0,361 0,361 0,361 0,361 0,361Alternative Point System 2 0,271 0,361 0,361 0,361 0,361 0,361Alternative Point System 3 0,173 0,361 0,361 0,361 0,361 0,361Panel DItaly- Serie AOld Point System 0,328 0,275 0,302 0,282 0,290 0,295Current Point System 0,375 0,309 0,323 0,309 0,326 0,328Alternative Point System 1 0,164 0,137 0,151 0,141 0,145 0,147Alternative Point System 2 0,291 0,250 0,286 0,262 0,263 0,270Alternative Point System 3 0,216 0,177 0,186 0,178 0,187 0,145Panel ESpain-PrimeraOld Point System 0,213 0,219 0,189 0,214 0,163 0,189Current Point System 0,240 0,246 0,204 0,240 0,189 0,224Alternative Point System 1 0,106 0,109 0,094 0,107 0,082 0,099Alternative Point System 2 0,194 0,199 0,178 0,194 0,146 0,182Alternative Point System 3 0,138 0,139 0,118 0,138 0,110 0,1284. Conclu<strong>di</strong>ng RemarksThis paper has attempt<strong>ed</strong> to measure the impacts of alternative points systemsin professional football leagues on the level of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance.Considering the fundamental importance of the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balancefor the football demand, FIFA may recommend a new point system in footballleagues w<strong>it</strong>h a view to increasing <strong>it</strong>. In search of developing such a policytool for FIFA, this paper argues that the existing point system in footballleagues does not serve fully the purpose of maximising the compet<strong>it</strong>ivebalance. Due to the nature of football, there is no clear-cut in<strong>di</strong>cator for the
76 Ferda Halicioglulevel of the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in a football league. Therefore one mayapply some plausible proxies for the level of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance. To thatend, this study has adopt<strong>ed</strong> the approach of the CV values of end-of-seasonpoints. On utilising the CV values to measure the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance,alternative point systems, along w<strong>it</strong>h the old and current point systems, werecomput<strong>ed</strong> for a hypothetical football league structure. Then similarmeasurement approach is appli<strong>ed</strong> for five lea<strong>di</strong>ng European football leagues,namely English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish. The hypothetical andreal data results in<strong>di</strong>cate that there is at least a statistical rational for havinga new point system in professional football leagues. Amongst those pointsystems analys<strong>ed</strong>, the most compet<strong>it</strong>ive football league took place when thepoint system of three points for a win, two points for a draw and one pointfor a loss was in use. In regards the level of football compet<strong>it</strong>ion, the Spanishleague appears to be most compet<strong>it</strong>ive and the Italian league is the leastcompet<strong>it</strong>ive on average. However, the empirical results are bas<strong>ed</strong> on onlyfive season’s CV values and they should be treat<strong>ed</strong> cautiously. 19 It is crystalclear that the conclusions of this paper are reach<strong>ed</strong> under rather restrictiveassumptions. It is also true that the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in a league may notbe improv<strong>ed</strong> just by sw<strong>it</strong>ching between the point systems. However, thepropos<strong>ed</strong> point system is a costless policy tool and <strong>it</strong> is a statistically provensystem to increase the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in professional football leagues.____________________19The long-term football compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance over 1947-2004 in the leagues of these five countriesis comput<strong>ed</strong> via <strong>di</strong>fferent approaches and the results in<strong>di</strong>cate that there is a significant decline incompet<strong>it</strong>ive balance. See J. MICHIE and C. OUGHTON, Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in Football: Trendsand Effects, Football Governance Research Centre, Birkbeck College of Univers<strong>it</strong>y of London,Research Paper, No. 2, London, 2004.
RIVISTA DI ISSN 1825-6678DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA DELLO SPORT Vol. II, Fasc. 2, 2006COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL:COMPARISON BY ADAPTING MEASURES: NATIONALMEASURE OF SEASONAL IMBALANCE AND TOP 3by Kelly Goossens*SOMMARIO: Introduction. – 1. Concept of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance. – 2. Measuresof compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance. – 3. Data, us<strong>ed</strong> measures and results. – 4.Conclusions.JEL CLASSIFICATION: C81, F02, L83.IntroductionSince Rottenberg 1 describ<strong>ed</strong> the labour market of the baseball league in 1956,many authors have taken up the challenge to do research on the economicsof professional team sports. It is a complex but appealing research area.Sandy, Sloane and Rosentraub 2 correctly describ<strong>ed</strong> the two-fold<strong>ed</strong> reasonof interest as follows: “The sports industry raises fascinating economicquestions and … sports have been a high-profile component of all societiesfor more than 4,000 years.” We start w<strong>it</strong>h a short description of the evolutionof research in the field of <strong>Sport</strong> Economics.In the early stages, theoretical research questions concerning____________________*Research and teaching assistant at the Univers<strong>it</strong>y of Antwerp at the Economics department.Postal address: Bureau B203, Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium. E-mail address:kelly.goossens@ua.ac.be. I want to thank my PhD supervisor Stefan Kesenne for helpful commentsand <strong>di</strong>scussion.1See S. ROTTENBERG, The baseball players’ labor market, J. of Pol. Ec., vol. 64, n.3, 1956, 242-258.2R. SANDY, P. SLOANE, M. ROSENTRAUB, The Economics of <strong>Sport</strong>, an International Perspective,Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, 2.
78 Kelly GoossensAmerican Leagues were tackl<strong>ed</strong> by the following major contributors. Neale 3<strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong> the peculiar economics of team sports and mention<strong>ed</strong> that restraintson compet<strong>it</strong>ion are justifiable to prevent strong financial teams to acquire allthe best players. Jones 4 became a specialist in the National Hockey League(hereafter NHL). He show<strong>ed</strong> among many other things that the NHL can becharacteriz<strong>ed</strong> to have monopolistic as well as monopsonistic features. Elho<strong>di</strong>riand Quirk 5 formaliz<strong>ed</strong> the theory of Rottenberg and gave proof of the‘invariance principle’. 6 The first sports economics book was e<strong>di</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> byNoll 7 in 1974 and gather<strong>ed</strong> the most influential articles at that time. Thisbook gave an extra boost to the new research area. He call<strong>ed</strong> attention toattendance, price setting and policy alternatives in his book. Empirics wereintroduc<strong>ed</strong> by Scully 8 and Canes 9 in the same year 1974. Scully estimat<strong>ed</strong> aproduction function and a revenue function to compare marginal revenueproduct w<strong>it</strong>h the salary of Major League Baseball players. He foundmonopsonistic explo<strong>it</strong>ation bas<strong>ed</strong> upon data of the seasons 1968 and 1969.Canes show<strong>ed</strong> that the player reservation system <strong>di</strong>d not improve the<strong>di</strong>stribution of players in the National League.Since the eighties research of teams sports economics augment<strong>ed</strong>exponentially and an overview of all contributors is no longer possible. Inthe following chapter many important authors are includ<strong>ed</strong>. We restrictourselves here to two authors. Rodney Fort was hir<strong>ed</strong> by Roger Noll in1982 and began to collect data about the U.S. professional sports leagues.____________________3See W.C. NEALE, The peculiar economics of professional sports: a contribution to the theory ofthe firm in sporting compet<strong>it</strong>ion and in market compet<strong>it</strong>ion, Quart. J. of Ec., 78, n. 1, 1964,1-14.4Some of his earliest work: J.C.H. JONES, The economics of the national hockey team, Can. J. ofEc., vol. 2, n. 1, 1969, 1-20; J.C.H. JONES, W. D. WALSH, Salary determination in the NHL: effectsof skills, franchise characteristics and <strong>di</strong>scrimination, Ind. and Lab. Rel., vol. 41, n.4, 1988,592-604; J.C.H. JONES, D.G. FERGUSON, Location and survival in the NHL, J. of Ind. Ec., vol. 36,n. 4, 1988, 443-457.; J.C.H. JONES, S. NADEAU, W. D. WALSH, Ethnic<strong>it</strong>y, productiv<strong>it</strong>y and salary:player compensation and <strong>di</strong>scrimination in NHL, Appl. Ec., vol. 31, n. 5, 1999, 593-608.5M. EL-HODIRI, J. QUIRK, An economic model of a professional sports league, J. of Pol. Ec., vol.79, n. 6, 1971, 1302-1319; M. EL-HODIRI, J. QUIRK, The economic theory of a professional sportsleague, in Government and the sports business, R. G. NOLL, Washington D.C., The BrookingsInst<strong>it</strong>ution, 1974, 33-80.6Gate revenue sharing has no impact on the <strong>di</strong>stribution of talents. KESENNE and others show<strong>ed</strong>that this no longer holds in other settings. For more details see S. KESENNE, League Managementin professional team sports w<strong>it</strong>h win maximizing clubs, European Journal for <strong>Sport</strong> Management,vol. 2, n. 2, 1996, 14-22 and much of his later work.7R.G. NOLL, (Ed) (1974), Government and the sports business, Washington D.C., The BrookingsInst<strong>it</strong>ution, 445.8G.W. SCULLY, Pay and performance in MLB, Am. Ec. Rev., vol. 64, n. 6, 1974, 915-930.9M.E. CANES, The social benef<strong>it</strong>s of rrestrictions on team qual<strong>it</strong>y, chapter 3 in Government andthe sports business, Washington D.C., The Brookings Inst<strong>it</strong>ution, 1974, 81-114.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 79He offers on his webs<strong>it</strong>e 10 an extensive dataset about economics and businessof the National Hockey League, the National Football League, the NationalBasketball Association and Major League Baseball. He publish<strong>ed</strong> somebooks 11 in collaboration w<strong>it</strong>h Quirk and became a recogniz<strong>ed</strong> author<strong>it</strong>y inthe sector of sports economics research. Zimbalist 12 is another importantauthor and e<strong>di</strong>tor of many books. ‘Baseball and Billions: A Probing LookInside the Big Business of Our National Pastime’ was list<strong>ed</strong> by Businessweek as one of the top eight business books of 1992.European research took a b<strong>it</strong> longer to jump the wagon w<strong>it</strong>h Sloane 13as pioneer in 1969. He look<strong>ed</strong> at English football and introduc<strong>ed</strong> theimportance of league objectives: win maximizing versus prof<strong>it</strong> maximizing.Hart, Hutton and Sharot 14 construct<strong>ed</strong> and estimat<strong>ed</strong> a basic demand modelfor Br<strong>it</strong>ish Association football but the empirical testing was lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> to fourteams over two seasons. Bird 15 ameliorat<strong>ed</strong> the model by using time seriesfor the whole league. Andreff focus<strong>ed</strong> attention on the economics of sport in1986 by his contribution in the collection Que sais-je and publish<strong>ed</strong> the bookEconomie Pol<strong>it</strong>ique du <strong>Sport</strong> in 1989. At the end of the eighties and especiallythe nineties European research clear<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>s arrears concerning theoreticalresearch and can now be equally valu<strong>ed</strong> to the US research. Some of thelater influential authors are mention<strong>ed</strong> in the next chapter. The Journal ofEconomic L<strong>it</strong>erature accept<strong>ed</strong> 2 papers w<strong>it</strong>h sports economics as subject.One was wr<strong>it</strong>ten by Fort and Quirk in 1995 and the other by Szymanski in2003. 16 The birth of several important sports journals and associations underlinethe importance of the growing sector. We mention the four most establish<strong>ed</strong>ones but many others have appear<strong>ed</strong> since the end of the nineties. In 1987the North American Society for <strong>Sport</strong> Management (hereafter NASSM)was form<strong>ed</strong> to promote, stimulate and encourage stu<strong>di</strong>es, research, scholarlywr<strong>it</strong>ing and professional development in the field of sport management. Their____________________10See www.rodneyfort.com/<strong>Sport</strong>sData/BizFrame.htm (July, 2006).11For example see: J. QUIRK, R. D. FORT, Pay Dirt: the business of professional team sports,New Jersey, Princeton Univers<strong>it</strong>y Press, 1997.12A. ZIMBALIST, Baseball and Billions. A Probing Look Inside the Big Business of Our NationalPastime, Basic Books, New York, 1992.13P. J. SLOANE, The labour market in professional football, Br<strong>it</strong>ish Journal of industrial relations,vol. 7, n. 2, 1969, 181-199.14R. A. HART, J. HUTTON, T. SHAROT, A statistical analysis of Association Football Attendances,Appl. Stat., vol. 24, n. 1, 1975, 17-27.15P. J. W. N. BIRD, The demand for league football, Appl. Ec., vol. 14, n. 6, 1982, 637-649.16R. FORT, J. QUIRK, Cross-subsi<strong>di</strong>zation, incentives, and outcomes in Professional team sportsleagues, J. of Ec. L<strong>it</strong>., vol. 33, n. 3, 1995, 1265-1299 and S. SZYMANSKI, Economic design ofsporting contests, J. of Ec. L<strong>it</strong>., vol. 41, n. 4, 2003, 1137-1187.
80 Kelly Goossensresearch journal is the Journal of <strong>Sport</strong> Management. The EuropeanAssociation for <strong>Sport</strong> Management (hereafter EASM) was found<strong>ed</strong> in 1994for the same reasons. They publish<strong>ed</strong> the European Journal for <strong>Sport</strong>Management from 1994 to 2000. In 2001 they start<strong>ed</strong> a new journal call<strong>ed</strong>European <strong>Sport</strong> Management Quarterly. Australia and New Zeeland follow<strong>ed</strong>by establishing their own <strong>Sport</strong> Management Association of Australia andNew Zealand (hereafter SMAANZ) and publish the <strong>Sport</strong> ManagementReview since 1998. The increas<strong>ed</strong> interest and ensuing research papers aboutthe economics of sports induc<strong>ed</strong> the creation of the Journal of <strong>Sport</strong>sEconomics in 2000. The e<strong>di</strong>torial board consists of both important Europeanas well as American sports economists. Some of them const<strong>it</strong>ute theInternational Association of <strong>Sport</strong>s Economists (hereafter IASE) which wasfound<strong>ed</strong> in 1999 to increase collaboration and to organize an annualconference to <strong>di</strong>scuss research.In this paper we focus on a important subject s<strong>it</strong>uat<strong>ed</strong> in the <strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong>research area: compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football leagues. W<strong>it</strong>hin mostEuropean countries the national highest league football compet<strong>it</strong>ion isprominent in tv sports coverage as well as in recreational spen<strong>di</strong>ng. Footballcan be consider<strong>ed</strong> as the most popular European sport. The highest leagueis in almost all European countries cover<strong>ed</strong> on tv. The English Premier Leagueas well as the German Bundesliga but also others are even worldwidebroadcast<strong>ed</strong>. The World Cup as well as the European Cup are importantmega-events. The Champions League, and to a smaller extent the Uefa Cup,are yearly European compet<strong>it</strong>ions that gather the top of the European teamsw<strong>it</strong>h huge compensations for participating teams and their home leagues.To give an example: the Champions league <strong>di</strong>stribut<strong>ed</strong> Euro 33.9 Millionamong Europe’s domestic leagues in the season 2004-2005 and had a grossbudget<strong>ed</strong> income in 2005 of Euro 560 million.The ne<strong>ed</strong> of a certain balance on the field is a major concern in footballleagues, as <strong>it</strong> is in all team sports. Teams should not excel excessively inplaying strength. Fans are assum<strong>ed</strong> to appreciate a game much more whenone team wins by 4 goals against 3 than when a team scores 7 goals and theother none. For a few games the latter imbalance is w<strong>it</strong>hout repercussionsbut when the winning team outperforms all of the opposing teams and this inevery game, we can expect that even the fans of the winning team looseinterest. This basic idea is often <strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong> by leagues and team owners in theme<strong>di</strong>a, as well as in <strong>Sport</strong>s Economics.In general, firms try to dominate and outperform compet<strong>it</strong>ors as muchas possible. In sports however we can talk about peculiar economiccharacteristics since this kind of compet<strong>it</strong>ive behaviour is absent.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 81Topkis 17 was one the first academic researchers to address this. He mention<strong>ed</strong>that teams want to come close to a perfect team but that they realize that <strong>it</strong>can not be too perfect since “there would not be any money in that”. Neale 18captur<strong>ed</strong> this thought in one sentence: «pure monopoly is <strong>di</strong>saster». Whenonly one team survives no games could be play<strong>ed</strong> and so the sports branchceases to exist. The product, a championship, is an in<strong>di</strong>visible joint-productand so teams ne<strong>ed</strong> each other. The more attractive a championship is, themore fans buy a ticket, the more broadcasters are willing to invest, the moresponsors are attract<strong>ed</strong>,… And <strong>it</strong> is generally accept<strong>ed</strong> that a compet<strong>it</strong>ionw<strong>it</strong>h more compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance is a more attractive one, ceteris paribus. Theleagues and team owners have us<strong>ed</strong> the concept of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance tojustify restrictions on behaviour of players and teams, as revenue sharing,transfer fees, salary caps and many other. In several cases, as w<strong>it</strong>h the Bosmanrulingin European football, the courts <strong>di</strong>d not agree w<strong>it</strong>h the restrictions.Even though some restrictions are abandon<strong>ed</strong>, others appear or are adjust<strong>ed</strong>.In this paper we will not specifically address the influence of interventionson compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance. We provide a first empirical <strong>di</strong>scussion of theevolutions of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance of the highest league football instead,which can give some provisional insights concerning interventions. Theimportance for the sports sector 19 and the use of <strong>it</strong> as a justification forrestrictions makes a comparison of European countries very informative.How compet<strong>it</strong>ive are the leagues in Europe? Is there ne<strong>ed</strong> for concern?How do the European national compet<strong>it</strong>ions compare to each other? Canthey be consider<strong>ed</strong> as one group and hence are international policy decisionspossible? Who is obviously most or least compet<strong>it</strong>ive? These are the researchquestions that we address in this paper.We begin w<strong>it</strong>h a defin<strong>it</strong>ion of the concept bas<strong>ed</strong> on a short l<strong>it</strong>eratureoverview. Next we <strong>di</strong>scuss the most frequently us<strong>ed</strong> measures. For aninternational comparison we show that an adaptation of existing measures isadvisable. A new measure is construct<strong>ed</strong> for seasonal imbalance. We form<strong>ed</strong>a comprehensive international database combining final tables of eleven____________________17J. H. TOPKIS, Monopoly in Professional <strong>Sport</strong>s, Yale Law J., vol. 58, 1949, 708.18W.C. NEALE, The peculiar economics of professional sports: a contribution to the theory of thefirm in sporting compet<strong>it</strong>ion and in market compet<strong>it</strong>ion, c<strong>it</strong>., 2.19Many managers and sports relat<strong>ed</strong> people fear<strong>ed</strong> the Bosman-case in 1995 because most expect<strong>ed</strong>high inequal<strong>it</strong>ies in player talents acquis<strong>it</strong>ions. In the Sunday Mirror of 3 September 2000, AndyGray (?) for example express<strong>ed</strong> his concerns about the possible creation of el<strong>it</strong>e clubs because ofthe high wages in sports. Jan Peeters, former president of the Belgian Football Association(KNBV), mention<strong>ed</strong> in 2000 that he fear<strong>ed</strong> that w<strong>it</strong>h the construction of the new transfer systemthe big teams would be favour<strong>ed</strong> and hence making <strong>it</strong> more <strong>di</strong>fficult for the l<strong>it</strong>tle teams to compete.These two, but many others w<strong>it</strong>h them, fear<strong>ed</strong> that the playing equal<strong>it</strong>ies were threaten<strong>ed</strong>.
82 Kelly GoossensEuropean countries. These countries are chosen bas<strong>ed</strong> on the top 20 FIFAworld ranking of April 2006. We replac<strong>ed</strong> the Czech Republic by Belgium.So we include ‘the big 5’ 20 together w<strong>it</strong>h 6 smaller countries: Belgium,Denmark, England, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,Spain and Sw<strong>ed</strong>en. We focus on the highest leagues for the seasons 1963-1964 to 2004-2005. Lower leagues are not includ<strong>ed</strong> because of datarestrictions and too <strong>di</strong>stinct structures across Europe. The smaller countriesinclude two central countries, two northern and two southern countries.Once we calculat<strong>ed</strong> appropriate measures we <strong>di</strong>scuss the trends. We usecluster analysis to verify whether the European countries can be consider<strong>ed</strong>as one group. Conclusions are drawn in the last subsection.1. Concept of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balanceMost authors who do research in the field of economics of team sportsinclude the idea of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance and <strong>it</strong>s importance but use <strong>di</strong>fferentterms for <strong>it</strong>. The following short l<strong>it</strong>erature overview gives some of thosealternative naming. We also show that the concept can include several<strong>di</strong>mensions. So before empirical research can start, a description of the<strong>di</strong>mension of interest is necessary.Topkis 21 <strong>di</strong>d not name the idea of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance but he includesthe idea as follows: «Baseball magnates are not fools. If anyone got togethera group of perfect players, who would pay to see them play the other teamsin the league?» Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to the founder of <strong>Sport</strong>s Economics research,Rottenberg: 22 «The nature of the industry (of baseball) is such thatcompet<strong>it</strong>ors must be of approximate equal ‘size’ if any are to be successful.»Neale 23 talks about the «League stan<strong>di</strong>ng effect» to underline the importanceof <strong>di</strong>fferences in stan<strong>di</strong>ngs of the teams over several years. Jones 24 mentionsthe «importance of compet<strong>it</strong>ive equal<strong>it</strong>y». El-ho<strong>di</strong>ri and Quirk 25 <strong>di</strong>scuss«equalization of compet<strong>it</strong>ive playing strengths» as an important objectivefor a sports league. Janssens and Kesenne 26 stress the importance of «sporting____________________20These five countries combine an important football culture w<strong>it</strong>h large populations.21J. H. TOPKIS, Monopoly in Professional <strong>Sport</strong>s, c<strong>it</strong>., 708.22S. ROTTENBERG, The baseball players’ labor market, c<strong>it</strong>., 242.23W.C. NEALE, The peculiar economics of professional sports: a contribution to the theory of thefirm in sporting compet<strong>it</strong>ion and in market compet<strong>it</strong>ion, c<strong>it</strong>., 1-3.24J.C.H. JONES, The economics of the national hockey team, c<strong>it</strong>., 3.25M. EL-HODIRI, J. QUIRK, An economic model of a professional sports league, c<strong>it</strong>., 1303.26P. JANSSENS, S. KESENNE, Belgian Soccer Attendances, Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management,vol. 32, n. 3, 1986, 305.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 83equal<strong>it</strong>y». Quirk and Fort and others 27 include «uncertainty of outcome» intheir research. «Symmetry among teams» is us<strong>ed</strong> by Palomino and Rigotti. 28Sloane 29 stresses the multi<strong>di</strong>mensional<strong>it</strong>y of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance by<strong>di</strong>stinguishing short-run uncertainty 30 from long-run uncertainty of outcome. 31He adds that long run domination of one or two clubs may be more important.Four <strong>di</strong>fferent interpretations of uncertainty of outcome are given by Cairns,Jennett and Sloane in 1986. First they mention match uncertainty. The secondand third interpretations are less clear: they <strong>di</strong>stinguish between seasonaluncertainty w<strong>it</strong>h an uncertain winner that influences util<strong>it</strong>y and seasonaluncertainty w<strong>it</strong>h the probabil<strong>it</strong>y that the own team wins the championshipthat influences util<strong>it</strong>y. Last there is the absence of long-run domination. 32Vrooman 33 points out that there are actually three possible interpretations ofcompet<strong>it</strong>ive balance, all connect<strong>ed</strong> to each other but now the last is somewhatless clear for us. First there is the interpretation of closeness of leaguecompet<strong>it</strong>ion w<strong>it</strong>hin seasons. Secondly the absence of dominance of a largemarket club can be in<strong>di</strong>cat<strong>ed</strong>. Last compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance can also meancontinu<strong>it</strong>y of performance from season to season. The latter is emphasize<strong>di</strong>n his paper of 1996. Szymanski 34 provides the clearest <strong>di</strong>vision. Heemphasizes that there are three kinds of uncertainty. First there can be matchuncertainty. Secondly there is season uncertainty which looks at theuncertainty w<strong>it</strong>hin one season. The third kind is the dominance of a fewteams over seasons call<strong>ed</strong> championship uncertainty.____________________27J. QUIRK, R. D. FORT, Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in <strong>Sport</strong>s Leagues, in J. Quirk, R.D. Fort, (<strong>ed</strong>.), PayDirt, The business of professional team sports, New Jersey, Princeton Univers<strong>it</strong>y Press, 1997,240-293. See also for example S. KESENNE, The salary cap proposal of the G-14 in Europeanfootball, Eur. Sp. Man. Quart., vol. 3, n. 2, 2003, 120-128; M. BAIMBRIDGE, S. CAMERON, P. DAWSON,Satell<strong>it</strong>e Television and the Demand for Football, A whole new ball game?, Scot. J. of Pol. Ec.,vol. 43, n. 3, 1996, 317-333; G. KNOWLES, K. SHERONY, M. HAUPERT, The Demand for MLB, A testof the UOO hypothesis, Am. Ec., vol. 36, n. 2, 1992, 72-80.28F. PALOMINO, L. RIGOTTI, The <strong>Sport</strong> League’s Dilemma, Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance versus incentivesto win, Industrial Organization 0012003, Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL, 2001.29P. J. SLOANE, The Economics of Professional Football, The football club as a util<strong>it</strong>y maximizer,Scot. J. of Pol. Ec., vol. 18, n. 2, 1971, 121-146.30This is what Rottenberg <strong>di</strong>scusses in his paper on the labour market of baseball. The focus lieson the balance w<strong>it</strong>hin one season, so whether a team obviously outperform the others.31Long run domination looks at whether there are some teams that remain in the top over severalseasons. For example, the New York Yankees dominat<strong>ed</strong> baseball in the 1950’s when they woneight American league pennants in 8 years.32For more details we refer to their article: J. CAIRNS, N. JENNETT, P. J. SLOANE, The Economics ofProfessional Team <strong>Sport</strong>s, A survey of theory and evidence, J. of Ec. Stud., vol. 13, n. 1, 1986, 1-80.33J. VROOMAN, The Baseball Players’ Labour Market Reconsider<strong>ed</strong>, South. Ec. J., vol. 63, n. 2,1996, 339-360.34S. SZYMANSKI, Economic design of sporting contests, c<strong>it</strong>..
84 Kelly GoossensBecause the concept can have several <strong>di</strong>mensions and a widely us<strong>ed</strong>defin<strong>it</strong>ion does not exist, <strong>it</strong> is advisable to explain what is meant when theconcept is us<strong>ed</strong>. We will show that a <strong>di</strong>stinction is necessary since evolutions<strong>di</strong>ffer.We follow Szymanski and consider the following three kinds ofcompet<strong>it</strong>ive balance.(i) Match uncertainty.(ii) Seasonal Uncertainty(iii) Championship UncertaintyWe focus on season uncertainty and championship uncertainty in thispaper. We interpret seasonal balance as the closeness of winning percentagesin one season and championship uncertainty as the absence of dominantteams over seasons.To impose policy decisions, we should determine how the optimallevel of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance can be reach<strong>ed</strong> and act accor<strong>di</strong>ngly. 35 A certainlevel of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance seems reasonable to hold the interest of spectatorsand sponsors for all teams but the determination of the optimal level is verycomplex. Research on the objectives of the agents in the market is necessary.The optimization of these objectives determines the optimal level butinterpersonal wealth measuring is ne<strong>ed</strong><strong>ed</strong> and this is very complex. Becauseof the unsolv<strong>ed</strong> issues about optimal compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance an ideal level isfrequently us<strong>ed</strong> instead.Two alternatives are often us<strong>ed</strong> in the l<strong>it</strong>erature of sports economicsto describe a league in perfect balance. Quirk and Fort introduc<strong>ed</strong> the use ofa win probabil<strong>it</strong>y of fifty percent for each team. This means that the ideallevel is present when the real number of wins is close to the one a computerwould generate if <strong>it</strong> randomly picks a number out of a binomial <strong>di</strong>stribution. 36The alternative is the use of a win percentage of 50% for all teams in theleague, which is equal to stating that all teams win half of their matches anloose the other half or that all games end in a tie. The two alternatives arenot equal because the standard deviation <strong>di</strong>ffers: for the first <strong>it</strong> equals equals0.5/√N, while for the second <strong>it</strong> is zero. Ne<strong>it</strong>her is proven to be optimal andboth are obviously <strong>di</strong>sputable. We are convinc<strong>ed</strong> that <strong>it</strong> is more appropriateto use another basis of comparison.There is no doubt about the necess<strong>it</strong>y to prevent complete imbalance.____________________35Assuming of course that compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance is a major concern. Convincing evidence has yetto be found. But as long as team managers, sports <strong>di</strong>rectors and others use the concept forrestrictions, <strong>it</strong> is at least very relevant for the team sports industry.36We <strong>di</strong>scuss their measure more thoroughly in the next chapter.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 85When <strong>it</strong> is always known in advance, w<strong>it</strong>hout exception, who wins, thefoundation of sports is destroy<strong>ed</strong> and <strong>it</strong> will cease to exist. An appropriateexpression like ‘you never know in sports, anything can happen’ capturesthe necess<strong>it</strong>y of absence of complete imbalance. Consequently we believethat <strong>it</strong> makes more sense to consider the worst case instead of the ideal caseto look at the levels of European football countries. The fact that a league<strong>di</strong>verges from an ideal league does not mean that intervention is necessary.However when a league is very close to complete imbalance, reaction seemsreasonable. So when policy decisions ne<strong>ed</strong> to be made a measure that includesthis complete imbalance seems justifi<strong>ed</strong>. Moreover, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng this completeimbalance solves the problem of <strong>di</strong>ffering number of teams between andw<strong>it</strong>hin countries as we will show in chapter 3.2. Measures of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balanceSince there are several interpretations of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance, there are alsomany propos<strong>ed</strong> measures. We give a short overview of some existingmeasures for both seasonal and championship uncertainty and <strong>di</strong>vide thechapter following this <strong>di</strong>stinction into two subsections. We do not presentan exhaustive list. For more details on the measures we refer to the articles.2.1. Seasonal imbalanceWe begin w<strong>it</strong>h a <strong>di</strong>scussion of the seasonal uncertainty measures bas<strong>ed</strong> onthe win percentages. Next we <strong>di</strong>scuss other measures chronologically.Win or point percentageIn what follows we will <strong>di</strong>scuss some measures that use the win percentageas basis. For the win percentage, the number of wins in one season arecount<strong>ed</strong> and <strong>di</strong>vid<strong>ed</strong> by the total nr of games play<strong>ed</strong> by that team. In Americansports most games are play<strong>ed</strong> until a winner prevails. In Europe draws arepossible and they are commonly includ<strong>ed</strong> as half a win. So the number ofwins are multipli<strong>ed</strong> by one and then add<strong>ed</strong> by the number of draws multipli<strong>ed</strong>by a half. This way winning half of your games gives the same result asalways en<strong>di</strong>ng the games in a tie. The calculation of win percentages isequivalent to the use of points when 2 points are award<strong>ed</strong> to the winner and1 for each team in a tie. This total of points is <strong>di</strong>vid<strong>ed</strong> by the maximum: thenumber of games multipli<strong>ed</strong> by 2. The general American counterpart consistsof 1 point for winning and <strong>di</strong>vi<strong>di</strong>ng by the number of games. They all give an
86 Kelly Goossensaverage league winning percentage of 0,5. In most European countries thepoint <strong>di</strong>stribution chang<strong>ed</strong> in the nineties to three points for wins and onefor draws. When the latter is appli<strong>ed</strong>, the use of points renders a seasonalaverage <strong>di</strong>fferent from 0,5 so <strong>it</strong> is no longer equivalent to the use of wins.RangeThe range is one of the easiest measures for compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance. It is the<strong>di</strong>fference between the highest and lowest win percentage. The bigger therange the more the best and worst team <strong>di</strong>ffer and hence the bigger theimbalance. It only takes two teams into account which is the biggest<strong>di</strong>sadvantage of this measure. We look<strong>ed</strong> at the information this measuregave us but we prefer to use the standard deviation of the <strong>di</strong>stribution of thewinning percentages because this takes all the teams into account.Standard deviation of winning percentageThe standard deviation 37 of the winning percentages in one season measureshow far the win percentages are spread around the average. The larger thestandard deviation, the less the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance is because the winpercentages are hence very <strong>di</strong>fferent between teams. By defin<strong>it</strong>ion <strong>it</strong> givesmore weight to the teams at both ends of the compet<strong>it</strong>ion which is exactlywhat we ne<strong>ed</strong>.The standard deviation as a measure of spread has the <strong>di</strong>sadvantageof the necess<strong>it</strong>y of a scale when comparing over countries or years: <strong>it</strong> dependson the average. Only when the average is the same, comparison over countriesor over seasons is possible. When we use the 2-1-0 points, the average isalways 0.5 and hence comparison is possible. W<strong>it</strong>h the 3-1-0 points, theaverages <strong>di</strong>ffer so the standard deviation cannot be compar<strong>ed</strong> anymore andthe use of the coefficient of variation 38 is necessary.Standard deviation ratioThe standard-deviation-ratio is the ratio of the actual standard deviation toan idealiz<strong>ed</strong> standard deviation. The ideal ratio is 1. The higher the ratio, themore the actual spread <strong>di</strong>verges from the ideal one and hence the worse thecompet<strong>it</strong>ive balance.____________________37SD=n∑i=1( winperc−averagewin)in38The coefficient of variation=sd/average.2; n = number of teams.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 87Quirk and Fort introduc<strong>ed</strong> 0.5/√N as the idealiz<strong>ed</strong> standard deviationw<strong>it</strong>h N the number of games play<strong>ed</strong> in a season. Their ideal league is onewhere every team has a probabil<strong>it</strong>y of 0.5 to win. The number of wins (x) inN games follows a binomial <strong>di</strong>stribution; hence the winning percentage(x/N) follows also a binomial <strong>di</strong>stribution w<strong>it</strong>h an average of 0.5 in the ideals<strong>it</strong>uation and a standard deviation of 0.5/√N. This ratio is the measure mostfrequently us<strong>ed</strong> in sports economics. 39As <strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong> in our introduction, we do not opt for the use of this‘ideal’ measure. Our objection against the notion ideal is support<strong>ed</strong> by ourfin<strong>di</strong>ng that the calculation of this ratio renders significant numbers below 1.In 1969 for example Germany has a ratio equal to 0,695. This means thatthe championship is more equal than when a computer would have pick<strong>ed</strong>the results if all teams had a chance to win of 0,5. So in terms of theinterpretation given by Quirk and Fort, we find a compet<strong>it</strong>ion that is moreequal than when the league is perfectly balanc<strong>ed</strong>.Gini coefficientThe Gini coefficient is originally develop<strong>ed</strong> to measure income inequal<strong>it</strong>iesby Gini Corrado. Schmidt and Schmidt & Berri 40 use <strong>it</strong> to measure theinequal<strong>it</strong>y of the <strong>di</strong>stribution of win percentages. It was earlier already appli<strong>ed</strong>to measure another kind of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance, namely the championshipvariation. This is <strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong> later in the paper.The cumulative percentage of teams is plac<strong>ed</strong> on the horizontal axis.On the vertical the cumulative percentage of winning can be found. The 45-degree line presents equal winning percentages. The Gini-coefficient iscalculat<strong>ed</strong> by the area between the 45-degree line and the actual lin<strong>ed</strong>etermin<strong>ed</strong> by the data <strong>di</strong>vid<strong>ed</strong> by the total area below that equal winningline. But w<strong>it</strong>h this formulation, the most unequal outcome is when one teamwins all the games. This is however not possible since one team can only win<strong>it</strong>s own games and not the games play<strong>ed</strong> between two other teams.Utt and Fort 41 hence argue that this measure cannot be us<strong>ed</strong> for____________________39J. QUIRK, R. D. FORT, Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in <strong>Sport</strong>s Leagues, c<strong>it</strong>.. See other papers as wellthat use this ratio: J. VROOMAN, A General Theory of Professional <strong>Sport</strong>s Leagues, South. Ec. J.,vol. 61, n. 4, 1995, 971-990; B. R. HUMPHREYS, Alternative Measures of Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in<strong>Sport</strong>s Leagues, J. of Sp. Ec., vol. 3, n. 2, 2002, 133-148; L. BUZZACCHI, S. SZYMANSKI, T. M.VALLETTI, Equal<strong>it</strong>y of Opportun<strong>it</strong>y and Equal<strong>it</strong>y of Outcome, Open leagues, clos<strong>ed</strong> leagues andcompet<strong>it</strong>ive balance, J. of Ind. Comp. and Tr., vol. 3, 2003, 167–186.40M. B. SCHMIDT, Compet<strong>it</strong>ion in Major League Baseball, The impact of expansion, Appl. Ec.Let., vol. 8, 2001, 21-26; M. B. SCHMIDT, D. J. BERRI, Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance and Attendance, Thecase of Major League Baseball, J. of Sp. Ec., vol. 2, n. 2, 2001, 145-167.41J. UTT, R. FORT, P<strong>it</strong>falls to Measuring Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance w<strong>it</strong>h Gini- Coefficients, J. of Sp.Ec., vol. 3, n. 4, 2002, 367-373.
88 Kelly Goossensw<strong>it</strong>hin season compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance since <strong>it</strong> understates the level. Thenumerator should be smaller. They propose an adjust<strong>ed</strong> Gini-coefficient butunderline that there remain problems w<strong>it</strong>h <strong>it</strong>. 42 Consequently we do notconsider <strong>it</strong> for our comparison of countries.Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance ratioThe standard deviation only accounts for seasonal uncertainty and not forchampionship uncertainty because the dominance of teams over seasons isnot taken into account. We show this in the next chapter. Humphreys andEckard 43 concentrat<strong>ed</strong> on a more dynamic measure to include both kinds ofuncertainty. Eckard decompos<strong>ed</strong> the variance of winning percentages into acumulative and time varying component. Humphreys us<strong>ed</strong> Eckard’s idea tomodel an easier measure but w<strong>it</strong>h the same basics. He nam<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong> the compet<strong>it</strong>ivebalance ratio (CBR). Since both measures are equally valu<strong>ed</strong> we prefer to<strong>di</strong>scuss the CBR.The standard deviation of winning over seasons per team is nowinclud<strong>ed</strong> and <strong>it</strong> is nam<strong>ed</strong> ‘w<strong>it</strong>hin-team-standard deviation’. The standarddeviation us<strong>ed</strong> before is call<strong>ed</strong> the ‘w<strong>it</strong>hin-season-standard deviation’. 44W<strong>it</strong>hin-team-standard deviationW<strong>it</strong>hin-season-standard deviation:S∑22( wis,−wi)( wis,−ws)SD wt,i= s=1SD ws,s = i=1(1)SnThe Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance Ratio (CBR) is the ratio of these twostandard deviations:CBR=n∑i=1SDnwt ,in∑S∑ SDws , s(2)s=1S____________________42For an overview we refer to their paper.43W. ECKARD, ANOVA-Bas<strong>ed</strong> Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance Measure, Defense, J. of Sp. Ec., vol. 4, n. 1,2003, 74-80; B. R. HUMPHREYS, ibidem, 2002 and B. R. HUMPHREYS, The ANOVA-Bas<strong>ed</strong> Compet<strong>it</strong>iveBalance Measure: A reply, J. of Sp. Ec., vol. 4, n. 1, 2003, 81-82.44i= team, s= season, n= total nr of teams, S= total nr of seasons, w i,s= win percentage of team iin season s, w i= average win percentage of team i over total nr of seasons, w s= average win
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 89The CBR lies between 0 and 1. When every team ends on the sameplace in the final ranking every season, all w<strong>it</strong>hin-team standard deviationsequal zero and hence the CBR equals 0. So championship certainty gives aCBR of 0. The same CBR is reach<strong>ed</strong> when the denominator is very large.When the w<strong>it</strong>hin-season standard deviation is very large in most seasons,the teams’ performances are very <strong>di</strong>stinct w<strong>it</strong>h very poor teams and verystrong teams so a large imbalance. Championship uncertainty gives a CBRof 1: the w<strong>it</strong>hin-team standard deviation equals the w<strong>it</strong>hin-season standarddeviation. Every team wins every nth season.This measure is not straightforward to calculate in European footballbecause of promotion and relegation. This means that not every team staysin the highest league during the total sample period. There is also the problemof the total number of teams playing in the first league. In every countrythere is a mixture as we show in Table 1 in the next chapter. Besides thene<strong>ed</strong> for adaptation to apply <strong>it</strong> for the European leagues, combining thesetwo kinds of balance makes <strong>it</strong> impossible to <strong>di</strong>stinguish between them. Forpolicy decisions <strong>it</strong> is important to pinpoint the balance that ne<strong>ed</strong>s to be tackl<strong>ed</strong>since interventions can be expect<strong>ed</strong> to have <strong>di</strong>fferent impacts on the twokinds of uncertainties.Relative EntropyHorow<strong>it</strong>z 45 chose to use the Relative-Entropy measure of information theoryto measure seasonal compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in Major League Baseball. 46R =HHM−=n∑i= 1pi−loglog221npi(3)To estimate whether a systematic and asymptotic approach to 1 isfound over S seasons he calculat<strong>ed</strong> the following regression____________________percentage of season s for all n teams together= 0,5.45I. HOROWITZ, The Increasing Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in MLB, Rev. of Ind. Org., vol. 12, n. 3,1997, 373-387. No original references are found in Horow<strong>it</strong>z’s paper but see the work of RaulCaruso for this. He uses the entropy measure to measure conflict and conflict management: R.CARUSO, Conflict and Conflict Management w<strong>it</strong>h Interdependent Instruments and AsymmetricStakes, paper prepar<strong>ed</strong> for the Jan Tinbergen Peace Science Conference, 2006.46W<strong>it</strong>h i = team; n = total nr of teams; p i= the proportion of the league victories of team i. H M=maximal entropy is found when every team has the same share of victories: p i= 1/n, for an 8 teamleague: p i=8 and H M=3. The latter maximum only applies when all teams play an equal numberof games.
90 Kelly GoossensY s=Ln(1/R s-1)= α s+ β ss + µ. If the estimator of â over all seasons issignificantly negative, an increase in balance is present. Horow<strong>it</strong>z warns foran autocorrelation problem signal<strong>ed</strong> by the Durbin Watson test. He usesdummies for important structural changes in the Baseball leagues and add<strong>ed</strong>them to the regression to remove the problem. He then estimat<strong>ed</strong> whetherthis balance measure R increas<strong>ed</strong> to 1 over time in a decreasing rate. 47 Hefound that this was the case and hence conclud<strong>ed</strong> that the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balanceimprov<strong>ed</strong> for both the American league as for the National league. A problemw<strong>it</strong>h the use of R is that <strong>it</strong> is always close to 1 when there are many teamsbecause one team cannot win more than their number of games. In Europeanfootball this is not the case.Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)Depken II 48 looks at the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Market shares aresquar<strong>ed</strong> and then summat<strong>ed</strong> over all firms in the market. This measure wasconstruct<strong>ed</strong> in 1982 to assess mergers. The US government’s ant<strong>it</strong>rustenforcement guidelines use the height of the HHI for that assessment.HHI=n2∑ MS 4ii=1∑49(4)It lies between 0 and 10000, zero when there is perfect compet<strong>it</strong>ionand 10000 when there is perfect monopoly. Depken II warns against the useof the winning percentages since the maximum of 100 is not attainable. Noteam can win games play<strong>ed</strong> between two other teams. The actual minimumis when teams have an equal share 1/n and so the minimum is 1/n. This onlyapproximates zero if n is very large which is not the case for many Europeanfootball leagues. He proposes the alternative of using production categoriesthat influence the number of wins. A team is assum<strong>ed</strong> to attract those playersthat can maximize the market shares in those production categories so thata (near) monopoly can be attain<strong>ed</strong>. For the Major League baseball he foundthat homeruns and strikeouts are the most important ones and uses the marketshares of both to calculate the HHI. Because of the accurate productionstatistics of baseball, he had no problems to calculate the market shares ofeach team.____________________47If R=1: perfect balance.48C. A. DEPKEN II, Free Agency and the Compet<strong>it</strong>iveness of MLB, Rev. of Ind. Org., vol. 14, n.3, 1999, 205-17.49W<strong>it</strong>h i = team; n = total nr of teams; MS i= market share of team i, going from zero to 100.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 91For other team sports, before the HHI can be calculat<strong>ed</strong>, a thoroughstudy ne<strong>ed</strong>s to be perform<strong>ed</strong> to <strong>di</strong>scover the production categories that havethe greatest influence on the number of wins. This forms a whole new researchsubject and is not includ<strong>ed</strong>.Strength <strong>di</strong>fference measur<strong>ed</strong> by an Order<strong>ed</strong> Prob<strong>it</strong> modelKoning 50 supposes that a latent random variable Y ij*exists that determinesthe outcome of a game. This variable is influenc<strong>ed</strong> by two factors. The firstfactor is the <strong>di</strong>fference in strength between team i and j, formalis<strong>ed</strong> by a i- a j.This strength is independent of the opponent and constant over a season. Toinclude random factors ε ijis add<strong>ed</strong>. So in general you have Y ij*= a i- a j+ ε ij.Since the actual strength <strong>di</strong>fference is not observ<strong>ed</strong>, he transform<strong>ed</strong>the model into an order<strong>ed</strong> prob<strong>it</strong> model. The home team i can win, lose ortie the game. The following defendable ordering for the team is assum<strong>ed</strong>. Ateam is assum<strong>ed</strong> to prefer winning over tying the game and the latter ispreferr<strong>ed</strong> to losing, so the order<strong>ed</strong> prob<strong>it</strong> model is as follows:0 if Yij * ≤ µ 1: lossYij = 1 if µ 1 µ 2: winMaximizing the appropriate likelihood function gives the standarderrors of the a i’s and these are us<strong>ed</strong> as a measure for compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance. Alarge standard error in<strong>di</strong>cates an imbalance. The use of this measure is notstraightforward and an advanc<strong>ed</strong> knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge of econometrics is necessaryto apply <strong>it</strong>.Surprise IndexGroot and Groot 51 introduce the surprise index. The surprise index is the____________________50The model is very technical. We offer only a general <strong>di</strong>scussion, for more technical details, seehis paper: R. H. KONING, Balance in Compet<strong>it</strong>ion in Dutch Soccer, The Stat., vol. 49, n. 3, 2000,419-431. Marques us<strong>ed</strong> his model to apply to the Portuguese league: A. MARQUES, Compet<strong>it</strong>iveBalance in the Portuguese Premier League of Professional Soccer, Industrial Organization0211025, Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL, 2002.51See J. GROOT, L. GROOT, The Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance of French Football, 1945-2002, Ec. Appl.,vol. 56, n. 4, 2003, 91-113 and L. GROOT, De-Commercializzare il Calcio Europeo eSalvaguardarne l’Equilibrio Compet<strong>it</strong>ivo, Una proposta welfarista, Riv. <strong>di</strong> Dir. <strong>ed</strong> Ec. <strong>dello</strong> Sp.,vol. 1, n. 2, 2005, 63-91.
92 Kelly Goossensratio between P, the realiz<strong>ed</strong> surprise points, and M, the maximum numberof surprise points that is possible when the teams are perfectly balanc<strong>ed</strong>. 52Two surprise points are given when a team looses from a lower rank<strong>ed</strong> teamand one point is award<strong>ed</strong> when the game ends in a tie. These points areweight<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h the rank <strong>di</strong>fference. 53PS =MN−1N1= ∑∑( Rij+ Rji)( j−i )(6)Mi= 1 j = i+1N−1∑M= 2 ( N − i) i = ( N − 1) N( N+1)/3 (7)i=1This ratio varies between 0 and 1. There are no surprises when thechampion always wins, the second rank<strong>ed</strong> team always wins except againstthe champion, the third rank<strong>ed</strong> team always wins except the former two etc,P will equal 0 and so S also equals 0. This is a perfectly unbalanc<strong>ed</strong>compet<strong>it</strong>ion. P equals M and hence S equals 1 when all games end in a drawor every team wins <strong>it</strong>s home match. The latter represents a perfectly balanc<strong>ed</strong>compet<strong>it</strong>ion.They found a ratio of 0,68 for French football, for Dutch footballonly an average of 0,54 so the Netherlands are less balanc<strong>ed</strong> than France.This measure ne<strong>ed</strong>s game-by-game information and hence is verydata-intensive. The possibil<strong>it</strong>y to compare countries is an advantage. 54 Grootand Groot show that <strong>it</strong> is highly correlat<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h the standard deviation andour results show the same ranking. They do emphasize that caution is ne<strong>ed</strong><strong>ed</strong>because some assumptions can be doubtful. 552.2. Championship uncertaintyTo measure dominance of teams only a few measures 56 have been us<strong>ed</strong> before.The measures of Eckard and Humphreys include this kind of balance as wellbut we preferr<strong>ed</strong> to <strong>di</strong>scuss <strong>it</strong> under the section of win percentages.____________________52Every game ends in a draw or every team wins <strong>it</strong>s home match.53(j-i) gives the rank order <strong>di</strong>fference w<strong>it</strong>h i < j and i and j the rank number at the end of theseason. R ij= result of game between home team w<strong>it</strong>h rank i and away team w<strong>it</strong>h rank j.54The <strong>di</strong>fferences in number of teams do not give problems since <strong>it</strong> is taken up in the numeratoras well as in the denominator.55See their paper of 2003 for more details.56The measure of Jennett is not includ<strong>ed</strong> since <strong>it</strong> calculates out-of-contention per game and doesnot include dominance of teams over seasons. For more details see: N. JENNETT, Attendances,
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 93Number of championships wonRottenberg 57 was the first to suggest that the equal<strong>it</strong>y of the <strong>di</strong>stribution ofplayer abil<strong>it</strong>y, which is the theoretical counterpart of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance,can be easily measur<strong>ed</strong> by just counting the number of championships wonper team. He found that in the American Baseball league the Yankeesdominat<strong>ed</strong> for eighteen years over the period from the 1920s to 1951. In theNational League the St. Louis Car<strong>di</strong>nals won nine times in that same period.He conclud<strong>ed</strong> that there was a very unequal <strong>di</strong>stribution in American baseballleagues.The ideal s<strong>it</strong>uation for Rottenberg is when every team in the leaguewins an equal number of times. This measure is very simple but <strong>it</strong> says onlysomething about the champion. In Belgium for example the struggle betweenClub Brugge and Anderlecht is often fierce and at the beginning of the season<strong>it</strong> is <strong>di</strong>fficult to pre<strong>di</strong>ct who will win. However we are certain that the battlefor the championship t<strong>it</strong>le will include both. So inclu<strong>di</strong>ng more teams cangive important extra information.In Europe the playlist of teams <strong>di</strong>ffers every year because of thepromotion and relegation scheme. Some teams enter, others leave the highestleague. Using the ideal s<strong>it</strong>uation where each team should win every nthseason is hence no option. But this measure does show in a fast an easy waywhether some teams win significantly more than others.Top k rankingTo look at the dynamic imbalance, top k ranking can be us<strong>ed</strong> as a complementfor the previous measure. The number of <strong>di</strong>fferent teams that end<strong>ed</strong> in thetop k is now count<strong>ed</strong>. When more teams end in the top k over a certainperiod of time than in a previous period of the same length, the compet<strong>it</strong>ionhas become less dominat<strong>ed</strong>. In Italy for example in the period 1980-1989 8<strong>di</strong>fferent teams end<strong>ed</strong> in the top 3, while in the period 1990-1999 <strong>it</strong> were 10<strong>di</strong>fferent teams. 58To allow comparison between European countries we assume thatthe probabil<strong>it</strong>y that a team enters the top k of the highest league will becomparable when all leagues (second, third and so on) are taken into accountin a country. So that <strong>di</strong>fferent number of teams in the highest league doesnot present a problem. 59____________________Uncertainty of Outcome and Policy in Scottish League Football, Scot. J. of Pol. Ec., vol. 31, n.2, 1984, 176-198.57S. ROTTENBERG, The baseball players’ labor market, c<strong>it</strong>..58In the next chapter more details are given.59We hope to clarify this assumption by the following example. A country A has 16 teams in the
94 Kelly GoossensWe use this measure for dynamic compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance since <strong>it</strong> isrelatively easy to compute and is good to take the promotion and relegationscheme into account. For measuring dominance of teams in European footballwe believe this measure is one of the best. 60Gini coefficient and Lorenz-curveThe Lorenz curve or Gini-coefficient can be us<strong>ed</strong> to measure the variationin championships. Quirk and Fort 61 plot the cumulative percentage of leaguechampionships on the vertical axis and on the horizontal the cumulativepercentage of team years in the league. The most successful teams (thosewho have the highest t<strong>it</strong>les/year ratio) are start<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h in the left corner. Tocalculate the Gini-coefficient the area between the Lorenz-curve and the45°-line is calculat<strong>ed</strong> and <strong>di</strong>vid<strong>ed</strong> by the area above that line. The 45°-linerepresents the case in which each team has the same frequency of leaguechampionships per year in the league. The larger the bulge, the more gamesare won by only a few teams. We construct<strong>ed</strong> the necessary database an<strong>di</strong>nclude <strong>it</strong> in our analysis.3. Data, us<strong>ed</strong> measures and resultsData were gather<strong>ed</strong> on the end rankings of the highest domestic footballleagues of 11 European countries: 62 Belgium (B): Jupiler league, Denmark(D): SAS Ligaen, England (E): Barclaycard Premiership, France (F): Ligue1, Germany (GE): Bundesliga, Greece (GR): Alpha Ethniki, Italy (I): SerieA, Netherlands (N): Holland Casino Ere<strong>di</strong>visie, Portugal (P): CampeonatoNacional, Spain (S): Primera División and Sw<strong>ed</strong>en (SW): Allsvenskan. Welook at the seasons beginning w<strong>it</strong>h the foundation of the Bundesliga in theseason 1963-1964 and end w<strong>it</strong>h the season 2004-2005. So we have a datasetof 42 seasons per country.____________________highest league during 3 years. Five teams enter<strong>ed</strong> the top 3 in that period. Country B has 22teams in the first league during the same 3 years and also had 5 teams that enter<strong>ed</strong> the top 3. Bothhave the same degree of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance (both 5 teams) even though they have a <strong>di</strong>fferent nrof teams in the first league. This is correct when the probabil<strong>it</strong>y to enter the top 3 resembles theprobabil<strong>it</strong>y to enter the top league. When there are fewer teams in the first league, there is ahigher probabil<strong>it</strong>y to enter the top k but also less probabil<strong>it</strong>y to enter this top league. We assumethat this applies.60We were not able to find or construct a better alternative that we could use for our comparison.The ratio between the actual number of teams entering the top k and an ideal number is present<strong>ed</strong>by BUZZACCHI, SZYMANSKI and VALLETTI, c<strong>it</strong>., but we were not able to reconstruct this measure.61J. QUIRK, R. D. FORT, Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in <strong>Sport</strong>s Leagues, c<strong>it</strong>..62We use the name of season 2004-2005 for the highest league compet<strong>it</strong>ion.www.uefa.com/FootballCentral/Directory/index.html (July, 2006).
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 95We start w<strong>it</strong>h an overview of our chosen measures bas<strong>ed</strong> on theprevious chapter. Next we <strong>di</strong>scuss our results structur<strong>ed</strong> into three subsectionsbas<strong>ed</strong> on the chosen measures.3.1. Our MeasuresFor the balance w<strong>it</strong>hin seasons we start from the win percentages. 63Theoretical research <strong>di</strong>scusses the <strong>di</strong>stribution of player talents and the lattercan be represent<strong>ed</strong> by the number of wins. All else equal, the more talents ateam possesses the more games will be won. So a measure that is bas<strong>ed</strong> onwin percentages seems justifi<strong>ed</strong>. We interpret seasonal balance as the spreadof these win percentages w<strong>it</strong>hin the season so that the use of the standarddeviation is the obvious choice. For the balance between seasons we ne<strong>ed</strong> tomeasure dominance of teams over seasons. We include both the top 3 aswell as the Lorenz curve to have a measure that focuses on the championalone.The National Measure of Seasonal ImbalanceTo compare winnings over seasons and over countries an adaptation of theexisting measures is appropriate because the number of teams <strong>di</strong>ffers. Anexample clarifies this. Assume that there is perfect certainty about theoutcomes of the championship, which is of course the worst case scenario: 64team 1 wins all of <strong>it</strong>s games, team 2 always wins except against the firstteam, team 3 always wins except games against the first and second, … Thestandard deviation of win percentages of such a compet<strong>it</strong>ion w<strong>it</strong>h 18 teamsis: 0,305148. Suppose this league decides to increase the number of teamsin the next season to 20 teams. When the worst scenario remains the standarddeviation becomes 0,303488. So by ad<strong>di</strong>ng two teams <strong>it</strong> has decreas<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>suncertainty measure, and hence gives the impression that the w<strong>it</strong>hin seasonal____________________63We first want to draw attention for the point schemes us<strong>ed</strong> by the leagues because this isrelevant for European football leagues. In general, games in the American major league sportscannot end in a draw and a win is reward<strong>ed</strong> by 1 point, a loss by zero. In the nineties mostEuropean countries chang<strong>ed</strong> their reward for winning from two to three points while a drawreceives one point and loosing zero. In the sports l<strong>it</strong>erature <strong>it</strong> is custom to take up a draw as halfa winning. This follows the old European scheme but a draw could also be includ<strong>ed</strong> as one thirdof a winning. We compar<strong>ed</strong> the two possible point-schemes for all countries but the trends arequ<strong>it</strong>e robust. W<strong>it</strong>h the use of the 3-1-0 <strong>di</strong>stinction we no longer get an average winning percentageof 0.5 and then the coefficient of variation (<strong>di</strong>vide sd by the average) ne<strong>ed</strong>s to be calculat<strong>ed</strong>. Wetherefore decid<strong>ed</strong> to include a tie as half a winning.64See the <strong>di</strong>scussion in our introduction about the basics of team sports: we ne<strong>ed</strong> someunpre<strong>di</strong>ctabil<strong>it</strong>y to keep the interest of fans and sponsors.
