numero completo in pdf - EuroStudium

Direttore: Francesco Gui (dir. resp.).
Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
Comitato scientifico: Antonello Biagini, Luigi Cajani, Francesco Dante, Anna Maria
Giraldi, Francesco Gui, Giovanna Motta, Pèter Sarkozy.
Comitato di redazione: Andrea Carteny, Stefano Lariccia, Chiara Lizzi, Enrico Mariutti,
Daniel Pommier Vincelli, Vittoria Saulle, Luca Topi, Giulia Vassallo.
Proprietà: “Sapienza” ‐ Università di Roma.
Sede e luogo di trasmissione: Dipartimento di Storia moderna e contemporanea, P. le
Aldo Moro, 5 ‐ 00185 Roma
tel. 0649913407 – e ‐ mail: eurostudium@eurostudium.eu
Decreto di approvazione e numero di iscrizione: Tribunale di Roma 388/2006 del 17
ottobre 2006
Codice rivista: E195977
Codice ISSN 1973‐9443

Indice della rivista
luglio ‐ settembre 2012, n. 24
MONOGRAFIE E DOCUMENTI
Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
“1474. Richordo di tutti e' beni inmobili”
Un inventario patrimoniale inedito della seconda metà del XV secolo
di Luciano Piffanelli p. 3
La Banca Commerciale Italiana e la politica di espansione all’estero dal
dopoguerra al risanamento dell’istituto (1918-1933)
di Francesca Romana Lenzi p. 31
Il Manifesto di Ventotene: nuove fonti d'archivio
di Giulia Vassallo p. 37
The OSS in the Italian Resistance: A Post Cold War Interpretation
di Claudia Nasini p. 46
RESOCONTI E RECENSIONI
Effie Pedaliu, Britain, Italy and the Origins of the Cold War
di Claudia Nasini p. 83
Stefano Petrungaro, Balcani. Una storia di violenza?
di Alessandra Teichner p. 104
2

Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
“1474. Richordo di tutti eʹ beni inmobili”
Un inventario patrimoniale inedito della seconda metà del XV secolo
di Luciano Piffanelli
Abstract: l’articolo si incentra sulla trascrizione della parte del libro di
ricordanze di Bongianni Gianfigliazzi inerente all’ampio inventario
patrimoniale compilato dal fiorentino nel 1474, presentando in apertura alcune
considerazioni in merito che saranno ampliate in uno studio successivo. Si
fornisce quindi in questa sede l’edizione di una fonte inedita che si delinea
quale base per interessanti analisi di stampo storico ed economico.
Il lavoro che segue è parte di un più articolato studio, prossimamente edito a
stampa 1 , incentrato sulla figura e sul manoscritto di ricordanze 2 di Bongianni
Gianfigliazzi, mercante fiorentino il quale, sfruttando abilmente le opportunità
di ascesa politica concessegli dal mutamento politico occorso nella sua città
alla metà degli anni ’30 del Quattrocento, assurse ai vertici della scena
pubblica di Firenze, incardinata attorno al polo mediceo.
L’inventario qui pubblicato venne compilato dal Gianfigliazzi il primo Agosto
del 1474, pochi mesi dopo che ebbe dettato un suo testamento a ser Nastagio
1 L. PIFFANELLI, Questo libro rosso. Ricordi inediti di Bongianni Gianfigliazzi (1418-1484), da ora
sempre Libro rosso (nelle note che seguono, accanto alle pagine è riportato anche il riferimento alla
cartulazione originale). In merito al Gianfigliazzi e al suo patrimonio fondiario, numerose informazioni
sono inoltre reperibili in ID., Investimento fondiario e sustanze di famiglia nella carriera di Bongianni
Gianfigliazzi. Evoluzione del patrimonio agrario di un gonfaloniere di giustizia tra Cosimo e Lorenzo
de’ Medici, in «Eurostudium 3w », XXIII (2012), pp. 4-39 (da ora sempre Investimento).
2 Il cui originale è conservato in Firenze, Archivio dei Buonuomini di San Martino, Gianfigliazzi,
2.2.0.1 (nel testo sempre Richordanze).
3

d’Amerigo Vespucci, padre del noto esploratore 3 . Negli undici anni intercorsi
tra il 1463 (anno del suo primo incarico politico) e il 1474, il nostro fiorentino
aveva ricoperto numerosissimi uffici 4 , impostando un biunivoco rapporto tra
quelli che potrei definire il suo ‘spazio sociale’ e il suo ‘spazio materiale’. Col
primo intendo la posizione da lui acquisita all’interno di quella civitas in cui il
cittadino agisce conformemente alle regole dettate dalla comunità cui
appartiene; lo ‘spazio sociale’ urbano identificherà quindi la dimensione che
l’individuo riesce a creare per sé all’interno del cosmo civico. Lo ‘spazio
materiale’, in via complementare, è rappresentato dal patrimonio accumulato
dall’individuo, in una trama che, com’è naturale, coinvolge ampiamente
rapporti di causa/effetto tra i due ‘spazi’.
Trattandosi principalmente di edizione di una fonte inedita, non mi
dilungherò in questa sede sui potenziali argomenti che documenti come
quello qui in oggetto possono chiamare in causa 5 ; né è mia intenzione
3
Cfr. Libro rosso, pp. 41-42/c. 17r. Per la paternità di Nastagio Vespucci su Amerigo cfr. Firenze,
Archivio di Stato, Tratte 80 (Libro delle età, II), c. 116r ; Firenze, Archivio dell’Opera del Duomo,
Registri, I, foglio 183; I. LUZZANA CARACI, Amerigo Vespucci, in Nuova Raccolta Colombiana,
XXI (1999), pp. 14-75.
4 Cfr. Investimento, pp. 27-30.
5
L’utilizzo di inventarî di beni si rivela infatti valido supporto per una fornita gamma di argomenti
quali, ad esempio, gli aspetti materiali e/o strutturali degli oggetti elencati (liste di questo tipo, riportanti
stoffe, abiti, accessorî, strumenti per cucire o cucinare si ritrovano spesso anche all’interno delle
Richordanze del Gianfigliazzi, come si può vedere in Libro rosso, pp. 72-74/cc. 49v-50r; cfr. inoltre, ad
es., la tesi dottorale di A. MENEGHIN, The Unglamorous Side of Shopping in Late Medieval Prato and
Florence. The Ricordanze of Taddeo di Chello (1341-1408), and Piero Puro di Francesco da Vicchio
(1397-1465), University of St. Andrews 2011 e EAD, La tavola di un salariato fiorentino nel
quindicesimo secolo, di prossima pubblicazione sull’Archivio Storico Italiano e per la cui lettura inedita
concessami ringrazio l’autrice), indagini patrimoniali intorno ad ospedali e strutture assistenziali (cfr. il
lavoro, non più giovane ma sempre valido per gli importanti contributi contenutivi, La società del
bisogno. Povertà e assistenza nella Toscana medievale, a cura di G. Pinto, Firenze 1989; l’interessante
studio di G. PICCINI, Il banco dell’Ospedale di Santa Maria della Scala e il mercato del denaro nella
Siena del Trecento, Siena 2012; P. BASILE, La proprietà dell’ospedale da un inventario di inizio
Trecento, in L’Ospedale Rodolfo Tanzi di Parma in età medievale, a cura di R. Greci, Bologna 2004,
pp. 179-210 e ivi, EAD., L’ospedale tra testamenti e donazioni, pp. 211-228) considerazioni economiche
(particolarmente interessante, visto il proprietario, è l’inventario di beni di Lorenzo de’ Medici, di cui è
conservata copia in Firenze, Archivio di Stato, Mediceo avanti il Principato, filza CLXV; importante è
poi il lavoro di P. NANNI, Lorenzo agricoltore. Sulla proprietà fondiaria dei Medici nella seconda metà
4

iproporre qui considerazioni da me già altrove esposte. Riprendo solamente
la conclusione per cui, a metà degli anni ’70 del Quattrocento, gli sforzi profusi
dal Gianfigliazzi nei confronti del proprio consolidamento patrimoniale sono
al vertice della loro parabola. A quell’altezza cronologica, Bongianni era stato
già membro degli Otto di Guardia e dei Dieci di Balia, Ufficiale
dell’Abbondanza, del Canale, del Monte e persino Gonfaloniere di Giustizia,
senza contare l’alta onorificenza del cavalierato dello Speron d’oro;
parallelamente, le denunce del 1469 agli Ufficiali del Catasto evidenziano una
felice situazione patrimoniale 6 che, grazie al suo manoscritto di ricordanze,
sappiamo essere ancora in positiva e costante crescita per almeno altri 6 anni,
per poi assestarsi.
Con tali indicazioni, sono indotto a supporre che Bongianni, in quel primo
Agosto 1474, conscio della sua raggiunta posizione politica e resosi conto di
aver cospicuamente irrobustito le proprie sustanze (tra le quali, lo ricordo, nel
Gennaio del 1470 confluì anche il palazzo appartenuto al rubelle Rinaldo
Gianfigliazzi 7 ) avesse voluto stilare un elenco, levare uno bilancio, come avrebbe
altrimenti detto, delle proprietà in suo possesso per avere più chiara la
del Quattrocento, in «Quaderni della Rivista storia dell’agricoltura», II (1992), pp. 1-148; anche nel
caso di Bongianni Gianfigliazzi qui affrontato, inoltre, si può trarre una stima della ricchezza del
possessore, tracciarne la geografia patrimoniale e, ancora, verificarne la trasparenza fiscale nei confronti
del governo centrale), considerazioni sugli ambienti sociali che li producono (cfr. G. CANTINI
GUIDOTTI, Tre inventari di bicchierai toscani tra Cinque e Seicento, Firenze 1983) e a volte persino
sulle intere comunità in cui vengono redatti (qualora si tratti di situazioni non comuni come le zone
alpine, per le quali si veda, ad esempio, B. PÖTTLER, Verlassenschaftsinventare als Quelle zur alpinen
Sachkultur, in «Histoire des Alpes - Storia delle Alpi – Geschichte der Alpen», VII (2002), pp. 253-
266).
6 Cfr. Firenze, Archivio di Stato, Catasto, 917, cc. 160r-163v. Per avere un’idea della migliore posizione
economica di Bongianni in quel momento rispetto ad altri rami del suo lignaggio cfr. Ivi, cc. 79, 134r,
dove sono rispettivamente raccolte le dichiarazioni di Maddalena di Francesco di Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi
e di Agnolo di Antonio Gianfigliazzi.
7 Cfr. Libro rosso, p. 33/c. 12v e infra, p. 6. Su alcuni aspetti di palazzo Gianfigliazzi si veda l’attento
lavoro di B. PREYER, Around and in the Gianfigliazzi Palace in Florence: Developments of the
Lungarno Corsini in the 15th and 16th Centuries, in «Mitteilungen des Kunsthistorischen Institutes in
Florenz», XLVIII (2004), pp. 55‐104.
5

situazione economica in cui si muoveva e poter magari programmare
potenziali investimenti futuri, non necessariamente nel settore agrario:
l’impegno dotale cui avrebbe dovuto eventualmente ottemperare in caso di
nuove nascite rientrava, ad esempio, in questa casistica 8 .
L’inventario del 1474 riprende ed amplia le compilazioni precedentemente
stilate da Bongianni 9 il quale, pensando di annotare puntualmente in quella
porzione del suo libro anche le acquisizioni successive alla data di inizio 10 , con
spirito ottimista predispose per questo suo nuovo elenco di beni un numero di
carte superiore a quello che si rivelò poi necessario: difatti, pur avendo il
Gianfigliazzi proceduto a successive – poche in realtà – acquisizioni 11 , 15 carte
sono interamente lasciate bianche, segno tangibile di una dedizione alla sfera
pubblica ormai quasi esclusiva negli ultimi dieci anni della sua vita, una
dedizione che investiva la sua persona e che si faceva riflesso di una
consolidata e pienamente metabolizzata posizione economico-sociale 12 .
8
E così fu, infatti. Tra il 1473 e il 1478, sua moglie Maddalena non partorì solo nell’anno in cui
Bongianni vergò l’inventario qui in esame; nei restanti casi, diede alla luce, nell’ordine, Cassandra
(p. 56/40v), Oretta (p. 59/c. 42r), Camilla (p. 62/c. 43v), Marietta (pp. 64-65/c. 44v), tutte
convenientemente dotate tra l’Aprile del 1476 e il Maggio del 1479. Cfr. Investimento, p. 39 e Libro
rosso alle pagine indicate tra parentesi.
9
Ivi, pp. 12-13/c. 2v e 20-21/c. 6r (parte del quale è visibile nella Fig.2, infra, p. 20).
10
Come poi fece. Si legge, infatti, a c. 23v: “Seghue beni inmobili”, ad indicare che le registrazioni
contenute in quella sezione vanno considerate parte integrante dell’inventario di beni iniziato a c. 17v.,
seppur redatte successivamente. Cfr. infra, pp. 17, 21 (Fig. 3).
11
23 Marzo 1475: un mulino presso Poggibonsi (pp. 53-56/cc. 23v, 40r); 30 Ottobre 1475: “uno
chanpo” con cui amplia il podere – già in suo possesso – detto “Le Quercie” (p. 57/c. 41v); 22 Gennaio
1478: un podere detto “el Ficho” (p. 54/c. 23v). Cfr. Investimento, pp. 30-31 e Libro rosso alle pagine
indicate tra parentesi.
12 Nella ricerca che sto conducendo attualmente sulla movimentazione economica del Gianfigliazzi, sto
indagando le ulteriori possibili motivazioni di questo assestamento, oltre quella “lavorativa” qui
esposta. I risultati di questa indagine spero potranno essere presto disponibili per il lettore. Le ragioni
professionali, in ogni caso, sembrano ricoprire il ruolo principale nelle cause dell’accomodamento
fondiario segnalato.
6

“Tutti e' beni inmobili” registrati nell’elenco che qui rendo edito, infatti,
confluiranno nella denuncia catastale del 1480 13 , sancendo il definitivo
successo del ramo cui Bongianni apparteneva e garantendo ai suoi successori
un futuro per nulla nell’ombra. I suoi due figli, Gherardo e Jacopo,
rivestiranno infatti importanti ruoli all’interno delle vicende fiorentine
successive alla cacciata di Piero di Lorenzo de’ Medici nel 1494: il primo restò
in città durante l’esperienza savonaroliana mentre suo fratello Jacopo,
inizialmente confinato (ma comunque avvantaggiato dalla presenza di
Gherardo tra le gerarchie politiche), non solo rientrerà in Firenze al momento
della prima restaurazione medicea (che fece séguito alla cacciata di Pier
Soderini nel 1512), ma fu tra i Dodici riformatori che “riscrissero”
l’ordinamento repubblicano il 27 Aprile 1532, dopo il rientro dei Medici
seguìto alla pace bolognese tra Carlo V imperatore e papa Clemente VII 14 .
13 Cfr. Firenze, Archivio di Stato, Catasto, 1009, cc. 160v-162r.
14 A Gherardo Gianfigliazzi sarà dedicato un mio prossimo studio; su Jacopo Gianfigliazzi cfr. V.
ARRIGHI, Jacopo Gianfigliazzi, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, LIV (2000), pp. 361-363.
7

Per quanto riguarda i criteri di edizione adottati nella seguente trascrizione,
ho voluto privilegiare il lettore al fine di una più immediata comprensione del
contenuto del manoscritto. Pertanto, le normalizzazioni apportate sono state
poco invasive e hanno previsto solo i seguenti accorgimenti:
- la divisione in parole;
- la regolarizzazione delle maiuscole e delle minuscole;
- l’uso della punteggiatura moderna, sebbene quasi mai siano stati adoperati
segni oltre la virgola e il punto, e l’introduzione dei segni diacritici;
- il suono palatale /j/ è stato ridotto ad una i ;
- il grafema unico per u e v è stato ricondotto all’uso moderno;
- tutte le abbreviazioni sono state sciolte e, per facilitare la lettura, non vengono
segnalate con parentesi le lettere in origine mancanti;
- le forme del verbo avere mancanti di h etimologica sono state accentate;
- le velari c e g sono state ricondotte, dove necessario, a palatali;
- i casi di geminazione sintagmatica non vengono annullati (a llui); nel caso di
nomi proprî o località, la prima lettera è minuscola (dDio);
- i gruppi ch e gh con valore velare sono stati mantenuti;
- la grafia di n ed l mediopalatali (cioè /ɲ/ e /ʎ/) non è stata modificata, lasciando
le forme ngn e lgl ; è stata però normalizzato il gruppo glu in gliu ;
- le consonanti scempie in luogo delle comuni doppie non sono state
modificate; fa eccezione il caso del cognome Vespucci, riportato nella fonte
alternativamente con e senza la doppia c e pertanto sempre normalizzato;
- i simboli di pesi, misure e valute sono state sempre sciolti, ad eccezione del
segno # (= lire/libre);
- l’assenza di vocaboli nella fonte è segnalata da ***; laddove possibile, la parte
mancante ipotizzata è segnalata tra parentesi graffe, { };
8

- la mancata trascrizione dovuta a guasti della carta è segnalata da [...];
- i depennamenti, le lettere abbandonate e gli errori interni al testo sono stati
trascritti così come appaiono nella fonte.
9

Trascrizione dell’inventario patrimoniale del 1474
tratto dal manoscritto di ricordi
di Bongianni Gianfigliazzi
10

eni inmobili
C17v
┼ 1474
1474 Richordo di tutti e' beni inmobili mi truovo [a] avere questo dì
primo d’Aghosto 1474. E choxì seghuito dì per dì detto richordo, / e nel
modo e forma mi sono pervenuti nelle mani e prima.
n°1 Una chasa per mia abitazione nel popolo di Santa Trinita di Firenze
e nella via di Lungharno. Questa mi pervenne del’aredità di Gherardo
mio fratello, el quale morì a dì 6 di Settenbre 1463 e fecie testamento a
dì 2 detto, roghato ser Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci, chome apare
in questo 5.
n°2 La detta chasa non aveva a quel tenpo se non 2 entrate Lungharno,
cioè la porta principale e l’uscio che va a la chorte de le bestie, stalla e
volta. / E perché el detto Gherardo l’aveva murata dua anni innanzi che
morissi, lasciò molte chose inbastite, le quali Io forni[i], / e di nuovo le
feci una entrata su la piazza di Santa Trinita per uno androne sotto el
palagio, che si chiama el palagio de’ Gianfigliazzi. El quale androne
chomprai dagli Uficiali della Torre, insieme chol detto palagio, chome
beni di rubelli per fiorini 1476 di sugiello, roghato ser Giovanni
Giannuzzi, notaio di detti Uficiali, a dì *** di Gennaio 1469. De la qual
chompera di detto palagio mi chontai el detto androne dove feci la detta
entrata, e più mi chontai 2 archi, che sono a llato al palagio detto, verso
al ponte di Santa Trinita, apicchati chon una bottegha nostra e di Papino
di Cierbino per non divisa. E ragiono tutto, cioè l’androne e 2 archi,
fiorini 276 di sugiello. / El tenpo di detto palagio si chonsentì e nominai
nella chonpera mona Tommasa, donna fu di Baldassarre di Franciescho
di messer Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi, per una parte, cioè fiorini 700, e
Bertoldo di Bertoldo Gianfigliazzi per una altra parte, per fiorini 500,
chome tutto apare per la divixa in detta charta. E perché 4 finestre di
detto palagio erono molte basse e ghu{arda}vono feci di pa sopra la
chorte nostra di chasa, / feci di patto a parole chon detta mona
Tommasa e Bertoldo / dovere a le mie spexe alzare tanto alto le dette
finestre che non vi si potessi agiugnere sanza schala. E fecile fer[r]are. E
chosì le feci chome stanno al presente, / sicché se alchuno volessi mai
abassarlla o farvi altre finestre o fare altro [e]dificio su detto muto, no
11

A le rede di
Cierbino
llo può fare. / E se pure fusse che lo faciesse, sarebbe chontro a
l’achordo fatto tra nnoi e puossene valere chi sarà in questa mia chasa
chon fare uno muro dinanzi a le dette finestre e aciechare tutti e' lumi,
perché el muro dove sono dette finestre / chon questa composizione
diventò muro chomune. / E da lato nostro Io lo feci tutto accantonare. /
A le rede di Cierbino che chonfinano cho’ detta mia chasa, s’achonsenti
loro s’achostassino al muro nostro e murassino sul muro nostro, chon
obrigho di non potere mai aprire finestra, né bucha o spiraglio sopra la
nostra chorte, / perché tra me e loro era uno chiassolino che divide la
loro chasa da la mia.
C18r
┼ 1474
Seghue el richordo de la detta chasa.
E' frati di Santa Trinita che confinavano dall’altra parte chon detta chasa
furono chontenti si levassi via ogni finestra loro che rischorpondeva
sulla detta mia chorte, / perché a loro fecie Gherardo mio fratello una
finestra ghrande sopratetto, che dà lume a loro dormentoro.
E' Ghaetani avevano anche finestra che si levorono via quando Io feci
sopra la loggia uno salotto da verno.
El sito di detta chasa in parte murata chomperò Gherardo mio fratello
da Luigi Teghiacci e fratelli, chome apare per charta, roghato ser
Nicholò di Franciescho la quale è nella chassetta, roghato ser Nicholò di
Franciescho del Chalzolaio a dì 31 di Gennaio 1459, chome apare
creditore e paghato detto Luigi di Giovanni Teghiacci e fratelli a libro
verde di detto Gherardo detto E, a 71. Chostò fiorini II mila di sugiello.
12

n°3 Una chasetta posta in detto luogho e popolo, da primo via di
Lungharno, sechondo rede di Cierbino, un terzo rede di Ruberto
Gianfigliazzi, e risponde dirieto nella chorte de la chasa de l’antra
abitazione / chomperai Io a dì 2 d’Aprile 1465 da messer Charllo de’
Medici, previe notaio, roghato ser Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci. /
El detto messer Charllo l’avea comperata da maestro Andrea da la
Perghola, chostò fiorini 210 di sugiello. / El pagamento a libro biancho
segnato F 84 non s’è rishosso la charta.
A dì primo di Marzo 1474 si fecie la charta di detta chasa a Bernardo
Rinieri e Nicholaio Bartolini e chompagnia Settavoli, cioè per loro a
Lorenzo de’ Medici o a chi e' nominasse, per fiorini 200 larghi, roghato
ser Antonio di ser Batista, notaio a l’arte di Porzantamaria, e
faciemoneli debitori detto Bernardo e Nicholaio a una loro ragione a
libro biancho segnato F 240 di fiorini 240 di sugiello. E fumone paghati
in drappi di seta. E però si chanciella perché nonn’è più mia.
C18v
Seghue beni inmobili
1474
n°4 Una chasa posta in detto popolo di Santa Trinita e su la choscia del
ponte a Santa Trinita, da primo la piazza di Santa Trinita, sechondo via
di Lungharno, un terzo palagio de’ Gianfigliazzi, un quarto rede di
Ruberto Gianfigliazzi, / chon una bottegha a uso di legnaiolo sotto detta
chasa. La quale bottegha, per non divisa, apartiene per la metà a Papino
di Cierbino e tiene a pigione detto Papino da me la mia metà per non
divisa, cioè la metà per non divisa appartenente a me, per fiorini 7
l’anno. / Questa detta chaxa chomperai da mona Maria e mona Oretta,
figliuole di Piero d’Amati Gianfigliazzi, a dì 10 di diciemnbre 1460 per
fiorini 800 di sugiello, roghato ser Nicholò di Franciescho del
Chalzolaio. Della sopra detta chompera sodò Chante d’Antonio
Chavalchanti e figliuoli per fiorini 500, chome apare per rogho fatto per
ser Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci sotto di ***. E tanti se ne paghò a
13

