09/06/<strong>2008</strong> 20:34:53 Folha: 2SER3010R200612940200326992200510427200522139<strong>2008</strong>183272004182491134720071750470001504200327083200419121200625621200315124200522142200614725200728050200522143199510116<strong>2008</strong>18328200223965200418270200613087200612929200418129200613088200417963200327205200715739200717745200522144200420484200613089200717583200213175200613091200613092200418762200728281200522128199825084200419270200522130200715741200420617807161159520061309320071574220071574370045706200715744<strong>2008</strong>18333UNIVERSIDADE COMUNITÁRIA REGIONAL DE CHAPECÓ - UNOCHAPECÓADRIANA EVANGELISTA DE MOURAADRIANA FATIMA DO PRADOADRIANA FERRARI ROSAADRIANA GUTBIERADRIANA KUSIAKADRIANA MAGGIADRIANA MARIA MONTEMEZZOADRIANA MILAN BONADIMANADRIANA PAIMADRIANA PARISADRIANA PIMENTEL DOS SANTOSADRIANA RODRIGUES VIDALADRIANA SCHLEICHERADRIANA SUTILADRIANA TAPPAROADRIANA TERESINHA CAMARGO DE AQUINOADRIANA THOMASADRIANA WUNDERVALDADRIANE BIASI RECHADRIANE JAQUELINE BECKER SCHAFERADRIANE LURDES MULLERADRIANE MANICAADRIANE MORONAADRIANE REBONATTOADRIANE SCATOLIN HERTZADRIANI CRISTIANI STANGAADRIANO ADELCINO ANSELMIADRIANO ANDRE KELLERADRIANO ANTONIO TONELLOADRIANO BEDINADRIANO BUSSOLAROADRIANO DOMINGOS JURIATTIADRIANO ECCOADRIANO FRITZEN SCHEIDADRIANO JOSE RAMBO SOAVEADRIANO KLEINADRIANO LUIS BALBINOTADRIANO LUIZ SARETTOADRIANO MASOADRIANO MASSOLINEADRIANO NEUMAR NARDIADRIANO POSSANADRIANO ROSINAADRIANO SCHAIDTADRIANO SCHMIDTADRIANO SELAADRIANO TORMEMADRIANO VIEIRAADRIELE LEIDENSADRIELE PASINADRIELI BENTZADRIELI LINHARES<strong>Alunos</strong> <strong>aptos</strong> a <strong>votar</strong> - Eleição <strong>DCE</strong><strong>Junho</strong> <strong>de</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
American Political Science Review Vol. 99, No. 4“structure” and its “character”; the former consists ofwhat is essential for the culture’s survival, whereas thelatter inclu<strong>de</strong>s particular norms and practices. A culture’sstructure is “more fundamental” than a culture’scharacter because it is the former that provi<strong>de</strong>s the“context of choice” for its members, and so it is the culture’sstructure, not its particular character or norms,that is <strong>de</strong>fen<strong>de</strong>d in his account (1989, 167–68, 172; 1995,104–105). But this distinction between structure andcontent is itself the product of political struggle. Whatis seen as essential for the survival of a culture such thatit is <strong>de</strong>emed a part of the “cultural structure” is itselfthe result of a community’s struggles over meaningand power. For instance, the lea<strong>de</strong>rs of a minority culturalcommunity might argue, against Kymlicka, thattheir cultural community continues to exist preciselybecause its members continue particular patriarchalpractices, and that if such practices are not protected,then the culture will become extinct. In other words,they might argue that their right to cultural contextis a right to particular cultural content (Margalit andHalbertal 1994, 504–505). Kymlicka himself suggests a<strong>de</strong>finition of culture that is more than the mere existenceof a cultural community and inclu<strong>de</strong>s someparticular content. In his early work, he <strong>de</strong>fines culturein terms of history, language, and traditions, andin his later work, he <strong>de</strong>fines “societal culture” as “ameaningful way of life” based on a common languageand common values (1989, 135, 165; 1995, 76). Thismove of <strong>de</strong>fining culture in terms of particular contentopens the door to its own set of challenges, not least<strong>de</strong>termining which practices are in<strong>de</strong>ed central for themaintenance of a culture, and how the centrality ofa particular practice should be weighed against otherconcerns. But these are not matters that can be resolvedonce and for all by <strong>de</strong>finitional fiat; it is a matter to be<strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d through the process of collective discussionand meaning-making.In addition, Kymlicka’s view of culture un<strong>de</strong>rstatesthe extent to which cultures are interactive and thusoverlooks the ways in which the content of a cultureand its change are shaped by other cultures and notonly by internal conflict. Cultures have long interactedand mutually influenced one another through relationsof tra<strong>de</strong>, warfare, and conquest, and cultures do notcorrespond in any neat way to national or societalboundaries. When it comes to minority cultures