La minaccia NBCR - Istituto Affari Internazionali

imported from Israel. Contaminated grapefruits were discovered in Naples and Rome and the
government took all grapefruits off the market. The “poison” turned out to be a substance
which causes colour tainting but is not harmful.” 19 .
Ancora alcune recenti iniziative in ambito NATO testimoniano la realtà della minaccia
NBCR.
E’ di aprile 2007 la notizia di un prototipo di dispositivo portatile sviluppato con la
Federazione Russa e testato con successo per la rilevazione e la localizzazione di sostanze
esplosive, R, N e C 20 .
Meno recente, ma di interessante lettura, la relazione su “Rilevazione chimica, biologica,
radiologica e nucleare” adottata dalla Commissione per la dimensione civile della sicurezza
presso l’Assemblea parlamentare della NATO. Questa ultima descrive molto bene una
questione rilevante della minaccia terroristica NBCR: ovvero il problema della sostenibilità
delle emergenze generate anche da falsi allarmi: “(…) as information and capabilities
become progressively more widespread via the Internet etc., it is becoming increasingly
difficult for the authorities to distinguish between a mere hoax and the real thing. This raises
a number of difficult questions about the appropriate responses to such threats, which not
only have the potential to be extremely disruptive to normal, day-to-day activities, but also
may provide individual terrorists and terrorist groups with a potent instrument against
society, even in the absence of a real capability or willingness to carry out an actual attack. In
any event, an attack using unconventional weapons would certainly cause serious economic
and social disruption. According to a recent study by the Organisation of Economic Co-
19 Other Group attacked Food or Water Supply target (Apr. 25, 1988, Italy), RAND - MIPT Terrorism
knowledge base, http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=5540
20 “(…) Named SENNA, the device could have a number of different applications. These include improving
transport security by on-site analysis of suspicious containers or luggage; protecting critical infrastructure or
public buildings by on-site detection at facilities; and promoting better security for troops deployed in crisismanagement
operations by allowing on-site detection in the field. (…) The device is based on nanosecond
neutron analysis technology and includes a compact neutron generator and an array of four gamma-ray and
three neutron detectors. It is a multi-sensor – this means that when the neutron generator is off, it can detect and
identify radioactive and unshielded nuclear materials, and when the neutron generator is on, it becomes a
detector of explosives and chemical substances, as well as of heavily shielded nuclear materials. Due to the high
penetrating ability of neutrons and high-energy gamma rays, the device can “see” through barriers and detect
threat materials located inside unattended passenger luggage, transport containers, etc. The device is position
sensitive – not only can it detect a hazardous material, it can also show its location inside the inspected object.”,
NATO-Russia project for detecting “dirty bombs”, 30 May 2007, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/05may/e0530b.html
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