’//, roghato ser
Lionardo di
Giovanni di
Lionardo da
Cholle, e e' detti
[...] e danari
detto Chante. E a dì 13 di Maggio 1468, di fiorini 300 si restavano a
paghare, si chomperò fiorini 1330 soldi 7 a fiorini di Monte. E feronsi
dire in detta mona Oretta Maria e mona Oretta condizionati in me el
che dirò e le paghe fino a tanto che 2 figliuoli di Borghognone di Piero
d’Amati Gianfigliazzi saranno in età a potere retifichare a la detta
vendita, fatta per la dette donne della detta chasa. Liberai el detto
chredito perché Piero e Orlando, figliuolo di Borghognone,
retificharono alla detta vendita. Apare pe‘ ’l paghamento fatto a libro
verde detto B 33.
A dì 16 di Marzo 1479 chomperai l’altra mezza bottegha sotto la detta
chasa da Papino di Cierbino per fiorini 75 di sugiello, charta per mano
di ser Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci. Per suo dato e fatto, apare el
paghamento a conto di detto Papino a libro biancho segnato F 295. Non
s’è rischossa la charta.
n°5 Una chasa in San Chasciano su la via maestra, la quale chomperai
da Lionardo di Franciescho da San Chasciano e da Giovanni d’Antonio
e fratelli Cierchiai fuori della porta a San Piero Ghattolini e d’Antonio
di Neri di messer Andrea Vettori, chon uno orto apichato a detta chasa
per fiorini 150 di sugiello. A dì 4 di Febraio 1470, roghato ser Nastagio
di ser Amerigho Vespucci, non ebbi altro sodamento se non ciaschuno
obrighato in tutto. / El paghamento apare a libro biancho segnato F 194.
La detta chasa vendem[m]o al Bernardo Rinieri e Nicholao Bartolini e
chompagnia Settavoli a dì 11 di Magio 1476, chome apaiono debitori a
libro biancho segnato F 249 di fiorini 300 a baratto di drappi / sanza
farne altra charta. / E a dì 6 di Marzo 1477 ne faciemo charta chome ci
dissono e' detti per loro a Alberto di Tomè d’Ardingho. Pagholle per
fiorini 110 larghi ’//,
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n°6 Una mezza chasa pure in San Chasciano apicchata a muro chomune
chomune cho’ lla chasa sopradetta e per non divisa. E in detta via /
questa chomprai a dì 23 di Febraio 1472 per fiorini 54 larghi, roghato ser
Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci, da messer Franciescho di Lorenzo
di Iachopo, chavaliere araldo della Signoria di Firenze. / Detta 1/2 chasa
per non divisa è a chomune chon altra 1/2 chon mona Chaterina, donna
fu di Bartolomeo di Franciescho, becchaio in San Chasciano, e figliuola
di Franciescho di Tommaso d’Andrea da Merchatale a Ghrieve, la quale
chompera sodò a dì *** di Marzo 1472 messer Xpofano Landini,
Chancielliere della Parte Ghuelfa, roghato detto ser Nastagio, e
paghossi al detto ser Franciescho el detto prezzo, chome apare a libro
biancho segnato F 224. E a dì di Settenbre 1473 la detta mona Chaterina
e Io restamo d’achordo a parole, sanz’altra schrittura, / che io mi tenessi
e abitassi el primo palcho di detta chasa, cioè una sala sulla via, e più
un’altra sala sul sechondo palcho sopra el primo, chon una chamera al
pari; e che el resto de la chasa s’abiti la detta mona Chaterina. / E così
ciaschuno s’abiti nella forma sopradetta sanz’altra divisa. E l’entrata
della parte mia sia per l’uscio della via che va supra la schala, a llato
alla porta ghrande del terreno.
n°7 Uno podere chon chasa da signore e da lavoratore, luogho detto per
là drieto “Paternuzzo” e ora si chiama “Chastelletto”. Da poi, in questa
si murò la chasa ghrande nel modo ch’ella è al presente, posto nel
chomune di San Chasciano, popolo e piviere di San Branchazio di Val
di Pexa. / Questa rimase a Gherardo mio fratello e a me chome rede di
mona Simona nostra madre, de la quale era e avevalo preso da per sua
dota chome beni di Bongianni di Giovanni nostro padre. / Da poi ci
dividem[m]o, detto Gherardo e Io, e tocchò a me. Nelle divise la charta.
E ’l prato fecie detta mona Simona nostra madre quando li fu
[a]giudichato per sua dota. È nella chassetta tra l’altre nostre charte e
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ischritture. / Antichamente fu di Bongianni nostro padre: era una trista
chasa e pichola, e quasi uno chasolare, e quando pervenne a me nella
divisa, si chiamava “Paternuzzo”. Di poi si mutò e chiamasi
“Chastelletto” chome detto. Di questo non n’ò altra notizia. Come si
pervenisse antichamente a le mani di Bongianni nostro padre, né ne
truovo alchuna schrittura chredo li venisse nella divisa chon messere
Iachopo Gianfigliazzi suo fratello. Morì nostro padre ch’era podestà di
Pogi Bonizi l’anno 1421.
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n°8 Uno podere chon chasa da lavoratore, posto nel popoli e piviere
della pieve di San Branchazio, nel chomune di San Chasciano. / luogho
detto “la chollina”, a primo via, a sechondo Giovanni Borromei, a 1/3
beni de la pieve detta. Questo podere fu antichamente di Bongianni mio
padre e preselo per sua dota mona Simona nostra madre. Nella forma
prese quello di sopra. / Rimase dopo la morte di nostra madre a
Gherardo mio fratello e a me chome sua rede. / Di poi nella divisa
tocchò a Gherardo e, dopo la morte di Gherardo nel 1463, tocchò a me
chome sua reda. / Chome si venisse a le mani di nostro padre, non ne
truovo alchuna schrittura. Chredo li tocchasse nela divisa fecie chon
messer Iachopo suo fratello, chome quello di sopra.
n°9 Uno terzo d’uno pezzo di boscho chiamato “Valle Maggiore” a
chomune chon Bartolomeo d’Adovardo di messer Iachopo
Gianfigliazzi, nel piviere di San Branchazio, chomune di San Chasciano,
popolo di Santa Chrestina in Val di Pesa. Da primo rede di Betto di
Giuliano, prestatore, a sechondo Chante Chavalchanti a 1/3 rede di
messer Iachopo Gianfigliazzi. Venne a nostro madre padre nelle divise
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tra lui e messer Iachopo suo fratello; / poi lo prese nostra madre per
dota come di sopra.
n°10 Uno podere, chon chasa da lavoratore, posto nel popolo e piviere
di San Branchazio detto, / luogho detto “la Palaia”, che nel catasto del
1427 dicieva in Giovanni di messer Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi. Da primo
chonfina chol podere mio chiamato “Chastelletto”, sechondo fossato,
1/3 rede di Ghaleazo Borromei, 1/4 rede detto. / Chomprollo Gherardo
mio fratello del mese di Febraio 1453, charta per mano di ser Amerigho
Vespucci, e tocchò a me nelle divixe per lodo dette tra nnoi Nicholò
d’Antonio Gianfigliazzi, nostro albitro, a dì 30 di Magio 1456, roghato
ser Silvano notaio a l’Arte di Porzantamaria. Non s’è riscossa la charta.
Agiunsi da poi a detto podere uno chanpo di staiora 2 incircha. Loghato
el chanpo della pal[a]ia e detti in chanbio a Bartolomeo d’Adovardo
Gianfigliazzi una vignia apicchata a chonfini cho’ la sua vignia del
Mantachone, senza farne altro chontratto ma solamente a parole si fecie
detto baratto. E da poi ciaschuno à sempre posseduto noi el chanpo e
lui la vignia.
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n°11 Uno podere posto nel popolo e piviere di San Branchazio,
chomune di San Chasciano, luogho detto “el chorno”,da primo via,
sechondo rede di messer Iachopo Gianfigliazzi, 1/3 beni nostri,
chomperale a dì 27 d’Ottobre 1456 da Rinaldo di Ghino Rondinelli e
fratelli per fiorini 150, charta per mano di ser Giovanni Aleghri, notaio.
Sodollo Andrea di Rinaldo Rondinelli. Rischossi la charta, è nella
chassetta tra l’altre mie schritture. /
n°12 E a dì 15 di Febraio 1456 chonperai e barattai chon messer Antonio
Chavalcanti, pievano di San Branchazio, uno pezzo di sodo chon uno
altro nostro sodo, / e apicchalo chon detto podere di sopra. / Fu fatto
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meglio el suo, che dette a me fiorini XXV di sugiello, e tanto li paghai. È
a me la charta nella chassetta, roghato detto dì ser Filippo Mazzei,
notaio a l’arciveschovado.
n°13 E a dì 4 di dicienbre 1467 chomperai e barattai chol detto messer
Antonio Alesandro Chavalchanti, piovano de la pieve sopradetta, uno
pezzo di terra sodo d’istaioira 6 incircha per fiorini 40 di sugiello. La
quale achozzai chon detto podere perché [e]gli era a chonfini chon detto
podere del chorno. E in paghamento li detti una taverna, suta nostra più
tenpo fa, pervenutaci da la [e]redità di nostra madre, che l’avea presa
per sua dota. Chonfina cho’ la detta pieve chon uno pezzo di terra
d’istaiora 2 incircha, apicchata chon detta taverna, chome apare per
charta, roghato ser Baldovino, notaio in veschovado. Rischossi la detta
charta ed è nella chassetta.
n°14 Uno podere, chon chasa da signore e da lavoratore, posto nel
popolo di Santa Maria a Marignolla, luogho detto “Marignolla”. Questo
mi pervenne de la [e]redità di Gherardo mio fratello, el quale chomperò
da Daniello di Luigi Chanigiani del mese d’Aprile d’Aprile 1455, charta
per mano di ser Nicholò di Franciescho del Chalzolaio, per fiorini 1200
di sugiello, che a primo, sechondo, 1/3, 1/4 via. E chon detto podere è un
pezzo di terra posto in detto popolo e luogho, el quale chomperò detto
Gherardo per via di baratto del mese di Magio 1457 dal rettore de la
chiexa di Santa Maria a Marignolla, charta per mano di ser Filippo da
Chastelfrancho, notaio in veschovado. E in chanbio di detta terra gli
dette e chonsegnò a la detta chiesa staiora 7 di terra posta nel popolo di
Santo Stefano a Vagnano, / la quale chomperò detto Gherardo da mona
Pippa, donna fu d’Antonio d’Antonio Chanacci, e d’altri, chome apare
nel sopradetto contratto. E più si chontiene chol sopradetto podere uno
pezzo di terra a uso di chantiero posto in Ghrieve, cho’ sua vochaboli e
chonfini, lungho la gora del mulino de’ Sachetti. / Chomperò detto
Gherardo del mese di Novenbre 1461 da Zanobi di Piero di Salamone
Torello e da Piero di Ghino Lippi, roghato ser Silvano, notaio a l’Arte di
Porzantamaria.
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n°15 Uno podere, con chasa da signore e da lavoratore, posto nel cho
popolo di San Donato a Schopeto, luogho detto “el bagnaccio”, e ora si
chiama “Marignolina”, a primo via, sechondo Sandro Lotti, 1/3 beni de
le chanpora, 1/4 Francho Sachetti, 1/5 Ghuasparre Biliotti. Questo
chonperai ’/, del mese di Settenbre 1461 ’/, dagli Uficiali de le Vendite cho’ bandi
e cholla solenità ’/, usate, e fu d’Antonio di Giovanni Barbadoro el quale
era confinato. Chostò fiorini 140 di sugiello da detti Uficiali, charta per
mano di ser Giovanni Miglioreli, notaio di detti Uficiali. / E fino a la
somma di fiorini 1200 di sugiello m’achordai chon detto Antonio
Barbadoro, che furono fiorini 1060 di sugiello. Gliele paghai in Bologna
in ghrana, zuccheri, choiame e drappi. / E chosì n’ebbi la charta fatta in
Bologna l’anno 1463; / sodollo Antonio Bonafe’ che sta a Bologna. / E la
vendita fecie Antornio Barbadoro e Giandonato suo figliuolo. / La
charta è nella chassetta insieme cho’ la charta mi feciono gli Uficiali del
Monte. / La chasa da signore era molto trista e Io la rifeci quasi tutta di
nuovo: e chosì vi feci di nuovo una altra chasa da lavoratore ch’è posta
sulla via a l’entrata di detto podere; che, oltro al primo chosto, si spese
in murare fiorini 1300 incircha.
n°16 Uno podere chon chasa da lavoratore posto nel popolo de la pieve
di San Branchazio, chomune di San Chasciano in Val di Pexa, luogho
detto “Gibione”, da primo via, a sechondo beni nostri, a 1/3 Bartolomeo
d’Adovardo Gianfigliazzi, a 1/4 beni furono di messer Rinaldo
Gianfigliazzi. / Chomperalo a dì 25 15 d’Ottobre 1463, / roghato ser
Giuliano Lanfredini, da Giovanni di Nicholò Falchoni. / Rischossi la
charta ed è nella chassetta. / El paghamento apare a libro biancho
segnato F a 48; chostò fiorini 290 di sugiello netti.
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Riscritto su primo
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n°17 Uno podere chon chasa da lavoratore posto in Val di Pesa, nel
popolo di San Michele a Polvereto, lu piviere di San Branchazio, luogho
detto “le quercie”, da primo via, sechondo Vergigno, 1/3 beni di Santa
Maria Nuova, a 1/4 Donato Chavalchanti. Chomperalo da Bernardo
d’Antonio di Riciardo degli Alberti, del mese d’Aprile 1465, roghato ser
Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci. Chostò fiorini 300 di sugiello e non
sodò altrimenti. Non n’è rischosso la charta. / El paghamento apare a
libro biancho segnato F 90.
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n°18 Uno podere chon chasa da lavoratore posto nel popolo e piviere di
San Branchazio di Val di Pesa, chomune di San Chasciano, luogho detto
“la Fontanella”, / da primo via, sechondo beni di detta pieve, 1/3 frati di
ciertosa, 1/4 Tomaso di Luigi di messer Lorenzo Ridolfi, chon più pezzi
di terra, apartenenti a detti poderi, chomperai. Cioè: e' 6/7 da Filipo di
Domenicho degli Agli a dì 12 d’Aghosto 1469, roghato ser Nastagio di
ser Amerigho Vespucci, per fiorini 342 soldi 17 a fiorini. / Di poi a dì 21
d’Aghosto 1472 / chomperai 1/7 di detto podere da Giovanni di Filippo
de Rossi, churatore della [e]redità giaciente di Franciescho di
Domenicho degli Agli, per fiorini 57 soldi 2 denari 10 a fiorini di
sugiello, roghato ser Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci. Di questo
podere non s’ebbe sodamento alchuno ecietto e' venditori. El
paghamento apare a libro biancho segnato F 171.
El sopradetto podere si barattò cho’ messere Alexandro di Donato
Chavalchanti, piovano della pieve di San Branchazio di Val di Pesa. E
chonsegnossi a detta pieve e da llui s’ebbe in chanbio di questo uno
podere in detto popolo e piviere vochato Poggio Seccho, chome si vede
dov’è fatto richordo di detto Poggio Seccho di sotto, nel chapitolo 23,
roghato di tutto ser Piero Orlandi, notaro in veschovado a dì 4 di
Giennaio 1472. / Non s’è rischossola charta. / E perché nonn’è più mio,
si chanciella.
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n°19 Uno podere chon chasa da lavoratore posto nel piviere di San
Branchazio di Val di Pesa e nel popolo di San Michele a Polvereto, /
luogho detto “Polvereto”, / da primo via, sechondo beni della detta
chiesa, a 1/3 fiume di Vergigno, a 1/4 beni di Sichelmo Girolami. /
Chonperalo da Cione di messer Giovannozzo Pitti a dì 11 di Gennaio
1464, roghato ser Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci. / Fu sodo da
messere Giovanno detto e Alfonso suo figliuolo e da Bernardo di ***
Chorbinelli. El paghamento apare in sonma di uno altro podere
chiamato “vetriciaio”, chonperato pure dal detto Cione, a libro biancho
segnato F 82. Non s’è rischossa la charta.
A dì 23 d’Aghosto 1474 chonperai 2 pezzi di terra per via di baratto
chon altre nostre terre e chon aroto di fiorini 28 larghi, che chonfina
chon detto podere e apichato al sopradetto podere. / Fu roghato de la
chonpera ser Antonio di ser Batista, notaio a l’Arte di Porzantamaria.
Chonperossi da Zanobi di Nanni del Turchio e da’ fratelli. El
paghamento apare a libro biancho segnato F 236. Non s’è richossa la
charta.
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n°20 Uno podere chon casa da lavoratore, fornacie e mulino, luogho
detto “el Vetriciaio”, nel piviere di San Branchazio e nel popolo di San
Michele a Polvereto di Val di Pesa, da primo via, a sechondo fiume di
Vergigno, a 1/3 beni di messer Giovannozzo Pitti, a 1/4 beni de le rede
di Nanni del Turchio. / Chomperalo da Cione di messer Giovannozzo
Pitti, insieme chol podere di sopra di n°19, per fiorini 1100 di sugiello
tutti a dua, roghato ser Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci a dì 11 di
Gennaio 1464. Sodollo messer Giovannozzo detto e Alfonso suo
figliuolo e Bernardo Chorbinelli, chome si dicie ne l’altro podere. El
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paghamento di tutti a dua i poderi apare a libro biancho segnato F a 82.
Non s’è richossa la charta.
A dì 23 d’Aghosto 1474 arosi a detto podere uno pezzo di terra
chonperata da Zanobi di Nanni del Turchio e fratelli, chome apare ne la
chonpera dei pezzi al podere di n°19 innanzi a questo di sopra, roghato
ser Antornio di ser Batista. El paghamento apare di fiorini 28 larghi a
libro biancho segnato F 236. Non s’è rischossa la charta.
n°21 Uno podere chon chasa da lavoratore posto nel popolo di Santa
Chrestina, piviere di San Branchazio di Val di Pexa, luogho detto
“Sorbiglianello”, a primo via, sechondo beni di Santa Chrestina, a 1/3
Betto di Giuliano, prestatore, a 1/4 Cione Pitti. Chonperalo da Scharlatto
e Tomaso d’Antonio di Scharlatto per fiorini 300 di sugiello, a dì 11 di
Gennaio 1464. El paghamento apare a libro biancho segnato F 82,
roghato ser Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci. Non fu sodo altrimenti
che da loro dua, / cioè Scharlatto e Tomaso. Non s’è rischossa la charta.
E' sopradetti 3 poderi, cioè Polvereto di n°19, Vetriciaio di n°20, /
Sorbiglianello di n°21, che chostorono fiorini 1400 di sugiello, obrighai
nel fare della charta a maritare cierte fanciulle e 4 rinovali l’anno per
l’anima di Gherardo mio fratello, chon chondizione che, spendendo
1400 in beni inmobili che stessono per la detta limosina, in tal chaso
s’intenda liberi mia e sopradetti 3 poderi. / E però a dì 6 di Novenbre
1465 / chonperai una bottegha in Porta Santa Maria a l’asercizio
dell’Arte della seta da’ sindachi di Piero Partini, / e fecisi dire ne l’Arte
de’ Merchatanti per fiorini 1400 per fare l’effetto di sopra; e
disobrighossi per vighore di detta chonpera e' sopradetti 3 poderi,
chome di tutto apare, roghato ser Batista di ser Franciescho, notaio a
l’arte de’ merchatanti, chome apare per uno richordo fatto in questo 8./
El paghamento è fatto a libro biancho segnato F 110.
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n°22 Uno pezzo di boscho posto nel popolo di Santa Chrestina, piviere
di San Branchazio di Val di Pesa, luogho detto “ghonfienti”, a primo
rede di Betto di Giuliano prestatore, a sechondo messer Bongianni
detto, a 1/3 Cione Pitti, a 1/4 via. Chonperolo da ser Simone, rettore de
la chiesa di santa Chrestina per fiorini 100 di sugiello, a dì 23 di
Gennaio 1468, roghato ser Pagholo Pagholi. / E in paghamento di detti
fiorini 100 se li dette uno pezzo di terra, / chonperata a dì 23 di Gennaio
1468 da Franciescho di Piero Petrini e fu circha astaiora 13. E fessi dire
nella detta chiesa di santa Chrestina, chome apare pe‘ ’l paghamento
fatto a libro biancho segnato F 219. Roghato di tutto ser Pagholo detto. /
Rischossi la charta e abialla nella chassetta.
n°23 Uno podere chon chasa da lavoratore, luogho detto “Pogio
seccho”, posto in Val di Pesa nel popolo e piviere di San Branchazio, /
da primo e sechondo via, a 1/3 beni della detta pieve, a 1/4 beni nostri /
chonperalo / da messer Alesandro di Donato Chavalchanti, piovano
della pieve di San Branchazio detto. E era di detta pieve, / roghato di
tutto ser Piero Orlandi, notaio in veschovado a dì 4 di Gennaio 1472. / E
in paghamento di detto podere detti a la detta pieve uno podere chon
chasa da lavoratore in luogho detto “la Fontanella”, popolo e piviere di
San Branchazio detto, / el quale avevo chonperato da Filippo di
Giovanni Domenicho degli Agli a dì 12 d’Aghosto 1469, roghato ser
Nastagio Vespucci per fiorini 342 soldi 17 pe’ 6/7 di detto podere e
l’altro 1/7 chonperai a dì 21 d’Aghosto 1472 da Franciescho di
Domenicho degli Agli per fiorini 57 soldi 2 denari 10 a fiorini di
sugiello, roghato ser Nastagio Vespucci e non se n’ebbe sodamento
alchuno. El paghamento apare a libro biancho 171. E del sopradetto
baratto fu roghato ser Piero Orlandi, notaio in veschovado chome detto
di sopra. E più s’à a dare a la detta pieve di San Branchazio fiorini 100
di sugiello oltre al podere sopradetto, chome apare in detto contratto.
23

Che quando si pagheranno se ne farà qui da pie’ richordo. / Ma non mi
sono mai suti domandati perché bisogna la pieve sopradetta li metta in
achoncime d’uno mulino, ch’è llà a in Pexa, che sarà di ghrande spesa. /
Non s’è rischossa la charta.
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n°24 Dua poderi chon chasa da lavoratore, luogho detto “la nocie”,
posti in Val di Pesa nel piviere di San Branchazio, popolo di San
Martino a Luchardo, e' quali chonperai a dì 10 di Dicienbre 1473 dagli
Uficiali del Monte per fiorini 100 larghi. Apare el paghamento a libro
biancho segnato F 229, roghato ser Antonio Chortese, notaio di detti
Uficiali. E abiamo la charta nella chassetta. / Furono questi poderi di
mona Lena, donna fu di Gherardo Gianfigliazzi mio fratello, la quale
chonperò più tenpo fa di denari gli lasciò Gherardo detto dopo la sua
morte e per suo testamento. E fugli posto su detti beni el chatasto e
decima e, non paghandosi perché ella era morta, fecie debito per dette
ghravezze chol Chomune. E per questa ragione gli Uficiali li venderono
/ e fu lo schanpo di detti poderi perché detta mona Lena, alla sua morte,
gli lasciò chomessi ne l’Arte de’ Merchatanti e volle che, de le rendite, si
faciesse cierte limosine. E per essere obrighati prima al Chomune, le
dette limosine non si facievano e non ebbe luogho la detta chomessione.
E ora, sendo pervenuti in me per vighore della detta chonpera fatta
dagli Uficiali del Monte, volendo scharichare la mia coscienza perché e'
poderi vagliono più prezzo che quello chostorono a me, e per fare bene
a l’anima di detta mona Lena e di Gherardo suo marito di quello
ch’ell’aveva ordinato pe‘ ’l suo testamento, / voglio che per me e per le
mie rede, de l’entrata di detti poderi, si dia per l’anima di detta mona
Lena e di Gherardo a’ frati e chonvento di Santa Trinita di Firenze
ogn’anno moggia 3 di ghrano posto in Firenze nella detta badìa di
quello si richoglie nella detta badìa su detti poderi, per dire ogni
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mattina una messa piana a l’altare magiore in detta chiesa, per l’anima
di detta mona Lena, e 2 rinovali in cierti tenpi, chome sono usitati di
fargli ogn’anno da poi ch’el[l]a morì. E più si dia del medesimo ghrano
staiora 15 ogn’anno al munistero de le monache murate e staiora 15 del
medesimo a le monache delle chonvertite, posto in Firenze, al detto
munistero, e staiora 10 di ghrano posto in Firenze a le monache di santa
Chiara e staiora 10 al munistero d’Anna Lena di Baldaccio e staiora 10 a
le monache al munistero di santa Monacha. / E di tutto si tengha
ogn’anno diligente chonto su’ libri mia e delle mie rede, e questo si facci
ogn’anno nel modo sopradetto, intendendo quando di detti poderi
procurerà o per chattivi tenporali o per qualunche altra chagione non si
ritraessi la sonma del ghrano sopradetta. Non sia tenuto, né Io né le mie
rede, a ffare la limosina sopradetta se non per quella erata rientrasse e
non più.
C23r
┼ MCCCC°LXXIIIJ°
Seghue el richordo de’ 2 poderi de rinpetto di n°24
chon questa chondizione: che se per me o per le mie rede sarà
chonperato tanti beni inmobili che la rendita di detti beni / che si
chonperassino, si paghasse moggia 5 di staiora 12 di ghrano ogn’anno a
quegli e quelle persone che di sopra si fa menzione, che in tal chaso
detti poderi e dette mie rede sieno libere da la deta limosina. E lascio
inmediate che sarà fatta la detta chonpera da’ loro beni per fare l’efetto
sopradetto. / E che ne sarà dato notizia a l’abate e chonvento di Santa
Trinita e a sopradetti monisteri di monache. / A ffine, che sappino per
l’avenire da chi abbino a avere la detta limosina. / E se chaso fusse che
nella chonpera di detti beni si spendesse meno che fiorini 500 di
sugiello, / voglio che tanti più beni si chonperi fino a detta sonma di
fiorini 500 di sugiello, e quella si ritraesse. Più sia dato per erata a le
sopradette monache e a santa / e a Santa Trinita le moggia 3 sopradette
e non più né altro.
25

