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143 Anno XVIII - 2008 - Marina Militare

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32<br />

A NEw SUN ON THE HORIZON?<br />

THE DAwN OF JAPAN’S<br />

ExPEDITIONARy CAPABILITy<br />

Doctor Alessio PATALANO<br />

LAUghTON NAVAL hISTOry SChOLAr<br />

DEpArTMENT Of WAr STUDIES<br />

KINg’S COLLEgE LONDON<br />

IntroductIon<br />

Thursday 23 August 2007 represented a date<br />

of historical significance for Japan’s post-war<br />

defence policy. In a stirring ceremony held<br />

at the Yokohama shipyards of the IHI Marine<br />

United, the launching of Japan’s long-awaited<br />

first flat-top helicopter-carrying destroyer, JDS<br />

Hyuga (DDH-181), marked the country’s return<br />

in the exclusive club of the world’s top class navies.<br />

1<br />

Far from being an isolated episode, the<br />

procurement of this new class of warships is at<br />

the centre of a major transformation of Japan’s<br />

defence policy, which in turn is symptomatic of<br />

the country’s re-emergence as a more confident<br />

political actor in international security and<br />

military affairs. 2 Indeed, as the largest unit<br />

to join the fleet of the Japan Maritime Self-<br />

Defence Force (JMSDF) since its establishment<br />

in 1954, this new platform together with its<br />

sister-ship planned to enter service in 2011,<br />

have been regarded as one of the most evident<br />

signs of Japan’s Post-Cold War ambitions<br />

to move away from its ‘defensive defence’,<br />

acquiring power projection capabilities. 3 In<br />

some cases, analysts argued that the post-9/11<br />

stepping up of Japan’s military empowerment,<br />

encompassing new capabilities and a widened<br />

spectrum of operations, was indicative of a<br />

rather sinister phenomenon named ‘Heisei<br />

militarization’ (from the name of the current<br />

Emperor and reminiscent of the ‘Showa militarization’<br />

of the 1930s). 4 Japan’s more muscular<br />

military endeavour would be part of a plan<br />

to build-up hard power to address increased<br />

regional security concerns and to expand the<br />

strategic partnership with the United States.<br />

Militarization ‘would not be a reversion to the<br />

old stereotype of Japan as addicted to militarism,<br />

but rather the common and dangerous behaviour<br />

of a normal medium-sized state in a militarized<br />

world’. 5 In this respect, some observers consider<br />

the Japanese military phenomenon as part of a<br />

broader and potentially de-stabilising process<br />

of naval arms race in Asia, headed by China<br />

and India. 6<br />

These assessments detailed to a considerable<br />

degree the various internal and external factors<br />

informing Japan’s domestic political debate<br />

on defence issues, but reserved only limited<br />

attention to the military and strategic rationale<br />

underpinning the acquisition of those enhanced<br />

capabilities. The tendency has been to treat<br />

the introduction of new naval combat systems<br />

as empirical evidence of the renewed political<br />

assertiveness of the past decade and a half<br />

rather than as tools of a national strategy. Thus,<br />

considerations on the size and the assets of the<br />

JMSDF’s fleet contributed to fulfil predictions<br />

on Japan’s pursuit of power projection, leaving

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