96 Kelly Goossensbalance improv<strong>ed</strong>. But this is not correct since we still know in advance whowill win and what the end ranking will be. The <strong>di</strong>fference appears to be verysmall but when we compare countries like Sw<strong>ed</strong>en and Denmark who hadfor example in the season 91-92 10 teams w<strong>it</strong>h England having 22 teams,the standard deviation is respectively 0,3021 and 0,3191, a <strong>di</strong>fference of 6percent. Every country chang<strong>ed</strong> the number of teams during our chosenperiod and between countries there are also <strong>di</strong>fferences.An overview can be found in Table 1.Table 1: Number of teams in highest league for all countries for seasons 63-64 to 2004-2005season B D E F GE GR I N P S SW63-64 16 12 22 18 16 16 18 16 14 16 1264-65 16 12 22 18 16 16 18 16 14 16 1265-66 16 12 22 20 18 16 18 16 14 16 1266-67 16 12 22 20 18 16 18 18 14 16 1267-68 16 12 22 20 18 18 16 18 14 16 1268-69 16 12 22 18 18 18 16 18 14 16 1269-70 16 12 22 18 18 18 16 18 14 16 1270-71 16 12 22 20 18 18 16 18 14 16 1271-72 16 12 22 20 18 18 16 18 16 18 1272-73 16 12 22 20 18 18 16 18 16 18 1473-74 16 12 22 20 18 18 16 18 16 18 1474-75 20 16 22 20 18 18 16 18 16 18 1475-76 19 16 22 20 18 16 16 18 16 18 1476-77 18 16 22 20 18 18 16 18 16 18 1477-78 18 16 22 20 18 18 16 18 16 18 1478-79 18 16 22 20 18 18 16 18 16 18 1479-80 18 16 22 20 18 18 16 18 16 18 1480-81 18 16 22 20 18 18 16 18 16 18 1481-82 18 16 22 20 18 18 16 18 16 18 1282-83 18 16 22 20 18 18 16 18 16 18 1283-84 18 16 22 20 18 16 16 18 16 18 1284-85 18 16 22 20 18 16 16 18 16 18 1285-86 18 14 22 20 18 16 16 18 16 18 1286-87 18 14 22 20 18 16 16 18 16 18 1287-88 18 14 21 20 18 16 16 18 20 20 1288-89 18 14 20 20 18 16 18 18 20 20 1289-90 18 14 20 20 18 18 18 18 18 20 1290-91 18 10 20 20 18 18 18 18 20 20 1091-92 18 10 22 20 18 18 18 18 18 20 1092-93 18 10 22 20 18 18 18 18 18 20 1493-94 18 10 22 20 18 18 18 18 18 20 1494-95 18 10 22 20 18 18 18 18 18 20 1495-96 18 12 20 20 18 18 18 18 18 22 14
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 97season B D E F GE GR I N P S SW96-97 18 12 20 20 18 18 18 18 18 22 1497-98 18 12 20 18 18 18 18 18 18 20 1498-99 18 12 20 18 18 18 18 18 18 20 1499-00 18 12 20 18 18 18 18 18 18 20 1400-01 18 12 20 18 18 16 18 18 18 20 142001-2002 18 12 20 18 18 14 18 18 18 20 142002-2003 17 12 20 20 18 16 18 18 18 20 142003-2004 18 12 20 20 18 16 18 18 18 20 142004-2005 18 12 20 20 18 16 20 18 18 20 14For an international comparison, using the standard deviation alonebiases the results as we have shown in our example. Using the standarddeviation ratio is one possibil<strong>it</strong>y. However, as we have <strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong> above, w<strong>ed</strong>o not believe that this is su<strong>it</strong>able. So we develop a new measure.We propose the National Measure of Seasonal Imbalance (NAMSI)that includes both the minimum and maximum standard deviation. Theminimum standard deviation is when all teams have equal winning percentagesof 0,5. This is a league in perfect balance: all have an equal number of pointsat the end of the season. The maximum standard deviation is reach<strong>ed</strong> whenperfect imbalance occurs and the first team wins all <strong>it</strong>s matches, the secondall except against the first and so on. 65NAMSI = actual range sd /maximal range s<strong>di</strong>=1( w−0,5)sd s− sd min=n= sd− sdn( w− 0,5)max min 2imaxi=1n∑∑in2=n∑i=1n∑i=1( w−0,5)iimax2( w− 0,5)266(8)___________________65The calculation of this maximal sd is only applicable for team sports that play each other anequal number of games.66Averagewin is by defin<strong>it</strong>ion 0,5. Inclu<strong>di</strong>ng the minimal standard deviation results in the samemeasure as exclu<strong>di</strong>ng since <strong>it</strong> is by defin<strong>it</strong>ion zero. The symbols represent the following: i =team; n = total nr of teams; w i= win percentage of team i; w imax= win percentage of a team whenthere is complete pre<strong>di</strong>ctabil<strong>it</strong>y: When n=3: team 1 wins all of <strong>it</strong>s games so has a win percentageof 1 (4 out of 4), team 2 wins only against team 3 so win percentage of 0,5 (2 out of 4) and team3 has a win percentage of 0. For all possible n this is calculat<strong>ed</strong>. An overview is available uponrequest.
98 Kelly GoossensWhen all teams win half of their games or all games end in a tie thereis perfect balance. The standard deviation of the season equals zero sincethe win percentages of all teams are 0,5. Hence the NAMSI will equal zero.If the worst case scenario is present the seasonal standard deviation equalsthe maximal standard deviation and the NAMSI equals 1. So the NAMSIranges between 0 and 1. When comparing two seasons or two countries ahigher NAMSI in<strong>di</strong>cates a higher seasonal imbalance.Besides seasonal imbalance we also ne<strong>ed</strong> a dynamic imbalancemeasure. The standard deviation is a static measure since <strong>it</strong> only looks atone season independently of other seasons. In Europe there can be a closefight for the championship’s t<strong>it</strong>le in one season but over seasons <strong>it</strong> are oftenthe same teams that compete for the first places. We <strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong> the exampleof the Belgian teams RSC Anderlecht and Club Brugge in the previouschapter. To measure the latter, the standard deviation measure 67 is inefficientas the example in Table 2 shows.League1:League2:Table 2: Win percentages of two hypothetical leaguesSeason1 Season2 Season3 Season4 Season5Team1 1 1 1 1 1Team2 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75Team3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5Team4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25Team5 0 0 0 0 0Season1 Season2 Season3 Season4 Season5TeamA 1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0TeamB 0.75 0.5 0.25 0 1TeamC 0.5 0.25 0 1 0.75TeamD 0.25 0 1 0.75 0.5TeamE 0 1 0.75 0.5 0.25In both leagues the standard deviation of every season equals 0,354.So accor<strong>di</strong>ng to this measure, both leagues are equally balanc<strong>ed</strong>. In the firstleague however <strong>it</strong> is obvious that team 1 dominates the compet<strong>it</strong>ion. They____________________67This obviously applies to the NAMSI as well.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 99win every game every season. In the second league team A dominates thecompet<strong>it</strong>ion in season1 but in the next seasons <strong>it</strong> does not do so anymore.The final ranking in the second league is <strong>di</strong>fferent every season while in thefirst there is no variabil<strong>it</strong>y. Hence to include dominance of teams we ne<strong>ed</strong>another measure. 68Number of teams entering the top 3 in 5 consecutive yearsFor the dynamic measure we look at the number of teams that end up in thetop K ranking. The choice of K and the number of years is arb<strong>it</strong>rary. Wechoose the top 3 because in most European countries <strong>it</strong> are two or threeteams that are commonly consider<strong>ed</strong> to be dominant. Taking up more teamsunderrates the dominance since the top 4 and 5 often change.We <strong>di</strong>vide our dataset in periods of 5 years to be able to <strong>di</strong>scussevolutions. We expect spectators to have this timeframe in mind when theyconsider dominance of teams. More research is necessary to validate thisassumption. We present the number of teams w<strong>it</strong>h a rolling or movingaverage. 69 The number of teams ranges between 3 and 15. The minimum isreach<strong>ed</strong> when the compet<strong>it</strong>ion is dominat<strong>ed</strong> by 3 teams and so the samethree teams end up in the three highest places. 70 When 3 <strong>di</strong>fferent teamsenter the top 3 every season we find the maximum of 15. 71Lorenz curves and Gini coefficientsBesides this dominance of top 3 teams we also want a measure to focus onthe champion. We expect that the top 3 teams can be dominat<strong>ed</strong> by the sameteams but that <strong>it</strong> is possible that the champion frequently changes. Theexample of Anderlecht and Club Brugge clarifies this. Anderlecht is expect<strong>ed</strong>to enter the top 3 every year but winning the championship is not certain. Ofthe 42 seasons they end<strong>ed</strong> 35 times in the top 3 and won 18 times. Webelieve that this is also an important factor when dominance of teams is____________________68This is also why the CBR was construct<strong>ed</strong>: the first league has a CBR of zero since the SD wt,iequals zero for all five teams. In the second league every team has a SD wt,iof 0,354, the averageis hence also 0,354 and a CBR of 1 is reach<strong>ed</strong>.69When we use consecutive periods, depen<strong>di</strong>ng on the start season we get <strong>di</strong>fferent significanttrends. When we use a moving average, our results are qu<strong>it</strong>e robust independent of the chosentimeframe.70In Portugal for example in the seasons 1992-1993 untill 1996-1998 only FC Porto, <strong>Sport</strong>ing CPand SL Benfica reach<strong>ed</strong> the top3.71No country reach<strong>ed</strong> this maximum. Eleven teams is the highest in our database. In the seasons90-91untill 94-95 the following 11 English teams reach<strong>ed</strong> a place in the top3: Arsenal, AstonVilla, Blackburn Rovers, Crystal Palace, Le<strong>ed</strong>s Un<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong>, Liverpool, Manchester Un<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong>, NewcastleUn<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong>, Norwich C<strong>it</strong>y, Nottingham Forest and Sheffield W<strong>ed</strong>nesday.
100 Kelly Goossensconsider<strong>ed</strong> and should consequently be look<strong>ed</strong> at as well.We include the Lorenz curves for the championship t<strong>it</strong>le <strong>di</strong>stributionand the subsequent Gini-coefficients over the entire period. This measure isoriginally develop<strong>ed</strong> for income inequal<strong>it</strong>y but can be us<strong>ed</strong> in this context asQuirk & Fort 72 demonstrat<strong>ed</strong>. For European football leagues the calculationis not straightforward. The promotion and relegation schemes shift manyteams over the total period between the two highest leagues of a country.Adaptations to the number of teams w<strong>it</strong>hin countries as well as <strong>di</strong>fferentnumbers between countries obstruct calculations too. Name changes, mergersand <strong>di</strong>sbandment make <strong>it</strong> even more challenging. Szymanski and Kuypers 73us<strong>ed</strong> a simplifi<strong>ed</strong> version in their book to circumvent these problems but ourcontribution lies in a more realistic calculation.All teams that appear<strong>ed</strong> in the highest leagues over the total periodwere research<strong>ed</strong>. If they were present for more than ten years, they weretaken up in our calculations. This assumption is plausible since an overviewof all champions in our countries show<strong>ed</strong> that 12 years was the lowest numberof years a champion was in contest. Very few spectators will account for thepossibil<strong>it</strong>y that a team that ascends infrequently to the highest league couldwin the championship in those years. Hence <strong>di</strong>smissing these teams isacceptable.The number of t<strong>it</strong>les a team won is weight<strong>ed</strong> by the number of yearsthe team was present in the highest league. 74 We believe this is informativesince compet<strong>it</strong>ions w<strong>it</strong>h a team that won 10 t<strong>it</strong>les over 40 years can beconsider<strong>ed</strong> to be <strong>di</strong>fferent from one that won 10 over 20 years.We use the Brown formula 75 to calculate the Gini-coefficient:k−∑1 1 1i=0G= 1 − ( Y i+ + Y i)( Xi +− Xi)(9)____________________72J. QUIRK, R. D. FORT, Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in <strong>Sport</strong>s Leagues, c<strong>it</strong>..73S. SZYMANSKI, T. KUYPERS, Winners and losers, the business strategy of football, HarmondsworthUK, Viking Press, 1999, 408.74J. QUIRK, R. D. FORT, Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in <strong>Sport</strong>s Leagues, c<strong>it</strong>..75M. BROWN, Using Gini-Style In<strong>di</strong>ces to Evaluate the Spatial Patterns of Health Pract<strong>it</strong>ioners,Theoretical considerations and an application bas<strong>ed</strong> on Alberta data, Soc. Science and M<strong>ed</strong>.,vol. 38, n. 9, 1994, 1243-1256. W<strong>it</strong>h Yi = cumulat<strong>ed</strong> proportion of the champions t<strong>it</strong>les wonweight<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h the number of years in the first league; Xi = cumulat<strong>ed</strong> proportion of the numberof teams; k = number of teams.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 1013.2. ResultsWe <strong>di</strong>scuss the results from our calculations separately for each measure.The National Measure of Seasonal ImbalanceThe calculat<strong>ed</strong> NAMSI can be found in Figure 1. 76 Separate graphs arepresent<strong>ed</strong> for in<strong>di</strong>vidual evolution combin<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h a significant trend line. 77Figure 1: NAMSI w<strong>it</strong>h trend for all countries in<strong>di</strong>vidually for seasons 63-64 to 04-05____________________76Sw<strong>ed</strong>en chang<strong>ed</strong> the structure of the highest league football at the start of the season 81-82 tillthe season 90-91. After the regular seasonal play the final rankings were us<strong>ed</strong> to play the Slutspil.This Slutspil consist<strong>ed</strong> of the first eight teams which had to play a Quarter-finale, a Semi-finaland a Final to determine the national champion. For the calculation of the NAMSI we use thefinal tables of the regular Allsvenskan and hence do not include these games. For the top 3however the outcomes of these finals are us<strong>ed</strong>. In the seasons 90-91 and 91-92 the Slutspil wasreplac<strong>ed</strong> by the Meidsterskapserien where the top 8 teams had to play each other and points wereaward<strong>ed</strong>. The points earn<strong>ed</strong> in the first part (the regular seasonal play) were <strong>di</strong>vid<strong>ed</strong> by 2 andadd<strong>ed</strong> to the points earn<strong>ed</strong> in the second part of the Championship. We do not include theseMeidsterskapserien in our calculations. From the season 92-93 on, the structure again resembl<strong>ed</strong>the other European countries.77We test<strong>ed</strong> via OLS estimation which of the following regressions had significant p-values atlevel 5%: namsi=α + βt + µ. ; namsi=α + βt + γt 2 + µ.; namsi=α + βt + γt2 + δt3 + ì; namsi=α + βt+ γt 2 + δt3 + pt 4 + µ. w<strong>it</strong>h t =1 to 42.
102 Kelly Goossens
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 103
104 Kelly Goossens
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 105Germany and France show no significant trend over the entire period.So in these countries over the entire period the playing <strong>di</strong>fferences of theteams in the highest leagues <strong>di</strong>d not change. It is often said in the me<strong>di</strong>a thatthe highly equal <strong>di</strong>stribution of French broadcast rights has equall<strong>ed</strong> thenational domestic compet<strong>it</strong>ion making them weaker to play on Europeanlevel. Our results do not suggest that the spread of win percentages chang<strong>ed</strong>over the entire period.Portugal is the only country that has a significant negative lineartrend which states a increasing balance. Belgium and England <strong>di</strong>splay a verymoderate linear rise in imbalance. So w<strong>it</strong>hin one season the deviation ofwinning percentages between teams has increas<strong>ed</strong> a l<strong>it</strong>tle over the total period.For Belgium we found a significant coefficient of 0.0019, while in Englan<strong>di</strong>t is 0.0016. So even though they are significant at the 5% level, the changeis extremely small.Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sw<strong>ed</strong>en all havea trend best approximat<strong>ed</strong> by a polynomial. The trend of Spain is bestpresent<strong>ed</strong> by a polynomial of the third degree, Italy of the second and theothers show a statistically significant trend of the fourth degree. 78 Greeceand the Netherlands are comparable. Both experienc<strong>ed</strong> an increase w<strong>it</strong>h a____________________78Mostly in empirical research, the trend is lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> for interpretation to a linear trend line butbecause we present a first empirical investigation and interpretation is not our main interest welook at significant polynomials as well. We would like to cooperate w<strong>it</strong>h sports fans/ researchersin all of these countries to verify whether important facts occurr<strong>ed</strong> that could explain theseevolutions. Unfortunately we are not inform<strong>ed</strong> enough of the histories of all these leagues at thismoment.
106 Kelly Goossenspeak at the end of the sixties-early seventies. 79 A decrease sets in as far as themid eighties. Contrary to Greece, the Netherlands do not reach the low levelfrom the beginning of the period. The imbalance then increases again whichsubsides in the last seasons to what appears the beginning of a new decrease.The other three countries show an oppos<strong>it</strong>e evolution also comparable toone another but less <strong>di</strong>stinct in Spain and Sw<strong>ed</strong>en contrary to Denmark. Adecrease sets in till the early seventies; deviation of winning percentagesaugments after this, w<strong>it</strong>h highs in the late eighties. All three countries almostreach their levels of the early sixties. Whether Sw<strong>ed</strong>en and Denmark willcontinue their new increase start<strong>ed</strong> at the beginning of the new century ne<strong>ed</strong>sto be awa<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong>. Italy shows a small narrowing of the spread of winningpercentages in the eighties but <strong>it</strong> increases again to reach a slightly higherdeviation at the latest seasons.We use this data to verify whether <strong>di</strong>stinct groups exist. Clusteringanalysis is an exploratory data analysis tool which <strong>di</strong>vides cases 80 into groupsw<strong>it</strong>hout provi<strong>di</strong>ng an explanation. It looks for structures in the data w<strong>it</strong>htwo objects belonging to one group if their degree of association is maximaland minimal if they present <strong>di</strong>fferent groups. It gives a warning that whengroupings exist, unifi<strong>ed</strong> policy decisions ne<strong>ed</strong> to be evaluat<strong>ed</strong> consideringthese classes.The <strong>di</strong>stances between countries are calculat<strong>ed</strong> by the Squar<strong>ed</strong>Euclidean <strong>di</strong>stance. 81 Independent of the chosen linkage method 82 we findthe same two groups. Since we have only eleven countries and so the numberof cases is lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> the use of hierarchical clustering is justifi<strong>ed</strong>. Th<strong>ed</strong>endrogram helps us to visually <strong>di</strong>stinguish clusters. The inter-cluster <strong>di</strong>stanceis measur<strong>ed</strong> horizontally. Those <strong>di</strong>stances should be small enough to haveclose countries. The dendrogram is present<strong>ed</strong> in Chart 1.____________________79The peak in the seasonal imbalance could be contribut<strong>ed</strong> to the fact that Ajax was superior;they won the Champions Cup three times in the early seventies.80Countries in our case.S281This calculates the shortest <strong>di</strong>stance between two points by the following formula:∑ ( xs−ys)s=1w<strong>it</strong>h x and y the calculations of the measure for each country. Other measures show the sameresults.82There are several possible linkage methods to determine which clusters ne<strong>ed</strong> to be form<strong>ed</strong>.Ward’s method is <strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong> in JR. J. H. WARD, Hierarchical Groupings to Optimize an ObjectiveFunction, J. of the Am. Stat. Ass., vol. 58, n. 301, 1963, 236-244. It ensures that we have thehighest possible homogene<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>hin groups because <strong>it</strong> minimizes the sum of squares of any twohypothetical clusters. So the cluster that increases the sum of squar<strong>ed</strong> <strong>di</strong>stances the least isadd<strong>ed</strong>. This method seems the most appropriate one for our data but the other methods show thesame two resulting groups.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 107Chart 1: Dendrogram NAMSI All countries Wards methodTwo groups can be classifi<strong>ed</strong>. 83Group 1: Belgium, Denmark, France, England, Italy, Germany, Spain and Sw<strong>ed</strong>enGroup 2: Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal.What Figure 1 and the <strong>di</strong>scussion of the trends already pre<strong>di</strong>ct<strong>ed</strong> isvalidat<strong>ed</strong> by the clustering: the 11 chosen European football countries aretoo <strong>di</strong>stinct to form one close group. To determine a ranking of the countriesbas<strong>ed</strong> on the NAMSI we calculate the averages over the total period. Figure2 shows that the averages approximate the groupings from the clustering.Belgium is somewhat in the middle of the two groups. France has the lowestaverage NAMSI closely follow<strong>ed</strong> by the other countries of the same group.Group 2 is the least balanc<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h Portugal as the tail-ender. Completeimbalance is present<strong>ed</strong> by 1 and all countries lie between 0,34 and 0,51 soon average they can not be evaluat<strong>ed</strong> as imbalanc<strong>ed</strong>.____________________83The number of groups chosen is determin<strong>ed</strong> by interpretabil<strong>it</strong>y. Since all linkage methodsshow the same two groups the result is robust. W<strong>it</strong>hin the first group the <strong>di</strong>stinction between twogroups is <strong>di</strong>fferent for <strong>di</strong>fferent linkage methods so we do not include this result.
108 Kelly GoossensFigure 2: Ranking of Average NAMSI for all countries for seasons 63-64 to 2004-2005 frommost balanc<strong>ed</strong> to most unbalanc<strong>ed</strong>Number of teams entering the top 3 in 5 yearsThe results for the number of teams that enter<strong>ed</strong> the top 3 over 5 years arepresent<strong>ed</strong> in Figure 3. We use the presentation of a moving average.Figure 3: Top 3 w<strong>it</strong>h trend for all countries in<strong>di</strong>vidually for seasons 63-64 to 04-05
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 109
110 Kelly Goossens
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 111
112 Kelly GoossensThe evolution in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy and Portugal isbest approximat<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h a linear trend. Belgium and Sw<strong>ed</strong>en have no statisticalsignificant trends so over the total period the number of teams that dominatethe top 3 has not chang<strong>ed</strong>. Sw<strong>ed</strong>en does show a peak in the beginning of theeighties. This is possibly an in<strong>di</strong>cation that the Slutspil increas<strong>ed</strong> the numberof teams in the top 3 and hence increas<strong>ed</strong> championship uncertainty. Denmark,Germany, Italy and Portugal all show a decrease in number of teams whichin<strong>di</strong>cates a worsening in dominance. The size of the decrease is very lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong>for all, we find a time coefficient of -0.028 for Italy, -0.036 for Portugal and-0.053 for both Denmark and Germany.England shows a rather erratic evolution best approximat<strong>ed</strong> by apolynomial of the third degree. A low is present in the mid seventies andsince the beginning of the nineties the number of teams has decreas<strong>ed</strong> qu<strong>it</strong>esubstantially. Perhaps England has been very influenc<strong>ed</strong> by the changingstructures of the Champion league such that the top teams remain<strong>ed</strong> on top.The Netherlands also follow a polynomial trend of the third degree. Theyshow a substantial decrease till the mid of the eighties. Possibly Ajax is herethe cause as well. Later they have extra teams entering the top 3 but do notreach the high of the early sixties. Since the late nineties a new decrease ispresent. The latest relative successes of the Dutch teams in the Championsleague may cause this new decline in balance.France, Greece and Spain have a quadratic trend. The number ofteams decreas<strong>ed</strong> in the French compet<strong>it</strong>ion until the early nineties, since
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 113then an increase has set in. A possible explanation is the relatively equally<strong>di</strong>vid<strong>ed</strong> broadcast rights since the late eighties which makes a better<strong>di</strong>stribution of playing talent possible among the teams. The low of Spain inthe mid eighties is only moderate. The mini peak in the mid nineties issomewhat puzzling. Greece shows an oppos<strong>it</strong>e quadratic trend w<strong>it</strong>h a highin the early eighties. We again do not have enough historical knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge togive an intu<strong>it</strong>ive explanation.The clustering of the eleven countries shows the same robust resultas before. The dendrogram is present<strong>ed</strong> in Chart 2.Chart 2: Dendrogram TOP 3 All countries Wards methodTwo groups can again be separat<strong>ed</strong>. 84Group 1: Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands England, Sw<strong>ed</strong>en, Denmark, Spain, France,GermanyGroup 2: Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands____________________84All possible cluster methods show here the same two groups as well.
114 Kelly GoossensA general ranking bas<strong>ed</strong> on the averages is given in Figure 4. It isobvious that the Netherlands, Greece and Portugal show the highestdominance of teams. They are close to the perfect dominance result of threeteams. They are follow<strong>ed</strong> by Italy, Spain and Belgium. When imbalance inItalian and Spanish football is <strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong>, our data shows that they do <strong>di</strong>fferfrom the other three big 5 countries when the dynamic imbalance of a fewteams is consider<strong>ed</strong>. Denmark is the most balanc<strong>ed</strong> one w<strong>it</strong>h on averagearound 8 teams en<strong>di</strong>ng in the top 3 over 5 years. W<strong>it</strong>h a maximum of 15 anminimum of 3 <strong>it</strong> is obvious that dominance of teams can be possible justifi<strong>ed</strong>subject of concern.Figure 4: Ranking of Average Number of teams entering Top 3 over 5 years for all countries forseasons 63-64 to 04-05 from most balanc<strong>ed</strong> to most unbalanc<strong>ed</strong>Lorenz curves and Gini coefficientsTo draft the Lorenz curves many adaptations are necessary which make <strong>it</strong>very complex. 85 The Lorenz curves are present<strong>ed</strong> in Figure 5. Because of the____________________85An overview of the adaptations can be deliver<strong>ed</strong> upon request. One example is when two teamsmerg<strong>ed</strong> and both were present in the highest league in at least one season we regard the team thatwas present in the season prece<strong>di</strong>ng the merger as the new form<strong>ed</strong> team. The other team isregard<strong>ed</strong> as a separate team that <strong>di</strong>ssolv<strong>ed</strong>. The Dutch teams Elinkwijk and DOS form<strong>ed</strong> FCAmsterdam in the season of 70-71. Both were in the highest league in seasons 65-66 and 66-67.Elinkwijk <strong>di</strong>d not re-enter the highest league. DOS was present in 69-70 and was the reason FCAmsterdam could play in the highest league in 70-71, hence the years DOS was in the highestleague are includ<strong>ed</strong> in the total number of years of FC Amsterdam, as if DOS always was FCAmsterdam. Elinkwijk remains a separate team. The explanation of the changes is morecomplicat<strong>ed</strong> than the actual adaptations so we will not go into <strong>it</strong> any further.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 115<strong>di</strong>fferent number of teams we have not yet found a way to present them all inthe same graph. Germany, Greece and Italy had 23 teams in the highestleague for more than 10 years and are combin<strong>ed</strong>. Belgium and Sw<strong>ed</strong>en had20 teams each. The other countries are present<strong>ed</strong> separately: Denmark w<strong>it</strong>h24 teams, England 34, France 29, the Netherlands 26, Portugal 25, andSpain 27.Figure 5: Lorenz curves for championship winners of all countries for seasons 63-64 to 2004-2005
116 Kelly GoossensBelgium is more concentrat<strong>ed</strong> than Sw<strong>ed</strong>en. Only 8 teams werechampion over the entire period in Belgium, while in Sw<strong>ed</strong>en there were 10teams. Anderlecht won 18 times, Club Brugge 12, Standard 5 and the othersonly once or twice. In Sw<strong>ed</strong>en Malmö won 13 times, IFK Göteborg 9 times,three teams won 4 or 5 times and the rest once or twice. Greece is the least
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 117balanc<strong>ed</strong> compar<strong>ed</strong> to Italy and Germany, Italy is the second in ranking.Greece only had 5 <strong>di</strong>fferent champions w<strong>it</strong>h Olympiakos winning 18 t<strong>it</strong>les,Panathinaikos 13 t<strong>it</strong>les and Athinae won 8. Italy had 12 champions w<strong>it</strong>h 16t<strong>it</strong>les for Juventus, 9 for Milan and 5 for Internazionale. The others wononce or twice. Twelve German champions are found w<strong>it</strong>h Bayern Münchenas top champion of 18 t<strong>it</strong>les. The others won all less than 6 times.Denmark has the most <strong>di</strong>fferent champions: 16. Brondby won 10t<strong>it</strong>les while all others 4 or less. There are 11 English championship winnersw<strong>it</strong>h 13 t<strong>it</strong>les for Liverpool, 10 for Manchester and 6 for Arsenal. All otherswon 3 or less championships. The French have 10 champions w<strong>it</strong>h no <strong>di</strong>stinctdominating teams: 9 for St-Etienne, 8 for Nantes, 7 for Marseille, 5 forMonaco and the others have 5 or fewer t<strong>it</strong>les. The Netherlands are clearlydominat<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h only 5 <strong>di</strong>fferent teams that won the championship: Ajaxwon 19 times, PSV 14, Feyenoord 7 and the others only once. Portugal iseven more concentrat<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h only four <strong>di</strong>fferent champions. SL Benfica has19 t<strong>it</strong>les, FC Porto has 15, <strong>Sport</strong>ing CP 7 and Boavista FC won only once.Finally there are 7 Spanish winners w<strong>it</strong>h Real Madrid as absolute dominantteam: they won 20 t<strong>it</strong>les, the most of all teams in our research. Fc Barcelonawon 9 times and the others 5 or less.We calculate the Gini-coefficients to be able to rank all the countries.Because the number of teams <strong>di</strong>ffers, this representation is bias<strong>ed</strong> but <strong>it</strong>shows the same ranking that could be expect<strong>ed</strong> from the <strong>di</strong>scussion of theFigure 6: Gini coefficients of all countries over total period for seasons 63-64 to 04-05ranging from most balanc<strong>ed</strong> to most unbalanc<strong>ed</strong>
118 Kelly Goossenschampionship t<strong>it</strong>les. Figure 6 shows that Denmark is the most balanc<strong>ed</strong> one,follow<strong>ed</strong> by Sw<strong>ed</strong>en. Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal are the mostdominat<strong>ed</strong> countries. Belgium is in the middle. Of the big 5 Germany is theleast concentrat<strong>ed</strong>, follow<strong>ed</strong> closely by Italy. France is third. England andSpain have more dominant champions than the other big 5 countries.Even w<strong>it</strong>hin the same group of compet<strong>it</strong>ive imbalance, championshipdominance, a good defin<strong>it</strong>ion of the subject is essential. Considering the big5 a <strong>di</strong>fferent picture appears when looking at the champions alone versusthe use of the number of teams entering the top 3. England shows a lowerbalance when champions are consider<strong>ed</strong>. So <strong>it</strong> is often the same team thatwins but the numbers two and three change more frequently. In Italy <strong>it</strong> israther the oppos<strong>it</strong>e: the same teams enter the top 3 but <strong>it</strong> is less certain whowill win. The calculation over a shorter period can be an amelioration of ourresearch to evaluate important changes over time considering the champions.The two groups found by the other two measures are present here. Portugal,Greece and the Netherlands are still most imbalanc<strong>ed</strong> but now less <strong>di</strong>stinctive.4. Conclusions and future researchDifferent interpretations of the concept exist and therefore <strong>it</strong> is important todefine what is understood by the concept. We give attention to three possibleinterpretations of the concept: <strong>di</strong>spersion of winning percentages, dominanceof top 3 teams and dominance of champions. We compare the Europeandomestic football leagues for all three interpretations. Because the numberof teams <strong>di</strong>ffers between countries and over time, an international comparisonof compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance ne<strong>ed</strong>s an adaptation of measures. For a comparisonw<strong>it</strong>hin seasons we compare the actual standard deviation range to the maximalone. This makes sure that we have a measure ranging between 0 and 1 and,more importantly, <strong>it</strong> compares the actual spread of win percentages to theone that occurs when there is perfect imbalance. The latter is the worst casescenario by defin<strong>it</strong>ion of team sports. So we prevent the use of an idealspread. 86 Between seasons we use the number of teams that enter the top 3over 5 years together w<strong>it</strong>h a <strong>di</strong>scussion of the champions over the total timeperiod.The countries <strong>di</strong>ffer not only between each other but depen<strong>di</strong>ng onthe chosen kind of compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance, <strong>di</strong>fferent evolutions are also not<strong>ed</strong>____________________86The concept of ‘ideal’ remains up for <strong>di</strong>scussion and is probably not a good subst<strong>it</strong>ute for an‘optimal’ <strong>di</strong>stribution so that, as <strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong> before, the results can not be interpret<strong>ed</strong> as well asthey should.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 119w<strong>it</strong>hin the European countries. In table 3 we present an overview of thetrends. Be aware that the second column <strong>di</strong>scusses dominance and so whenthe number of teams in the top 3 increases, the dominance decreases.Table 3: Overview of the trends in seasonal and dynamic imbalance measur<strong>ed</strong> by the NAMSIand number of teams entering the top 3 in 5 years for the seasons 1963-1964 to 2004-2005Trend NAMSI 63-04 Trend Dominance 63-04nr teams in top3Belgium small rise (linear) status quoDenmark down till seventies, up till eighties, Small increase (lin)down till begin new century(poly trend 4d)England small rise (lin) End eigthies a small peak, sincemid nineties increase (3d)France status quo Increase till begin nineties andthen decrease (2d)Germany status quo Small increase (lin)Greece up till seventies, down till eighties, low in early eighties (2d)up till begin new century (4d)Italy decrease till eighties, then increase (2d) Small decrease (lin)Netherlands up till seventies, down till eighties, Increase till begin eighties,up till begin new century (4d)decrease untill end nineties andthen increase again (3d)Portugal Decline (lin) Increase (lin)Spain down till seventies, up till eighties and More dominance in midthen back up (3d)eighties (2d)Sw<strong>ed</strong>en down till seventies, up till eighties, status quodown till begin new century (4d)The table shows that <strong>it</strong> is essential to clearly define which kind ofbalance is referr<strong>ed</strong> to because the measures show <strong>di</strong>fferent evolutions an<strong>di</strong>nterventions can be expect<strong>ed</strong> to influence them <strong>di</strong>stinctly. Portugal showseven opposing evolutions for the two measures, in<strong>di</strong>cat<strong>ed</strong> by <strong>it</strong>alic. W<strong>it</strong>hinseasons Portugal has known a better spread but between seasons th<strong>ed</strong>ominance of the top 3 has increas<strong>ed</strong> so that we can conclude that the threetop teams: Benfica, Porto and <strong>Sport</strong>ing are <strong>di</strong>fficult opponents to beat but
120 Kelly Goossensthat between the other teams a more equal <strong>di</strong>stribution of talent is present.The Netherlands also show an opposing evolution after the success onEuropean level in the seventies: w<strong>it</strong>hin seasons the spread decreas<strong>ed</strong> but thetop teams became more dominant. From the early eighties more teams reach<strong>ed</strong>the top 3 but the lower rank<strong>ed</strong> teams had more <strong>di</strong>fficulties to face the betterteams. Greece is the only country that has an equal evolution for bothmeasures for a part of the dataset, in<strong>di</strong>cat<strong>ed</strong> in the table in bold. It had theclosest compet<strong>it</strong>ion w<strong>it</strong>hin seasons in the seventies and eighties w<strong>it</strong>h also ahigher number of teams entering the top 3. If we look at the number ofpoints: 87 the best and worst team only had a <strong>di</strong>fference of 28 points at theend of the season, while before and after these decades <strong>it</strong> was on average 43points. 88 At the same time roughly 6 teams instead of 4 on average enter<strong>ed</strong>the top 3. The Champions league increas<strong>ed</strong> the revenues for their participantsin the nineties which cause higher budget gaps between teams in the nationalcompet<strong>it</strong>ion. This might be the major reason of the decrease in balance inGreece. Knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge of the histories of the <strong>di</strong>fferent European leagues cangive meaningful insights into possible reasons of changes but for now welack the knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge.In some cases the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance <strong>di</strong>d not change significantlyover the last four decades. This is the case for the French and Germancompet<strong>it</strong>ive balance w<strong>it</strong>hin seasons . In Belgium and England only a smallsignificant increase was found. When dominance in top 3 is consider<strong>ed</strong>Sw<strong>ed</strong>en <strong>di</strong>d not experience a significant change. If we compare the begins<strong>it</strong>uation in the early sixties to the latest seasons we often find only small<strong>di</strong>fferences, even if in between some peaks and lows are found. The one thatdoes attract attention is England where a large decrease in number of teamsin the top 3 is found. They start<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h on average 8 teams and end up in thelast season w<strong>it</strong>h only 4 teams. Again we expect that the influence of theChampions League might be a major reason for this because the major declinestart<strong>ed</strong> at the same time the Champions League was introduc<strong>ed</strong>. 89We expect spectators to react <strong>di</strong>fferently to changes in theseimbalances. We would like to test to which imbalance spectators are themost sens<strong>it</strong>ive and how for example TV revenue sharing schemes or theChampions league affect the levels.Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands have some catching up to do____________________87Using points or win percentages is equivalent, see the <strong>di</strong>scussion above.88Roughly the best teams had 49 points on average and worst 19 against 57 as best and 14 asworst team. This is bas<strong>ed</strong> on calculations w<strong>it</strong>h 2 points for a win and 1 for a draw.89The European Cup chang<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>s name in 1990-1991 to Champions League and became highlycommercial w<strong>it</strong>h huge revenues to <strong>di</strong>vide.
Compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance in European football 121if a more similar level to the other European countries is an objective. Theyconst<strong>it</strong>ute a <strong>di</strong>fferent group from the other countries and are the least balanc<strong>ed</strong>for all three measures. When the ‘big5’ demand national or internationalbo<strong>di</strong>es for unifi<strong>ed</strong> interventions for all European football leagues an evaluationw<strong>it</strong>h caution is now shown to be essential. European football leagues do notevolve equally and have not the same levels. Our results point into the<strong>di</strong>rection that every country should be look<strong>ed</strong> at separately rather thantogether when compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance is consider<strong>ed</strong> and that national policiesinclu<strong>di</strong>ng the country-specific characteristiques should receive prior<strong>it</strong>y tointernational policies.A next conclusion involves the sizes of imbalance. We find that w<strong>it</strong>hina season there is no ne<strong>ed</strong> to worry. The teams have win percentages ratherclose to the average of 0,5. The Namsi-averages range between 0,342 and0,505. So all countries are closer to perfect seasonal balance than to perfectimbalance. 90 For the dominance of top 3 teams however, the averages rangefrom 4,66 to 8,34. Perfect dominance would mean 3 teams in the top 3while perfect balance is attain<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h 15 teams. The results are now closerto perfect dominance, in<strong>di</strong>cating that the <strong>di</strong>scussions in the me<strong>di</strong>a might bejustifi<strong>ed</strong>. However we do not see any drastic evolutions in them, exceptmaybe for England, and the imbalance should not be exaggerat<strong>ed</strong> sincecomparable dominance is present for at least four decades.Last we want to focus on what the <strong>di</strong>scussion of the championshipt<strong>it</strong>les shows: all countries have dominant champions. A creation of a Europeanleague, 91 which has receiv<strong>ed</strong> some me<strong>di</strong>a attention, might be a possiblesolution to decrease the dominance. Research of these dominant teams cangive some in<strong>di</strong>cation whether a league between those teams would not betoo imbalanc<strong>ed</strong>. Our results do not make this comparison possible. The endrankings of the Champions League can be helpful but because teams alsoplay nationally we can expect that the results of a real European league will<strong>di</strong>ffer. But to decrease the dominance of champions, all dominant teamsshould enter the European League. If we look at teams that have won 5t<strong>it</strong>les or more, as summariz<strong>ed</strong> in table 4, our countries should have 3participants each except France w<strong>it</strong>h 4 teams, Germany w<strong>it</strong>h 2 and Denmarkw<strong>it</strong>h only 1. We can expect that a large country such as Germany mightoppose to such a compos<strong>it</strong>ion. The idea however renders an interestingsubject for future research.____________________90Perfect balance: Namsi=0, Perfect imbalance: Namsi=1.91This is a league in which all the dominant European teams would play each other and no longerplay national. The use of promotion and relegation could be possible.
122 Kelly GoossensTable 4: Teams that have won 5 t<strong>it</strong>les or more over the period 1964-2003.Country Team T<strong>it</strong>lesBelgium Brugge 12RSCA 18Standard 5Denmark Brøndby IF 10England Arsenal 6Liverpool 13Manchester Un<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> 10France Marseille 7Monaco 5Nantes 8St Etienne 9Germany Bayern München 18Borussia Mönchengladbach 5Greece AEK Athinai 8Olympiakos Piraeus 18Panathinaikos 13Italy Internazionale 5Juventus 16Milan 9The Netherlands Ajax 19feyenoord 7PSV 14Portugal FC Porto 15SL Benfica 19<strong>Sport</strong>ing CP 7Spain Atlético de Madrid 5FC Barcelona 9Real Madrid 20Sw<strong>ed</strong>en Djurgårdens 5IFKGöteborg 9Malmö 13
RIVISTA DI ISSN 1825-6678DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA DELLO SPORT Vol. II, Fasc. 2, 2006RECENSIONEUMBERTO LAGO, ALESSANDRO BARONCELLI, STEFAN SZYMANSKI (a cura<strong>di</strong>), IL BUSINESS DEL CALCIO, SUCCESSI SPORTIVI E ROVESCIFINANZIARI, Egea, Milano, 2004.<strong>di</strong> Raul Caruso*Obiettivo del volume curato da Umberto Lago, Alessandro Baroncelli eStefan Szymanski, è quello <strong>di</strong> presentare un’analisi articolata delle nuoveproblematiche legate agli aspetti economici dell’industria ‘calcio’evidenziandone, in particolare le evoluzioni occorse negli ultimi anni. Prima<strong>di</strong> esaminare nel dettaglio la struttura del volume è bene offrire una semplicee imme<strong>di</strong>ata valutazione. Il volume, grazie alla sua ricchezza <strong>di</strong> contenuti ealla sua chiarezza espos<strong>it</strong>iva, nonostante alcuni punti <strong>di</strong> debolezza, mer<strong>it</strong>a <strong>di</strong>essere letto da addetti ai lavori, stu<strong>di</strong>osi – economisti e non – del fenomeno‘calcio’ e probabilmente da semplici interessati all’approfon<strong>di</strong>mento <strong>di</strong> unadelle tematiche più interessanti e <strong>di</strong>battute in questi ultimi anni.L’opera è idealmente sud<strong>di</strong>visa in tre sezioni. In una prima sezione(capp. 1-5) sono presentati i caratteri <strong>di</strong>stintivi dell’industria calcio el’evoluzione sviluppatasi in questi ultimi anni. In una seconda sezione (capp.6-10) sono esaminati nel dettaglio i fattori più importanti per ladeterminazione <strong>di</strong> una strategia compet<strong>it</strong>iva da parte delle società calcistichee, in particolare, la relazione tra variabili economiche e performance sportive.In una sezione conclusiva (capp. 11-12) è affrontato il fondamentale temadell’equilibrio compet<strong>it</strong>ivo e, in particolare, nell’ultimo cap<strong>it</strong>olo sonopresentate alcune possibili soluzioni agli attuali problemi dell’industria calcioin Italia.Nei primi due cap<strong>it</strong>oli (a firma <strong>di</strong> Alessandro Baroncelli) l’autor<strong>ed</strong>elinea il quadro ambientale <strong>di</strong> riferimento. Questi cap<strong>it</strong>oli, pertanto,cost<strong>it</strong>uiscono la base ideale per il prosieguo della lettura del volume. Nel____________________*Ist<strong>it</strong>uto <strong>di</strong> Pol<strong>it</strong>ica Economica, Univers<strong>it</strong>à Cattolica del Sacro Cuore <strong>di</strong> Milano,raul.caruso@unicatt.<strong>it</strong>.
124 Raul Carusoprimo cap<strong>it</strong>olo, in particolare, l’autore presenta e illustra alcuni dati economiciche forniscono una misura del fenomeno, ma soprattutto mostrano icambiamenti e le evoluzioni degli ultimi anni. È evidenziato l’impattodell’ingresso dei gran<strong>di</strong> gruppi industriali e dell’industria televisiva sui ricavidell’industria ‘calcio’. Guardando con attenzione ai dati forn<strong>it</strong>i appare chiaroil sorprendente cambiamento verificatosi in pochi anni. Il tutto è riassumibilenell’espressione utilizzata quale t<strong>it</strong>olo per uno dei paragrafi: ‘da gioco abusiness’. Nel prosieguo del cap<strong>it</strong>olo, l’autore offre alcuni aspetti che eglidefinisce ‘strutturali’ e che attengono al sistema <strong>di</strong> ruoli fondamentali <strong>dello</strong>sport professionistico caratterizzato dalla presenza <strong>di</strong> una plural<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> attoriche contribuiscono alla creazione del prodotto calcio. La <strong>di</strong>scussione in mer<strong>it</strong>oad alcune peculiar<strong>it</strong>à del settore ‘calcio’ serve ad aprire la strada allaproblematica che sottende all’intero lavoro: il rapporto tra successoeconomico e successo sportivo.Se, nel primo cap<strong>it</strong>olo, Baroncelli ha presentato la caratteristicheprincipali <strong>di</strong> un sistema fornendone anche una ‘misura’, nel secondo cap<strong>it</strong>oloint<strong>it</strong>olato ‘le regole del gioco’, l’autore descrive il complesso quadronormativo che regolamenta il settore caratterizzato dal sovrapporsi <strong>ed</strong>ell’interazione <strong>di</strong> norme e regolamenti nazionali e internazionali conparticolare riferimento alla sentenza Bosman, ai regolamenti internazionalidella FIFA e al loro impatto sugli aspetti economici della gestione dellesquadre <strong>di</strong> calcio professionistico. È evidenziato come il potere contrattual<strong>ed</strong>ei singoli atleti sia mutato ra<strong>di</strong>calmente rispetto al passato, ma è anch<strong>ed</strong>escr<strong>it</strong>to l’impatto sub<strong>it</strong>o dai settore giovanili.Il terzo cap<strong>it</strong>olo (a firma <strong>di</strong> Alessandro Baroncelli e Umberto Lago)è uno dei più importanti dell’intero volume. Esso è incentrato sulla <strong>di</strong>saminaeconomico-finanziaria delle società calcistiche. Sono analizzate in dettagliole componenti pos<strong>it</strong>ive <strong>di</strong> r<strong>ed</strong><strong>di</strong>to <strong>di</strong> una società calcistiche, vale a <strong>di</strong>re: (1) latra<strong>di</strong>zionale ven<strong>di</strong>ta <strong>di</strong> biglietti e abbonamenti; (2) i prof<strong>it</strong>ti derivanti dallagestione <strong>di</strong>retta degli sta<strong>di</strong>. A questo propos<strong>it</strong>o, è c<strong>it</strong>ato quale esempiovirtuoso quello del campionato inglese in cui le società <strong>di</strong> calcio sono ancheproprietarie degli sta<strong>di</strong>. La s<strong>it</strong>uazione <strong>it</strong>aliana si presenta con la sua consuetaambigu<strong>it</strong>à. È <strong>di</strong>fficile comprendere se le società calcistiche si comportino dafree-rider nei confronti degli enti locali che generalmente sono proprietari<strong>ed</strong>elle strutture sportive oppure soffrano questo tipo <strong>di</strong> s<strong>it</strong>uazione; (3) ilmerchan<strong>di</strong>sing; (4) la sponsorizzazioni; (5) la cessione dei <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti televisiviche in questo momento rappresentano la componente pos<strong>it</strong>iva <strong>di</strong> r<strong>ed</strong><strong>di</strong>to piùimportante; (6) il ricorso al mercato azionario per le società che hanno deciso<strong>di</strong> quotarsi in borsa. Nel prosieguo del cap<strong>it</strong>olo, l’analisi
Il business del calcio, successi sportivi e rovesci finanziari 125si sposta sulle componenti negative <strong>di</strong> r<strong>ed</strong><strong>di</strong>to tra le quali spicca chiaramenteil peso degli ingaggi da corrispondere ai calciatori professionisti. Inparticolare, si affronta quello che nella tra<strong>di</strong>zionale economia <strong>dello</strong> sport sidefinisce ‘effetto superstar’. Secondo questa impostazione, la domanda <strong>di</strong>sport da parte del pubblico sarebbe maggiore in presenza <strong>di</strong> atleti dotati <strong>di</strong>particolari abil<strong>it</strong>à, vale a <strong>di</strong>re la ‘superstar’. I guadagni <strong>di</strong> alcuni giocatori,pertanto, sarebbero giustificati da queste particolari preferenze deiconsumatori.Considerata la sua importanza relativa, il tema della determinazion<strong>ed</strong>el salario <strong>di</strong> un calciatore professionista è l’oggetto del cap<strong>it</strong>olo successivo(a firma <strong>di</strong> Giambattista Rossi e Umberto Lago). Una volta analizzati neldettaglio – la trattazione è tra le più approfon<strong>di</strong>te e brillanti del volume –gli attuali processi <strong>di</strong> determinazione dell’ingaggio, gli autori propongono<strong>di</strong> introdurre forme contrattuali in cui il valore dell’ingaggio sia legato allaperformance sportiva. Questa proposta appare giustificabile se si consideral’esigenza <strong>di</strong> ridurre i costi <strong>di</strong> gestione. D’altro canto, essa lo è anche invirtù del fatto che un meccanismo <strong>di</strong> incentivi dovrebbe essere in grado <strong>di</strong>selezionare con maggiore efficacia i talenti migliori, dovrebbe ev<strong>it</strong>are icomportamenti da free-rider, contribuendo in ultima analisi a una miglioreperformance sportiva. Questi sistemi non sarebbero comunque immuni da<strong>di</strong>fetti che sono puntualmente evidenziati dagli autori. Se una piccola cr<strong>it</strong>icadeve essere mossa agli autori è quella <strong>di</strong> non aver considerato adeguatamenteil fatto che attualmente il mercato europeo delle prestazioni sportive deicalciatori è sostanzialmente un mercato unico, libero e aperto. In terminieconomici, l’effetto previsto dovrebbe essere quello <strong>di</strong> una sostanzialeconvergenza delle retribuzioni contrattuali dei calciatori nei <strong>di</strong>versi paesi. Inparole più semplici, l’ingaggio <strong>di</strong> un calciatore <strong>di</strong> eccellenti abil<strong>it</strong>à, dovrebbecostare più o meno lo stesso nei <strong>di</strong>versi campionati. Le società – se cr<strong>ed</strong>onoall’effetto ‘superstar’ – saranno costrette a pagare ingaggi più alti ai miglior<strong>it</strong>alenti <strong>it</strong>aliani e/o stranieri.Il quinto cap<strong>it</strong>olo (a firma <strong>di</strong> Roger Penn) riprende una delle tematichepresentate nel cap<strong>it</strong>olo terzo vale a <strong>di</strong>re la gestione degli sta<strong>di</strong> e, quin<strong>di</strong>, sipropone <strong>di</strong> analizzare la relazione tra sviluppo locale e investimento instrutture e attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportive. L’autore descrive l’esperienza del calcio ingleseconcentrandosi principalmente sulla funzione degli sta<strong>di</strong> quali ‘no<strong>di</strong>’ <strong>di</strong> piùampie reti <strong>di</strong> business. L’Old Trafford a Manchester e il Reebok Sta<strong>di</strong>um aBolton, sono c<strong>it</strong>ati quali esempi <strong>di</strong> sta<strong>di</strong> che assolvono a tale funzioneintrecciandosi a una pletora <strong>di</strong> business commerciali e culturali.Sfortunatamente, quantunque l’argomento oggetto del cap<strong>it</strong>olo sia <strong>di</strong> grande
126 Raul Carusointeresse, la trattazione è fragile e debole nei contenuti. Il parallelismo conla teoria dei <strong>di</strong>stretti industriali potenzialmente foriera <strong>di</strong> gran<strong>di</strong> interrogativi,è solamente accennata contribuendo poco all’approfon<strong>di</strong>mento del tema.Il sesto cap<strong>it</strong>olo (a firma <strong>di</strong> Stefan Szymanski) introduce la secondaparte del volume. Esso affronta la relazione tra posizione compet<strong>it</strong>iva eposizione r<strong>ed</strong><strong>di</strong>tuale. La domanda che si pone l’autore è in sintesi: maggioristipen<strong>di</strong> per i calciatori portano a un maggiore successo sportivo? In altreparole, un maggiore investimento in talento conduce a una miglioreperformance sportiva? La domanda non è peregrina dato che il monte stipen<strong>di</strong>,come evidenziato nel cap<strong>it</strong>olo terzo, rappresenta per una società <strong>di</strong> calcio laprincipale componente negativa <strong>di</strong> r<strong>ed</strong><strong>di</strong>to. Uno dei presupposti da tenereben presente analizzando questa relazione economica è cost<strong>it</strong>u<strong>it</strong>o dal fattoche nel mondo del calcio – ma più in generale nel mondo <strong>dello</strong> sport – a<strong>di</strong>fferenza <strong>di</strong> un normale mercato del lavoro, il talento è accuratamenteosservabile. 1 Pertanto, le società che si apprestano a effettuare rilevantiesborsi monetari per l’acquisizione del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to alle prestazioni sportive <strong>di</strong> uncalciatore dovrebbero essere perfettamente informate della corrispondenzatra prezzo pagato e talento acquis<strong>it</strong>o. L’analisi condotta da Szymanski<strong>di</strong>mostra che, in linea generale, maggiori stipen<strong>di</strong> portano a un maggioresuccesso sportivo e che un maggiore successo sportivo porta a maggioriricavi. Questo, comunque, rimane un risultato ancora non sod<strong>di</strong>sfacente sesi considera che le potenzial<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> una squadra <strong>di</strong>pendono anche da altrifattori, tra cui non ultimo, il bacino <strong>di</strong> utenza, approssimabile dalle <strong>di</strong>mensionidella c<strong>it</strong>tà in cui la squadra si trova.Tale fattore <strong>di</strong> vantaggio compet<strong>it</strong>ivo per le squadre <strong>di</strong> serie A rientranella più ampia <strong>di</strong>scussione presentata nel cap<strong>it</strong>olo settimo (a firma <strong>di</strong>Umberto Lago) e nel cap<strong>it</strong>olo ottavo (a firma <strong>di</strong> Umberto Lago e Manfre<strong>di</strong>Palmeri) in mer<strong>it</strong>o alla strategia compet<strong>it</strong>iva nel settore calcio. Il cap<strong>it</strong>olosettimo, in primo luogo, delinea con precisione le fonti del vantaggiocompet<strong>it</strong>ivo <strong>di</strong> una società calcistica. Particolare attenzione è rivolta alla<strong>di</strong>fferenza tra ‘piccole’ e ‘gran<strong>di</strong>’ squadre. In particolare, uno degli elementiche sono da tenere in considerazione è la ‘grandezza’ delle squadrepartecipanti alla lega. Chiaramente uno dei no<strong>di</strong> principali è il profondo gapin termini <strong>di</strong> risorse finanziarie. L’autore sottolinea la necess<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>fferentifilosofie <strong>di</strong> gestione, basandosi sul presupposto che il circolo virtuoso <strong>di</strong>____________________1Il tema dell’informazione nelle organizzazioni sportive è stato affrontato con particolareriferimento al mondo del ciclismo su questa rivista da D. TONDANI, I Ranking Internazionalicome rime<strong>di</strong>o alle asimmetrie informative negli sport in<strong>di</strong>viduali: il caso del ciclismoprofessionistico, vol. 1, n. 2, 93-117, 2005, <strong>di</strong>sponibile all’in<strong>di</strong>rizzo www.rdes.<strong>it</strong>/riv2_tondani.pdf.