E' sopradetti poderi chonperai chome detto dagli Uficiali del Monte del
Monte di licenzia e volontà di don Matteo, abate di Santa Trinita, e di
Taddeo di Duccio Mancini, fratello di detta mona Lena, e a loro
preghiere è richiesta per sbrighargli dal debito del Chomune per potere
fare le sopradette limosine, che per essere obrighati alle ghravezze del
Chomune non si facievano. In detta chonpera fu uno podere posto nel
popolo di San Xpofano in Portichaia, luogho detto “chanbali” che
apartiene a detto Taddeo di Duccio Mancini e a sua ‘stanza se ne fe’
menzione in detta charta per sbrigharllo dal Chomune chome beni di
mona Lena sopradetta.
C23v
┼ MCCCC°LXXIIIJ°V
Seghue beni inmobili
n°25 Uno mulino chon 4 palmenti e 4 pile da gualchiere e una stele
d’arotare, e chon tiratoi e stalle e sale e chamere, posto a Pogibonizi su
l’Elsa, presso a le mura di Pogibonizi cho’ le sue appartenenze, luogho
detto “el mulino nuovo”, cho’ sua vochaboli e chonfini. / Questo
chonperai, fiorini 1400 di sugiello, cioè la 1/4 parte da Bernardo e
Franciescho di Lupo Squarcialupi e la 1/4 parte da Benedetto di
Giovannozzo Biliotti e la metà da Giovanni di Matteo Benizi. Roghato
di tutto ser Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci sotto dì 25 d’Aghosto
1475; e non s’è rischosso la charta. Paghossi chome apare a libro biancho
segnato F 247. / El modo del sodamento di detto mulino ò per la 1/4
parte di Bernardo e Franciescho Squarcialupi loro medesimi e per la 1/4
parte di Benedetto Biliotti e per 1/2 di Giovanni Benizi. / È mallevadore
Bernardo di Nichola Chapponi sotto cierta chondizione, chome apare
per uno richordo fatto al giornale segnato F 117 e 118, soschritto di suo
mano.
A dì 7 di Settenbre 1479 si perde’ il Pogio Inperiale che fumo rotti dal
ducha di Chalavria e perdessi Pogibonizi; e perdessi el detto mulino ed
26

è anchora perduto fino a questo dì 12 d’Aghosto 1480, ne le mani del
Ducha sopradetto.
n°26 Uno podere vochato “el ficho” nel popolo e piviere di San
Branchazio di Val di Pesa, da primo via, sechondo Vergigno, 1/3 via, 1/4
beni mia. / Chomperalo a dì 22 di Gennaio 1477 da Piero de’ Rossi,
prochuratore dopo la morte di Piero del Fede, di che era detto podere,
per fiorini 300 di sugiello, roghato detto dì ser Nastagio di ser
Amerigho Vespucci. / Obrighom[m]i la [e]redità di detto Piero a la
difesa gienerale. Fecisi el paghamento chome apare a una ragione di
detto podere a libro biancho segnato F 276.
C24r
┼ MCCCC°LXXV
Uno podere posto nel Chomune di San Chasciano, popolo di Santa
Maria a Bignola, luogho detto Bignola, da primo via, da sechondo beni
de la detta chiesa, da 1/3 el fiume di Pesa, da 1/4 beni de le monache di
san Domenicho da Firenze. Questo era di Gherardo Gianfigliazzi mio
fratello, che fu della dota di mona Simona nostra madre, e tocchò a
detto Gherardo nella divisa fatta tra me e lui. / Lasciollo per suo
testamento a l’Arte di Porta Chalimala per dare e' frutti a la badìa e
chonvento di Santa Trinita di Firenze, per dire una messa ogni mattina
per l’anima sua nella chapella de’ Gianfigliazzi vecchia, / e non di
meno. Nel detto testamento di detto Gherardo lasciò prochuratore dopo
la morte me, Bongianni suo fratello, / che disponessi del suo testamento
chome a me Bongianni paressi. E Io tolsi a fitto detto podere per #102 di
piccioli e ogn’anno s’è paghato detto fitto. / E chome apare per rogho di
ser Nastagio di ser Amerigho Vespucci, chome prochuratore dopo la
morte giudichai che, dando a detta chiesa di Santa Trinita tanti beni
inmobili chon detto obrigho di detta messa, che vaglino o chostino
fiorini quattrocento di sugiello, allora e in quello chaso detto podere di
Bignola s’intenda essere del detto messer Bongianni e delle sue rede. E
27

per[ci]ò ò fatto questo richordo sechondo l’antenzione e voglia mia e
chome prochuratore dopo la morte del detto Gherardo mio fratello,
chome apare per richordo in questo 8.
C24v
┼ MCCCC°LXXV
La chapella magiore di Santa Trinita è mia, chome apare in questo 12, la
quale mi fu data dal popolo e Io l’ho achoncia e fatta dipigniere e fattovi
la tavola e le spalliere e sepoltura. / La spexa che Io v’ho fatta apare a
libro biancho segnato F 155, sanza la dipintura, / che si dà ogn’anno a
Alesso Baldovinetti, maestro che l’ha dipinta durante la vita sua,
ogn’anno mogia dua di ghrano, / dua chognia di vino, / dua barili d’olio
e una chatasta di legnie, tutto posto in Firenze.
Le carte da 25r a 39v sono lasciate in bianco, probabilmente in
previsione di eventuali ulteriori acquisizioni patrimoniali.
28

Fig. 1 Firenze, Archivio dei Buonuomini di San Martino, Gianfigliazzi, 2.2.0.1, c. 17v.
Fig. 2 Firenze, Archivio dei Buonuomini di San Martino, Gianfigliazzi, 2.2.0.1, c. 6r.
29

Fig. 3 Firenze, Archivio dei Buonuomini di San Martino, Gianfigliazzi, 2.2.0.1, c. 23v:
nel ricordo n°25 è registrato l’acquisto del mulino sito presso Poggibonsi.
Fig. 4 Firenze, Archivio dei Buonuomini di San Martino, Gianfigliazzi, 2.2.0.1, c. 23v:
al ricordo n°26 è registrato l’acquisto del podere “el Ficho”
30

Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
La Banca Commerciale Italiana e la politica di espansione all’estero dal
dopoguerra al risanamento dell’istituto (1918‐1933)
di Francesca Romana Lenzi
L’articolo si propone di mettere in luce alcuni degli aspetti che hanno
caratterizzato l’internazionalizzazione del sistema bancario italiano, con
specifico riferimento alla Banca Commerciale Italiana ed alla sua rete estera. Il
presente lavoro si inserisce in un più ampio progetto di ricerca dell’autrice, in
corso presso l’Archivio storico della Banca d’Italia in Roma (ASBI) e presso
l’Archivio storico della Banca Commerciale Italiana di Milano (ASI‐BCI), volto
ad approfondire la relazione degli istituti bancari italiani nel bacino est europeo
e le strategie di penetrazione italiana all’estero attraverso la partecipazione allo
sviluppo industriale e finanziario dei Paesi di destinazione 1 .
1 Per il saggio sono stati consultati i seguenti fondi: Banca D’Italia, Archivio Storico: Direttorio
Azzolini; Raccolte diverse; Banca Commerciale Italiana, Archivio Storico: Servizio Estero e rete
estera; Segreteria degli amministratori delegati Facconi e Mattioli; Verbali del Consiglio
d’Amministrazione, Segreteria e copialettere di G. Toeplitz; Copialettere di Enrico Marchesano. Per una
bibliografia più ampia sul tema si rimanda a: AA.VV., Banca e Industria tra le due guerre, ricerca
promossa dal Banco di Roma in occasione del suo primo bicentenario, vol. ʺL’economia e il
pensiero economicoʺ, Banco di Roma, ed. Mulino, Bologna 1981; AA.VV., La formazione della
Banca Centrale in Italia: atti della giornata di studio in onore di Antonio Confalonieri, promossa dalla
Facoltà di economia e di scienze bancarie, finanziarie e assicurative, tenutasi presso lʹUniversità
cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano lʹ8 gennaio 1993, Giappichelli, Torino 1994; R. Di Quirico, Le
banche italiane al’estero 1900‐1950. Espansione bancaria all’estero e integrazione finanziaria
internazionale nell’Italia negli anni tra le due guerre, European Press Academic publishing, Firenze
2000; N. La Marca, Italia e Balcani fra le due guerre: saggio di una ricerca sui tentativi italiani di
espansione economica nel Sud Est europeo fra le due guerre, Nuova Cultura, Roma 1993; P.F. Asso
et.al., Finanza internazionale, vincolo esterno e cambi, 1919‐1939, Laterza, Roma 1993; L. De Rosa (a
cura di), Sistemi bancari e finanziari internazionali: evoluzione e stabilità, scritti di Antonio Fazio,
Laterza, Roma 2001; F. Pino, F. Gaido, (a cura di), Mattioli Raffaele, Uscire dalla crisi, Nino Aragno
editore, Milano 2010; G. Toniolo, Centʹanni, 1894‐1994, Banca Commerciale Italiana, Milano
F.R. Lenzi, La Banca Commerciale Italiana
31

Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
Tra primi passi intrapresi dall’Italia per la strutturazione unitaria e per
l’inserimento nel panorama globale dell’economia, vi fu senz’altro il processo di
apertura ai mercati internazionali delle industrie a mezzo di strategie di
delocalizzazione produttiva e di formule condivise di dirigenza locale. Con
lʹingresso nel XX secolo, in particolar modo, si assistette a un importante
sviluppo del credito italiano nel panorama internazionale, trainato dalle
iniziative del Credito italiano e della Banca Commerciale Italiana volte a creare
reti multinazionali bancarie in grado di competere con altri poli di espansione
creditizia, già attivi in Europa e negli Stati Uniti. Infatti, se l’espansione del
sistema bancario dell’Italia all’estero aveva già mosso alcuni passi in avanti sul
finire del secolo XIX, sospinta da ragioni di natura industriale, da ambizioni di
potenza della politica estera, da interessi di presenza diretta nelle piazze
finanziarie internazionali per godere delle facilitazioni accordate alle strutture
bancarie di natura internazionale, il primo vero passo del sistema bancario
italiano all’estero è da considerarsi l’apertura della filiale del banco di Roma a
Parigi, nel 1902 2 .
I processi di espansione all’estero di alcuni attori bancari quali il Banco di
Roma e la Banca Italiana di Sconto subirono un freno per la crisi successiva alla
guerra; nel periodo interbellico si assistette all’ingresso dei due istituti di
credito sui mercati internazionali, sotto forma di sostegno alle attività
commerciali e industriali italiane e straniere, nell’arco di un ampliamento delle
strategie e degli obiettivi dei rispettivi gruppi dirigenti. Le principali aree di
espansione del settore creditizio italiano furono il Sudamerica e il bacino
danubiano balcanico: l’una per ragioni di contatto culturale, di opportunità
economica e di fermento migratorio; lʹaltra per le stesse ragioni, oltre che per
l’evidente agevolazione dovuta alla vicinanza geografica. Infine, entrambe le
aree costituivano motivo di interesse geostrategico dellʹItalia post bellica e, in
seguito, mussoliniana. Storicamente, è possibile identificare due fasi di
espansione degli istituti di credito italiani nel periodo compreso tra le guerre
1994; A. Confalonieri, Banca e industria in Italia dalla crisi del 1907 all’agosto del 1914, 2 voll.,
Milano 1982; S. Cassese, Il credito italiano e la fondazione dell’Iri, Libri Scheiwiller, Milano 1990;
AA.VV., Le istituzioni finanziarie degli anni Trenta nell’Europa continentale, collana di ricerche
economico finanziarie del Banco di Roma, ed. Mulino, Bologna 1982; G. Toniolo,”Crisi
economica e smobilizzo pubblico delle banche miste (1930‐1934)”, in Industria e banca nella
grande crisi. 1929‐1934, Etas, Milano 1978, pp. 284‐352; G. Rodano, Il credito allʹeconomia. Raffaele
Mattioli alla Banca Commerciale Italiana, Ricciardi, Milano 1983; AA.VV., Alberto Beneduce e i
problemi dellʹeconomia italiana del suo tempo, Edindustria, Roma 1985.
2 La Banca Commerciale Italiana assunse il controllo del Banco commerciale di San Paolo nel
1905: questa è la prima esperienza della Comit sul piano internazionale e una delle prime
dell’Italia, se si ritiene che l’internazionalizzazione bancaria ebbe vita con l’apertura della filiale
del Banco di Roma a Parigi. Cfr. R. Di Quirico, op. cit., p. 30.
F.R. Lenzi, La Banca Commerciale Italiana
32

Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
mondiali: fino agli anni Trenta vi fu una centrale influenza degli avvenimenti,
delle decisioni e della posizione italiana conseguenti al conflitto;
successivamente, la politica di espansione bancaria fu segnata dallʹintreccio di
due realtà storiche che attraversarono l’Italia ‐ lʹascesa del regime fascista – e il
mondo ‐ la crisi economica del 1929 3 .
Con specifica attenzione allʹesperienza della Comit, il percorso di apertura
fu segnato da una propria tempistica, scandita da specifici momenti di sviluppo
strategico e geografico. Sin dal primo decennio del XX secolo, nonostante la
condizione di arretratezza nello sviluppo economico della penisola rispetto alla
maggioranza degli attori europei, la Banca Commerciale Italiana perseguì
l’obiettivo strategico dell’inserimento nelle grandi reti di alleanze bancarie
all’estero – il cosiddetto international banking ‐. La politica della Banca
Commerciale Italiana si manifestò inizialmente varia, optando talune volte per
la partecipazione a istituti bancari esteri, tali altre per la realizzazione di nuove
realtà creditizie e favorendo, tuttavia, le forme partecipative più flessibili,
piuttosto che sottoporsi a rigidi vincoli di alleanza.
A metà degli anni Venti, la strategia della Comit si differenziò da quella
dellʹaltro grande istituto creditizio di Milano, il Credito italiano. Questʹultimo
rallentò la propria attività di insediamento per concentrare le energie sulle aree
già toccate dalle filiali 4 , prediligendo la compartecipazione in istituti bancari
associati, mentre la Comit proseguì con la creazione di affiliate che le
garantissero il controllo diretto delle attività. In linea con questa politica, la
Banca Commerciale avviò una seconda fase di espansione, divenendo negli
anni Trenta la principale rete multinazionale bancaria verso cui gli istituti di
credito indirizzassero le proprie attenzioni.
Sul finire degli anni Venti, la Comit, con sede centrale a Milano e più di
cento sedi in Italia, aveva già consolidato il proprio insediamento all’estero
grazie alla realizzazione delle sedi di Londra, Smirne, New York e
Costantinopoli, allargando successivamente il bacino di penetrazione attraverso
nuovi e diversi istituti di partnership bancaria, tanto in Europa quanto in altri
continenti. In Europa occidentale erano state aperte affiliate in Francia
(Comitfrance) e nella Svizzera italiana, presso Lugano, Bellinzona, Chiasso,
Locarno, Mendrisio; in America del sud, dove la Comit aveva la direzione del
Banco italiano in Perù e delle sue sette sedi, del Banco di Guayaquil in Ecuador
e dove gestiva, assieme alla Francia, Sudameris ‐ la Banca francese e italiana per
l’America del sud, con sede a Parigi e dislocata in Brasile, Argentina, Cile e
Columbia ‐. La Comit era inoltre presente in Nordamerica, con le trust companies
di New York e Boston. Era in corso l’apertura della filiale di Smirne (1929).
3 R. Di Quirico, op. cit.; G. Toniolo, op. cit., 1994.
4 Cfr. S. Cassese, op. cit.
F.R. Lenzi, La Banca Commerciale Italiana
33

Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
Infine, vi erano le associate o affiliate della Comit nell’area danubiano balcanica: la Banca
Commerciale polacca – con 21 filiali ‐; in Grecia, con tre filiali e la prossima costituzione di
Comitellas (1929); la Bulcomit, in Bulgaria, con quattro filiali; in Romania, la Romcomit, a
Bucareşt, in Cecoslovacchia,con la Boehmische Bank di Praga e più di venti filiali; in
Ungheria, in Croazia e persino in Africa, in Egitto, con le sedi di Alessandria, de Il Cairo e
altre tre filiali 5
.
Dal Rapporto di risanamento della Banca Commerciale, stilato nel 1933 6
, emerge che
le dipendenze della Comit all’estero, ossia le filiali dirette, le affiliazioni e le banche
associate, ebbero tutte il compito comune di dedicarsi allo sviluppo del lavoro delle
banche locali, con una particolare attenzione al finanziamento del traffico con l’Italia.
Riguardo alla specifica funzione di ciascuna di esse nella strategia di sviluppo della
Comit, le dipendenze vennero catalogate in tre grandi categorie geografiche. Nella prima
furono incluse le filiali del Nordamerica e dell’Europa occidentale. Le filiali di New York
e di Londra costituirono i principali nodi di rappresentanza e di contatto con i massimi
centri finanziari internazionali, pertanto ebbero la funzione di aprire alla Comit i rispettivi
mercati di sbocco e da allora svolsero il compito di tesorerie per dollari e sterline,
concedendo i relativi crediti di corriere. A tal fine, esse avrebbero dovuto essere sempre in
possesso di fondi importanti, da ottenere in parte attraverso la loro stessa clientela.
Tuttavia, il ridotto afflusso di disponibilità nel periodo di crisi costrinse queste filiali a
ricorrere in misura crescente al supporto della Commerciale di Milano. Una simile
funzione ebbe anche Sudameris con riferimento alle piazze di Parigi e al movimento di
franchi francesi del gruppo Comit, oltre ad essere la riserva centrale di liquidità per le
dipendenze del Sudamerica. Dunque, questo primo gruppo fu caratterizzato dal compito
comune di essere il punto di riferimento dei mercati di sbocco su larga scala, quindi anche
datore di fondi e di liquidità. Una simile funzione fu condivisa anche con le tre BCI Trust
nordamericane, con la Comitfrance e con la Banca della Svizzera italiana 7
.
Il secondo gruppo comprese le filiali in Sudamerica, ossia in Brasile, in Uruguay, in
Argentina, in Cile, in Colombia, il Banco Italiano di Lima e il Banco Italiano di
Guayalquir. Questi stabilimenti, come le altre banche europee in Sudamerica, nacquero
come sostituti delle banche di emissioni, procurando
5 Banca Commerciale Italiana e Romena ‐Relazione del Consiglio di Amministrazione e rapporto dei Sindaci
sull’esercizio 1928, in ASBI, Raccolte diverse, Relazioni e Bilanci, pratt., n. 624, doc. 40. 6 ASBI, Banca
d’Italia, Direttorio Azzolini., pratt., n. 80, fasc. 1, sfasc. 1, p. 138. 7 Al giugno 1933 la Comit doveva a
queste tre filiali oltre 50.000.000 di lire, mentre i capitali investiti valevano 91 milioni. ASBI, Banca
d’Italia, Direttorio Azzolini, pratt., n. 80, fasc. 1, sfasc. 1, p. 139.
F.R. Lenzi, La Banca Commerciale Italiana

Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
all’economia di quei Paesi, ancora coloniali, il credito necessario per il
finanziamento dei raccolti mediante operazioni self‐liquidating 8 di cambio su
Londra. Più avanti, a seguito dello sviluppo dei sistemi bancari autonomi e con
il complicarsi della struttura economica e delle difficoltà del commercio
internazionale, tale attività andò restringendosi fino a che le banche europee in
Sudamerica si rivolsero in misura crescente al lavoro locale, fornendo appoggio
nelle colonie e alle iniziative dei connazionali immigrati, avvalendosi degli
strumenti locali anziché far riferimento alle sedi centrali. Le Comit di New York
e di Londra e Sudameris restarono tuttavia le fornitrici di credito per le
operazioni di cambio e di accettazione e per condizioni di straordinaria
difficoltà ‐ come avvenne al verificarsi dei prelievi presso il Banco italiano di
Lima, in seguito alla caduta del vecchio Banco de Perù y Londres, per cui la
filiale di New York aprì telegraficamente un credito di riserva di 4.000.000 di
dollari ‐. Al 30 giugno del 1933 questo secondo raggruppamento di filiali
doveva alla sede di Milano 28 milioni, mentre l’investimento della Comit nei
loro capitali ammontava a 80 milioni circa.
Il terzo gruppo, infine, si componeva delle Commerciali dell’area
dell’Europa orientale, dei Balcani e del Levante ‐ comprendendo anche la
Grecia, l’area turca e l’Egitto ‐, e vide la Comit stessa quale autrice principale
dei fondi, in via diretta o come intermediaria, anche a prescindere dai capitali
investiti. Le dipendenze di questo gruppo erano debitrici alla Commerciale
italiana di 270.000.000 lei di cui quattro da parte della Romcomit, la quota
minore rispetto a tutte le altre sedi (Handlobank 50 milioni, più gli affari
polacchi per 165 milioni, Bulcomit 22 milioni, Comitellas 8 milioni, tra le altre),
mentre la quota di capitale posseduta dalla Comit era, alla stessa data, di 106
milioni. Durante gli anni Venti e in parte degli anni Trenta, questo terzo
raggruppamento di dipendenze si espanse fino a coprire tutta l’area che era
appartenuta agli Imperi centrali, attraverso la creazione di numerose succursali.
In particolare le filiali di Polonia, Ungheria, Romania e Bulgaria entrarono
rapidamente a far parte delle maggiori banche di riferimento nei Paesi in cui
operavano. Un posto importante fu rivestito anche dalle filiali della Comit in
Turchia e in Egitto (Comitegit). Al contrario, ancora in fase di osservazione per
l’eventuale sviluppo successivo era la dipendenza jugoslava, mentre scarsa
importanza aveva, al 1933, Comitellas nel panorama del sistema bancario greco,
e la dipendenza di Comitfrance in Marocco.
Infine, nell’Europa centrale, la Banca Commerciale fu rappresentata da un
ufficio stabilito a Berlino con puro compito informativo e di contatto e dalla
8 L’operazione self‐liquidating è una forma di operazione a premio di periodo limitato: a fronte di
un impegno economico e di contributo in denaro del partecipante, è prevista la corresponsione
di un premio.
F.R. Lenzi, La Banca Commerciale Italiana
35

Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
filiale della Itabanca, l’affiliata italiana, a Vienna, anch’essa con ridotti compiti
di contatto.
Le realtà bancarie generate dalla Comit in quegli anni risultarono essere
non solo, e non tanto, appendici e filiali dipendenti dalla banca di Milano, bensì
veri e propri attori partecipanti e interagenti con la struttura organizzativa della
Comit 9 . Lo spartiacque per l’espansione all’estero di Comit venne segnato
profondamente dalla ristrutturazione del sistema bancario italiano degli anni
Trenta e dalle vicende che seguirono. Con l’operazione Sofindit, realizzata tra il
1931 e il 1935, allʹindomani della sua liquidazione, Comit trasferì alla società le
partecipazioni azionarie e tutto il personale che si occupava della gestione delle
partecipazioni 10 . Al termine della travagliata fase di trasformazione, il 20 marzo
1933, Toeplitz si dimise e fu sostituito dal giovane Raffaele Mattioli insieme con
Michelangelo Facconi 11 . I due amministratori delegati assieme al nuovo
direttore Giovanni Malagodi diedero corpo ad una profonda riforma
dell’apparato bancario, introducendo processi di meccanizzazione e rivedendo
le modalità di studio dei crediti e la valutazione delle prospettive reddituali
delle imprese. La Banca Commerciale Italiana venne convertita da “banca
mista” a “banca commerciale”, sullo sfondo dell’affermarsi dello Stato
imprenditore e dell’economia corporativa. L’avvicinarsi del secondo conflitto
globale e l’acuirsi delle caratteristiche autarchiche e di controllo dei cambi del
regime, posero termine alla vocazione e il ruolo internazionale di Comit 12 .
9 Si può ritenere che il 1928 sia stato il momento culminante nei rapporti tra i mercati finanziari
internazionali e le banche italiane: giunse a maturazione un equilibrio tra i maggiori istituti di
credito negli scambi con le diverse aree finanziarie mondiali. La crisi dell’anno successivo
costituì la terza tappa di un percorso in cui la penisola fece i conti le proprie debolezze
sistemiche: la strategia di sviluppo e internazionalizzazione finanziaria adottata dall’Italia era
stata basata su una serie di variabili non controllabili dagli stessi attori. La Comit e il Credito
Italiano vennero travolti dal deficit di liquidità e ancora una volta fu necessario l’intervento
dello Stato per sostenere l’industria. Dalla ʺRelazione Cda Romcomit Bilancio 1928” in ASBI,
Raccolte diverse, Relazioni e Bilanci, pratt., n.624, doc.40; ASBCI, Milano, Carte Mattioli, cart. 3,
fasc. II, parte 2, p. 136.
10 Sul tema: G. Toniolo, op. cit., 1978, pp. 284‐352; G. Rodano, op. cit.
11 Cfr ASI‐BCI, Segreteria e copialettere di G. Toeplitz; Copialettere di Enrico Marchesano; Segreteria
degli amministratori delegati e Carte Mattioli. Sul passaggio di consegne di Comit da Toeplitz e
Mattioli, il collasso della banca e il ruolo di Beneduce di “cerniera” tra Mattioli e il governo
Mussolini, si veda: F. Pino, “Mattioli, Raffaele”, voce bibliografica in Dizionario biografico degli
italiani, Treccani, vol. 72, Roma 2008; G. Malagodi, “Il ʹsalvataggioʹ della Banca commerciale nel
ricordo di un testimone”, in Industria e banca nella grande crisi, 1929‐34, a cura di G. Toniolo, Etas
Libri, Milano 1978; A. Millo, Lʹélite del potere a Trieste. Una biografia collettiva 1891‐1938,
FrancoAngeli, Milano 1989.
12 Sulla crisi bancaria degli anni Trenta in Europa e in Italia si veda: AA.VV., Le istituzioni
finanziarie degli anni Trenta nell’Europa continentale, collana di ricerche economico finanziarie del
Banco di Roma, ed. Mulino, Bologna 1982.
F.R. Lenzi, La Banca Commerciale Italiana
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Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
Il Manifesto di Ventotene: nuove fonti dʹarchivio*
di Giulia Vassallo
In questi ultimi anni, la riscoperta e la valorizzazione del Manifesto di Ventotene,
sia come lascito prezioso della Resistenza italiana, sia come archetipo ancora
fecondo di una concreta progettualità politica europeista e federalista, hanno
disvelato agli studiosi le diverse “zone d’ombra” rimaste addensate attorno allo
scritto pontino.
Tralasciando di illustrare nel dettaglio i nodi problematici del testo – i
quali, peraltro, sono stati puntualmente elencati e discussi nell’ambito di studi
recenti sull’argomento 1 ‐ obiettivo del presente lavoro è quello di offrire alcuni
spunti interpretativi relativamente a singole questioni aperte, ovvero a) in
merito alla diffusione e circolazione del documento, nelle differenti versioni, sul
continente e all’estero e b) circa il ruolo effettivamente svolto da Eugenio
Colorni nella fase di elaborazione dello scritto, rivelatosi, stando alle ultime
acquisizioni, ben più significativo di quanto comunemente ritenuto.
Le ipotesi avanzate in appresso, che si auspica risultino scientificamente
attendibili e documentate, sono il frutto di un lavoro di ricerca condotto da chi
scrive sulle fonti contenute in archivi per così dire “minori”, cioè, da quanto
risulta dalla letteratura, tra i meno frequentati dagli esperti della materia. Più
precisamente, si allude agli archivi romani della Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso
* Il presente articolo riproduce in parte il testo della relazione dal titolo: “Contributi alla
precisazione della storia del Manifesto di Ventotene sulla base di fonti archivistiche meno
conosciute” presentata da chi scrive alla XVI Summer School dell’AUSE (Venezia, 12‐13 luglio
2012), sul tema: “Crisi e rilancio dell’UE. Percezioni e approcci interdisciplinari”.
1 Per una ricostruzione dettagliata del dibattito sugli aspetti ancora poco chiari del Manifesto di
Ventotene si veda G. Vassallo, Il Manifesto di Ventotene: premesse per un’edizione critica, in
«Eurostudium3w», aprile‐giugno 2011, n. 19, pp. 4‐125, in particolare le pp. 10‐14, ove si
precisano gli storici che hanno individuato tali aspetti controversi e le ipotesi formulate in
merito.
G. Vassallo, Il Manifesto di Ventotene
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Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
– Fondo Lelio Basso – e dell’Associazione Nazionale per gli Interessi del
Mezzogiorno (ANIMI) – Fondo Manlio Rossi Doria – nonché all’archivio
dell’Istituto di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea (ISEC) – Fondo Arialdo Banfi
– di Sesto San Giovanni 2 .
Entrando ora in medias res, tra le carte consultate negli istituti sopra
menzionati è emerso un documento che potrebbe definirsi centrale, giacché, al
di là del suo interesse intrinseco, ha finito per costituire un punto di partenza
essenziale per avviare ulteriori indagini e individuare nuove chiavi di lettura.
Ci si riferisce, per la precisione, alla copia dattiloscritta del Manifesto di Ventotene
conservata nel Fondo Basso, serie “Resistenza”, la quale è intitolata “Manifesto
per un’Europa libera ed unita” 3 ed è stata catalogata come la versione del
Manifesto pubblicata a Roma nel 1944, a cura di Eugenio Colorni. Tuttavia,
confrontando tale documento con l’edizione romana dello scritto federalista,
balza agli occhi una difformità che potrebbe definirsi strutturale, vale a dire la
differente suddivisione in capitoli. In effetti, se il documento del Fondo Basso
costituisse effettivamente una copia del Manifesto del 1944 dovrebbe presentarsi
suddiviso in tre parti, laddove, viceversa, si riscontra una ripartizione in quattro
capitoli, cioè una struttura analoga a quella dell’edizione a stampa del Manifesto
pubblicata sul n. 1 dei «Quaderni del Movimento Federalista Europeo»
all’indomani del convegno di fondazione del MFE, a Milano, nell’agosto 1943.
Non solo. Procedendo ad un esame più approfondito del testo dell’archivio
Basso, ossia ad un confronto sia con la copia del 1943, sia con la versione del
Manifesto modificata da Colorni, risulta che, a livello di singole parole o di
punteggiatura, il documento dell’archivio Basso presenta maggiori
corrispondenze con l’edizione romana che con la versione del Manifesto
stampata a Milano. I risultati della collazione inducono pertanto a supporre che
la copia conservata da Basso rappresenti una versione per così dire intermedia
del documento, la quale, presumibilmente, costituiva il testo in circolazione
negli ambienti dell’antifascismo socialista tra il 1942 e il 1944. Di più. Si
potrebbe addirittura ipotizzare che tale versione del Manifesto possa
rappresentare l’esemplare su cui lavorò Eugenio Colorni nella preparazione del
suo volume Problemi della Federazione Europea, pubblicato, come si è detto più
sopra, a Roma nel 1944.
2 Tutti gli archivi menzionati afferiscono al progetto “Archivi on line”, promosso e realizzato
dal Senato della Repubblica. In virtù di ciò, oltre alla base dati, parte del materiale cartaceo
conservato nei suddetti istituti è stato digitalizzato ed è consultabile online sul sito
http://www.archivionline.senato.it/
3 Cfr. Archivio della Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso, Fondo Lelio Basso, serie 7, sottoserie 1, UA
5, sfasc. 2, 6 Comunicato, “Manifesto per l’Europa libera e unita” e ivi, 5 Appunti, “La
situazione rivoluzionaria: vecchie e nuove correnti”.
G. Vassallo, Il Manifesto di Ventotene
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Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
A sostegno di quest’ultima ipotesi interviene, del resto, una lettera 4 dello
stesso Colorni a Spinelli e Rossi, che i due ex confinati di Ventotene ricevettero
per il tramite di Guglielmo Usellini 5 . Nella missiva, il filosofo milanese, volendo
giustificare la scelta di scrivere di proprio pugno la prefazione del documento,
precisa di non aver potuto reperire l’edizione milanese del Manifesto. E per di
più lascia intendere, utilizzando il plurale “non siamo riusciti ad avere”, che
l’intero gruppo socialista, in cui egli militava e che operava clandestinamente a
Roma, si era trovato nell’impossibilità di ottenere una copia della versione
stampata all’indomani del convegno in via Poerio 6 . Un dettaglio non certo di
poco conto, giacché consente di aggiungere un tassello importante all’opera di
ricostruzione della storia del Manifesto di Ventotene, in quanto chiarisce che
l’edizione romana dello scritto federalista fu realizzata sulla copia che allora era
in circolazione tra i socialisti, cioè su una versione del Manifesto precedente alla
prima edizione a stampa. Ipotesi, quest’ultima, che induce a sua volta ad
assimilare il dattiloscritto che costituì la base su cui lavorò Colorni alla copia in
possesso di Lelio Basso e poi confluita nel suo archivio.
È la testimonianza di Manlio Rossi Doria, del resto ‐ raccolta nei suoi
“Quaderni e Diari”, a loro volta conservati nell’archivio dell’ANIMI ‐, a
confermare che Lelio Basso, e più in generale i gruppi socialisti clandestini attivi
in Italia tra il 1941 e il 1944, vennero in contatto con il Manifesto già all’indomani
della sua seconda stesura (agosto 1941). E a costituire il tramite tra costoro e i
confinati federalisti, Colorni in particolare, sarebbe stata Ursula Hirschmann,
che effettuava frequenti viaggi da Ventotene a Milano – “fungeva da
fenicottero”, secondo l’espressione di Rossi Doria – e che si occupava di tenere
al corrente il terzetto ventotenese del dibattito in corso sul continente 7 . Lelio
4 La lettera è conservata in Archivio Storico dell’Unione Europea (ASUE), Fondo Altiero Spinelli
(AS) 3, Lettera di Usellini (Moreno) contenente una lettera di Colorni (Aldo) a Altiero Spinelli e Ernesto
Rossi, 15 febbraio 1944, p. 2. Va precisato che la lettera non è firmata né è esplicitata l’identità
del latore. Le informazioni qui riportate, tuttavia, si desumono da una nota di Spinelli, a
margine della lettera stessa.
5 Guglielmo Usellini (1906‐1958), infatti, collaborava all’epoca con Colorni alla redazione de
«L’Unità europea» e militava tra le file dell’antifascismo socialista. Sull’attività svolta da
Usellini a favore del federalismo europeo si veda quanto affermato da P.S. Graglia in “Altiero
Spinelli tra atlantismo e Terza Forza: De Gasperi, Adenauer, Nenni (1948‐1969)”, in P. Craveri,
G. Quagliariello (a cura di), Atlantismo e europeismo, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2003, pp. 293‐
330.
6 “Abbiamo pubblicato i vostri scritti in un elegantissimo libretto che uscirà fra tre o quattro
giorni, e di cui vi accludo una bozza del frontespizio. Ho dovuto fare io la prefazione, perché
non siamo riusciti ad avere una copia del Manifesto che avevate pubblicato a Milano”. Cfr.
Lettera di Colorni a Spinelli e Rossi, cit.
7 Cfr. Archivio dell’Associazione Nazionale per gli Interessi del Mezzogiorno d’Italia (ANIMI),
Fondo Manlio Rossi‐Doria, Quaderni e diari, UA: 39, Ricordi e testimonianze sul PdA e
G. Vassallo, Il Manifesto di Ventotene
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Basso, inoltre, non risulta fra i partecipanti al convegno in casa di Mario Alberto
Rollier, cosa che contribuisce ad alimentare la convinzione che la copia del
Manifesto in suo possesso rappresentasse un esemplare antecedente alla prima
versione a stampa dello scritto. Lo stesso esemplare, viene quindi da
presumere, su cui lavorò Eugenio Colorni 8 .
L’accenno a Ursula Hirschmann apre il campo a un’altra questione ancora
oggi oggetto di discussione tra gli studiosi, ovvero lʹidentificazione di chi fu
coinvolto nell’opera di riproduzione dattiloscritta del manoscritto federalista
che Ursula, Ada Rossi e le sorelle di Spinelli, Gigliola e Fiorella, e
verosimilmente anche Cerilo Spinelli, si occuparono di trasportare attraverso il
Tirreno, fino alle principali città della penisola 9 . In proposito, è opportuno
tenere in considerazione quanto emerge dal ricordo di Arialdo Banfi 10 , il quale
sostiene che, nel 1942, “trovandosi ancora a Milano in licenza” 11 , entrò in
contatto, per il tramite di suo fratello Gian Luigi, “Giangio”, amico di vecchia
data di Mario Alberto Rollier, con il fratello di quest’ultimo, Guido, da cui
interlocutori vari, Ricordi del P.d.A., Lettera a Leo Valiani, febbraio 1968. Il brano è riportato anche
da E. Paolini, in Altiero Spinelli. Dalla lotta antifascista alla battaglia per la federazione europea, Il
Mulino, Bologna, 1996, p. 240, nonché da Michele Strazza, Melfi terra di confino Il confino a Melfi
durante il fascismo, Edizioni Tarsia, Melfi, 2002, p. 97.
8 Che Colorni e Basso fossero in costante, reciproco contatto in quel periodo emerge peraltro da
due lettere conservate nel Fondo Lelio Basso. La prima, datata 3 dicembre 1975, è indirizzata ad
Antonio Andrisano e recita come segue: “Mi pare di aver così chiarito quale sia stato il mio
contributo all’attività politico‐organizzativa da un lato […] e attività politico‐ideologica nelle
discussioni con Morandi, Luzzatto, Colorni, e altri. Fu del resto per questa mia attività che,
quando cercammo di ricostruire le fila di un movimento organizzato durante la guerra, che poi
sboccò nel MUP”. Cfr. Archivio della Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso, Fondo Lelio Basso Serie 25
corrispondenza, Lettera 687, Lelio Basso a Antonio Andrisano, 3 dicembre 1975. La seconda, inviata
ad Ursula Hirschmann, del 20 ottobre 1973, riferisce di un rapporto intenso e di un proficuo
scambio di carattere politico‐ideologico tra Basso e Colorni nel periodo compreso tra il 1927 e il
1938. Ivi, Lettera 488, Lelio Basso a Ursula Spinelli, 20 ottobre 1973.
9 Per una ricostruzione dettagliata del dibattito in corso sulle modalità di trasferimento del
Manifesto dalla colonia confinaria al continente cfr. G. Vassallo, Il Manifesto di Ventotene…, cit.,
pp. 45‐49.
10 Alla testimonianza di Banfi ricorre anche Cinzia Rognoni Vercelli, nell’intento di tratteggiare
il panorama geografico e politico in cui circolò il Manifesto all’indomani della sua stesura
definitiva. Cfr. C. Rognoni Vercelli, Mario Alberto Rollier un valdese federalista, Edizioni
Universitarie Jaca, Milano, 1991, p. 72.
11 Nel 1942, Arialdo Banfi era tenente dell’esercito e operava lontano dal fronte, in una zona
cosiddetta di “guerra non guerreggiata” in Sicilia. Contratta l’ameba, che Banfi indica come
“una malattia assai diffusa tra i settentrionali mandati al Sud”, riuscì a trascorrere diversi mesi a
Milano “e partecipare così ad attività antifasciste sia pure in ruoli marginali”. Cfr. ISEC, Fondo
Arialdo Banfi, b. 37, fasc. 81, serie 6, UA 81, ff. 19208‐19213.
G. Vassallo, Il Manifesto di Ventotene
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Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
ricevette l’invito a copiare a macchina “i fogli giunti da Ventotene” 12 . Non si
trattò certo di una richiesta casuale. I federalisti allora raccolti attorno a Rollier,
infatti, avevano senz’altro considerato la condizione privilegiata in cui si
trovava Banfi, il quale, in quanto militare, godeva di un ampia libertà di
movimento, sia in Italia, sia all’estero. Da qui l’idea di affidargli un ruolo
strategico, che certo non avrebbero gli altri antifascisti noti alla polizia del
regime, nell’opera di diffusione del Manifesto entro e fuori dai confini nazionali.
In effetti, l’impegno profuso da Banfi nel favorire la circolazione dello
scritto pontino tra gli antifascisti presenti nelle zone ove egli veniva inviato per
ragioni di servizio mostra che l’ipotesi di un suo coinvolgimento diretto nella
militanza federalista fu oltremodo feconda. Nel ricordo del futuro senatore
socialista:
[…] anche mio fratello era stato richiamato ed era a Chiavari; gli portai una copia del manifesto
ed anche lui cominciò a farlo circolare tra ufficiali antifascisti di Chiavari…
Tornato in Sicilia ho portato copia del manifesto agli amici Pasqualino Noto (lui era medico e
dirigeva una clinica, lei, Lia, era pittrice, amica di Guttuso, Barbera, Franchina cui mi ero legato
da amicizia quando, nel 1933, avevo fatto a Palermo la scuola Allievi Ufficiali.
[…] Prima di prendere il treno per la Francia, con la trepidazione e l’angoscia che ben potete
immaginare – un’antifascista [sic] che andava in un paese occupato dai fascisti – passai da
12 Ibidem. “Nel mese di marzo del 1942 fui dimesso dall’Ospedale militare di Palermo ed inviato
in convalescenza a Milano, a casa mia, dove restai fino alla fine di maggio: in quel periodo
Guido Rollier mi parlò per la prima volta di due antifascisti condannati dal Tribunale Speciale
fascista e internati nell’Isola di Ventotene, certi Rossi e Spinelli che avevano, insieme ad altri
confinati, scritto un manifesto in cui essi proponevano che, alla fine della guerra, l’Europa tutta
si unisse in una Federazione Europea. Visto il mio interesse per queste idee Guido Rollier mi
chiese se ero disposto a copiare a macchina il documento che mi avrebbe fatto avere e a farlo
circolare clandestinamente fra amici di cui fosse possibile fidarsi. Fui d’accordo con la proposta
di Guido Rollier su cui Mario Rollier fu più esplicito e mi raccontò che era venuta a Milano
Ursula Hirschmann, moglie di Eugenio Colorni portando una copia del manifesto col compito
di diffonderlo tra gli antifascisti di ogni opinione politica ma con molta cautela.”. È lecito
supporre, in tale contesto, che “i fogli” che Banfi accettò di “copiare a macchina” fossero già
stati “purificati” da Mario Alberto Rollier di quegli eccessi anticlericali di ascendenza rossiana
che erano presenti nel manoscritto ventotenese – per la precisione la frase: “… e dovrà
riprendere la sua opera educatrice per sviluppare lo spirito critico in modo da liberare le
coscienze da ogni residuo di trascendenza” ‐ e che compaiono nella versione del Manifesto
pubblicata nel «Bollettino n. 1» del Movimento “Popolo e libertà”, il quale costituisce, con tutta
probabilità, la prima edizione a stampa del documento e per il cui esame dettagliato si rimanda
a G. Vassallo, Il Manifesto di Ventotene…, cit., p. 41, n. 111 e a M. Frosio Roncalli, L’origine dei
un’idea: il nesso fra federalismo e unità europea nel Manifesto di Ventotene, in «Storiadelmondo», n.
12, 14 luglio 2003, ‹http://www.storiadelmondo.com/12/frosioroncalli.ventotene.pdf›. A tale
proposito, è opportuno sottolineare che anche la copia dattiloscritta del Manifesto conservata
nell’archivio Basso è priva di quel passo, ma conserva ancora, come l’edizione del 1943, la parte
sui rapporti Stato‐Chiesa, la quale è stata invece definitivamente espunta da Colorni.
G. Vassallo, Il Manifesto di Ventotene
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Eurostudium 3w luglio-settembre 2012
Milano […] ed incontrai anche gli amici tra cui Mario e Guido Rollier e Riccardo Lombardi che
avevo già conosciuto […]
Con l’incoscienza giovanile e forte della mia divisa di ufficiale presi il treno che allora collegava
Torino con Nizza via Cuneo, Mentone: nella valigia […] alcune copie del manifesto federalista.
[…] Utilizzando la mia notevole libertà di movimento sono andato a trovare due ufficiali amici
da tempo, che sapevo essere antifascisti: uno era Emilio Castellani, il ben noto traduttore di
Goethe, germanista insigne, morto da poco; egli era ad Annecy. Castellani era stato comunista e
credo che allora lo fosse ancora: poi fummo insieme del [sic] Partito d’Azione e poi in quello
socialista; l’altro era l’Avv. Gino Boeri, figlio di Giovan Battista Boeri deputato prima del
fascismo, antifascista militante come suo padre […] Con questi due prendemmo accordi sul
lavoro da fare ma, intanto, consegnai quel poco che avevo che, in realtà, erano solo alcune copie
del Manifesto di Ventotene. 13
Volendo riassumere, sulla base di tali dichiarazioni, la copia del Manifesto
che Banfi, con le sue “due ditina” 14 , aveva dattiloscritto intorno alla fine del
maggio 1942, pervenne dapprima in Sicilia, transitando negli ambienti vicini a
Guttuso e a Lia Pasqualino Noto, arrivò poi oltre il versante francese delle Alpi,
toccando Nizza, e da lì, presumibilmente, raggiunse i circoli dei fuoriusciti
italiani in Francia. Tra i quali militava da tempo Silvio Trentin, che, com’è noto,
fu l’autore della traduzione in francese del Manifesto. Viene da chiedersi, a
questo punto, se la copia cui fece riferimento Trentin per la sua traduzione non
fosse il testo che Banfi, “con trepidazione e angoscia” portò con sé dall’Italia sul
treno verso Nizza. E certo non può sfuggire, a chi si interroghi in tal senso, il
ricordo di Ursula Hirschmann 15 , secondo cui Trentin ricevette il Manifesto nella
primavera del 1942 e si occupò successivamente della sua diffusione tra i
resistenti transalpini 16 .
Senza dimenticare infine, a chiusura del cerchio, che la copia dattiloscritta
da Arialdo Banfi potrebbe verosimilmente corrispondere al testo del documento
dell’archivio Basso. A rendere plausibile tale ipotesi è quanto affermato dallo
stesso Banfi, il quale, in un ricordo circa i suoi rapporti con il leader socialista,
13 Cfr. A. BANFI, cit., ff. 19211‐19214. Questo passo della testimonianza di Banfi, resa in
occasione del Quarantennale del MFE e pubblicata in «Il Federalista», XXV, n. 4, dicembre 1983,
pp. 162‐4, è citato anche da Cinzia Rognoni Vercelli nella seguente versione: “Con le dita
inesperte cominciai a copiare il Manifesto federalista e a diffonderlo tra gli amici che sapevo
antifascisti”. Cfr. C. Rognoni Vercelli, Mario Alberto Rollier…, cit., p. 72 e n.
14 Ivi, f. 19127, ARIALDO BANFI.
15 L’informazione è desunta da Piero Graglia, nel suo articolo Il federalismo proudhoniano di Silvio
Trentin, in
http://www.progettoitaliafederale.it/Il_federalismo_proudhoniano_di_Silvio_Trentin.htm#28. A
sua volta, Graglia precisa di aver fatto riferimento al più volte citato volume di C. Rognoni
Vercelli, Mario Alberto Rollier…, cit., p. 72 e note.
16 In tale contesto, una collazione tra la traduzione del Manifesto ad opera di Trentin e il
documento conservato nell’archivio Basso – che chi scrive si ripromette di realizzare a breve
termine ‐ potrebbe offrire ulteriori, importanti chiarimenti.
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indica nel “gruppo Rollier” il veicolo essenziale dell’incontro 17 . Cosa che lascia
supporre che sia Basso, sia Banfi avessero accesso ai medesimi documenti
provenienti da Ventotene, e diffusi, come si è visto nella testimonianza di
Manlio Rossi Doria, da Ursula Hirschmann 18 .
In conclusione, le informazioni fornite da Banfi sembrano rivestire una
grandissima rilevanza, sia per ripercorrere la “corsa pel mondo” ‐ a dirla con
Bauer 19 ‐ compiuta dal Manifesto una volta abbandonate le sponde dell’isola
pontina, sia per tentare di collocare il documento dell’archivio Basso in un
contesto dai contorni meno sfumati. Peraltro, che il futuro senatore socialista sia
un testimone attendibile è confermato, seppure indirettamente, dallo stesso
Altiero Spinelli. Lo si desume da una lettera inviata a Momi (questo il
diminutivo di Arialdo), il 22 agosto 1986, da Ursula Hirschmann. Quest’ultima
infatti, accingendosi a pubblicare “il secondo volume delle Memorie” di Altiero
‐ lasciato incompiuto da Ulisse, recentemente scomparso ‐ e trovandosi a dover
completare un “torso incompiuto”, relativo al “primo convegno del 27 agosto
1943”, chiedeva l’aiuto dell’amico ex senatore, precisando che era stato lo stesso
Altiero, non sicuro “di ricordare il nome di tutti i partecipanti”, ad aver lasciato
scritto “di chiedere a te [Banfi, ndr.] di integrare la lista” 20 .
Il fatto che anche Spinelli giudicasse oltremodo affidabile la memoria di
Arialdo Banfi, inoltre, induce ad accordare credibilità a un’altra preziosa
informazione che emerge dalle carte del suo archivio, relativa a Colorni e al suo
ruolo di ispiratore consapevole, insieme a Rossi e a Spinelli, del Manifesto. Più
nel dettaglio, Banfi sostiene che, già a partire dal 1938, mentre Colorni, pochi
mesi prima del suo arresto dirigeva, a Milano, il Centro interno socialista,
“alcuni intellettuali antifascisti” tra cui “Leonardo Borgese”, “Bongiovanni e
Usellini” si riunivano al “Bar Craja (un bar pasticceria sito in Piazza
Filodrammatici a Milano)” e “discutevano del fascismo e del dopo fascismo” 21 .
In particolare, sostiene Banfi, questi gruppi si mostravano particolarmente
sensibili al tema della “crisi degli Stati nazionali democratici che avevano
favorito la nascita del fascismo” e, scoppiata la guerra, cominciarono a
interrogarsi su come “contribuire a creare le premesse perché, a guerra finita
con la vittoria delle forze democratiche antifasciste, si potesse creare una
Europa Unita su basi democratiche” 22 .
17 Cfr. http://www.leliobasso.it/testimoni/itestimoni_banfi_testo.htm
18 Cfr. supra, n. 7.
19 Cfr. R. Bauer, Quello che ho fatto. Trent’anni di lotte e di ricordi, Cariplo‐Laterza, Bari, 1987, p.
122.
20 Cfr. ISEC, Fondo Arialdo Banfi, b. 37, fasc. 81, serie 6, UA 81, f. 19226, Lettera di Ursula Spinelli
a Arialdo Banfi, Sabaudia, 22 agosto 1986.
21 Cfr. A. BANFI, cit., f. 19210.
22 Ibidem.
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Ora, di là dall’interesse che tale informazione riveste per se stessa – tale da
sollecitare, in futuro, un qualche ulteriore approfondimento ‐, particolarmente
significativa risulta, in questa sede, la presenza, all’interno del circolo del Bar
Craja, di Leonardo Borgese, con cui Colorni aveva “sempre avuto rapporti di
amicizia” 23 e col quale intratteneva un fitto scambio epistolare di carattere
eminentemente politico‐intellettuale 24 . Ciò detto, è lecito supporre che anche
l’allora direttore del Centro interno socialista fosse al corrente dei contenuti di
quelle riunioni, se non, azzardando un’ipotesi più ardita, che avesse
partecipato, seppure indirettamente, al dibattito. Certo è, ad ogni modo, che
Eugenio Colorni arrivò a Ventotene già nutrito di cultura europeista e di spunti
