Summaries / Resúmenes - Studia Moralia

Summaries / Resúmenes - Studia Moralia Summaries / Resúmenes - Studia Moralia

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44 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONEunified theology in the Summa, may well be debated. 6Nevertheless, my point was that he carried out his endeavorwithin a unified framework. This, I argue, enabled him to solvesome important questions. This is not to say that all were or aresatisfied with the solutions he provided or that those solutionsare beyond debate.I do not refer to St. Thomas as the “patron saint” of a unifiedvision, with the implication that we ought to adopt his viewof the matter. I can only repeat that I did not propose that wereturn to an uncritical acceptance of St. Thomas. Even if St.Thomas did provide a unified vision, which is my own opinion,I stated clearly in the original article that this unity was not afixed vision and was something we must still seek to discover(p. 104). That does not strike me as advocating a simplisticreturn to the past.Nor do I attribute, anachronistically, a more recent conceptof “moral theology” to St. Thomas. There is nothing in my textwhich indicates that I am treating St. Thomas as a “moral theologian”in the contemporary sense of this phrase. I am simplyproposing that he sought to construct a unified, theologicalvision within which he could encompass and sustain a body ofmoral teaching. 7 For the purposes of my argument we couldrefer to this as “practical theology,” as does Boyle. 8 In any case,I did not use the term “moral theology” in respect to St.Thomas.Nevertheless, Selling seems determined to try to read myarticle as some kind of apologetic for a “return” to St. Thomas.He then puts forwards arguments to show that this would notbe a viable project. Of course, the period within which St.6Cf. Wilhelm Metz, Die Architektonik der Summa Theologiae desThomas von Aquin: Zur Gesamtsicht des thomaschen Gedankens (Hamburg:Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998) 35-37.7Leonard E. Boyle, The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of SaintThomas (Toronto, Ontario: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1982).On the unified plan of the Summa see, Brian V. Johnstone, “The Debate onthe Structure of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas: fromChenu (1939) to Metz (1998),” in Paul Van Geest, Harm Goris, Carlo Leget,eds., Aquinas as Authority (Leuven: Peeters, 2002) 187-200.8Boyle, The Setting , 16.

THE SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION IN CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY 45Thomas worked was “pre-scientific” in terms of our contemporarynotion of science and Thomas himself does not take intoaccount contemporary science. (How could he?) This wouldpreclude an uncritical return to his way of thinking. But, if Imay repeat, I did not claim that we should simply return to thethought of St. Thomas. That is why I am proposing a newapproach based on the notion of gift.Much less do I present thirteenth century society as amodel that is somehow normative for all subsequent centuries.Thus, Selling’s account of the deficiencies of this society isbeside the point of the argument. I am not trying to resurrectWalsh’s thesis of “The Thirteenth, Greatest of Centuries.”With regard to St. Thomas’s treatment of “moral theology”as we call it, it is true, of course, that the II-II of the Summadeals with the virtues. But the whole point of the Summa wasto try to integrate the virtues into a unified theological vision.This vision of reality had an important bearing on St. Thomas’sresolution of certain problems.Consider the particular question mentioned by Selling,namely, the overriding of the claims to private property in considerationof the deprivation of a poor person. 9 The justificationfor this overriding rests not merely on the consideration of therequirements of virtue as opposed to a narrow interpretation ofthe seventh commandment, but on the reason why the goods ofthe earth were created. They were created for the good of all:that is their “nature” as created realities. Thus, when the goodsof creation are distributed so that some are unduly, that isunreasonably, deprived, the claims of private property yield tothe basic purpose of those created goods.The order of creation is not a “restriction.” It is the foundationof the justification of private property, which is legitimatedby reason as the best way, in historical circumstances, of makingsure that the goods of creation serve the good of all.“Restriction” would be better applied to a certain interpretationof law in moral theology. I would question the word “attitude”as used here by my critic. It is too loose a word to capture whatSt. Thomas meant by virtue. For St. Thomas, the notion of9S. Th. II-II, 66, 7.

THE SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION IN CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY 45Thomas worked was “pre-scientific” in terms of our contemporarynotion of science and Thomas himself does not take intoaccount contemporary science. (How could he?) This wouldpreclude an uncritical return to his way of thinking. But, if Imay repeat, I did not claim that we should simply return to thethought of St. Thomas. That is why I am proposing a newapproach based on the notion of gift.Much less do I present thirteenth century society as amodel that is somehow normative for all subsequent centuries.Thus, Selling’s account of the deficiencies of this society isbeside the point of the argument. I am not trying to resurrectWalsh’s thesis of “The Thirteenth, Greatest of Centuries.”With regard to St. Thomas’s treatment of “moral theology”as we call it, it is true, of course, that the II-II of the Summadeals with the virtues. But the whole point of the Summa wasto try to integrate the virtues into a unified theological vision.This vision of reality had an important bearing on St. Thomas’sresolution of certain problems.Consider the particular question mentioned by Selling,namely, the overriding of the claims to private property in considerationof the deprivation of a poor person. 9 The justificationfor this overriding rests not merely on the consideration of therequirements of virtue as opposed to a narrow interpretation ofthe seventh commandment, but on the reason why the goods ofthe earth were created. They were created for the good of all:that is their “nature” as created realities. Thus, when the goodsof creation are distributed so that some are unduly, that isunreasonably, deprived, the claims of private property yield tothe basic purpose of those created goods.The order of creation is not a “restriction.” It is the foundationof the justification of private property, which is legitimatedby reason as the best way, in historical circumstances, of makingsure that the goods of creation serve the good of all.“Restriction” would be better applied to a certain interpretationof law in moral theology. I would question the word “attitude”as used here by my critic. It is too loose a word to capture whatSt. Thomas meant by virtue. For St. Thomas, the notion of9S. Th. II-II, 66, 7.

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