Summaries / Resúmenes - Studia Moralia

322 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONEticular way of envisioning the “idea” or “good” of peace, as Ihave tried to explain above, is the fundamental source of themoral intensity of this concern. The idea of peace, nourished byreligious faith, ought to be realized, as far as possible, in humanhistory. It is, I suggest, the notion of the idea or “form” of peace,which ought to be realized in the “matter” of human history,which legitimates and requires the intervention of the Church inhuman affairs. Further, in the view taken by the Pope, a recognitionof the absolute priority of grace over human effort doesnot call for a lessening, but rather for an intensification of sucheffort.Inconsistency? Peace and Just war?On the face of it, there does seem to be a paradox where atradition which gives clear priority to the imperative of peace, atthe same time, does not repudiate the “just war” doctrine. Theproblem becomes more acute, when we take into account PopeJohn Paul’s categoric rejection of war. While the Pope has notdefended the just war doctrine, neither has he repudiated it andadopted pacifism. The problem is, how can one repudiate war,while not affirming pacifism? Is it possible to articulate meaningfullyanother position?This should be phrased somewhat more precisely, sincecommentators (at least those in Europe) who expound theCatholic position now consistently use the term “just defence”rather than “just war.” However, this does not solve the problem,since the acceptance of just defence, when it includes as anextreme, last resort, armed defence, is still difficult to reconcilewith a categoric rejection of all war. The Holy See recognized, inconnection with the violence in the former Yugoslavia, that governmentsand the international community have a right andduty to “disarm the aggressor.” 32 But this will surely normallyentail the use of militarized violence, as it did in that situation.To refuse to call this “war” may well seem a semantic diversion32Origins, 22:43 (1993) 735.