di riflessione sul tema dell’Europa federale. Lo attesta, peraltro, Giuseppe
Aventi (pseudonimo di Giuseppe Paganelli) nel suo Diario di Ventotene, allorché
afferma di aver visto Colorni e Spinelli “affaccendati… attorno a un loro
progetto di federazione europea” già il 29 agosto 1939 25 . Ben prima, quindi,
dell’arrivo di Ernesto Rossi (che raggiunse l’isola nel novembre di quello stesso
anno 26 ), il quale, stando a quanto di recente emerso dagli studi di Antonella
Braga, sembrerebbe aver apportato alla riflessione europeista ventotenese il
contributo decisivo, in termini di formulazione di un concreto “programma
d’azione”, per avviare la stesura del Manifesto 27 . E lo stesso Manlio Rossi Doria,
23 È lo stesso Eugenio Colorni a testimoniare il suo antico legame di amicizia col Borgese nel
corso dell’interrogatorio precedente la propria assegnazione al confino: “Confermo che con i
nominati Paolo e Piero Treves, Borgese Leonardo, Luzzatto Lucio, ho sempre avuto rapporti di
amicizia, specifico che ho affermato di non essere fascista ma non di essere antifascista”. Cfr.
ACS, Ministero dell’Interno, DGPS, Divisione Affari Generali e Riservati, Confinati Politici, b.
271, fasc. Eugenio Colorni, R. Prefettura di Trieste a Ministero dell’Interno, Trieste, 28 dicembre 1938.
Fu Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, padre di Leonardo, di cui Colorni era allievo all’Università di
Milano, a favorire l’incontro tra i due. Per una ricostruzione più approfondita del rapporto tra
Colorni e i Borgese cfr. M. Degl’Innocenti, “Introduzione a Eugenio Colorni”, in Id. (a cura di),
Eugenio Colorni dall’antifascismo all’europeismo socialista e federalista, Piero Lacaita Editore,
Manduria‐Bari‐Roma, 2010, pp. 5‐108, qui pp. 39‐40.
24 Cfr. ACS, Ministero dell’Interno, DGPS, Divisione Affari Generali e Riservati, Casellario
Politico Centrale, b. 1422, Copia dell’appunto della Div. Pol. Politica in data 13. 12. 1938. Recita il
documento: Dallo spoglio della voluminosa corrispondenza sequestrata al Colorni sono rimasti
confermati i suoi rapporti coi Treves, col Borgese e con altri noti sovversivi”.
25 Cfr. G. Aventi (Giuseppe Paganelli), Diario di Ventotene, Galata, Genova, 1975, p. 58.
26 Cfr. A. Braga, Un federalista giacobino. Ernesto Rossi pioniere degli Stati Uniti d’Europa, Il Mulino,
Bologna, 2007, p. 155.
27 Ivi, pp. 134‐154. Stando ad Antonella Braga, a testimoniare che, già prima del suo arrivo a
Ventotene, Ernesto Rossi aveva dato carattere pragmatico alla propria riflessione sugli Stati
Uniti d’Europa è una lettera alla madre, del 30 aprile 1937, nel cui sommario “solo il primo e, in
parte, il secondo punto appaiono dedicati ai riferimenti ideali che dovevano sostenere la
battaglia per gli Stati Uniti d’Europa. Nei rimanenti punti sono invece delineati i termini
generali di uno specifico programma d’azione […] Molti degli argomenti qui indicati
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in una lettera a Leo Valiani del febbraio 1968, non manca di sottolineare che “il
Manifesto di Ernesto e di Altiero” è “anche opera di Eugenio Colorni” 28 .
Prima di concludere, si rende opportuna una riflessione, volta
essenzialmente a motivare lʹinteresse storiografico per una rilettura più
completa e sistematica del Manifesto di Ventotene. Lo scritto pontino, per certi
versi, è da ritenersi prodotto particolarmente virtuoso di una crisi estesa a vari
livelli. È scritto nel 1941, l’anno più critico della seconda guerra mondiale.
Come progetto, nasce dalla lucida constatazione sia della crisi della civiltà
europea, sia di un’altra crisi, irreversibile, dello stato nazionale. È espressione di
uno smarrimento profondo a livello di coscienza individuale, quello che vivono
gli autori del documento – e insieme a loro buona parte dei gruppi progressisti
europei. I quali non soltanto, come nel caso di Spinelli, cominciano a soffocare
nella rigidità dottrinale dei partiti d’appartenenza, ma soprattutto, come
recentemente rilevato 29 , soffrono il “tradimento dell’Urss”, consumatosi nella
firma del patto Ribbentrop‐Molotov, il 23 agosto del 1939. E quest’ultimo,
sempre in accordo con tale giudizio, rappresenta un tornante decisivo, “su cui
forse ci si è meno soffermati” 30 , per generare un rovesciamento di prospettive e
far intravedere nella soluzione federale europea un nuovo ideale, integro e
concretamente perseguibile, verso cui riconvertire le speranze e intorno al quale
far convogliare l’entusiasmo dirompente di quanti ancora credevano nel valore
della libertà e della democrazia europea.
Letto in questa prospettiva, il Manifesto di Ventotene acquista un significato
di straordinaria attualità, cosa che costituisce uno stimolo ulteriore a
proseguirne lo studio e l’approfondimento, anche con l’ausilio di nuove fonti
archivistiche, che attendono soltanto di essere esplorate.
torneranno nel Manifesto di Ventotene […] ma ciò che più conta è rilevare come nel documento
del 1937 sia già presente l’elemento decisivo che differenzia il Manifesto da altri progetti
federalisti, precedenti o coevi, ossia quello di considerare l’unità europea non come più un
astratto ideale, ma come l’obiettivo prioritario di una specifica azione politica”. Cfr. Ivi, pp. 146‐
147.
28 Cfr. Lettera a Leo Valiani, febbraio 1968, cit., p. 5. Tale affermazione, è però necessario precisare,
si pone in contraddizione con quanto affermato da Altiero Spinelli nell’intervista rilasciata a
Sonia Schmidt, ove si legge: “Colorni non ha avuto parte alla redazione. Perciò nel pubblicarlo
poi in Problemi della Federazione europea, egli ha posto solo le iniziali A.S. e E.R. e non le sue”. Cfr.
S. Schmidt, “Intervista con Altiero Spinelli”, in A. Spinelli e E. Rossi, Il Manifesto di Ventotene,
Guida, Napoli, 1982, pp. 171‐174.
29 Cfr. F. Gui, “Spinelli, Colorni e il Manifesto di Ventotene”, in F. Zucca (a cura di), Eugenio
Colorni federalista, Pietro Lacaita Editore, Manduria‐Bari‐Roma, 2011, pp. 25‐37.
30 Ivi, pp. 29‐30.
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The OSS in the Italian Resistance: A Post Cold War Interpretation
by Claudia Nasini
The Italian Resistance requires a more complex account than that traditionally
portrayed by official historiography, which mostly claims that Italian Partisan
Patriots constituted the core of Resistance to Nazi rule 1 . New evidence, from
both the US and Italian intelligence archives, shows that numerous American
agents, hundreds of Italian government soldiers and countless fully‐fledged
American spies of Italian nationality participated in the Liberation of Italy.
This article explores the missing part of the story of the Resistance in the
VI Partisan Ligurian Zone in the Northwest of Italy. It describes the manifold
cooperation between Italian and American agents in support of local Partisans.
It also shows how several factors hindered traditional historiography, not only
ideological bias – albeit very important – but also the protagonistsʹ preference
for secrecy 2 . Last but not least, the prolonged lack of documentation played an
1 This interpretation not only appears in the renown work ‐ rather outdated but still considered
a point of reference in this field – by R. Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana (8 settembre 1943‐
maggio 1945), Torino, Einaudi, 1964, p. 528 and passim. This idea has also recently been
maintained in the work by D. Ellwood, “Gli alleati e la Resistenza”, in E. Collotti, R. Sandri, F.
Sessi (ed. by), Dizionario della Resistenza. Storia e geografia della Liberazione, vol. I, Torino, Einaudi,
2001, in particular pp. 246‐248. This interpretation reemerges in equally renown reconstructions,
particularly one we will return to dwell upon, that of one of the main Italian expert of Partisan
Resistance, G. Bocca, in his Storia dell’Italia partigiana. Settembre 1943‐maggio 1945, Milano,
Mondadori, 1995, pp. 164‐168. Originally published in the mid‐60’s, the work has been
republished several times until the mid‐90’s. Finally, it is worth noting that even today
Badoglio’s Government, the Italian Monarchy and the refunded post‐1943 Italian Army (the
three backbones of the so‐called ʺKingdom of the Southʺ) are highly neglected topics in Italian
historiography on Italian Resistance; see on this topic E. Aga Rossi, Una nazione allo sbando,
Bologna, Il Mulino, new corrected edition, 2003, pp.12; 17.
2 On the many historiographical ʺgapsʺ in Italian literature see E. Aga Rossi’s review “Alleati e
Resistenza in Italia” in Id., L’Italia nella sconfitta, Esi, Naples, 1985, particularly pp. 192; 197.
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important part. The raison dʹÉtat of the Italian and US governments kept both
OSS and SIM (Italian Military Intelligence) archives ʺclassifiedʺ until a few years
ago. Evidently, there were some ʺtop secretʺ affairs to keep quiet, such as the
OSS’s habit, for instance, of enrolling Italians as fully‐fledged U.S. military
personnel 3 . At the same time, the Italian government’s compliance with – or
more exactly, submission to ‐ this American practice was not something to be
proud of, from the Italian side.
The article will show how, in practice, many SIM agents and Italian
soldiers ended up operating inside the Resistance thanks to the missions ran by
the OSS. These Italian nationals took orders straight from the Americans in the
context of Allied strategies. The US services recruited these men in prison and
detention camps 4 and turned them into secret service agents under direct
orders from Washington. They were subject to US laws of war 5 . It is clear that
their nature as agents for both SIM and OSS was unknown to their fellow
Partisans. In practice, former Italian soldiers operated in the context of certain
OSS missions; as well as, in the most embarrassing cases, former SIM agents
deserted their own services, choosing to join the US forces. These men earned
the resentment of Italian commanding officers who threatened after the war to
consider them true and proper deserters. However, the contribution of these
very agents proved indispensable to strengthening the Patriots’ war against the
Nazi‐fascists though they were half way between spies and fighters, defenders
of the fatherland and mercenaries working for foreigners.
3 To begin by late spring of 1944, the Americans began to recruit into OSS former Italian
Government military personnel. To the latter was asked to sign contracts that turned them into
U.S. soldiers in all respects. This practice, adopted by that time until the end of the Italian
Campaign was in stark contrast with military laws, which does not provide for military
personnel to move from its national army to that of another country.
4 Starting from October 1943 the Allies set up some camps in the South of Italy for the re‐
ordering, recovery and subsequent re‐employment of Italian military personnel who had
disbanded following the armistice. At the same time, the Allies also used numerous former
Italian prisoners who had been purposely freed and subjected to Allied command. Even today
there is no comprehensive study on Italian co‐belligerency, a reconstruction of the Italian Army
after the 8 th of September is in the volume by S. Loi, I rapporti fra Italiani e Alleati nella
Cobelligeranza, S.M.E. Ufficio Storico, Roma, 1986, pp. 74‐75. Loiʹs work, however, does not
mention the former Italian military personnel and prisoners employed by the Allies.
5 See further on in the article the quoted final report by the OSS Major Andre Pacatte in NARA,
RG 210, Entry 210, box, 80, folder 6, doc. 2599/9. Report of Major Andre Pacatte first written in the
field later expanded and corrected, in particular p. 46. Major Pacatte, from the landing in Sicily until
April 1945 was with an OSS Secret Intelligence detachment working alongside the 5 th American
Armata and was one of the major players in planning the envoy of Italian agents in occupied
Italy.
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Finally this article, by introducing and analyzing the role of SIM in the
context of the collaboration with the American OSS counterpart, allows for a
reading of the Resistance which for the first time takes into account the
presence of another important protagonist, that is, the Italian authorities of the
Southern part of Italy, liberated by the Anglo‐Americans, upon which SIM
depended. Besides the Italian Partisans (led by some of the future leaders of the
Italian political parties) and Anglo‐American intelligence services, there was a
third element which has until now completely neglected by historiography.
This further protagonist was, until June 1944, the so‐called “Kingdom of the
South”; namely, the military Government of General Pietro Badoglio centered
in the Southern Italian seaport of Brindisi. After June 1944 Badoglio’s
Government was replaced by the “Rome’s Government” which came to include
the re‐born Italian anti‐Fascist parties and was transferred to Rome. Until the
Liberation the “Rome’s Government” was led by one of the less investigated
Prime minister of Italian history, that is, the statesman Ivanoe Bonomi.
The total omission – conscious or not – of this third protagonist essentially
has two explanations. On the one hand, we repeat, there was the question of
“secrecy” and a total absence until very recently of almost any documentation
relative to the Italian and US intelligence services at the time of the war. On the
other hand, the historiographical ʺgapʺ can be explained by what Italian
historian Leopoldo Nuti defined as an ʺunresolved issueʺ in Italian
historiography on the Cold War which, nevertheless, had recognized the
importance of the international scene on Italian history. That is, the substantial
difficulty such literature has in discerning the specific “causal connections”
which make internal Italian politics a direct consequence of what happens on an
international level. As Nuti has observed, the evolution of the international
context can help clarify the Italian history only if historians bring to light the
concrete bonds which connect the two dimensions 6 . Besides, Nuti indicates a
second aspect, just as important as the first, from an interpretative point of
view. This is the need for historians to establish the room for maneuver of the
political ʺagencyʺ which was in any case exercised by the minor power as it
interacted with the greater powers 7 . The influence of the post‐revisionism of
Gier Lundestad is evident here. According to Nuti, in fact, when Lundestad
“stresses the invitational aspects of much of [American] expansion [in Europe
6 L. Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e lʹapertura a sinistra. Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia,
Roma‐Bari, Laterza, 1999, ʺIntroduzioneʺ, p. VIII.
7 Ibidem.
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during the Cold War]” 8 he is making a very useful statement in understanding
the Italian case 9 .
This text, in the footsteps of other important works 10 aims – if not to
resolve Nutiʹs issue regarding the relationship between Italian Resistance and
the United States – to attempt to at least ask the right questions so as to
correctly address future research. Was the collaboration among secret services,
before and during the Badoglio and Bonomi Governments, totally imposed by
the Americans and if not, to what extent was it the product of a dialectic
between Washington and Brindisi (and then Rome)? In other words, to what
extent were the Italian political forces and/or the leaders of the re‐born parties
in the South forced to passively accept the US influence in the decision to set up
ʺjointʺ secret services in support of the Partisans of the North? Or, rather, did
those same forces, (or at least a part of them) decide to exercise an active role of
their own when they put SIM into play? Certainly from the evidence one can
deduce that these questions are all but inappropriate.
****
By way of a preface, it is important to keep in mind the significance of the
Resistance in Italy. In national representation, the Italian Partisan formations
(aligned to the reborn Italian political parties), fighting against the Nazi‐fascists,
restored dignity to Italy after the Fascist experience. Did the new‐born Italian
Republic need redemption from its totalitarian past? Italian historiography
manufactured this experience of atonement: the so‐called ʺmyth of Italian
Resistanceʺ. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s both Marxist and Crociana (inspired
by the inheritance of liberal historian Benedetto Croce) historiography absorbed
8 G. Lundestad, The American Empire and other Studies of US Foreign Relations in a Comparative
Perspective, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 55‐56. See also Id., Empire by
Invitation? The United States and Western Union. 1945‐1952, in «Journal of Peace Research», 23,
(September 1986): 263‐77; Id., Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration,
1945‐1997, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998; Id., The United States and Western Europe since
1945: from “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003.
9 Cfr. L. Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e lʹapertura a sinistra, op. cit., p. XVI.
10 It is not possible here to address a complex debate such as the one on the political agency of
the minor powers as compared to the stronger American ally during the Cold War. See on the
topic, among many others, J.L. Gaddis, New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American
Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspective, in «Diplomatic History», 14 (Summer 1990), p. 442
and fll. Among the Italian scholars who have substantially contributed to the issue of the
dialectic between hegemonic/minor powers, see in particular L. Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l’apertura a
sinistra…, op. cit.; C. Spagnolo, La stabilizzazione incompiuta: il Piano Marshall in Italia, Roma,
Carocci, 2001; M. del Pero, L’alleato scomodo. Gli USA e la DC negli anni del centrismo (1948‐1955),
Roma, Carocci, 2001.
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this account of Italian Resistance. After all, both schools claimed for their own
political faction the leadership of the Italian Partisans 11 . The more valiant the
Italian Resistance, the better for the Communists, Catholics, Liberals or
whoever claimed the guidance of the movement. In this representation, there
was no space for American and British support; let alone for the refunded
Italian Army and its intelligence arm (SIM), both remnants of the Fascist
regime. On the contrary, either Crociani and Marxist historians claimed that the
Anglo‐Americans had somehow prevented a stronger development of the
Italian Resistance. Italian Prime Minister Pietro Badoglio and the Army
(markedly royalist) had also been associated in the plot. The fear of
Communism preponderance within the Resistance had led to this project of
ʺcontainmentʺ. Consequently, Anglo‐American military aid ‐ belatedly
delivered ‐ had been scarce, ineffective and targeted to specific supposedly
conservative Partisan formations (that is, anti‐Communists aligned with
Badoglio) 12 .
Regarding the role of the Bonomi Government in the Resistance (though
this is an hardly covered topic by Italian historiography) the general judgment ‐
not to say prejudgment ‐ of that Government policy is by no means
benevolent 13 . In sum, according to traditional readings both the Anglo‐
American and Italian authorities assigned to intelligence the goal of weaving a
sort of ʺsanitary cordonʺ around the Italian Partisans. Thus, both the OSS and
SIM’s role within the Resistance has been considered coercive rather than
supportive 14 . In this context, whilst the interpretation of the role of SIM in the
Resistance remains substantially unvaried, even those authors who in the mid‐
80s began to acknowledge the contribution provided to Partisans by the Anglo‐
Americans were not able to fully appreciate its extent 15 . The aid was
substantially quantitatively under‐estimated as was therefore its capacity in
significantly influencing the Italian Resistance.
11 On the issue of politically oriented historiography see M. Kelly’s review of Italian Resistance
scholarship, The Italian Resistance in Historical Transition: Class War, Patriotic War or Civil War? in
«Eras Journal», http://arts.monash.edu.au/publications/eras/edition‐4/kelly.php. On the political
uses of the past in Italian historiography, is also worth noting R.J.B. Bosworth, The Italian
Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism, London,
Arnold, 1998.
12 For some Italian scholars, among many others, who have claimed this ʺcontainmentʺ strategy
see note one above.
13 See, among others, G. Boccaʹs opinion, Storia dell’Italia partigiana…, op. cit., passim.
14 Ibidem.
15 In particular see also E. Aga Rossi, ʺAlleati e Resistenza..., op. cit.; and M. De Leonardis, La
Gran Bretagna e la resistenza partigiana in Italia (1943‐1945), Naples, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane,
1988, passim.
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The truth would appear somehow different from what, again Leopoldo
Nuti, has derogatory labeled as the ʺvulgataʺ on Italian Resistance traditionally
accredited by national historiography 16 .
As this article will illustrate, at least in the VI Partisan Ligurian Zone (an
area covering parts of the Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy and Emilia regions of
Italy) the word ʺintelligenceʺ cannot be used as a synonym for ʺcontainmentʺ or
ʺanti‐Communismʺ 17 . New documentation on intelligence regarding the VI
Zone reveals that historians should carefully reconsider relations between the
local Partisans, the American OSS and Badoglio’s SIM. The still in progress
opening of the archives of the OSS at the National Archives and Records
Administration (N.A.R.A.), in Washington DC, has made available an
impressive quantity of unpublished information on the activities of the
American intelligence in Italy, through the years 1943‐45 18 .
16 Nuti labelled in this way the bulk of Italian historiography on the Cold War. See L. Nuti, Gli
Stati Uniti e lʹapertura a sinistra…, op. cit., p. XI.
17 Only very recently have the first studies appeared in Italy which, in evaluating the support
the Anglo‐Americans gave to the Resistance, keep proper account of the decisive role played by
SIM in supporting the Italian Partisan movement. See C. Nasini, “Guerra clandestina ed identità
nazionale. Il contributo dei servizi informazioni alleati e italiano alla Resistenza (1943‐1945)”, in
AA.VV., Studi Storico‐Militari 2007, Roma, SME Ufficio Sorico, 2009, pp. 509‐543; and Id., “La
missione americana Walla‐Walla nella VI Zona Operativa Ligure Partigiana”, in AA.VV., Studi
Storico‐Militari 2005, Roma, SME Ufficio Storico, 2007, pp. 615‐633. Concerning the role of SOE
and OSS missions in support of the Resistance also see the recent work by Tommaso Piffer
which however does not grasp the full extent, and even plays down, the importance of the role
played in that context by SIM or in any case by agents of Italian nationality, T. Piffer, Gli Alleati
e la Resistenza italiana, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2010.
18 In the Eighties the CIA started transferring to NARA the very first folders of the circa 6000
cubic feet of documentation which it held since the end of the war. Also very important it has
been the declassification following the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 2000 which has
allowed for the opening of documents until that momento withheld by the CIA. Following this
Act, a further 4000 pages of previously classified documentation have been made available at
NARA. Equally fundamental was the declassification on August 2008 of a further 35,000 OSS
personal files (circa 750,000 pages) which describe in detail the activities of a myriad of OSS
operatives both in the home offices of Washington DC, New York and San Francisco and in the
dozens of OSS outposts all over the world, in particular in Europe, North Africa and Asia. For
Italy, these rounds of declassifications, as well as the meticulous filing job done by the
Americans, offer for the first time the opportunity to isolate ʺhomogeneous unitsʺ of documents
about the Italian Resistance inside a foreign archive. In other words, the archive of the OSS
today allows historians to locate the actual Allied decision‐making centers and their policy
towards the Partisan formations. On the difficulties until very recently in isolating
documentation about the Resistance in foreign archives see G. Perona, Ricerche archivistiche..., op.
cit., p. 90. More complex is the situation concerning the imposing archive of the Italian SIM,
which after being temporarily opened to research a few years ago is currently being re‐ordered
in the Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito (AUSSME) in Rome.
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A great quantity of this material regards specifically the activities of OSS
in support of the Italian Resistance and also, in the same context, OSS
connection with the Italian counterpart alias SIM.
It is worth here mentioning also the further (similarly neglected)
important protagonist of this ʺclandestine networkʺ, that is, the British Special
Operations Executive (SOE) 19 . At least in the VI Zone, after the Armistice of
September 1943, not only American but also British agents, cooperated with
Italian SIM in implementing combined operations intended to support local
Patriots 20 . Digging further into SOEʹs activity in Italy is another important task
awaiting scholars. First of all, because OSS documents suggest that SOEʹs
determination to support the Italian Partisans was as strong as that of the
Americans. Secondly, because a deeper analysis of SOE military aid might help
to refute the largely acknowledged interpretation according to which the British
had an essentially ʺanti‐anti‐Fascistʺ attitude during their 1943‐1944 presence in
Italy.
Even important scholarly works, such as those of British historian F.W.
Deakin and Italian scholar Massimo De Leonardis, have helped convey a
misleading idea about relations between SIM and British SOE. Once more, in
fact, the true size of this collaboration has not been fully appreciated.
Furthermore, De Leonardis infers that prevalently the British –mostly at the
very beginning of the Italy Campaign ‐ used Italian SIM agents (mainly
conservative if not openly outright monarchists). SOE, in fact, was forced to
employ these Italians by the economics of war, that is, in order to spare the use
of British personnel. According to the Italian historian, a different attitude was
adopted by the Americans. Being probably more ʺdemocraticʺ they totally
19 It goes beyond the scope of this present work to examine the activity of the SOE in the context
of the Italian Resistance. As recently pointed out by the official SOE historian, M.R.D. Foot
(SOE, London 2010), as of this date there is no comprehensive scholarly work in Great Britain or
in English language on the role of the British Services during the Italy Campaign. Therefore,
only what newly emerges on the matter from the OSS documentation will be reported. On the
matter also see the memoirs of the British Major Andrew Croft (A Talent for Adventure, Hanley
Swan, London, 1991), commander of the Brtish SOE in Corsica. In Italian language see instead
on the matter M. De Leonardis, La Gran Bretagna, op. cit.; the chapter on the SOE of the quoted