withinone state, the influence of the dominant culture isun<strong>de</strong>niable. Jeremy Waldron has emphasized the interactivenature of cultures in criticizing Kymlicka’sstrategy of cultural preservation, which he views tobe based on a flawed un<strong>de</strong>rstanding of the nature ofcultures: “To preserve acultureisoftentotakeafavored‘snapshot’ of it, and insist that this version mustpersist at all costs, in its <strong>de</strong>fined purity, irrespective ofthe surrounding social, economic, and political circumstances.”But such a strategy of preservation would“cripple the mechanisms of adaptation and compromise,”which is an “inherent feature” of every culture(Waldron 1995, 109–110). In his reply to Waldron,Kymlicka does recognize the fact of cultural interchange;in<strong>de</strong>ed, one might argue that Kymlicka thinksthere is too much interchange from majority to minoritycultures such that the latter are threatened withextinction. But he has focused primarily on one typeof interaction—–Western states’ strategy of “benign neglect”toward minority cultures—–in or<strong>de</strong>r to exposewhat he <strong>de</strong>ems to be the incoherence and injustice ofthis strategy. In practice, however, indifference is notthe only or even primary mo<strong>de</strong> of interaction betweenWestern states and minority groups. The dominantculture’s own unjust norms have shaped the practiceof cultural accommodation, leading in some cases tothe accommodation of unjust practices within minoritycultures. In addition, although we might agree withKymlicka’s (1995, 105) claim against Waldron that acknowledgingcultural interchange does not mean acceptingthat there are no distinct cultures, we need torecognize more than Kymlicka does that the distinctnessof a culture <strong>de</strong>pends in part on the nature and extentof cultural interchange. Rather than assuming thatcultures are distinct and largely endogenously <strong>de</strong>velopedwholes, we should instead be open to questioningto what extent they are.Several recent contributions to the <strong>de</strong>bate on multiculturalismhave emphasized that cultural interactions—–throughthe global economy, transnational communicationsnetworks, and migrations of people acrossbor<strong>de</strong>rs—–are an important source of cultural change.As Bhikhu Parekh (2000, 163) puts it, “[C]ulturesare not the achievements of the relevant communitiesalone but also of others, who provi<strong>de</strong> their context,shape some of their beliefs and practices, and remaintheir points of reference. In this sense almost all culturesare multiculturally constituted.” Both Benhabib(2002, 7) and Deveaux (2003, 790) have emphasized thepermeability of boundaries between cultures. Shachar(2001, 2, 88–92, 117–45) stresses that groups are alwaysreacting to the effects of state power, and her “jointgovernance” approach, which calls for ongoing interactionbetween the state and minority groups in thegovernance of different spheres of minority group life,clearly recognizes that minority and majority culturesare interconnected. 2Although these theorists have stressed that culturalinteractions are an important source of cultural constructionand change, they stop short of examininghow cultural interactions have shaped cultural i<strong>de</strong>ntitiesand conflicts. A social constructivist view of2 Shachar <strong>de</strong>fines “i<strong>de</strong>ntity groups” or “nomoi communities” as“religiously <strong>de</strong>fined groups of people” who “share a comprehensiveand distinguishable worldview that extends to creating a lawfor the community.” I<strong>de</strong>ntity groups are said to share “a uniquehistory and collective memory, a distinct culture, a set of socialnorms, customs, and traditions” (Shachar 2001, 2, n. 5). But this<strong>de</strong>finition seems to “recapitulate the mistakes of group essentialism”(Benhabib 2002, 123) because members of cultural groups may notshare a comprehensive worldview and because cultures are not endogenously<strong>de</strong>veloped wholes as Shachar’s <strong>de</strong>finition of “i<strong>de</strong>ntitygroups” seems to suggest. Although Shachar <strong>de</strong>velops institutional<strong>de</strong>signs aimed at promoting interaction between states and minoritygroups in the governance of minority affairs, her analysis does notexamine the role that states have played in shaping and reinforcingminority group i<strong>de</strong>ntities and practices at the center of culturalconflicts.475
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