Il business del calcio, successi sportivi e rovesci finanziari 127una squadra provinciale si basa essenzialmente sull’abil<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> selezionaregiovani talenti, per poi beneficiare <strong>di</strong> eventuali plusvalenze al momento dellacessione ai gran<strong>di</strong> ‘club’ dei <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti delle loro prestazioni sportive. La capac<strong>it</strong>à<strong>di</strong> generare ricavi è strettamente legata a questa abil<strong>it</strong>à laddove per i ‘gran<strong>di</strong>’club gli obiettivi in termini <strong>di</strong> r<strong>ed</strong><strong>di</strong>to sono maggiormente interconnessi conil conseguimento <strong>di</strong> successi sportivi. L’analisi del settimo cap<strong>it</strong>olo si completain quello successivo nel momento in cui gli autori presentano in manieradettagliata il ‘vantaggio <strong>di</strong> localizzazione’ quale fonte <strong>di</strong> vantaggiocompet<strong>it</strong>ivo. Secondo questa impostazione, la squadra <strong>di</strong> una grande c<strong>it</strong>tàsarà sempre più avvantaggiata rispetto alle squadra <strong>di</strong> c<strong>it</strong>tà più piccola. Lalocalizzazione rappresenterebbe una fonte ‘naturale’ <strong>di</strong> vantaggiocompet<strong>it</strong>ivo. Dall’analisi dei dati presentati, emerge comunque il fatto cheesiste una <strong>di</strong>fferenza tra squadra del Nord e del Sud. Basti pensare al caso <strong>di</strong>c<strong>it</strong>tà quali Napoli, Bari, e Palermo: c<strong>it</strong>tà <strong>di</strong> gran<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>mensioni che vivonoalterne fortune dal punto <strong>di</strong> vista sportivo. È forse abbastanza per sollevareil dubbio che, un<strong>it</strong>amente alla localizzazione geografica e quin<strong>di</strong> al potenzialebacino d’utenza, siano anche altri fattori a influenzare le potenziali fonti <strong>di</strong>vantaggio compet<strong>it</strong>ivo.Nel contempo, se una cr<strong>it</strong>ica può essere mossa agli autori del cap<strong>it</strong>oloè esattamente questa. Il calcio, paradossalmente, a <strong>di</strong>fferenza <strong>di</strong> altri settoridella v<strong>it</strong>a economica, ha reso manifesto un fenomeno comune ad altri settorieconomici: lo strutturarsi e il consolidarsi <strong>di</strong> circoli viziosi che hanno favor<strong>it</strong>ofenomeni <strong>di</strong> concentrazione e polarizzazione a favore delle gran<strong>di</strong> squadr<strong>ed</strong>el nord. Quantunque le risorse intangibili (innovazione, reputazione,struttura organizzativa) analizzate brevemente nel prosieguo del cap<strong>it</strong>olo ein<strong>di</strong>cate quali ulteriori fonti <strong>di</strong> vantaggio compet<strong>it</strong>ivo contribuiscano in partea chiarire la genesi <strong>di</strong> questo fenomeno, questo mer<strong>it</strong>erebbe una maggiore epiù profonda attenzione. Tra le risorse intangibili c<strong>it</strong>ate, la ‘reputazione’cost<strong>it</strong>uisce l’oggetto del nono cap<strong>it</strong>olo (a firma <strong>di</strong> Manfre<strong>di</strong> Palmeri) cheforse rappresenta la sezione più fragile <strong>di</strong> tutto il volume. L’autore si propone<strong>di</strong> analizzare il valore della reputazione e del marchio <strong>di</strong> una società sportivacon particolare riferimento al caso della Juventus. Se da un lato, gli scandaliemersi negli ultimi mesi gettano una nuova luce sul caso specifico, latrattazione è comunque banale e <strong>di</strong> spessore decisamente trascurabile.Nel cap<strong>it</strong>olo successivo (a firma <strong>di</strong> Alessandro Baroncelli) vieneriportato e <strong>di</strong>scusso il mo<strong>dello</strong> organizzativo del Parma Calcio nella gestion<strong>ed</strong>el settore giovanile. A <strong>di</strong>spetto del crac finanziario <strong>di</strong> cui si è resoprotagonista il gruppo Parmalat, il mo<strong>dello</strong> organizzativo del Parma Calciorappresenta ancora adesso un unicum nel calcio <strong>it</strong>aliano. In particolare,
128 Raul Carusol’autore descrive i tratti caratteristici della ‘rete’ organizzata dal Parma Calcio.In seno a questa rete, il Parma Calcio cost<strong>it</strong>uiva l’impresa guida all’interno<strong>di</strong> una serie <strong>di</strong> relazioni governate da appos<strong>it</strong>i incentivi. L’autore evidenziache la rete del Parma Calcio, così come strutturata ha raggiunto gli obiettiviconseguendo risultati sorprendenti. Questa analisi è <strong>di</strong> particolare interessein virtù <strong>di</strong> due considerazioni: (a) in primo luogo, nel cap<strong>it</strong>olo sesto UmbertoLago aveva specificato che le società calcistiche <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>mensioni e risorsefinanziarie ridotte dovevano necessariamente avere come riferimento uncircolo virtuoso in cui la valorizzazione <strong>di</strong> giovani talenti assumesse un ruoloprimario; (b) in secondo luogo, la sentenza Bosman e il regolamento FIFAhanno mo<strong>di</strong>ficato la struttura del mercato del talento sportivo nel mondodel calcio e pertanto impongono una più accurata gestione <strong>di</strong> settori giovanilisia nazionali sia extranazionali.Gli ultimi due cap<strong>it</strong>oli del volume, se il lettore consente questaespressione, ‘chiudono il cerchio’. Nel penultimo cap<strong>it</strong>olo, Stefan Szymanskipresenta un’analisi dell’equilibrio compet<strong>it</strong>ivo del campionato <strong>it</strong>aliano <strong>di</strong>calcio, mentre nell’ultimo cap<strong>it</strong>olo Alessandro Baroncelli in<strong>di</strong>ca alcunesoluzioni possibili alle attuali problematiche <strong>di</strong> natura economica-finanziariache scuotono il pianeta calcio.Il concetto <strong>di</strong> equilibrio compet<strong>it</strong>ivo cost<strong>it</strong>uisce la principalepreoccupazione degli economisti che si occupano <strong>di</strong> sport <strong>ed</strong> è stato soventel’oggetto <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>versi contributi apparsi su questa rivista. 2 Il concetto <strong>di</strong>equilibro compet<strong>it</strong>ivo è chiaramente e <strong>di</strong>rettamente legato a quellodell’incertezza del risultato che rappresenta uno dei principali motivi <strong>di</strong>interesse del pubblico rispetto al mondo <strong>dello</strong> sport. Quantunque per anni inItalia si sia ignorata questa semplice regola dettata dall’evidenza empirica ean<strong>ed</strong>dotica, è ragionevole assumere che quanto più è bilanciato un campionatoo un singolo incontro tanto più è elevato l’interesse che esso susc<strong>it</strong>a neifru<strong>it</strong>ori del prodotto ‘calcio’. Esso cost<strong>it</strong>uisce, pertanto, il necessario punto<strong>di</strong> riferimento teorico per qualsivoglia <strong>di</strong>batt<strong>it</strong>o in mer<strong>it</strong>o all’organizzazione<strong>di</strong> campionati e <strong>di</strong>stribuzione delle risorse. Il principale interesse della____________________2L’equilibrio compet<strong>it</strong>ivo è stato uno dei principali interessi della <strong>Rivista</strong> <strong>di</strong> <strong>Dir<strong>it</strong>to</strong> <strong>ed</strong> <strong>Economia</strong><strong>dello</strong> <strong>Sport</strong>. Sia per la definizione teorica sia per <strong>di</strong>fferenti stime empiriche si v<strong>ed</strong>ano in particolareL. GROOT, De-commercializzare il calcio europeo e salvaguardarne l’equilibrio compet<strong>it</strong>ivo:una proposta welfarista, vol. 1, n. 2, 2005, 63-91; R. CARUSO, Asimmetrie negli incentivi, equilibriocompet<strong>it</strong>ivo e impegno agonistico: <strong>di</strong>storsioni in presenza <strong>di</strong> doping e combine, vol. 1, n.3,2005, 13-38.; K. GOOSENS, Compet<strong>it</strong>ive Balance in European Football: Comparison by adpatingmeasures. National Measures of Seasonal Imbalances and Top 3, (questo numero); F. HALICIOGLU,The impacts of Football Point Systems on the compet<strong>it</strong>ive balance: evidence from some europeanfootball leagues, (questo numero). Tutti gli articoli c<strong>it</strong>ati sono <strong>di</strong>sponibili alla pagina www.rdes.<strong>it</strong>/rivistaonline.htm.
Il business del calcio, successi sportivi e rovesci finanziari 129economia <strong>dello</strong> sport, infatti, è valutare in che termini <strong>di</strong>fferenti ‘regole-delgioco’influiscano sull’equilibrio compet<strong>it</strong>ivo e sull’impegno agonistico degliatleti. È opinione <strong>di</strong> chi scrive, comunque, che in Italia negli ultimi anni nonsia stata attribu<strong>it</strong>a alcuna importanza a questo aspetto e si impone, pertanto,una urgente riflessione in mer<strong>it</strong>o. Questa appare tanto più necessaria nelmomento in cui la forbice nella dotazione 3 <strong>di</strong> risorse tra squadre gran<strong>di</strong> epiccole sembra ulteriormente ampliarsi.Nell’ultimo cap<strong>it</strong>olo, Alessandro Baroncelli ripresenta alcuni tra ipunti più cr<strong>it</strong>ici del volume al fine <strong>di</strong> proporre alcune soluzioni che siano ingrado <strong>di</strong> assicurare un adeguato sviluppo economico-finanziario e, nelcontempo, un’adeguata performance sportiva. La ‘ricetta’ Baroncelli èriassumibile in alcuni punti principali: (1) contenere il costo <strong>di</strong> salari e stipen<strong>di</strong>.Le analisi dei cap<strong>it</strong>oli prec<strong>ed</strong>enti hanno mostrato, infatti, che gli stipen<strong>di</strong> deicalciatori cost<strong>it</strong>uiscono la principale componente negativa <strong>di</strong> r<strong>ed</strong><strong>di</strong>to; (2)controllare in toto le infrastrutture fondamentali per la gestione sportiva,vale a <strong>di</strong>re gli impianti sportivi e in particolare lo sta<strong>di</strong>o. Questa soluzione sipresenta maggiormente necessaria nel momento in cui una società calcisticasia quotata in borsa; (3) implementare strategie <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>versificazione offrendoprodotti e/o servizi complementari allo spettacolo sportivo; (4) gestire inmaniera efficiente la formazione e la selezione <strong>di</strong> nuovi talenti e <strong>di</strong> nuovicalciatori attraverso nuovi modelli organizzativi <strong>di</strong> tipo reticolare; (5)creazione e sfruttamento <strong>di</strong> una ‘marca’, vale a <strong>di</strong>re stu<strong>di</strong>are formule checonsentano <strong>di</strong> beneficiare in termini commerciali della popolar<strong>it</strong>à delle societàcalcistiche; (6) espansione delle fonti <strong>di</strong> ricavo attraverso nuovi business, inparticolare, legati alle nuove tecnologie della comunicazione.Nel concludere queste brevi note, è bene riba<strong>di</strong>re che il volume inquestione, pur sussistendo alcuni punti fragili, mer<strong>it</strong>a un plauso per lacompletezza e l’impostazione con la quale tratta l’argomento. Si consentaun’ultima riflessione. Le analisi economiche del mondo del calcio, e in genere,quelle relative al mondo <strong>dello</strong> sport, hanno una portata maggiore <strong>di</strong> quellocomunemente immaginato. Lo sport, infatti, ha anticipato molti dei fenomeniche attualmente si attribuiscono alla cosiddetta globalizzazione dell’economia.Analisi accurate dei settori sportivi come quella presentata in questo volumecontribuiscono, pertanto, a una riflessione più ampia su nuove tendenze cheinvestono anche i cosiddetti mercati ‘tra<strong>di</strong>zionali’.____________________3Si v<strong>ed</strong>a ad esempio la proposta <strong>di</strong> riforma del campionato formulata da Raul Caruso e NicolaGiocoli, CARUSO R., GIOCOLI N., (2006), Nuove regole del gioco, pubblicata il 27 Luglio 2006 suls<strong>it</strong>o www.lavoce.info.
GIURISPRUDENZA COMUNITARIA________________________________
RIVISTA DI ISSN 1825-6678DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA DELLO SPORT Vol. II, Fasc. 2, 2006CORTE DI GIUSTIZIA CAUSA C-519/04DAVID MECA-MEDINA E IGOR MAJCEN / COMMISSIONEDELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEESENTENZA DELLA CORTE(Terza Sezione)18 luglio 2006 (*)«Ricorso contro una pronuncia del Tribunale <strong>di</strong> primo grado – Regole per ilcontrollo antidoping adottate dal Com<strong>it</strong>é international olympique –Incompatibil<strong>it</strong>à con le norme comun<strong>it</strong>arie in materia <strong>di</strong> concorrenza e <strong>di</strong>libera prestazione <strong>di</strong> servizi – Denuncia – Rigetto»Nel proce<strong>di</strong>mento C-519/04 P,avente ad oggetto un ricorso contro una pronuncia del Tribunale <strong>di</strong> primogrado, proposto, ai sensi dell’art. 56 <strong>dello</strong> Statuto della Corte <strong>di</strong> giustizia, il22 <strong>di</strong>cembre 2004,David Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na, residente in Barcellona (Spagna),Igor Majcen, residente in Lubiana (Slovenia),rappresentati dagli avv.ti J.-L. Dupont e M.-A. Lucas,ricorrenti,proce<strong>di</strong>mento in cui le altre parti sono:Commissione delle Comun<strong>it</strong>à europee, rappresentata dalla sig.ra O. Beynete dal sig. A. Bouquet, in qual<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> agenti, con domicilio eletto inLussemburgo,convenuta in primo grado,Repubblica finlandese, rappresentata dalla sig.ra T. Pynnä, in qual<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> agente,interveniente in primo grado,LA CORTE(Terza Sezione),_________________(*) Lingua processuale: il francese.
134 Giurisprudenza Comun<strong>it</strong>ariacomposta dal sig. A. Rosas, presidente <strong>di</strong> Sezione, dai sigg. J. Malenovský(relatore), J.-P. Puissochet, A. Borg Barthet e A. Ó Caoimh, giu<strong>di</strong>ci,avvocato generale: sig. P. Léger,cancelliere: sig. B. Fülöp, amministratore,vista la fase scr<strong>it</strong>ta del proce<strong>di</strong>mento e in segu<strong>it</strong>o alla trattazione orale del 23marzo 2006,sent<strong>it</strong>e le conclusioni dell’avvocato generale, presentate all’u<strong>di</strong>enza del 23marzo 2006,ha pronunciato la seguenteSENTENZA1 Con la presente impugnazione, i sigg. Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na e Majcen (inprosieguo, insieme: i «ricorrenti») chi<strong>ed</strong>ono l’annullamento della sentenzadel Tribunale <strong>di</strong> primo grado delle Comun<strong>it</strong>à europee 30 settembre 2004,causa T 313/02, Meca Me<strong>di</strong>na e Majcen/Commissione (Racc. pag. II 3291;in prosieguo: la «sentenza impugnata»), per aver quest’ultimo respinto illoro ricorso <strong>di</strong> annullamento della decisione della Commissione delleComun<strong>it</strong>à europee 1° agosto 2002, che respinge la denuncia, depos<strong>it</strong>ata dairicorrenti contro il Com<strong>it</strong>é international olympique (Com<strong>it</strong>ato olimpicointernazionale; in prosieguo: il «CIO») intesa ad ottenere l’accertamentodell’incompatibil<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> alcune <strong>di</strong>sposizioni normative adottate da questo <strong>ed</strong>attuate dalla Fédération internationale de natation (F<strong>ed</strong>erazione internazionalenuoto; in prosieguo: la «FINA») nonché <strong>di</strong> alcune pratiche relative ai controlliantidoping con le norme comun<strong>it</strong>arie in materia <strong>di</strong> concorrenza e <strong>di</strong> liberaprestazione dei servizi (caso COMP/38158 – Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na e Majcen/CIO,in prosieguo: la «decisione impugnata»).Fatti della controversia2 Il Tribunale ha riassunto la regolamentazione antidoping <strong>di</strong> cui trattasi(in prosieguo: la «regolamentazione antidoping controversa») ai punti 1 6della sentenza impugnata:«1 Il (…) CIO è l’autor<strong>it</strong>à suprema del Mouvement olympique (in prosieguo:il “Movimento olimpico”), che riunisce le <strong>di</strong>fferenti f<strong>ed</strong>erazioni sportiveinternazionali, tra cui la (…) FINA.2 La FINA applica al nuoto, attraverso le sue Doping Control Rules (regoleper il controllo antidoping, nel testo vigente all’epoca dei fatti; in prosieguo:le “DC”), il co<strong>di</strong>ce antidoping del Movimento olimpico. La regola DC 1.2,lett. a), definisce il doping come la “violazione che si verifica quando unasostanza vietata viene trovata nei tessuti soli<strong>di</strong> o liqui<strong>di</strong> del corpo <strong>di</strong> unosportivo”. Tale definizione corrisponde a quella enunciata all’art. 2, n. 2, del
Sentenza causa C- 519/04 David Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na 135c<strong>it</strong>ato co<strong>di</strong>ce antidoping, secondo cui è qualificabile come doping “la presenzanell’organismo dell’atleta <strong>di</strong> una sostanza vietata, la constatazione dell’uso<strong>di</strong> una tale sostanza o la constatazione dell’applicazione <strong>di</strong> un metodo vietato”.3 Il nandrolone e i suoi metabol<strong>it</strong>i, il norandrosterone (NA) e ilnoretiocolanolone (NE) (in prosieguo denominati, collettivamente: il“nandrolone”) sono sostanze anabolizzanti vietate. Tuttavia, secondo la prassidei 27 laboratori accre<strong>di</strong>tati dal CIO e dalla FINA e per tenere conto dellapossibil<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> una produzione endogena, e dunque non colpevole, <strong>di</strong>nandrolone, la presenza <strong>di</strong> questa sostanza nei tessuti <strong>di</strong> atleti <strong>di</strong> sesso maschileè qualificata come doping soltanto oltre una soglia <strong>di</strong> tolleranza <strong>di</strong> 2nanogrammi (ng) per millil<strong>it</strong>ro (ml) <strong>di</strong> urina.4 Qualora si accerti un primo caso <strong>di</strong> doping con un anabolizzante, laregola DC 9.2, lett. a), esige che l’atleta sia sospeso dalle competizioni peralmeno quattro anni. Tale sanzione può tuttavia essere ridotta, in applicazion<strong>ed</strong>ella regola DC 9.2, ultima frase, e delle regole DC 9.3 e DC 9.10, se l’atleta<strong>di</strong>mostra <strong>di</strong> non aver assunto scientemente la sostanza vietata oppure com<strong>ed</strong>etta sostanza potesse essere presente nei suoi tessuti senza negligenza daparte sua.5 Le sanzioni vengono irrogate dal Doping Panel (Com<strong>it</strong>ato antidoping)della FINA, le cui decisioni possono cost<strong>it</strong>uire oggetto <strong>di</strong> ricorso in appello<strong>di</strong>nanzi al Tribunal arb<strong>it</strong>ral du sport (Tribunale arb<strong>it</strong>rale <strong>dello</strong> sport; inprosieguo: il “TAS”), in virtù della regola DC 8.9. Il TAS, che ha s<strong>ed</strong>e inLosanna, è finanziato e amministrato da un organismo in<strong>di</strong>pendente dal CIO,il Conseil international de l’arb<strong>it</strong>rage en matière de sport (Consigliointernazionale per l’arb<strong>it</strong>rato nello sport; in prosieguo: il “CIAS”).6 Le sentenze del TAS possono cost<strong>it</strong>uire oggetto <strong>di</strong> ricorso <strong>di</strong>nanzi alTribunal fédéral suisse (Tribunale f<strong>ed</strong>erale svizzero), giu<strong>di</strong>ce competenteper la riforma delle sentenze <strong>di</strong> arb<strong>it</strong>rato internazionale emesse in Svizzera».3 I fatti all’origine della controversia sono stati riassunti dal Tribunale aipunti 7 20 della sentenza impugnata:«7 I ricorrenti sono due atleti professionisti che praticano il nuoto <strong>di</strong> lunga<strong>di</strong>stanza, equivalente acquatico della maratona.8 Nel corso <strong>di</strong> un controllo antidoping effettuato il 31 gennaio 1999 durantele competizioni <strong>di</strong> Coppa del mondo <strong>di</strong> questa <strong>di</strong>sciplina a Salvador de Bahia(Brasile), in occasione delle quali si erano classificati, rispettivamente, primoe secondo, i ricorrenti sono risultati pos<strong>it</strong>ivi al test contro il nandrolone. Iltasso rilevato per il sig. D. Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na è stato <strong>di</strong> ng/ml 9,7 e per il sig. I.Majcen <strong>di</strong> ng/ml 3,9.9 L’8 agosto 1999 il Doping Panel della FINA ha adottato una decisione
136 Giurisprudenza Comun<strong>it</strong>aria<strong>di</strong> sospensione dei ricorrenti per un periodo <strong>di</strong> quattro anni.10 Su appello dei ricorrenti, il TAS ha confermato, con sentenza arb<strong>it</strong>rale29 febbraio 2000, la decisione <strong>di</strong> sospensione.11 Nel gennaio 2000, esperimenti scientifici hanno <strong>di</strong>mostrato che imetabol<strong>it</strong>i <strong>di</strong> nandrolone possono essere prodotti in modo endogenodall’organismo umano, ad un tasso che potrebbe superare la soglia <strong>di</strong>tolleranza consent<strong>it</strong>a, con il consumo <strong>di</strong> alcuni alimenti, come la carne <strong>di</strong>verro.12 Visti tali sviluppi, la FINA <strong>ed</strong> i ricorrenti hanno convenuto, con accordoarb<strong>it</strong>rale 20 aprile 2000, <strong>di</strong> deferire <strong>di</strong> nuovo la causa al TAS, ai fini <strong>di</strong> unriesame.13 Con sentenza arb<strong>it</strong>rale 23 maggio 2001, il TAS ha ridotto la sanzione <strong>di</strong>sospensione dei ricorrenti a due anni.14 I ricorrenti non hanno proposto ricorso contro questa sentenza arb<strong>it</strong>rale<strong>di</strong>nanzi al Tribunal fédéral suisse.15 Con lettera del 30 maggio 2001, i ricorrenti hanno depos<strong>it</strong>ato unadenuncia presso la Commissione, a norma dell’art. 3 del regolamento delConsiglio 6 febbraio 1962, n. 17, primo regolamento d’applicazione degliarticoli [81 CE] e [82 CE] (GU 1962, n. 13, pag. 204), lamentando laviolazione degli artt. 81 CE e/o 82 CE.16 Nella loro denuncia i ricorrenti hanno messo in <strong>di</strong>scussione la compatibil<strong>it</strong>à<strong>di</strong> alcune <strong>di</strong>sposizioni regolamentari adottate dal CIO <strong>ed</strong> applicate dalla FINA,oltre che <strong>di</strong> alcune prassi relative al controllo antidoping, con la normativacomun<strong>it</strong>aria sulla concorrenza e sulla libera prestazione dei servizi. In primoluogo, la fissazione della soglia <strong>di</strong> tolleranza a ng/ml 2 cost<strong>it</strong>uirebbe unapratica concordata tra il CIO <strong>ed</strong> i 27 laboratori da esso accre<strong>di</strong>tati. Talesoglia avrebbe scarse basi scientifiche e potrebbe condurre all’esclusione <strong>di</strong>atleti innocenti o semplicemente negligenti. Nel caso dei ricorrenti, ilsuperamento accertato della soglia <strong>di</strong> tolleranza avrebbe potuto derivar<strong>ed</strong>alla consumazione <strong>di</strong> un piatto contenente carne <strong>di</strong> verro. In secondo luogo,l’adozione da parte del CIO <strong>di</strong> un meccanismo <strong>di</strong> responsabil<strong>it</strong>à oggettivaoltre che l’instaurazione <strong>di</strong> organi competenti per la soluzione arb<strong>it</strong>rale dellecontroversie in materia <strong>di</strong> sport (il TAS <strong>ed</strong> il CIAS), insufficientementein<strong>di</strong>pendenti rispetto al CIO, rafforzerebbero il carattere anticoncorrenzial<strong>ed</strong>ella soglia in causa.17 secondo la detta denuncia, l’applicazione <strong>di</strong> questa normativa (inprosieguo denominata in<strong>di</strong>stintamente: le «regole antidoping controverse»o la «regolamentazione antidoping controversa») condurrebbe alla violazion<strong>ed</strong>elle libertà economiche degli atleti, garant<strong>it</strong>e in particolare dall’art. 9 CE,
Sentenza causa C- 519/04 David Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na 137e, dal punto <strong>di</strong> vista del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to della concorrenza, alla violazione dei <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>tiche gli atleti possono invocare a norma degli artt. 81 CE e 82 CE.18 con lettera dell’8 marzo 2002, la Commissione, in applicazione dell’art.6 del regolamento (CE) della Commissione 22 <strong>di</strong>cembre 1998, n. 842,relativo alle au<strong>di</strong>zioni in taluni proce<strong>di</strong>menti a norma dell’articolo [81 CE] <strong>ed</strong>ell’articolo [82 CE] (GU L 354, pag. 18), ha in<strong>di</strong>cato ai ricorrenti i motiviper cui essa r<strong>it</strong>eneva <strong>di</strong> non dover accogliere la denuncia.19 con lettera dell’11 aprile 2002, i ricorrenti hanno presentato allaCommissione le loro osservazioni relative alla lettera dell’8 marzo 2002.20 con decisione 1º agosto 2002 (…), la Commissione ha respinto ladenunzia dei ricorrenti, dopo aver esaminato la regolamentazione antidopingcontroversa secondo i cr<strong>it</strong>eri <strong>di</strong> valutazione del <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to della concorrenza <strong>ed</strong>opo essere pervenuta alla conclusione che tale regolamentazione nonricadeva nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o del <strong>di</strong>vieto previsto dagli artt. 81 CE <strong>ed</strong> 82 CE (…)».Proce<strong>di</strong>mento <strong>di</strong>nanzi al Tribunale e sentenza impugnata4 L’11 ottobre 2002 i ricorrenti hanno proposto <strong>di</strong>nanzi al Tribunale unricorso <strong>di</strong>retto all’annullamento della decisione controversa, d<strong>ed</strong>ucendo tremotivi a sostegno del loro ricorso. Innanzi tutto, la Commissione avrebbecommesso un errore manifesto <strong>di</strong> valutazione in fatto <strong>ed</strong> in <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to r<strong>it</strong>enendoche il CIO non sia un’impresa ai sensi della giurisprudenza comun<strong>it</strong>aria.Inoltre, essa avrebbe erroneamente applicato i cr<strong>it</strong>eri stabil<strong>it</strong>i dalla Cortenella sentenza 19 febbraio 2002, causa C-309/99, Wouters e a. (Racc. pag.I-1577), r<strong>it</strong>enendo che la regolamentazione antidoping controversa noncost<strong>it</strong>uisca una restrizione della concorrenza ai sensi dell’art. 81 CE. Infine,la Commissione avrebbe commesso un errore manifesto <strong>di</strong> valutazione infatto <strong>ed</strong> in <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to al punto 71 della motivazione della decisione impugnata,respingendo gli addeb<strong>it</strong>i fatti valere dai ricorrenti ai sensi dell’art. 49 CE neiconfronti della regolamentazione antidoping.5 Il 24 gennaio 2003 la Repubblica <strong>di</strong> Finlan<strong>di</strong>a ha chiesto <strong>di</strong> intervenire asostegno della Commissione. Con or<strong>di</strong>nanza 25 febbraio 2003, il president<strong>ed</strong>ella Quarta Sezione del Tribunale ha ammesso tale intervento.6 Con la sentenza impugnata, il Tribunale ha respinto il ricorso dei ricorrenti.7 Ai punti 40 e 41 della sentenza impugnata, il Tribunale ha considerato,fondandosi sulla giurisprudenza della Corte, che se i <strong>di</strong>vieti sanc<strong>it</strong>i dagli artt.39 CE e 49 CE si applicano alle norme adottate nel campo <strong>dello</strong> sport cheriguardano l’aspetto economico che l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva può rivestire, invecei <strong>di</strong>vieti che queste <strong>di</strong>sposizioni del Trattato CE sanciscono non riguardanole regole puramente sportive, cioè quelle regole che riguardano le questioniche interessano esclusivamente lo sport e che, come tali, sono estranee all’atti-
138 Giurisprudenza Comun<strong>it</strong>ariav<strong>it</strong>à economica.8 Il Tribunale ha rilevato, al punto 42 della sentenza impugnata, che lacircostanza che un regolamento puramente sportivo sia estraneo all’attiv<strong>it</strong>àeconomica, con la conseguenza che tale regolamento non ricade nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o<strong>di</strong> applicazione degli artt. 39 CE e 49 CE, significa, parimenti, che esso èestraneo ai rapporti economici che interessano la concorrenza, con laconseguenza che esso non ricade nemmeno nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione degliartt. 81 CE <strong>ed</strong> 82 CE.9 Ai punti 44 e 47 della sentenza impugnata, il Tribunale ha consideratoche il <strong>di</strong>vieto del doping si basa su considerazioni puramente sportive <strong>ed</strong> èdunque estraneo a qualsiasi considerazione economica. Esso è pervenutoalla conclusione che le regole per la lotta antidoping non possono rientrarenell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione delle <strong>di</strong>sposizioni del Trattato sulle libertàeconomiche e, in particolare, degli artt. 49 CE, 81 CE <strong>ed</strong> 82 CE.10 Il Tribunale ha considerato, al punto 49 della sentenza impugnata, che laregolamentazione antidoping controversa, che non persegue alcuno scopo<strong>di</strong>scriminatorio, è intimamente legata allo sport in quanto tale. Esso ha poirilevato, al punto 57 della sentenza impugnata, che la circostanza che il CIOabbia potuto anche aver presente la preoccupazione, leg<strong>it</strong>tima secondo iricorrenti stessi, <strong>di</strong> preservare il potenziale economico dei Giochi olimpici inoccasione della fissazione della regolamentazione antidoping controversanon comportava, <strong>di</strong> per sé, la conseguenza <strong>di</strong> non dover riconoscere a taliregole una natura puramente sportiva.11 Al punto 66 della sentenza impugnata, il Tribunale ha inoltre precisatoche, avendo la Commissione concluso nella decisione controversa che laregolamentazione antidoping controversa esulava dall’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazion<strong>ed</strong>egli artt. 81 CE <strong>ed</strong> 82 CE, il riferimento contenuto nella m<strong>ed</strong>esima decisioneal metodo <strong>di</strong> analisi della c<strong>it</strong>ata sentenza Wouters e a. non può comunqueporre nuovamente in dubbio tale conclusione. Il Tribunale ha poi considerato,al punto 67 della sentenza impugnata, che la contestazione della dettaregolamentazione rientrava nella competenza degli organi <strong>di</strong> composizion<strong>ed</strong>elle controversie sportive.12 Il Tribunale ha parimenti respinto il terzo motivo d<strong>ed</strong>otto dai ricorrenti,considerando, al punto 68 della sentenza impugnata, che la regolamentazioneantidoping controversa, essendo puramente sportiva, non rientravanell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione dell’art. 49 CE.Conclusioni dell’impugnazione13 Nel loro ricorso <strong>di</strong> impugnazione, i ricorrenti chi<strong>ed</strong>ono che la Cortevoglia:
Sentenza causa C- 519/04 David Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na 139– annullare la sentenza impugnata;– accogliere le conclusioni presentate dai ricorrenti <strong>di</strong>nanzi al Tribunale;– condannare la Commissione alle spese dei due gra<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> giu<strong>di</strong>zio.14 La Commissione chi<strong>ed</strong>e che la Corte voglia:– in via principale, respingere interamente il ricorso;– in subor<strong>di</strong>ne, accogliendo le conclusioni presentate in primo grado,respingere il ricorso <strong>di</strong>retto all’annullamento della decisione controversa;– condannare i ricorrenti alle spese, ivi comprese quelle del proce<strong>di</strong>mento<strong>di</strong> primo grado.15 La Repubblica <strong>di</strong> Finlan<strong>di</strong>a chi<strong>ed</strong>e che la Corte voglia:– respingere interamente il ricorso.Sull’impugnazione16 Con la loro argomentazione, i ricorrenti d<strong>ed</strong>ucono quattro motivi asostegno della loro impugnazione. Con il primo motivo, il quale si sud<strong>di</strong>videin più parti, essi lamentano che la sentenza impugnata sarebbe viziata da unerrore <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to in quanto il Tribunale ha considerato che la regolamentazioneantidoping controversa non rientrava nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione degli artt.49 CE, 81 CE e 82 CE. Con il secondo motivo, essi sostengono che lasentenza impugnata sarebbe viziata da snaturamento del contenuto delladecisione controversa. Con il terzo motivo, essi lamentano che la dettasentenza sarebbe viziata da errori <strong>di</strong> forma a causa <strong>di</strong> motivazionicontrad<strong>di</strong>ttorie e <strong>di</strong> motivazione insufficiente. Con il quarto motivo, essisostengono che la sentenza impugnata sarebbe stata pronunciata al termine<strong>di</strong> una proc<strong>ed</strong>ura irregolare, poiché il Tribunale ha violato i <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>ti della <strong>di</strong>fesa.Sul primo motivo17 Il primo motivo attinente ad un errore <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to si sud<strong>di</strong>vide in tre parti.I ricorrenti sostengono, in primo luogo, che il Tribunale ha interpretatoerroneamente la giurisprudenza della Corte relativa al rapporto tra leregolamentazioni sportive e l’amb<strong>it</strong>o d’applicazione delle <strong>di</strong>sposizioni delTrattato. Essi lamentano, in secondo luogo, che il Tribunale non ha tenutoconto della portata, in mer<strong>it</strong>o a tale giurisprudenza, delle norme che vietanoil doping in generale e della regolamentazione antidoping controversa inparticolare. Essi sostengono, in terzo luogo, che il Tribunale ha ingiustamenteconsiderato che la detta regolamentazione non poteva essere assimilata adun comportamento <strong>di</strong> mercato rientrante nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione degliartt. 81 CE e 82 CE e quin<strong>di</strong> non poteva essere assoggettata al metodo <strong>di</strong>analisi elaborato dalla Corte nella sua c<strong>it</strong>ata sentenza Wouters e a.Sulla prima parte– Argomenti delle parti
140 Giurisprudenza Comun<strong>it</strong>aria18 Secondo i ricorrenti, il Tribunale avrebbe male interpretato lagiurisprudenza della Corte secondo la quale l’esercizio dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportivasarebbe <strong>di</strong>sciplinato dal <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario solo in quanto sia configurabilecome un’attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica. In particolare, contrariamente a quanto<strong>di</strong>chiarato dal Tribunale, la Corte non avrebbe mai escluso in maniera generaleregolamentazioni puramente sportive dall’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione delle<strong>di</strong>sposizioni del Trattato. Sebbene la Corte abbia considerato che laformazione delle squadre nazionali era una questione che riguardavaunicamente lo sport e, come tale, era estranea all’attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica, ilTribunale non poteva d<strong>ed</strong>urne che ogni regola relativa ad una questioneriguardante unicamente lo sport sia, come tale, estranea all’attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica,e sfugga quin<strong>di</strong> ai <strong>di</strong>vieti sanc<strong>it</strong>i dagli artt. 39 CE, 49 CE, 81 CE e 82 CE.Quin<strong>di</strong>, il concetto <strong>di</strong> regola puramente sportiva dovrebbe essere lim<strong>it</strong>atoalle sole regole relative alla composizione e alla formazione delle squadrenazionali.19 I ricorrenti sostengono inoltre che il Tribunale avrebbe erroneamenteconsiderato che una regolamentazione che riguarda unicamente lo sportinerisca necessariamente all’organizzazione e al corretto svolgimento dellacompetizione, mentre, secondo la giurisprudenza della Corte, essa dovrebberiguardare anche la natura <strong>ed</strong> il contesto specifico degli incontri sportivi.Essi sostengono altresì che, data la natura materialmente in<strong>di</strong>visibil<strong>ed</strong>ell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva professionistica, la <strong>di</strong>stinzione operata dal Tribunaletra la <strong>di</strong>mensione economica e la <strong>di</strong>mensione non economica del m<strong>ed</strong>esimoatto sportivo sarebbe del tutto artificiosa.20 Per la Commissione, il Tribunale ha fatto una corretta applicazione dellagiurisprudenza della Corte secondo la quale le regolamentazioni puramentesportive si sottrarrebbero, in quanto tali, alle norme sulla libertà <strong>di</strong>circolazione. Si tratterebbe dunque effettivamente <strong>di</strong> un’eccezione <strong>di</strong> portatagenerale per le regole puramente sportive, che non sarebbe quin<strong>di</strong> lim<strong>it</strong>ataalla composizione e alla formazione <strong>di</strong> squadre nazionali. Peraltro, essa nonrileva in che modo una norma che riguarda unicamente lo sport e che attienealla specific<strong>it</strong>à degli incontri potrebbe non inerire al corretto svolgimentodegli incontri.21 Per il governo finlandese, l’approccio del Tribunale sarebbe conforme al<strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario.– Giu<strong>di</strong>zio della Corte22 Si deve ricordare che, considerati gli obiettivi della Comun<strong>it</strong>à, l’attiv<strong>it</strong>àsportiva è <strong>di</strong>sciplinata dal <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to comun<strong>it</strong>ario in quanto sia configurabilecome attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica ai sensi dell’art. 2 CE (v. sentenze 12/12/1974,
Sentenza causa C- 519/04 David Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na 141causa 36/74, Walrave e Koch, Racc. pag. 1405, punto 4; 14 luglio 1976,causa 13/76, Donà, Racc. pag. 1333, punto 12; 15 <strong>di</strong>cembre 1995, causa C415/93, Bosman, Racc. pag. I 4921, punto 73; 11 aprile 2000, cause riun<strong>it</strong>eC 51/96 e C 191/97, Deliège, Racc. pag. I 2549, punto 41, e 13 aprile 2000,causa C 176/96, Lehtonen e Castors Braine, Racc. pag. I 2681, punto 32).23 Così, quando un’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva riveste il carattere <strong>di</strong> una prestazione<strong>di</strong> lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato o <strong>di</strong> una prestazione <strong>di</strong> servizi retribu<strong>it</strong>a come nelcaso dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à degli sportivi professionisti o semiprofessionisti (v., in talsenso, c<strong>it</strong>ate sentenze Walrave e Koch, punto 5, Donà, punto 12, e Bosman,punto 73), essa ricade in particolare nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione degli artt.39 CE e segg. o degli artt. 49 CE e segg.24 Tali <strong>di</strong>sposizioni comun<strong>it</strong>arie in materia <strong>di</strong> libera circolazione delle personee <strong>di</strong> libera prestazione dei servizi non <strong>di</strong>sciplinano soltanto gli atti delle autor<strong>it</strong>àpubbliche, ma si estendono anche alle normative <strong>di</strong> altra natura <strong>di</strong>rette a<strong>di</strong>sciplinare collettivamente il lavoro subor<strong>di</strong>nato e le prestazioni <strong>di</strong> servizi(c<strong>it</strong>ate sentenze Deliège, punto 47, nonché Lethonen e Castors Braine, punto35).25 La Corte ha tuttavia <strong>di</strong>chiarato che i <strong>di</strong>vieti che queste <strong>di</strong>sposizioni delTrattato sanciscono non riguardano le regole che vertono su questioni cheinteressano esclusivamente lo sport e che, come tali, sono estranee all’attiv<strong>it</strong>àeconomica (v., in tal senso, sentenza Walrave e Koch, c<strong>it</strong>., punto 8).26 Per quanto riguarda la <strong>di</strong>fficoltà <strong>di</strong> separare gli aspetti economici daquelli sportivi <strong>di</strong> un’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva, la Corte ha riconosciuto, nella c<strong>it</strong>atasentenza Donà, punti 14 e 15, che le norme comun<strong>it</strong>arie sulla liberacircolazione delle persone e dei servizi non ostano a normative o a prassigiustificate da motivi non economici, inerenti alla natura e al contesto specifici<strong>di</strong> talune competizioni sportive. La Corte, però, ha sottolineato che talerestrizione delle sfera d’applicazione delle dette norme deve restare entro ilim<strong>it</strong>i del suo oggetto specifico. Pertanto, essa non può essere invocata perescludere un’intera attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva dalla sfera d’applicazione del Trattato(c<strong>it</strong>ate sentenze Bosman, punto 76, e Deliège, punto 43).27 Alla luce <strong>di</strong> tutte queste considerazioni, si evince che la sola circostanzache una norma abbia un carattere puramente sportivo non sottrae dall’amb<strong>it</strong>o<strong>di</strong> applicazione del Trattato la persona che eserc<strong>it</strong>a l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>sciplinata datale norma o l’organo che l’ha emanata.28 Se l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva <strong>di</strong> cui trattasi rientra nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione delTrattato, i requis<strong>it</strong>i per il suo esercizio sono allora sottoposti a tutti gli obblighiderivanti dalle varie <strong>di</strong>sposizioni del Trattato. Ne consegue che le normeche <strong>di</strong>sciplinano la detta attiv<strong>it</strong>à devono sod<strong>di</strong>sfare i presupposti d’applicazio-
142 Giurisprudenza Comun<strong>it</strong>ariane <strong>di</strong> tali <strong>di</strong>sposizioni che, in particolare, sono finalizzate a garantire la liberacircolazione dei lavoratori, la libertà <strong>di</strong> stabilimento, la libera prestazion<strong>ed</strong>ei servizi o la concorrenza.29 Così, nel caso in cui l’esercizio <strong>di</strong> tale attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva debba esserevalutato alla luce delle <strong>di</strong>sposizioni del Trattato relative alla libera circolazion<strong>ed</strong>ei lavoratori o alla libera prestazione dei servizi, occorrerà verificare se lenorme che <strong>di</strong>sciplinano la detta attiv<strong>it</strong>à sod<strong>di</strong>sfino i presupposti d’applicazion<strong>ed</strong>egli artt. 39 CE e 49 CE, ossia non cost<strong>it</strong>uiscano restrizioni vietate dai dettiarticoli (sentenza Deliège, c<strong>it</strong>., punto 60).30 Del pari, nel caso in cui l’esercizio della detta attiv<strong>it</strong>à debba essere valutatoalla luce delle <strong>di</strong>sposizioni del Trattato relative alla concorrenza, occorreràverificare se, tenuto conto dei presupposti d’applicazione propri degli artt.81 CE e 82 CE, le norme che <strong>di</strong>sciplinano la detta attiv<strong>it</strong>à provengano daun’impresa, se quest’ultima lim<strong>it</strong>i la concorrenza o abusi della sua posizion<strong>ed</strong>ominante, e se tale restrizione o tale abuso pregiu<strong>di</strong>chi il commercio tra gliStati membri.31 Parimenti, quand’anche si consideri che tali norme non cost<strong>it</strong>uisconorestrizioni alla libera circolazione perché non riguardano questioni cheinteressano esclusivamente lo sport e, come tali, sono estranee all’attiv<strong>it</strong>àeconomica (c<strong>it</strong>ate sentenze Walrave e Koch nonché Donà), tale circostanzanon implica né che l’attiv<strong>it</strong>à sportiva interessata si sottragga necessariament<strong>ed</strong>all’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione degli artt. 81 CE e 82 CE né che le dette normenon sod<strong>di</strong>sfino i presupposti d’applicazione propri dei detti articoli.32 Orbene, al punto 42 della sentenza impugnata, il Tribunale haconsiderato che la circostanza che un regolamento puramente sportivo siaestraneo all’attiv<strong>it</strong>à economica, con la conseguenza che tale regolamentonon ricade nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione degli artt. 39 CE e 49 CE, significa,parimenti, che esso è estraneo ai rapporti economici che interessano laconcorrenza, con la conseguenza che esso non ricade nemmeno nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o<strong>di</strong> applicazione degli artt. 81 CE <strong>ed</strong> 82 CE.33 R<strong>it</strong>enendo che una regolamentazione poteva in tal modo essere sottrattaipso facto dall’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione dei detti articoli soltanto perché eraconsiderata puramente sportiva alla luce dell’applicazione degli artt. 39 CEe 49 CE, senza che fosse necessario verificare previamente se taleregolamentazione rispondesse ai presupposti d’applicazione propri degli artt.81 CE e 82 CE, menzionati al punto 30 della presente sentenza, il Tribunaleè incorso in un errore <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to.34 Pertanto, i ricorrenti hanno ragione a sostenere che il Tribunale, al punto68 della sentenza impugnata, ha ingiustamente respinto la loro domanda
Sentenza causa C- 519/04 David Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na 143con la motivazione che la regolamentazione antidoping controversa nonrientrava né nell’amb<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> applicazione dell’art. 49 CE né nel <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to in materia<strong>di</strong> concorrenza. Occorre, quin<strong>di</strong> annullare la sentenza impugnata, senza cheoccorra esaminare né le altre parti del primo motivo né gli altri motivi d<strong>ed</strong>ottidai ricorrenti.Nel mer<strong>it</strong>o35 Conformemente all’art. 61 <strong>dello</strong> Statuto della Corte <strong>di</strong> giustizia, poichélo stato degli atti lo consente, va statu<strong>it</strong>o nel mer<strong>it</strong>o sulle conclusioni dellericorrenti <strong>di</strong>rette all’annullamento delle decisioni controverse.36 Occorre ricordare al riguardo che i ricorrenti hanno d<strong>ed</strong>otto tre motivi asostegno del loro ricorso. Essi hanno addeb<strong>it</strong>ato alla Commissione <strong>di</strong> averconsiderato, da un lato, che il CIO non era un’impresa ai sensi dellagiurisprudenza comun<strong>it</strong>aria, dall’altro, che la regolamentazione antidopingcontroversa non cost<strong>it</strong>uiva una restrizione della concorrenza ai sensi dell’art.81 CE, infine, che la loro denuncia non conteneva fatti che potessero portarealla conclusione che poteva essersi verificata una violazione dell’art. 49 CE.Sul primo motivo37 I ricorrenti sostengono che la Commissione avrebbe sbagliato a nonqualificare il CIO come impresa ai fini dell’applicazione dell’art. 81 CE.38 È tuttavia pacifico che, per decidere sulla denuncia <strong>di</strong> cui era invest<strong>it</strong>adai ricorrenti alla luce delle <strong>di</strong>sposizioni degli artt. 81 CE e 82 CE, laCommissione ha inteso considerare, come risulta esplic<strong>it</strong>amente dal punto37 della decisione controversa, che il CIO doveva essere qualificato comeimpresa e, in seno al movimento olimpico, come una associazione <strong>di</strong>associazioni internazionali e nazionali <strong>di</strong> imprese.39 Tale motivo, essendo fondato su una lettura errata della decisionecontroversa, è ininfluente e per tale ragione deve essere respinto.Sul secondo motivo40 I ricorrenti sostengono che la Commissione ha ingiustamente considerato,per respingere la loro denuncia, che la regolamentazione antidopingcontroversa non cost<strong>it</strong>uiva una restrizione della concorrenza ai sensi dell’art.81 CE. Secondo loro, la Commissione ha erroneamente applicato i cr<strong>it</strong>eristabil<strong>it</strong>i dalla Corte nella c<strong>it</strong>ata sentenza Wouters e a. per giustificare glieffetti restr<strong>it</strong>tivi della regolamentazione antidoping controversa sulla libertàd’azione dei ricorrenti. A loro avviso, da un lato, la detta regolamentazione,infatti, non inerirebbe per niente, contrariamente a quanto r<strong>it</strong>enuto dallaCommissione, ai soli obiettivi intesi a preservare l’integr<strong>it</strong>à della competizionee quella della salute degli atleti, ma mirerebbe a garantire gli interessieconomici del CIO. Dall’altro, tale regolamentazione, fissando il lim<strong>it</strong>e mas-
144 Giurisprudenza Comun<strong>it</strong>ariasimo a 2 ng/ml <strong>di</strong> urina, che non risponde ad alcun cr<strong>it</strong>erio <strong>di</strong> certezzascientifica, sarebbe eccessiva e andrebbe oltre quanto necessario percombattere efficacemente il doping.41 Occorre rilevare, innanzi tutto, che sebbene i ricorrenti sostengano chela Commissione ha commesso un errore manifesto <strong>di</strong> valutazione assimilandoil contesto globale in cui il CIO ha adottato la regolamentazione controversaa quello in cui l’or<strong>di</strong>ne olandese degli avvocati aveva adottato il regolamentosu cui la Corte è stata chiamata a pronunciarsi nella sentenza Wouters e a.,essi non corr<strong>ed</strong>ano tale motivo <strong>di</strong> precisazioni che consentano <strong>di</strong> valutarnela fondatezza.42 Occorre rilevare inoltre che la compatibil<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> una regolamentazionecon le norme comun<strong>it</strong>arie in materia <strong>di</strong> concorrenza non può essere valutatain astratto (v., in tal senso, sentenza 15 <strong>di</strong>cembre 1994, causa C 250/92,DLG, Racc. pag. I 5641, punto 31). Non ogni accordo tra imprese o ognidecisione <strong>di</strong> un’associazione <strong>di</strong> imprese che restringa la libertà d’azione delleparti o <strong>di</strong> una <strong>di</strong> esse ricade necessariamente sotto il <strong>di</strong>vieto sanc<strong>it</strong>o all’art.81, n. 1, CE. Infatti, ai fini dell’applicazione <strong>di</strong> tale <strong>di</strong>sposizione ad un caso<strong>di</strong> specie, occorre innanzi tutto tener conto del contesto globale in cui ladecisione dell’associazione <strong>di</strong> imprese <strong>di</strong> cui trattasi è stata adottata o <strong>di</strong>spiegai suoi effetti e, più in particolare, dei suoi obiettivi. Occorre poi verificare segli effetti restr<strong>it</strong>tivi della concorrenza che ne derivano ineriscano alperseguimento <strong>di</strong> tali obiettivi (sentenza Wouters e a., c<strong>it</strong>, punto 97) e sianoad essi proporzionati.43 Per quanto riguarda il contesto globale in cui la regolamentazionecontroversa è stata adottata, la Commissione ha potuto considerare a giustot<strong>it</strong>olo che l’obiettivo generale <strong>di</strong> tale regolamentazione è inteso, la qual cosanon è contestata da nessuna delle parti, a combattere il doping in vista <strong>di</strong>uno svolgimento leale della competizione sportiva e include la necess<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>assicurare la par<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> chances tra gli atleti, la loro salute, l’integr<strong>it</strong>à el’obiettiv<strong>it</strong>à della competizione nonché i valori etici nello sport.44 Peraltro, dato che per garantire l’esecuzione del <strong>di</strong>vieto del doping sononecessarie sanzioni, l’effetto <strong>di</strong> queste ultime sulla libertà d’azione degli atletiva considerato, in linea <strong>di</strong> principio, come inerente alle regole antidoping.45 Quin<strong>di</strong>, anche qualora si r<strong>it</strong>enga che la regolamentazione antidopingcontroversa vada considerata una decisione <strong>di</strong> associazioni <strong>di</strong> imprese chelim<strong>it</strong>a la libertà d’azione dei ricorrenti, essa non può, tuttavia, cost<strong>it</strong>uirenecessariamente una restrizione <strong>di</strong> concorrenza incompatibile con il mercatocomune ai sensi dell’art. 81 CE, perché è giustificata da un obiettivo leg<strong>it</strong>timo.Infatti, una lim<strong>it</strong>azione del genere inerisce all’organizzazione <strong>ed</strong> al corretto
Sentenza causa C- 519/04 David Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na 145svolgimento della competizione sportiva <strong>ed</strong> è proprio finalizzata ad assicurareun sano spir<strong>it</strong>o <strong>di</strong> emulazione tra gli atleti.46 I ricorrenti, anche se non contestano che tale obiettivo sia reale,sostengono però che la regolamentazione antidoping controversa ha anchelo scopo <strong>di</strong> garantire gli interessi economici del CIO e che per preservaretale scopo sono state adottate regole eccessive come quelle contestate nelcaso <strong>di</strong> specie. Secondo loro, tali regole non possono quin<strong>di</strong> essereconsiderate inerenti al corretto svolgimento della competizione e sottrarsi ai<strong>di</strong>vieti sanc<strong>it</strong>i dall’art. 81 CE.47 A questo propos<strong>it</strong>o, occorre ammettere che la natura repressiva dellaregolamentazione antidoping controversa e la grav<strong>it</strong>à delle sanzioni applicabiliin caso <strong>di</strong> sua violazione sono in grado <strong>di</strong> produrre effetti negativi sullaconcorrenza perché potrebbero, nel caso in cui tale sanzioni s’avverassero,alla fine, immotivate, comportare l’ingiustificata esclusione dell’atleta dallecompetizioni e dunque falsare le con<strong>di</strong>zioni <strong>di</strong> esercizio dell’attiv<strong>it</strong>à inquestione. Ne consegue che, per potersi sottrarre al <strong>di</strong>vieto sanc<strong>it</strong>o dall’art.81, n. 1, CE, le restrizioni così imposte da tale regolamentazione devonolim<strong>it</strong>arsi a quanto è necessario per assicurare il corretto svolgimento dellacompetizione sportiva (v., in tal senso, sentenza DLG, c<strong>it</strong>., punto 35).48 Una regolamentazione del genere potrebbe infatti rivelarsi eccessiva, daun lato nella determinazione delle con<strong>di</strong>zioni atte a fissare la linea <strong>di</strong>demarcazione tra le s<strong>it</strong>uazioni che rientrano nel doping sanzionabili e quelleche non vi rientrano, e dall’altro nella sever<strong>it</strong>à delle dette sanzioni.49 Nel caso <strong>di</strong> specie, tale linea <strong>di</strong> demarcazione è in<strong>di</strong>viduata nellaregolamentazione antidoping controversa dalla soglia <strong>di</strong> 2 ng/ml <strong>di</strong> urinaoltre la quale la presenza <strong>di</strong> nandrolone nel corpo dell’atleta cost<strong>it</strong>uisc<strong>ed</strong>oping. I ricorrenti contestano tale regola sostenendo che la soglia cosìcalcolata sarebbe fissata ad un livello eccessivamente basso, il quale nonpoggerebbe su alcun cr<strong>it</strong>erio <strong>di</strong> certezza scientifica.50 Tuttavia, i ricorrenti non <strong>di</strong>mostrano che la Commissione avrebbecommesso un errore manifesto <strong>di</strong> valutazione r<strong>it</strong>enendo leg<strong>it</strong>tima tale regola.51 Infatti, è noto che il nandrolone è una sostanza anabolizzante la cuipresenza nel corpo degli atleti è in grado <strong>di</strong> migliorare le loro prestazioni e<strong>di</strong> falsare lo svolgimento leale delle competizioni cui gli interessatipartecipano. Il principio alla base del <strong>di</strong>vieto che colpisce tale sostanza èpertanto giustificato, tenuto conto dell’obiettivo della regolamentazioneantidoping.52 È altresì pacifico che tale sostanza può essere prodotta a livello endogenoe che, per tener conto <strong>di</strong> tale fenomeno, le istanze sportive, e segnatamente