work by T. Piffer, Gli Alleati e la Resistenza italiana, op. cit.. Important is also the testimony of OSS
Captain Albert Materazzi, interviewed extensively in Washington by the Author during
summers of 2004 and 2005.
20 Needless to mention that during WWII throughout the whole Europe OSS and SOE
Headquarters accorded to Partisan warfare behind the enemy line a high strategic value. See in
particular G.C. Chalou, (ed. by) The Secrets War. The Office of Strategic Services in World War II,
N.A.R.A., Washington DC, 1992.
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shunned the use of SIM agents 21 . The truth, again, is more complex. In fact, after
a slow start the OSS soon gained ground over the British counterpart and by the
end of the Italy Campaign it could boast (also due its greater resources) a much
more consistent role than that of the British, especially in terms of supplies and
agents sent 22 . In this context, what is more significant is that it was mainly OSS
which employed SIM agents, and not the British. The Americans used the
Italian services without reservations, and not only at the beginning of the
Resistance. Though still not investigated much, the clandestine network thus set
up by the intelligence services reached an unimaginable dimension, both in
terms of the extent and complexity of the network as well as of people involved.
Although at the current state of research, it is impossible to establish the exact
number of men who took part in establishing such a network in the entire Italy,
yet, it is possible to estimate a number for the VI Zone. On the basis of OSS and
SIM documents as well as of existing (although scarce) literature, it is accurate
to say that around 130 agents operated in the local Resistance working for both
Italian and Anglo‐American services 23 . It is also important to keep in mind
when considering this number that the VI Zone was only one area of the Allied
21 In the same line of thought also C. Delzell, I nemici di Mussolini, op. cit., p. 300; E. Aga Rossi,
“Alleati e Resistenza…, op. cit., note 19, p. 203. More recently D. Ellwood has expressed a partly
different view cfr. D. Ellwood, Gli alleati e la Resistenza, op. cit., p. 245.
22 See C.F. Delzell, The American OSS and the Italian Armed Resistance, op. cit., p. 363.
23 As far as scholarship is concerned, it is here important to mention the volume by Colonel
Antonio Lanfaloni, one of the chief of SIM during the Italy Campaign, upon whom we will
return later in this article. According to Lanfaloni’s account, in the Ligurian area alone, between
October 1943 and April 1945, the Italian SIM provided the SOE with 18 agents and 8 sabotage
instructors in what were called ʺreconnaissance and operationalʺ missions. To these agents must
be added the men who took part in the combined OSS/SIM missions which will be dealt with in
more detail in this text. These are the agents belonging respectively to the Operational Groups
(O.G.s) and Secret Intelligence (S.I.) sections of the American OSS which, during the same period,
were delivered in Liguria through amphibious landings and airdrops. These included, for
instance, the 15 Italo‐American agents of the O.G. “Walla‐Walla” mission in Liguria; the
following 16 agents of the O.G. “Peedee” mission and the further 13 agents of the last operational
mission to reach Liguria, the “Roanoke”. Finally, it must be considered, still only taking the
Liguria area into account, the personnel employed in the five S.I. missions which were
simultaneously activated in the region to take part in building the underground network itself.
These were the “Lobo”, “Piroscafo” and “Maria Giovanna” missions each composed of an
agent and a radio‐telegrapher; and the so‐called ʺcellʺ missions, which will be again specifically
addressed later in this article. Each cell mission (alias “Locust ” and “Meridien”) counting
effective agents, informers, sympathizers and guides (in any way paid by or answering to OSS)
amounted to a personnel of at least 30 individuals. Overall, therefore, as previously mentioned,
during the Italy Campaign over 130 men operated in the sole VI Zone of Italy. See A.Lanfaloni,
L`azione dello Stato Maggiore Generale per lo sviluppo del movimento di Liberazione, S.M.E. Ufficio
Storico, Rome, 1975, pp. 76‐87; 96‐99.
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subdivision of occupied Italy. There were several other ʺZonesʺ where there
must have similarly been operating other agents.
Regarding the specific focus of this article, that is, the ʺcombinedʺ Italian
and US missions, it is important to stress that their efforts along with arms and
munitions, provided the Partisans with radio operators and sabotage
instructors who proved no less essential in order to conduct effective warfare
against the Nazi‐fascists. Furthermore, these teams supplied clothes, food,
medicine and financial support which also proved paramount for the guerrillas.
It is also worth noting that this aid was provided without discriminations
between the different political factions, Communists included.
OSS Organization and Action Plans in Italy: the False Swiss Lead
Recently the historian David Ellwood noticed how in Italy, in spite of the
importance of OSS as a ʺmediatorʺ between the Resistance and the High Allied
Command, this intelligence has been little covered by the historiography 24 . No
studies have been conducted on OSS’s relations with the Allied political and
military authorities. Similarly, little is recorded about contacts between OSS and
the Italian Government, while even less is known about OSS’s procedures in
Italy; in the first place, very little is known, for instance, about the process
through which OSS recruited personnel to send on missions behind enemy
lines; secondly, the information sources of the organization remain obscure;
finally, the exact way by which OSS contacted Partisan formations is
unrecorded 25 . The new OSS documentation shows that, especially in the initial
phase of the Italian Campaign, OSS mainly used personnel belonging to Italian
SIM 26 . These documents are also a useful source to comprehend, on the one
hand, the strategy pushing the two intelligence services to an early and effective
collaboration and, on the other, the specific procedures of the combined
operation.
One reason for historiography’s lasting omission on the importance of SIM
is the tendency for studies to focus on Switzerland. Nearly all historiography
assumes that Switzerland was where the most important contacts between
Anglo‐American intelligences and the Italian Resistance took shape 27 . More to
24 D. Ellwood, Gli alleati e la Resistenza italiana, op. cit., p. 245.
25 Ibidem.
26 Some hints about SIM personnel employed by OSS, are in C.F. Delzell, I nemici di Mussolini,
op. cit., pp. 304‐305 and Id., The American OSS and the Italian Armed Resistance, op. cit., p. 359.
27 Even the most recent scholarship still overestimate the importance of Switzerland when
analyzing relations between the allied intelligence service and the Italian Resistance, see, for
instance, even the 2010, in many respects accurate volume, by T. Piffer, Gli Alleati e la Resistenza
italiana, op. cit., in particular pp. 65‐71.
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the point, most of these authors have often pointed out that not much came
from these initial contacts, with no significant help for the nascent Italian
Resistance movement 28 . However, this circumstance does not correspond to the
reality depicted in OSS documents.
In other words, whilst until today the literature has concentrated on the
importance of the relationships entertained in (and via) Switzerland between
the Milan Partisan entourage, OSS and SOE base in Switzerland (Berne and
Lugano) and the Mediterranean Allied Command (AFHQ), OSS archive
material shows a different picture. It reveals how from 1943 OSS ʺItalian
sectionʺ developed a vast network of relations with eminent Partisans leaders
(even at top levels) within occupied Italy. These links proceeded in parallel with
those established in Switzerland, but ‐ and more importantly ‐ the Italian S.I.
connections proved more fruitful for the Partisans in terms of military aids than
the Swiss OSS channels. It is also important to note here that OSS took
advantage of Italian authorities’ offer to help in setting up such a network in
Northern Italy. OSS documentation allows for the first time for the
identification of the Italian key figures of this ʺsecretʺ network: besides
Badoglio, it included numerous ministers of the Italian Government such as the
Navy Minister (Raffaele De Courten) and the War and Finance Under‐
secretaries (Taddeo Orlando and Guido Jung). As stated in an OSS document
written in November 1943 from Italy and addressed to Whitney Shepardson,
head of the OSS/Secret Intelligence branch in Washington:
It is not often that contacts of this nature exist within the Cabinet of another government. It is
suggested that your Intelligence organization give serious and immediate thought to utilizing
these leads. We will give you every cooperation in this matter. 29
Since October 1943, and especially after the Italian declaration of war
against the Germany, therefore, numbers of officers of the Italian Navy and
Army, as well as of their respective intelligence services, were secretly
extricated from occupied Italy by OSS. Once transferred to Southern Italy,
Africa and Corsica, these officers were ordered to cooperate, with every
28 Among the authors complaining for lack of Anglo‐American support see, for instance, D.
Ellwood, Gli alleati e la Resistenza, op. cit., p. 247; see also G. Bocca, Storia dell’Italia partigiana..., op.
cit., p. 107 and passim.
29 Cfr. NARA, R.G. 226, Entry 210, box 119, folder 5, doc. 4692/3. OSS. OSS contacts in new Italian
Cabinet. 20 novembre 1943. See also on these connections between Italian and US intelligence
organizations the aforementioned long memorandum of OSS major Andre Pacatte in NARA,
RG 210, Entry 210, box, 80, folder 6, doc. 2599/9. Report of Major Andre Pacatte first written in the
field later exanded and corrected, in particular p 50. See also L. Marchesi, E. Sogno, C. Milan, Per la
libertá. Il contributo militare italiano al servizio informazioni alleato (8 settembre 1943‐25 aprile 1945),
Mursia, Milano, 1995, pp. 10‐24.
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resources and information in their possession, with the Italian SIM. The latter,
in fact, had been promptly reorganized by the Anglo‐American, under Colonel
Pompeo Agrifoglio in Brindisi 30 so as to start fuelling the Partisans in the
North 31 .
In more detail, important ties with the Italian Resistance were established
through the missions and activities of OSS Secret Intelligence (SI) section in
Italy, led by Captain Biagio Massimo Corvo. The other branches of the
American intelligence in Italy also played a very important role in establishing
ties with the Italian Resistance. These were namely the Operational Group
headed by Colonel Russell B. Livermore and the Special Operation unit, at length
commanded by a Captain of French origin, André Bourgoin 32 . These three
organisms, starting from that October of 1943, worked with the systematic
support of SIM 33 . The main objectives were to militarily support the Resistance
and connect its war effort with decisions from the Allied Mediterranean
Command (AFHQ). These were ʺcombinedʺ initiatives which started in centres
the OSS began to set up all over the Italian peninsula and in its islands as of July
1943. The first activated were in Palermo, La Maddalena, Brindisi, Bari, Caserta
and Naples (also Bastia in Corsica), and then came those in Siena and
Florence 34 . Through collaboration between the OSS and SIM, thus, numerous
30 On the reorganization of SIM under Anglo‐American guidance in Brindisi as early as in
October 1943, cfr. A.U.S.S.M.E., fondo I‐3, busta 43; fascicolo 4, Costituzione del C.S. alla data del
1° gennaio 1944; A.U.S.S.M.E., fondo I‐3, busta 43, fascicolo 4, Costituzione del C.S. alla data del 26
febbraio 1944; A.U.S.S.M.E., fondo I‐3, busta 43, fascicolo 4, Quadro di battaglia dell’Esercito
Italiano, foglio n. 12936 in data 9 maggio 1944 dell’Ufficio Operazioni – Comando Supremo;
A.U.S.S.M.E., fondo M‐7, busta 408, fascicolo 4, Costituzione dello Stato Maggiore Generale, foglio
n. 816/90/AV, in data 30 ottobre 1944 dello Stato Maggiore Generale. There has not yet been a
comprehensives study on the history of SIM after the armistice, especially concerning its
relations with the counterparts of Anglo‐American intelligence services. Much that is known
about the organization can be found in the volume by G. Pasqualini, Carte segrete dell’Intelligence
italiana 1919‐1949, Roma, RUD, 2006; also see S. Loi, I rapporti fra Italiani e Alleati nella
Cobelligeranza, S.M.E. Ufficio Storico, Roma, 1986, in particular pp. 74‐75 and passim.
31 Cfr. Major Andre Pacatte’s memorandum in NARA, RG 210, Entry 210, box, 80, folder 6, doc.
2599/9. Report of Major Andre Pacatte first written in the field later exanded and corrected, pp. 3‐51.
32 See on this issue Kermit Roosevelt (ed. by), The Overseas Targets: War Report of the O.S.S., New
York, 1976; an account of Kermit’s volume for Italy is in C.F. Delzell, “The American OSS and
the Italian Armed Resistance”, in R. Amedeo (ed. by), Le missioni Alleate e le formazioni dei
partigiani autonomi nella Resistenza piemontese, Minutes of the International Conference held in
Turin on 21‐22 October 1978, L`Arciere, Cuneo, 1980, pp. 353‐375.
33 Cfr. NARA, RG 226, Entry 211, box 47, folder 7. OSS‐ X2 Branch. 15 April 1944. In this
documents OSS/X2 section (counter‐espionage) suggested OSS Headquarter in Washington DC
to fully integrate SIM into OSS intelligence network in Italy.
34 Cfr. K. Roosevelt, The Overseas Targets, op. cit., passim.
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channels were opened connecting occupied Italy with its already liberated part
and with the Swiss centres.
Regarding Switzerland, as historian F.W. Deakin wrote, the ʺSwiss baseʺ
of Anglo‐American intelligence services was specifically a “listening post”.
Switzerland represented the “main operational office for gathering information
and creating lines of couriers” 35 . In Anglo‐American plans Switzerland was
therefore not the main site for the constitution of contacts and especially of the
logistic network with which to fuel the system of Allied supplies to the
Resistance.
As Max Corvo further recalls in his illuminating autobiography (which
takes into account the first OSS documents declassified in 1990), the Swiss office
ran by Allen Dulles always enjoyed a certain operational autonomy 36 . Many of
the initiatives taken by Dulles concerning the Italian Resistance were often
decided without the approval of the AFHQ, from which Dulles nominally took
his orders. His aim was especially to obtain military ‐ and probably also
political ‐ information on Italy from the Partisan leaders. Certainly, at the end of
1943, one of the main tools Dulles had for negotiations with Partisan leaders
was the promise of obtaining AFHQ support for airdrops for Patriots in the
mountains. These drops were however often not carried out, for various
reasons, the main one being the difficulties, until the late spring of 1944, of
communication between the Swiss and Brindisi bases where the structures for
these airdrops were located 37 .
As Corvo often recalled, later during the Italian Campaign, Washington
realized the importance of improving control over Swiss OSS activity. Starting
from mid 1944 Dullesʹs base was better coordinated with Italian OSS base in
35 F. Deakin, “Lo Special Operation Executive e la lotta partigiana”, in F. Ferratini Tosi, G.
Grassi, M. Legnani (ed. by), L’Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale e nella Resistenza, Milano, Franco
Angeli, 1988, p. 99.
36 Cfr. M. Corvo, La Campagna d’Italia, op. cit., p. 259. According to Corvo there were two reasons
for the autonomy enjoyed by Dulles compared to other OSS directors. In the first place, the
placing of the office in neutral territory favoured the development of his independence in
decision‐making at least until a certain point during the War. In second place, his autonomy
was due to the network of personal relationships Dulles had with influent members of the
establishment as future head of the CIA and brother of Eisenhower’s State Secretary, John
Foster Dulles.
37 Ivi, pp. 259‐260. The OSS documentation confirms Corvo’s opinion on communication
problems between the OSS bases in Italy and those in Switzerland. One document suggests how
this problem was never completely solved during the whole Italian Campaign. Cfr. NARA, RG
226, Entry 210, box 252, folder (9)wn10628, Report of Italian SI Desk, 31 March 1945, p. 3.
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Brindisi, as had not been the case until that moment 38 . Corvo summarizes and
concludes:
Towards the end of 1943, the clandestine movements of Milan contacted both Dulles and the
Bern SOE. The arrival of OSS missions from the South and the possibility of direct connections
with our base in liberated Italy reduced the importance of the Swiss offices in Lugano and Bern
with regards to clandestine activity. 39
Returning to the contribution provided by Badoglio’s services, what led to
the employment by OSS of soldiers provided by SIM were reasons of military
opportunity. In the first place, the undisputed training that the intelligence
personnel had over mere civilians as well as those who were simply former
Italian soldiers 40 . Furthermore, the fact that until 1943 (or even in the first half of
1944) Anglo‐American military commands were resolved not to risk the lives of
a great number of their soldiers in dangerous enemy territory. This practice
lasted until the Americans saw definite strategic advantages 41 . It was, therefore,
necessary to verify the worthiness of the Partisan nuclei, as well as the capacity
and reliability of their leaders. To ascertain these conditions was the task of SIM
personnel, more motivated than Anglo‐American soldiers in the awareness of
serving an important cause for their country. Only when the Partisan efficiency
and determination to fight became apparent did the Anglo‐American officers
come into the field.
Italian SIM gave OSS (and SOE especially at first) not only its operative
capacities and all the logistic structures and means it had, but above all its
numerous volunteers 42 . Most were former members of the disbanded Italian
armed forces. Most of these men had gone through the Front to reach their
38 In late spring 1944, a connection office between OSS/Switzerland and OSS/SI in Italy was
opened at AFHQ in Caserta and entrusted to the leadership of US Captain Homer Hall. The
lack of connection between the two bases had led to unpleasant consequences such as
noteworthy confusion in the traffic of information coming from Switzerland and Brindisi, being
often both simply labelled in Washington as “Italian Resistance”. This even led to double
airdrops or in worse cases, none at all. Among the various initiatives taken by Captain Hall
were sending an Italian OSS/SI mission to Switzerland, the Cassini team, so that it may act as
mediator between Dulles and Corvo. Cfr. M. Corvo, La Campagna d’Italia, op. cit., pp. 259‐260.
Concerning this issue we also recall the future Italian President Parriʹs remark, reported in the
work by Secchia and Frassati, whilst complaining of the lack in supply to the Lombard Alps,
Parri pointed out how in the Valleys of Lanzo, Pellice and Raia there had been simultaneous
requests from three or four different sources, in P. Secchia and F. Frassati, La Resistenza e gli
Alleati, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1962, p. 87.
39 M. Corvo, La Campagna d’Italia, op. cit., p. 259.
40 See memorandum drafted by OSS captain Bourgoin, NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, box 72, folder
2, doc. 002540/14, Report of captain Andre Bourgoin.
41 See M. De Leonardis, La Gran Bretagna e la resistenza partigiana, op. cit., p. 106.
42 See note 23 above.
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commands in southern Italy. After a quick training, these Italian soldiers were
provided with radios and infiltrated into occupied Italy. They were to make
contact with the first set of Partisan groups. As Deakin observed on the initial
activity of the British services in support of the Resistance:
Directed from Brindisi, and later from Naples, these activities were delegated [by British High
Command] to SOE and SIS. Within limits also made available to the British was the vast
network SIM had. Its experienced technical organization had agents and radio points in enemy
territory. In the following months Italian nuclei recruited through the SIM were sent by sea or
air to connect with the existing networks. 43
In other words, after an initial phase in which SIM sent single agents
mainly to gather information in the North, it was later employed in the
selection of chosen personnel to help the Anglo‐American services mount
missions of larger impact. It was especially this network of contacts and
activities which gave the Italian Resistance immediate and consistent
advantages in terms of military supply and support, more than had been
decided through the secret offices of Dulles and Mc Caffery (the latter being
chief of SOE) in Switzerland. In consideration of what has been said, not
surprisingly the airdrops organised by the Lugano meetings of November 1943
between Ferruccio Parri, Leo Valiani, Dulles and Mc Caffery were rather scarce.
Much more copious was the quantity of military aid given to the Partisans
which the latter, not without the help of the SIM, were able to establish with
OSS bases of Brindisi, in the rest of southern Italy and especially that of Bastia.
One Eloquent Case Study: the VI Zone of Occupied Italy
By April 1945 in the VI Partisan Ligurian Zone, American OSS support enabled
local Partisans to inflict considerable damage on Nazi‐fascist units. It also
helped the Patriots, on the one hand, to protect local infrastructures from
German scorched‐earth tactics during their retreat and, on the other, to liberate
the city of Genoa a good three days before the US Army’s arrival. All these
achievements, however, came about the effective intermediation of Italian SIM
agents.
The VI Operational Ligurian Zone was born in the summer of 1944 when
the local Partisan commanders named this large portion of territory. It included
the area between the eastern part of the Italian region of Liguria, the western
part of the Emilia‐Romagna, and the southern parts of Lombardy and
Piedmont. This area was of high strategic interest for the Allied Headquarters
43 W.F. Deakin, Lo Special Operation Executive e la lotta partigiana, op. cit., p. 108.
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since the beginning of the Italian Campaign44 . Although the Germans
considered the Ligurian and Piedmont Apennine mountains running across
central Italy as part of their defense barrier ‐ later to be named “the Gothic line”
45 ‐ the proximity of a large part of Liguria to the sea fostered the Allies’ plan of
penetrating the region through amphibious landings.
As evidence of the strategic importance of the area, early in the Italian
Campaign the Germans deployed some of their best divisions in this region and
also began to conduct ferocious terror retaliation against civilians46 . In this
context, as early as in October 1943 after the Italian Monarchy’s declaration of
war, Italian and Anglo‐American emissaries started to arrive in the region in
order to support local Partisans in their warfare. From the end of 1943, various
teams, originally formed by Italian SIM representatives, were thus delivered in
the Zone through airdrops and amphibious landings. The initial teams were to
encounter significant difficulties; the several German rastrellamenti (raking
operations) often caused severe casualties among the Italian agents47 .
The first Italians arrived from Southern Italy in the VI Zone – even before
it was officially constituted by the Partisans – at the end of October 1943. Unlike
the following Anglo‐American teams, the first SIM units were very small. They
usually contained no more than a couple of representatives, among whom was
a professional radio telegraphist. The limited size of these first units was due to
their essentially informative tasks. These missions were sent to occupied Italy
primarily to make a reconnaissance for the Allied Headquarters; they gathered
information on the Germans and made a preliminary analysis of the Partisans.
The estimates of the latter helped the Allies to understand the capacity of the
local Resistance. This enabled AFHQ to evaluate the significance of military
support that the Patriots – if adequately equipped – might provide to the
advance of mainline troops. SIM reports, thus, were one of the most important
sources in the Allies’ perception of the Partisans, and therefore played a major
part in the following AFHQ decision of sending further military aid and agents
to the Zone.
Two of the first SIM missions – codenamed VALENTINE and OTTO ‐
reached the area of Genoa (via Corsica) by end of November 1943. The story of
these two teams, strictly interconnected, well highlights the significance of the
44 See among the others G. Rosignoli, The Allied Forces in Italy. 1943‐1945, Parma, Ermanno
Albertelli Editore, 1989, p. 121.
45 As early as in November 1943, the Germans started to build heavy fortifications along the
Italian Appennines, ibidem.
46 On the German military strategy in the VI Zone see in particular P.P. Rivello, Quale giustizia
per le vittime dei crimini nazisti? L eccidio della Benedicta e la strage del Turchino tra storia e diritto,
Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 2002, pp. 95‐97.
47 G. Rosignoli, The Allied Forces in Italy, op. cit., p. 134.
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SIM’s emissaries for local Resistance. It also clearly shows how Italian
historiography has often neglected important pieces of the entire puzzle.
According to traditional accounts, the Allies’ decision to send the OTTO
mission to Liguria had been fostered by the local Partisans. By November 1943,
connections between the Ligurian Patriots and the Allies had supposedly been
developed through some Allied ex‐POWs. These soldiers had succeeded in
reaching the Allied Headquarters in Corsica with the Partisans’ help. Their
reports, on a valiant anti‐German Resistance in Liguria, had encouraged the
Allies to send the OTTO mission into the region. According to traditional
historiography, at the forefront of these first contacts was one of the most
celebrated leaders of the Resistance, the Genoese neurologist Ottorino
Balduzzi 48 . His organization, the Organizzazione Partigiana Otto (the Partisan
Otto‐Organization) has been celebrated as one of the most successful Resistance
network against the Germans.
As stated by this reading, in November 1943, Balduzzi helped an Allied
ex‐POW, the British officer Thomas Gore, to reach Corsica through a audacious
trip by boat. Gore informed the Allies of Balduzzi’s assistance and of the
Patriots’ resolution to establish contacts with the Allies. As a consequence of
Gore’s encouragement, the Allies had decided to send agents to Genoa. Since
then – and thanks to the Partisan enterprise ‐ contacts with the Anglo‐
Americans took on both consistency and continuity. On this account, the
