Summaries / Resúmenes - Studia Moralia
Summaries / Resúmenes - Studia Moralia Summaries / Resúmenes - Studia Moralia
328 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONEcommon good.” Such ordering is the work of political reasoning.Such views could find a certain resonance in the papal “naturallaw” doctrine explained above.However, the notion of “justice” which is not clearlyexplained by Weigel, appears to be a kind of contractual justicebetween states by which they agree not to infringe each other’sintegrity and rights. He explains further that it may happen,regrettably, that a certain party violently breaks the accordbetween nations and attacks others. In such a case, the samepolitical reason, governed by justice, requires that such violencebe repelled, where necessary by counter violence, that is by war.What is to be restored, in this retributive notion of justice, is thecontractual order, which had hitherto prevailed.The reason which guides such a war, then, may, and shouldbe an extension of that reason which governs the normal activityof states. War then is an extension of politics by other means,as the German philosopher of war von Clausewitz famously stated.We find this Clausewitzian position explicitly re-affirmed byWeigel:Thus the just war tradition is best understood as a sustainedand disciplined intellectual attempt to relate the morally legitimateuse of proportionate and discriminate military force to morallyworthy political ends. In this sense, the just war tradition sharesClausewitz’s view of the relationship between war and politics:unless war is an extension of politics, it is simply wickedness. 41This means, according to Weigel’s interpretation, that, if waris not governed by a “higher” norm than that of pure tactics orforce, that is by reason, it cannot be regarded as falling withinthe range of morally acceptable activities.However, I would add, it does not follow that a war ruled bypolitical reason is morally right or good. It depends, of course,whether the political reason itself is internally coherent, andwhether it is directed by correct moral principles. We are toldthat political reason ought be governed by “morally, worthy41Ibid.
POPE JOHN PAUL II AND THE WAR IN IRAQ 329political ends.” But what are these ends? The restoration of anarrowly conceived contractual justice? The protection and promotionof the “American experiment”? Whose ends are they andwho is to judge their moral worthiness? These questions are notanswered by Weigel.Not much help is to be found from the much cited phrasefrom Clausewitz, quoted here by Weigel, that war is an extensionof politics by other means. 42 There is much dispute as to whatprecisely he meant; his concern seems to have been to describethe behaviour of armies at war in order to determine what hasworked and what has not. 43 He does not argue that they shouldbe subject to ethical rules. Indeed, if one attempted to introduceextraneous ethical rules, this would seem to distort Clausewitz’swhole scheme. In fact, questions of morality simply do not enterinto his thinking. When he does mention “moral forces” what hemeans is what we call “morale,” as in the statement “the moraleof the soldiers was high.” 44The purely formal notion of politics, together with the equallyformal notion of “justice, in Weigel’s presentation, makes itpossible to insert, by way of content, the politics of a particularnation into the concept of “political reason” and the politicalends of that nation into “morally worthy political ends.” ThePope’s position, on the other hand, is formulated within a universalframework of a vision of solidarity in peace. Within thisvision, on the level of politics, moral reason requires first of allthat all should seek peace through collaboration in the realizationof that common project aimed at human unity in solidarity.In keeping with this, conflicts should be resolved by recourse toa universal authority, not by the claims of a particular state, noteven where that state claims that its politics are governed by (itsown, particular) conception of justice.Weigel’s account, therefore, seems to belong to that, unfor-42Carl VON CLAUSWITZ, Vom Krieg, (Bonn: Fred. Dümmlers Verlag, 1980)990 (Book 8, chap. 6, B). Morality is clearly not an issue.43See, Carl VON CLAUSEWITZ, Vom Krieg (Bonn: Fred. Dümmlers Verlag,1980) 192 (Book 1, Ch. 1, no. 3).44His phrase is “Die moralischen Hauptpotenzen.” Clausewitz, VomKrieg, 359 (Book 3, chap. 4).
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328 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONEcommon good.” Such ordering is the work of political reasoning.Such views could find a certain resonance in the papal “naturallaw” doctrine explained above.However, the notion of “justice” which is not clearlyexplained by Weigel, appears to be a kind of contractual justicebetween states by which they agree not to infringe each other’sintegrity and rights. He explains further that it may happen,regrettably, that a certain party violently breaks the accordbetween nations and attacks others. In such a case, the samepolitical reason, governed by justice, requires that such violencebe repelled, where necessary by counter violence, that is by war.What is to be restored, in this retributive notion of justice, is thecontractual order, which had hitherto prevailed.The reason which guides such a war, then, may, and shouldbe an extension of that reason which governs the normal activityof states. War then is an extension of politics by other means,as the German philosopher of war von Clausewitz famously stated.We find this Clausewitzian position explicitly re-affirmed byWeigel:Thus the just war tradition is best understood as a sustainedand disciplined intellectual attempt to relate the morally legitimateuse of proportionate and discriminate military force to morallyworthy political ends. In this sense, the just war tradition sharesClausewitz’s view of the relationship between war and politics:unless war is an extension of politics, it is simply wickedness. 41This means, according to Weigel’s interpretation, that, if waris not governed by a “higher” norm than that of pure tactics orforce, that is by reason, it cannot be regarded as falling withinthe range of morally acceptable activities.However, I would add, it does not follow that a war ruled bypolitical reason is morally right or good. It depends, of course,whether the political reason itself is internally coherent, andwhether it is directed by correct moral principles. We are toldthat political reason ought be governed by “morally, worthy41Ibid.