146 Giurisprudenza Comun<strong>it</strong>ariail CIO tram<strong>it</strong>e la regolamentazione antidoping controversa, hanno ammessoche la presenza della detta sostanza è qualificata come doping solo quandooltrepassa una certa soglia. Quin<strong>di</strong>, è soltanto nell’ipotesi in cui, tenuto conto<strong>dello</strong> stato delle conoscenze scientifiche al momento dell’adozione dellaregolamentazione antidoping controversa o anche al momentodell’applicazione che ne è stata fatta per sanzionare i ricorrenti, nel 1999, lasoglia <strong>di</strong> tolleranza sia fissata ad un livello talmente basso da dover r<strong>it</strong>enereche non tenga sufficientemente conto <strong>di</strong> tale fenomeno, che la dettaregolamentazione dovrebbe essere considerata ingiustificata alla luc<strong>ed</strong>ell’obiettivo cui era finalizzata.53 Orbene, dagli elementi del fascicolo risulta che al momento rilevante, laproduzione endogena me<strong>di</strong>a osservata in tutti gli stu<strong>di</strong> allora pubblicati era20 volte inferiore a 2 ng/ml <strong>di</strong> urina e che il valore massimo della produzioneendogena osservata era inferiore <strong>di</strong> circa un terzo. Nonostante i ricorrentisostengano che, a partire dal 1993, il CIO non poteva ignorare il rischiosegnalato da un esperto che il semplice consumo <strong>di</strong> una quant<strong>it</strong>à lim<strong>it</strong>ata <strong>di</strong>verro poteva portare atleti perfettamente innocenti ad oltrepassare la sogliain questione, comunque non è accertato che al momento rilevante tale rischiosia stato confermato dalla maggioranza della comun<strong>it</strong>à scientifica. Inoltre, irisultati degli stu<strong>di</strong> e degli esperimenti condotti in materia dopo l’adozion<strong>ed</strong>ella decisione controversa sono, comunque, ininfluenti sulla leg<strong>it</strong>tim<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong>quest’ultima.54 Ciò premesso, e poiché i ricorrenti non precisano a quale livello la soglia<strong>di</strong> tolleranza in questione doveva essere fissata al momento rilevante, nonrisulta che le restrizioni che impongono tale soglia agli sportivi professionistivadano al <strong>di</strong> là <strong>di</strong> quanto necessario per assicurare lo svolgimento e il correttofunzionamento delle competizioni sportive.55 Poiché i ricorrenti non hanno peraltro lamentato la natura eccessiva dellesanzioni applicabili e irrogate nel caso <strong>di</strong> specie, non è stata <strong>di</strong>mostrata lasproporzionatezza della regolamentazione antidoping controversa.56 Di conseguenza occorre respingere il secondo motivo.Sul terzo motivo57 I ricorrenti sostengono che la decisione controversa è viziata da un errore<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>r<strong>it</strong>to in quanto respinge, al punto 71, la loro tesi secondo la quale leregole del CIO violano le <strong>di</strong>sposizioni dell’art. 49 CE.58 Si deve tuttavia rilevare che l’istanza formulata dai ricorrenti <strong>di</strong>nanzi alTribunale verte sulla leg<strong>it</strong>tim<strong>it</strong>à <strong>di</strong> una decisione adottata dalla Commissioneal termine <strong>di</strong> un proce<strong>di</strong>mento aperto per una denuncia depos<strong>it</strong>ata inconform<strong>it</strong>à del regolamento del Consiglio 6 febbraio 1962, n. 17, primo
Sentenza causa C- 519/04 David Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na 147regolamento d’applicazione degli articoli [81] e [82] del Trattato (GU 1962,n. 13, pag. 204). Ne consegue che il controllo giuris<strong>di</strong>zionale su tale decision<strong>ed</strong>eve necessariamente essere circoscr<strong>it</strong>to alle regole <strong>di</strong> concorrenza qualirisultano dagli artt. 81 CE e 82 CE, e che quin<strong>di</strong> non può estendersi alrispetto delle altre <strong>di</strong>sposizioni del Trattato (v., in tal senso, or<strong>di</strong>nanza 23/2/2006, causa C 171/05 P, Piau, non pubblicata nella Raccolta, punto 58).59 Pertanto, a prescindere dalla ragione per la quale la Commissione harespinto l’argomento fatto valere dai ricorrenti rispetto all’art. 49 CE, ilmotivo da essi d<strong>ed</strong>otto è ininfluente e deve quin<strong>di</strong> essere anch’esso respinto.60 Alla luce <strong>di</strong> tutto quanto prec<strong>ed</strong>e, occorre dunque respingere il ricorsoproposto dai ricorrenti contro la decisione controversa.Sulle spese61 A norma dell’art. 122, primo comma, del regolamento <strong>di</strong> proc<strong>ed</strong>ura,quando l’impugnazione è respinta, o quando l’impugnazione è accolta e lacontroversia viene defin<strong>it</strong>ivamente decisa dalla Corte, quest’ultima statuiscesulle spese. Ai sensi dell’art. 69, n. 2, del m<strong>ed</strong>esimo regolamento, applicabileal proce<strong>di</strong>mento <strong>di</strong> impugnazione in forza del successivo art. 118, la partesoccombente è condannata alle spese se ne è stata fatta domanda. In forzadell’art. 69, n. 3, <strong>dello</strong> stesso regolamento, se le parti soccombonorispettivamente su uno o più capi, ovvero per motivi eccezionali, la Cortepuò ripartire le spese o decidere che ciascuna parte sopporti le proprie spese.Quanto al n. 4, primo comma, della m<strong>ed</strong>esima <strong>di</strong>sposizione, esso <strong>di</strong>sponeche gli Stati membri intervenuti nella causa sopportino le proprie spese.62 Poiché la Commissione ha concluso chi<strong>ed</strong>endo la condanna dei ricorrentie questi ultimi sono rimasti sostanzialmente soccombenti, occorre condannarlialle spese relative sia al presente giu<strong>di</strong>zio sia a quello <strong>di</strong>nanzi al Tribunale.La Repubblica <strong>di</strong> Finlan<strong>di</strong>a sopporterà le proprie spese.Per questi motivi la Corte (Terza Sezione) <strong>di</strong>chiara e statuisce:1) La sentenza del Tribunale <strong>di</strong> primo grado delle Comun<strong>it</strong>à europee 30/9/2004, causa T 313/02, Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na e Majcen/Commissione, è annullata.2) Il ricorso proposto <strong>di</strong>nanzi al Tribunale <strong>di</strong> primo grado con il numero <strong>di</strong>causa T 313/02 e <strong>di</strong>retto all’annullamento della decisione dellaCommissione 1/8/2002 che respinge la denuncia dei sigg. Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>nae Majcen è respinto.3) I sigg. Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na e Majcen sono condannati alle spese relative sia alpresente giu<strong>di</strong>zio sia a quello <strong>di</strong>nanzi al Tribunale.4) La Repubblica <strong>di</strong> Finlan<strong>di</strong>a sopporterà le proprie spese.Firme
GIURISPRUDENZA INTERNAZIONALE___________________________________
RIVISTA DI ISSN 1825-6678DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA DELLO SPORT Vol. II, Fasc. 2, 2006SENTENZA DEL TRIBUNALE DI CHARLEROI CAUSA G-14,CHARLEROI C. FIFATRIBUNAL DE COMMERCE DE CHARLEROIJUGEMENT Prononcé le 15 mai 2006 Affaire Rôle Général n° A/05/03843EN CAUSE DE:1) La SA SPORTING DU PAYS DE CHARLEROI, dont le siège Charleroi,Boulevard Zoé Drion n° 19, inscr<strong>it</strong>e à la Banque Carrefour n° 0472.519.068;Demanderesse, représentée par Messieurs Abbas GHOLI BAYAT, et EugèneTCHEN, administrateur;Comparaissant par son conseil, Maître Jean-Pierre DEPREZ, Charleroi, dontle cabinet est sis à 6001 CHARLEROI, avenue Eugène Mascaux n° 129.2) Le G-14 GROUPEMENT DES CLUBS DE FOOTBALLEUROPEENS, Européen d’Intérêt Economique (GEIE), dont le siège socialest avenue de la Toison d’Or, n° 67, inscr<strong>it</strong>e à la Banque Carrefour0473.255.278;Demandeur sur intervention volontaire, représenté par Monsieur général duG14;Comparaissant par ses conseils Maîtres Martin HISSEL, Jean-LouisDUPOMT, Patrick HENRY, tous trois avocats au barreau de Liège, dont lecabinet boulevard Emile de Laveleye, n° 65 b, par Maître Bernard de barreaude Liège, dont le cabinet est sis à 4020 LIEGE, place des que par MaîtreDALLAFIOR, avocat au barreau de Zurich, Rämistrasse, n° 5, à 8001ZURICH.CONTRE:1) La FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALLASSOCIATION (« la FIFA ») dont le siège social est établi à 8030 Zurich(Suisse), H<strong>it</strong>zigweg n° 11, inscr<strong>it</strong>e au registra du commerce de Zurich sousle n° CH-020.6.000.262-1.Défenderesse, représentée et comparaissant par ses conseils MaîtresChristophe RONSE et Laurent SERVAIS, avocats au barreau de Bruxelles,dont le cabinet est sis à 1000 BRUXELLES, avenue du Port, n° 86 CB4414, ainsi que par Maître AMI BARAV du barreau de Paris, dont le cabinet
152 Giurisprudenza Internazionaleest sis à 75005 PARIS, place du Panthéon, n° 12.2) Les parties intervenant volontairement mieux décr<strong>it</strong>es ci-après:1. L’UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS EUROPEENNES DE FOOTBALL(UEFA), association de dro<strong>it</strong> suisse, dont le siège social est établi à 1260Nyon 2, route de Genève 46, Suisse;2. La CONFEDERATION AFRICAINE DE FOOTBALL (CAF),association de dro<strong>it</strong> égyptien, dont le siège social est établi à 6th OctoberC<strong>it</strong>y, Abdel Khalek Sarwat Street, En Hay El Motamayez, P.O. Box 23,Egypte;3. La CONFEDERACION SUDAMERICANA DE FUTBOL(Confédération Sudaméricaine de Football, CONMEBOL), association d<strong>ed</strong>ro<strong>it</strong> paraguayen, dont le siège social est établi à Luque (Gran Asunciôn),Autopista Aeroperto Internacional y Leonismo Luqueno, Paraguay;4. L’ASIAN FOOTBALL CONFEDERATION (Confédération Asatiqu<strong>ed</strong>e Football, AFC), association de dro<strong>it</strong> Malaisien, dont le siège social estétabli à 57000 Kuala Lumpur, Jalan 1/155B, Buk<strong>it</strong> Jalil, Malaysie;5. L’OCEANIA FOOTBALL CONFEDERATION (ConfédérationOcéanienne de Football, OFC), association de dro<strong>it</strong> néo-zélandais, dont lesiège social est établi à Auckland, Mauriceroad 12, P.O. Box 62 586,Nouvelle-Zélande;6. FEDERATE SHQIPTARE E FUTBOLLIT (Fédération Albanaise deFootball, FAF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> albanais, dont le siège social est établiRr. « Elbasan<strong>it</strong> », Tirana, Albanie;7. FEDERACIO ANDORRANA DE FUTBOL (Fédération Andorrane deFootball, FAF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> andorrane, dont le siège social est établiAv. Carlemany 67 3 PI. Les Escaldes-Engordany, Principauté d’Andorre;8. La FEDERATION DE FOOTBALL D’ARMENIE (FFA), associationde dro<strong>it</strong> arménien, dont le siège social est établi 27, Khanjyan str. Yerevan,République d’Arménie;9. ÔSTERREICHISCHER FUSSBALL-BUND (Association de FootballAutrichienne, OFB), association de dro<strong>it</strong> autrichien, dont le siège social estétabli à 1020 Vienne, Meiereistrasse 7, Autriche;10. L’ASSOCIATION DES FEDERATIONS DE FOOTBALLD’AZERBAIDJAN (AFFA), association de dro<strong>it</strong> azerbaidjanais, dont le siègesocial est établi 37 Khojali Avenue, « Silk Way » Business Center, Baku,AZ1025 Azerbaidjan;11. L’ASSOCIATION BIELORUSSE DE FOOTBALL (FBF), associationde dro<strong>it</strong> biélorusse, dont le siège social est établi à Minsk (Belarus), 8/2Kirov str, Biélorussie;
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 15312. NOGOMETNI/FUDBALSKI SAVEZ BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA(Fédération de Football de Bosnie-Herzégovine, FFBH), association de dro<strong>it</strong>de Bosnie et Herzégovine, dont le siège social est établi Ferha<strong>di</strong>ja 30, 71000Sarajevo, Bosnie–Herzégovine;13. L’UNION DE FOOTBALL DE BULGARIE (UFB), association de dro<strong>it</strong>bulgare, dont le siège social est établi à Sofia 1124, 26 Tzar Ivan Assen IIStr , Bulgarie;14. L’ASSOCIATION DE FOOTBALL DE CHYPRE (AFC), associationde dro<strong>it</strong> chypriote, dont le siège social est établi 1 Rue Stasinos, 2404 Engomi,1306 Nicosia, Chypre;15. HRVATSKI NOGOMETNI SAVEZ (Fédération de Football de Croatie,HNS-CFF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> croate, dont le siège social est établiRusanova 13, 10000 Zagreb, Croatie;16. DANSK BOLDSPIL-UNION (Association Danoise de Football, ADF),association de dro<strong>it</strong> danois, dont le siège social est établi à Fodboldens Hus,DBU Allé 1, 2605, Danemark;17. SCOTTISH FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION (Association Ecossaise deFootball, SFA), association de dro<strong>it</strong> écossais, dont le siège social est établi àHampden Park, Glasgow G42 9AY, Écosse;18. REAL FEDERACION ESPANOLA DE FUTBOL (FédérationEspagnole de Football, RFEF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> espagnol, dont le siègesocial est établi à 28230 Las Rozas (Madrid), Calle Ramôn y Cajal s/n,Espagne;19. EESTI JALGPALLI LIIT (Association Estonienne de Football, AEF),association de dro<strong>it</strong> estonien, dont le siège social est établi Asula 4c, Tallinn11312, Estonie;20. SUOMEN PALLOLIITTO (Association de Football de Finlande, AFF),association de dro<strong>it</strong> finlandais, dont le siège social est établi Urheilukatu 5,00250, Helsinki, Finlande;21. La FEDERATION GEORGIENNE DE FOOTBALL (GFF), associationde dro<strong>it</strong> géorgien, dont le siège social est établi 76 A, I. Chavchavadze av.,0162 Tbilissi, Géorgie;22. La FEDERATION HELLENIQUE DE FOOTBALL (FHF), associationde dro<strong>it</strong> grec, dont le siège social est établi 137 Avenue Gigrou, Athènes,Grèce;23. MAGYAR LABDARUGO SZOVETSEG (Fédération Hongroise deFootball, FHF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> hongrois, dont le siège social est établiRobert K krt. 61-65, Budapest, 1134, Hongrie;24. FOTBOLTSSAMBAND FOROYA (Association de Football des Iles
154 Giurisprudenza InternazionaleFéroé, AFIF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> des Iles Faeroe, dont le siège social estétabli à Gundadalur, P.O. Box 3028, FO-110 Tôrshavn, Iles Féroé;25. FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION OF IRELAND (Association Irlandaise deFootball, AIF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> irlandais, dont le siège social est établi 8Merrion Square, Dublin 2, Irlande;26. IRISH FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION (Association de Football d’Irland<strong>ed</strong>u Nord, AFIN), association de dro<strong>it</strong> nord-irlandais, dont le siège social estétabli 20 Windsor Avenue, Belfast BT9 6EE, Irlande du Nord, Royaume-Uni;27. KNATTSPYRNUSAMBAND ISLANDS (Assosiation Islandaise deFootball, AIF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> islandais, dont le siège social est établiLaugardal IS-104 Reykjavik, Islande;28. HITACHDOET LEKADOEREGEL BEJISRAEEL (Association deFootabll d’Israël, AFI), de dro<strong>it</strong> israélien, dont le siège social est établi AbbaHillel, 299, Ramat Gan (Stade de Ramat Gan), Israël;29. FEDERAZIONE ITALIANA GIUOCO CALCIO (Fédération Italienn<strong>ed</strong>e Football, FIF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> <strong>it</strong>alien, dont le siège social est établi àRome, Via Gregorio Allegri 14, Italie;30. La FEDERATION DE FOOTBALL DU KAZAKHSTAN (FFK),association de dro<strong>it</strong> kazakhstanais, dont le siège social est établi Ba<strong>it</strong>ursynovStr 47 A, 060000, Atyrau, Kazakhstan.31. LATVIJAS FUTBOLA FEDERACIJA (Fédération Lettonne de Football,FLF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> letton, dont le siège social est établi Augsiela 1,Riga, LV1009, Lettonie;32. LIECHTENSTEINER FUSSBALLVERBANDS (Association deFootball du Liechtenstein, AFL), association de dro<strong>it</strong> du Liechtenstein, dontle siège social est établi Altenbach 11, FL-9490 Vaduz, Liechtenstein;33. LIETUVOS FUTBOLO FEDERACIJA (Fédération L<strong>it</strong>uanienne deFootball, FLF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> l<strong>it</strong>uanien, dont le siège social est établiSeimyniskiu 15, Vilnius LT-2005, L<strong>it</strong>uanie;34. La FEDERATION LUXEMBOURGEOISE DE FOOTBALL (FLF),association sans but lucratif de dro<strong>it</strong> luxembourgeois, dont le siège socialest établi à L-3239 Mondercange, rue de Limpach, Luxembourg;35. La FEDERATION MACEDONIENNE DE FOOTBALL (FMF),association de dro<strong>it</strong> macédonien, dont le siège social est établi st. 8-ma UdarnaBrigada, 31a, 1000 Skopje, Macédoine;36. MALTA FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION (Association Maltaise deFootball, AMF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> malte, dont le siège social est établi280, St. Paul’s Street, Valletta, Malte;
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 15537. FEDERATIA MOLDOVENEASCÂ DE FOTBAL (Fédération Moldav<strong>ed</strong>e Football, FMF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> moldave, dont le siège social estétabli Str. Tricolorului 39, MD-2012 Chisnau, Moldavie;38. NORGES FOTBALLFORBUND (Association de Football Norvégienne,AFN), association, dont le siège social est établi Ullevall Sta<strong>di</strong>on, Sognsveien75 J, 0855 Oslo, Norvège;39. CYMDEITHAS BEL DROED CYMRU (Fédération de Football du Paysde Galles, FFPG), association de dro<strong>it</strong> anglais, dont le siège social est établi11/12 Neptune Court, Vanguard Way, Car<strong>di</strong>ff DF24 5PJ, Pays de Galles,Royaume-Uni;40. KONINKLIJKE NEDERLANDSE VOETBALBOND (Union RoyaleNéerlandaise de Football, URFN), association de dro<strong>it</strong> néerlandais, dont lesiège social est établi à 3707 HX Zeist, Woudenbergseweg 56-58, Pays-Bas;41. PLOSKI SWIAZEK PILKI NOZNEJ (Association Polonaise deFootball, APN), association de dro<strong>it</strong> polonais, dont le siège social est établiMiodowa 1, 00-080 Warszawa, Pologne;42. FEDERACAO PORTUGUESA DE FUTEBOL (Fédération Portugais<strong>ed</strong>e Football, FPF), association portugaise de dro<strong>it</strong> privé et avec statut d’intérêtpublic, dont le siège social est établi Rua Alexandre Herculano, n° 58,Lisbonne, Portugal;43. FEDERATIA ROMANA DE FOTBAL (Fédération Roumaine deFootball, FRF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> roumain, dont le siège social est établi«The House of Football», Str. Serg. Vasile Serbanica 12, 022186 Bucharest,Roumanie;44. L’UNION DE FOOTBALL DE RUSSIE (UFR), association de dro<strong>it</strong>de la Fédération Russe, dont le siège social est établi Luzhnetskayanaberezhnaya, 8 119992 Moscou, Fédération Russe;45. FEDERAZIONE SAMMARINESE GIUOCO CALCIO (FédérationSaint-Marinaise de Football, FSMF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> San Marinais, dontle siège social est établi Viale Campo dei Giudei, 14 - 47890, San Marin;46. FUDBALSKI SAVEZ SRBIJE I CRNE GORE (Association de Footballde la Serbie et du Montenegro, AFSM), association de dro<strong>it</strong> Serbe et duMontenegro, dont le siège social est établi à Belgrade, Terazije 35, Serbie etMontenegro;47. SLOVENSKY FUTBALOVY ZVAZ (Association Slovaque de Football,ASF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> de la République slovaque, dont le siège socialest établi à Bratislava, Junàcka 6., 832 80, République slovaque;48. NOGOMETNA ZVEZA SLOVENIJE (Association Slovène de Football,
156 Giurisprudenza InternazionaleASF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> slovène, dont le siège social est établi Cerinova4, Ljubljana, Slovénie;49. SVENSKA FOTBOLL FORBUNDET (Association Suédoise deFootball ASF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> suédois, dont le siège social est établiSolnavâgen 51 P.O. Box 1216, SE-171 23 Solna, Suède;50. L’ASSOCIATION SUISSE DE FOOTBALL (ASF), association de dro<strong>it</strong>suisse, dont le siège social est établi 3074 Muri/BE, Worbstrasse 48, boîtepostale 3000, Berne 15, Suisse;51. CESKOMORAVSKY FOTBALOVY SVAZ (Association de Footballde la République Tchèque, AFRT), association de dro<strong>it</strong> tchèque, dont lesiège social est établi à Prague 1, Kozi street 7, 110, République Tchèque;52. TURKIYE FUTBOL FEDERASYONU (Fédération Turque de Football,FTF), association de dro<strong>it</strong> turc, dont le siège social est établi Konaklar Mah.Ihlamurlu Sok. No 9 4. Levent 34330 Istanbul, Turquie;53. La FEDERATION DE FOOTBALL D’UKRAINE (FFU), associationde dro<strong>it</strong> ukrainien, dont le siège social est établi Ulyanovykh Str. 1, Kiev,UA-03150, Ukraine;Représentées et comparaissant par leurs conseils Maîtres Christophe RONSEet Laurent SERVAIS, avocats au barreau de Bruxelles, dont le cabinet estsis à 1000 BRUXELLES, avenue du Port, n° 86 CB 4414 ainsi que parMaître AMI BARAV avocat au barreau de Paris, dont le cabinet est sis à75005 PARIS, place du Panthéon, n° 12.54. L’UNION ROYALE BELGE DES SOCIETES DE FOOTBALL ASBL(URBSFA), association sans but lucratif de dro<strong>it</strong> belge dont le siège socialest établi à 1020 BRUXELLES, avenue Houba de Strooper n° 145;Représentée et comparaissant par son conseil Me Daniel DESSARD, avocatau barreau de Liège, dont le cabinet est sis à 4000 LIEGE, boulevard Piercotn° 2.Affaire Rôle Général n° A/06/00735EN CAUSE DE:1) La SA SPORTING DU PAYS DE CHARLEROI, dont le siège socialest établi à 6000 Charleroi, boulevard Zoé Drion, n° 19, inscr<strong>it</strong>e à la BanqueCarrefour des Entreprises sous le n° 0472.519.068;Demanderesse, représentée par Messieurs Abbas GHOLI BAYAT,administrateur-délégué, et Eugène TCHEN, administrateur;Comparaissant par son conseil, Maître Jean-Pierre DEPREZ, avocat aubarreau de Charleroi, dont le cabinet est sis à à 6001 CHARLEROI, avenueEugène Mascaux, n° 129.2) Le G-14 GROUPEMENT DES CLUBS DE FOOTBALL
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 157EUROPEENS, Groupement Européen d’Intérêt Economique (GEIE), dontle siège social est établi à 1060 Bruxelles, avenue de la Toison d’Or, n° 67,inscr<strong>it</strong> à la Banque Carrefour des Entreprises sous le n° 0473.255.278;Demanderesse sur intervention volontaire, représentée par Monsieur ThomasKURTH, manager général du G14;Comparaissant par ses conseils Maîtres Martin H1SSEL, Jean-LouisDUPONT, Patrick HENRY, tous trois avocats au barreau de Liège, dont lecabinet est sis à 4000 LIEGE, boulevard Emile de Laveleye, n° 65 b, parMaître Bernard de COCQUEAU, avocat au barreau de Liège, dont le cabinetest sis à 4020 LIEGE, place des Nations-Unies, n° 7, ainsi que par MaîtreDALLAFIOR, avocat au barreau de Zurich, dont le cabinet est sisRâmistrasse, n° 5, à 8001 ZURICH.CONTRE:1) La FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALLASSOCIATION (FIFA), dont le siège social est établi à 8030 Zurich (Suisse),H<strong>it</strong>zigweg n°11, inscr<strong>it</strong>e au registre de commerce de Zurich sous le n° CH-020.6.000.262-1;Défenderesse, représentée et comparaissant par ses conseils MaîtresChristophe RONSE et Laurent SERVAIS, avocats au barreau de Bruxelles,dont le cabinet est sis à 1000 BRUXELLES, avenue du Port, n° 86 CB4414, ainsi que par Maître AMI BARAV du barreau de Paris, dont le cabinetest sis à 75005 PARIS, place du Panthéon, n° 12.2) L’UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS EUROPEENNES DE FOOTBALL(UEFA), association de dro<strong>it</strong> suisse, dont le siège social est établi à 1260Nyon 2, route de Genève 46, Suisse;Partie intervenant volontairement, représentée et comparaissant par sesconseils Maîtres Christophe RONSE et Laurent SERVAIS, avocats aubarreau de Bruxelles, dont le cabinet est sis à 1000 BRUXELLES, avenu<strong>ed</strong>u Port, n° 86 CB 4414, ainsi que par Maître AMI BARAV du barreau deParis, dont le cabinet est sis à 75005 PARIS, place du Panthéon, n° 12.Le tribunal a constaté la production en forme régulière des pièces deprocédure prévues par la loi.Les conseils des parties ont été entendus à l’au<strong>di</strong>ence du 20 mars 2006, dateà laquelle la cause a été prise en délibéré.Après avoir délibéré, le tribunal prononce le jugement suivant:EXPOSE DU LITIGELes fa<strong>it</strong>s pertinents pour l’examen du l<strong>it</strong>ige peuvent être résumés commesu<strong>it</strong>:1. Les parties au procès figurent à <strong>di</strong>fférents étages de la pyramide que
158 Giurisprudenza Internazionaleforme l’organisation mon<strong>di</strong>ale du football. (Si l’on considère le G-14 danssa fonction de représentation des intérêts de 18 clubs européens).La FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION(«la FIFA») en est l’inst<strong>it</strong>ution faîtière; il s’ag<strong>it</strong> d’une association de dro<strong>it</strong>suisse qui, selon ses statuts, a pour membres des associations nationales(article 1 er ) lesquelles regroupent des clubs de football qualifiés d’amateursou de professionnels.Les associations nationales peuvent également se grouper en confédérations.(article 9)Toujours selon ses statuts, la FIFA a pour but: «La promotion du football, l<strong>ed</strong>éveloppement de relations a micales entre les associations nationales, lesconfédérations, les clubs et les joueurs ainsi que l’établissement et le contrôl<strong>ed</strong>es règlements et des méthodes intéressant les lois du jeu et la pratique dufootball.» (article 2)Les statuts, règlements et décisions de la FIFA sont obligatoires pour sesmembres. (article 4)La SA SPORTING DU PAYS DE CHARLEROI («le SPORTING») gèreun club de football, membre de l’UNION ROYALE BELGE DESSOCIETES DE FOOTBALL (URBSFA), qui évolue dans le championnatde <strong>di</strong>vision 1. Le G-14 est un groupement européen d’intérêt économique(GEIE), immatriculé en Belgique, qui regroupe <strong>di</strong>x hu<strong>it</strong> des clubs de footballles plus importants en Europe.2. Le l<strong>it</strong>ige trouve son origine dans la blessure dont a été victime, ennovembre 2004, M. Abdelmadjid OULMERS, joueur professionnel denational<strong>it</strong>é marocaine sous contrat au SPORTING DE CHARLEROI.Au vu de son niveau de jeu, celui-ci ava<strong>it</strong> été inv<strong>it</strong>é par la Fédérationmarocaine à honorer une première sélection nationale lors du match amicalopposant, le 17 novembre 2004, le MAROC au BURKINA FASO.Alors qu’il marqua<strong>it</strong> le seul but de la rencontre, M. OULMERS a été victim<strong>ed</strong>u tacle d’un joueur burkinabé, qui lui a occasionné une entorse de la chevillegauche avec rupture de ligaments externes; il est ensu<strong>it</strong>e resté éloigné desterrains pendant une période d’environ hu<strong>it</strong> mois.3. Le SPORTING DE CHARLEROI n’ava<strong>it</strong> pas assuré son joueur contreles risques de blessure. Par télécopie du 8 décembre 2004, il s’est adressé àla Fédération marocaine, l’interrogeant sur ses intentions concernant laréparation du préju<strong>di</strong>ce occasionné.En réponse, le 17 décembre 2004, la Fédération marocaine a décliné sonintervention, se prévalant de l’article 37 du règlement FIFA « relatif au statutet au transfert des joueurs » (version du 5 juillet 2001), selon lequel:
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 159« Un club qui met l’un de ses joueurs à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion d’une association selonles <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions de l’article 38 ci dessous n’a dro<strong>it</strong> à aucune indemn<strong>it</strong>éfinancière (…)Les clubs auprès desquels des joueurs convoqués sont enregistrés, assurenteux–mêmes les joueurs concernés contre les mala<strong>di</strong>es et les accidentspouvant survenir durant la période de mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, de même pour lesblessures subies lors du match international ou des matches internationauxpour lesquels ils sont libérés. »La SA SPORTING DU PAYS DE CHARLEROI a dès lors mis en cause laréglementation FIFA; par acte d’huissier du 12 juillet 2005, elle a c<strong>it</strong>é cetteassociation pour:1) Entendre <strong>di</strong>re pour dro<strong>it</strong> que les articles 36 à 41 inclus du règlementFIFA concernant le statut et le transfert des joueurs, dans sa version adoptéeIe 5/7/2001 (ou les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions équivalentes qui figureraient dans de nouvellesversions du règlement) sont illégaux pour violation du dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire,Ie cas échéant après avoir posé à la Cour de Justice des CommunautésEuropéennes la question préju<strong>di</strong>cielle suivante:«Les <strong>di</strong>verses obligations imposées aux clubs et aux joueurs de football,sous contrat de travail auprès des<strong>di</strong>ts clubs, par les articles 36 à 41 inclusdu règlement FIFA concernant le statut et le transfert des joueurs, const<strong>it</strong>uent-elles des restrictions de concurrence illic<strong>it</strong>e et/ou des abus de pos<strong>it</strong>iondominante inter<strong>di</strong>ts par les articles 81 et 82 du Tra<strong>it</strong>é C.E.?»2) Après, le cas échéant, avoir pris connaissance de I’arrêt préju<strong>di</strong>cielprononcé par la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes, entendre<strong>di</strong>re pour dro<strong>it</strong> qu’en raison de l’illégal<strong>it</strong>é des <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions préc<strong>it</strong>ées durèglement FIFA, la SA SPORTING DU PAYS DE CHARLEROI est libéré<strong>ed</strong>orénavant de l’obligation de mettre à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion ses joueurs en faveur deséquipes nationales.3) Entendre condamner la FIFA à indemniser la SA SPORTING DU PAYSDE CHARLEROI de tout préju<strong>di</strong>ce subi ou à subir, le cas échéant, du fa<strong>it</strong>de la blessure contractée par Monsieur Abdelmadjid OULMERS lors dumatch du 17/11/2004, Maroc - Burkina Faso, et entendre condamner laFIFA à payer à la SA SPORTING DU PAYS DE CHARLEROI la somme enprincipal de 100.000 Euro sous réserve.4) Entendre condamner la FIFA à indemniser la SA SPORTING DU PAYSDE CHARLEROI pour les <strong>di</strong>vers préju<strong>di</strong>ces subis du fa<strong>it</strong> de la mise à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, sans compensation financière, de certains de ses joueurs aubénéfice des fédérations nationales concernées, dommage évalué à la sommeen principal de 50.000 Euro sous réserve, rédu<strong>it</strong>e à 1 Euro provisionnel.
160 Giurisprudenza InternazionalePar requête déposée le 5 septembre 2005, le G-14 a fa<strong>it</strong> interventionvolontaire dans la procédure. Ses demandes sont les mêmes que celles duSPORTING, en ce qui concerne les points 1) et 2); pour le surplus, le G-14tend à:- Entendre <strong>di</strong>re pour dro<strong>it</strong> après, le cas échéant, avoir pris connaissance del’arrêt préju<strong>di</strong>ciel prononcé par la Cour de Justice des CommunautésEuropéennes, qu’en raison de l’illégal<strong>it</strong>é des <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions préc<strong>it</strong>ées durèglement FIFA, les membres du G-14 sont libérés dorénavant de l’obligationde mettre à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion leurs joueurs en faveur des équipes nationales.- Entendre condamner la FIFA à indemniser le G-14 et ses membres pourles <strong>di</strong>vers préju<strong>di</strong>ces subis du fa<strong>it</strong> de la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, sans compensationfinancière, de certains de leurs joueurs au prof<strong>it</strong> de la FIFA et des fédérationsnationales, dommage évalué à 1 Euro provisionnel.Les demandes du SPORTING et du G-14 seront par la su<strong>it</strong>e légèrementmo<strong>di</strong>fiées, notamment en ce qui concerne le libellé de la question préju<strong>di</strong>cielle.Cinq confédérations continentales, dont l’UNION DES ASSOCIATIONSEUROPEENNES DE FOOTBALL (UEFA), ont fa<strong>it</strong> intervention volontair<strong>ed</strong>ans le l<strong>it</strong>ige ainsi que 49 fédérations nationales, dont l’UNION ROYALEBELGE DES SOCIETES DE FOOTBALL (URBSFA), en vue de soutenirla pos<strong>it</strong>ion de la FIFA.4. Pour répondre à un argument de procédure, le SPORTING, par act<strong>ed</strong>’huissier du 19 janvier 2006, a introdu<strong>it</strong> une nouvelle c<strong>it</strong>ation contre laFIFA, tendant au même objet que la c<strong>it</strong>ation du 12 juillet 2005. Le G-14 estintervenu volontairement dans cette affaire, par requête déposée le 6 mars2006 lors de l’au<strong>di</strong>ence d’introduction.A cette date, le second dossier a été remis au 20 mars 2006, c’est à <strong>di</strong>re àl’au<strong>di</strong>ence déjà fixée pour plaider le premier dossier.Par conclusions déposées le 22 février 2006, le G-14 a introdu<strong>it</strong> une nouvell<strong>ed</strong>emande, formulée en nom propre contre la FIFA et l’UEFA, en vue d’obtenirréparation du dommage résultant de l’entrave à ses activ<strong>it</strong>és commerciales,évalué à 1 Euro provisionnel.LA PROCEDUREDans le cadre de son délibéré, le tribunal a pris connaissance des piècessuivantes déposées par les parties au dossier de la procédure:Dans le dossier identifié sous le rôle général n° A/05/03843:- La c<strong>it</strong>ation notifiée le 12 juillet 2005 à la requête de la SA SPORTINGDU PAYS DE CHARLEROI contre la FIFA;- La requête en intervention volontaire déposée le 5 septembre 2005 par leG-14 Groupement des clubs de football européens;
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 161- Les conclusions déposées par la FIFA, le 15 novembre 2005;- La requête en intervention volontaire déposée par l’UEFA, le 17 novembre2005;- Les conclusions déposées par le SPORTING et le G-14, le 14 décembre2005;- Les requêtes en intervention volontaire déposées par 5 confédérations defootball, le 8 février 2006;- Les requêtes en intervention volontaire déposées par 49 fédérations defootball, les 8 et 21 février 2006;- Les conclusions ad<strong>di</strong>tionnelles et de synthèse déposées par la FIFA, par 5confédérations de football et 48 fédérations de football, le 8 février 2006;- Les conclusions ad<strong>di</strong>tionnelles et de synthèse déposées par le SPORTINGet le G-14, le 22 février 2006;- Les conclusions ad<strong>di</strong>tionnelles et de synthèse (en réal<strong>it</strong>é, secondesconclusions ad<strong>di</strong>tionnelles et de synthèse) déposées par la FIFA, par 5confédérations de football et 48 fédérations de football, le 8 mars 2006;- Les conclusions déposées par l’UNION BELGE de FOOTBALL àl’au<strong>di</strong>ence du 20 mars 2006;- Les dossiers déposés par le SPORTING et le G-14, par la FIFA ainsi quepar l’URBSFA à l’au<strong>di</strong>ence du 20 mars 2006.Dans le dossier identifié sous le rôle général A/06/00735:- La c<strong>it</strong>ation notifiée le 19 janvier 2006 à la requête du SPORTING DECHARLEROI contre la FIFA;- La requête en intervention volontaire déposée le 6 mars 2006 par leG-14.DISCUSSIONTITRE I - EXAMEN DES ARGUMENTS DE PROCEDURELa FIFA soulève de nombreux arguments d’incompétence et d’irrecevabil<strong>it</strong>éque le tribunal examine ci-dessous.Exception d’arb<strong>it</strong>rageLa FIFA se fonde sur les articles 59, 60 et 61 de ses statuts pour soutenir quele SPORTING DE CHARLEROI ainsi que le G-14 seraient liés par uneclause d’arb<strong>it</strong>rage les contraignant à soumettre le l<strong>it</strong>ige au Tribunal Arb<strong>it</strong>raldu <strong>Sport</strong> (le «TAS»).En vue d’examiner cette exception, le tribunal do<strong>it</strong> d’abord vérifier à quelleversion des statuts de la FIFA il y a lieu de se référer.Selon la FIFA, seule devra<strong>it</strong> être retenue la version mo<strong>di</strong>fiée lors du congrèsde Marrakech, le 1 er décembre 2005, alors que selon le SPORTING et le G-14, la version adoptée à Doha, le 9 octobre 2003, sera<strong>it</strong> d’application.
162 Giurisprudenza InternazionaleLa FIFA souligne que les statuts qu’elle é<strong>di</strong>cté s’imposent immé<strong>di</strong>atement etautomatiquement à tous les clubs, membres des fédérations nationales defootball, par un phénomène de transmission en « cascade », du faîte de lapyramide du football jusqu’à sa base : de la FIFA, vers les confédérations,les fédérations et les clubs.Il en ira<strong>it</strong> ainsi des statuts mo<strong>di</strong>fiés à Marrakech le 1 er décembre 2005, lesquelsse seraient dès le jour de leur adoption imposés au SPORTING et au G-14,en particulier les mo<strong>di</strong>fications ayant tra<strong>it</strong> à l’obligation de recours au TASqui s’appliqueraient à tous l<strong>it</strong>iges non encore jugés et donc au présent l<strong>it</strong>ige.Il est élémentaire de rappeler que les régies légales ou contractuellesapplicables à la solution d’un l<strong>it</strong>ige sont celles qui ont cours au moment oùle premier fa<strong>it</strong> générateur de l’obligation se produ<strong>it</strong>, so<strong>it</strong> en l’occurrence à ladate où M.OULMERS fut mis à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, sans indemn<strong>it</strong>és, de la Fédérationmarocaine de football.Dans le cadre de la présente procédure, la FIFA n’est dès lors pas fondée àse prévaloir d’une mo<strong>di</strong>fication de son règlement, intervenue postérieurement,qui plus est après introduction de l’action en justice du SPORTING DECHARLEROI.En conséquence, le tribunal se référera à la version des statuts de la FiFAadoptée le 23 octobre 2003, à Doha.Dans ces statuts, les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions relatives à l’intervention du TAS figurentau t<strong>it</strong>re VIII, articles 59 à 61. Ceux-ci sont libellés comme su<strong>it</strong>:Article 59“1. La FIFA offre la possibil<strong>it</strong>é de faire recours au Tribunal arb<strong>it</strong>ral dusport, un Tribunal arb<strong>it</strong>ral indépendant ayant son siège à Lausanne (Suisse),pour tout <strong>di</strong>fférend opposant la FIFA, les confédérations, les membres, agentsde matches et les agents de joueurs licenciés.2. (…) “.Article 60“1. Le TAS est seul compétent pour tra<strong>it</strong>er des recours interjetés contretoute décision ou sanction <strong>di</strong>sciplinaire prise en dernier ressort par touteautor<strong>it</strong>é juri<strong>di</strong>ctionnelle de la FIFA, d’une confédération, d’un membre oud’une ligue. Le recours do<strong>it</strong> être déposé au TAS dans les 10 jours suivant lacommunication de la décision.2. Le TAS ne tra<strong>it</strong>e pas les recours relatifs:a) à la violation des Lois du jeu;b) à une suspens ion inférieure ou égale à quatre matches ou 3 mois;c) à une décision d’un Tribunal arb<strong>it</strong>ral d’une association ou d’uneconfédération, indépendant et régulièrement const<strong>it</strong>ué;
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 1633. Le TAS est également chargé de régler tout l<strong>it</strong>ige opposant à un tiersl’une des ent<strong>it</strong>és ou des personnes mentionnées à l’alinéa 1, pour autantqu’il y a<strong>it</strong> une convention d’arb<strong>it</strong>rage”.Article 61«1. Les confédérations, les membres et les ligues s’engagent à reconnaîtrele TAS comme instance juri<strong>di</strong>ctionnelle indépendante. Ils s’engagent àprendre toutes les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions nécessaires pour que leurs membres ainsique leurs joueurs et officiels se soumettent à l’arb<strong>it</strong>rage du TAS. Les mêmes<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions s’appliquent aux agents de matches et aux agents des joueurslicenciés.2. Tout recours devant un Tribunal or<strong>di</strong>naire est inter<strong>di</strong>t, sauf s’il estspécifiquement prévu parles règlements de la FIFA.3. Les associations doivent insérer, dans leurs statuts, une <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion selonlaquelle leurs clubs et leurs membres ne peuvent pas porter un l<strong>it</strong>ige devantles tribunaux or<strong>di</strong>naires mais doivent soumettre tout <strong>di</strong>fférend éventuel auxorganes juri<strong>di</strong>ctionnels de l’association, de la confédération ou de la FIFA.»L’on aura relevé plusieurs problèmes d’interprétation dans ces <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions;ainsi, l’article 59 stipule que la FIFA «offre la possibil<strong>it</strong>é de faire recours auTAS», alors que l’article 61 est libellé de manière impérative, notammentparce qu’il inter<strong>di</strong>t le recours à un tribunal or<strong>di</strong>naire.Par ailleurs, l’article 60 semble in<strong>di</strong>quer que la compétence du TAS n’estexclusive que pour les matières définies à cet article («Le TAS est seulcompètent»), ce qui laisse supposer que pour le surplus, les recours or<strong>di</strong>nairessont ouverts, au choix des parties.Enfin, en lui-même, l’article 61 pose un problème d’interprétation.Au paragraphe 1 er , il est in<strong>di</strong>qué que: «Les confédérations, les membres(c’est à <strong>di</strong>re les fédérations) et les ligues s’engagent à reconnaître le TAScomme instance juri<strong>di</strong>ctionnelle indépendante. Ils s’engagent à prendretoutes les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions nécessaires pour que leurs membres (c.a.d. les clubs)ainsi que leurs joueurs et officiels se soumettent à l’arb<strong>it</strong>rage du TAS (…)»Par contre, au paragraphe 3, il n’est plus question de l’intervention du TASpour les clubs:«Les associations doivent insérer, dans leurs statuts, une <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion selonlaquelle leurs clubs et leurs membres ne peuvent pas porter un l<strong>it</strong>ige devantles tribunaux or<strong>di</strong>naires mais doivent soumettre tout <strong>di</strong>fférend éventuel auxorganes juri<strong>di</strong>ctionnels de l’association, de la confédération ou de la FIFA».Or, l’on sa<strong>it</strong> que le TAS n’est pas un organe juri<strong>di</strong>ctionnel de la FIFA.En bref, il est peu évident de <strong>di</strong>scerner dans les articles 59, 60 et 61 desstatuts FIFA, une ligne <strong>di</strong>rectrice nette dans le sens d’une obligation éventuelle
164 Giurisprudenza Internazionaleimposée aux clubs de recourir à l’arb<strong>it</strong>rage du TAS; au contraire, l’imprécisiondes termes amène le tribunal à la conclusion que les statuts adoptés à Dohane mettent pas clairement à charge du SPORTING et du G-14 une telleobligation.***Surabondamment, le tribunal envisagera la s<strong>it</strong>uation juri<strong>di</strong>que dansl’hypothèse où, malgré le caractère contra<strong>di</strong>ctoire de certaines <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions,l’on pourra<strong>it</strong> considérer que les textes concernés ont une signification précise.Par postulat, il sera ainsi admis que les statuts de la FIFA, adoptés à Doha,mettent clairement à charge des clubs l’obligation - à inscrire dans le règlementdes fédérations nationales – de recourir à l’arb<strong>it</strong>rage du TAS.En vue de vérifier si le SPORTING et le G-14 sont susceptibles d’être tenussur cette base, il convient de se référer au dro<strong>it</strong> commun de l’arb<strong>it</strong>rage.Dans le cadre de cet examen, la FIFA ne conteste pas l’application du dro<strong>it</strong>belge (Elle se réfère au code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire, ses dernières conclusions p. 33,verbo 35, et p. 35, al. 2); cette pos<strong>it</strong>ion est conforme au principe uniform<strong>ed</strong>e dro<strong>it</strong> international privé suivant lequel, pour régler les questions de pureprocédure, les tribunaux appliquent, à l’exclusion de toute autre, les règlesde dro<strong>it</strong> interne.(Voy. F. RIGAUX et M. FALLON, Dro<strong>it</strong> international privé, tome II, Larcier1993, n° 894 et svt )De toutes les façons, ainsi que le prévo<strong>it</strong> le code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire belge, le dro<strong>it</strong>suisse impose qu’en arb<strong>it</strong>rage international, il so<strong>it</strong> possible d’établir par untexte la preuve d’une clause arb<strong>it</strong>rale.(Loi fédérale de dro<strong>it</strong> international privé adoptée le 18 décembre 1987,voir P. LALIVE « Le dro<strong>it</strong> suisse de l’arb<strong>it</strong>rage », travaux offerts auprofesseur A. FETTWEIS, Story -Scientia, 1989 p. 279 et svt)C’est ce que stipule l’article 1677 du code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire belge, qui intègre letexte de la convention européenne portant loi uniforme, adopté à Strasbourgle 20 janvier 1966:« Toute convention d’arb<strong>it</strong>rage do<strong>it</strong> faire l ’objet d’un écr<strong>it</strong> signé des partiesou d’autres documents qui engagent les parties et manifestent leur volontéde recourir à l’arb<strong>it</strong>rage. »Pour établir l’existence de la convention d‘arb<strong>it</strong>rage, il suff<strong>it</strong> donc que lapreuve puisse en être rapportée par des documents, même éventuellementnon signés, mais répondant à la double exigence de clarté et de cert<strong>it</strong>udeexprimée par la loi.L’écr<strong>it</strong> dont il est fa<strong>it</strong> mention à l’article 1677 du code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire n’est icirequis que pour faire la preuve de la volonté d’une partie de se soumettre àl’arb<strong>it</strong>rage.
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 165(Ph. de Bournonville, L’arb<strong>it</strong>rage, Répertoire Notarial, Tome XIII, LivreVI, p. 96 n° 70 )En l’occurrence, à défaut d’un écr<strong>it</strong> exprès du SPORTING et du G-14, ilappartient à la FIFA de démontrer que ces parties ont d’une manière oud’une autre manifesté leur volonté de recourir à l’arb<strong>it</strong>rage et, partant, desoustraire tout l<strong>it</strong>ige impliquant notamment la FIFA, à la compétence desjuri<strong>di</strong>ctions de l’ordre ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire.Or, la FIFA in<strong>di</strong>que dans ses dernières conclusions (p. 71 en note) qu’iln’existe aucun lien contractuel entre les demandeurs et elle-même; l’on ne<strong>di</strong>stingue pas comment, dans ces con<strong>di</strong>tions, une clause d’arb<strong>it</strong>rage pourra<strong>it</strong>leur être opposée puisqu’une telle clause résulte d’un lien conventionnel,quelle que so<strong>it</strong> la manière dont il s’est formé.Au surplus, le SPORTING, sans être contre<strong>di</strong>t, relève que la seule claus<strong>ed</strong>’arb<strong>it</strong>rage prévue aux statuts de l’Union belge de football prévo<strong>it</strong> que :«Les clubs s’engagent, après épuisement des moyens internes, à soumettretout l<strong>it</strong>ige les opposant à l’URBSFA à un collège d’arb<strong>it</strong>res choisi parlesmembres de la Commission belge de l’arb<strong>it</strong>rage du sport.»II s’ag<strong>it</strong> là d’une clause d’arb<strong>it</strong>rage clairement lim<strong>it</strong>ée au dro<strong>it</strong> interne; dèslors, à supposer même que les clubs puissent être liés par les statuts de lafédération dont ils sont membres, répercutant eux-mêmes les statuts de laFIFA et auxquels ils auraient adhéré par un mécanisme contractuel implic<strong>it</strong>eou exprès (quod non, voir infra p. 28), encore Notre tribunal devra<strong>it</strong>-ilconstater que les statuts de l’Union belge ne prévoient pas de <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ionimposant l’arb<strong>it</strong>rage du TAS, dans l’hypothèse d’un confl<strong>it</strong> impliquant unclub belge et la FIFA.Par ailleurs, la FIFA n’explique pas non plus pourquoi le G-14 sera<strong>it</strong> luimêmelié par une clause d’arb<strong>it</strong>rage sur laquelle il aura<strong>it</strong>, d’une manière oud’une autre, marqué son accordIl s’ensu<strong>it</strong> qu’à ce stade du l<strong>it</strong>ige, aucun élément ne démontre que,expressément ou implic<strong>it</strong>ement mais de manière certaine, le SPORTING etle G-14 auraient manifesté une quelconque volonté d’accepter l’arb<strong>it</strong>rag<strong>ed</strong>u TAS, dans leurs rapports avec la FIFA.Enfin, il est évident que l’inter<strong>di</strong>ction é<strong>di</strong>ctée par le second paragraphe del’article 61 de recourir aux tribunaux or<strong>di</strong>naires, n’est d’application que dansl’hypothèse où une convention d’arb<strong>it</strong>rage en bonne et due forme viendra<strong>it</strong>à soustraire le l<strong>it</strong>ige à ces juri<strong>di</strong>ctions.Toute <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion qui prescrira<strong>it</strong> une inter<strong>di</strong>ction générale de s’adresser auxjuri<strong>di</strong>ctions or<strong>di</strong>naires sera<strong>it</strong> en effet contraire à l’Ordre public et, enconséquence, devra<strong>it</strong> être écartée par Notre tribunal.
166 Giurisprudenza InternazionaleLa preuve n’étant pas rapportée de l’existence d’une convention d’arb<strong>it</strong>rageopposable aux parties demanderesses, l’exception d’arb<strong>it</strong>rage do<strong>it</strong> êtr<strong>ed</strong>éclarée non fondée, sans qu’il so<strong>it</strong> nécessaire d’examiner plus loinl’argumentation des parties.Exception d’incompétence des juri<strong>di</strong>ctions de l’ordre ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire belgeLa FIFA soutient ensu<strong>it</strong>e que les juri<strong>di</strong>ctions de l’ordre ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire belge neseraient pas compétentes pour connaître du l<strong>it</strong>ige.Selon la FIFA en effet, la demande d’indemnisation formulée par leSPORTING et le G-14 ne sera<strong>it</strong> qu’accessoire par rapport à l’objet réel desdemandes, qui est d’obtenir une déclaration d’illégal<strong>it</strong>é de la réglementationFIFA pour incompatibil<strong>it</strong>é au dro<strong>it</strong> européen; ainsi recadrées, les demandesressorti raient de l’ordre ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire suisse.Pour examiner cette argumentation, il convient liminairement de déterminerl’objet de la demande du SPORTING, demandeur au principal.Suivant l’enseignement de la doctrine, l’objet de la demande correspond àl’intérêt; il s’ag<strong>it</strong> de la prétention, de l’avantage recherché.Ce que la partie demande n’est pas la reconnaissance éthérée d’un dro<strong>it</strong>,mais un avantage, hors de sa qualification juri<strong>di</strong>que. C’est pourquoi uneconception concrète de l’objet do<strong>it</strong> prévaloir; ce qui importe, c’est ce queveut le demandeur ou ce qu’il réclame en fa<strong>it</strong>, le juge recevant mission derectifier au besoin la qualification juri<strong>di</strong>que invoquée.(G. de LEVAL, Eléments de procédure civile, Larder 2003, page 32 n° 18/AVoir également A. FETTWEIS, Manuel de procédure civile, Faculté de dro<strong>it</strong>de Liège 1987, page 58)En dro<strong>it</strong> belge (pour rappel, applicable à l’examen de la procédure), lacompétence d’une juri<strong>di</strong>ction s’établ<strong>it</strong> en fonction de l’objet de la demandetel que déterminé dans l’acte introductif d’instance.(Cassation, 11 mai 1990, Pas. I, 1045)En ce qui concerne le SPORTING DE CHARLEROI, la demande tend enrésumé à :- Entendre <strong>di</strong>re pour dro<strong>it</strong> que les articles 36 à 41 du règlement FIFAconcernant le statut et le transfert des joueurs, sont illégaux pour violationdu dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire.- Dès lors, entendre <strong>di</strong>re pour dro<strong>it</strong> qu’en raison de l’illégal<strong>it</strong>é de ces<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions, le SPORTING ne sera dorénavant plus tenu de mettre à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion ses joueurs en faveur des équipes nationales.- Entendre condamner la FIFA à indemniser le SPORTING pour le préju<strong>di</strong>cesubi et à subir du fa<strong>it</strong> de la blessure contractée par M. OULMERS, évaluésous réserve à 100.000 Euro.
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 167- Entendre condamner la FIFA à indemniser le SPORTING pour les <strong>di</strong>verspréju<strong>di</strong>ces subis du fa<strong>it</strong> de la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, sans compensationfinancière, de certains de ses joueurs au bénéfice des fédérations nationalesconcernées, dommage évalué à la somme en principal de 50.000 Eurosous réserve.Il ressort de cet examen que l’objet de la demande du SPORTING vise laréparation d’un préju<strong>di</strong>ce, essentiellement du fa<strong>it</strong> de la sélection sanscompensation financière de M. OULMERS et de l’absence d’indemnisationsu<strong>it</strong>e à sa blessure (Voir page 3 des motifs de la c<strong>it</strong>ation).Certes, le SPORTING sollic<strong>it</strong>e que le tribunal <strong>di</strong>se pour dro<strong>it</strong> que certainsarticles du règlement FIFA sont illégaux mais, dans l’espr<strong>it</strong> de cette partie, ils’ag<strong>it</strong> là du passage obligé vers son indemnisation.En effet, dans l’argumentation qui est développée, la réglementation FIFAest identifiée comme ayant fa<strong>it</strong> obstacle au défraiement du SPORTING parla Fédération marocaine, su<strong>it</strong>e à la sélection et à la blessure de son joueur, etcomme étant dès lors à la base de son dommage.Quant à la demande qui tend à voir le SPORTING libéré de l’obligation demise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de ses joueurs en faveur des sélections nationales, elle estdestinée à prévenir tout préju<strong>di</strong>ce futur puisque, dans la thèse du SPORTING,la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion d’un joueur sans compensation financière est sourc<strong>ed</strong>’un dommage indemnisable.Le tribunal analysera donc la demande du SPORTING comme une demandeayant pour objet de réparer un préju<strong>di</strong>ce déjà subi et de prévenir tout préju<strong>di</strong>cefutur.S’agissant d’une demande ainsi caractérisée, la FIFA reconnaît que lesjuri<strong>di</strong>ctions de l’ordre ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire belge devraient se déclarer compétentes;voyez ses conclusions page 48, n° 49:«Il n’est pas contesté que les juri<strong>di</strong>ctions belges seraient terr<strong>it</strong>orialementcompétentes pour connaître de la demande d’indemnisation formulée parleSPORTING.»Pour confirmer cette compétence, il y a lieu de se référer à la convention deLugano, adoptée le 16 septembre 1988 et ratifiée par la Suisse, laquellerègle les problèmes de compétence lorsque le défendeur est domicilié sur leterr<strong>it</strong>oire d’un Etat contractant non-membre de l’Union européenne.L’article 5 de la convention de Lugano, prévo<strong>it</strong> que : «Le défendeur domiciliésur le terr<strong>it</strong>oire d’un Etat contractant peut être attra<strong>it</strong> dans un autre Etatcontractant: (...)3. En matière délictuelle ou quasi -délictuelle, devant le tribunal du lieu oùle fa<strong>it</strong> dommageable s’est produ<strong>it</strong>.»
