Summaries / Resúmenes - Studia Moralia
Summaries / Resúmenes - Studia Moralia Summaries / Resúmenes - Studia Moralia
318 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONELondon (1915) Russia, Britain and France came to an understandingwith Italy to exclude the Pope from peace negotiations.The Papacy was effectively side-lined. However, this situationchanged and by 1978, 116 nations had diplomats accredited tothe Holy See. In recent years the international activity of theHoly See has expanded further. At present 177 nations maintaindiplomatic relations with it.This tradition has, therefore, a vision of peace, an historicalproject aiming at the construction and protection of structuresto protect peace, a positive imperative to work for peace and aconcrete practice in favour of peace. Clearly, there is a fundamentalcontinuity between the peace pastorate of his predecessorsand that of Pope John Paul II.Public Statements by the PopesPapal statements on war have generally had a “prophetic”quality, that is to say, they have been cast in the form of generaldenunciations of war and violence, and calls for peace. The concretestrategy has generally not been to apply to specific nationalpolicies or acts of war, the ethical criteria embodied in thedoctrine of the “just war.” Thus, for example, the Popes, in thepast, have generally not attempted to make public judgments asto which side has the “just cause” or even as to which concreteacts of war constitute a violation of the principles of proportionalityor discrimination. There were clearly cases where theseprinciples were violated, such as “carpet bombing” by both sidesin World War II. But the Popes did not usually specifically condemnparticular instances or particular sides.However, in May 1915, Pope Benedict XV, declared the conflictwhich had just begun, and which the Italian governmentwas contemplating joining, an “orrenda carneficina,” (horriblecarnage), and in August 1917, published a famous note advocatingdisarmament, in which he declared the war an “inutilestrage” (a useless massacre). 24 Pius XII has often been criticized24Martin CLARK, Storia dell’Italia contemporanea, 1871-1999 (Milan:Bompiani, 1999) 270.
POPE JOHN PAUL II AND THE WAR IN IRAQ 319for not explicitly condemning specific acts of belligerent nationsin the Second World War, (and also of not speaking out againstthe Nazi killing of Jews). This is a complex question. If he spokeout against one side, he would forego his position of neutralityand with that his ability to mediate on behalf of peace. Oneinterpretation, by the historian Owen Chadwick, is that the Popebelieved that he did make explicit condemnations of atrocities.But his statements were cast in a diplomatic style which was soobscure that the meaning was not obvious to most people, evenif it was clear to the Nazis themselves. 25 Pius XII did condemnexplicitly the killing of innocents in reprisals. 26 Paul VI, in hismessage for the World Day of Peace, Jan 1 st . 1976, was muchmore forthright. He referred to “the butchery of untold magnitude,as at Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.” 27 So it cannot be saidthat specific categorical condemnations were never delivered byPopes.Nevertheless, there was a general policy of avoiding suchcondemnations during the period of conflict. The reason appearsto have been the conviction that such specific condemnationswould alienate particular countries and make the reconcilingactivity of the official Church difficult or impossible. The requirementof “pastoral” reconciliation was given precedence over thedenouncing of wrongs. It is in this respect, in particular, that Isuggest we can see a change in the policy of John Paul II. He hasspoken with a degree of frankness that left little doubt that hewas opposed to the war that was about to begin in Iraq in 2002.The implications of this change require further analysis.An Historical EvaluationHow has the papal peace pastorate fared in the test of history?We may apply some tests, first to the engagement for peace25Owen CHADWICK, Britain and the Vatican during the Second World War(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 219.26JOBLIN, L’église, 285.27www.vatican/holy-father/paul_vi/messages/peace/documents/hf_pvi_mes19751018_ix-world-day-for-peace_en.html.
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318 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONELondon (1915) Russia, Britain and France came to an understandingwith Italy to exclude the Pope from peace negotiations.The Papacy was effectively side-lined. However, this situationchanged and by 1978, 116 nations had diplomats accredited tothe Holy See. In recent years the international activity of theHoly See has expanded further. At present 177 nations maintaindiplomatic relations with it.This tradition has, therefore, a vision of peace, an historicalproject aiming at the construction and protection of structuresto protect peace, a positive imperative to work for peace and aconcrete practice in favour of peace. Clearly, there is a fundamentalcontinuity between the peace pastorate of his predecessorsand that of Pope John Paul II.Public Statements by the PopesPapal statements on war have generally had a “prophetic”quality, that is to say, they have been cast in the form of generaldenunciations of war and violence, and calls for peace. The concretestrategy has generally not been to apply to specific nationalpolicies or acts of war, the ethical criteria embodied in thedoctrine of the “just war.” Thus, for example, the Popes, in thepast, have generally not attempted to make public judgments asto which side has the “just cause” or even as to which concreteacts of war constitute a violation of the principles of proportionalityor discrimination. There were clearly cases where theseprinciples were violated, such as “carpet bombing” by both sidesin World War II. But the Popes did not usually specifically condemnparticular instances or particular sides.However, in May 1915, Pope Benedict XV, declared the conflictwhich had just begun, and which the Italian governmentwas contemplating joining, an “orrenda carneficina,” (horriblecarnage), and in August 1917, published a famous note advocatingdisarmament, in which he declared the war an “inutilestrage” (a useless massacre). 24 Pius XII has often been criticized24Martin CLARK, Storia dell’Italia contemporanea, 1871-1999 (Milan:Bompiani, 1999) 270.
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