episode of Gore’s rescue is considered the exclusive achievement of Balduzzi.
As recent documents reveal, the truth was somehow different. According
to some SIM files – as well as to the memoirs of British officer Andrew Croft –
the radiotelegraphist Paolo Risso and the engineer Emanuele Straserra arranged
Gore’s rescue. Both Risso and Straserra were, actually, SIM emissaries 49 . These
two agents managed the contacts and communication with the Allies, which
enabled Gore’s rescue. Balduzzi, from his side, only provided Gore a boat and
some Partisans who accompanied the British officer in the crossing. Both Risso
and Straserra were in Liguria as members of the SIM’s mission VALENTINE.
48 On Gore’s episode in Italian literature see, among the many others, P.E. Taviani, La resistenza
in Liguria e gli Alleati, in Missioni alleate e partigiani autonomi, op. cit., p. 267; C. Brizzolari, Un
archivio della resistenza in Liguria, Genova, Cassa di Risparmio di Genova ed Imperia, 1985, pp.
95‐98; 174‐177; Danilo Veneruso, Gli alleati e la resistenza in Liguria, in La Resistenza in Liguria…,
op. cit., pp. 30‐34; F. Fucci, I servizi d`informazione della Resistenza, in A. Mola (ed. by), La
Cobelligeranza italiana nella lotta di Liberazione dell`Europa, Roma, Ministero della Difesa, 1986, pp.
83 and fll. See also an author traditionally more unbiased as E. Sogno, La Franchi. Storia di
un’organizzazione partigiana, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1996, p. 230 and fll.
49Cfr. A.U.S.S.M.E. fondo S.I.M., div. 11, busta 11, doc. 12885. It is a OSS list including the names
of Italian agents operating in the Liguria area.
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The latter was probably the first Italian team sent from Corsica with the specific
purpose of rescuing Anglo‐American POWs 50 .
On the 3 rd of December 1943, the Italian navy officer Davide Cardinale,
one of the Balduzzi’s Patriots who accompanied Gore in Corsica, returned to
Liguria by boat. Cardinale had spent twenty days in an Allied training camp in
Algeria. Along with some weapons, he brought back with him to Liguria SIM
radiotelegraphist Silvio De Fiore 51 . From then on, De Fiore’s mission – indeed
codenamed OTTO – helped the Ligurian Partisans to establish regular
communications with the Allied Headquarters both in Africa and in Brindisi.
As a consequence of De Fiore’s underground activity, from the beginning of
1944 other missions started to land in Liguria.
Another important team was the CAP mission 52 . This mission reached
Genoa via the nearby Emilia‐Romagna in January 1944. The team, formed by
two Italian soldiers (who in October 1945 had volunteered into SIM), had left
the airport of Blida, Algeria, on the 28 th of October 1943. After two months of
reconnaissance activity among the Emilia and Tuscany Patriots, they were
ordered to move in the area of Genoa. Once in the area, the mission established
contacts with the local Partisans and started to prepare for the landing of
subsequent missions on the local coast. The commander of the mission, Vittorio
Cottini, and his radiotelegraphist Bruno Pagani, gathered for the Allies
information on several topics; topographic details of Liguria, including spots
easily accessible and not heavily fortified by the Germans; information on the
enemy garrisons; possible hiding‐places for agents and radiotelegraphic
equipment. Their reports also included information on possible spies, guides
and supporters who might cooperate with the Partisans; finally, they also
included dossiers on individuals who might help in various ways from the
reproduction of documents to purchase of motor vehicles and fuel.
The CAP was still in the area when three subsequent missions arrived in
the Zone on the 1 February of 1944. According to the navy officer Vittorio
Cottini, head of the CAP:
our mission helped other Anglo‐American representatives to land safely on the Genoa coast
and to reach the Partisans’ formations in the inner part of the Ligurian region. Once there these
50 Cfr. A. Croft, A talent for Adventure, op. cit., p. 195.
51Cfr. A.U.S.S.M.E., fondo S.I.M., div. 11, busta 111, doc 103252., S.M.G.‐Uffcio I, Attività agente‐
radiotelegrafista Silvio De Fiore, 30 dicembre 1945. Some hints about De Fiore are also in E. Sogno,
La Franchi, op. cit., p. 230 and fll.
52 Cfr. A.U.S.S.M.E. fondo S.I.M., div. 11, busta 111, doc 103188‐103189. This is a copy of the
report issued by Anton Vittorio Cottini, commander of CAP mission, in January 1945.
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men helped the Partisans’ formations to establish the first dropping points and to receive the
first aid provided by the Allies. 53
In short, the goal of the ensuing missions like the LLL, RDI and STELLA,
which landed near the village of Voltri, Genoa, between 1 st February and 17 th of
March 1944 was to reinforce the existing clandestine network. These new
missions also helped the Partisans to expand their guerrilla operations to
contiguous regions. Some teams, therefore, after arriving on the Ligurian coast
moved to operate among the Partisans of Piedmont 54 .
This was the case, for instance, of the LLL mission. Soon after its arrival in
Liguria, on February 1 st 1944, the LLL (formed by lieutenant Italo Cavallino,
codenamed “Siro”; second lieutenant Secondo Balestri “Annibale” and
rediotelegraphist Secondo Balestri “Biagio”) split into two teams with different
goals 55 . Whilst the first ʺcellʺ composed by “Annibale” remained in Genoa to
help communications with the Allies, the second team, constituted by agents
“Siro” and “Biagio”, moved to operate northwest. Once in Piedmont, the two
agents organized the first dropping points in the Casotto, Ellera and Peso
valleys. The two agents also set up the early ʺtraining campsʺ for maximizing
Partisan warfare.
The LLL was able to continue its activity among the Patriots after March
1944 when the Germans conducted one of their more severe rastrellamenti in
occupied Italy. After this German mopping up ‐ which disbanded Baluzzi’s
Organizzazione Otto ‐ the LLL was paramount in maintaining connections
between remnant of local Resistance and the Allies. After March ‘44, the LLL
continued its activity, in fact, for several months. Unlike the two agents
“Biagio” and “Sirio”, who were captured by the Germans, the radiotelegraphist
“Annibale” was able to survive. After joining another SIM agent (Ernesto
Silvestrini codenamed “Amilcare”) who had also escaped the Germans’
reastrellamento, “Annibale” constituted a new team called “Annibale‐
Amilcare” 56 . This mission, from various spot of the VI Zone continued to
transmit valuable information to the Allies until April 1945 57 . In that date,
53 A.U.S.S.M.E. fondo S.I.M., div. 11, busta 111, doc 103189.
54 In particular, the RDI and STELLA moved to operate among the Turin Partisans of the III
Operational Partisan Zone. See E. Sogno, La Franchi. Storia di un’organizzazione Partigiana, op. cit.,
p. 200.
55 A.U.S.S.M.E. fondo S.I.M., div. 11, busta 111, doc 103189.
56 On the Annibale‐Amilcare mission see in particular E. Sogno, La Franchi, op. cit., p. 200.
57 Cfr. A.U.S.S.M.E., fondo S.I.M., 11 div., busta 119, doc. 105521. Ufficio I ‐ S.M.G. Situazione
Appennino ligure di Levante, settembre 1943‐aprile 1945. It is report on the Italian Western
Apennine during the winter 1944‐1945. The document states that the “Amilcare‐Annibale”
mission, in December 1944, was still actively forwarding information on the VI Operational
Ligurian Zone.
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however, the two agents ‐ ultimately captured by the Germans ‐ were executed
in Genoa 58 .
The Growth of American Connections among the Partisans
At the end of spring 1944, two missions with partly innovative characteristics,
“Locust” and “Meridien” were sent into Zone VI. These missions were
organized by the Secret Intelligence section of OSS and again made up of
former Italian military personnel. The latter were mainly recruited among
prisoners of war and troops gathered in the so‐called ʺriordinamentoʺ
(detention and reorganizing) camps in the South of Italy. Recruiting also took
place within SIM (there was also a small number of Partisans among them).
However, the significant aspect of the new type of missions was that in this case
the agents were directly hired by OSS with proper contracts. They were well
paid and subject to American war rules. Another interesting fact was that the
missions, in many cases were made up by several dozen agents.
Infiltration began as usual in small nuclei. In this case, though, the single
“cells”, as each reached its destination, instead of operating individually, would
join a single underground organization, making it more extensive and
penetrative 59 . This would fulfil the Allies’ aim to empower their own
information system and would ensure that the Partisan formations obtained the
greatest possible number of radios and sabotage instructors 60 .
Finally – but of no lesser importance – the new missions were to prepare
the ground for the first commandos entirely composed of Anglo‐American
soldiers. According to an ʺoutgoingʺ message from OSS Major Thomas
Stoneborough, who directed this type of operation in June 1944 from Bastia:
“Locust” mission must be told to prepare the ground for the arrival of men and materials […] It
is urgent that “Locust” informs us which is the most reliable and combative Brigade of the 6 th
Zone because we intend to parachute 15 US soldiers and an officer to help the partisans. 61
Regarding the provenance of these agents, illuminating details appear
from OSS documents. As anticipated, the missions were no longer made up of
Italian agents ʺlentʺ by the Italian intelligence service to the Allies. They were
rather composed of Italian former military personnel enrolled in the US Armed
Forces or SIM agents who had decided to switch over to work exclusively for
58 See E. Sogno, La Franchi, op. cit.
59 Cfr. NARA, R.G. 226, Entry 190 B, box 3. folder 21. Agent Questionaire. 11 May 1945.
60 Ibidem.
61 Cfr. NARA, RG 226, Entry 165, box 35, folder 330. 2677 Headquarters Co. – Incoming and
outgoing message forms.
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the American intelligence service 62 . Furthermore, OSS demanded these Italians
formal and circumstanced commitments such as undersigning proper ʺcontractʺ
of enrolment 63 .
The agents were in fact asked to sign documents which, as some copies
kept in the US archives show, demanded exclusive allegiance to the US and the
consequent observation of their war rules and to consider themselves to all
effects US military personnel 64 . In other words they were truly and properly
enrolled in the US army and in OSS in particular.
In exchange for this, according to a written agreement, the USA was
committed to pay the enrolled Italians 150 US dollars a month besides
providing board and lodging. It was also stipulated that in the case of death or
permanent crippling of the “employee”, a sum of 5000 US dollars would be
payable, convertible in Italian Liras.
In other words, certain SIM agents whom proved particularly capable in
the course of a first employment beyond enemy lines were encouraged to
abandon any previous ties with the Italian High Command and shift to
working exclusively for the Americans.
An example, is the case of the key man in at least the first phases of
“Locust” mission, the radiotelegraph operator of Italian Navy provenance,
Mario Robello. The latter, in a previous operation, had been lent to the Allies in
agreement with the Italian Navy 65 . An OSS report tells how Robello in March
1944 took part in the “Lobo” mission, parachuted into Tuscany by the US
services following a request made to their Italian counterpart, SIM. According
to the document, OSS had “contacted the Italian Admiral commanding the
Navy in Naples in order to get from the latter radio operators [including
Robello] from the Italian navy who were willing to go on a mission ‘for the
account of our operations’” 66 .
Afterwards, the abovementioned Robello was then engaged in “Locust”
mission working, in this second case, directly under American contract: his
name in fact appears in an OSS list which reports the names of Italian agents
collaborating with American OSS behind the lines 67 . In the same mission,
62 See A. Pacatte, Report of Major Andre Pacatte first written in the field later exanded and corrected,
op. cit., p. 46.
63 Cfr. NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, box 142, folder 2. December 1944. These are copies of such
“contract” traced in the OSS archives.
64 Ibidem.
65 Cfr. NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, box 72, folder 2, doc. 002540/14, Report of captain Andre
Bourgoin.
66 Ivi, p. 33.
67 NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, box 72, folder 2. Names of the agents who worked in German occupied
Italy. 8 February 1945.
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besides the aforementioned Paolo Risso and Emanuele Straserra, who belonged
to a team now called “Montreal”, operated also SIM agents coming from
Brindisi, Gaetano De Stefanis and Manfredo Bertini, belonging to the “Balilla 2”
nucleus 68 . Certainly both De Sfefanis and Bertini acted under contract with OSS.
This can be deduced, not only by their presence in the aforementioned list, but
also in the following and controversial collaboration “certificates” that OSS
Headquarters provided them after the war (we will return to dwell upon these
certificates later in this article). In practice Robello switched, between the first
and second mission, just like De Stefanis and Bertini, from the status of Italian
military personnel (and agent), to that of American agent. The “Locust”,
operated first in the Piacenza area and then, from summer 1944, with the
Garibaldi “Chichero” 3 rd Brigade of Zone VI, preparing the “Walla‐Walla”
mission, this time entirely American 69 .
As regards “Meridien” mission, almost contemporary to “Locust”, it also
employed a SIM radio‐telegrapher, Alfonso Cardella. The latter, had reached
Liguria as early as October 1943. In that circumstance, Cardella had been
employed by SIM to operate as radio‐telegrapher in British MI‐19 mission, that
is, as a SOE collaborator 70 . After that time, “Meridien” was boosted with several
radio operators and teams of agents such as the ones led by the anti‐Fascist
Erasmo Maré, leader of “Apple” mission, and the professional soldier Gustavo
Profumo, head of “Betty” team 71 . Maré came from the O.R.I. (Organizzazione
della Resistenza Italiana), an anti‐Fascist movement which from its birth was
also an important source of personnel for OSS missions. The ORI was to prove a
good channel for contacts with CLN Partisan leadership in the North 72 . The
American documents show how, besides the network set up by OSS using
Italian agents (of whom hundreds with true and proper contracts), hundreds of
other Italians participated as collaborators and sympathisers. Among these,
certainly most ORI members.
68 Cfr. A.U.S.S.M.E., fondo SIM, div. 10, busta 199, doc. 146644. Oggetto: Tenente ftr. (a) cpl. De
Stefanis Gaetano. 8 giugno 1945. According to the document from the Italian Military Archive, De
Stefanis was enrolled as a SIM agent on 15th November 1943.
69 On Robello, De Stefanis and Bertini see also L. Guccione, Missione “Rosa”‐“Balilla”. Resistenza e
Alleati, Vangelista, Milano, 1987 in particular pp. 129 e fll.
70 Cardella is listed in a OSS/X2 document regarding the first Italian contact in the occupied
Italy. Cfr. NARA, RG 226, Entry 211, box 47, folder 4. X2 Branch, Headquarter detachment, 2677
Regiment OSS (Prov), Apo 512, US Army, 3 July 1945.
71 On the Meridien mission see also G.B. Lazagna, Intervista a “Minetto”. Comandante della Brigata
Arzani, Edizioni Colibrì, Torino, 2001 in particular pp. 15‐27.
72 On the O.R.I is here worth mentioning the volume by M. Corvo, The O.S.S. in Italy. 1942‐1945.
A Personal Memoir, op. cit., p. 142. See also the most authoritative account on O.R.I. in the
Resistence by its leader R. Craveri, La campagna d’Italia ed i servizi segreti. La storia dell’O.R.I.
(1943‐1945), Milano, La Pietra, 1980.
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The history of missions such as “Locust” and “Meridien” proves
undoubtedly more complex and embarrassing, not only for the ʺepic of the
Resistanceʺ, but in the end for the Allies themselves. Desertions on the Italian
side, as well as the monetary solicitation carried out by OSS, are not the clearest
passages in the anti‐Fascist military cooperation conducted in Italy.
It was probably security concerns which led the Americans, as of spring
1944, to employ only Italian personnel directly responding to their orders and
no longer SIM personnel. Probably there prevailed the fear that continuing to
share men and decisions with the Italian counterpart, it would not have been
possible to keep the OSS plans secret 73 . As for the Liberation of Rome, in fact,
projects far more important than sending a few sparse teams of undercover
agents were deemed “top secret”. The fate of dozens and dozens of men was in
play, all working undercover in occupied Italy and who represented a solid
bond with the Resistance as well as the instrument to exercise a certain control
over it. Furthermore, it must not be underestimated that, nearing the end of the
war, it became necessary to think about what would happen afterwards. In this
regard, it was obvious that SIM agents, as long as they remained such, even
though operating under Allied orders, kept reporting to the Italian Supreme
Command. The latter, as a consequence, was capable of giving its agents orders
that could sometimes differ from the Anglo‐American directives. This is exactly
what the Americans were trying to avoid by opting for direct enrolment in the
US army.
What is certain is that both Americans and Italians have preferred to skip
over these experiences, if not totally ignoring them. In the case of the US,
bearing in mind that the “Kingdom of the South” had become ʺco‐belligerentʺ
with the Allies, it could not have been a perfectly proper practice to recruit
agents among Italian ex prisoners of war and among soldiers in detention
centres (not to say from active SIM agents), requiring that the latter abandoned
the Italian army to become true and proper “American soldiers”, as stated in
the abovementioned contracts.
All the ambiguity, and in a certain sense bad faith which surrounded such
events is exemplified in an overall report made after the war by OSS Major
Andre Pacatte. The latter, as hinted, together with Captain Bourgoin, was one of
those responsible for recruiting Italian agents to send behind the lines. Pacatte
wrote:
To recruit native radio operators, it was necessary to secure proper authorization from SIM,
through the Allied Control Commission, through Maj. Ricca [an OSS commanding officer]
73 On the problem of secrecy concerning the identities of OSS agents see NARA, RG 210, Entry
210, box, 80, folder 6, pp. 46; 50. The aboovementioned Report of Major Andre Pacatte.
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(when he was available –his Headquarters being in Brindisi and ours in Caserta). If this
authorization had not been received, these operators would have been considered deserters by
the Italian Army or Navy. This created a security problem, because the Italian Secret Service
would naturally know who our agents were, so that we had to incur the ire of Maj. Ricca , the
Italian Army, by having the recruited operators desert first, then trained, then sent on their
missions, and while they were in enemy country we would transmit their files and have their
military situation regularized. 74
This admission by Major Pacatte explains why neither Italy nor its army
who was aware of the events never claimed any paternity over this contribution
to the Resistance.
In practice, Italian High Command, which might hardly have behaved
differently, kept considering as deserters all the Italians who agreed to switch to
the American side. It was only American intercession, after the war, which
prevented military justice from running its course. More precisely, the US
Government made sure to award its ex Italian agents with collaboration
“certificates” which justified their actions, absolving them from the
punishments for desertion 75 . It is not however difficult to understand the
resentment felt within the Italian army towards these agents, very few of whom
were taken back into the Italian secret services.
Probably it was this the form of collaboration between the Italian and
American intelligence services “in sending agents behind the lines” to which
the aforementioned SIM Major Antonio Lanfaloni hints, yet very briefly, in his
volume. The author, by his own admission, in fact, limits himself to describe the
collaboration given to British SOE, without reporting anything about the one
with American OSS. There is, however, an explanatory note offered by the
author, slightly tucked away: “This work only describes the work carried out by
SIM with the parallel British organisation (N.° 1 Special Force): there is no
mention of the work of the corresponding American organization (O.S.S.) with
which this Office has cooperate especially for missions in occupied territory” 76 .
In truth, collaboration with the American counterpart was extensive and
important, seeing that, since early 1944, OSS admitted the indispensable role of
Italian SIM in military collaboration with Italy. In a document dated April 15
1944 and addressed to Washington, OSS even hypothesized integrating SIM in
the US intelligence system instead of merely subordinating it, as laid out in the
74 Ivi, p. 46.
75 Cfr. A.U.S.S.M.E., fondo SIM, div. 11, fald. 15, mat. 1824. Si tratta dell’attestato rilasciato dagli
americani al tenente Gaetano De Stefanis dopo che da ʺformerʺ agente del SIM divenne membro
della missione dell’OSS “Locust”.
76 A. Lanfaloni, L`azione dello Stato Maggiore Generale per lo sviluppo del movimento di
Liberazione,S.M.E. Ufficio Storico, Roma, 1975, p. 66.
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armistice agreements. As the author, belonging to X2 section of OSS
(counterespionage) wrote:
Bearing in mind basic factors, such as the fact that cooperation with Italian authorities would
remain partial if only one way, and that SIM could not function adequately if its members were
to be kept unawares of important information […] one must reach the highest level of
cooperation with the SIM and consider it as much as possible a part of our information service
though in respect of the essential security measures. 77
Then, though, as hinted at in the Pacatte report, ʺsecrecy concernsʺ and
military motives pushed the Americans to entrust themselves only to directly
recruited agents. This marginalized the Italian intelligence services, allowing
the Americans to proceed on their own in occupied Italy. The price to pay was
the resentment generated in the Italian armed forces who considered this choice
an affront best not spoken about. This may explain the reticence of Lanfaloni in
mentioning the secret Italo‐American collaboration.
Furthermore, it is also possible to infer that OSS wished to make use of its
Italian agents even in the post‐war period, whether or not they were readmitted
into the Italian armed and intelligence forces. The Italian Army, for their part,
committed itself to readmit as few as possible of those ʺdesertersʺ 78 . A new
shady area emerges, all in all, which demands further in‐depth investigation.
From the Partisan point of view, finally, the missions entrusted by OSS to
Italians were scorned. At most, they were considered close to the most
conservative political sectors and an instrument of the Italian Monarchy, such
was the extent of the prejudice against these men. If supplies failed to arrive it
was often presumed that the Italian agents were directly responsible. It was in
fact feared that these rather mysterious Italians, whose identity was uncertain,
aimed to weaken or in any case condition the Resistance in some way. On the
other hand the agents, who had no political preparation, could hardly
understand the highly ideologically characterized world of the Resistance
leaders 79 . In any case, it is evident that the theme of collaboration/exclusion of
77 Cfr. NARA, RG 226, Entry 211, box 47, folder 7. OSS‐X2 Branch. 15 April 1944.
78 Cfr. NARA, RG 210, Entry 210, box, 80, folder 6, doc. 2599/9. Report of Major Andre Pacatte first
written in the field later exanded and corrected. According to Pacatte “There is no doubt that
services from SIM could never be 100% for us, (a certain percentage would always be for the
benefit of Italy), but, they need money and most of their organization is composed of
professionals whose life work is secret services. The opportunity exists NOW, but in a few
months, as Italy will come into its own, this opportunity will no longer exist. It is needless to
emphasize that for a post war organization, such opportunity should be seized by OSS”.
79 On the specific issue of the Italian agents’ psycology and political orientation see in particular
E. Sogno, Per la Libertà, op. cit., p. 65 and Id., La Franchi, op. cit., pp. 185‐186. See also the very
evocative reading of A. Ungari, In nome del Re. I monarchici italiani dal 1943‐1945, Firenze, Le
Lettere, 2004.
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Italian agents also requires serious further investigation by Resistance
historians.
What is certain is that the contribution of these Italians has been totally
ignored in many so‐called local reconstructions and this lacuna needs to be
filled as soon as possible.
The Phase of American Commandos: Same Area Different Personnel
OSS documents allow to recreate the history of subsequent missions, in which
American military personnel was prevalent, while the Italians were mainly
confined to a support function. In short, the large American commando
operations of ʺWild Billʺ Donovan. In sum, starting from summer 1944, and
using instructions provided by previous team, namely “Locust” and
“Meridien”, as well as their dropping zone, OSS began to deliver in the VI Zone
three additional teams 80 .
The first nucleus, called “Walla‐Walla”, started operating on August 11 th
1944; “Peedee” and “Roanoke” followed respectively in April and March 1945.
Both missions would remain in the VI Zone until the end of the war. By April
1945, such missions granted to the VI Zone Ligurian Partisans about one
thousand tonnes of supplies, including weapons, equipment, medicines and
essential goods; not to mention, the financial backing, which for the single
“Walla‐Walla” mission amounted to more than 15,000 dollars 81 .
The O.G.s contributed a great deal to the strengthening of the VI Zone.
Not only during the final offensive of spring 1945, but also during the previous
winter, when they supported the Partisans in contesting the German mopping
up operations.
The decision to send the ʺoperational missionsʺ in summer 1944 coincided
with two important military events. In the first place, the Allied landing in
Provence, on 15 th August 1944, two months after the one in Normandy;
secondly, in September, the restarting of Allied advance towards the Po river
(in reality, German resistance arrested the Allies on the Gothic line along the
direction Massa Carrara/Rimini).
At that point the VI Zone became for the Allies strategically even more
important. According to Italian scholar, Guido Rosignoli, in the Western part of