168 Giurisprudenza Internazionale(Sur la base quasi-délictuelle de la demande, voir infra p. 28)Depuis l’arrêt Mines de potasse , la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice desCommunautés Européennes attribue à l’article 5-3 une portée ambivalente:La notion de fa<strong>it</strong> dommageable vise à la fois, le lieu où le dommage estsurvenu et le lieu de l’événement causal, ce qui permet au demandeur uncumul électif entre les fors de chacun des lieux.Par la su<strong>it</strong>e, la Cour a adopté une interprétation restrictive de l’arrêt préc<strong>it</strong>é,précisant que celui-ci s’applique aux seuls cas où dès l’origine, il y a eu<strong>di</strong>ssociation de l’événement causal et de la première manifestation matériell<strong>ed</strong>u dommage, du moins lorsque ce dernier présente un caractère patrimonial.(Sur ces développements, voy. H. BORN, M. FALLON, J.LVAN BOXTAEL,Dro<strong>it</strong> ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire international, Chronique de JP1991-1998, Les dossiers duJT, Larder 2001, p. 175 et svt.)Tel est bien le cas en l’espèce où le dommage allégué par le SPORTINGs’est manifesté en Belgique dès la survenance de l’événement causal que futà la fois l’absence de compensation financière pour la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion deM. OULMERS et la blessure subie au Maroc par ce dernier, qui dès cemoment est entré dans une longue période d’in<strong>di</strong>sponibil<strong>it</strong>é dont lesrépercussions ont été ressenties par son club essentiellement dans lacompét<strong>it</strong>ion nationale.En conséquence, sur pi<strong>ed</strong> de l’article 5-3 de la convention de Lugano, letribunal reconnaîtra la compétence des juri<strong>di</strong>ctions de l’ordre ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire belgepour tra<strong>it</strong>er de la demande en indemnisation du SPORTING DECHARLEROI.***Il convient ensu<strong>it</strong>e d’examiner Notre compétence internationale dans le cadr<strong>ed</strong>e la demande formulée par le G-14, sur requête en intervention volontair<strong>ed</strong>éposée par application des articles 15 et 16 du code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire.L’article 6-2 de la convention de Lugano envisage cette s<strong>it</strong>uation:«(Le) défendeur peut aussi être attra<strong>it</strong>:(...)2. s’il s’ag<strong>it</strong> d’une demande en garantie ou d’une demande en intervention,devant le tribunal saisi de la demande originaire, à moins qu’elle n ‘a<strong>it</strong> étéformé e que pour traduire hors de son tribunal celui qui a été appelé.»II est admis par la doctrine que l’article 6-2 s’applique à l’interventionvolontaire comme à l’intervention forcée (H.BORN, M. FALLON, J.LVANBOXTAEL, Dro<strong>it</strong> ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire international, mêmes réf. page 203 n° 110); leG-14 est dès lors susceptible de s’en prévaloir.Pour pouvoir appliquer l’article 6-2, il faudra que le juge puisse constater
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 169l’existence d’un lien de connex<strong>it</strong>é entre les demandes principale et incidenteet que so<strong>it</strong> écartée bute présomption de fraude visant à contourner les règlesor<strong>di</strong>naires de la compétence internationale.La connex<strong>it</strong>é s’évalue suivant l’article 22, al. 3 de la convention de Lugano:«Sont connexes, au sens du présent article, les demandes liées entre ellespar un rapport si étro<strong>it</strong> qu’il y a intérêt à les instruire et à juger en mêmetemps afin d’év<strong>it</strong>er des solutions qui pourraient être inconciliables si lescauses étaient jugées séparément.»Formulée dans la requête en intervention volontaire, la demande du G-14tend en résumé à :- Entendre <strong>di</strong>re pour dro<strong>it</strong> que les articles 36 à 41 du règlement FIFAconcernant le statut et le transfert des joueurs, sont illégaux pour violationdu dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire.- Dès lors, entendre <strong>di</strong>re pour dro<strong>it</strong> qu’en raison de l’illégal<strong>it</strong>é de ces<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions, le G-14 et ses membres ne seront dorénavant plus tenus demettre à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion leurs joueurs en faveur des équipes nationales.- Entendre condamner la FIFA à indemniser le G-14 et ses membres pourles <strong>di</strong>vers préju<strong>di</strong>ces subis du fa<strong>it</strong> de la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, sanscompensation financière, de certains de leurs joueurs au bénéfice de laFIFA et des fédérations nationales concernées, dommage évalué à 1 Europrovisionnel.Eu égard à ce libellé, la connex<strong>it</strong>é do<strong>it</strong> d’ores et déjà être regardée commeacquise puisque la demande est semblable à celle formulée par le SPORTINGDE CHARLEROI, le G-14, à l’instar du SPORTING, ayant introdu<strong>it</strong> un<strong>ed</strong>emande d’indemnisation pour le préju<strong>di</strong>ce résultant de l’obligation de miseà <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion gratu<strong>it</strong>e de joueurs, é<strong>di</strong>ctée par la FIFA.Par ailleurs, l’on ne <strong>di</strong>stingue pas de fraude en l’espèce, le G-14 s’étantgreffé sur une réclamation objectivement semblable au but d’indemnisationque lui-même poursu<strong>it</strong>.Dans ces con<strong>di</strong>tions, le tribunal se <strong>di</strong>ra également compétent en tant quejuri<strong>di</strong>ction de l’ordre ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire belge, pour connaître de la demande introdu<strong>it</strong>epar le G-14 contre la FIFA.Exception d’incompétence du tribunal de commerceLa FIFA conteste également la compétence d’attribution du tribunal decommerce, estimant que le l<strong>it</strong>ige ressort du tribunal de 1ère instance deCharleroi.La compétence du tribunal de commerce est fondée sur l’article 573, 1°, ducode ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire, selon lequel:«Le tribunal de commerce connaît en premier ressort:
170 Giurisprudenza Internazionale1° des contestations entre commerçants relatives aux actes réputéscommerciaux par la loi...»Or, la FIFA conteste détenir la qual<strong>it</strong>é de commerçant et dénie que les actesqui lui sont reprochés soient const<strong>it</strong>utifs d’actes de commerce.***LA FIFA peut-elle être considérée comme une personne morale exerçant lecommerce ?Il ne s’ag<strong>it</strong> pas là d’une question de pure procédure, qui entraînera<strong>it</strong> ipsofacto l’application, à l’exclusion de toute autre, des règles de dro<strong>it</strong> interne.Certes, il y aura lieu, au second stade, de déterminer si, sur pi<strong>ed</strong> de la loibelge de procédure - en l’occurrence l’article 573, 1°, C.J. - les con<strong>di</strong>tionsde la compétence matérielle du tribunal de commerce sont réunies.Mais, dans un premier temps, il convient d’identifier la loi de fond, loi suisseou loi belge, en application de laquelle sera établie ou non la qual<strong>it</strong>é decommerçant dans le chef de la FIFA.Il est admis en dro<strong>it</strong> belge que les con<strong>di</strong>tions régissant l’existence d’unepersonne morale et l’étendue de sa capac<strong>it</strong>é sont exclusivement soumises àla loi du pays où celle-ci a son siège.Dans le même sens, la détermination de la personnal<strong>it</strong>é juri<strong>di</strong>que d’uneassociation de fa<strong>it</strong> étrangère relève de la loi nationale de cette association.(Voy. F. RIGAUXetM. FALLON, Dro<strong>it</strong> international privé, tome II, Larderéd. 1993, n° 1595)Par analogie, le tribunal admettra que la qual<strong>it</strong>é de commerçant d’unepersonne morale se détermine en vertu de la loi nationale de celle-ci.En décider autrement entraînera<strong>it</strong> des s<strong>it</strong>uations d’insécur<strong>it</strong>é juri<strong>di</strong>que puisquela qual<strong>it</strong>é de commerçant d’une personne morale pourra<strong>it</strong> être reconnue ounon, en fonction du pays dans lequel cette qual<strong>it</strong>é sera<strong>it</strong> envisagée parapplication de la loi du for.C’est donc bien en fonction du dro<strong>it</strong> suisse qu’il convient d’examiner laqual<strong>it</strong>é de commerçant de la FIFA; à cet égard, l’article 1.1 des statuts de laFIFA précise que :«La FIFA est une association inscr<strong>it</strong>e au registre de commerce au sens desarticles 60 et suivants du code civil suisse.»L’article 60 du code civil suisse est libellé de la sorte :« Les associations pol<strong>it</strong>iques, religieuses, scientifiques, artistiques, debienfaisance, de récréation ou autres qui n’ont pas un but économiqueacquièrent la personnal<strong>it</strong>é dès qu‘elles expriment dans leurs statuts la volontéd’être organisées corporativement (...)»Quant à l’article 61, il stipule que :
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 171«1. L’association dont les statuts ont été adoptés et quia const<strong>it</strong>ué sa <strong>di</strong>rectionpeut se faire inscrire au registre du commerce.2. Est tenue de se faire inscrire toute association qui, pour atteindre sonbut, exerce une industrie en la forme commerciale.»Malgré l’inv<strong>it</strong>ation en ce sens adressée par les parties demanderesses, laFIFA ne précise pas si son inscription au registre du commerce, priseconformément à l’article 1.1 de ses statuts, a eu lieu en application duparagraphe 1 er ou du paragraphe 2 de l’article 61 du code civil suisse, c’est à<strong>di</strong>re volontairement ou obligatoirement.Si cette inscription ava<strong>it</strong> été enregistrée sur pi<strong>ed</strong> du paragraphe 1 er , le tribunalinfère que la FIFA n’aura<strong>it</strong> pas manqué de produire aux débats les documentsattestant du caractère volontaire de l’inscription; en l’absence de telsdocuments, il do<strong>it</strong> être admis que l’inscription au registre du commerce estintervenue par application du paragraphe 2 de l’article 61 du code civil suisse.Dès lors, sur base du dro<strong>it</strong> suisse, la FIFA do<strong>it</strong> être considérée comme uneassociation sans but économique (article 60), mais qui pour atteindre sonobjectif exerce une industrie en la forme commerciale (article 61, al. 2), enl’occurrence une activ<strong>it</strong>é de spectacle, et dont l’inscription au registre ducommerce est obligatoire.L’on rapprochera ce type d’organisation de la société à final<strong>it</strong>é sociale queconnaît le dro<strong>it</strong> belge; celle-ci se défin<strong>it</strong> en effet comme une société quipoursu<strong>it</strong> un autre but que l’enrichissement de ses membres alors même qu’ellepeut exercer une activ<strong>it</strong>é commerciale et détenir la qual<strong>it</strong>é de commerçant.(V. TILQUIN et SIMONARD, Tra<strong>it</strong>é des sociétés, tome 1, Kluwer éd. 1996,n° 358 et 360/M. Coipel, Les sociétés à final<strong>it</strong>é sociale, in Guide juri<strong>di</strong>qu<strong>ed</strong>e l’entreprise, livre 11 bis. 1, p. 29 et svt.)En fonction de ces éléments, le tribunal admettra qu’aux yeux de la loi suisse,la FIFA est t<strong>it</strong>ulaire de la qual<strong>it</strong>é de commerçant. La première con<strong>di</strong>tionposée par l’article 573, 1 er du code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire belge est ainsi remplie.L’article 573, 1 er , requiert également que la contestation so<strong>it</strong> relative à desactes réputés commerciaux par la loi.Il a été <strong>di</strong>t plus haut que la FIFA deva<strong>it</strong> être considérée comme une personnemorale détenant la qual<strong>it</strong>é de commerçant aux yeux du dro<strong>it</strong> suisse; or, lespersonnes morales n’ont pas de «double vie»; toute leur activ<strong>it</strong>é consiste enla poursu<strong>it</strong>e de leur objet et toutes leurs obligations doivent être considéréescomme étant contractées dans le cadre de leur activ<strong>it</strong>é professionnelle.(TILQUIN et SIMONARD, Tra<strong>it</strong>é des sociétés, tome 1, Kluwer éd. 1996, n°288)Ainsi, dès l’instant où la FIFA a été envisagée comme exerçant une industrie
172 Giurisprudenza Internazionaleen la forme commerciale, tous les actes qu’elle pose sont de naturecommerciale au sens de l’article 573, 1°, du code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire, de la mêmemanière que seraient considérés comme commerciaux les actes d’une sociétéde dro<strong>it</strong> belge à final<strong>it</strong>é sociale, posés dans le cadre d’une activ<strong>it</strong>é de naturecommerciale.Partant, la compétence d’attribution de Notre tribunal est établie.Exception liée à l’inscription du G-14 auprès de la Banque Carrefour desEntreprisesLa FIFA soutient que la demande du G-14 do<strong>it</strong> être déclarée irrecevable,n’étant pas basée sur une activ<strong>it</strong>é pour laquelle ce groupement éta<strong>it</strong> inscr<strong>it</strong> àla Banque Carrefour des Entreprises (BCE) au moment du dépôt de la requêteen intervention volontaire.L’argumentation est la suivante: Lorsque la demande en justice introdu<strong>it</strong>epar une entreprise commerciale trouve son fondement dans une activ<strong>it</strong>é quin’a pas fa<strong>it</strong> l’objet d’une inscription à la BCE, cette demande do<strong>it</strong> être déclaréeirrecevable sur pi<strong>ed</strong> de l’article 14,4° de la loi sur la Banque Carrefour.A cet égard, le tribunal se lim<strong>it</strong>era à relever que le G-14 n’est pas une sociétémais un groupement d’intérêt économique. (Tra<strong>it</strong>é pratique de dro<strong>it</strong>commercial, tome 4, «Les groupements d’intérêt économique (GEIE et GIE)en dro<strong>it</strong> belge», Kluwer 1998, p.963 et 964)Avant la création de la BCE, un GEIE deva<strong>it</strong> d’ailleurs être immatriculé,non pas au registre du commerce mais au registre des GEIE ouvert auprèsdu tribunal de commerce de Bruxelles.Dès lors, l’article 14,4° de la loi sur la BCE ne lui est pas applicable; ausurplus, II ne résulte d’aucun élément que lors de sa const<strong>it</strong>ution en septembre2000, antérieurement à la création de la BCE, l’immatriculation du G-14aura<strong>it</strong> été incorrecte et que son dro<strong>it</strong> d’action en justice devra<strong>it</strong> être restreint.L’exception d’irrecevabil<strong>it</strong>é ne peut dès lors être accueillie sur cette base.Exception d’irrecevabil<strong>it</strong>é, liée à l’absence de qual<strong>it</strong>é dans le chef duSPORTING DE CHARLEROILa FIFA soutient également que l’action du SPORTING DE CHARLEROIdevra<strong>it</strong> être déclarée irrecevable parce que la décision d’ester en justice émanenon pas de l’organe habil<strong>it</strong>é, à savoir le conseil d’administration, mais duseul délégué à la gestion journalière, M. Abbas BAYAT, qui n’en ava<strong>it</strong> pas lepouvoir.En dro<strong>it</strong> belge, il est unanimement admis que la société peut ratifier l’acteaccompli par une personne sans pouvoir, aux yeux de la loi ou des statuts;en effet, l’article 848 du code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire prévo<strong>it</strong> que :«Dans le cas où un acte de procédure aura<strong>it</strong> été accompli au nom d’une
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 173personne en l’absence de toute représentation légale sans qu’elle l’a<strong>it</strong>ordonné, permis ou ratifié, même tac<strong>it</strong>ement, elle pourra demander au jug<strong>ed</strong>e le déclarer non avenu (...) Les autres parties l<strong>it</strong>igantes peuvent introduireles mêmes demandes à moins que la personne au n om de laquelle l’acte aété accompli ne le ratifie ou ne le confirme en temps utiles.»Dans l’hypothèse d’un excès de pouvoir, il appartient à l’organe compétentpour passer l’acte d’apprécier s’il y a lieu à ratification; ainsi, le conseild’administration d’une société anonyme pourra<strong>it</strong> ratifier les actes du déléguéà la gestion journalière qui dépassent la sphère légale de cette notion.La ratification n’est soumise à aucune forme. Elle peut être expresse outac<strong>it</strong>e et consiste souvent en l’exécution spontanée de l’acte incriminé.Lorsque l’acte passé en excès de pouvoir est entériné, la ratification intervientrétroactivement et la société est censée engagée valablement ab in<strong>it</strong>io.Ce principe fa<strong>it</strong> l’objet d’un correctif de bon sens : La ratification do<strong>it</strong> tenircompte des dro<strong>it</strong>s acquis dans l’intervalle par le tiers de bonne foi, et nepourra<strong>it</strong> préju<strong>di</strong>cier celui-ci.(Sur ces développements, voy. C. BERTSCH, La gestion de l’entreprise etla représentation des SA, SPRL et SC, Guide juri<strong>di</strong>que de l’entreprise, livre23.2, mise à jour du 09/09/2002, p. 80)Ainsi, sous réserve par exemple d’une prescription acquise dans l’intervalle,l’organe compétent peut toujours ratifier « en temps utiles » l’action ju<strong>di</strong>ciaireintrodu<strong>it</strong>e par un organe incompétent.(V. RENARD, Action et représentation en justice des personnes morales,Journal des tribunaux 2002, p. 227, 2.2. Sur la ratification parle C.A. d’un<strong>ed</strong>écision d’ester en justice: Mons, 23 mars 1989, RDC 1990, p. 328 et 329et la note de J.F. ROMAIN, p. 334 et 335. Sur l’absence d’effets de laratification en raison du dro<strong>it</strong> acquis par un tiers: Liège, 22 janvier 1998,JLMB 2000 p. 1497).En l’occurrence, la décision prise par M. A. BAYAT d’assigner en justice laFIFA a, pour autant que de besoin, été ratifiée par le conseil d’administrationdu SPORTING suivant délibération du 16 novembre 2005.La FIFA ne soutient pas avoir acquis, depuis la première c<strong>it</strong>ation en justic<strong>ed</strong>u 12 juillet 2005, certains dro<strong>it</strong>s auxquels la décision de ratification pourra<strong>it</strong>porter atteinte.Dans ces con<strong>di</strong>tions, l’accord du conseil d’administration sera en tout étatde cause considéré comme parfa<strong>it</strong> à la date de la décision prise par M. BAYAT,ce qui implique le rejet de l’exception d’irrecevabil<strong>it</strong>é pour défaut de qual<strong>it</strong>é.Au demeurant, la SA SPORTING DU PAYS DE CHARLEROI a introdu<strong>it</strong>une nouvelle c<strong>it</strong>ation en justice, par acte d’huissier du 19 janvier 2006; cette
174 Giurisprudenza Internazionalec<strong>it</strong>ation do<strong>it</strong> être jointe pour connex<strong>it</strong>é à la c<strong>it</strong>ation première; elle est recevable,ayant fa<strong>it</strong> l’objet d’une décision en bonne et due forme du conseild’administration.Exception d’irrecevabil<strong>it</strong>é, liée à l’absence de qual<strong>it</strong>é dans le chef du G-14II s’impose de constater que par sa délibération du 9 juin 2005, l’assembléegénérale du G-14 a ratifié la décision du com<strong>it</strong>é de gestion prise le 18 mai2005, d’intervenir volontairement dans le l<strong>it</strong>ige introdu<strong>it</strong> par le SPORTINGDE CHARLEROI.De toute façon, en date du 6 mars 2006, le G-14 a déposé une requête enintervention volontaire dont la régular<strong>it</strong>é n’est pas contestée, dans le cadr<strong>ed</strong>e la seconde c<strong>it</strong>ation du SPORTING que le tribunal vient de décider dejoindre à la première.Exception d’irrecevabil<strong>it</strong>é des demandes du G-14, pour défaut d’intérêtLa FIFA conteste la recevabil<strong>it</strong>é de la demande introdu<strong>it</strong>e par le G-14, aumotif que celui-ci ne sera<strong>it</strong> pas autorisé à ester en justice pour compte de sesmembres, à défaut d’intérêt.Comme le précise ses statuts (page 4), le G-14 est un « groupement européend’intérêt économique » (GEIE), immatriculé en Belgique, à <strong>di</strong>stinguer du «groupement d’intérêt économique» (GIE), régi par la seule loi belgein<strong>it</strong>ialementla loi du 17 juillet 1989, aujourd’hui le code des sociétés, articles839 et suivants - et dès lors étranger aux débats.En tant que GEIE, le G-14 est soumis au règlement européen n° 2137/85 duConseil, adopté le 25 juillet 1985, ainsi qu’à la loi belge du 12 juillet 1989portant <strong>di</strong>verses mesures d’application du règlement, et enfin aux <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ionsde la convention const<strong>it</strong>utive du G-14.Sur base des articles 1 er , § 2, et 3, § 1 er , du<strong>di</strong>t règlement, l’on peut définir leGEIE comme étant une personne morale, const<strong>it</strong>uée par contrat entre deuxou plusieurs personnes physiques ou morales, qui ne peut réaliser de bénéficespour son propre compte et qui a pour but exclusif de facil<strong>it</strong>er ou de développerl’activ<strong>it</strong>é économique de ses membres, d’améliorer ou d’accroître les résultatsde cette activ<strong>it</strong>é, à laquelle l’activ<strong>it</strong>é du groupement do<strong>it</strong> se rattacher et parrapport à laquelle elle do<strong>it</strong> avoir un caractère auxiliaire.(V.SIMONART, « Les groupements d’intérêt économique - GIE et GEIE »,Répertoire de dro<strong>it</strong> notarial, Tome XII - Dro<strong>it</strong> commercial et économique,Livre IX, Ed. 2002, p. 63).Par application de l’article 249 du Tra<strong>it</strong>é de Rome, un règlement européenest obligatoire dans tous ses éléments et <strong>di</strong>rectement applicable dans toutEtat membre; aucun acte de transpos<strong>it</strong>ion n’est donc nécessaire et ces<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions font partie du dro<strong>it</strong> pos<strong>it</strong>if de tous les Etats depuis sa date
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 175d’application.Mais le règlement n° 2137/85 renvoie au dro<strong>it</strong> des Etats membres en ce quiconcerne certains points laissés optionnels ou certaines questions.Il appartena<strong>it</strong> donc à chaque Etat de légiférer sur ces questions laissées enoption ou non expressément tra<strong>it</strong>ées, ce à quoi le législateur belge s’estattaché par la loi du 12 juillet 1989.(Sur ces développements, voy. F. LEMEUNIER, « Groupement d’intérêtéconomique (GIE) », Encyclopé<strong>di</strong>e Deimas - Ed. 1999, page 40. V.SIMONART, mêmes réf. p. 67).En résumé, la hiérarchie des normes est claire : le groupement européend’intérêt économique immatriculé en Belgique est soumis d’abord aux<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions impératives du règlement européen et ensu<strong>it</strong>e à la législationbelge d’application et d’option du 12 juillet 1989, outre la faculté pour legroupement d’adopter certaines options laissées libres par le règlement oule dro<strong>it</strong> interne.(V. SIMONART, mêmes réf. p. 71 n° 11)***Le tribunal do<strong>it</strong> donc vérifier, par application de ce corpus légal, l’étendu<strong>ed</strong>u dro<strong>it</strong> d’un GEIE, immatriculé en Belgique, d’ester en justice.Selon la jurisprudence constante de la Cour de cassation, les personnesmorales ne peuvent agir en justice que dans la mesure où elles y ont unintérêt, ce qui sera le cas si elles invoquent un dro<strong>it</strong> subjectif dont ellescherchent à obtenir la protection ou qu’elles entendent mettre en œuvre.L’intérêt propre des personnes morales comprend ce qui concerne leurexistence, leur patrimoine et leurs dro<strong>it</strong>s moraux. Par contre, elles ne peuvent,sauf dérogation légale, défendre les intérêts, même collectifs, de leursmembres devant les tribunaux.(Voy. la jurisprudence de la Cour de cassation et les auteurs c<strong>it</strong>és par V.SIMONART, mêmes réf. p. 207 n° 370. G. CLOSSET-MARCHAL, «Lesactions collectives devant les <strong>di</strong>fférentes juri<strong>di</strong>ctions», CUP mai 2001,volume 47, p. 15 à 18).Pour justifier néanmoins de son intérêt à agir au nom des clubs qui lecomposent, le G-14 tire argument de l’article 1 er de la loi belge d’applicationdu 12 juillet 1989, lequel <strong>di</strong>spose que :« Les groupements européens d’intérêt économique (...) immatriculés enBelgique ont la personnal<strong>it</strong>é juri<strong>di</strong>que.Ces groupements peuvent agir en justice pour faire valoir leurs dro<strong>it</strong>s propresainsi que ceux résultant des intérêts communs de leurs membres. »Le G-14 analyse cette <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion comme inst<strong>it</strong>uant une exception au principe,
176 Giurisprudenza Internazionaleselon lequel un groupement, même légalement const<strong>it</strong>ué, n’a pas d’actionpour obtenir réparation d’un préju<strong>di</strong>ce causé à tout ou partie de ses membres.Pour envisager cette problématique, il faut d’abord <strong>di</strong>stinguer les trois typesd’actions susceptibles d’être introdu<strong>it</strong>es par un groupement, devant lestribunaux:- L’action d’intérêt propre, c’est à <strong>di</strong>re celle par laquelle le groupementvise la défense d’intérêts qui lui sont personnels, patrimoniaux ou extrapatrimoniaux.- L’action de défense des intérêts in<strong>di</strong>viduels, qui est celle par laquelle legroupement ag<strong>it</strong> en justice pour défendre les intérêts in<strong>di</strong>viduels de toutou partie de ses membres.- L’action d’intérêt collectif, c’est à <strong>di</strong>re l’action en justice introdu<strong>it</strong>e parun groupement en vue de défendre l’intérêt de la collectiv<strong>it</strong>é qu’il encadre,considérée comme une ent<strong>it</strong>é générale et abstra<strong>it</strong>e qui absorbe et dépassela somme des intérêts in<strong>di</strong>viduels de ses membres.(Voy. G. CLOSSET-MARCHAL, mêmes réf., p. 11 et 12)Dans le cas d’espèce, l’examen de la requête en intervention volontair<strong>ed</strong>éposée par le G-14 montre que celui-ci engage en réal<strong>it</strong>é une action d<strong>ed</strong>éfense des intérêts in<strong>di</strong>viduels de ses membres.En effet, la demande formulée dans la requête a pour objet la réparation dupréju<strong>di</strong>ce subi par chacun des clubs qui composent le groupement, su<strong>it</strong>e àl’obligation de mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, sans indemn<strong>it</strong>és, de joueurs au prof<strong>it</strong> dessélections nationales.C’est bien ainsi que le tribunal a analysé l’action du G-14 lors de l’examenrelatif à sa compétence internationale, admettant pour cette raison le lien deconnex<strong>it</strong>é avec la demande du SPORTING, et c’est bien ainsi que le G-14considère sa propre action, notamment en page 151 de ses dernièresconclusions:«(...) c’est précisément la constatation de l’illégal<strong>it</strong>é du règlement (FIFA)qui const<strong>it</strong>ue le tremplin permettant ensu<strong>it</strong>e de postuler réparation dudommage causé par cette illégal<strong>it</strong>é...»Dès lors, suivant la classification adoptée ci-dessus, l’on ne se s<strong>it</strong>ue pas dansle cadre d’une action d’intérêt collectif mais dans le cadre d’une action visantla défense d’intérêts in<strong>di</strong>viduels propres à 18 clubs, qui certes arguent d’unefaute in<strong>it</strong>iale commune mais dans le but proclamé d’obtenir, à travers leG-14, la réparation d’un dommage personnel à chacun.***Ce type d’action est-il autorisé dans le cadre d’un GEIE?La loi du 12 juillet 1989 portant <strong>di</strong>verses mesures d’application du règlement
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 1772137/85 semble admettre qu’un GEIE immatriculé en Belgique puisseintroduire l’action d’intérêt collectif. L’article 1 er de la loi vise en effet ladéfense des intérêts communs de leurs membres.(Voir également la <strong>di</strong>scussion lors des travaux parlementaires: Doc. Pari.808/5-88/89, «Rapport fa<strong>it</strong> au nom de la Commission de la justice par M.Mayeur», p. 21)La doctrine s’est interrogée sur la portée de cette <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, dérogatoirepar rapport à l’article 1 er , § 2, du règlement européen inst<strong>it</strong>uant le GEIE etdont l’introduction dans notre dro<strong>it</strong> semble relever d’un «accident législatif»ou encore de «motifs peu convaincants.»(Voy. J. MILQUET, «Un nouvel instrument juri<strong>di</strong>que à la croisée du dro<strong>it</strong>communautaire, du dro<strong>it</strong> national et de l’autonomie de la volonté», DAOR1989 n° 12 p. 24. V. SIMONART, mêmes réf. p. 207, n° 370)II n’exista<strong>it</strong> en effet aucune raison objective, due à la spécific<strong>it</strong>é du GEIE,de lui octroyer un dro<strong>it</strong> d’action collective.(J. MILQUET, mêmes réf. p.24 et 25)En outre, s’agissant de ce qui, à l’époque de la loi, aura<strong>it</strong> représenté uneinnovation marquante en dro<strong>it</strong> national, l’on relèvera l’imprécision dans lestermes utilisés par le législateur, lorsque celui-ci envisage la possibil<strong>it</strong>é pourun GEIE de faire valoir en justice « les dro<strong>it</strong>s résultant des intérêts communsde leurs membres. »Ce texte a-t-il instauré un dro<strong>it</strong> d’action d’intérêt collectif, ayant pour final<strong>it</strong>éla défense de l’intérêt commun des membres, en vue duquel le GEIE estconst<strong>it</strong>ué?Do<strong>it</strong>-on aller plus loin et admettre que le législateur a prévu la possibil<strong>it</strong>épour le groupement de défendre les intérêts in<strong>di</strong>viduels communs de sesmembres, résultant par exemple de la réclamation d’un préju<strong>di</strong>ce ayant uneorigine commune?(J. MILQUET, mêmes réf., p. 25)L’on rappellera à cet égard la primauté du règlement européen sur le dro<strong>it</strong>national, lorsqu’il é<strong>di</strong>cté des <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions impératives.(T. TILQUIN et V. SIMONART, Tra<strong>it</strong>é des sociétés, tome 1, Ed. 1996, n°204)Or, const<strong>it</strong>ue une règle impérative l’article 3 du règlement 2137/85, selonlequel l’activ<strong>it</strong>é duGEIE do<strong>it</strong> présenter un caractère auxiliaire par rapport à l’activ<strong>it</strong>ééconomique de ses membres.(V. SIMONART, mêmes réf., p. 67, selon laquelle font partie des règlesimpératives: «l’objet du groupement: art. 3»)
178 Giurisprudenza InternazionaleCe caractère d’auxiliar<strong>it</strong>é a pour conséquence, exposée dans le considérant5 de l’en-tête du règlement, que l’activ<strong>it</strong>é du groupement ne peut se subst<strong>it</strong>uerà celle de ses membres.(Voy. V. SIMONART, mêmes réf., p. 81. Tra<strong>it</strong>é pratique de dro<strong>it</strong> commercial,tome 4, «Les groupements d’intérêt économique (GEIE et GIE) en dro<strong>it</strong>belge», Kluwer, p. 959 et 965)Tel sera<strong>it</strong> bien le cas si le G-14 éta<strong>it</strong> autorisé à réclamer pour compte de sesmembres la réparation d’un dommage qui leur est in<strong>di</strong>viduel, même si l’origineen est commune: il se subst<strong>it</strong>uera<strong>it</strong> à chacun d’entre eux, dans ce qui fa<strong>it</strong>partie de leur activ<strong>it</strong>é économique.En application de la règle d’auxiliar<strong>it</strong>é du groupement contenue dans lerèglement européen, il s’impose par conséquent de conclure que:- parla loi du 12 juillet 1989, le législateur belge n’a pas inst<strong>it</strong>ué en faveurdu GEIE un dro<strong>it</strong> d’action de défense des intérêts in<strong>di</strong>viduels de sesmembres,- et que, tout au plus, le législateur a pu viser l’action d’intérêt collectif.Le G-14 ne peut donc être autorisé à se subst<strong>it</strong>uer aux 18 clubs qui lecomposent, pour réclamer réparation d’un préju<strong>di</strong>ce propre à chacun.***Au demeurant, ainsi que le souligne la FIFA, l’article 1 er , § 2, du règlementeuropéen n’autorise le GEIE à ester en justice que dans le but de défendreles dro<strong>it</strong>s qui lui sont propres; voyez la rédaction de cette <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion : « Legroupement ainsi const<strong>it</strong>ué a la capac<strong>it</strong>é, en son nom propre , d’être t<strong>it</strong>ulair<strong>ed</strong>e dro<strong>it</strong>s (...) et d’ester en justice. »C’est d’ailleurs dans ce sens que la loi belge du 12 juillet 1989 en a assuré latranspos<strong>it</strong>ion à l’article 1 er al. 2 : « (Les) groupements peuvent agir en justicepour faire valoir leurs dro<strong>it</strong>s propres (...) »Ainsi qu’il a été exposé plus haut, le règlement est obligatoire lorsqu’il nelaisse pas d’option au dro<strong>it</strong> interne des Etats d’intervenir; tel est le cas pourl’étendue du dro<strong>it</strong> des groupements d’ester en justice dès lors que l’article1 er § 2 du règlement fa<strong>it</strong> partie des <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions impératives auxquelles toutgroupement est soumis.(V. SIMONART, mêmes réf., p. 67, selon laquelle font partie des <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ionsimpératives: « la capac<strong>it</strong>é du groupement et les inter<strong>di</strong>ctions auxquelles ilest soumis: art. 1.2., 3.2 et 23 »)Compte tenu du caractère impératif de cette <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, Notre tribunal do<strong>it</strong>avoir égard au seul texte du règlement européen, lequel s’impose à lui sansautre détour et dont il lui appartient d’assurer la prééminence sur la norm<strong>ed</strong>e dro<strong>it</strong> interne.
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 179(T. TILQUIN et V. SIMONART, mêmes réf., n° 202 et 204)En l’occurrence, le règlement 2137/85 ne laisse pas au GEIE d’autre champd’action en justice que la défense d’intérêts propres au groupement lui-même.La hiérarchie des normes entre le dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire et le dro<strong>it</strong> nationalimpose de considérer que l’article 1 er § 2 du règlement européen prime l’article1 er al. 2 de la loi belge du 12 juillet 1989, de sorte qu’un GEIE immatriculéen Belgique ne peut <strong>di</strong>sposer d’un dro<strong>it</strong> d’ester en justice plus étendu que l<strong>ed</strong>ro<strong>it</strong> reconnu parle règlement.Le G-14 étant uniquement autorisé à se prévaloir en justice d’un dro<strong>it</strong> quilui sera<strong>it</strong> propre, sa demande en paiement de dommages et intérêts formuléepour compte de ses 18 membres do<strong>it</strong> a fortiori être déclarée irrecevable.En d’autres termes, ne subsiste à ce stade que la demande du G-14 tendantà la réparation du préju<strong>di</strong>ce résultant de l’entrave à l’exercice d’activ<strong>it</strong>és quisont les siennes en tant que groupement.Exception d’irrecevabil<strong>it</strong>é de la demande du G-14, formulée en nom propreLe G-14 n’a formulé une demande en nom propre que dans ses conclusionsad<strong>di</strong>tionnelles et de synthèse déposées le 22 février 2006.Il réclame dorénavant à la FIFA et à l’UEFA la réparation d’un préju<strong>di</strong>cepersonnel, évalué à 1 Euro provisionnel, en raison de l’entravequ’engendrera<strong>it</strong> le règlement FIFA par rapport à l’exercice de ses activ<strong>it</strong>és.Il s’ag<strong>it</strong> là d’une demande nouvelle dont la recevabil<strong>it</strong>é do<strong>it</strong> s’apprécier auregard de l’article 807 du code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire.Selon cette <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion : « La demande dont le juge est saisi peut être étendueou mo<strong>di</strong>fiée, si les conclusions nouvelles, contra<strong>di</strong>ctoirement prises, sontfondées sur un fa<strong>it</strong> ou un acte invoqué dans la c<strong>it</strong>ation, même si leurqualification juri<strong>di</strong>que est <strong>di</strong>fférente. »Dans le cas d’espèce, le tribunal do<strong>it</strong> avoir égard à la requête en interventionvolontaire déposée le 5 septembre 2006 par le G-14, en tant qu’acteintroductif d’instance formulant la demande in<strong>it</strong>iale.(A. FETTWEIS, Manuel de procédure civile, mêmes réf, pages 88 et svt.,spécialement n° 71 et 73)Dans la<strong>di</strong>te requête (p.1), le G-14 fa<strong>it</strong> état des <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions réglementaires,é<strong>di</strong>ctées par la FIFA, qui contraignent les clubs à mettre leurs joueurs à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion des fédérations nationales «aux dates et pour les périodesunilatéralement fixées par (la FIFA) et ses membres».Plus loin, le G-14 relève n’être pas en mesure «d’organiser des rencontresou destournois, même amicaux, lorsque leurs joueurs sont ainsiréquis<strong>it</strong>ionnés.» (p. 2)C’est bien sur ces fa<strong>it</strong>s que le G-14 se base aujourd’hui pour prétendre à un
180 Giurisprudenza Internazional<strong>ed</strong>ommage propre, résultant de l’entrave alléguée à sa liberté d’organiser desmatchs amicaux ou des tournois entre les équipes des clubs qui le composent.La demande nouvelle introdu<strong>it</strong>e en nom propre par le G-14 rencontre dèslors les con<strong>di</strong>tions de l’article 807 du code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire.Par ailleurs, aucune conséquence ne pourra<strong>it</strong> être tirée du fa<strong>it</strong> que cett<strong>ed</strong>emande nouvelle est greffée sur une demande originaire dont le tribunalvient de prononcer l’irrecevabil<strong>it</strong>é, en raison de ce que le G-14 sollic<strong>it</strong>a<strong>it</strong>réparation du dommage personnel subi par chacun de ses membres.En effet, la jurisprudence et la doctrine récente reconnaissent une certaineautonomie à la demande nouvelle, qui ne do<strong>it</strong> pas elle-même être basée surune demande originaire recevable pour pouvoir, à son tour, être déclaréerecevable. ( V. Com. Mons, 16/02/2000, Revue de Dro<strong>it</strong> Commercial Belge,2000, p. 775 et 776, qui présente une analyse complète de la question )La FIFA soutient encore que cette demande en réparation d’un dommagepropre est dépourvue de tout intérêt né et actuel, n’ayant qu’un caractèrepurement théorique.Cette argumentation ne peut être retenue : Le G-14 allègue, sans qu’à cestade des débats cette affirmation paraisse fantaisiste, avoir été privé detoute possibil<strong>it</strong>é d’organiser des compét<strong>it</strong>ions entre ses membres, en raisondu caractère unilatéral et contraignant du calendrier FIFA.Il n’est pas impossible qu’un préju<strong>di</strong>ce de ce type a<strong>it</strong> pu naître en terme deperte d’une chance d’organiser des tournois ou des matches amicaux; ils’ensu<strong>it</strong> que le G-14 a intérêt au sens de l’article 17 du code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire àintervenir dans la procédure, pour tenter de faire reconnaître ce préju<strong>di</strong>ce etson imputabil<strong>it</strong>é à la FIFA.La demande nouvelle introdu<strong>it</strong>e par le G-14 est ainsi recevable.La question de la qual<strong>it</strong>é dans le chef des confédérations et fédérations,intervenant volontairementLe SPORTING et le G-14 demandent que les confédérations et fédérationssoient tenues de produire une copie des actes d’où il résultera<strong>it</strong> que la décisiond’intervenir volontairement dans le l<strong>it</strong>ige émane bien des organes compétents.Cette demande ne peut être satisfa<strong>it</strong>e; en effet, lorsque l’avocat intervient aunom d’une société, il est légalement présumé avoir reçu de l’organe compétentun mandat régulier d’agir en justice. Cette présomption est réfragable etpeut être renversée par la partie adverse; c’est à cette dernière qu’incombela preuve du défaut de décision de l’organe compétent pour représenter lasociété, et non à l’avocat de la<strong>di</strong>te société.(J.F. ROMAIN, note sous Mons, 23 mars 1989, RDC 1990, p. 334)En l’occurrence, il ne résulte d’aucune circonstance portée à la connaissance
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 181du tribunal que les organes des parties intervenantes n’auraient pas pris entemps utiles et régulièrement la décision d’introduire une demande.TITRE II - EXAMEN DE LA DEMANDE AU FONDL’argumentation développée par le SPORTING et le G-14 pour fonder leurdemande peut être synthétisée de la sorte :1) La FIFA contraint les clubs de football à prêter aux équipes nationales lesjoueurs sélectionnés, en délaissant aux clubs la couverture d’assuranceéventuelle et en les privant de toute compensation financière; elle imposepar ailleurs son calendrier des compét<strong>it</strong>ions et inter<strong>di</strong>t tout match oucompét<strong>it</strong>ion non soumis à son autorisation préalable.Les règles visées sont les suivantes :- Sur l’obligation du prêt de joueurs aux équipes nationales : Dans la versionantérieure, adoptée le 5 juillet 2001, il s’ag<strong>it</strong> de l’article 36 du «Règlementconcernant le Statut et le Transfert des Joueurs» (RSTJ), al. 1 et 2, ainsique de l’article 38 al. 1.- Dans la version actuelle adoptée le 1 er juillet 2005, est concerné l’article 1de l’annexe 1 du RSTJ.- Sur l’absence de compensation financière en contrepartie de la mise à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de joueurs : Version antérieure, article 37 al.1 er ; version actuelle,article 2 al. 1 er .- Sur le maintien à charge des clubs de la couverture d’assurance: Article37 al. 3 de la version antérieure; article 2 al. 3 de la version actuelle.Sur le caractère obligatoire du calendrier FIFA : La règle se s<strong>it</strong>ue aux articles74 et 75 des statuts de la FIFA.D’après le SPORTING et le G-14, ces règles sont contraires à laréglementation européenne, car const<strong>it</strong>utives d’une entente inter<strong>di</strong>te entreentreprises ou d’un abus de pos<strong>it</strong>ion dominante, tel que prohibés par lesarticles 81 et 82 du Tra<strong>it</strong>é de Rome, ainsi que d’une atteinte aux articles 39et 40 inst<strong>it</strong>uant la libre circulation des travailleurs et la libre prestation desservices à l’intérieur de l’Union.2) Toujours suivant les parties demanderesses, les règles FIFA, considéréescomme illic<strong>it</strong>es et donc fautives, sont à la base du préju<strong>di</strong>ce subi par leSPORTING lequel, eu égard à leur existence, n’a pu réclamer decompensation financière pour le prêt de son joueur, M. OULMERS, ni obtenirailleurs la réparation du dommage résultant de son in<strong>di</strong>sponibil<strong>it</strong>é pourblessure.Pour sa part, le G-14 estime subir un dommage propre en raison du caractèreunilatéral et obligatoire du calendrier FIFA, puisqu’il lui est de factoimpossible d’organiser des compét<strong>it</strong>ions qui concernent ses 18 clubsmembres.
182 Giurisprudenza Internazionale***La FIFA assume et justifie l’existence des règles cr<strong>it</strong>iquées; elle considèreque l’interaction entre les trois principes relatifs à la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion desjoueurs, à savoir l’obligation du prêt de joueurs aux équipes nationales, lecalendrier international des matches et l’absence de tout dro<strong>it</strong> à unecompensation, est essentielle pour la coor<strong>di</strong>nation globale du footballinternational et pour permettre que les compét<strong>it</strong>ions internationalesrassemblent les meilleurs joueurs des équipes nationales concernées. (V. sesdernières conclusions p. 89 et 90).Plus spécifiquement, l’absence d’indemnisation en faveur des clubs trouveson origine dans une volonté de solidar<strong>it</strong>é entre les fédérations nationales;de cette manière en effet, les fédérations aux ressources lim<strong>it</strong>ées sontnéanmoins en mesure de sélectionner l’él<strong>it</strong>e de leurs joueurs nationaux, etconservent leurs <strong>di</strong>sponibil<strong>it</strong>és financières pour investir dans le développementdu football à l’intérieur de leurs frontières.***Préalablement à l’examen du fondement des demandes et des contestations,le tribunal do<strong>it</strong> rechercher s’il fera usage des règles qui gouvernent laresponsabil<strong>it</strong>é contractuelle ou s’il appliquera les règles relatives à laresponsabil<strong>it</strong>é quasi-délictuelle.L’on rappellera à cet égard que la FIFA est l’organisation faîtière qui coiffela pyramide mon<strong>di</strong>ale du football; elle a pour membres des associationsnationales (art.1 de ses statuts), lesquelles regroupent les clubs de footballamateurs ou professionnels.Elle <strong>di</strong>spose du pouvoir d’é<strong>di</strong>cter les règles d’organisation du football auniveau mon<strong>di</strong>al, qui sont obligatoires pour l’ensemble de ses membres (art.4).La question préalable à résoudre est de déterminer si le pouvoir dont useainsi la FIFA prend place dans un cadre contractuel ou dans un cadre normatif.En d’autres termes, do<strong>it</strong>-on considérer que les clubs de football, en tant que«membres in<strong>di</strong>rects» de la FIFA, sont des co-contractants par rapport àcelle-ci, censés adhérer au contrat-type présenté par l’organisation faîtière,vér<strong>it</strong>able contrat d’adhésion?Do<strong>it</strong>-on au contraire admettre que la FIFA <strong>di</strong>spose, au sein de la sphère dufootball, d’une vér<strong>it</strong>able compétence normative dans le cadre, par exemple,d’une mission reconnue d’intérêt général visant l’activ<strong>it</strong>é sportive, qui luiaura<strong>it</strong> été tac<strong>it</strong>ement déléguée par l’Autor<strong>it</strong>é publique?(Voir les considérants 74 à 78 de l’Arrêt PI AU c/ FIFA, qui approchent deprès cette problématique, arrêt du TPI, 26 janvier 2005, affaire T -193/02)
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 183A ce propos, le tribunal relèvera que ni la FIFA d’une part, ni le SPORTINGet le G-14 d’autre part, n’estiment qu’une relation contractuelle unira<strong>it</strong> laFIFA aux clubs qui en dépendent.La première considère qu’il n’existe aucun lien contractuel entre lesdemandeurs et elle-même (dernières conclusions p. 71 en note), les secondsque la FIFA <strong>di</strong>spose d’un pouvoir réglementaire de fa<strong>it</strong> auquel sont soumisles clubs (dernières conclusions, p. 44).En réal<strong>it</strong>é, il semble bien que lorsqu’elle promulgue ses règles, la FIFA agisseplus dans le cadre d’une fonction d’autor<strong>it</strong>é, sous réserve de compatibil<strong>it</strong>éavec l’ordre public national et international, que dans le cadre de contratsd’adhésion avec les clubs, notamment parce que les règles FIFA const<strong>it</strong>uentun corpus général d’encadrement de l’organisation du football et de l’activ<strong>it</strong>édes clubs.(Voy. L SILANCE, Les sports et le dro<strong>it</strong>, Ed. De Boeck 1998, p. 83 et svt.,selon lequel la nature de règles de dro<strong>it</strong> de certaines règles é<strong>di</strong>ctées par lesfédérations sportives est in<strong>di</strong>scutable.)II n’existe pas de cert<strong>it</strong>ude sur la base juri<strong>di</strong>que qui lég<strong>it</strong>ime cette compétencenormative, mise en oeuvre par certains organismes de dro<strong>it</strong> privé ne détenantpas la qual<strong>it</strong>é de législateur national ou supranational.Dans le cadre d’une conception un<strong>it</strong>aire du dro<strong>it</strong>, l’on pourra<strong>it</strong> défendre lathèse suivant laquelle, lorsqu’il n’existe pas d’habil<strong>it</strong>ation expresse, l’autor<strong>it</strong>édes fédérations sportives leur est tac<strong>it</strong>ement déléguée par les Etats ou lesorganisations supranationales.Au contraire, certains préfèrent conclure à l’existence d’un pluralism<strong>ed</strong>’ordres juri<strong>di</strong>ques, <strong>di</strong>stincts des ordres nationaux et dont la lég<strong>it</strong>im<strong>it</strong>é éman<strong>ed</strong>e leur effectiv<strong>it</strong>é, c’est à <strong>di</strong>re de leur capac<strong>it</strong>é à <strong>di</strong>riger la condu<strong>it</strong>e de leursmembres. (L SILANCE, mêmes réf. p. 84 à 88 )Quant à lui, le tribunal se lim<strong>it</strong>era à relever que les règles é<strong>di</strong>ctées par laFIFA témoignent d’une vér<strong>it</strong>able autor<strong>it</strong>é normative, et qu’elles sontcommunément reconnues et appliquées comme règles de dro<strong>it</strong> par les courset les tribunaux tant qu’elles n’entrent pas en contra<strong>di</strong>ction avec des<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions d’ordre public national ou international.Il n’y a donc pas lieu d’envisager les relations entre les clubs et la FIFAcomme étant de type contractuel mais de conclure que les clubs de footballsont purement et simplement soumis à l’autor<strong>it</strong>é de la règle imposée parlaFIFA.Partant, la responsabil<strong>it</strong>é imputée par les parties demanderesses à la FIFA nepourra<strong>it</strong> exister que sur une base extra-contractuelle.***
184 Giurisprudenza InternazionaleLa FIFA est mise en cause pour atteinte au dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire. La règlequi gouverne la responsabil<strong>it</strong>é des personnes de dro<strong>it</strong> privé pour ce type detransgression ne <strong>di</strong>ffère pas des principes généraux de la responsabil<strong>it</strong>é : Lapersonne responsable est tenue de réparer à concurrence des dommagesqu’elle cause en violation du dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire, conformément au dro<strong>it</strong>commun.Il appartient donc à un dro<strong>it</strong> national de déterminer les con<strong>di</strong>tions et l’étendu<strong>ed</strong>e la responsabil<strong>it</strong>é; le cas échéant, il est fa<strong>it</strong> application des normes deconfl<strong>it</strong>s de lois pour identifier le dro<strong>it</strong> dont les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions sont applicables.Sous réserve du renvoi préju<strong>di</strong>ciel en interprétation ou en vali<strong>di</strong>té, c’estdonc aux tribunaux nationaux qu’il revient de vérifier si les règles du dro<strong>it</strong>communautaire dont se prévaut le demandeur ont été ou non méconnues etsi elles ont été à la base d’un dommage.(J. VERHOEVEN, Dro<strong>it</strong> de la Communauté européenne, Précis de la facultéde dro<strong>it</strong> UCL, Larder 2001, p. 474, 475 et 468 )II en résulte que Notre tribunal est habil<strong>it</strong>é à statuer sur une responsabil<strong>it</strong>ééventuelle de la FIFA pour atteinte aux règles européennes, dans le cadr<strong>ed</strong>’un dommage subi en Belgique, au sein de l’Union; cependant, eu égard àla localisation des parties dans plusieurs Etats, dont deux hors Unioneuropéenne (la FIFA et l’UEFA), la vérification do<strong>it</strong> d’abord être opérée,sur base des règles de dro<strong>it</strong> international privé belge, de la loi nationaleapplicable à la détermination des responsabil<strong>it</strong>és.Le Code de dro<strong>it</strong> international privé (CDIP) stipule à l’article 99 que:« § 1. L’obligation dérivant d’un fa<strong>it</strong> dommageable est régie:1° parle dro<strong>it</strong> de l’Etat sur le terr<strong>it</strong>oire duquel la personne responsable etla personne lésée ont leur résidence hab<strong>it</strong>uelle au moment de la survenanc<strong>ed</strong>u fa<strong>it</strong> dommageable2° A défaut de résidence hab<strong>it</strong>uelle sur le terr<strong>it</strong>oire d’un même Etat, parl<strong>ed</strong>ro<strong>it</strong> de l’Etat sur le terr<strong>it</strong>oire duquel le fa<strong>it</strong> générateur et le dommage sontsurvenus ou menacent de survenir en total<strong>it</strong>é;3° dans les autres cas, parle dro<strong>it</strong> de l’Etat avec lequel l’obligation encause présente les liens les plus étro<strong>it</strong>s;§2. Toutefois, l’obligation dérivant d’un fa<strong>it</strong> dommageable est régie(...)2° en cas de concurrence déloyale ou de pratique commerciale restrictive,parle dro<strong>it</strong> de l’Etat sur le terr<strong>it</strong>oire duquel le dommage est survenu oumenace de survenir. »L’article 99 § 2 CDIP prévo<strong>it</strong> donc, en dérogation à la règle générale, unrattachement spécifique menant à la désignation de la loi du lieu du dommage
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 185dans l’hypothèse où ce dommage est réclamé à la su<strong>it</strong>e d’actes anticoncurrentiels.(«Le nouveau dro<strong>it</strong> international privé belge», sous la coor<strong>di</strong>nation de H.BOULARBAH, J. T. 2005, p. 196 n° 195)Le texte légal vise donc bien l’hypothèse d’une action en responsabil<strong>it</strong>é baséesur l’existence d’actes anti-concurrentiels.Ainsi qu’il a été expliqué plus haut, le préju<strong>di</strong>ce est subi en Belgique par leSPORTING DE CHARLEROI; il est imputé à la FIFA, association de dro<strong>it</strong>suisse, pour une atteinte alléguée au dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire.Il s’ensu<strong>it</strong> que l’article 99 § 2 CDIP est d’application et que le dro<strong>it</strong> belg<strong>ed</strong>o<strong>it</strong> être utilisé dans l’examen de l’action en dommages et intérêts <strong>di</strong>rigéecontre la FIFA.***En dro<strong>it</strong> belge, la matière de la responsabil<strong>it</strong>é quasi-délictuelle est régie parl’article 1382 du Code civil, suivant lequel :« Tout fa<strong>it</strong> quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, obligecelui parla faute duquel il est arrivé, à le réparer. »Par application de cette <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, l’obligation de réparer requiert cinqcon<strong>di</strong>tions:- Le dommage : II n’y a pas d’obligation de réparer sans dommage. Celuicipeut exister même s’il n’y a pas lésion d’un dro<strong>it</strong>; l’atteinte portée à unintérêt suff<strong>it</strong>.- Le fa<strong>it</strong> générateur : Le dommage n’est pris en considération que s’il peutêtre mis en relation avec un fa<strong>it</strong> qui, d’après les règles de dro<strong>it</strong>, peut êtresource de responsabil<strong>it</strong>é.- Le lien de causal<strong>it</strong>é : II s’ag<strong>it</strong> de la relation de cause à effet entre le fa<strong>it</strong>générateur et le dommage.- L’imputabil<strong>it</strong>é : Entre le fa<strong>it</strong> générateur qui cause le dommage et lapersonne qui a l’obligation de réparer, il faut établir un lien. La loi peut eneffet imputer un acte à une personne autre que son auteur.- Le caractère personnel du dommage : Cette notion est proche de l’exigenc<strong>ed</strong>e qual<strong>it</strong>é au sens de l’article 17 du code ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire. En principe, seule lapersonne qui sub<strong>it</strong> le dommage a qual<strong>it</strong>é pour agir en réparation. La loipeut toutefois attribuer cette qual<strong>it</strong>é à une personne autre que la personnepréju<strong>di</strong>ciée. (V. supra, l’examen de cette problématique à propos del’absence de qual<strong>it</strong>é du G-14 en tant que GEIE, à agir au nom de sesmembres)(J.L. FAGNART, Introduction générale au dro<strong>it</strong> de la responsabil<strong>it</strong>é, Dossier 1, Volume 1, in Responsabil<strong>it</strong>és, Tra<strong>it</strong>é théorique et pratique, Story-
186 Giurisprudenza InternazionaleScientia, p. 18 n° 33)Dès l’abord, la FIFA estime que les demandes <strong>di</strong>rigées contre elle doiventêtre déclarées non fondées, au motif que fera<strong>it</strong> défaut la première con<strong>di</strong>tion,élémentaire, à une mise en cause de sa responsabil<strong>it</strong>é, à savoir l’existenc<strong>ed</strong>’un dommage.Selon son analyse en effet, le SPORTING n’aura<strong>it</strong> subi aucun préju<strong>di</strong>cesu<strong>it</strong>e à la sélection et à la blessure de son joueur, M. OULMERS. Quant audommage propre au G-14, il sera<strong>it</strong> artificiellement invoqué.A ce stade des débats, il n’appartient pas au tribunal de déterminer le montantexact du préju<strong>di</strong>ce éventuellement subi par le SPORTING et le G-14, maisbien de vérifier que le dommage allégué par ces derniers ne se révèle pas, àpremier examen, totalement inexistant.Dans cette hypothèse en effet, il sera<strong>it</strong> sans intérêt de se pencher sur l’existenc<strong>ed</strong>’une faute imputable à la FIFA et du lien de causal<strong>it</strong>é avec un dommage quine sera<strong>it</strong> de toute façon que virtuel.Sans entrer dans des détails superflus, le tribunal do<strong>it</strong> admettre que pour unclub de football professionnel, la perte de l’un de ses joueurs en vue est àtout le moins :- Préju<strong>di</strong>ciable au niveau sportif, sans qu’il y a<strong>it</strong> lieu de faire référence auxrésultats plus ou moins favorables réalisés par le club depuis la blessur<strong>ed</strong>u joueur; en effet, le raisonnement visant à déterminer le préju<strong>di</strong>ce sportifse fa<strong>it</strong> en terme de « perte d’une chance » d’obtenir de meilleurs résultatssi le joueur ava<strong>it</strong> été <strong>di</strong>sponible, la perte d’une chance étant, comme on lesa<strong>it</strong>, indemnisable en dro<strong>it</strong> de la responsabil<strong>it</strong>é.- Préju<strong>di</strong>ciable au niveau financier; le club est amené à exposer certainsfrais et peut subir un alour<strong>di</strong>ssement de sa masse salariale; en outre, lablessure grave et l’absence prolongée des terrains peuvent influernégativement sur la valeur d’un joueur.Pour ces raisons, l’on ne peut accueillir l’idée que sera<strong>it</strong> indolore pour unclub de football professionnel, la blessure prolongée de l’un de ses joueurs,en état de forme tel qu’il vena<strong>it</strong> pour la première fois d’être sélectionné dansl’équipe nationale de son pays.Le tribunal do<strong>it</strong> ainsi admettre que le SPORTING a déjà subi un dommag<strong>ed</strong>u chef de la blessure de son joueur, quels qu’en soient l’origine et le montant.Par ailleurs, à ce dommage pourraient s’en ajouter d’autres, susceptiblesd’être invoqués par les parties demanderesses; en effet, si une faute de laFIFA éta<strong>it</strong> mise en lumière, dans le fa<strong>it</strong> de contraindre les clubs à prêter leursjoueurs sans compensation financière, l’existence d’un préju<strong>di</strong>ce endécoulera<strong>it</strong> derechef, résultant de l’absence de défraiement.
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 187Le même raisonnement est transposable au dommage que le G-14, agissanten nom propre, prétend avoir subi par su<strong>it</strong>e du caractère contraignant ducalendrier FIFA, puisque ce groupement pourra<strong>it</strong> alléguer, au t<strong>it</strong>re depréju<strong>di</strong>ce, la perte d’une chance d’avoir pu organiser des tournois ou matchesamicaux, sans qu’à ce stade des débats cette assertion puisse d’ores et déjàêtre écartée.L’existence d’un dommage étant avérée ou cré<strong>di</strong>ble dans le chef des partiesdemanderesses, il appartient au tribunal de se pencher plus avant sur lescon<strong>di</strong>tions d’une responsabil<strong>it</strong>é éventuelle de la FIFA.***Subsi<strong>di</strong>airement, la FIFA souligne qu’à supposer démontrée l’existence d’unefaute dans son chef au regard du dro<strong>it</strong> européen, celle-ci ne pourra<strong>it</strong> detoute façon présenter le moindre lien de causal<strong>it</strong>é avec le dommage alléguépar le SPORTING et le G-14.A l’instar de ce qui a été argumenté pour le dommage, il suffira<strong>it</strong> dès lors autribunal de constater cette absence de lien causal pour, dès ce stade, <strong>di</strong>re lesdemandes non fondées.Le tribunal examinera séparément au regard des demandes formulées par leSPORTING et le G-14, la problématique du lien causal.- Examen de la relation causale éventuelle entre certaines <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ionscontraignantes de la réglementation FIFA et le dommage invoqué par leSPORTING, su<strong>it</strong>e à la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de M. OULMERS et à sablessure.Les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions pertinentes de la réglementation FIFA se s<strong>it</strong>uent à l’annexe1 du Règlement du Statut et du Transfert des Joueurs, sous le t<strong>it</strong>re «Mise à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion des joueurs pour les équipes représentatives des associations»(dernière version du 1 er juillet 2005, laquelle correspond, si ce ne sont quelquesvariantes accessoires, aux articles 36 à 41 du même règlement, version du5juillet 2001, Chap<strong>it</strong>re XIII )Ces règles sont reprodu<strong>it</strong>es ci-dessous (Le tribunal en souligne les partiesles plus concernées):Article 1 - Principes1. Un club ayant enregistré un joueur do<strong>it</strong> mettre ce joueur à la <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ionde l’association du pays pour lequel le joueur est qualifié, sur la base desa national<strong>it</strong>é, s’il est convoqué par l’association en question. Tout autreaccord entre un joueur et un club est inter<strong>di</strong>t.2. La mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion du joueur au sens de l’alinéa précédent estobligatoire pour les matches prévus aux dates du calendrier internationaldes matches coordonné, de même que pour tous les matches faisant l’objet
188 Giurisprudenza Internazional<strong>ed</strong>’une décision particulière de mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion du Com<strong>it</strong>é Exécutif dela FIFA.3. La mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion pour les matches devant être <strong>di</strong>sputés à des datesnon prévues par le calendrier international des matches coordonné n’estpas contraignante.4. Le joueur do<strong>it</strong> également être mis à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion pour la période depréparation précédant une rencontre. La durée de cette période est fixéecomme su<strong>it</strong>:a) pour un match amical: 48 heures;b) pour un match de qualification dans le cadre d’un tournoi international:quatre jours (y compris le jour du match). La période de mise à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion sera étendue à cinq jours si le match en question est <strong>di</strong>sputédans une autre confédération que celle du club auprès duquel le joueurest enregistré;c) pour un match de qualification comptant pour un tournoi internationalprévu à une date réservée pour un match amical: 48 heures;d) pour une compét<strong>it</strong>ion finale dans le cadre d’un tournoi international:14 jours avant le match d’ouverture du tournoi.Les joueurs sont tenus de rejoindre l’équipe représentative au moins 48heures avant le coup d’envoi.5. Les joueurs des associations automatiquement qualifiées pour descompét<strong>it</strong>ions finales de la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA ou dechampionnats des confédérations pour les équipes nationales «A» doiventêtre mis à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion pour les matches amicaux se déroulant aux datesprévues pour les matches officiels, selon les règles applicables auxmatches officiels.6. Les clubs et associations concernés peuvent convenir d’une mise à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion plus longue.7. Tout joueur ayant répondu à une convocation de son association ausens du présent article est tenu d’être à nouveau à la <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de sonclub 24 heures au plus tard après le match pour lequel il a été convoqué.Ce délai est porté à 48 heures si le match a lieu dans une autreconfédération que celle du club auprès duquel le joueur est enregistré.Le club do<strong>it</strong> être informé par écr<strong>it</strong> des <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions de voyages aller -retour prévues pour le joueur et ce <strong>di</strong>x jours avant le match. L’associationdo<strong>it</strong> s’assurer qu’après le match, le joueur regagne son club dans l<strong>ed</strong>élai imparti.8. Dans le cas où un joueur ne rejoint pas son club dans les délais prévuspar cet article, la période de mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion pour son association estécourtée comme su<strong>it</strong> pour les futures mises à <strong>di</strong>s pos<strong>it</strong>ion du joueur en
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 189cause:a) pour un match amical: à 24 heures;b) pour un match de qualification: à trois jours;c) pour la compét<strong>it</strong>ion finale d’un tournoi international: à <strong>di</strong>x jours.9. n cas de manquement répété de la part d’une association, la Commissiondu Statut du Joueur de la FIFA peut imposer les sanctions appropriéesqui pourront inclure, mais sans se lim<strong>it</strong>era:- des amendes;- une réduction de la période de mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion;- une inter<strong>di</strong>ction de demande de mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion pour le ou les matchessuivant(s).Article 2 - Dispos<strong>it</strong>ions financières et assurances1. Un club qui met l’un de ses joueurs à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion d’une associationselon les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions de la présente annexe n‘a dro<strong>it</strong> à aucune indemn<strong>it</strong>éfinancière.2. L’association qui convoque le joueur supporte les frais effectifs detransport encourus par le joueur su<strong>it</strong>e à cette convocation.3. Les clubs auprès desquels des joueurs convoqués sont enregistrés assurenteux-mêmes les joueurs concernés contre les mala<strong>di</strong>es et les accidentspouvant survenir durant la période de mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, de même quecontre les blessures contractées lors du match international ou desmatches internationaux pour lequel ou pour lesquels ils sont mis à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion.Article 3 - Convocation des joueurs1. En principe, tout joueur de football affilié à un club est tenu de répondrepos<strong>it</strong>ivement à une convocation qui lui est notifiée par l’association dontil est ressortissant pour l’une de ses équipes représentatives.2. Une association désirant convoquer un joueur qui évolue à l’étrangerdo<strong>it</strong> le lui notifier par écr<strong>it</strong> et ce, 15 jours au plus tard avant le matchpour lequel le joueur est convoqué. L’association informera en mêmetemps le club du joueur par écr<strong>it</strong>. Le club do<strong>it</strong> confirmer la mise à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion du joueur dans les six jours qui suivent.3. Une association demandant assistance à la FIFA pour obtenir la mise à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion d’un joueur évoluant à l’étranger ne peut le faire que sousles deux con<strong>di</strong>tions suivantes:a) une demande d’intervention do<strong>it</strong> avoir été adressée à l’association auprèsde laquelle le joueur est enregistré, mais sans succès;b) le dossier do<strong>it</strong> avoir été soumis a la FIFA au moins 5 jours avant la dat<strong>ed</strong>u match pour lequel le joueur est sollic<strong>it</strong>é.Article 4 - Joueurs blessés
190 Giurisprudenza InternazionaleUn joueur ne pouvant satisfaire à une convocation de l’association dont ilest ressortissant en raison d’une blessure ou d’une mala<strong>di</strong>e do<strong>it</strong>, à lademande de cette association, se soumettre à un examen mé<strong>di</strong>cal auprèsd’un médecin que celle-ci aura choisi. Si le joueur le souha<strong>it</strong>e, l’examenmé<strong>di</strong>cal peut avoir lieu sur le terr<strong>it</strong>oire de l’association auprès de laquelleil est enregistré.Article 5 - Restrictions de jeuUn joueur qui a été convoqué par son association pour l’une de ses équipesreprésentatives n’a pas le dro<strong>it</strong> déjouer avec le club auquel il appartientpendant le temps que dure ou aura<strong>it</strong> dû durer sa mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion au sensde la présente annexe, à moins d’un accord avec l’association concernée.Cette inter<strong>di</strong>ction de jouer est de sure mît pro longée de 5 jours si le joueurn’a pas voulu ou n ‘a pu donner su<strong>it</strong>e, pour des raisons quelconques, à laconvocation dont il éta<strong>it</strong> l’objet.Article 6 - Mesures <strong>di</strong>sciplinaires1. Toute violation des <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions de la présente annexe entraînera dessanctions <strong>di</strong>sciplinaires.2. Si un club refuse de mettre à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion un joueur ou néglige la mise à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion en violation des <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions de la présente annexe, laCommission du Statut du Joueur de la FIFA demandera à l’associationà laquelle est affilié le club de déclarer perdu le match (ou les matches)auquel le joueur a participé avec le club concerné. Tout point ainsi obtenupar le club en question est annulé . Tout match <strong>di</strong>sputé selon le systèm<strong>ed</strong>e coupe est considéré comme ayant été remporté par l’équipe adverse,sans tenir compte du score.3. (…)***Il est avéré que les règles reprodu<strong>it</strong>es ci-dessus organisent une mise à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion forcée, à charge des clubs-employeurs, des joueurs sélectionnéspar les fédérations nationales.Si l’on se réfère à la loi belge, une telle mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de salariés estréglementée par la loi du 24 juillet 1987 (mo<strong>di</strong>fiée par la loi du 12 août2000); selon la jurisprudence, cette loi fa<strong>it</strong> partie des « lois de police et desûreté », dont les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions sont applicables au contrat de travail, lorsqueles prestations de travail sont hab<strong>it</strong>uellement accomplies sur le terr<strong>it</strong>oirebelge.(O. DEBRAY, La mobil<strong>it</strong>é internationale: Problématique de la loi applicableaux contrats de travail, in «Le contrat de travail et la nouvelle économie»,Ed. du Jeune Barreau 2001, p. 23 et 24)
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 191Le dro<strong>it</strong> belge sera<strong>it</strong> donc d’application si l’on considéra<strong>it</strong> la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ionde M. OULMERS sous l’angle du dro<strong>it</strong> commun.L’article 31 de la loi préc<strong>it</strong>ée prohibe le principe de la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion detravailleurs lorsque l’utilisateur exerce une part quelconque de l’autor<strong>it</strong>éappartenant normalement à l’employeur; cependant, par dérogation à la règlegénérale, la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de travailleurs est autorisée par l’article 32,notamment lorsqu’elle vise l’exécution momentanée de tâches spécialiséesrequérant une qualification professionnelle particulière.Dans cette hypothèse, le paragraphe 2 de l’article 32 prévo<strong>it</strong> qu’uneconvention tripart<strong>it</strong>e écr<strong>it</strong>e do<strong>it</strong>, avant le début de la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion, êtresignée par l’employeur, l’utilisateur et le travailleur, constatant les con<strong>di</strong>tionsainsi que la durée de la période de mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion.(C.ENGELS et O.WOUTERS, Outsourcing: enjeu et conséquences au regard(...) de la loi du 24 juillet 1987 relative au détachement et au prêt depersonnel, in « Le contrat de travail et la nouvelle économie », mêmes réf.,p. 117 àt 119 )Si l’on applique ces principes au cas d’espèce, l’on do<strong>it</strong> admettre que le prêtde M. OULMERS à la Fédération marocaine aura<strong>it</strong> dû relever de la loi du24 juillet 1987, et plus particulièrement de la dérogation prévue à l’article32, puisqu’il y a mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion temporaire d’un joueur-salarié en vu<strong>ed</strong>’une prestation en sélection nationale, ce qui représente indub<strong>it</strong>ablementune tâche spécialisée requérant une qualification particulière.En poursuivant l’analogie avec le dro<strong>it</strong> commun, et sans porter de jugementde valeur sur la logique du système adopté par la FIFA, l’on conviendraqu’il n’est pas d’exemple d’une s<strong>it</strong>uation où un employeur se vo<strong>it</strong> contraintde prêter un salarié, sans pouvoir préalablement régler les modal<strong>it</strong>és du prêtavec l’intéressé et l’utilisateur.Il est clair que si la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion éta<strong>it</strong> intervenue dans un cadre légalor<strong>di</strong>naire, le SPORTING, club-employeur, aura<strong>it</strong> nécessairement obtenu del’utilisateur, les avantages minimum que sont une intervention dans le salair<strong>ed</strong>u joueur et une couverture d’assurance pour la durée du prêt.Or, après avoir contraint les clubs au prêt de joueurs, sous peine de sanctions(Voy. l’article 6 de l’annexe), la réglementation FIFA prive ces mêmes clubsde tout dro<strong>it</strong> à une indemn<strong>it</strong>é financière et leur délaisse la charge del’assurance.C’est bien en vertu de ces règles que le SPORTING s’est vu refuser toutrecours contre la Fédération marocaine, celle-ci, par son fax du 17 décembre2004, ayant logiquement décliné son intervention en se prévalant de l’article37 du règlement FIFA (aujourd’hui article 2 de l’annexe préc<strong>it</strong>ée).
