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FOGLI DI LAVORO per il Diritto internazionale 3 ... - Giurisprudenza

FOGLI DI LAVORO per il Diritto internazionale 3 ... - Giurisprudenza

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<strong>FOGLI</strong> <strong>DI</strong> <strong>LAVORO</strong> <strong>per</strong> <strong>il</strong> <strong>Diritto</strong> <strong>internazionale</strong> 3/2008<br />

substantive content and effects of the right – and not only its<br />

legal classification – under the domestic law of the State<br />

concerned (see König, cited above, § 89).<br />

45. The Court observes that the proceedings at issue<br />

concerned the question whether the remaining applicant<br />

associations could prevent the Government from using certain<br />

terms when publicly referring to their religious groups.<br />

According to the domestic courts' case-law, such a right could<br />

be derived from the right to freedom of religion, as enshrined in<br />

Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 of the Basic Law. It remains to be<br />

determined whether this right could be regarded as a “civ<strong>il</strong>”<br />

right within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.<br />

46. The Court considers that possible negative consequences<br />

for the applicant associations' financial situation did not form the<br />

direct subject matter of the present proceedings. However, wh<strong>il</strong>e<br />

the Court has found on many occasions that the pecuniary nature<br />

of an asserted right brought a dispute within the ambit of Article<br />

6 § 1 (see, for example, Salesi v. Italy, judgment of 26 February<br />

1993, Series A no. 257-E, § 19, and Woś v. Poland,<br />

no. 22860/02, §§ 76, 77, ECHR 2006-...), this does not mean<br />

that disputes of a non-pecuniary nature necessar<strong>il</strong>y fall outside<br />

the scope of that provision. In this context, the Court draws<br />

attention to its established case-law as to the “civ<strong>il</strong>” character of<br />

the right to enjoy a good reputation (see Helmers v. Sweden,<br />

judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-A, p. 14, § 27,<br />

and Tolstoy M<strong>il</strong>oslavsky v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 13<br />

July 1995, Series A no. 316-B, § 58). Furthermore, the Court<br />

has recently held that the right to use state-owned premises for<br />

religious ceremonies had to be considered as directly decisive<br />

for the respective applicant's “civ<strong>il</strong> rights and obligations”, thus<br />

leading to the applicab<strong>il</strong>ity of Article 6 (see Tserkva Sela<br />

Sosulivka v. Ukraine, no. 37878/02, § 42, 28 February 2008).<br />

47. The Court does not find it necessary to determine if the<br />

right to freedom of religion generally has to be considered as a<br />

“civ<strong>il</strong> right” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. Having regard<br />

to the particular circumstances of the case, in particular its<br />

relation to the applicant associations' good reputation, the Court<br />

considers that the dispute at issue concerned a “civ<strong>il</strong> right”<br />

within the meaning of Article 6 § 1.<br />

189

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