143 Anno XVIII - 2008 - Marina Militare

framework in mind that in those years research
studies were conducted for the design of a
16,000-ton light helicopter carrier capable of
8 to 14 HSS-2 helicopters. 39 It is also in this
period, that options were examined for a 7,000-
8,000-ton landing ship based on the model of
the Italian San Marco class. 40
natIonal strategy beyond
the cold war: achIevIng
exPedItIonary flexIbIlIty
The sudden end of the bipolar confrontation and
the implosion of the Soviet Union left Japanese
political circles – as much as those in other nations
of the Western bloc – rather disoriented on the
courses of action to guarantee security. 41 The
failure to provide some form of military support
in the first Gulf War prompted many to question
the merits of Japan’s mercantilist foreign policy.
Tokyo – they argued – had to address some of its
constitutional constraints in order to be able to
participate with a degree of military commitment
in operations under international mandate,
‘normalising’ its behaviour as a state actor.
In February 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa
Morihiro (1993-1994) took the initiative and
commissioned a report with the intent of
reassessing the country’s defence capability.
Once released, the recommendations of the socalled
Higuchi committee constituted the basis
for the drafting of the new NDPO, 42 which was
eventually adopted in November 1995. 43 Both
documents recognised in cooperative patterns
of security the likely leitmotifs of future
international relations and suggested a defence
agenda aiming at engaging in a more ‘active
and constructive security policy’. 44 Attention
to international stability was certainly the main
intellectual novelty of the document but it was
not the only priority Japanese strategic planners
sought to address. In Northeast Asia, the power
vacuum created by the disappearance of one
of the superpowers had made the situation
more volatile, with unresolved and potentially
escalating tensions in the Korean Peninsula and
across the Taiwanese strait. Equally testing for
regional stability were the actions of state actors
such as China seemingly profiting from the post-
Cold War transition to achieve greater influence,
engaging to that end in a comprehensive scheme
of economic and military modernisation. 45
The NDPO was drafted seeking to balance
the requirements for a higher international
military profile and those necessary to deal with
closer regional sources of military (and naval)
apprehension. 46 The Japanese armed forces had
to become as a result, ‘streamlined, effective
and flexible’. 47 For the JMSDF the new pos-
ture demanded the enhancement of the service
ability to offer agile and accurate responses,
rebalancing the various components of the
fleet to perform not only ASW duties but to use
seapower to support the nation’s renewed commitment
to the international community. 48 On
the other hand, the document reaffirmed the basic
requirements of the national naval strategy
drawing a line of continuity with the previous
NDPO in that ‘the defence of adjacent seas and
the securing the safety of maritime traffic are
essential in order to secure the foundations of
national survival’; this constituted a ‘matter of
life or death’ whether in peacetime or in cases
of emergency. 49
The inherent flexibility of naval platforms in
pursuing both the international and national
objectives of Japan’s transforming defence
ensured the role of the JMSDF in national defence,
and though it did not prevent a downsizing of
the fleet’s inventory, it did pave the way for
platforms with a strong expeditionary appeal.
In the Pacific, the naval core of Japan’s most
apparent Cold War threat had started depleting
rapidly and whilst China’s expanding ‘scope of
activities in the high seas’ was to be observed
with a keen eye, its force modernisation was
‘expected to gradually proceed at a moderate
rate’. 50 Such considerations were coupled with
other more crucial domestic factors, namely a
period of severe economic recession which had
affected the country since the beginning of the
decade. Compared to the force level established
by the 1976 NDPO, the new document called
for a reduction of approximately 16% of the
surface fleet (from approx. 60 to approx. 50
major vessels) and of almost 23% of the air
component (from approx. 220 to approx.
170 aircraft). 51 The principal addition to the
navy’s evolving inventory was introduced in
1993, when following the first deployments
overseas for UN-led peace support operations,
the JMSDF dusted off the mid-1980s studies
for a larger amphibious unit and used them as
basic design to procure its first landing ship,
Osumi (LST-4001). With its 8,900 tons of
displacement, helicopter flight deck, internal
landing platform dock (LDP) equipped with
landing crafts air cushion (LCAC), the Osumi
soon became an iconic symbol of the JMSDF’s
contribution to Japan’s ambitions as an active
player in international stability. The limited
presence of point-defence systems for selfprotection
emphasised its original vocation as a
delivery platform, but made it also dependant
on the protection of other escort units in the
case of overseas dispatches. In 1998 and 1999,
other two units of the same class were procured
to fulfil the requirements of the new national
official policy.
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