192 Giurisprudenza Internazionale***Pour juger du lien de causal<strong>it</strong>é entre une faute et un dommage, la jurisprudencebelge applique la théorie de l’équivalence des con<strong>di</strong>tions: le lien de causal<strong>it</strong>éexiste lorsqu’il est établi que le dommage tel qu’il s’est produ<strong>it</strong>, ne se sera<strong>it</strong>pas réalisé si la faute n’ava<strong>it</strong> pas été commise.Inversement, le juge qui constate qu’un dommage se sera<strong>it</strong> tout de mêmeprodu<strong>it</strong> tel qu’il s’est présenté in concreto en l’absence d’une faute, do<strong>it</strong>conclure à l’inexistence d’un lien causal entre cette faute et le dommage.(J.L. FAGNART, c<strong>it</strong>é supra, même réf., p. 18 n° 33)En l’occurrence, il est constant que le dommage allégué par le SPORTINGest lié à l’application contraignante de la réglementation FIFA; le club eneffet:- s’est vu contraint en vertu de l’article 1 de l’annexe, de mettre son joueurà la <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de la Fédération marocaine, (le caractère obligatoire duprêt de M. OULMERS n’est plus <strong>di</strong>scuté dans les dernières conclusionsde la FIFA)- en vertu de l’article 2, § 1 er préc<strong>it</strong>é, il s’est vu refuser toute compensationfinancière pour l’intervention dans le salaire du joueur.- en vertu du même article, § 3, la charge d’assurer le joueur lui a étédélaissée, alors que par ailleurs le club éta<strong>it</strong> privé de toute compensation.- toujours en vertu de l’article 2, § 1, le SPORTING s’est vu refuser l<strong>ed</strong>ro<strong>it</strong> de réclamer réparation à la Fédération marocaine, pour le dommageconsécutif à la blessure de M. OULMERS.Il résulte de l’application du dro<strong>it</strong> commun que si le SPORTING ne s’éta<strong>it</strong>pas trouvé confronté aux règles FIFA, il aura<strong>it</strong> pu en toute liberté établir uneconvention de mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de son joueur, intégrant les intérêts quisont les siens; or, cette liberté de négocier entre parties égales au contrat,pour aboutir à la fixation de dro<strong>it</strong>s et obligations équilibrés, est précisémentce dont le SPORTING n’a pu bénéficier en raison de la réglementation FIFA.(S’exprimant de la sorte, le tribunal veut rappeler qu’il ne pose aucunjugement de valeur sur les raisons qui ont amené la FIFA à promulguer cesrègles, le raisonnement développé se s<strong>it</strong>uant exclusivement dans le cadr<strong>ed</strong>e l’examen du lien de causal<strong>it</strong>é)En d’autres termes, le dommage subi par le SPORTING ne se sera<strong>it</strong> pasprodu<strong>it</strong> tel qu’il s’est présenté, si le caractère obligatoire du règlement FIFAne lui ava<strong>it</strong> ôté une chance de négocier une compensation avec la fédérationqui alla<strong>it</strong> exercer l’autor<strong>it</strong>é sur M. OULMERS, et une indemnisation aprèsla blessure de ce dernier.A cet égard ne peuvent être pris en compte les arguments de la FIFA dans le
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 193sens suivant:1 er argument : Le lien de causal<strong>it</strong>é ne sera<strong>it</strong> pas établi parce qu’en l’absencemême de règlement contraignant, il aura<strong>it</strong> été de l’intérêt du SPORTING deprêter son joueur à la sélection nationale de son pays, ce en vue de bénéficierde l’augmentation de la valeur de transfert indu<strong>it</strong>e, de l’accroissement desrecettes générées par les ventes de produ<strong>it</strong>s dérivés, de la valorisation del’image du club etc...A cet égard, il reste douteux qu’un club a<strong>it</strong> nécessairement intérêt à prêterson joueur pour un match amical au retentissement international lim<strong>it</strong>é etimpliquant des risques de blessure non négligeables.Premièrement, si la sélection d’un joueur en équipe nationale peut,éventuellement, exercer une influence sur la valeur du joueur, cela semble leplus souvent se vérifier dans le cadre de compét<strong>it</strong>ions de haut niveau,bénéficiant d’une couverture mé<strong>di</strong>atique importante, (coupe du monde,certaines coupes continentales).Deuxièmement, il paraît plus exact de considérer qu’en général, au niveaueuropéen, la valeur d’un joueur progresse d’abord au vu de ses prestationsdans son équipe de club, le nombre de matches <strong>di</strong>sputés dans ce cadre, auniveau national ou international, étant de loin supérieur au nombre de matchesjoués en équipe nationale.Troisièmement, l’on est amené à douter que pour un club d’une notoriétélim<strong>it</strong>ée sur la scène internationale, la sélection d’un joueur par une fédérationqui, à l’heure actuelle, ne figure pas dans les premières fédérations mon<strong>di</strong>ales,puisse exercer une influence significative sur les produ<strong>it</strong>s dérivés ou l’imag<strong>ed</strong>e son club.Enfin, l’on renverra à la constatation qu’en se voyant contraint de céder sonjoueur sans compensation à la Fédération marocaine, le SPORTING a detoute façon perdu une chance de négocier certaines garanties minimum pourque le prêt imposé ne lui so<strong>it</strong> pas en final défavorable.2 ème argument: Le seul lien causal avec le dommage résidera<strong>it</strong> dans l’abstentiondu SPORTING d’assurer son joueur contre le risque de blessure, ainsi quele règlement FIFA lui en faisa<strong>it</strong> l’obligation.Précisément, c’est ce règlement qui fa<strong>it</strong> l’objet de cr<strong>it</strong>ique; si celui-ci éta<strong>it</strong>considéré comme illégal, l’abstention du SPORTING ne pourra<strong>it</strong> lui êtrereprochée car, en dehors d’une obligation légale ou contractuelle valable,nul ne peut être contraint de recourir à l’assurance. En d’autres termes, lavictime d’un fa<strong>it</strong> dommageable ne pourra<strong>it</strong> se voir priver d’une réparationau motif qu’elle aura<strong>it</strong> omis de prévoir une couverture d’assurance.Au demeurant, le dommage résultant de la blessure de M. OULMERS n’est
194 Giurisprudenza Internazionalepas le seul réclamé, puisqu’il est question également de l’absence decompensation financière pour la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion du joueur.3 eme argument: Le lien de causal<strong>it</strong>é ne sera<strong>it</strong> pas unique puisque, de toutefaçon, le SPORTING éta<strong>it</strong> tenu de mettre le joueur à la <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de sasélection nationale, en vertu d’une clause figurant dans son contrat.Le contrat de M. OULMERS contient effectivement la clause suivante: « Leclub s’engage à mettre le Joueur à la <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de la fédération national<strong>ed</strong>u pays dont il est ressortissant, conformément aux règlements de la FIFAet de l’UEFA, pour des matches de compét<strong>it</strong>ion de l’équipe nationale «A»et «espoirs». »L’on relèvera immé<strong>di</strong>atement que cette clause est prévue « conformémentaux règlements de la FIFA (...) »; le contrat de M. OULMERS est en réal<strong>it</strong>éun contrat type ré<strong>di</strong>gé par la ligue professionnelle de football belge, enapplication des règles FIFA. L’obligation conventionnelle de mise à<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion résulte dès lors des règles incriminées dont le SPORTINGdemande de constater l’illégal<strong>it</strong>é.Ces arguments ayant été écartés, le tribunal résumera le lien de causal<strong>it</strong>éentre la faute éventuelle de la FIFA et le dommage subi par le SPORTINGDE CHARLEROI; celui-ci résulte de ce que:- En raison du règlement FIFA, le SPORTING n’a pu négocier au mieux deses intérêts avec la Fédération marocaine, lorsque celle-ci a requis la miseà <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de M. OULMERS au prof<strong>it</strong> de la sélection nationale.- Après la blessure de ce dernier, le SPORTING n’a pu, pour les mêmesraisons, réclamer à la fédération concernée le préju<strong>di</strong>ce qu’il estime avoirsubi.Examen de la relation causale éventuelle entre certaines <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ionscontraignantes de la réglementation FIFA et le dommage subi par le G-14,du fa<strong>it</strong> de la supposée entrave à l’exercice des activ<strong>it</strong>és commerciales de c<strong>ed</strong>ernier.Les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions pertinentes relatives au caractère obligatoire du calendrierFIFA se s<strong>it</strong>uent aux articles 74 et 75 des statuts de la FIFA. L’article 74<strong>di</strong>spose que:«Le Com<strong>it</strong>é exécutif fixe d’entente avec les confédérations un calendrierinternational des matches auxquels les confédérations, les membres et lesligues sont tenus de se conformer.»Quant à l’article 75, il prévo<strong>it</strong> que: «Aucun match ni compét<strong>it</strong>ion ne peutavoir lie u sans autorisation préalable de la FIFA.»Le calendrier FIFA, par son caractère unilatéral et obligatoire, esteffectivement susceptible de compromettre l’organisation, par un groupement
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 195de clubs qui se révélera<strong>it</strong> inév<strong>it</strong>ablement concurrent, de compét<strong>it</strong>ions qui luiseraient propres.Le lien de causal<strong>it</strong>é est en l’espèce également avéré.***Ayant admis la réal<strong>it</strong>é d’un dommage découlant de l’existence de laréglementation FIFA, le tribunal do<strong>it</strong> à ce stade examiner si, commel’épinglent les parties demanderesses, certains articles de cette réglementationsont contraires au dro<strong>it</strong> européen et justifient dès lors qu’une faute so<strong>it</strong>imputée à la FIFA.Dans ce but, il y a lieu de se référer à la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justic<strong>ed</strong>es Communautés Européennes, pour vérifier si et dans quelle mesurel’activ<strong>it</strong>é sportive est susceptible de se voir assujettie aux règles é<strong>di</strong>ctées parle Tra<strong>it</strong>é de Rome.(Voir concernant les développements ci-après J. VANDEN EYNDE, LesCahiers des sciences administratives, novembre 200 5, n° 6, <strong>Sport</strong> et dro<strong>it</strong>:Les fédérations, actes du colloque du 29 novembre 2005, «Les fédérationssportives sont -elles des entreprises commerciales?», p.84 et svt.)Dans l’Union européenne, le sport est soumis au principe de subsi<strong>di</strong>ar<strong>it</strong>é ence sens qu’il ressort essentiellement de la compétence des Etats membres.Si le sport n’est pas en soi une compétence communautaire, il est lié à <strong>di</strong>versdomaines qui relèvent <strong>di</strong>rectement ou in<strong>di</strong>rectement des pol<strong>it</strong>iques de l’Union.Notamment, au niveau européen, le sport exerce un impact sur la liberté decirculation des personnes et sur la pol<strong>it</strong>ique de la concurrence.L’activ<strong>it</strong>é sportive présente en effet deux aspects; l’on <strong>di</strong>stingue :- D’une part, l’activ<strong>it</strong>é sportive en soi, qui rempl<strong>it</strong> un rôle social, culturelet d’intégration, à laquelle la réglementation de l’Union ne s’appliquethéoriquement pas mais dont les derniers conseils européens soulignentl’importance. (Cfr. la déclaration annexe adoptée à Amsterdam en 1997 ainsique la déclaration sur le sport adoptée à Nice en 2000)- D’autre part, l’activ<strong>it</strong>é économique générée par l’activ<strong>it</strong>é sportive, àlaquelle le <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>if légal européen s’applique nécessairement.En ce qui concerne la concurrence, ce <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>if a pour objectif de garantirque les acteurs actifs au sein du marché puissent se concurrencer librement.C’est ainsi que l’article 81 § 1 er du Tra<strong>it</strong>é stipule que «Sont incompatiblesavec le marché commun et inter<strong>di</strong>ts tous accords entre entreprises, toutesdécisions d’associations d’entreprises et toute pratique concertée qui sontsusceptibles d’affecter le commerce entre Etats membres et qui ont pourobjet ou pour effet d’empêcher, de restreindre ou de fausser le jeu de laconcurrence à l’intérieur du marché commun (...)»
196 Giurisprudenza InternazionaleToutefois, la même <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion prévo<strong>it</strong> en son § 3 que certaines pratiques ouententes peuvent être admises.Quanta l’article 82, il prohibe, « dans la mesure où le commerce entre Etatsmembres est susceptible d’en être affecté, le fa<strong>it</strong> pour une ou plusieursentreprises d’explo<strong>it</strong>er de façon abusive une pos<strong>it</strong>ion dominante sur lemarché commun ou dans une partie substantielle de celui-ci (...)»Dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour européenne, l’application des règles dudro<strong>it</strong> européen à la matière sportive a pour la première fois été envisagé<strong>ed</strong>ans l’arrêt Walrave-Koch qui a posé l’hypothèse de la <strong>di</strong>chotomie entrel’organisation économique du sport et sa régulation interne.(CEJL, 12 décembre 1974, Walrave etKoch, 36/74, Recueil, page 140)Dans cet arrêt, la Cour dégage les principes suivants : L’exercice des sportsrelève du dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire dans la mesure seulement où il const<strong>it</strong>ue uneactiv<strong>it</strong>é économique au sens du Tra<strong>it</strong>é (1); de manière dérogatoire, il peutéventuellement bénéficier d’un statut privilégié lorsque les règles visées sontliées <strong>di</strong>rectement à la régulation du sport (2); la règle légale européennes’impose non seulement à l’action des autor<strong>it</strong>és publiques mais s’étend aussiaux réglementations d’une autre nature, en clair notamment celles qui émanentdes fédérations sportives (3).Il resta<strong>it</strong> par la su<strong>it</strong>e à préciser ce qui peut être considéré comme une règleliée « <strong>di</strong>rectement » à la régulation du sport; au terme d’une approchepragmatique, il semble que la jurisprudence européenne a<strong>it</strong> exclu totalementou partiellement des lois de la concurrence, un ensemble de règles quigouvernent le monde du sport, en particulier les règles <strong>di</strong>tes sportives tellesque l’organisation du jeu, la sélection des athlètes pour certaines compét<strong>it</strong>ions,la compos<strong>it</strong>ion d’équipes représentatives et les règles du dopage.Lorsqu’elle a été amenée à se prononcer sur la cr<strong>it</strong>ique d’une règle é<strong>di</strong>ctéepar une fédération sportive, la Cour paraît, au stade actuel d’évolutionjurisprudentielle, avoir été guidée parles principes suivants:- Il est acquis qu’une règle strictement régulatrice du sport sort del’application de l’article 2 du Tra<strong>it</strong>é qui vise les activ<strong>it</strong>és économiques.- Il ne suffira<strong>it</strong> cependant pas de constater qu’une règle sportive exerc<strong>ed</strong>es répercussions économiques, pour l’inclure nécessairement dans le champd’application de la législation européenne.- Même au sein de son activ<strong>it</strong>é économique, le sport présente des spécific<strong>it</strong>ésqu’il faut prendre en compte lors de l’application des règles de dro<strong>it</strong> européen.- Il est établi que les règles régulatrices ne peuvent créer aucune<strong>di</strong>scrimination au sens des Tra<strong>it</strong>és.- Les règles régulatrices doivent être proportionnées et il ne do<strong>it</strong> pas exister
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 197d’autres moyens moins restrictifs de parvenir aux objectifs lég<strong>it</strong>imes visés.L’on terminera cet examen de la jurisprudence communautaire en relevantqu’aujourd’hui, il ne paraît plus pouvoir être contesté que les fédérationssportives doivent être considérées, au niveau européen, comme étant desentreprises ou des associations d’entreprise. (J. VANDEN EYNDE, mêmesréf., p. 89 à 91)Sur base de ces apports, il appartient maintenant à Notre tribunal de vérifiersi les règles de dro<strong>it</strong> européen dont en l’occurrence se prévalent le SPORTINGet le G-14, ont été méconnues par la FIFA, ce qui impliquera<strong>it</strong> une faut<strong>ed</strong>ans son chef.Il est constant en effet que si elle s’estime suffisamment éclairée par lajurisprudence de la Cour, la juri<strong>di</strong>ction nationale peut décider elle-même del’interprétation correcte du dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire, et de son application à las<strong>it</strong>uation factuelle qu’elle constate.Par contre, un renvoi préju<strong>di</strong>ciel peut s’avérer utile, au stade approprié de laprocédure, quand la réponse de la Cour est nécessaire à la juri<strong>di</strong>ction nationalepour résoudre le l<strong>it</strong>ige dont elle est saisie et lorsqu’il s’ag<strong>it</strong> d’une questiond’interprétation nouvelle présentant un intérêt général pour l’applicationuniforme du dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire à travers l’Union ou lorsque lajurisprudence existante ne paraît pas applicable à un cadre factuel iné<strong>di</strong>t.(Voir Cour de Justice, «Note d’information destinée aux juri<strong>di</strong>ctionsnationales concernant la procédure préju<strong>di</strong>cielle devant la Cour de justice..»,Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, 11.06.2005, C 143/1 à C 143/4)***Le SPORTING DE CHARLEROI et le G-14 contestent la lég<strong>it</strong>im<strong>it</strong>é d’uneréglementation grâce à laquelle, selon l’argumentation développée, la FIFAet ses membres protègent et développent leurs propres intérêts commerciauxau détriment de ceux des clubs, sans que les restrictions de concurrence,l’abus de pos<strong>it</strong>ion dominante ou les atteintes à la libre circulation dont il estfa<strong>it</strong> état soient justifiés par une quelconque nécess<strong>it</strong>é objective et sans queles clubs y aient consenti.A entendre ces parties, les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions statutaires et réglementaires cr<strong>it</strong>iquéesne seraient pas en mesure de satisfaire au test de proportionnal<strong>it</strong>é de la fin etdes moyens car il sera<strong>it</strong> possible d’adopter, en concertation avec tous lesintéressés, des règles permettant d’atteindre les objectifs annoncés par laFIFA d’une manière qui respecte les dro<strong>it</strong>s de chacun.Certaines <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions de la réglementation FIFA seraient donc incompatiblesavec les articles 81 et 82 du Tra<strong>it</strong>é CE, prohibant les restrictions deconcurrence et l’abus de pos<strong>it</strong>ion dominante, ainsi qu’avec les articles 39 et
198 Giurisprudenza Internazionale49 du Tra<strong>it</strong>é inst<strong>it</strong>uant la libre circulation des travailleurs et la libre prestationdes services à l’intérieur de l’Union, les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions réglementaires querelléesaffectant la libre jouissance par les joueurs et les clubs des libertés que leurconfèrent les articles 39 et 49 préc<strong>it</strong>és.***D’une manière générale, l’examen de la compatibil<strong>it</strong>é de la règle sportiveavec le dro<strong>it</strong> européen se révèle délicat, notamment parce que le juge do<strong>it</strong>év<strong>it</strong>er de compromettre des équilibres complexes, mis en place souvent auniveau mon<strong>di</strong>al, dans un domaine dont les derniers conseils européens(Amsterdam, Nice) ont souligné l’importance sociale.Ainsi qu’il a été rappelé plus haut, la jurisprudence européenne privilégiejusqu’ici une approche pragmatique, sur base de principes qui restent larges,chaque fois que lui est soumise la cr<strong>it</strong>ique d’une règle sportive.En l’occurrence, les règles FIFA ici attaquées - ou celles d’autres fédérationssportives qui s’en rapprocheraient - n’ont pas encore été déférées à l’examende la Cour. Pour rappel, ces règles sont les suivantes (dans la version du 1 erjuillet 2005) :- L’article 1 de l’annexe 1 au Règlement du Statut et du Transfert desJoueurs, relative au prêt obligatoire de joueurs aux équipes nationales.- L’article 2, al. 1 er , relatif à l’absence d’indemnisation des clubs lors de lamise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de joueurs.- L’article 2, al. 3, concernant le maintien à charge des clubs de la couvertur<strong>ed</strong>’assurance en cas de prêt obligatoire de joueurs.- Les articles 74 et 75 des statuts, imposant le calendrier coordonné FIFA.Pour vérifier la compatibil<strong>it</strong>é de ces <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions avec le dro<strong>it</strong> européen, il ya lieu premièrement d’examiner si celles-ci doivent être analysées comm<strong>ed</strong>es règles purement sportives, é<strong>di</strong>ctées par la FIFA en sa qual<strong>it</strong>é d’organismerégulateur du football, et dans ce contexte échappant dès l’abord aux règlesé<strong>di</strong>ctées par le Tra<strong>it</strong>é CE.Ensu<strong>it</strong>e, s’il apparaissa<strong>it</strong> que ces règles ne sont pas purement sportives carexerçant une répercussion économique, encore le tribunal ne pourra<strong>it</strong>-il eninférer, eu égard à la jurisprudence actuelle, qu’il y aura<strong>it</strong> lieu nécessairementde les assujettir au Tra<strong>it</strong>é.Et même, à les supposer soumises aux articles 81 et 82 du Tra<strong>it</strong>é, ces règlessont susceptibles de n’être pas identifiées par la Cour comme contraires audro<strong>it</strong> européen de la concurrence ou encore de bénéficier d’un régim<strong>ed</strong>érogatoire.Quant à la compatibil<strong>it</strong>é des règles cr<strong>it</strong>iquées par rapport aux articles 39 et49 du Tra<strong>it</strong>é, il n’apparaît pas non plus que le tribunal puisse s’en faire une
Sentenza causa G-14 Charleroi c. FIFA 199opinion défin<strong>it</strong>ive à travers l’enseignement actuel de la Cour.Eu égard donc à l’état de la jurisprudence communautaire, Notre tribunal nepeut se considérer comme suffisamment éclairé sur la réponse qui émanera<strong>it</strong>de la Cour de Justice, confrontée à ces <strong>di</strong>fférentes questions, à telle enseigneque si une juri<strong>di</strong>ction nationale décida<strong>it</strong> de trancher en l’état, son ver<strong>di</strong>ctapparaîtra<strong>it</strong> fatalement anecdotique tant il est certain que sur ces questionsnouvelles et pointues, la Cour de Justice Européenne est la seule susceptibl<strong>ed</strong>e générer, au sein de l’Union, une jurisprudence uniforme et lég<strong>it</strong>ime.La question préju<strong>di</strong>cielle est donc in<strong>di</strong>spensable pour juger de la légal<strong>it</strong>é desrègles FIFA mieux identifiées ci-dessus, en regard du Tra<strong>it</strong>é CE, et pourpermettre ainsi à Notre tribunal de statuer sur la demande en dommages etintérêts introdu<strong>it</strong>e par le SPORTING DE CHARLEROIetleG-14.C’est pourquoi, avant-<strong>di</strong>re dro<strong>it</strong>, il y a lieu d’interroger la Cour de Justicesur la question formulée au <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>if du présent jugement.Par contre, la solution du l<strong>it</strong>ige n’impose pas d’interroger la Cour sur lalégal<strong>it</strong>é de la réglementation de l’UEFA; en effet, les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions qui y figurentsont prescr<strong>it</strong>es en application des règles obligatoires émanant de la FIFA,comme l’in<strong>di</strong>que l’article 20 des statuts de cette organisation, al. 3: «Chaqueconfédération (donc l’UEFA) a tes dro<strong>it</strong>s et obligations suivantes: (...) a)Respecter et faire respecter les statuts, règlements et décisions de la FIFA.»,tan<strong>di</strong>s que l’alinéa 5 prévo<strong>it</strong> que: «Les statuts et règlements desconfédérations doivent être soumis à la FIFA pour approbation.»Dès lors, si certaines règles de la FIFA étaient déclarées contraires au Tra<strong>it</strong>é,il en découlera<strong>it</strong> auss<strong>it</strong>ôt que les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions analogues figurant dans lerèglement de l’UEFA le seraient aussi.PAR CES MOTIFSLE TRIBUNALE DE COMMERCE STATUANT CONTRADICTOI-REMENTJoint comme connexes les causes RG A/05/03843 et A/06/00735. Se déclarecompétent pour connaître des <strong>di</strong>fférentes demandes.D<strong>it</strong> la demande de la SASPORTING DU PAYS DE CHARLEROI recevable.D<strong>it</strong> la demande du G-14 GROUPEMENT DES CLUBS DE FOOTBALLEUROPEENS recevable uniquement en ce qu’elle concerne la réclamationd’un préju<strong>di</strong>ce propre à ce groupement; la <strong>di</strong>t irrecevable en ce qu’elleconcerne la réclamation d’un préju<strong>di</strong>ce propre à chacun de ses <strong>di</strong>x hu<strong>it</strong>membres, à savoir le préju<strong>di</strong>ce résultant de la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion obligatoireet gratu<strong>it</strong>e de joueurs en faveur des sélections nationales.D<strong>it</strong> recevables les interventions volontaires déposées par cinq confédérationset quarante neuf fédérations de football, mieux identifiées en en-tête du
200 Giurisprudenza Internazionalejugement.Constate que l’examen du fondement des demandes en réparation, <strong>di</strong>rigéescontre la FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALLASSOCIATION (FIFA) par la SA SPORTING DU PAYS DE CHARLEROIet le G-14 GROUPEMENT DES CLUBS DE FOOTBALL EUROPEENS,et contre l’UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS EUROPEENNES DEFOOTBALL (UEFA) par le G-14, nécess<strong>it</strong>e qu’il so<strong>it</strong> statué sur la légal<strong>it</strong>é,au regard du dro<strong>it</strong> européen, de règles é<strong>di</strong>ctées par la FIFA.Dès lors, avant de statuer sur le fondement des demandes, pose la questionpréju<strong>di</strong>cielle suivante à la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes,en application de l’article 234 du Tra<strong>it</strong>é CE:«Les obligations imposées aux clubs et aux joueurs de football sous contratde travail avec ces clubs, parles <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions statutaires et réglementairesde la FIFA qui organisent la mise à <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion obligatoire et gratu<strong>it</strong>e desjoueurs en faveur des fédérations nationales ainsi que la fixation unilatéraleet contraignante du calendrier international des matches coordonné, sontellesconst<strong>it</strong>utives de restrictions illic<strong>it</strong>es de concurrence ou d’abus depos<strong>it</strong>ion dominante ou d’obstacles à l’exercice des libertés fondamentalesconférées parle Tra<strong>it</strong>é CE, et donc contraires aux articles 81 et 82 du Tra<strong>it</strong>éou de toute autre <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion de dro<strong>it</strong> communautaire, particulièrement lesarticles 39 et 49 du Tra<strong>it</strong>é? »Dans l’attente de la réponse de la Cour, réserve à statuer et renvoie la causeau rôle particulier de la 1 ère chambre du tribunal.II a été fa<strong>it</strong> application de la loi du 15 juin 1935 sur l’emploi des langues enmatière ju<strong>di</strong>ciaire;APPLICATION DE L’ARTICLE 779 DU CODE JUDICIAIREPar ordonnance en date du 15 mai 2006 de Monsieur le Président J.PH.LEBEAU, Monsieur F. DE CLERCQ, Juge Consulaire suppléant, a étédésigné pour remplacer Madame M. JANFILS, qui, ayant assisté aux débatset participé au délibéré, s’est trouvée lég<strong>it</strong>imement empêchée d’assister auprononcé et de signer le présent jugement.Prononcé en au<strong>di</strong>ence publique de la PREMIERE chambre du Tribunal decommerce de Charleroi, le QUINZE MAI DEUX MILLE SIX.Présents,Monsieur J-P. LEBEAU, PrésidentMonsieur F. DE CLERCQ, Juge consulaire suppléantMonsieur M. BALSAT, Juge consulaireMonsieur D. BIERLAIRE, Greffier en chef
RIVISTA DI ISSN 1825-6678DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA DELLO SPORT Vol. II, Fasc. 2, 2006TAS: VERTENZA FIFA/AMA CIRCA LA PROPORZIONALITÀDELLE SANZIONI PER DOPINGCAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADAAdvisory Opinion render<strong>ed</strong> by the Court of Arb<strong>it</strong>ration for <strong>Sport</strong> s<strong>it</strong>ting inthe following compos<strong>it</strong>ion:President: Mr. Hans Nater, Attorney-at-Law, Zurich, Sw<strong>it</strong>zerlandArb<strong>it</strong>rators: Ms. Corinne Schmidhauser, Attorney-at-Law, Bern,Sw<strong>it</strong>zerland Mr. Stephan Netzle, Attorney-at-Law,Zurich, Sw<strong>it</strong>zerlandAd hoc Clerk: Mr. Michael Tuchschmid, Attorney-at-Law, Zurich,Sw<strong>it</strong>zerlandRequest by:1. Fédération Internationale de Football Association, Zurich, Sw<strong>it</strong>zerland-FIFA-Request by2. World Anti-Doping Agency, Montreal, CanadaRepresent<strong>ed</strong> by Mr. François Kaiser, Carrard Paschoud Heim & Partners,Lausanne, Sw<strong>it</strong>zerland-WADA-I. INTRODUCTION1. This matter comes before the Court of Arb<strong>it</strong>ration for <strong>Sport</strong> (CAS)pursuant to the provisions concerning Advisory Opinions of the Code of<strong>Sport</strong>s-relat<strong>ed</strong> Arb<strong>it</strong>ration (CAS Code). The Fédération Internationale deFootball Association (FIFA) and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)have each fil<strong>ed</strong> a request for an Advisory Opinion in order to resolve a<strong>di</strong>spute arising out of the implementation of the World Anti-Doping Code(WADC) into the FIFA Disciplinary Code (FIFA DC).2. FIFA and WADA are in <strong>di</strong>spute as to whether certain rules of theWADC concerning the impos<strong>it</strong>ion of sanctions for anti-doping rule violationsare admissible under Swiss law. FIFA is particularly concern<strong>ed</strong> about thestandard sanction of a two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y (art. 10.2 WADC) w<strong>it</strong>h thelim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> possibil<strong>it</strong>y of eliminating or r<strong>ed</strong>ucing the sanction only in the eventof exceptional circumstances (art. 10.5 WADC). FIFA takes the view thatSwiss law requires an in<strong>di</strong>vidual assessment of the sanction, bas<strong>ed</strong> on theobjective and subjective circumstances of the in<strong>di</strong>vidual case. WADA subm<strong>it</strong>s
202 Giurisprudenza Internazionalethat the WADC is compatible w<strong>it</strong>h Swiss law, and that the FIFA DC has<strong>di</strong>sregard<strong>ed</strong> a number of mandatory provisions of the WADC.3. The CAS Advisory Opinion is a unique process and proc<strong>ed</strong>ure 1 . It isa non-bin<strong>di</strong>ng opinion wr<strong>it</strong>ten in an arb<strong>it</strong>ration format, answering specificquestions. The answers may set out certain general principles and act asguidelines as to possible ways of viewing and characterizing particulars<strong>it</strong>uations.II. THE QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE PANEL4. Independently of each other, FIFA and the WADA subm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> a requestfor an Advisory Opinion by CAS.A. Request from FIFA5. FIFA, in <strong>it</strong>s request dat<strong>ed</strong> September 29, 2005, subm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> the followingquestions to CAS:“1. Is <strong>it</strong> correct that the Applicant, in accordance w<strong>it</strong>h <strong>it</strong>s doping sanctionprovisions, in particular Art. 62 of the Disciplinary Code, has laid downa solution that is compatible w<strong>it</strong>h the Swiss legal system and pays he<strong>ed</strong>to the generally accept<strong>ed</strong> legal principle of observing the principle ofculpabil<strong>it</strong>y when imposing doping penalties?2. Is <strong>it</strong> correct that the Applicant is oblig<strong>ed</strong> to lay down a sanction systemin <strong>it</strong>s regulations that pays he<strong>ed</strong> to the “principle of culpabil<strong>it</strong>y” andthus cannot be ‘compell<strong>ed</strong>’ to adapt <strong>it</strong>s correspon<strong>di</strong>ng sanction provisionsto standard specifications that show no regard, or at least no rigorousregard, for the principle of culpabil<strong>it</strong>y (in<strong>di</strong>vidual case management)?”6. The CAS President, in his decision dat<strong>ed</strong> October 31, 2005, subm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong>the following questions to the Panel:“1. En “ratifiant” le Code Mon<strong>di</strong>al Antidopage (C.M.A.) avec la réserve“qu’il so<strong>it</strong> tenu compte des spécific<strong>it</strong>és du football et des principesgénéraux du dro<strong>it</strong>”, la FIFA s’est-elle réservé le dro<strong>it</strong> de prévoir dansson “Code <strong>di</strong>sciplinaire”, des sanctions inférieures à celles prévues parle<strong>di</strong>t Code?Ou cette “ratification” rend-t-elle juri<strong>di</strong>quement inopérante les<strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions du “Code <strong>di</strong>sciplinaire” auxquelles se subst<strong>it</strong>uent celles duC.M.A.2. L’organe compétent de la FIFA a-t-il la faculté d’infliger une sanctioninférieure à la sanction minimale prévue par le C.M.A. en tenant compt<strong>ed</strong>es circonstances de la cause et notamment du degré de culpabil<strong>it</strong>é dela personne incriminée?____________________1McLaren, CAS Advisory Opinions, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (<strong>ed</strong>s.), The Court of Arb<strong>it</strong>rationfor <strong>Sport</strong> 1984-2004, The Hague 2006, p. 180.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 2033. L’organe compétent de la FIFA est-il tenu de respecter les prescriptionsdu C.M.A., même dans l’hypothèse où elles seraient en contra<strong>di</strong>ctionavec les principes généraux du dro<strong>it</strong> applicables en Suisse et le dro<strong>it</strong>suisse lui-même?Ou au contraire le<strong>di</strong>t organe de la FIFA do<strong>it</strong>-il obligatoirement tenircompte de ces principes et du dro<strong>it</strong> suisse dans sa démarche?4. D’une façon générale, la sanction minimale prévue par le C.M.A.s’impose-t-elle à l’organe compétent de la FIFA pour sanctionner uncontrevenant au C.M.A.?Ou le<strong>di</strong>t organe a-t-il la faculté de prononcer une sanction inférieure àla sanction minimale du C.M.A.?”B. Request from WADA7 In <strong>it</strong>s request dat<strong>ed</strong> November 16, 2005, WADA, subm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> thefollowing questions to CAS:“Question 1: Is the FIFA Disciplinary Code, in particular the sanc-tions setforth in Article 62, in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the World Anti-Doping Code, inparticular Article 10?Question 2: Is in<strong>di</strong>vidual case management, as set forth in the FIFADisciplinary Code, in particular in Article 62.1, in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the WorldAnti-Doping Code, in particular Article 10.5?Question 3: Does the FIFA Disciplinary Code, in particular Articles 62 and63, provide for sanctions for other violations of the anti-doping rules inconform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the World Anti-Doping Code, in particular Article 10 of theCode?Question 4: Is Article 33 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>hthe World Anti-Doping Code as regards sanctions?Question 5: Are the provisions of the FIFA Disciplinary Code w<strong>it</strong>h regard tothe sanctions against teams, in particular Article 63, in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h theprovisions Article 11 of the World Anti-Doping Code?Question 6: Are the provisions of the FIFA Disciplinary Code w<strong>it</strong>h regard toTherapeutic Use Exemptions, in particular Article 61, in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>hthe provisions of the World Anti-Doping code re-gar<strong>di</strong>ng TUEs, in particularArticles 4.4 and 13.3 of the Code?Question 7: Does Article 60.5 of the FIFA Statutes offer the possi-bil<strong>it</strong>y ofan appeal to the CAS in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h Articles 13.1 and 13.2 of the WorldAnti-Doping Code?”8 The CAS President, in his decision dat<strong>ed</strong> November 25, 2005,subm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> the following questions to the Panel:“I. En l’état actuel des relations juri<strong>di</strong>ques entre WADA et la FIFA, et en
204 Giurisprudenza Internazionaletenant dûment compte des documents fournis à la fois par WADA et par laFIFA, cette dernière est-elle tenue de mettre son Code Disciplinaire enconform<strong>it</strong>é avec le Code Mon<strong>di</strong>al Antidopage?II. Si la réponse à la question «I.» est oui:1. Is the FIFA Disciplinary Code, in particular the sanctions set forth inArticle 62, in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the World Anti-Doping Code, in particularArticle 10?2. Is in<strong>di</strong>vidual case management, as set forth in the FIFA DisciplinaryCode, in particular in Article 62.1, in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the World Anti-DopingCode, in particular Article 10.5?3. Does the FIFA Disciplinary Code, in particular Articles 62 and 63,provide for sanctions for other violations of the anti-doping rules inconform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the World Anti-Doping Code, in par-ticular Article 10 ofthe Code?4. Is Article 33 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the WorldAnti-Doping Code as regards sanctions?5. Are the provisions of the FIFA Disciplinary Code w<strong>it</strong>h regard to thesanctions against teams, in particular Article 63, in con-form<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h theprovisions Article 11 of the World Anti-Doping Code?6. Are the provisions of the FIFA Disciplinary Code w<strong>it</strong>h regard toTherapeutic Use Exemptions, in particular Article 61, in con-form<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>hthe provisions of the World Anti-Doping Code re-gar<strong>di</strong>ng TUEs, in particularArticles 4.4. and 13.3 of the Code?7. Does Articles 60.5 of the FIFA Statues offer the possibil<strong>it</strong>y of an appealto the CAS in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h Articles 13.1 and 13.2 of the World Anti-Doping Code?III. Si la réponse à la question «I.» est non, quelles conséquences devraientêtre tirées de cette réponse?”III. ANALYSIS9. This Advisory Opinion will deal w<strong>it</strong>h the issues which <strong>it</strong> has considere<strong>di</strong>n the order set out in the Index.A. Proc<strong>ed</strong>ural Remarks10 The relevant provisions of the Code of <strong>Sport</strong>s-relat<strong>ed</strong> Arb<strong>it</strong>ration (theCAS Code) are:Art. S12 para. 3:“The responsibil<strong>it</strong>ies of such Panels are, inter alia:[…]c. to give non-bin<strong>di</strong>ng advisory opinions at the request of the IOC, the IFs,the NOCs, WADA, the associations recogniz<strong>ed</strong> by the IOC and the Olympic
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 205Games Organizing Comm<strong>it</strong>tees (“OCOGs”).”Art. R60:“Request for OpinionThe IOC, the IFs, the NOCs, WADA, the associations recogniz<strong>ed</strong> by theIOC and the OCOGs, may request an advisory opinion from the CAS aboutany legal issue w<strong>it</strong>h respect to the practice or development of sport or anyactiv<strong>it</strong>y relat<strong>ed</strong> to sport. The request for an opinion shall be address<strong>ed</strong> to theCAS and accompani<strong>ed</strong> by any document likely to assist the Panel entrust<strong>ed</strong>w<strong>it</strong>h giving the opinion.”Art. R61:“In<strong>it</strong>iation by the CASWhen a request is fil<strong>ed</strong>, the CAS President shall review whether <strong>it</strong> may bethe subject of an opinion. In the affirmative, he shall proce<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h theformation of a Panel of one or three arb<strong>it</strong>rators from the CAS list anddesignate the President. He shall formulate, at his own <strong>di</strong>scretion, thequestions subm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> to the Panel and forward these questions to the Panel.”11 Both FIFA and WADA made <strong>it</strong>s request pursuant to art. S12 l<strong>it</strong>. c andR60 et seq. of the CAS Code. In accordance w<strong>it</strong>h art. R61 of the CASCode, the requests were review<strong>ed</strong> by the CAS President. He adm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> bothrequests to the extent of his newly formulat<strong>ed</strong> questions, which weresubm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> to the Panel for <strong>it</strong>s Opinion.Hence, the Advisory Opinion addresses the questions subm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> by the CASPresident.B. The Obligation of FIFA to Comply w<strong>it</strong>h the WADC1. Legal Nature of WADC12 The WADC is a model code which is design<strong>ed</strong> to meet the stat<strong>ed</strong>purposes 2 :To protect the Athletes’ fundamental right to participate in doping-free sportand thus promote health, fairness and equal<strong>it</strong>y for Athletes worldwide; andTo ensure harmoniz<strong>ed</strong>, coor<strong>di</strong>nat<strong>ed</strong> and effective anti-doping programs onthe international and national level w<strong>it</strong>h regard to detection, deterrence andprevention of doping.”By signing a declaration of acceptance of the WADC, ent<strong>it</strong>ies, such asWADA 3 , the IOC, the IFs, the NOCs etc., became Signatories (as defin<strong>ed</strong> in____________________2Cf. Introduction to the WADC, p. 1 et seq.3In February 1999, at the IOC-host<strong>ed</strong> World Conference on Doping in <strong>Sport</strong> in Lausanne, delegatesfrom the Olympic Movement, IFs, the Un<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> Nations, governments, national anti-doping agencies,athletes and the me<strong>di</strong>cal profession took a first step towards getting sports bo<strong>di</strong>es and governmentsto work towards a consistent and coor<strong>di</strong>nat<strong>ed</strong> approach. Specifically, they agre<strong>ed</strong> to establish anindependent national anti-doping agency in time for the 2000 Sydney Olympics, w<strong>it</strong>h a mandate
206 Giurisprudenza Internazionalethe WADC) upon approval by each of their respective governing bo<strong>di</strong>es 4 .13 “The Code [WADC] is the fundamental and universal document uponwhich the World Anti-Doping Program in <strong>Sport</strong> is bas<strong>ed</strong>. The purpose ofthe Code [WADC] is to advance the anti-doping effort through universalharmonization of core anti-doping elements. It is intend<strong>ed</strong> to be specificenough to achieve complete harmonization on issues where uniform<strong>it</strong>y isrequir<strong>ed</strong>, yet generally not in other areas to perm<strong>it</strong> flexibil<strong>it</strong>y on how agre<strong>ed</strong>upon anti-doping principles are implement<strong>ed</strong>” 5 .14 Para. 2 of the Introduction to the WADC identifies certain rules whichmust be incorporat<strong>ed</strong> into the rules of each Anti-Doping Organization w<strong>it</strong>houtany substantive changes:“Part One of the Code does not replace, or eliminate the ne<strong>ed</strong> for,comprehensive anti-doping rules adopt<strong>ed</strong> by each of these Anti-DopingOrganizations. While some provisions of Part One of the Code must beincorporat<strong>ed</strong> essentially verbatim by each Anti-Doping Organization in<strong>it</strong>s own anti-doping rules, other provisions of the Part One establishmandatory gui<strong>di</strong>ng principles that allow flexibil<strong>it</strong>y in the formulation ofrules by each Anti-Doping Organization or establish requirements thatmust be follow<strong>ed</strong> by each Anti-Doping Organizations but ne<strong>ed</strong> not berepeat<strong>ed</strong> in <strong>it</strong>s own anti-doping rules. The following Articles, as applicableto the scope of anti-doping activ<strong>it</strong>y which the Anti-Doping Organizationperforms, must be incorporat<strong>ed</strong> into the rules of each Anti-DopingOrganization w<strong>it</strong>hout any substantive changes (allowing for necessarynonsubstantive e<strong>di</strong>ting changes to the language in order to refer to theorganization’s name, sport, section numbers, etc.): Articles 1 (Defin<strong>it</strong>ionof Doping), 2 (Anti-Doping Rule Violations), 3 (Proof of Doping), 9(Automatic Disqualification of In<strong>di</strong>vidual Results), 10 (Sanctions onIn<strong>di</strong>viduals), 11 (Consequences to Teams), 13 (Appeals) w<strong>it</strong>h the exceptionof 13.2.2, 17 (Statute of Lim<strong>it</strong>ations) and Defin<strong>it</strong>ions.”15 The WADC is not per se legally bin<strong>di</strong>ng. The Signatories of the WADCare requir<strong>ed</strong> to implement applicable provisions through policies, statutes,rules or regulations accor<strong>di</strong>ng to their author<strong>it</strong>y and w<strong>it</strong>hin their relevantspheres of responsibil<strong>it</strong>y 6 .2. Has FIFA comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> to Adopt the WADC?____________________“to co-or<strong>di</strong>nate the various programs necessary to realize the objectives that shall be defin<strong>ed</strong>jointly by all the parties concern<strong>ed</strong> (cf. Flint/Taylor/Lewis, The Regulation of Drug Use in <strong>Sport</strong>,in: Lewis/Taylor (<strong>ed</strong>.), <strong>Sport</strong>: Law and Practice, London 2003, N. E4.42, p. 922).4Art. 23.1.1 WADC.5Cf. Introduction to the WADC, p. 1.6Art. 23.2.1 WADC.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 20716 First, the Panel will consider whether FIFA undertook to implementthe WADC, e<strong>it</strong>her at the Copenhagen World Conference on Doping in <strong>Sport</strong>in March 2003 or by <strong>it</strong>s Declaration of May 21, 2004.2.1 The Copenhagen World Conference on Doping in <strong>Sport</strong> in March 200317 At the Copenhagen World Conference on Doping in <strong>Sport</strong> in March2003, the draft of the WADC was <strong>di</strong>scuss<strong>ed</strong> and approv<strong>ed</strong> by the delegatesby acclamation. Such general and unspecifi<strong>ed</strong> expression of support orconsent cannot be regard<strong>ed</strong> as formal acceptance of the WADC. 72.2 The Declaration of May 21, 200418 At the 54th Or<strong>di</strong>nary FIFA Congress of May 21, 2004 in Paris, FIFApass<strong>ed</strong> a declaration in support of WADA and the WADC (Declaration).The Declaration was sign<strong>ed</strong> by Joseph S. Blatter, President of FIFA, RichardW. Pound, Chairman of WADA, and Dr. Jacques Rogge, President of theInternational Olympic Comm<strong>it</strong>tee (IOC).19 The Declaration reads:“Declaration by the 54 th Or<strong>di</strong>nary FIFA Congress in Paris (the CentennialCongress)The 54 th Or<strong>di</strong>nary FIFA Congress in Paris on 20 and 21 May 2004 isaware of the importance and necess<strong>it</strong>y of the fight against doping.In light of excellent cooperation w<strong>it</strong>h the World Anti-Doping Agency(WADA), the FIFA Congress declares <strong>it</strong>s uncon<strong>di</strong>tional support for thefight against doping and <strong>it</strong>s respect for the World Anti-Doping Code.Bas<strong>ed</strong> on the address made by WADA Chairman Richard W. Pound tothis Congress, FIFA advocates continu<strong>ed</strong> collaboration w<strong>it</strong>h WADA inthe fight against doping in the knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge that WADA will respect theautonomy of international sports f<strong>ed</strong>erations, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng FIFA. In thepresence of the President of the International Olympic Comm<strong>it</strong>tee (IOC)Dr. Jacques Rogge and the Chairman of the World Anti-Doping Agency(WADA) Richard W. Pound, FIFA is proud to sign this declaration at <strong>it</strong>sCentennial Congress thereby officially ratifying <strong>it</strong>s cooperation w<strong>it</strong>hWADA.”20 FIFA subm<strong>it</strong>s that, by signing the Declaration, <strong>it</strong> has accept<strong>ed</strong> anobligation to implement the WADC w<strong>it</strong>h the reservation of “factors specificto football and generally recogniz<strong>ed</strong> principles of law”. 821 Ne<strong>it</strong>her Party subm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> that the Declaration const<strong>it</strong>ut<strong>ed</strong> a contractbetween WADA and FIFA to implement the WADC into the FIFA Rules.22 WADA takes the view that the Declaration <strong>di</strong>d not oblige FIFA to____________________7Cf. WADA’s request p. 9, footnote 7.8FIFA’s request p. 2.
208 Giurisprudenza Internazionaleincorporate the WADC into <strong>it</strong>s bylaws. That is also the view of the Panel.23 The Declaration primarily expresses the intention of FIFA to supportWADA and <strong>it</strong>s fight against doping. The Declaration refers to the WADConly in a subor<strong>di</strong>nate clause by declaring FIFA’s respect of the WADC. Suchwor<strong>di</strong>ng cannot be interpret<strong>ed</strong> as FIFA’s acceptance of an obligation toimplement the WADC into <strong>it</strong>s bylaws. The Panel understands the Declarationas a non-bin<strong>di</strong>ng letter of intent which does not const<strong>it</strong>ute a formal acceptanceof the WADC pursuant to art. 23 WADC. Moreover, the Panel is of the viewthat the Declaration’s wor<strong>di</strong>ng does not lead to FIFA’s conclusion that <strong>it</strong> hadaccept<strong>ed</strong> the WADC w<strong>it</strong>h the reservation of “factors specific to footballand generally recogniz<strong>ed</strong> principles of law”.3. The Olympic Charter24 Rule 26 of the Olympic Charter (OC) imposes an obligation on theInternational F<strong>ed</strong>erations (IF) who wish to obtain and maintain the recogn<strong>it</strong>ionof the IOC, to adopt and implement the WADC. Rule 26 reads:“26 Recogn<strong>it</strong>ion of IFsIn order to develop and promote the Olympic Movement, the IOC mayrecognize as IFs international non-governmental organisationsadministering one or several sports at world level and encompassingorganisations administering such sports at national level.The statutes, practice and activ<strong>it</strong>ies of the IFs w<strong>it</strong>hin the OlympicMovement must be in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the Olympic Charter, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng theadoption and implementation of the World Anti-Doping Code. Subject tothe foregoing, each IF maintains <strong>it</strong>s independence and autonomy in theadministra-tion of <strong>it</strong>s sport.”25 FIFA became a recogniz<strong>ed</strong> IF of the Olympic Movement 9 shortly after<strong>it</strong>s foundation in 1904. As a recogniz<strong>ed</strong> IF, FIFA is oblig<strong>ed</strong> by Rule 26 of theOC to implement the WADC.26 Rule 23 of the OC specifies possible legal consequences for an IF thatdoes not fulfill this obligation. It reads:“23 Measures and SanctionsIn the case of any violation of the Olympic Charter, the World Anti-DopingCode, or any other regulation, as the case may be, the measures or sanctionswhich may be taken by the Session, the IOC Executive Board or the____________________9The Olympic Charter defines the “Olympic Movement” in section 3 of the Fundamental Principlesof Olympism as follows:“The Olympic Movement is the concert<strong>ed</strong>, organis<strong>ed</strong>, universal and permanent action, carri<strong>ed</strong>out under the supreme author<strong>it</strong>y of the IOC, of all in<strong>di</strong>viduals and ent<strong>it</strong>ies who are inspir<strong>ed</strong> bythe values of Olympism. It covers the five continents. It reaches <strong>it</strong>s peak w<strong>it</strong>h the bringing togetherof the world’s athletes at the great sports festival, the Olympic Games. Its symbol is five interlac<strong>ed</strong>rings.”
