143 Anno XVIII - 2008 - Marina Militare

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In 2004, the pace of the structural transformation
initiated in the mid-1990s was further incremented
in the revised version of the NDPO. The new
document, which was approved in December as
NDPG, 52 sought to address Japan’s responses
to the systemic changes brought about by the
9/11 attacks to the United States, North Korea’s
political brinkmanship and nuclear policies, and
China’s double-digit investments in military
modernisation. Compared to its predecessor,
the NDPG emphasised more the existence
of conventional sources of military concern
in the region. Nonetheless, it maintained an
overall balanced approach calling for a military
capable of protecting the country’s territory,
whilst enhancing the nation’s international
status and responsibilities. As a result, the
Japanese military needed to continue its path
from a ‘deterrent effect-oriented’ to a ‘response
capability-oriented’ posture, in order to become
a fully ‘multi-functional flexible defence force’
(MFFDF). 53 The JSDF were to complete the
recalibration of their capabilities to maximise
the prevention or the emergence of threats to the
nation and in case of emergencies, to determine
‘where and how’ to employ of the country’s
military might ‘to maximum effect’. 54 In March
2006, the upgrading of the Joint Staff Office
(JSO) as the coordinating body for operations
like BMD, defence of off-shore islands and
disaster relief, set a new milestone in that
direction. 55
For the JMSDF, the new national doctrine
rewarded the ongoing transformation from a
Cold war ‘sea denial’ force to one engaged at
various degrees in defence against maritime
power projection exploiting sea control (to
defend Japan’s maritime space), expeditionary
capabilities (to contribute to international
security) and ‘good order at sea’ (to contribute
to the safety of maritime activities). 56 In
his official instructions, CMS Admiral Furusho
Koichi (2003-2005) formalised the navy’s
evolving characteristics introducing the concept
of ‘flexibility’ 57 as one of the core tenets of the
navy’s own doctrine. Each task had not to be
blindly carried out along pre-established lines
or plans as was the case during the Cold War;
rather, from the commanders deployed at sea
to the strategic planners in Tokyo, all service
members had to learn to diversify their responses
to meet ‘the unexpected’. 58 The fleet also was to
be reorganised, with the basic tactical formation
shifting from the ASW flotilla (7 DDs + 1
DDH) to the Escort Division (3 DDs + 1 DDH,
or 1 DDG). Compared to the 1995 NDPO, the
relative slowdown of the force downsizing
penned by the NDPG, equal to about 9% of
its surface fleet (from approx. 50 to 47 units)
and a little less than 12% of the air arm (from
approx. 170 to approx. 150 aircraft), partly
gauged such a diversification and widening of
the navy’s commitments. 59 The JMSDF had to
ready itself to deal with conventional threat
(e.g. limited missile attack, illegal occupation
of parts of the country, violation of territorial
air and maritime space) as well as more multinational
commitments.
The increase of naval activities in Japan’s
surrounding maritime milieu made the JMSDF
of the new century as strategically important as
ever in the past. Already in 2001, CMS Admiral
Ishikawa Toru (2001-2003) had eloquently
pointed out that ‘for the JMSDF, the dawn of the
21 st century paved the way to an “era of [hard]
work”. 60 In one step, learning the lessons of the
77-year long history of the IJN, the JMSDF has
passed from a period of “infancy” 61 to one of
“maturity”’. 62 The 2004 NDPG had indirectly
taken note of the Admiral’s words expanding
the undertaking of the JMSDF. In accordance
with the tradition developed in the Cold War, the
leaders of the force responded to the challenge
by opting for a balanced force which could use
the versatility of its assets to maintain at the
same time an effective defensive system against
the ambitions of regional competitors and the
necessary lifting capability to comply to the
expeditionary nature of the nation’s growing
international commitment.
conclusIons
At a more close scrutiny, the history of Japan’s
post-war defence and naval policy strongly
suggests that it is misleading to categorise
the recent transformation of the archipelago’s
military posture as one eyeing power projection
capabilities. Since the second half of the 1970s,
the JMSDF has constantly endeavoured to
improve the quality of the platforms of its
fleet and the basic rationale underpinning its
procurement policies was one dominated by
issues of sea lanes defence (up to a 1,000 nautical
miles form Japanese shores in the 1980s) and of
sea control within the national maritime space.
More recently, the modernisation process and
naval activities of the People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) and North Korea’s missile
capabilities made of the potential applications in
fleet air defence and BMD of the latest Kongo
(DDG-173) and Atago (DDG-177) class of
Aegis-equipped destroyers a clear example of
the JMSDF’s state-of-the-art defensive means
to maintain sea control in the waters of the
western Pacific. Against this backdrop, with the
new Hyuga class of helicopter carriers, which
can carry a combination of up to 10 SH-60K
Helicopters and MCH-101 for ASW and Search
and Rescue and is equipped with one 16-cell
Mk41 vertical launch system – VLS -, 2 Phalanx
multi-barrel CIWS and Aegis-type air defence