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 209<strong>di</strong>sciplinary commission referr<strong>ed</strong> to under 2.4 below are:1 In the context of the Olympic Movement:[…]1.2 w<strong>it</strong>h regard to IFs:a) w<strong>it</strong>hdrawal from the programme of the Olympic Games of:- a sport (Session),- a <strong>di</strong>scipline (IOC Executive Board),- an event (IOC Executive Board);b) w<strong>it</strong>hdrawal of provisional recogn<strong>it</strong>ion (IOC Executive Board);c) w<strong>it</strong>hdrawal of full recogn<strong>it</strong>ion (Session).1.3 w<strong>it</strong>h regard to associations of IFs:a) w<strong>it</strong>hdrawal of provisional recogn<strong>it</strong>ion (IOC Executive Board);b) w<strong>it</strong>hdrawal of full recogn<strong>it</strong>ion (Session).[…]2 In the context of the Olympic Games, in the case of any violation ofthe Olympic Charter, of the World Anti-Doping Code, or of any otherdecision or applicable regulation issu<strong>ed</strong> by the IOC or any IF or NOC,inclu<strong>di</strong>ng but not lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> to the IOC Code of Ethics, or of any applicablepublic law or regulation, or in case of any form of misbehaviour:[…]2.4the IOC Executive Board may delegate <strong>it</strong>s power to a <strong>di</strong>sciplinarycommission.3 Before applying any measure or sanction, the competent IOC bodymay issue a warning.4 All sanctions and measures are taken w<strong>it</strong>hout preju<strong>di</strong>ce to any otherrights of the IOC and of any other body, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng but not lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> toNOCs and IFs.”27 The Panel concludes that FIFA, as a recognis<strong>ed</strong> IF, has an obligationto the IOC to adopt and implement the WADC. Failure of a recogniz<strong>ed</strong> IF todo so may cause the IOC to take the measures set out in Rule 23 of the OC.Ne<strong>it</strong>her the IOC nor WADA has, however, the author<strong>it</strong>y to enforce theadoption and implementation of the WADC into the bylaws of a recogniz<strong>ed</strong>IF.C. The Differences and Similar<strong>it</strong>ies between the WADC and the FIFAAnti-Doping Rules1. The Relevant Provisions28 The relevant provisions of the WADC are contain<strong>ed</strong> in the World Anti-Doping Code as issu<strong>ed</strong> in March 2003. Article 24.2 of the WADC clarifiesthat “(t)he comments annotating various provisions of the [WADC] are inclu-
210 Giurisprudenza Internazional<strong>ed</strong><strong>ed</strong> to assist in the understan<strong>di</strong>ng and interpretation of the [WADC].” Thecomments are not subject to the acceptance and implementation of the WADCby the Signatories as defin<strong>ed</strong> in Article 23 of the WADC 10 . From the verybeginning, they seem to have been re-gard<strong>ed</strong> as a mere source of interpretationof the WADC 11 and cannot, therefore, be consider<strong>ed</strong> as obligatory provisionsof the WADC. The WADC’s hea<strong>di</strong>ngs are for “convenience only and shallnot be deem<strong>ed</strong> part of the substance of the [WADC] or to affect in any waythe language of the provisions to which they refer.” 1229 The anti-doping rules of the FIFA are not contain<strong>ed</strong> in one selfcontain<strong>ed</strong>part of FIFA’s regulatory provisions, but are to be found in theFIFA Statutes dat<strong>ed</strong> October 19, 2003 and amend<strong>ed</strong> on September 12, 2005(the “FIFA Statutes”), the Disciplinary Code as of September 1, 2005 (the“FIFA DC”) and the “Regulations Doping Control for FIFA Compet<strong>it</strong>ionsand Out of Compet<strong>it</strong>ion” of January 2005 (the “FIFA RDC”). For the purposeof this Opinion, the relevant provisions are generally referr<strong>ed</strong> to as the “FIFAAnti-Doping Rules.”2. Synopsis30 The <strong>di</strong>fferences between the Parties relate to Part One of the WADC(“Doping Control”), i.e. Articles 1 - 17 WADC, w<strong>it</strong>h the exception of Art.16 WADC covering sports involving animals.31 A comparison of the relevant anti-doping rules of FIFA and WADA isattach<strong>ed</strong> to this Advisory Opinion.3. Differences and Similar<strong>it</strong>ies between the WADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules3.1 Defin<strong>it</strong>ion of Doping (Articles 1 and 2 WADC. Articles 60 and 62.1FIFA DC and Articles I and II FIFA RDC)32 Both, the WADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules define doping asthe occurrence of one or more of the anti-doping rule violations set forth inthe respective regulations, i.e. (i) the presence of a prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance or<strong>it</strong>s metabol<strong>it</strong>es or markers in an athlete’s bo<strong>di</strong>ly specimen, (ii) use or attempt<strong>ed</strong>use of a prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance or a prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> method, (iii) refusing, or failingw<strong>it</strong>hout compelling justification, to subm<strong>it</strong> to sample collection after____________________10The Panel is not aware of any IF which implement<strong>ed</strong> also the comments to the WADC into <strong>it</strong>sown anti-doping rules.11E.g. the Comment is regard<strong>ed</strong> as a source of interpretation and not as a source of (contract) lawby: CAS 2005/A/847 Knauss v/FIS, sec. 7.3.4; CAS 2005/A/830 G. Squizzato v/FINA, N 10.25;Kaufmann-Kohler/Malinverni/Rigozzi, Legal Opinion on the Conform<strong>it</strong>y of Certain Provisionsof the Draft World Anti-Doping Code w<strong>it</strong>h Commonly Accept<strong>ed</strong> Principles of International Law,dat<strong>ed</strong> February 26, 2003, available at www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/kaufmann-kohlerfull.pdf,sec. 171 and 176.12Art. 24.4 of the WADC.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 211notification as authoriz<strong>ed</strong> in applicable anti-doping rules or otherwise eva<strong>di</strong>ngsample collection, (iv) violation of applicable requirements regar<strong>di</strong>ng athlete/player availabil<strong>it</strong>y for out-of compet<strong>it</strong>ion testing inclu<strong>di</strong>ng failure to providerequir<strong>ed</strong> whereabouts information and miss<strong>ed</strong> tests which are bas<strong>ed</strong> onreasonable rules, (v) tampering, or attempting to tamper, w<strong>it</strong>h any part ofdoping control (tests), (vi) possession of prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substances and methods,(vii) trafficking in any prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance or prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> method, (viii)administration or attempt<strong>ed</strong> administration of a prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance orprohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> method to any athlete/player or assisting, encouraging, ai<strong>di</strong>ng,abetting, covering up or any other type of complic<strong>it</strong>y involving an anti-dopingrule violation or any attempt<strong>ed</strong> violation.33 The defin<strong>it</strong>ions of doping in the WADC and the FIFA Anti-DopingRules are identical.3.2 Strict Liabil<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h Respect to the Presence of a Prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> Substancein an Athlete’s Bo<strong>di</strong>ly Specimen (Article 2.1.1 WADC. Article II. 1.2FIFA RDC)34 Both the WADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules provide that ananti- doping rule violation is establish<strong>ed</strong> upon the mere presence of aprohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance or <strong>it</strong>s metabol<strong>it</strong>es or markers in an athlete’s or player’sbo<strong>di</strong>ly specimen and that no intent, fault, negligence or knowing use mustbe establish<strong>ed</strong>.35 The WADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules are identical w<strong>it</strong>h respectto the strict liabil<strong>it</strong>y principle.3.3 Proof of Doping (Article 3 WADC. Article III FIFA RDC)36 Both, the WADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules are bas<strong>ed</strong> on thesame principles that (i) the anti-doping organisation shall have the burden ofestablishing that an anti-doping rule violation has occurr<strong>ed</strong> and that (ii) factsrelat<strong>ed</strong> to anti-doping rule violations may be establish<strong>ed</strong> by any reliable means,inclu<strong>di</strong>ng admissions 13 . Furthermore, both have accept<strong>ed</strong> similar (rebuttable)presumptions (i) that WADA-accre<strong>di</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> laboratories have conduct<strong>ed</strong> thesample analysis and the custo<strong>di</strong>al proc<strong>ed</strong>ures in accordance w<strong>it</strong>h the respectiveinternational standard for laboratory analysis, and (ii) that departures fromthe international standard for testing which <strong>di</strong>d not cause an adverse analyticalfin<strong>di</strong>ng or other anti-doping violation shall not invalidate such results.37 There is a <strong>di</strong>fference in wor<strong>di</strong>ng w<strong>it</strong>h respect to the standard of proof.The WADC has integrat<strong>ed</strong> the formula constantly appli<strong>ed</strong> by CASjurisprudence, accor<strong>di</strong>ng to which “[ … ] the standard of proof shall bewhether the anti-doping organization has establish<strong>ed</strong> an anti-doping rule____________________13Art. 3.2 WADC, art. III.2 FIFA RDC.
212 Giurisprudenza Internazionaleviolation to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing body bearing inmind the seriousness of the allegation which is made. This standard ofproof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probabil<strong>it</strong>y but less thanproof beyond reasonable doubt. Where the [WADC] places the burden ofproof upon the athlete or other person alleg<strong>ed</strong> to have comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> an antidopingrule violation to rebut a presumption or establish specifi<strong>ed</strong> facts orcircumstances, the standard of proof shall be by a balance of probabil<strong>it</strong>y.”No such wor<strong>di</strong>ng has been includ<strong>ed</strong> in the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules. However,this formula only reflects the general principles which will be appli<strong>ed</strong> byCAS panels whether or not such formula is explic<strong>it</strong>ly contain<strong>ed</strong> in theapplicable anti-doping regulations.38 The Panel concludes that the omission of the standard of proof-sectionin the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules does not const<strong>it</strong>ute a material <strong>di</strong>fference tothe WADC.3.4 Prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> List (Article 4 WADC. Appen<strong>di</strong>x A of the FIFA RDC)39 Appen<strong>di</strong>x A of the FIFA RDC incorporates the 2005 Prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> ListInternational Standard which came into effect on January 1, 2005 into theFIFA Anti-Doping Rules. Appen<strong>di</strong>x A also provides that the FIFA RDC willbe amend<strong>ed</strong> upon any update of the WADA Prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> List.40 Both, the WADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules have the same listof prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substances.3.5 Therapeutic Use Exemption (Articles 4.4 and 13.3 WADC. Article61 FIFA DC and Appen<strong>di</strong>x B FIFA RDC) 1441 In accordance w<strong>it</strong>h art. 4.4 WADC, art. 61 of the FIFA DC (as well asAppen<strong>di</strong>x B of the FIFA RDC) provides that athletes subject to FIFA’sjuris<strong>di</strong>ction w<strong>it</strong>h me<strong>di</strong>cal con<strong>di</strong>tions requiring the use of a prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substanceor a prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> method may request a therapeutic use exemption (TUE)from FIFA, if there is no alternative to the prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance or method.The cr<strong>it</strong>eria to grant a TUE 15 are identical w<strong>it</strong>h those provid<strong>ed</strong> in the WADC.42 The provisions on confidential<strong>it</strong>y of information of WADA and FIFAdo not materially <strong>di</strong>ffer desp<strong>it</strong>e a <strong>di</strong>fference in wor<strong>di</strong>ng. Art. 5.0 IS-TUEprovides that the athlete must consent to the <strong>di</strong>sclosure of information alsoto staff involv<strong>ed</strong> in the management, review or appeal of TUE. The FIFAAnti-Doping Rules provide that the athlete must consent to the <strong>di</strong>sclosure____________________14Art. 4 WADC does not belong to the provisions which the WADC designates as “articles […]which must be incorporat<strong>ed</strong> into the rules of each Anti-Doping Organization w<strong>it</strong>hout anysubstantive changes.”15Art. 4.4 WADC refers to <strong>it</strong>s International Standard. The material cr<strong>it</strong>eria for granting a TUE islaid down in art. 4.0 of the WADA International Standard for TUE (version November 2004,effective as from January 1,2005; “IS-TUE”).
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 213to the granting body and to the me<strong>di</strong>cal personnel of other relevant antidopingorganisations under the FIFA RDC 16 which also includes the me<strong>di</strong>calpersonnel of WADA, since <strong>it</strong>s review body consists of physicians 17 .43 Art. 4.4 of the WADC further states that WADA shall be inform<strong>ed</strong> ofthe granting of TUE. Pursuant to the “TUE Commission DecisionTemplate” 18 , WADA is provid<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h certain specific information 19 . Accor<strong>di</strong>ngto art. B8 of the FIFA RDC, <strong>it</strong> seems that WADA will be provid<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>hsimilar information 20 . Thus, there is no <strong>di</strong>fference between the WADC andthe FIFA rules in this respect.44 Art. 7.0 and 8.0 IS-TUE describe in great detail the contents of theTUE applications. Model application forms are attach<strong>ed</strong>, the sections an<strong>di</strong>tems of which - but not the form <strong>it</strong>self - are declar<strong>ed</strong> to be a minimumstandard. Materially, the content must enable the granting body to assess theme<strong>di</strong>cal s<strong>it</strong>uation of the athlete and the necess<strong>it</strong>y to use a prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substanceor method. Even though the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules do not list the contentsof the application form, the FIFA granting body requires the same informationto reach <strong>it</strong>s decision. The FIFA RDC fur their suggests the use of the standardapplication forms of WADA. The Panel, therefore, concludes that there isno material <strong>di</strong>fference in the application process.45 Finally, art. 4.4 of the WADC provides that WADA may review thegrant or, upon request of an athlete, the denial, of a TUE and reverse th<strong>ed</strong>ecision which was subject to the review. WADA’s decision is subject toappeal to CAS 21 .46 The FIFA Anti-Doping Rules do not contain an express provisiongiving WADA a right to review the granting or denial of a TUE. WADA isonly grant<strong>ed</strong> a more general right to appeal to CAS against doping decisionsof FIFA after “every internal channel has been exhaust<strong>ed</strong>” 22 . However, thisright of appeal is not a valid subst<strong>it</strong>ute for the right to review the grant ordenial of a TUE. The appeal right applies only in the very final phase of ananti-doping rule violation, i.e. after the athlete has been notifi<strong>ed</strong> of an antidopingrule violation. In contrast, the right to review the granting or denial____________________16Art. B8 of Appen<strong>di</strong>x B of the FIFA RDC.17Art. 6 IS-TUE.18Download<strong>ed</strong> from WADA’s webs<strong>it</strong>e on December 22, 2005.19I.e. names of the athlete and the TUE Comm<strong>it</strong>tee’s members, file number, substance and th<strong>ed</strong>ates of decision and expiration of the TUE.20I.e. name of the player and association, me<strong>di</strong>cal in<strong>di</strong>cation, me<strong>di</strong>cation and <strong>it</strong>s duration.21Art. 13.3 WADC.22Cf. art. 61.5 FIFA DC and art. 60.5 FIFA Statutes. However, the FIFA Anti-Doping Rulesne<strong>it</strong>her explic<strong>it</strong>ly provide for an appeal against TUE decisions of the granting body, nor explic<strong>it</strong>lygive WADA a right to such appeal.
214 Giurisprudenza Internazionaleof a TUE provid<strong>ed</strong> by art. 4.4 of the WADC applies in a much earlier stagewhere the s<strong>it</strong>uation has not necessarily amount<strong>ed</strong> to an anti-doping ruleviolation. Furthermore, the absence of a right of WADA to review the grantor denial of a TUE makes <strong>it</strong> impossible for the WADA to determine whetherthe International F<strong>ed</strong>erations and anti-doping organizations apply the samestandards when they grant or deny TUEs. In the Panel’s opinion, this isamaterial <strong>di</strong>fference between the WADC and the FIFA DC. The Panel notes,however, that the TUE does not belong to the mandatory provisions of theWADC 23 .3.6 Testing (Article 5 WADC. Article IV FIFA RDC) 2447 Art. 5 of the WADC requires an IF to establish a register<strong>ed</strong> testingpool for international-level athletes. FIFA conducts in-compet<strong>it</strong>ion and outof-compet<strong>it</strong>iondoping tests only at matches and compet<strong>it</strong>ions organiz<strong>ed</strong> byFIFA. FIFA does not provide testing beyond. 25 The FIFA testing proc<strong>ed</strong>uresas set out in great detail in art. IV FIFA RDC are not substantially <strong>di</strong>fferentfrom the proc<strong>ed</strong>ures provid<strong>ed</strong> by art. 5 WADC and the highly detail<strong>ed</strong> WADAInternational Standard for Testing.3.7 Analysis of Samples and Results Management (Articles 6 and 7WADC. Article IV.6 FIFA RDC and Articles 133-138 FIFA DC) 2648 Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. IV.6.1 FIFA RDC, the analysis of the samples shallbe carri<strong>ed</strong> out in a laboratory accre<strong>di</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> by WADA. Such laboratories aresubject to the respective International Standards as issu<strong>ed</strong> by WADA 27 . Thissafeguards a uniform sample analysis under both the WADC and the FIFAAnti-Doping Rules.49 Art. 7.5 WADC allows for provisional suspensions, i.e. to impose asuspension prior to the final hearing. The opportun<strong>it</strong>y for a provisional hearingmust be given to the offender e<strong>it</strong>her before impos<strong>it</strong>ion of the provisionalsuspension or timely thereafter.50 Art. 133-138 FIFA DC provide that the chairman of the ju<strong>di</strong>cial bodymay pronounce provisional measures, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng provisional suspensions. Heis not oblig<strong>ed</strong> to hear the parties; he shall take his decisions bas<strong>ed</strong> on the____________________23Cf. para. 10.24Art. 5 WADC does not belong to the provisions which the WADC designates as “articles […]which must be incorporat<strong>ed</strong> into the rules of each Anti-Doping Organization w<strong>it</strong>hout anysubstantive changes.”25Testing beyond matches and compet<strong>it</strong>ions of FIFA is regulat<strong>ed</strong> by the national football f<strong>ed</strong>erationand/or the national Anti-Doping Organisations.26Art. 6 and 7 WADC do not belong to the provisions which the WADC designates as “articles[…] which must be incorporat<strong>ed</strong> into the rules of each Anti-Doping Organization w<strong>it</strong>hout anysubstantive changes.”27Art. 6.4 WADC.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 215evidence available 28 . The effective maximum of a provisional suspension is50 days 29 . In case of application of the maximum period, there is no timelyhearing in the sense of art. 7.5 WADC.51 The FIFA Anti-Doping Rules do not provide for a hearing to confirmthe provisional suspension, but for a right of appeal 30 .52 W<strong>it</strong>h the exception of the proc<strong>ed</strong>ural rules on provisional suspensions,the result management as provid<strong>ed</strong> by FIFA does not substantially <strong>di</strong>fferfrom the proc<strong>ed</strong>ure as suggest<strong>ed</strong> by the WADC (art. 7).3.8 Hearing (Article 8 WADC. Articles 116-118 FIFA DC)53 Art. 8 WADC contains basic principles to guarantee the offender theright to a fair hearing. The hearing process shall address whether an antidopingrule violation was comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> and, if so, determine the appropriateconsequences. In particular, there shall be a timely hearing by a fair an<strong>di</strong>mpartial hearing body, and the athlete shall have the right to present evidence.Art. 8 WADC does not belong to the provisions which the WADC designatesas “articles […] which must be incorporat<strong>ed</strong> into the rules of each Anti-Doping Organization w<strong>it</strong>hout any substantive changes.”54 Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 116 FIFA RDC, the Disciplinary Comm<strong>it</strong>tee decideson the basis of the file. The athlete is allow<strong>ed</strong> to present wr<strong>it</strong>ten submissionsduring the investigation. Upon request, the Disciplinary Comm<strong>it</strong>tee mayarrange for oral statements 31 . The FIFA Anti-Doping Rules do not specifyunder what circumstances the Disciplinary Comm<strong>it</strong>tee is compell<strong>ed</strong> to holdan oral hearing. Rule 57 of the Code of <strong>Sport</strong>s-relat<strong>ed</strong> Arb<strong>it</strong>ration may serveas a useful guide: It provides that the panel may decide not to hold a hearing,if <strong>it</strong> deems <strong>it</strong>self to be sufficiently well inform<strong>ed</strong> 32 . Such a formula is likely tobe appli<strong>ed</strong> by the FIFA Disciplinary Commission. Even though the Paneldoes not expect that, in practice, there will be a material <strong>di</strong>fference, <strong>it</strong> notesthat the WADC requires an oral hearing in all cases.3.9 Disqualification and Consequence for the Team (Articles 9 and 11WADC. Article 62.5 FIFA DC)55 An in-compet<strong>it</strong>ion anti-doping rule violation does not automaticallylead to <strong>di</strong>squalification of the team result 33 . The consequences for the teamare specifi<strong>ed</strong> in art. 11 WADC.____________________28Art. 134 FIFA DC.29Art. 136 FIFA RDC.30Art. 137 FIFA RDC.31Art. 116.2 FIFA RDC.32In accordance w<strong>it</strong>h the CAS case law, the right to be heard does not necessarily imply thehol<strong>di</strong>ng of a hearing (see CAS 92/84 C. v/ FEI, § 12: the right to be heard “does not include thestrict right to be able to express oneself orally, in wr<strong>it</strong>ing or both”(translation).33Art. 9 WADC.
216 Giurisprudenza Internazionale56 It must be also emphasiz<strong>ed</strong> that ne<strong>it</strong>her the WADC, nor the FIFA DCdetermine specific sanctions when more than one team member is found tohave comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> a doping offence but only give to the competent author<strong>it</strong>iesthe responsibil<strong>it</strong>y to decide the appropriate measures to be taken w<strong>it</strong>h respectto team sanctions.57 Where more than one team member in a team sport has been notifi<strong>ed</strong>of a possible anti-doping rule violation in connection w<strong>it</strong>h an event, 34 theteam shall be subject to target testing for the event. If more than one teammember is found to have comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> an anti-doping rule violation during theevent, the team may be subject to <strong>di</strong>squalification (emphasis add<strong>ed</strong>).58 Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 62.5 FIFA DC, “(i)f more than one player from thesame team is sanction<strong>ed</strong> for doping offenses, the team may also be sanction<strong>ed</strong>.The team may have points d<strong>ed</strong>uct<strong>ed</strong> and in a final compet<strong>it</strong>ion the team’sresult may be annull<strong>ed</strong>. The Association of the team concern<strong>ed</strong> may also besubject to <strong>di</strong>sciplinary sanctions.” FIFA does not require target testing.59 First, both the WADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules provide forthe possibil<strong>it</strong>y of <strong>di</strong>squalification of the team if at least two team membersare sanction<strong>ed</strong>. The <strong>di</strong>fference in wor<strong>di</strong>ng does not result in a material<strong>di</strong>fference.60 Secondly, accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. IV.3 FIFA RDC, there are always twoplayers to be test<strong>ed</strong>. If both are test<strong>ed</strong> pos<strong>it</strong>ive, the team may be sanction<strong>ed</strong>.61 The Panel finds that w<strong>it</strong>h regard to the team results, the same principleshave been respect<strong>ed</strong> and that the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules provide for asolution which is not substantially <strong>di</strong>fferent from the one provid<strong>ed</strong> by theWADC. The absence of a requirement of target testing is not consider<strong>ed</strong> amaterial <strong>di</strong>fference in the light of FIFA’s anti-doping policy. It is expect<strong>ed</strong>that FIFA will do further tests anyway if two players have been foundsuspicious of a anti-doping rule violation.62 It must be also emphasiz<strong>ed</strong> that ne<strong>it</strong>her the WADC, nor the FIFA DCdetermine specific sanctions when more than one team member is found tohave comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> a doping offence but only give to the competent author<strong>it</strong>iesthe responsibil<strong>it</strong>y to decide the appropriate measures to be taken w<strong>it</strong>h respectto team sanctions.3.10 Sanctions (Article 10 WADC. Article 62 FIFA DC)3.10.1 In<strong>di</strong>vidual Case Management (Article 10.5 WADC. Article 62 FIFADC)63 Both the WADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules provide for a sanction____________________34I.e. a series of in<strong>di</strong>vidual compet<strong>it</strong>ions conduct<strong>ed</strong> together under one ruling body, such as theOlympic Games.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 217of an athlete who has been found having violat<strong>ed</strong> anti-doping rules. Thesanction consists of a suspension from compet<strong>it</strong>ions of a certain period oftime.64 To determine the duration of the sanction for the most commonoffenses, the WADC is bas<strong>ed</strong> on a concept of a fix<strong>ed</strong> standard penalty 35which can be completely eliminat<strong>ed</strong> or r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> by up to 50% under certaincon<strong>di</strong>tions 36 . On the other hand, the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules oblige thesanctioning body to determine, w<strong>it</strong>hin a defin<strong>ed</strong> timeframe, the specificsuspension accor<strong>di</strong>ng to the degree of the offender’s guilt and the objectiveand subjective circumstances of the case. The sanctioning body is oblig<strong>ed</strong>to take into account generally recognis<strong>ed</strong> principles of law. 3765 The FIFA Anti-Doping Rules regar<strong>di</strong>ng doping sanctions <strong>di</strong>ffer in tworespects from the WADC, namely in regard to (i) the possible duration ofthe suspension, and (ii) the degree of fault which the sanctioning body musttake into account when <strong>it</strong> determines the suspension or the r<strong>ed</strong>uction thereof.a) Duration of the Sanction66 For a first offense of presence of prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance, the WADCprovides for a standard suspension of two years which can be r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> by amaximum of one year in cases of no significant fault or negligence, and tozero in cases of no fault or negligence. The FIFA Anti-Doping Rules set atimeframe for various first offenses of between 6 months and 2 years. 38 TheFIFA Anti-Doping Rules do not, however, expressly allow for the completeelimination of the sanction in cases of no fault or negligence, but providethat once a player is found to have violat<strong>ed</strong> the anti-doping regulations (strictliabil<strong>it</strong>y), 39 “[…] a suspension of no less than six month […] shall be impos<strong>ed</strong>”(emphasis add<strong>ed</strong>).67 The WADC standard suspension of two years applies also for certainother anti-doping rule violations, such as Use or Attempt<strong>ed</strong> Use of aProhib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> Substance or a Prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> Method (art. 2.2 and 10.2), refusing orfailing to subm<strong>it</strong> to Sample collection (art. 2.3 and 10.4.1), Tampering w<strong>it</strong>hDoping Control (art. 2.5 and 10.4.1) and Possession of Prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> Substancesand Methods (art. 2.6 and 10.2).68 The WADC provides for less severe sanctions for violations of art. 2.1(specifi<strong>ed</strong> substances, first offense, art. 10.3), namely, a warning orineligibil<strong>it</strong>y for up to one year; and art. 2.4 (whereabouts violation or miss<strong>ed</strong>____________________35Art. 10.2 WADC.36Art. 10.5 WADC.37Art. 62.1 FIFA DC.38Art. 62.2 FIFA DC.39Art. 60 FIFA DC and RDC II.
218 Giurisprudenza Internazionaletests, art. 10.4.3), namely, ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y for between 3 months and 2 years.More severe sanctions will be impos<strong>ed</strong> for violations of art. 2.7 (trafficking)or art. 2.8 (administration of prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance or method), namely, aperiod of ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y of from four years up to lifetime ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y. Finally,anti-doping rule violations involving a minor shall be consider<strong>ed</strong> a particularlyserious violation and, if comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> by athlete support personnel, result inlifetime ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y.69 Art. 10.5.1 of the WADC provides for the possibil<strong>it</strong>y of the eliminationof the sanction for violations of art. 2.1 (presence of prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance)or art. 2.2 (use of a prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance or method). R<strong>ed</strong>uction up to 50%of the sanction is possible for violations of art. 2.1 (Presence of Prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong>Substance, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng specifi<strong>ed</strong> substances accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 10.3); art. 2.2(use of prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance or method); art. 2.3 (failing to subm<strong>it</strong> to samplecollection); and art. 2.8 (administration of a prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance or methodand complic<strong>it</strong>y). No r<strong>ed</strong>uction of the ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y period is provid<strong>ed</strong> forviolation of art. 2.4 (whereabouts violation and miss<strong>ed</strong> tests); art. 2.5(tampering w<strong>it</strong>h doping control); art. 2.6 (possession); and art. 2.7(trafficking).70 Under the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules, violations of the FIFA RDC are,as a general rule, subject to a suspension of between six months and twoyears, 40 inclu<strong>di</strong>ng whereabout violations and miss<strong>ed</strong> tests 41 . Less severesanctions are provid<strong>ed</strong> in case of use of specifi<strong>ed</strong> substances. 42 More severesanctions (i.e. ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y of four years minimum) can be impos<strong>ed</strong> forpossession, trafficking, administration or complic<strong>it</strong>y. 43 If players of less than21 years are affect<strong>ed</strong> by the trafficking, administration or complic<strong>it</strong>y of theviolator, the ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y of the violator shall be for lifetime.71 Art. 34 of the FIFA DC provides for the possibil<strong>it</strong>y to interrupt th<strong>ed</strong>uration of the suspension by rest periods during or between seasons. Suchmeasure has an aggravating effect, since <strong>it</strong> extends de facto the overall periodduring which an athlete is bann<strong>ed</strong> from competing. The Panel is, however,not aware of any practice and can therefore not assess the practical effect ofthat provision. The WADC does not contain such a rule and, thus, does not<strong>di</strong>fferentiate between compet<strong>it</strong>ion and rest periods.b) Degree of Fault which is Relevant to Determine the Duration of theSanction____________________40Art. 62 FIFA DC.41Art. 62.2 and 62.4 in fine FIFA DC.42Art. 62.3 FIFA DC, i.e. warning or ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y of less than six months.43Art. 62.4 FIFA DC.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 21972 The WADC is bas<strong>ed</strong> on the principle of fix<strong>ed</strong> sanctions which willapply in the vast major<strong>it</strong>y of cases, subject to elimination or r<strong>ed</strong>uction onlyunder “exceptional circumstances” as in<strong>di</strong>cat<strong>ed</strong> by the t<strong>it</strong>le of art. 10.5(“Elimination or R<strong>ed</strong>uction of Period of Ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y Bas<strong>ed</strong> on ExceptionalCircumstances”) and the Comment to art. 10.5.2. The Panel notes, however,that the wor<strong>di</strong>ng of the WADC does not refer to “exceptional circumstances”but uses only the terms “no fault or negligence” 44 and “no significant fault ornegligence”, 45 which are defin<strong>ed</strong> in Appen<strong>di</strong>x 1 of the WADC as follows:“No fault or Negligence: The Athlete’s establishing that he or she <strong>di</strong>d not knowor suspect, and could reasonably have known or suspect<strong>ed</strong> even w<strong>it</strong>h the exerciseof utmost caution, that he or she had Us<strong>ed</strong> or been administer<strong>ed</strong> the Prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong>Substance or Prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> Method” (emphasis add<strong>ed</strong>).“No significant fault or Negligence: The Athlete’s establishing that his or herfault or negligence, when view<strong>ed</strong> in the total<strong>it</strong>y of the circumstances and takinginto account the cr<strong>it</strong>eria for No Fault or Negligence, was not significant inrelationship to the anti-doping rule violation.”73 The WADC imposes on the athlete a duty of utmost caution to avoidthat a prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance enters his or her body. Case law of CAS and ofother sanctioning bo<strong>di</strong>es has confirm<strong>ed</strong> these duties, and identifi<strong>ed</strong> a numberof obligations which an athlete has to observe, e.g., to be aware of the actuallist of prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substances, to closely follow the guidelines and instructionsw<strong>it</strong>h respect to health care and nutr<strong>it</strong>ion of the national and internationalsports f<strong>ed</strong>erations, the NOC’s and the national anti-doping organisation, notto take any drugs, not to take any me<strong>di</strong>cation or nutr<strong>it</strong>ional supplementsw<strong>it</strong>hout consulting w<strong>it</strong>h a competent me<strong>di</strong>cal professional, not to acceptany me<strong>di</strong>cation or even food from unreliable sources (inclu<strong>di</strong>ng on-line ordersby internet), to go to places where there is an increas<strong>ed</strong> risk of contamination(even unintentional) w<strong>it</strong>h prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substances (e.g. passive smoking ofmarihuana). Further case law is likely to continue to identify other s<strong>it</strong>uationswhere there is an increas<strong>ed</strong> risk of contamination, and, thus, constantly specifyand intensify the athlete’s duty of care. 46 The Panel underlines that thisstandard is rigorous, and must be rigorous, especially in the interest of all____________________44Art. 10.5.1 WADC.45Art. 10.5.2 WADC.46In the first contaminat<strong>ed</strong> supplement-cases, there may have been a valid excuse of the athletethat he had no chance to know about the contamination. Today, however, the risk of contaminationis widely known and the anti-doping organizations have issu<strong>ed</strong> explic<strong>it</strong> warnings to use anynutr<strong>it</strong>ional supplements w<strong>it</strong>hout me<strong>di</strong>cal advice. An athlete who is still continuing to takenutr<strong>it</strong>ional supplements on his or her own account is violating his or her duty of care. Thus, anathlete’s att<strong>it</strong>ude which compli<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h his or her duty of care in the past, may not suffice in thefuture.
220 Giurisprudenza Internazionaleother compet<strong>it</strong>ors in a fair compet<strong>it</strong>ion. However, the Panel reminds thesanctioning bo<strong>di</strong>es that the endeavours to defeat doping should not lead tounrealistic and impractical expectations the athletes have to come up w<strong>it</strong>h.Thus, the Panel cannot exclude that under particular circumstances, certainexamples list<strong>ed</strong> in the comment to art. 10.5.2 of the WADC as cases of “nosignificant fault or negligence” may reasonably be judg<strong>ed</strong> as cases of “nofault or negligence.”74 It is this standard of utmost care against which the behaviour of anathlete is measur<strong>ed</strong> if an anti-doping violation has been identifi<strong>ed</strong>. “No fault”means that the athlete has fully compli<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h the duty of care. This doesnot exclude that there may still be a pos<strong>it</strong>ive fin<strong>di</strong>ng but such fin<strong>di</strong>ng will notlead to a sanction other than <strong>di</strong>squalification.75 “No significant fault” means that the athlete has not fully compli<strong>ed</strong>w<strong>it</strong>h his or her duties of care. The sanctioning body has to determine thereasons which prevent<strong>ed</strong> the athlete in a particular s<strong>it</strong>uation from complyingw<strong>it</strong>h his or her duty of care. For this purpose, the sanctioning body has toevaluate the specific and in<strong>di</strong>vidual circumstances. However, only if thecircumstances in<strong>di</strong>cate that the departure of the athlete from the requir<strong>ed</strong>conduct under the duty of utmost care was not significant, the sanctioningbody may apply art. 10.5.2 of the WADC and depart from the standardsanction.76 The WADC does not define whether these circumstances must be“objective” or “subjective” and the sanctioning body is not requir<strong>ed</strong> to makesuch a <strong>di</strong>stinction. It is obvious that these circumstances must be specificand relevant to explain the athlete’s departure from the expect<strong>ed</strong> standardbehaviour.77 The reference to “exceptional circumstances” in the t<strong>it</strong>le of art. 10.5WADC has in the Panel’s view no separate meaning. Whether a specificcircumstance is con-sider<strong>ed</strong> “exceptional” or “truly exceptional” is not apre-requis<strong>it</strong>e for the application of art. 10.5.1 and 10.5.2 of the WADC.78 Such a construction of Section 10.5.1 and 10.5.2 of the WADC isconsistent w<strong>it</strong>h the understan<strong>di</strong>ng of WADA’s Chairman, Mr. Richard W.Pound, as stat<strong>ed</strong> by him at the FIFA Centennial Congress on May 21, 2004in Paris: “There is a universal view that each doping case has to be consider<strong>ed</strong>as an in<strong>di</strong>vidual case and that all of the facts relevant to that case (such asthe circumstances of the athlete, the nature and quant<strong>it</strong>y of the substance,and the repet<strong>it</strong>ion of offenses) have to be carefully stu<strong>di</strong><strong>ed</strong> before anysanction could be consider<strong>ed</strong>. The WADA shares this philosophy entirely.”79 Accor<strong>di</strong>ngly, CAS Panels have taken a similar approach when deci<strong>di</strong>ngcases bas<strong>ed</strong> on anti-doping regulations of organizations which have
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 221implement<strong>ed</strong> the WADC. 4780 Once an athlete’s specific behavior has been identifi<strong>ed</strong> as a nonsignificantdeparture from the requir<strong>ed</strong> duty of utmost care, the sanctioningbody must determine the quantum of the r<strong>ed</strong>uction from the standard sanction.As a consequence, the in<strong>di</strong>vidual sanction will be fix<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>hin the penaltyframework set by the WADC, namely between two years and one year.81 There is no explic<strong>it</strong> guidance in the WADC about how the in<strong>di</strong>vidualquantum shall be measur<strong>ed</strong> but CAS case law is already developing principlesor cr<strong>it</strong>eria to assist in deci<strong>di</strong>ng whether the specific quantum of a sanctionw<strong>it</strong>hin the given framework corresponds to the degree of fault of the athlete.82 The FIFA rules to determine the duration of the sanction look <strong>di</strong>fferent:Art. 62.2 of the FIFA DC refers to “the degree of the offender’s guilt” andlists factors which must be taken into account, such as “the objective andsubjective circumstances” and “general principles of law”, w<strong>it</strong>hout howeverdetailing or qualifying the meaning of such factors. To date, the Panel is notaware of any decisions by FIFA bo<strong>di</strong>es bas<strong>ed</strong> on the new art. 62 FIFA DCand does therefore not know what circumstances and principles areconsider<strong>ed</strong> to be relevant.83 The reference in art. 62.1 of the FIFA DC to “the offender’s guilt”could be constru<strong>ed</strong> as carrying the implication that the FIFA Anti-DopingRules, like the WADC, impose on the athlete a duty of utmost caution toavoid doping. As a consequence, under the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules, thesanctioning body must compare the specific behaviour of an athlete w<strong>it</strong>h theexpect<strong>ed</strong> “faultless” behaviour of a <strong>di</strong>ligent and careful athlete in order todetermine the “offender’s guilt”. In light of FIFA’s clear public stand againstdoping, the Panel is satisfi<strong>ed</strong> that the duty of care expect<strong>ed</strong> from an athleteunder the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules will not be substantially <strong>di</strong>fferent fromthe att<strong>it</strong>ude expect<strong>ed</strong> from an athlete under the WADC. A more lenientapproach to the athlete’s duty of care would materially compromise FIFA’sefforts to fight doping.84 There is, however, a substantial <strong>di</strong>fference between the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules and the WADC: Art. 62.1 of the FIFA DC refers generally to“the offender’s guilt” whereas art. 10.5 of the WADC provides that the optionof eliminating or r<strong>ed</strong>ucing the standard two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y is availableonly in cases of “no fault or negligence” and “non-significant fault or____________________47CAS OG 06/001 WADA v/Lund, para. 4.17; CAS 2005/A/830 G. Squizzato v/FINA, para.10.26; CAS 2004/A/690 Hippder<strong>di</strong>nger v/ ATP, para. 77; ATP Anti-Doping Tribunal, Decision ofMarch 24, 2005 (Dim<strong>it</strong>ry Vlasov), para. 35; CAS 2005/A/847 Knauss v/ FIS, para. 7.5.1 et seq.regar<strong>di</strong>ng elements which should not be taken into account; CAS 2003/A/484 Vencill v/ USADA,considering the fault as “extremely significant”.
222 Giurisprudenza Internazionalenegligence”. A fault which does not qualify as non-significant will thereforeinev<strong>it</strong>ably lead to the standard two-year ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y under the WADC. Onthe other hand, the two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y is not a compulsory consequenceunder the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules, even if there is more than “non-significantfault”. The wor<strong>di</strong>ng of art. 62.1 of the FIFA DC rather allows the sanctioningbody to utilize the full range between 6 months and 2 years to align thesanction to any degree of “the offender’s guilt”, i.e. from insignificant oreven no guilt up to very significant guilt or even malicious intent. The wor<strong>di</strong>ngseems to in<strong>di</strong>cate that under the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules, the two years’sanction will be consider<strong>ed</strong> as the maximum penalty applicable to seriousanti-doping rule violations whereas under the WADC, the two-year penaltyis a standard which will apply in all cases except where there is “no(significant) fault or negligence”. Still, the Panel acknowl<strong>ed</strong>ges that <strong>di</strong>fferentsanctioning bo<strong>di</strong>es in <strong>di</strong>fferent countries may have a <strong>di</strong>fferent understan<strong>di</strong>ngas to whether a certain fault is significant or not. The same remark is alsotrue at the CAS level, i.e. when CAS panels have to decide whether anathlete act<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h utmost care or not.85 On the other hand, art. 62 of the FIFA DC does not allow the completeelimination of a sanction in cases of “no fault or negligence.” The wor<strong>di</strong>ngof art. 62.2 of the FIFA DC is unambiguous: “For a first offense, a suspensionof no less than six months and no more than two years shall be impos<strong>ed</strong>.”Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. II.1.2 of the FIFA RDC, an offense is establish<strong>ed</strong> upon themere presence of a prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance in an athlete’s bo<strong>di</strong>ly specimen anddoes not require any fault or guilt of the athlete. Once an offense has beenestablish<strong>ed</strong>, the sanction must be determin<strong>ed</strong> accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 62 of theFIFA DC, which provides no possibil<strong>it</strong>y to eliminate the sanction in cases of“no fault”. Any other interpretation would be contrary to the wor<strong>di</strong>ng of theFIFA Anti-Doping Rules.86 When <strong>it</strong> comes to the circumstances to be taken into account todetermine an athlete’s guilt or fault, the question arises whether a sanctioningbody applying art. 62.1 FIFA DC must take other or further circumstancesinto consideration than those address<strong>ed</strong> by art. 10.5 WADC, since art. 62.1FIFA DC refers to “the objective and subjective circumstances of the case”as well as to “generally accept<strong>ed</strong> principles of law”. The Panel finds that theWADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules do not <strong>di</strong>verge in this respect. TheWADC requires the sanctioning body to examine “the total<strong>it</strong>y of the address<strong>ed</strong>by art. 62.1 of the FIFA DC. 48 By referring to “the objective and subjectivecircumstances of the case” art. 62.1 of the FIFA DC must also be understoodto mean that only specific circumstances which are relevant for
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 223a certain violation of the athlete’s duty of care may be taken into account.This is not <strong>di</strong>fferent under the WADC.87 To the extent that such specific circumstances have been accept<strong>ed</strong> asvalid justifications for the athlete’s departure from the “utmost care”-standard,they must be appropriately reflect<strong>ed</strong> in the quantum of the in<strong>di</strong>vidual sanction.Accor<strong>di</strong>ngly, w<strong>it</strong>hin the framework set by art. 62.2 FIFA DC, the specificsanction must be proportionate to the degree of departure from the athlete’sduty of care. This is how the Panel understands the reference to the “generalprinciples of law” in art. 62.1 FIFA DC. Such approach to the determinationof the quantum of the specific sanction is not <strong>di</strong>fferent from the principleswhich govern the determination of a sanction w<strong>it</strong>hin the penalty frameworkof the WADC.c) Conclusions88 The Panel concludes that FIFA Anti-Doping Rules and the WADCare not substantially <strong>di</strong>fferent w<strong>it</strong>h regard to the method to determine thein<strong>di</strong>vidual sanction for a specific anti-doping rule violation. Both requirethe sanctioning body to measure the conduct of the athlete against a duty ofutmost caution and to assess the ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y period w<strong>it</strong>hin a given penaltyframework in proportion of the degree of fault.89 There are however three significant <strong>di</strong>fferences between the WADCand the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules:- The frameworks of the penalties for first offenses are <strong>di</strong>fferent (i.e. 6months/2 years accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 62.1 FIFA DC and 1 year/2 yearsaccor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 10.5.2 WADC). 49- Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 10.1.1 WADC, the two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y is the standardsanction from which a departure is only possible in cases of no fault orno significant fault. Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 62.1 FIFA DC the 2-years’ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y period is the maximum penalty. The Panel would like to stressthe following: The arb<strong>it</strong>ration process may still, through carefulapplication of the rules contain<strong>ed</strong> in the WADC and the FIFA DC andthe consequent analyzes, develop a jurisprudence that does not deviatesignificantly under e<strong>it</strong>her code save for the question of the minimumsanction.____________________48The effect which a specific sanction may have on an in<strong>di</strong>vidual athlete (e.g. the fact that anineligibil<strong>it</strong>y of certain duration may prevent an athlete from participating in the Olympic Gamesor in a number of games in the Champions League) is not a “circumstance” in the meaning of art.10.5 WADC or art. 62.1 FIFA DC which must be taken into account to determine the degree offault or guilt. Whether such effects may effect the duration of an ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y shall be <strong>di</strong>scusse<strong>di</strong>n the context of the principle of proportional<strong>it</strong>y.49This <strong>di</strong>fference may be lessen<strong>ed</strong> if the FIFA sanctioning body makes use of the possibil<strong>it</strong>y tointerrupt the ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y period by rest season (Art. 34 FIFA DC).
224 Giurisprudenza Internazionale- Once a doping offense has been establish<strong>ed</strong>, the WADC allows for acomplete elimination of the sanction in case of “no fault or negligence”whereas the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules do not explic<strong>it</strong>ly allow to r<strong>ed</strong>ucingthe sanction below the minimum threshold of 6 months, even in cases of“no fault or negligence.”3.10.2 Specifi<strong>ed</strong> Substances (Article 10.3 WADC. Article 62.3 FIFA DC)90 Art. 62.3 of the FIFA DC does not define the term “certain substance”.From the German and the French version of the FIFA DC, <strong>it</strong> is clear that the“certain substance” are the specifi<strong>ed</strong> substances list<strong>ed</strong> in the (WADA) list ofprohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substances.91 Art. 10.3 of the WADC provides for a r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> frame of sanctions, ifthe athlete can demonstrate the use of a specifi<strong>ed</strong> substance was not intend<strong>ed</strong>to enhance performance. In contrast, art. 62.3 of the FIFA DC simply providesthat the minimum sanctions may be r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>hout specifying the con<strong>di</strong>tionsof such r<strong>ed</strong>uction.92 For a first offense, the WADC provides for a sanction ranging from amere warning and reprimand to a one year suspension, a two years’ suspensionfor a second offense and a lifetime ban for a third offense. The athlete hasalso the possibil<strong>it</strong>y of eliminating or r<strong>ed</strong>ucing the sanction under art. 10.5 ofthe WADC. Art. 62.5 of the FIFA DC provides, for a first offense, for asanction ranging from a warning to a two-year suspension. For a secondoffense, <strong>it</strong> only provides for a minimum, i.e. two-year suspension. A thirdoffense results in a lifetime ban.93 The Panel recognises certain <strong>di</strong>fferences in the wor<strong>di</strong>ng of the rulesgoverning Specifi<strong>ed</strong> Substances. In particular, under the FIFA Anti-DopingRules, the less severe sanctions apply irrespective of whether the athlete candemonstrate that the substance was not intend<strong>ed</strong> to enhance his or herperformance. On the other hand, a first offense under the FIFA Anti-DopingRules can be sanction<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h a two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y whereas the WADClim<strong>it</strong>s the sanction to one year. How-ever, the Panel does not expect that inpractice, these <strong>di</strong>fferences will lead to a materially <strong>di</strong>fferent treatment of anathlete under e<strong>it</strong>her set of rules.3.10.3 Second Offenses (Articles 10.2, 10.6 WADC. Article 41 FIFA DC)94 The WADC and the FIFA DC define a “second offense” <strong>di</strong>fferently.Pursuant to art. 41.2.d of the FIFA DC, an offense is consider<strong>ed</strong> as a secondoffense if <strong>it</strong> is comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> before the lapse of two years from the impos<strong>it</strong>ionof a suspension of at least four months in the previous case. Art. 41.4 of theFIFA DC contains special rules regar<strong>di</strong>ng repeat<strong>ed</strong> doping infringements.However, the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules do not contain a defin<strong>it</strong>ion of “second
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 225offense”. Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 10.6.1 of the WADC, an offense may only beconsider<strong>ed</strong> as a second offense, if <strong>it</strong> was comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> after (i) the offender hasreceiv<strong>ed</strong> notice of the first offense, or (ii) after the anti-doping organizationhas made a reasonable attempt to give notice of the first offense. There is noparticular rule on the interval between a first and a second offense.95 The FIFA DC provides for a maximum of a lifetime ban a secondoffense in cases of breaches of art. 2.2-2.5. A minimum sanction is notspecifi<strong>ed</strong>. Regar<strong>di</strong>ng possession, trafficking and administration/complic<strong>it</strong>y,the FIFA DC does not specify penalties for a second offense. The WADCprovides for the violations contain<strong>ed</strong> in art. 2.1-2.3 and 2.6 for a lifetime banin case of a second offense. A r<strong>ed</strong>uction to a period of ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y of eightyears is possible in all cases of no significant fault or negligence.96 The Panel thus finds that there is at least one material <strong>di</strong>fference betweenthe WADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules, since under the FIFA DC, thesevere consequences of a second offense apply if the second offense occursw<strong>it</strong>hin two years whereas the WADC contains no such lim<strong>it</strong>ation.3.10.4 Multiple Violations (Article 10.6 WADC. Article 43 FIFA DC)97 As w<strong>it</strong>h the notion of a second offense, the Panel also notes <strong>di</strong>fferencesbetween the WADC and the FIFA rules regar<strong>di</strong>ng multiple violations.Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 43 FIFA DC, if a person incurs several sanctions as aresult of one or several anti-doping rule violations, the sanctioning bodyimposes the sanction for the most severe offense and may increase the sanctionby not more than half of the maximum.98 The WADC does not contain a general rule on how to treat suchmultiple violations, unless specifi<strong>ed</strong> substances are involv<strong>ed</strong>: In this regard,art. 10.6.2 WADC provides that if, bas<strong>ed</strong> on the same doping control, anathlete has comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> an offense involving a specifi<strong>ed</strong> substance and aprohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance or method, the athlete shall be deem<strong>ed</strong> to havecomm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> only one anti-doping rule violation and the sanction shall be bas<strong>ed</strong>on the prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substance or method carrying the most severe sanction.3.10.5 Substantial Assistance (Article 10.5.3 WADC)99 Art. 10.5.3 WADC provides that the sanction may be r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> by amaximum of 50% if the offender has provid<strong>ed</strong> substantial assistance to theanti doping investigators which results in <strong>di</strong>scovering or establishing a dopingoffense by a third party involving possession by athlete support personnel, 505trafficking 1 or administration/complic<strong>it</strong>y. 52____________________50 Art. 2.6.2 WADC.51 Art. 2.7 WADC.52 Art. 2.8 WADC.
226 Giurisprudenza Internazionale100 The FIFA rules do not provide for such a substantial assistance. ThePanel, considers this to be a significant <strong>di</strong>fference between WADC and theFIFA Anti-Doping Rules. 533.10.6 Probationary Sanctions (Article 33 FIFA DC)101 The WADC does not allow for a suspension of the execution of asanction or a part thereof. Art. 10.9 WADC rather provides that a sanction<strong>ed</strong>person may not, during the ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y period, participate in any capac<strong>it</strong>y ina compet<strong>it</strong>ion or other activ<strong>it</strong>y except for authoris<strong>ed</strong> anti-doping orrehabil<strong>it</strong>ation programs.102 Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 33.1 FIFA DC, the sanctioning body is requir<strong>ed</strong> toexamine whether the implementation of part of a sanction (i.e. ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y)may be suspend<strong>ed</strong>. Such suspension is permissible if the circumstances, inparticular the previous record of the offender, generally “allow <strong>it</strong>” 54 . ThePanel notes that the French and German versions of the con<strong>di</strong>tions of suchsuspension are stricter than the English version, the author<strong>it</strong>ative Frenchversion 55 being more lenient than the German text.103 Art. 33.2 FIFA DC lim<strong>it</strong>s the possibil<strong>it</strong>y of probation to suspensionsnot excee<strong>di</strong>ng six months. In other words, a probationary sanction is onlypossible if the minimum sanction of art. 62.1 FIFA DC of six months isappli<strong>ed</strong>. Art. 33.3 FIFA DC further lim<strong>it</strong>s the probation to a maximum of thehalf of the sanction. The Panel considers the option of a probationary sanctionto be a significant <strong>di</strong>fference to the WADC since <strong>it</strong> amplifies the <strong>di</strong>fferencewhich already exists w<strong>it</strong>h regard to the minimum sanctions: Whereas theminimum sanction of the WADC in cases of no significant fault is one year,the minimum under the FIFA DC is only six months and can be furtherr<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> to three months, subject to probation.3.10.7 Status during Ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y (Article 10.9 WADC. Article 20 FIFA DC)104 An offender serving a suspension may not, under art. 10.9 WADC,participate in any capac<strong>it</strong>y in any activ<strong>it</strong>y organis<strong>ed</strong> or authoris<strong>ed</strong> by anyWADC-signatory. Further, sport-relat<strong>ed</strong> financial support shall be w<strong>it</strong>hheld(except in case of use of specifi<strong>ed</strong> substances). If the suspension is longerthan four years, the offender may participate in local events in other sportsthan the sport in which the offense was comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong>.105 Art. 20.1 and 20.2 FIFA DC provide that a player who has beensuspend<strong>ed</strong> shall not be includ<strong>ed</strong> on the players’ list for the match. He is____________________53One may however argue that provi<strong>di</strong>ng substantial assistance to the anti-doping organizationcould also be recogniz<strong>ed</strong> as subjective circumstance which must be taken into considerationwhen the sanction is determin<strong>ed</strong>.54Art. 33.2 FIFA DC.55Art. 151.2 FIFA DC.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 227further bann<strong>ed</strong> from taking part in future matches or compet<strong>it</strong>ion or to atten<strong>di</strong>n the area imme<strong>di</strong>ately surroun<strong>di</strong>ng the field of play. Thus, a suspend<strong>ed</strong>football player is bann<strong>ed</strong> from actively participating in football matches orcompet<strong>it</strong>ions but not from participating or competing in other sports (or fora ban of suspend<strong>ed</strong> other athletes who desire to be adm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> as footballerplayers during their suspension in other sports). The Panel doubts whetheranother f<strong>ed</strong>eration would allow an athlete who has been bann<strong>ed</strong> because ofa violation of the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules to compete in that other sport.Likewise, <strong>it</strong> seems improbable that an athlete bann<strong>ed</strong> by another sportsf<strong>ed</strong>eration because of a doping offense will be adm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> to football activ<strong>it</strong>iesgovern<strong>ed</strong> by FIFA.3.10.8 Disqualification of Results in Compet<strong>it</strong>ions Subsequent to SampleCollection (Article 10.7 WADC)106 Art. 10.7 WADC provides that all compet<strong>it</strong>ive results from the date ofthe doping offense until the commencement of the suspension shall be<strong>di</strong>squalifi<strong>ed</strong> unless fairness requires otherwise.107 No such provision is contain<strong>ed</strong> in the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules.However, <strong>it</strong> would be <strong>di</strong>fficult to apply this rule only to an in<strong>di</strong>vidual memberof a team. The Panel finds therefore that art. 10.7 WADC is consummat<strong>ed</strong>by art. 11 WADC which leaves <strong>it</strong> to FIFA to determine the consequences ofan in<strong>di</strong>vidual anti-doping rule violation to the team.3.10.9 Commencement of Ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y Period (Articles 10.8 WADC)108 Under art. 10.8 WADC, the ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y period shall begin at the dateof the hearing decision, unless fairness requires taking delays in the hearingprocess into consideration. Provisional suspensions shall be cre<strong>di</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> againstthe total suspension.109 Under the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules, the sanctions become effectiveonly upon the date on which the decision of the sanctioning body becomesfinal and enforceable. Art. 133 FIFA DC allows the chairman of the competentsanctioning body to impose a provisional suspension if this measure is deem<strong>ed</strong>appropriate.110 The Panel finds that the rules on the commencement of the ineligibil<strong>it</strong>yperiod are not substantially <strong>di</strong>fferent.3.10.10 Reinstatement Testing (Article 10.10 WADC. Article 63 FIFA DC)111 Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 10.10 WADC, a suspend<strong>ed</strong> athlete must make himselfavailable for testing and provide whereabouts information during the wholeineligibil<strong>it</strong>y period. The wor<strong>di</strong>ng of the WADC does not require that asuspend<strong>ed</strong> athlete must also be test<strong>ed</strong> before regaining eligibil<strong>it</strong>y to participate.Art. 63 FIFA DC provides that FIFA may order a player to undergo further
228 Giurisprudenza Internazional<strong>ed</strong>oping tests during the ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y period.112 The Panel thus concludes that there is no material <strong>di</strong>fference betweenthe WADC and the FIFA rules.3.11 Appeal Right to CAS (Article 13 WADC. Article 61.5 FIFA DC andArticles 59 and 60.5 FIFA Statutes) 56113 Art. 13 of the WADC specifies in great detail which decisions underthe WADC may be subject to appeal, and who is ent<strong>it</strong>l<strong>ed</strong> to file an appeal.Art. 13.1 WADC also states that filing an appeal has in principle no suspensiveeffect unless the appellate body orders otherwise. W<strong>it</strong>h respect tointernational-level athletes (which correspond to athletes subject to FIFA’sjuris<strong>di</strong>ction), art. 13.2.1 WADC provides for an appeal as of right to CAS.Art. R47 of the Code of <strong>Sport</strong>s-relat<strong>ed</strong> Arb<strong>it</strong>ration states that before anappeal is accept<strong>ed</strong> by CAS, all available internal reme<strong>di</strong>es must be exhaust<strong>ed</strong>.Art. 13.2.3 WADC lists the persons ent<strong>it</strong>l<strong>ed</strong> to appeal to CAS. It includesthe athletes concern<strong>ed</strong>, the relevant international f<strong>ed</strong>eration and any otheranti-doping organization, the IOC in matters relat<strong>ed</strong> to the Olympic Gamesand the WADA.114 Art. 59 and 60 FIFA Statutes provide that the CAS is competent toresolve <strong>di</strong>sputes between, inter alia, FIFA and the players. Thus, the player(or any other person being subject of a doping relat<strong>ed</strong> decision) and, ifapplicable, the other party to the case are, in principle, ent<strong>it</strong>l<strong>ed</strong> to appeal thefinal decision of FIFA to CAS. Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 60.5 of the FIFA Statutes,WADA may also appeal decisions of FIFA in doping matters to the CAS.However, the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules do not establish a duty to informWADA, or a right of WADA to learn, about doping decisions of FIFAinst<strong>it</strong>utions. The absence of any such information right renders the WADA’sright of appeal inoperative. The Panel considers the lack of right on the partof WADA to any information about FIFA’s decisions in doping cases to be amaterial <strong>di</strong>fference.115 Pursuant to art. 60.3 FIFA Statutes, there is no CAS juris<strong>di</strong>ction incase of suspensions of up to three months. Suspensions of three months arepossible under the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules if the athlete is grant<strong>ed</strong> a probationfor the rest of the suspension. Thus, the minimum sanction under the FIFAAnti-Doping Rules is not subject to appeal to CAS, which means that WADAhas no instrument to enforce a ju<strong>di</strong>cial review if <strong>it</strong> deems such a minimumsanction to be too lenient. In the view of the Panel, art. 60.3 of the FIFAStatutes also applies to appeals in doping matters, because the concern<strong>ed</strong>athlete must rely on the clear wor<strong>di</strong>ng of the FIFA Statutes.____________________56For the appeal relating to the granting or denying a TUE, see para. 46 above.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 229116 The IOC is not grant<strong>ed</strong> an explic<strong>it</strong> right to appeal against FIFA dopingdecisions,which is in contrast to art. 13.2.3(d) WADC. However, <strong>it</strong> is <strong>di</strong>fficultto imagine specific circumstances in which the IOC would ne<strong>ed</strong> such anappeal right. When <strong>it</strong> comes to anti-doping rule violations at the OlympicGames, the IOC is the competent sanctioning body and thus a party to aneventual appeal.3.12 Confidential<strong>it</strong>y and Reporting (Article 14 WADC. Articles 8 and 9FIFA RDC)117 The WADC sets out several principles of coor<strong>di</strong>nation of anti-dopingresults, public transparency respect of privacy interests of persons involv<strong>ed</strong>,accept<strong>ed</strong> by the WADC signatories: (i) an alleg<strong>ed</strong> offender must be inform<strong>ed</strong>of the charge; (ii) in International F<strong>ed</strong>eration, the offender’s national antidopingorganization and WADA must be inform<strong>ed</strong> of the charge, updat<strong>ed</strong>during the process and provid<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h the decision, (iii) a conviction must bepublicly <strong>di</strong>sclos<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>hin 20 days, (iv) International F<strong>ed</strong>erations and nationalanti-doping organizations must collect whereabouts information of athletesof the testing pool and provide such information to WADA; (v) testinginformation and results must be provid<strong>ed</strong> to WADA clearing house; (vi)annual statistical reports must be provid<strong>ed</strong> to WADA.118 Art. 8.1 of the FIFA RDC provides that the national anti-dopingorganization shall be inform<strong>ed</strong> of a pos<strong>it</strong>ive A-sample only if national law sorequires. Pursuant to art. 9.1 FIFA RDC, the Disciplinary Comm<strong>it</strong>tee may, ifnecessary, inform the national anti-doping organization of pos<strong>it</strong>ive fin<strong>di</strong>ngs.FIFA retains the exclusive right to publish the test results and theconsequences thereof. 57119 The Panel concludes that FIFA’s more lenient provisions regar<strong>di</strong>ngthe information of the national anti-doping organization and WADA const<strong>it</strong>utea material deviation from the WADC since <strong>it</strong> aggravates the co-or<strong>di</strong>nationof the international efforts against doping and renders WADA’s appeals rightto CAS nugatory (see also previous section).3.13 Statute of Lim<strong>it</strong>ations of Doping Offenses (Article 17 WADC. Article44.2 FIFA RDC)120 The WADC provides in art. 17 that action may be commenc<strong>ed</strong> for adoping offense up to eight years from the date the offense occurr<strong>ed</strong>. Art.44.2 of the FIFA RDC <strong>di</strong>ffers from this rule in provi<strong>di</strong>ng that the prosecutionof violations of anti-doping rules is only preclud<strong>ed</strong> after 20 years.4. Material Differences (Summary)121 The Panel finds the most significant <strong>di</strong>fferences to be:____________________57Art. 9.2 FIFA RDC.
230 Giurisprudenza Internazionale(1) the minimum duration of the ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y period for a first offense, i.e.six months accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 62.2 of the FIFA DC as oppos<strong>ed</strong> to one yearaccor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 10.5.2 of the WADC;(2) the degree of fault which is relevant for the determination of thein<strong>di</strong>vidual sanction, i.e. r<strong>ed</strong>uction of the standard two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>yallow<strong>ed</strong> only if “no significant fault” has been demonstrat<strong>ed</strong> 58 vs.determination of the in<strong>di</strong>vidual sanction w<strong>it</strong>hin the penalty framework underconsideration of all degrees of guilt or fault; 59(3) the absence of a FIFA rule allowing complete elimination of thesuspension in case of “no fault or negligence”; 60(4) the option of a probationary sanction under art. 33 FIFA DC wherethere is no such option under the WADC;(5) the absence of a right of the WADA to review the granting or denial ofa TUE; 61(6) the absence of any substantial assistance as provid<strong>ed</strong> by art. 10.5.3 ofthe WADC under the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules;(7) the absence of a rule in the WADC to determine the relevant timeperiod during which an offense is consider<strong>ed</strong> as a “second offense”;(8) the absence of an appropriate right of information of the WADA onanti-doping decisions issu<strong>ed</strong> by FIFA bo<strong>di</strong>es, as a con<strong>di</strong>tion to exercise <strong>it</strong>sright of appeal and the exclusion of the three months’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y sanctionfrom review by CAS.D. Does Mandatory Swiss Law Require FIFA to Deviate from WADC?122 FIFA takes the view that the <strong>di</strong>fferences identifi<strong>ed</strong> in Chapter C andsummariz<strong>ed</strong> in para. 121 are requir<strong>ed</strong> by mandatory law. The applicablemandatory law is Swiss law since FIFA has been establish<strong>ed</strong> as an associationgovern<strong>ed</strong> by Swiss law 62 .1.1 Swiss Law123 There is no question, and <strong>it</strong> is not <strong>di</strong>sput<strong>ed</strong> by WADA, that the rulesand regulations issu<strong>ed</strong> by FIFA, as a Swiss association, must comply w<strong>it</strong>hSwiss law. Swiss law grants to associations a wide <strong>di</strong>scretion to regulatetheir own affairs. 63 The fre<strong>ed</strong>om of associations to regulate their own affairsis lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> only by mandatory law. The question is, therefore, whether thereare mandatory provisions which prevent FIFA from adopting the WADC in<strong>it</strong>s entirety.____________________58Art. 10.5.2 WADC.59Art. 62.1 FIFA DC.60Art. 10.5.1 WADC.61Art. 4.4 WADC.62Art. 1.1 FIFA Statutes.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 231124 The law which is relevant to answer the above question consistsprimarily of the Swiss law on associations. 64 However, <strong>it</strong> includes also generalprinciples of law which are not lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> to a specific area of law. 65 One ofthese general principles, which pervades Swiss jurisprudence and the Swisslegal system, and which is relevant in the context of this Opinion, is theprinciple of proportional<strong>it</strong>y, a principle which has <strong>it</strong>s roots in const<strong>it</strong>utionaland administrative law. On the other hand, the Panel is not prepar<strong>ed</strong> to takerefuge in such uncertain concepts as that of a “lex sportiva”, as has beenadvocat<strong>ed</strong> by various authors. The exact content and the boundaries of theconcept of a lex sportiva are still far too vague and uncertain to enable <strong>it</strong> tobe us<strong>ed</strong> to determine the specific rights and obligations of sports associationstowards athletes.1.2 The Law of Sanctions Impos<strong>ed</strong> by Associations125 In Swiss law, <strong>it</strong> is generally accept<strong>ed</strong> that an association may impose<strong>di</strong>sciplinary sanctions upon <strong>it</strong>s members if they violate the rules andregulations of the association. The juris<strong>di</strong>ction to impose such sanctions isbas<strong>ed</strong> upon the fre<strong>ed</strong>om of associations to regulate their own affairs. Theassociation is grant<strong>ed</strong> a wide <strong>di</strong>scretion to determine the violations whichare subject to sanctions, and to define the kind and the measure of the sanction.In a <strong>di</strong>fferent context, this wide <strong>di</strong>scretion is referr<strong>ed</strong> to as “the margin ofappreciation”.126 In order to impose a sanction an association must satisfy the followingcon<strong>di</strong>tions:- The violator must be subject to the rules and regulations of thatassociation 66 .- There must be a sufficiently clear statutory basis for a penalty in the statutesor bylaws of the association. 67- The sanction proc<strong>ed</strong>ure must guarantee the right to be heard. 68127 Disciplinary sanctions impos<strong>ed</strong> by associations are subject to the civillaw and must be clearly <strong>di</strong>stinguish<strong>ed</strong> from criminal penalties. A sanctionimpos<strong>ed</strong> by an association is not a criminal punishment. Ne<strong>it</strong>her Swiss legal____________________63Art. 63 Swiss Civil Code; BK-Riemer, ST para. 226.64Art. 60 et seq. Swiss Civil Code..65Swiss F<strong>ed</strong>eral Supreme Court 122 I 340 E. 7b; ZK-Lieber, Art. 7 N 118.66An athlete can become subject to the regulations of an international f<strong>ed</strong>eration by several ways,inclu<strong>di</strong>ng <strong>di</strong>rect membership, in<strong>di</strong>rect membership or bas<strong>ed</strong> on a specific agreement which maybe embo<strong>di</strong><strong>ed</strong> also in an entry form (e.g. to the Olympic Games) or a compet<strong>it</strong>ion license, cf. Flint/Taylor/Lewis (cf. footnote 3) N. E4.61 et seq., p. 928 et seq. and Hodler, Teilnehmer- undAthletenvertrag, in: Nater (<strong>ed</strong>.), <strong>Sport</strong> und Recht: Vertragsgestaltung im <strong>Sport</strong>, Zurich 2004, p. 4and 9.67BK-Riemer, art. 70N210.68Swiss F<strong>ed</strong>eral Supreme Court 90 II 347 E. 2; BK-Riemer, art. 75 N 36.
232 Giurisprudenza Internazional<strong>ed</strong>octrine nor case law stipulate that art. 63 et seq. of the Swiss Penal Code, 69which require the criminal judge to allocate the penalty accor<strong>di</strong>ng to th<strong>ed</strong>egree of guilt, the motives of the offender, his or her curriculum and his orher personal circumstances, are applicable <strong>di</strong>rectly or by analogy to sanctionsimpos<strong>ed</strong> by an association. Art. 63 et seq. of the Swiss Penal Code does notconst<strong>it</strong>ute a general principle for any kind of sanctions. In particular, <strong>it</strong> isnot applicable to sanctions bas<strong>ed</strong> on civil law or sanction bas<strong>ed</strong> onadministrative law. This does not mean that there are no lim<strong>it</strong>s to sanctionsoutside the criminal law, but that the lim<strong>it</strong>s are <strong>di</strong>fferent.1.3 The Burden of Proof128 As a general principle, <strong>it</strong> is the association imposing a sanction whichhas the burden of proof that a rule-violation has been comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong>. 70129 Accor<strong>di</strong>ngly, <strong>it</strong> is the sanctioning body which must demonstrate thatan athlete has comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> an anti-doping rule violation, e.g. by a report of anaccre<strong>di</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> laboratory. Once the anti-doping rule violation has beenestablish<strong>ed</strong>, the WADC introduces a presumption that the athlete act<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>hfault or negligence. This presumption is rebuttable and the athlete maydemonstrate that he or she act<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>hout (significant) fault or negligence.130 The presumption of fault or negligence is recogniz<strong>ed</strong> by Swiss law invarious circumstances and does not conflict per se w<strong>it</strong>h the presumption ofinnocence which is a concept of criminal law. In contract law, where theparty have a mutual duty of good fa<strong>it</strong>h, there is e.g. a presumption that abreach of contract was the result of negligence, and <strong>it</strong> is the burden of thefailing party to demonstrate that <strong>it</strong> <strong>di</strong>d not act negligently (art. 97 CO).____________________69Art. 63 of the Swiss Penal Code reads as follows:“Le juge fixera la peine d’après la culpabil<strong>it</strong>é du délinquant, en tenant compte des mobiles, desantécédents et de la s<strong>it</strong>uation personnelle de ce dernier.”Art. 64 of the Swiss Penal Code reads as follows: “Le juge pourra atténuer la peine:− lorsque le coupable aura agi− en cédant à un mobile honorable,− dans une détresse profonde,− sous l’impression d’une menace grave,− sous l’ascendant d’une personne à laquelle il do<strong>it</strong> obéissance ou de laquelle il dépend;− lorsqu’il aura été indu<strong>it</strong> en tentation grave par la condu<strong>it</strong>e de la victime;− lorsqu’il aura été entraîné par la colère ou par une douleur violente, produ<strong>it</strong>es par uneprovocation injuste ou une offense immér<strong>it</strong>ée;− lorsqu’il aura manifesté par des actes un repentir sincère, notamment lorsqu’il auraréparé le dommage autant qu’on pouva<strong>it</strong> l’attendre de lui;− lorsqu’un temps relativement long se sera écoulé depuis l’infraction et que le délinquantse sera bien comporté pendant ce temps;− lorsque l’auteur éta<strong>it</strong> âgé de 18 à 20 ans et ne posséda<strong>it</strong> pas encore pleinement lafaculté d’apprécier le caractère illic<strong>it</strong>e de son acte.”70Article 8 of the Swiss Civil Code: “In the absence of a special provision to the contrary, theburden of proving an alleg<strong>ed</strong> fact rests on the party who bases his claim on that fact.”
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 233131 Athletes have a rigorous duty of care towards their compet<strong>it</strong>ors andthe sports organization to keep their bo<strong>di</strong>es free of prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substances.Anti-doping rule violations do not “just happen” but are, in most cases, theresult of a breach of that duty of care. This justifies to presume that theathlete act<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h fault or negligent and to shift the burden of proof from thesanctioning body to the athlete to exonerate him- or herself. On the otherhand, to impose to the sanctioning body to demonstrate that the athleteact<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h fault or negligence would make the fight against doping extremely<strong>di</strong>fficult or even impossible. The shifting of the burden of proof to the athleteto demonstrate that he or she act<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>hout (significant) fault does notconst<strong>it</strong>ute a violation of Swiss law 71 provid<strong>ed</strong> that there is a fair and equalstandard of proof. 721.4 Lim<strong>it</strong>s on the Power of an Association to Impose Sanctions132 When imposing a sanction, the sanctioning body must observe thefollowing lim<strong>it</strong>s:1.4.1 The Principle of Fault 73133 There is no legal defin<strong>it</strong>ion of fault in Swiss law. 74 The concept offault under Swiss law is broad and covers a wide range of <strong>di</strong>fferent forms offault, from light fault to serious fault and intention. Fault is generally defin<strong>ed</strong>as an error or defect of judgment or of conduct respectively or as a breachof duty impos<strong>ed</strong> by law or contract. 75 Negligence is generally defin<strong>ed</strong> as theomission to do something which a reasonable man, guid<strong>ed</strong> by those or<strong>di</strong>naryconsiderations which or<strong>di</strong>narily regulate human affairs, would do, or th<strong>ed</strong>oing of something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. 76____________________71See also, in an international context, Kaufmann-Kohler/Malinverni/Rigozzi (cf. footnote 11),sec. 131 et seq., especially sec. 134.72CAS 2005/A/830 G. Squizzato v/ FINA, sec. 10.17; ECHR Salabiaku v/ France, Decision ofOctober 7, 1998, para. 27, A114-A (1998); Scherrer, Strafrechtliche und strafprozessualeGrundsätze bei Ver-bandssanktionen, in Fr<strong>it</strong>zweiler (Ed.), Doping - Sanktion, Beweise, Ansprüche,Bern 2000, p. 127 et seq.; Scherrer, Vereinsstrafe - m<strong>it</strong> oder ohne Verschulden, in: Jusletter 6.September 2004, N 9.73FIFA, in <strong>it</strong>s request, uses the term “culpabil<strong>it</strong>y”, while the FDC refers to the “player’s guilt”.Conversely, WADA and the WADC use the term fault”. This Panel, in line w<strong>it</strong>h CAS jurisprudence,uses the term “fault” for the following reason: “Fault” is the term us<strong>ed</strong> in civil law (Black,Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th <strong>ed</strong>., St. Paul 1990, p. 608; Romain/Bader/Byrd, Dictionary of Legaland Commercial Terms, 5th <strong>ed</strong>., Munich/Basle/Vienna 2000, p. 315) and CAS is an arb<strong>it</strong>rationcourt dealing w<strong>it</strong>h civil matters. On the other hand, “guilt” is deriv<strong>ed</strong> from criminal law (Black,p. 708; Romain/Bader/Byrd, p. 355), while “culpabil<strong>it</strong>y” cannot be assign<strong>ed</strong> to a specific field oflaw.74Gauch/Schluep/Schmid/Rey, Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 8th<strong>ed</strong>, Zu-rich 2003, N 2766.75Black (cf. footnote 73), p. 608; Gauch/Schluep/Schmid/Rey (cf. footnote 74), N 2766.76Black (cf. footnote 73), p. 1022.
234 Giurisprudenza InternazionaleAccor<strong>di</strong>ng to a similar defin<strong>it</strong>ion, negligence is a breach of due <strong>di</strong>ligence. 77134 It is controversial whether, under Swiss law, fault must be establishe<strong>di</strong>n order to impose an association sanction. 78 The Panel is not aware of anexplic<strong>it</strong> mandatory provision under Swiss law, prohib<strong>it</strong>ing the impos<strong>it</strong>ion ofan association penalty w<strong>it</strong>hout taking the fault of the rule violator into account.It is not unusual for the bylaws of associations to contain fix<strong>ed</strong> penaltieswhich apply if a member violates the rules or regulations of that association.135 Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to Riemer, the requirement of fault to impose a sanctionmust be reflect<strong>ed</strong> in the bylaws. 79 HEINI/PORTMANN take the view that sanctions(e.g. suspensions) violating the personal privacy of an athlete by damaginghis or her professional reputation are valid if the athlete is at fault, 80 provid<strong>ed</strong>,however, that art. 27 para. 2 Swiss Civil Code has been respect<strong>ed</strong>. RIEMERholds that art. 160 et seq. Swiss Code of Obligations (contractual penalties)cannot be appli<strong>ed</strong> by analogy arguing that the athlete does not provideanything in favor of the association. 81 HEINI/SCHERRER are of the view thatfault is necessary to impose an association sanction. 82 Likewise, the Germandoctrine relies on the degree of fault as a fundamental cr<strong>it</strong>erion. 83136 In common w<strong>it</strong>h the great major<strong>it</strong>y of learn<strong>ed</strong> authors, the Panelconcludes that the impos<strong>it</strong>ion of an association sanction requires fault onbehalf of the athlete.1.4.2 The Principle of Equal Treatment137 Sanctions impos<strong>ed</strong> by associations must comply w<strong>it</strong>h the principle ofequal treatment, e.g. insofar as all members or const<strong>it</strong>uents of that associationmust be treat<strong>ed</strong> alike. This is especially true in sports where equal treatmentis fundamental for any sports compet<strong>it</strong>ion.1.4.3 The Principle of Proportional<strong>it</strong>y138 The sanction must also comply w<strong>it</strong>h the principle of proportional<strong>it</strong>y,in the sense that there must be a reasonable balance between the kind of themisconduct and the sanction. 84 In administrative law, the principle ofproportional<strong>it</strong>y requires that (i) the in<strong>di</strong>vidual sanction must be capable of____________________77Gauch/Schluep/Schmid/Rey (cf. footnote 74), N 2772.78Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to Scherrer, CaS 2005, p. 48, the principle “in dubio pro reo” must be respect<strong>ed</strong> aswell. This principle seems to contra<strong>di</strong>ct the civil law character of association sanctions and the<strong>di</strong>fferent burden of proof of association sanctions compar<strong>ed</strong> to penal law. The question, however,ne<strong>ed</strong> not to be answer<strong>ed</strong> in this Advisory Opinion.79BK-Riemer, art. 70N210.80Heini/Portmann, Das schweizerische Vereinsrecht, SPR II/5, 3. <strong>ed</strong>., Basel 2005, N 319.81BK-Riemer, art. 70 N 221 and 222.82BSK-Heini/Scherrer, art. 70 N 19a; Scherrer, (cf. footnote 75), p. 127 et seq.83Haas, CaS 2004, p. 60.84BK-Riemer, art. 70N211.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 235achieving the envisag<strong>ed</strong> goal, (ii) the in<strong>di</strong>vidual sanction is necessary toreach the envisag<strong>ed</strong> goal and (iii) the constraints which the affect<strong>ed</strong> personwill suffer as a consequence of the sanction are justifi<strong>ed</strong> by the overall interestin achieving the envisag<strong>ed</strong> goal. 85139 A long series of CAS decisions have develop<strong>ed</strong> the principle ofproportional<strong>it</strong>y in sport cases 86 . This principle provides that the sever<strong>it</strong>y of asanction must be proportionate to the offense comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong>. To beproportionate, the sanction must not exce<strong>ed</strong> that which is reasonably require<strong>di</strong>n the search of the justifiable aim 87 . Both the Swiss F<strong>ed</strong>eral Supreme Courtand a significant part of Swiss legal doctrine have upheld the principle ofproportional<strong>it</strong>y. 88,89KAUFMANN-KOHLER/MALIN-VERNI/RIGOZZI, in their legal opinion to the WADC,consider a sanction’s proportional<strong>it</strong>y as cr<strong>it</strong>ical, 90 but justifiable in view ofthe leg<strong>it</strong>imate aim of harmonizing doping matters. 91 The Panel is of the viewthat the principle of proportional<strong>it</strong>y is guarante<strong>ed</strong> under the WADC, 92moreover, proportional sanctions facil<strong>it</strong>ate compliance w<strong>it</strong>h the principle offault. Consequently, each body must consider the proportional<strong>it</strong>y of impos<strong>ed</strong>sanctions for doping cases. 931.4.4 The Moral Rights of the Offender (Article 27 and 28 Swiss CivilCode)140 The sanction must not violate the moral rights of the offender, as defin<strong>ed</strong>by art. 27 and 28 of the Swiss Civil Code. Art. 27.2 of the Swiss Civil Codeprovides that excessive legal comm<strong>it</strong>ments of a person are null and void.Art. 28 prohib<strong>it</strong>s any violation of a person’s personal<strong>it</strong>y, which is deem<strong>ed</strong> tobe illegal unless the person has agre<strong>ed</strong> to the violation. This means that aperson who is joining an association and participates in the association’sactiv<strong>it</strong>ies, is deem<strong>ed</strong> to having consent<strong>ed</strong> to the association’s rules and___________________85Hafelin/Muller, Grundriss des allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts, 4th <strong>ed</strong>., Zurich 2002, N 581.86E.g. CAS 1995/122 NWBA v/IPC; CAS 1995/141 C. v/FINA; CAS 97/180 P. v/FINA; CAS 98/214 B. v/IJF; CAS 99/A/246 W. v/FEI; CAS 2000/A/270 Meca-Me<strong>di</strong>na and Majcen v/FINA;CAS 2000/A/312 L v/FILA; CAS 2000/A/317 A. v/FILA; CAS 2004/A/624 IAAF v/ÖLV andLichtenegger; CAS 2005/A/847, Knauss v/FIS.87LEWIS/TAYLOR/PARKHOUSE, Challenges in the courts to the actions of sports governing bo<strong>di</strong>es, in:Lewis/Taylor (<strong>ed</strong>.), <strong>Sport</strong>: Law and Practice, London 2003, A3.110, p. 156.88Swiss F<strong>ed</strong>eral Supreme Court, N., J., Y., W. c/ FINA, Judgment of March 31, 1999, report<strong>ed</strong> inCAS Digest II, p. 767, 772.89FUCHS, Rechtsfragen der Vereinsstrafe, Zurich 1999, p. 110 et seq.90KAUFMANN-KOHLER/MALINVERNI/RIGOZZI (cf. footnote 11), sec. 166 et seq., referring to Krabbev/IMF et. al., Decision of the LG Munich of May 17, 1995, SpuRt 1995, p. 161, 168.91KAUFMANN-KOHLER/MALINVERNI/RIGOZZI (cf. footnote 11), sec. 185.92A previous CAS Panel arriv<strong>ed</strong> at the same conclusion (CAS 2005/A/847, Knauss v/FIS, sec.7.5.4).93LEWIS/TAYLOR/PARKHOUSE (cf. footnote 87), A3.111, p. 158.
236 Giurisprudenza Internazionaleregulations, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng the rules on sanctions. Such sanctions are thus notconsider<strong>ed</strong> as violations of one’s personal<strong>it</strong>y 94 as long as they are not excessiveunder art. 27.2 Swiss Civil Code.1.4.5 Lim<strong>it</strong>ations on Contractual Penalties141 The same result is reach<strong>ed</strong> by applying art. 163 Swiss Code ofObligations (CO) which governs contractual penalties or liquidat<strong>ed</strong> damages(“Konventionalstrafen”, “peines”). Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 163.1 of the CO,liquidat<strong>ed</strong> damages may be agre<strong>ed</strong> upon in any amount by the parties.Excessively high liquidat<strong>ed</strong> damages shall be r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> at the <strong>di</strong>scretion of thejudge. 95 Whether sanctions impos<strong>ed</strong> by associations upon their memberscan be regard<strong>ed</strong> as liquidat<strong>ed</strong> damages or contractual penalties, is <strong>di</strong>sput<strong>ed</strong>. 96However, <strong>it</strong> is the Panel’s opinion that <strong>it</strong> is justifi<strong>ed</strong> in seeking assistancefrom these provisions since (i) the relationship between athletes and nationalor international sports f<strong>ed</strong>erations is often bas<strong>ed</strong> on contracts instead of<strong>di</strong>rect membership and (ii) art. 163 of the CO reflects the fundamentalprinciples which have been establish<strong>ed</strong> also by art. 27 and 28 of the SwissCivil Code, namely, the right of the parties to agree to confer a wide <strong>di</strong>scretionin the regulation of their own affairs and the right or juris<strong>di</strong>ction of thecourts only to interfere if such <strong>di</strong>scretion has been abus<strong>ed</strong>.1.5 Conclusion142 The Panel concludes that Swiss law grants an association a wide<strong>di</strong>scretion to determine the obligations of <strong>it</strong>s members and other peoplesubject to <strong>it</strong>s rules, and to impose such sanctions <strong>it</strong> deems necessary toenforce the obligations.143 The right to impose a sanction is lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> by the mandatory prohib<strong>it</strong>ionof excessive penalties, which is embo<strong>di</strong><strong>ed</strong> in several provisions of Swiss law.To find out whether a sanction is excessive, a judge must review the typeand scope of the prov<strong>ed</strong> rule-violation, the in<strong>di</strong>vidual circumstances of thecase, and the overall effect of the sanction on the offender. However, only ifthe sanction is evidently and grossly <strong>di</strong>sproportionate in comparison w<strong>it</strong>hthe prov<strong>ed</strong> rule violation and if <strong>it</strong> is consider<strong>ed</strong> as a violation of fundamentaljustice and fairness, would the Panel regard such a sanction as abusive and,thus, contrary to mandatory Swiss law.2. Are the Rules of the WADC which Differ Substantially from the FIFAAnti-Doping Rules Compatible w<strong>it</strong>h Swiss law?144 The material <strong>di</strong>fferences between the WADC and the FIFA Anti-DopingRules have been identifi<strong>ed</strong> in para. 121. These <strong>di</strong>screpancies have to be____________________94Art. 28.2 Swiss Civil Code.95Art. 163.3 CO.96BK-Riemer, art. 70 N 223.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 237measur<strong>ed</strong> against the standard as defin<strong>ed</strong> in para. 142 above. 972.1 Discrepancy Relating to the Determination of the Sanction in Caseof a First Offense 98145 The Panel reminds the applicants that both, the WADC and the FIFAAnti-Doping Rules have adopt<strong>ed</strong> a concept of a minimum and a maximumpenalty for first time violations. The question is only whether that minimumshall be six months or one year. Both sets of rules provide further thatw<strong>it</strong>hin that framework the in<strong>di</strong>vidual sanction shall be establish<strong>ed</strong> bydetermining the degree of fault, i.e. the departure of the athlete from theutmost care-standard.146 Taking the above principles into consideration, the WADC would onlybe consider<strong>ed</strong> to be violating mandatory Swiss law if the followingcircumstances would be consider<strong>ed</strong> to be an excessive punishment for afirst-time violation of the anti-doping rules:147 (i) An athlete who demonstrates that he or she satisfies the “nosignificant fault” test will be sanction<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h no less than one year ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y148 (ii) An athlete who does not demonstrate that he or she satisfies the“no significant fault” test will be sanction<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h no less than two years’ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y.149 To determine whether such sanctions are excessive, the misconductmust be compar<strong>ed</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h the sanction, thereby taking into account not onlythe overall purpose of the sanction, but also <strong>it</strong>s specific effects.150 The ultimate goal of the WADC is to protect all athletes’ fundamentalright to participate in doping-free sport and, thus, promote health, fairnessand equal<strong>it</strong>y for athletes worldwide. This amb<strong>it</strong>ious goal is to be reach<strong>ed</strong>through harmoniz<strong>ed</strong>, coor<strong>di</strong>nat<strong>ed</strong> and effective anti-doping programs at theinternational and national level w<strong>it</strong>h regard to detection, deterrence andprevention of doping. 99 It is common ground of all signatories of the WADCthat these goals require tough and relentless action. To prosecute and punishdoping offenders is an important element of the fight against doping. Theremust be an effective deterrent against the use of prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substances ormethods. There is no doubt that the two years’ suspension as a standardprovid<strong>ed</strong> by the WADC is capable of serve as an effective deterrent. Certainf<strong>ed</strong>erations and most notably many athletes’ representatives have request<strong>ed</strong>even tougher sanctions.____________________97Exclu<strong>di</strong>ng para. 121 (5), as art. 4 WADC does not belong to the provisions which the WADCdesignates as “articles […] which must be incorporat<strong>ed</strong> into the rules of each Anti-DopingOrganization w<strong>it</strong>hout any substantive changes” (cf. para. 14 and footnote 14).98Cf. para. 121 (1), (2), (3) and (4).99Cf. p. 1 of the WADC.
238 Giurisprudenza Internazionale151 The two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y is also accept<strong>ed</strong> as appropriate and necessarysanction in the vast major<strong>it</strong>y of sports organizations. Any shorter ineligibil<strong>it</strong>yperiod would inev<strong>it</strong>ably r<strong>ed</strong>uce the deterrent effect of a doping sanction an<strong>di</strong>ncrease the risk that athletes would become less careful w<strong>it</strong>h regard toprohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substances and methods. This overall goal is in the pr<strong>ed</strong>ominantinterest of all athletes and their au<strong>di</strong>ence and justifies the consequence thatthe person who has violat<strong>ed</strong> the rules will suffer substantial sanction. Thespecific interests in the coor<strong>di</strong>nation and harmonization of the efforts againstdoping and the principle of equal treatment also justify that the same antidoping-rulesand the same sanctions apply to all athletes, irrespective of theparticular sport that they practice. The Panel finds therefore that the twoyears’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y for doping offenses where the athlete may not demonstrate“no significant fault or negligence” is not excessive, and does not violatemandatory Swiss law.152 The Panel is well aware that a two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y may const<strong>it</strong>ute avery harsh punishment for an athlete. Such a sanction may affect not onlythe player but also his team. It may even drive the player out of a team, an<strong>di</strong>t may lead to a substantial loss of income. On the other hand, one must notforget that the player has a real choice not to violate the anti-doping rules,and will avoid these harsh consequences if he or she complies w<strong>it</strong>h therequir<strong>ed</strong> standard of care. It is the cheater who is punish<strong>ed</strong> not the one whoplays by the rules. The Panel shares the view of the WADA and mostinternational f<strong>ed</strong>erations that <strong>it</strong> is the two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y only whichconst<strong>it</strong>utes a cre<strong>di</strong>ble deterrent against doping.153 Although <strong>it</strong> is true that especially the economic consequences of twoyears’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y for a professional football player may be <strong>di</strong>fferent fromthose which would affect an amateur athlete, the emotional effect of beingbarr<strong>ed</strong> from sports compet<strong>it</strong>ions for two years is the same. Furthermore,there are other professional sports where a two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y hascomparable impacts, such as professional tennis, track and field or cycling.These f<strong>ed</strong>erations have adopt<strong>ed</strong> the WADC in <strong>it</strong>s present form and haveobviously not consider<strong>ed</strong> the financial consequences of a two years’ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y as const<strong>it</strong>uting an excessive punishment. On the contrary, thePanel has conclud<strong>ed</strong> that <strong>it</strong> would be grossly unfair if an athlete would receive“less severe treatment” which allow<strong>ed</strong> him to return to the lucrativeprofessional sport earlier, just because he had previously earn<strong>ed</strong> a high salary.To sum up, the Panel finds that the economic consequences do not justify todeviate from the standard sanction.154 This conclusion is support<strong>ed</strong> by the fact that under the WADC, the
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 239standard sanction of two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y is subject to r<strong>ed</strong>uction if theplayer can demonstrate “no significant fault or negligence”. Appli<strong>ed</strong> to thein<strong>di</strong>vidual case, this is in full compliance w<strong>it</strong>h the principle of proportional<strong>it</strong>y.155 There remains the question of whether Swiss law requires a lowerminimum sanction, i.e. six months instead of one-year ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y. So far asthe Panel is aware, there is no in<strong>di</strong>cation in Swiss jurisprudence that wouldsupport an argu-ment that a minimum sanction of one year in the case of “nosignificant fault or negligence” would violate mandatory Swiss law whereasa minimum of six months as provid<strong>ed</strong> by art. 62.1 FIFA DC would not. Bycontrast, the Panel has conclud<strong>ed</strong> that a six months’ minimum ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y isdefin<strong>it</strong>ely not a deterrent against the use of prohib<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> substances or methods,particularly since this minimum eligibil<strong>it</strong>y period is not explic<strong>it</strong>ly link<strong>ed</strong> to“no significant fault or negligence” by the athlete. In the light of theseconclusions, there is no ne<strong>ed</strong> to consider whether a further m<strong>it</strong>igation of theminimum sanction by a probationary sanction is requir<strong>ed</strong> by Swiss law.156 Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to the wor<strong>di</strong>ng of the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules, the sixmonths ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y period is to be impos<strong>ed</strong> for the minimum offense, namely,a violation of the anti-doping rules w<strong>it</strong>hout any fault at all. This is probablynot in line w<strong>it</strong>h the Swiss law. The strict application of the fault principleaccor<strong>di</strong>ng to Swiss law excludes the impos<strong>it</strong>ion of any sanction on an athletewho has comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> no fault.157 To summarize, the Panel considers that the principle of proportional<strong>it</strong>yas referr<strong>ed</strong> to by FIFA requires the sanctioning body not only to evaluate thein<strong>di</strong>vidual misconduct and the impact on the sanction on the athlete, butalso to take the overall goal and the ne<strong>ed</strong> for an uniform and harmoniz<strong>ed</strong>concept in the fight against doping into account.158 Accor<strong>di</strong>ngly, the Panel holds that mandatory Swiss law ne<strong>it</strong>her requiresthe impos<strong>it</strong>ion of a probationary sanction nor the r<strong>ed</strong>uction of the minimumsanction from one year to six month ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y in cases of no significantfault. Nor does mandatory Swiss law require the impos<strong>it</strong>ion of a less severesanction than two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y if the athlete cannot demonstrate thathe or she bears “no significant fault or negligence”.2.2 The Substantial Assistance Provision 100159 Art. 10.5.3 of the WADC provides for a r<strong>ed</strong>uction of not less thanone-half of the minimum period otherwise applicable, if the athlete providessubstantial assistance which results in <strong>di</strong>scovering or establishing an antidopingrule violation by another person (substantial assistance provision).The question may arise whether the “otherwise applicable minimum period”____________________100Cf. para. 121 (6).
240 Giurisprudenza Internazionalerefers to the two year standard sanction accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 10.2 WADC or tothe minimum sanction of one year accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 10.5.2 WADC.Unfortunately, the WADC does not give a clear solution in this regard.However, the Panel does not have to answer this question, since the FIFAAnti-Doping Rules do not contain a substantial assistance-provision at all.160 The idea of a substantial assistance-provision, like the relat<strong>ed</strong> pleabargaining, has no tra<strong>di</strong>tion in Swiss law. It is instead a common law-concept.However, there is no provision in Swiss law which would prohib<strong>it</strong> such aprovision. The Swiss F<strong>ed</strong>-eral Tribunal has explic<strong>it</strong>ly allow<strong>ed</strong> a sentencingtribunal to take into account the substantial assistance given by a criminaloffender w<strong>it</strong>hin the framework of art. 63 of the Swiss Criminal Code. 101 Afortiori, the Panel has no reservations to apply the substantial assistanceprovisionin the context of <strong>di</strong>sciplinary sanctions.2.3 Second Offense 102161 Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 10.6.1 of the WADC, an offense may be consider<strong>ed</strong>as a second offense only if <strong>it</strong> was comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> after the offender has receiv<strong>ed</strong>notice of the first offense, or after the anti-doping organization has made areasonable attempt to give notice of the first offense. The interval betweenthe commission of a first and the commission of a second offense is notexplic<strong>it</strong>ly lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong>. Art. of the 17 WADC, which provides a general lim<strong>it</strong>ationperiod of eight years, is not applicable, 103 w<strong>it</strong>h the effect that the time framein which a relevant second offense can take place is unlim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong>.162 Assuming that the WADC does not lim<strong>it</strong> the time frame, a secondoffense could theoretically be comm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> 10 or 15 years after the first offense,although the first sentence has been fully serv<strong>ed</strong>. Such an interpretation raisessubstantial doubts about <strong>it</strong>s compliance w<strong>it</strong>h Swiss law. Art. 27 Swiss CivilCode 104 declares an excessive comm<strong>it</strong>ment, which may e.g., be caus<strong>ed</strong> bythe length of the interval defining a second offense, null and void. The SwissCivil Code does not provide a timeframe for (non-) excessive comm<strong>it</strong>ments,thus a court decides due to the circumstances of the in<strong>di</strong>vidual case whethera comm<strong>it</strong>ment is excessive in duration or intens<strong>it</strong>y. 105 Prec<strong>ed</strong>ents in dopingmatters do not exist. As a general rule, an unlim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> duration of a legal____________________101Netzle, Die Kronzeugenregelung im World Anti-Doping Code (WADC), in: Jusletter February20, 2006, para. 30 refers to the so call<strong>ed</strong> “Nachtatverhalten”.102Cf. para. 121 (7).103Cf. the Comment to art. 17.104Art. 27 Swiss Civil Code reads as follows: “Excessive comm<strong>it</strong>ment:[…](2) No person can alienate his personal liberty nor impose any restrictions on his own enjoymentthereof which are contrary to law and moral<strong>it</strong>y.”105Swiss F<strong>ed</strong>eral Supreme Court 114 II 159, 161 etseq.; BSK-Hueguenin, art. 27 N 15.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 241comm<strong>it</strong>ment is more than cr<strong>it</strong>ical. 106163 The Panel is not bound to the Comment’s interpretation, as explain<strong>ed</strong>above. 107 The wor<strong>di</strong>ng of art. 17 WADC does not exclude <strong>it</strong>s application todefine a second offense. In reverse, this provision may be consult<strong>ed</strong> to lim<strong>it</strong>the timeframe that defines the second offense. This understan<strong>di</strong>ng wouldmost probably be in compliance w<strong>it</strong>h Swiss law, as the timeframe is lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong>to eight years.164 Consequently, this Panel is of the view that an unlim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> period for thefin<strong>di</strong>ng of a second offense is most likely a violation of mandatory Swisslaw. If the Panel had to determine the relevant period, <strong>it</strong> would tend towardsa solution that would adopt the lim<strong>it</strong>ation period prescrib<strong>ed</strong> in art. 17 of theWADC and lim<strong>it</strong> the time period in which a second offense could be takeninto account to eight years. The Panel has no reason to believe that a timeperiod of eight years would be excessive. Thus, FIFA is not forc<strong>ed</strong> bymandatory Swiss law to lim<strong>it</strong> the relevant time period to two years only.2.4 No Information Right of the WADA 108165 The FIFA Anti-Doping Rules do not provide an information right infavor of WADA. WADA may, thus, face a practical problem in exercising <strong>it</strong>sright of appeal against decisions by FIFA sanctioning bo<strong>di</strong>es. Swiss law doesnot require FIFA to w<strong>it</strong>hhold information from WADA nor to provide for aninformation right of WADA.166 It is not w<strong>it</strong>hin in the Panel’s author<strong>it</strong>y to examine whether underSwiss law, the WADA might enforce <strong>it</strong>s information rights as a con<strong>di</strong>tion toexercise <strong>it</strong>s appeals rights. The Applicants may be well advis<strong>ed</strong> to design aprocess to safeguard the flow of relevant information to the WADA.3. Conclusion167 The WADC and the FIFA DC are in compliance w<strong>it</strong>h Swiss law. 109There are no mandatory provisions of Swiss law that require FIFA to deviatefrom the WADC w<strong>it</strong>h the only exception of the unlim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong> period to determinea second offense. Other <strong>di</strong>fferences between the WADC and FIFA Anti-Doping Rules cannot be justifi<strong>ed</strong> by mandatory Swiss law.***____________________106Swiss F<strong>ed</strong>eral Supreme Court 93 II 290, 300; 114 11 159; Gauch/Schluep/Schmid/Rey (cf.footnote 74), N664.107Cf. para. 28.108Cf. para. 121 (8).109By signing the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in <strong>Sport</strong> on June 26, 2003, Sw<strong>it</strong>zerlandrecognis<strong>ed</strong> the WADC. The UNESCO International Convention against Doping in <strong>Sport</strong> enablingthe UNESCO member states to align their domestic legislation w<strong>it</strong>h the WADC is support<strong>ed</strong> bySw<strong>it</strong>zerland and in process of ratification.
242 Giurisprudenza InternazionaleIV. ADVISORY OPINIONA. Answers to the Questions of FIFA, Subm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> by the CAS President1. Question sec. 1 para. 1: “En „ratifiant” le Code Mon<strong>di</strong>al Antidopage(C.M.A.) avec la réserve „qu’il so<strong>it</strong> tenu compte des spécific<strong>it</strong>és du footballet des principes généraux du dro<strong>it</strong>”, la FIFA s’est-elle réservé le dro<strong>it</strong> deprévoir dans son „Code <strong>di</strong>sciplinaire”, des sanctions inférieures à cellesprévues par le<strong>di</strong>t Code?” (transla-tion : By «ratifying» the World Anti-DopingCode [WADC] w<strong>it</strong>h the reservation that there should be «taken into accountfactors specific to football and generally recognis<strong>ed</strong> principles of law», <strong>di</strong>dFIFA preserve <strong>it</strong>s right to provide in <strong>it</strong>s «Disciplinary Code» less severesanctions than those provid<strong>ed</strong> by the WADC?)168 Answer: To date, FIFA has not “ratifi<strong>ed</strong>” or implement<strong>ed</strong> the WADC,but has adopt<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>s own Anti-Doping Rules which are not fully consistentw<strong>it</strong>h the WADC. By signing the Declaration of May 21, 2004, FIFA expresse<strong>di</strong>ts intention to live up to the spir<strong>it</strong> of the WADC, and in<strong>di</strong>cat<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>suncon<strong>di</strong>tional support for the fight against doping and <strong>it</strong>s respect for theWADC. The Declaration is not enforceable. It does not contain anyreservations w<strong>it</strong>h regard to the specific<strong>it</strong>ies of football.2. Question sec. 1 para. 2: “Ou cette “ratification” rend-t-ellejuri<strong>di</strong>quement inopérante les <strong>di</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ions du “Code <strong>di</strong>sciplinaire” auxquellesse subst<strong>it</strong>uent celles du C.M.A.?” (translation: Or does this «ratification»make legally ineffective the provisions of the «Disciplinary Code» whichsubst<strong>it</strong>ute for those of the WADC?)169 Answer: To date, FIFA has not “ratifi<strong>ed</strong>” or implement<strong>ed</strong> the WADC,but has adopt<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>s own Anti-Doping Rules which are not fully consistentw<strong>it</strong>h the WADC. As an independent association govern<strong>ed</strong> by Swiss law,FIFA has the power to establish, w<strong>it</strong>hin the lim<strong>it</strong>s of mandatory Swiss law,such rules and regulations as <strong>it</strong> deems appropriate. As long as FIFA has notformally implement<strong>ed</strong> the WADC into <strong>it</strong>s regulatory body, the const<strong>it</strong>uentsof FIFA are bound only by the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules, but not by theWADC.170 Still, FIFA is a recogniz<strong>ed</strong> International F<strong>ed</strong>eration under Rule 26 ofthe Olympic Charter. Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to Rule 26 para. 2 of the Olympic Charter,FIFA is oblig<strong>ed</strong> to implement the WADC. The WADC is not self-executory.If an IF does not implement the WADC, sanctions may be impos<strong>ed</strong> accor<strong>di</strong>ngto Rule 23 of the Olympic Charter.3. Question sec. 2: “L’organe compétent de la FIFA a-t-il la facultéd’infliger une sanction inférieure à la sanction minimale prévue par le C.M.A.en tenant compte des circonstances de la cause et notamment du degré de
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 243culpabil<strong>it</strong>é de la personne incriminée?” (translation: Does the competentbody of FIFA have the power to impose a sanction lower than the minimumsanction provid<strong>ed</strong> by the WADC, taking into account the circumstances ofthe case and in particular the degree of fault of the person concern<strong>ed</strong>?)171 Answer: FIFA has validly adopt<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>s own Anti-Doping Rules whichare not fully consistent w<strong>it</strong>h the WADC. As an association govern<strong>ed</strong> bySwiss law, FIFA is free, w<strong>it</strong>hin the lim<strong>it</strong>s of mandatory Swiss law, to determinesuch sanctions on anti-doping violations as <strong>it</strong> deems appropriate. This includesFIFA’s competence to establish lower minimum sanctions than provid<strong>ed</strong> bythe WADC. The competent sanctioning bo<strong>di</strong>es of FIFA are oblig<strong>ed</strong> to applythe Anti-Doping Rules of FIFA only and may not take recourse to the WADCalternatively.4. Question sec. 3 para. 1: “L’organe compétent de la FIFA est-il tenu derespecter les prescriptions du C.M.A., même dans l’hypothèse où ellesseraient en contra<strong>di</strong>ction avec les principes généraux du dro<strong>it</strong> applicablesen Suisse et le dro<strong>it</strong> suisse lui-même?” (translation: Shall the competentbody of FIFA comply w<strong>it</strong>h the provisions of the WADC, even on theassumption that they would be in contra<strong>di</strong>ction to the general principles oflaw applicable in Sw<strong>it</strong>zerland and to Swiss law <strong>it</strong>self ?)172 Answer: FIFA has validly adopt<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>s own Anti-Doping Rules whichare not fully consistent w<strong>it</strong>h the WADC. As an association govern<strong>ed</strong> bySwiss law, FIFA is free, w<strong>it</strong>hin the lim<strong>it</strong>s of mandatory Swiss law, to determinesuch sanctions on anti-doping violations <strong>it</strong> deems appropriate.5. Question sec. 3 para. 2: “Ou au contraire le<strong>di</strong>t organe de la FIFA do<strong>it</strong>ilobligatoirement tenir compte de ces principes et du dro<strong>it</strong> suisse dans sadémarche?” (translation : Or, on the contrary, is the said FIFA body oblig<strong>ed</strong>to take these principles and Swiss law into account?)173 Answer: FIFA is subject to Swiss law and, therefore, bound to complyw<strong>it</strong>h mandatory Swiss law inclu<strong>di</strong>ng recogniz<strong>ed</strong> general principles of law.The same applies to the sanctioning bo<strong>di</strong>es of FIFA. However, mandatorySwiss law does not require FIFA to draft <strong>it</strong>s Anti-Doping Rules as <strong>it</strong> <strong>di</strong>d.6. Question sec. 4 para. 1: “D’une façon générale, la sanction minimaleprévue par le C.M.A. s’impose-t-elle à l’organe compétent de la FIFA poursanctionner un contrevenant au C.M.A.?” (translation : As a general rule, isthe minimum sanction provid<strong>ed</strong> by the WADC mandatory to the competentbody of FIFA sanctioning a person breaching the WADC ?)174 Answer: FIFA has validly adopt<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>s own Anti-Doping Rules whichare not fully consistent w<strong>it</strong>h the WADC. As an association govern<strong>ed</strong> bySwiss law, FIFA is free, w<strong>it</strong>hin the lim<strong>it</strong>s of mandatory Swiss law, to determine
244 Giurisprudenza Internazionalesuch sanctions on anti-doping violations <strong>it</strong> deems appropriate and providefor lower minimum sanctions than those suggest<strong>ed</strong> by the WADC.7. Question sec. 4 para. 2: “Ou le<strong>di</strong>t organe a-t-il la faculté de prononcerune sanction inférieure à la sanction minimale du C.M.A.?” (translation : Ordoes the said body have the power to impose a sanction lower than theminimum sanction of the WADC ?)175 Answer: FIFA has validly adopt<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>s own Anti-Doping Rules whichare not fully consistent w<strong>it</strong>h the WADC. As an association govern<strong>ed</strong> bySwiss law, FIFA is free, w<strong>it</strong>hin the lim<strong>it</strong>s of mandatory Swiss law, to determinesuch sanctions on anti-doping violations <strong>it</strong> deems appropriate and apply lowerminimum sanctions than those provid<strong>ed</strong> by the WADC.B. Answers to the Questions of the WADA, Subm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> by the CASPresident1. Question sec I.: “En l’état actuel des relations juri<strong>di</strong>ques entre WADAet la FIFA, et en tenant dûment compte des documents fournis à la fois parWADA et par la FIFA, cette dernière est-elle tenue de mettre son CodeDisciplinaire en conform<strong>it</strong>é avec le Code Mon<strong>di</strong>al Antidopage?” (translation:In the current state of the legal relations between WADA and FIFA, and onthe basis of the documents provid<strong>ed</strong> by both WADA and FIFA, is the latteroblig<strong>ed</strong> to amend the Disciplinary Code in accordance w<strong>it</strong>h the World Anti-Doping Code?)176 Answer: The documents subm<strong>it</strong>t<strong>ed</strong> by the WADA or FIFA do notconst<strong>it</strong>ute a formal acceptance or implementation of the WADC by FIFA.As an association govern<strong>ed</strong> by Swiss law, FIFA is free, w<strong>it</strong>hin the lim<strong>it</strong>s ofmandatory Swiss law, to adopt such anti-doping rules <strong>it</strong> deems appropriate,whether or not such own rules comply w<strong>it</strong>h the WADC.177 However, FIFA is a recogniz<strong>ed</strong> International F<strong>ed</strong>eration under Rule26 of the Olympic Charter. Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to Rule 26 para. 2 of the OlympicCharter, FIFA is oblig<strong>ed</strong> to implement the WADC. Not implementing theWADC does not render the WADC applicable by subst<strong>it</strong>ution, but may leadto sanctions as provid<strong>ed</strong> in Rule 23 of the Olympic Charter.178 By signing the Declaration of May 21, 2004, FIFA express<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>sintention to live up to the spir<strong>it</strong> of the WADC and in<strong>di</strong>cat<strong>ed</strong> <strong>it</strong>s uncon<strong>di</strong>tionalsupport for the fight against doping and <strong>it</strong>s respect for the WADC. To date,this intention has not yet been completely satisfi<strong>ed</strong>.2. Question sec. II.: “Si la réponse à la question «I.» est oui:” (translation: If the answer to question « I. » is yes:)179 The answer is yes w<strong>it</strong>h regard to FIFA’s obligations under Rule 26 ofthe Olympic Charter. The Panel deems <strong>it</strong> therefore appropriate to addressthe following questions.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 2452.1 Question sec. II.1.: “Is the FIFA Disciplinary Code, in particular thesanctions set forth in Article 62, in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the World Anti-DopingCode, in particular Article 10?”180 Answer: The sanctions provid<strong>ed</strong> by the FIFA Disciplinary Code forfirst time offenses are <strong>di</strong>fferent from those provid<strong>ed</strong> by the WADC in threerespects:(1) The penalty framework of art. 62.1 FIFA DC consists of a minimumineli-gibil<strong>it</strong>y period of six months and a maximum of two years whereas art.10.2 WADC establishes a standard penalty of two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y.(2) The WADC standard penalty of two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y may be r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong>up to one year only if the athlete demonstrates that he or she bears “nosignificant fault or negligence” whereas the penalty framework of FIFA isavailable for all degrees of fault. Under the WADC, any violation where theathlete does not demonstrate “no significant fault or negligence” will lead toa compulsory two years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y: this sanction is expect<strong>ed</strong> to apply underthe FIFA Anti-doping Rules only in severe cases.(3) The FIFA DC does not allow the complete elimination of the suspensionin case of “no fault or negligence” as provid<strong>ed</strong> by art. 10.5.1 WADC.Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art. 62.1 FIFA DC, the sanctioning body is bound in any casewhere an anti-doping rule violation has been establish<strong>ed</strong> to apply “asuspension of no less than six months”, even in cases where the athlete maydemonstrate that he or she bears “no fault or negligence”.2.2 Question sec. M.2.: “Is in<strong>di</strong>vidual case management, as set forth inthe FIFA Disciplinary Code, in particular in Article 62.1, in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>hthe World Anti-Doping Code, in particular Article 10.5?”181 Answer: The FIFA Anti-Doping Rules and the WADC are notsubstantially <strong>di</strong>fferent w<strong>it</strong>h regard to the method to determine the sanctionfor a specific anti-doping rule violation. Both require the sanctioning bodyto measure the in<strong>di</strong>vidual conduct of the athlete against a heavy duty of careand to assess the ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y period w<strong>it</strong>hin a given penalty timeframe inproportion to the degree of fault, thereby taking all relevant circumstancesinto account.182 The substantial <strong>di</strong>fference lies, however, in the fact that the penaltyframework between one and two years’ eligibil<strong>it</strong>y of the WADC is availableonly if the athlete can demonstrate “no significant fault or negligence” whereasFIFA’s penalty framework between six months and two years of art. 62.1FIFA DC applies not only to “no significant fault or negligence”-s<strong>it</strong>uationsbut to all degrees of fault. This may lead to <strong>di</strong>fferent sanctions under thesame circumstances.
246 Giurisprudenza Internazionale2.3 Question sec. N.3.: “Does the FIFA Disciplinary Code, in particularArticles 62 and 63, provide for sanctions for other violations of the antidopingrules in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the World Anti-Doping Code, in particularArticle 10 of the Code?”183 Answer: The WADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules (which includesalso the FIFA RDC) identify the same facts as violations of the anti-dopingrules. In particular, the violations which are characteriz<strong>ed</strong> by art. 10.4 WADCas “Other Anti-Doping Violations” are consider<strong>ed</strong> as anti-doping ruleviolations also under the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules, as well.184 However, the sanctions for such other anti-doping rule violations are<strong>di</strong>fferent:185 The <strong>di</strong>fferences concern the minimum sanction for a first offense ofrefusing or failing to sample collection, where the FIFA DC provides for aminimum of six months and the WADC imposes the standard sanction oftwo years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y, subject to r<strong>ed</strong>uction in cases of no significant fault ornegligence (see also Answer to Question sec. II.2), and the minimum sanctionfor a first offense relat<strong>ed</strong> to tampering, where the FIFA DC provides for aminimum of six months and the WADC imposes the standard sanction oftwo years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>hout the possibil<strong>it</strong>y of r<strong>ed</strong>uction in cases of nosignificant fault or negligence.186 The Panel notes on the other hand that the WADC allows for a r<strong>ed</strong>uctionof the four years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y in case of “no significant fault or negligence”whereas the four years’ ineligibil<strong>it</strong>y is a strict minimum sanction under theFIFA DC.187 The Panel recognizes that there is also a <strong>di</strong>fferent wor<strong>di</strong>ng regar<strong>di</strong>ngthe sanctions on whereabout violations. However, the Panel expects thatthis <strong>di</strong>fference will not result in a substantial <strong>di</strong>screpancy in the sanctioningof whereabout violators.2.4 Question sec. M.4.: “Is Article 33 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code inconform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the World Anti-Doping Code as regards sanctions?”188 Answer: Art. 33 of the FIFA DC allows the sanctioning body to partiallysuspend the sanction if the duration of such sanction does not exce<strong>ed</strong> sixmonths. As a result, the minimum sanction provid<strong>ed</strong> by the FIFA DC of sixmonths’ may be further r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> to three months, subject to probation. Thisadds substantially to the <strong>di</strong>fference to the minimum sanctions provid<strong>ed</strong> bythe WADC. Art. 33 FIFA DC is therefore not in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the WADC.2.5 Question sec. M.5.: “Are the provisions of the FIFA Disciplinary Codew<strong>it</strong>h regard to the sanctions against teams, in particular Article 63, inconform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the provisions Article 11 of the World Anti-Doping Code?”
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA 247189 Answer: Both rules provide for the possibil<strong>it</strong>y of <strong>di</strong>squalification iftwo or more athletes have violat<strong>ed</strong> the anti-doping rules. Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to art.IV.3 FIFA RDC, there are always two players per team to be test<strong>ed</strong> whereasthe WADC does not contain such a requirement. On the other hand, theWADC requires target testing if more than one athletes has been notifi<strong>ed</strong> ofa possible anti-doping rule violation whereas there is no such rule in theFIFA Anti-Doping Rules. Both rules have still the same goal, namely tosanction the entire team if more than one team member has violat<strong>ed</strong> the antidopingregulations. The Panel finds therefore that art. 63 FIFA DC is notmaterially <strong>di</strong>fferent from art. 11 WADC.2.6 Question sec. II.6.:”Are the provisions of the FIFA Disciplinary Codew<strong>it</strong>h regard to Therapeutic Use Exemptions, in particular Article 61, inconform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the provisions of the World Anti-Doping Code regar<strong>di</strong>ngTUEs, in particular Articles 4.4. and 13.3 of the Code?”190 Answer: The provisions of the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules (i.e. the FIFADC and Annex B to the FIFA DRC) regar<strong>di</strong>ng the requirements for the grantof a TUE and the respective proc<strong>ed</strong>ures are in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h the WADC.The Panel has, however, identifi<strong>ed</strong> a material <strong>di</strong>fference in that the FIFAAnti-Doping Rules do not provide for a right of WADA to review the grantingor refusal of a TUE. Although the Panel is not aware of the practical relevanceof this right, <strong>it</strong> considers such right of review to be material and importantfor the harmonization of the fight against doping.2.7 Question sec. II.7.: “Does Articles 60.5 of the FIFA Statues offer thepossibil<strong>it</strong>y of an appeal to the CAS in conform<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h Articles 13.1 and 13.2of the World Anti-Doping Code?”191 Answer: Art. 60.5 of the FIFA Statutes offer the possibil<strong>it</strong>y of an appealto CAS basically to the same parties as art. 13.2.3 WADC, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng WADA.The IOC is not among the parties ent<strong>it</strong>l<strong>ed</strong> to appeal FIFA-decisions to CAS.This exception is not significant because under the WADC the IOC’sproc<strong>ed</strong>ural rights are restrict<strong>ed</strong> to matters pertinent to the Olympic Games.By participating in the Olympic Games, FIFA and the players will anywaysubm<strong>it</strong> to the specific rules of the Olympic Games.192 There is however a significant <strong>di</strong>fference since the FIFA Anti-DopingRules do not explic<strong>it</strong>ly provide for an information right of WADA w<strong>it</strong>h regardto anti-doping decisions of FIFA bo<strong>di</strong>es. The Panel finds that w<strong>it</strong>hout suchan information right, the appeal right of the WADA remains of lim<strong>it</strong><strong>ed</strong>effectiveness.193 Art. 60.3 of the FIFA Statutes excludes suspensions up to three monthsfrom appeals to CAS. Such suspensions may well apply in cases where a
248 Giurisprudenza Internazionaleprobationary sanction has been grant<strong>ed</strong>. The most lenient sanctions underthe FIFA Anti-Doping Rules (i.e. three months suspension to be serv<strong>ed</strong> plusthree months suspension subject to probation) will therefore not be subjectto any ju<strong>di</strong>cial review.3. Question sec. III.: “Si la réponse à la question «I.» est non, quellesconséquences devraient être tirées de cette réponse?” (translation: If theanswer to question « I. » is no, which are the consequences of that answer?)[…]Done in Lausanne, 21 April 2006THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORTHans Nater President of the PanelCorinne Schmidhauser Arb<strong>it</strong>ratorStephan Netzle Arb<strong>it</strong>ratorMichael Tuchschmid Ad hoc clerkV. AnnexComparative Table of the WADC and the FIFA Anti-Doping Rules