80 The Operational Groups (O.G.s), were groups with very high clearance levels, commanded by
OSS officials. Cfr. on the subject M. Warner (ed. by), The Office of Strategic Services. America’s
First Intelligence Agency, pubblicata dalla CIA nel maggio 2000. On the American O.G.s in Italy
see specifically, A. Materazzi, Americani dell`OSS e partigiani, Milano, Quaderni della FIAP,
Bastogi, 1993, p. 14 and fll.
81 Cfr. N.A.R.A., R.G. 226, Entry 143, box 9, folder 124, O.S.S.‐2671th Spe. Recon. Batt. Accounting
for Funds on Walla‐Walla Mission. 31 December 1944.
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Italy: “any breakthrough of this side of [the Gothic line] could be dangerous to
the assailant army as it could be attacked on its flank. [Moreover] only a
massive army could venture into the Po valley and the Allies did not possessed
enough strength for this task” 82 . The Anglo‐Americans, in other words, felt the
need for greater use of Partisan activity in the VI Zone in order to feel more safe
in that area. At the same time, the Italian Patriots had to compensate as much as
possible the Anglo‐American lack of infantry. In order to land in Normandy
and Provence, in fact, the Allied Armies in Italy (now called the 15 th Army
Group) had been deprived of more than seven Divisions 83 . Also justifying a
more effective guerrilla role in the Zone was the need to prevent the Germans
from sending military supplies to their positions on the Apennine using the
many roads and other lines of communication available 84 . In the end, “Walla‐
Walla” succeeded in its specific goal of preventing the Germans the main roads
of the VI Zone, breaking off German communication along the Gothic line. Only
the arresting of the Allied offensive and, as a consequence, the German guerilla
mopping‐up operation in December 1944 prevented the mission from
consolidating its achievements.
On this subject, an example of the spirit of collaboration inspired by the
“Walla‐Walla” mission is documented by two letters, found in OSS archives. In
both these letters (together with the names of other political leaders of the VI
Zone) there is the signature of the Garibaldi “Cichero” Division Communist
leader Anton Ukmar (battle name “Miro”) 85 . In both correspondences, on which
we will return, the authoritative and feared leader Miro, also commander in
chief of Zone VI, thanked US General Mark Clark for the invaluable support
given to his Partisans by OSS personnel. Miro in one of his letter to Clark did
not omit mentioning the powerful bazookas the American agents had been able
to deliver to his men 86 . In sum, the documents confirm that the Americans
succeeded in their effort to come to a military cooperation with the Partisans
82 Ibidem.
83 Cfr. G. Conti, “L’esercito italiano sulla linea Gotica fra alleati e partigiani”, in G. Rochat, E.
Santarelli, P. Sorcinelli (ed. by), Linea Gotica 1944. Eserciti, popolazione, partigiani, minutes of
International Coference by the AMPI in Pesaro‐Urbino and by the Instituto pesarese per la
storia del movimento di Liberazione. Pesaro, 27‐ 29 September 1984, Milano, Franco Angeli,
1986, p. 143 and fll.
84 Ibidem. See G. Rochat, E. Santarelli, P. Sorcinelli (ed. by), Linea Gotica 1944…, op. cit..
85 According to Italian SIM archival documentation, Anton Ukmar was a fervent Communist,
very close not only to the Genoa PCI (which had in fact entrusted him of the commando f the VI
Zone) but also to Moscow. See also in E. Collotti, R. Sandri, F. Sessi (ed. by), Dizionario della
Resistenza. Luoghi, formazioni, protagonisti, vol. II, Torino, Einaudi, 2001, pp. 507; 565‐566; 657‐658.
86 N.A.R.A., R.G. 226, Entry 143, box 9,“Lettera del C.L.N. ‐ C.V.L. VIa zona operativa ligure
partigiana al Comando della 5ª Armata americana”. 9 marzo 1945.
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and to their unification under the missions’ control. Whether convinced or
forced for the sake of increasing their military capability, the Partisan leaders
agreed to the American request of military unification under Allied control.
Towards the end of the “Walla‐Walla” mission, Allied aid became
frequent and consistent. For instance, it is worth noting the air‐drop of
November 16 th 1944, when 30 British Wellington aircrafts delivered to the Zone
195 containers and 13 packs for a total weight of 5926 lbs. of materials. On
November 18 th , the ʺCicheroʺ Partisan division also received 13 Italian Brixia
mortars. Later in the month, on 28 th November, 6 Dakota aircrafts dropped 232
supply packages of over 25.210 lbs. in weight. On the same day, another Dakota
delivered another 12 packages, totalling 3.000 lbs. of materials 87 . As many local
reconstructions recall, the effect of the October and November aids allowed the
Zone VI Partisans some noteworthy successes 88 .
Then, though, came the sinister days of the great Germanic Aachen
operation, the last great Nazi‐fascist mopping up operation 89 . As an effect of the
Aachen offensive, American supplies dropped. On December 20 th , “Walla‐
Walla”, having lost the indispensable contacts to continue its activity, decided
to leave the Zone VI 90 .
Immediately after the departure of the “Walla‐Walla”, another ʺoperationalʺ
mission was set up, “Peedee” team. The aim of this mission was to save the
Partisan brigades surrounded in the Aachen manoeuvre. Consequently, 16 Italo‐
American agents were sent on January 18 th 1945 onto Mount Antola (in the
province of Genoa) under the command of US captain “Van”, alias Leslie
Vannoncini. As with the “Walla‐Walla” mission, the reception of “Peedee” was
arranged by the OSS/S.I. teams “Locust”, “Meridien” which, in mid January of
1945, were still operating in the VI Zone.
OSS Headquarters gave “Peedee” the task of training Partisans for a
further important military tactic, decided during the so‐called “Rome
Agreements” of December 1944 between the Allied command and CLNAI
87 N.A.R.A., R.G. 226, Entry 143, box 9, folder 124, O.S.S.‐2671th Spe. Recon. Batt., Bi‐weekly
Report. Walla‐Walla mission. 1‐15 November 1944. OSS Major Samuel C. King’s report to colonel
Livermore.
88 See on this tipic, G.B. Lazagna, Rocchetta, Val Curone e Val Borbera nella guerra, op. cit., p. 123.
89 See on the Aachen, P.P. Rivello, Quale giustizia per le vittime dei crimini nazisti?, op. cit., p. 135‐
136.
90 Cfr. N.A.R.A., R.G. 226, Entry 143, box 9, folder 124, O.S.S.‐ 2671th Special. Recon. Batt.,
Report. for period 15‐31 December 1944. Colonel Livermore to Washington.
***
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chiefs 91 . According to these agreements the formations were to use special
tactics to counter the very probable scorched‐earth tactic performed by the
Germans in retreat.
In Zone VI it was necessary that the Partisan, on the one hand, continued
in the sabotage of enemy communication lines and, on the other, ensured access
to the port of Genoa and main highways 92 . These roads were in particular Route
1, (La Spezia‐Genova), Route 35 (Genoa‐Alessandria) and Route 45 (Genoa‐
Piacenza). Furthermore, according to the Anglo‐American post‐hostility plan
Genoa had to be used to channel food and other primary resources to the
population to avoid public unrest 93 . It was also necessary for the Partisans to
safeguard the industrial units as well as the infrastructures around Genoa
(especially electric power plants). The objectives assigned to “Peedee”
represented “the conclusion of the hard work laid down by OSS in the previous
9 months” 94 . By the way, it would have been against Anglo‐American interests
to abandon the Partisans after all the work done by the missions and foreseeing
the imminent final offensive.
Commander ʺVanʺ and his men at first made sure to predispose new
dropping‐points for the reception of supplies. This carefully planned operation
enabled the Allied air force to make a further 115 airdrops. These supplied the
Resistance with 1100 Sten and M3 machine guns; 2000 automatic and
semiautomatic rifles (M1 and Mauser model); 35 mortars; 73 bazooka rocket‐
launchers and 25 ʺPiatʺ bomb launchers 95 . In other words, thanks to Allied
supplies, each Partisan detachment had at least 1 bazooka and 1 mortar besides
the rest of the equipment necessary for consistent firepower.
To further confirm the collaboration which had been established, it would
be useful at this point to comment the aforementioned letters found in OSS
archives. These were the ones the Garibaldi Brigade commander Anton Ukmar,
alias “Miro”, sent to American General Clark, commander of US troops in Italy.
91 On the “Rome Agreements” see in particular M. De Leonardis, ʺGli accordi del dicembre 1944
tra Alleati e C.L.N.A.I. visti attraverso i documenti del Foreign Officeʺ, in R. Amedeo (ed. by),
Le missioni Alleate..., op. cit., pp. 341‐343.
92 N.A.R.A., R.G. 226, Entry 143, box 9, folder 124, O.S.S. ‐ 2671 th Special. Recon. Batt., Bi‐weekly
report. Peedee mission. 16‐30 April 1945. Lieutenant Colonel Fred Bielaski’s report to OSS
Headquarters ‐ 2671 Special Reconnaissance Battalion Separate (Provisional) ‐ in Caserta.
93 Bielaskiʹs report to Livermore. N.A.R.A., R.G. 226, Entry 143, box 9, folder 124. O.S.S.‐2671th Spe. Recon. Batt.‐col. Bielaski, Bi‐weekly Report. Peedee mission. 1‐15 May 1945.
94 Cf. NARA, RG, 226, Entry 143, box 9, OSS‐ 2671th Special Recon. Batt., Semi‐Monthly Report.
16‐30 April 1945 (Lt. Col. Fred Bielaski).
95 See “Resoconto sugli armamenti partigiani della VI zona nella primavera 1945”, in N.A.R.A.,
RG. 226, Entry 143, box 9, folder 124. O.S.S. ‐ 2671th Special. Recon. Batt. Report on Sixth Zone.
May 1945.
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The first letter, dated March 9 th 1945, is signed by “Miro”, commander of the VI
Zone, as well as by his second in command, Umberto Lazagna (battle name
“Canevari”), a Catholic Party adherent. The two Partisans addressed Clark with
the following words:
This is not the first time, Sir, which we have expressed to you our deepest thanks for the work
done by the Peedee mission. The behavior of the mission and of his commander has
encountered the best sympathy and admiration by our formations. These men, besides working
night and day to enable us to receive the drops of the weapons, after enduring much risk and
fatigue during the Germans’ mop up operations, volunteered to participate in the open combat
which occurred in the 6 th Zone, showing their courage and ability especially with the
“bazookas”. In this way the formations, after the recent battles in which the Partisans fought
very well, now well armed and supplied, are ready for the final offense: no obstacles will stop
the impetus of our brave “Garibaldini” and your men will be at our side, welcomed guests and
precious comrades. 96
The letter gives the impression of a sincere gratitude towards the
Americans. Furthermore, as the second letter of May 3 rd read
Officers and men of the Mission have encountered the best sympathy by our Formations and
the population of towns and villages occupied by us […] We shall not forget them or will not
forget all the good that has been done and all the help which has been given by the great
American nation, under of the guide of its great president F. D. Roosevelt, to the cause of
democracy, liberty and justice. 97
These letters are to be seen in the international context of the time. It is
important to note that at that point of the conflict both Togliatti and Stalin,
though for partly different reasons, were in favour of a collaboration with the
USA 98 . As regards Stalin, after Teheran and Yalta his attitude has became
openly inclined towards an appeasement with the Americans in Italy. Italy’s
post‐war international position were intended to be under the US guidance and
influence. It implied the cooperation of Italian Communists Partisans with all
the other several political forces which constituted the Italian Resistance. First
96 NARA, R.G. 226, Entry 143, box 9, folder 8.
97 Cfr. N.A.R.A., R.G. 226, Entry 143, box 9, folder 124, “Lettera del C.L.N. ‐ C.V.L. VIa zona
operativa ligure partigiana al Comando della 5ª Armata americana”, 3 May 1945.
98 This is not the proper context to address the question of the autonomy/subordination rapport
between Soviet Union foreign policy at this stage of WWII and its relations with that of the
Italian Communist Party under Togliatti. This topic has engendered a lively historiographical
querrelle in Italy, currently still underway. To this regard see the contrasting positions of A.
Agosti, Togliatti, op. cit., in particular p. 280 and passim; and E. Aga Rossi, V. Zaslavski, Togliatti e
Stalin. Il PCI e la politica estera staliniana negli archive di Mosca, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007, passim.
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and foremost a collaboration was to be found with the Catholics, who
particularly enjoyed the favour of the Allies 99 .
Conclusions: the ʺSecret Resistanceʺ ‐ the Italian Missing Dimension
In concluding this investigation of the VI Zone it is possible to assert that so far
the role of the underground intelligence support to the Italian Partisan
movement has been underestimated by historians. Traditional readings on the
intelligence dimension of the Italian Resistance have been heavily affected by
the more general interpretation on the nature of the relations between
Resistance and Allies. This also has biased the consequent evaluation of the
importance in that context of the authorities of the “Kingdom of the South” and
then of the “Rome Government”. The bulk of these readings have largely been
based on an allegedly opposition between the Italian Resistance and the Anglo‐
Americans (including the Italian Government of the South subjugated to the
Allies by its official co‐belligerency condition). Such studies have generally
maintained three claims: firstly, that the role played by such ʺcovertʺ operations
was essentially negligible and thus irrelevant; secondly, that such operations,
when they took place, aimed mainly to discriminate against the Communist
Partisan formations in order to weaken their military power; thirdly, these
ʺsecretʺ missions have been thought to exercise merely a ʺconservativeʺ effect
on the Partisan movement to thwart the potential Communist preponderance in
post‐war Italian politics 100 .
These inaccurate conclusions ‐ on the whole emblematic of the prejudice
surrounding the army and the intelligence services, both Italian and Anglo‐
American – are also maintained in Giorgio Bocca’s Storia dell’Italia partigiana;
though he is one of the foremost experts on the Resistance in the Liguria area.
According to Bocca, the Allies and the “Kingdom of the South” both maintained
a rather ambiguous ʺwait and seeʺ attitude towards the Partisan movement in
Italy. According to Bocca, the aim of the Italian Army’s high command, which
directed SIM, was to persuade the Allies to contain an indiscriminate growth of
the Resistance movement. This aim was shared by the Anglo‐Americans 101 . In
99 At that time of the conflict, Stalin’s strategy of ʺpopular frontsʺ, that is, of wide anti‐Fascist
coalitions under Communist leadership, had been suggested almost everywhere by the Soviet
leader to Communist heads outside the USSR. It was a project which firmly rested on the
assumption of an alliance of the Communists with all the other party forces. Cfr. E. Aga Rossi,
V. Zaslavski, Togliatti e Stalin, op. cit., p. 39.
100 See R. Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza, op. cit., p. 528 e passim; more recently D. Ellwood, Gli
alleati e la Resistenza, op. cit., in particular p. 248; G. Bocca, Storia dell’Italia partigiana..., op. cit., pp.
164‐168.
101 G. Bocca, Storia dell’Italia partigiana.., op. cit., pp. 115‐116.
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this interpretation, SIM personnel was considered a hindrance to the Partisan
movement, if not an outright ʺsmoke‐screenʺ dividing Allies and Resistance 102 .
In yet more detail, Bocca’s claim aims not only to discredit Italian military high
command, but the patriotic integrity of the individual SIM agents operating in
the field. The latter are seen to have repeatedly betrayed their cause, double‐
crossing it in favour of the Fascist Republic of Salò if not deserting it outright
and crossing over to the Fascist side when they felt overridden by OSS and SOE
counterparts. As Bocca observes: “When the Allies organized direct contacts
with the Resistance, SIM officers parachuted into occupied territories mostly
went back to their homes when not crossing outright over to the Fascist
republic” 103 .
Insofar as regards the alleged uselessness of the Italian missions,
sometimes along with the assumption of the unreliability of SIM agents, a
similar conviction has often been expressed by the small number of authors
who have investigated the role of the secret services in the Resistance 104 . The
archive documentation recently made available instead underlines the
importance of the Italian agents. According to OSS records, as amply
documented at least for the VI Ligurian Zone, Italian SIM personnel played a
key part in providing military support for the Resistance. This role had in any
case been planned and laid out in the often underestimated ʺQuebec
Memorandumʺ, imposed on Italy at the signing of the Armistice. This
Memorandum set as a condition for the rehabilitation of the defeated country
its military participation in the campaign against Nazi‐fascism in Italy 105 . As a
consequence, as OSS records reveal, as of September 1943, the Southern Italy
military authority, along with the reconstitution of the disbanded army, re‐
established its intelligence services (that is, SIM) order to support the first
Partisan formations. This was in line with the Allied vision which entrusted to
the Partisan movements in occupied countries the specific role of operating
behind the lines in consort with the secret services of their Governments often
exiled ‐ or operating in the liberated areas of their countries, as in Italy ‐ SIM
therefore carried out the tasks expected of it, within the scope of its somewhat
limited authority. It actively participated in the initial phase of setting up this
clandestine network so indispensable for delivering military support to the
102 Ibidem.
103 Ivi, p. 116.
104 See in particular F. Fucci, “I servizi d`informazione della Resistenza”, in A. Mola (ed. by), La
cobelligeranza italiana nella lotta di Liberazione dell`Europa, Ministero della Difesa, Roma, 1986, p.
86.
105 On the Memorandum of Quebec cfr. A. Lanfaloni, L`azione dello Stato Maggiore Generale…, op.
cit., pp. 5‐6.
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Resistance. The story of missions such as OTTO and VALENTINE prove this
unequivocally. This conclusion can be drawn both from SIM documents and the
Allied reports.
It is also true that in certain specific instances some of the historiographic
accusations against SIM agents could be legitimate: for instance the ease with
which some of them, as happened in the OTTO and LLL missions, ended up
playing into the hands of enemy counterespionage. It is however important to
note that the agents of the first missions were almost always forced to operate
in inhabited centers to make contact with local C.L.N. Partisan leaders, thus
acting in close proximity to the enemy. In other words, the risks taken by SIM
protagonists of those missions were far greater than those incurred by the
clandestine Partisan activity in the mountains. Finally it is also worth
mentioning that certain prejudices against Italian SIM personnel were borne out
of the cultural difference which distinguished them from the strongly
politicized Partisan elements. SIM men, very often professional soldiers and
thus exclusively motivated by their patriotic impulse to liberate their country,
were mistrusted by the rest of the Resistance Patriots and kept at a distance 106 .
A similar bias about OSS and SOE efficiency is extant in Italian
historiography to this day. Italian author Flavio Fucci has deemed the British
and US intelligence services “untrained”, “simple‐minded” and
“irresponsible” 107 . In summation, whether by supposed suggestion from SIM, or
through their own choice, the Allies would restrain from providing military
support and supplies to the Partisans. This discriminating attitude was firstly
aimed at containing the Communists; in second place at controlling the growth
of the Partisan movement because the latter was feared to be a factor of
potential progressive renewal in Italy. Once again, the documents refute this
presumed inefficiency, at least in the case of OSS. It should suffice to cite the
heavily armed Partisan offensive of spring 1945 to illustrate the aid provided by
these missions. It is important to recall, furthermore, that the awareness of
Allied support brought through SIM and OSS missions was an indisputable
factor in providing moral encouragement to the Resistance. This also attracted
more and more Patriots to participate in such behind the lines activities. This
morale booster may well have been more important than the military aid itself.
In reference to the question of anti‐Communist discrimination, the reality
portrayed by OSS archive material completely refutes the version hitherto
accredited by Italian historiography. This not only concerns the work of Marxist
authors ‐ such as Roberto Battaglia, Pietro Secchia, Filippo Frassati and Giorgio
106 On this issue cfr. L. Marchesi, E. Sogno, C. Milan, Per la libertá, op. cit., p. 65.
107 F. Fucci, Spie per la libertà. I servizi segreti della Resistenza, Milano, Ugo Mursia Editore, 1983,
pp. 72; 386.
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Amendola ‐ but also the judgment often expressed by a supposedly more
unbiased author, the often quoted, Bocca 108 .
In all truth, the Communist and Action Party Partisan formations, that is,
the leftist ones, were treated on a totally equal basis as the autonomous military
ones (alias those aligned with Badoglio). Any priority in delivering the aids was
established according to the efficiency and combativeness of the Partisan
formations; on the opportunity to employ the latter in areas of interest for the
Allied commands; on the proximity of the Partisans to the dropping points; and
finally, but not less important, according to the availability of aircraft for the
Italian Resistance front 109 . Several episodes portrayed in this article
corroborated this assumptions. First and foremost the number of bazookas
delivered to the Communist Partisans through “Peedee” mission. Furthermore,
even British lieutenant colonel Basil Davidson, commander of SOE/Glover
mission, claimed that after the war some ʺmythsʺ had arisen regarding the
Allied containment of Communist formations in Liguria 110 . It is therefore
important to note that not even the British identified the Communists as
antidemocratic forces to be disempowered systematically. In conclusion, in
March 1945, Davidson serenely wrote to his superiors that: “The Ligurian
C.L.N. was an organization truly representative of all the main political factions
within the resistance and that, though the Communist organization was
undoubtedly the most effective, there was no indication that it intended
carrying out an anti‐democratic acts” 111 . Davidson’s considerations well
illustrate the general climate and good disposition of the Allies in providing
Partisans with modern and heavy weapons, notwithstanding anti‐scorch‐earth
tactic equipment through to the end of the war. This attitude remained
unchanged even after the Greek Communist insurrection, which undoubtedly
cast a grey shadow of doubt over the Italian Communist Partisans, alias the
ʺGaribaldi brigadesʺ, but not to the extent of isolating or marginalizing them.
Finally, as regards the anti‐Communism of the agents of the Italian
monarchy, it should suffice to recall that “Walla‐Walla” and “Peedee” missions
108 Cfr. R. Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana…, op. cit., p. 528 e passim; P. Secchia e F. Frassati,
La Resistenza e gli alleati, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1962, p. 10; G. Amendola, Intervista sull’antifascismo,
a cura di Piero Melograni, Roma‐Bari, Laterza, 1994 (1ª ediz. 1976), pp. 174‐175.
109 See on this the same conclusion of E. Sogno, La Franchi, op. cit., p. 110.
110 Along with the “Peedee” mission, the “Glover”, commaned by Davidson as well as by
colonel Mac Mullen, lived for four mounts among the VI Zone Partisans. The two missions
cooperated in supporting the Italian Ressistance. Cfr. N.A.R.A., R.G. 226, Entry 143, box 9,
folder 124. O.S.S. ‐2671 th Spe. Recon. Batt.‐ col. Bielaski, Bi‐weekly Report. Peedee mission. 1‐15
April 1945.
111 See B. Davidson’s paper at the “La Resistenza in Liguria e gli Alleati” Conference (Genoa,
March 29‐31, 1985) quoted in M. Calegari, Americani dell’O.S.S. e partigiani, op. cit., p. 337.
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carried out their activity also thanks to the initial contacts established in the
context of the ʺGaribaldi‐Cicheroʺ Division by emissaries of Badoglio.
Hundreds of names make up the list of SIM agents employed by the Allies to
help the Italian Resistance 112 ,
In conclusion, the initial difficulties in relations between Allies and
Resistance are to be explained differently than by the assumption of
discrimination. The main reason for this, besides logistic difficulties, is to be
attributed to the numerous fronts to be supported by the Anglo‐Americans. The
latter, often were thus unable to supply all such guerrillas simultaneously 113 .
In reference to the last charge ascribed to the Allies, that is, of having
aimed the missions, not so much for purposes of military effectiveness, as to
support conservative elements ‐ thus in a position to ensure even in the post‐
war years a continuity of the pre‐Fascist political system – this claim is refuted
by OSS documents once again. The archival material does not suggest OSS had
a blatant conservative motivation. In reality, what is rather apparent is that for
the Americans the missions were operating as an example of progressive
behavior and ideals. This was the task especially entrusted to the Italo‐
Americans of the O.G. missions who came to live for months among the
fighters of the new Italy.
For instance, what troubled most the “Peedee” commander, Cpt.
Vannoncini, according to his final report on the mission, was that those young
Partisans, so brave and full of anti‐Fascist ideals, could be in the future driven
by various circumstances to abandon their democratic ideals, embracing new
totalitarian faiths. Therefore, the task for the post‐war period was, on the one
hand, to keep the Patriots engaged in some big enterprise and, secondly, to
teach them “how democracy works”. This idea was not exactly going back to
the antiquated institutions of the pre‐Fascists liberal Italy, so much ancien régime
in many respects; but rather to spread in the Italian Patriots’ minds and souls, to
be synthetic, values and models of American democracy 114 . For this reason, OSS
headquarters decided to send behind the lines American military personnel of
US citizenship but of recent Italian origins (like Vannoncini himself); the so
called ʺsecond generationʺ Americans were, in other words, entrusted to spread
the ʺAmerican way of lifeʺ among the Partisans bands.
All the abovementioned elements, in any case, may help to explain a
further important theme of this research. That is, why the total oblivion in
112 Cfr. A.U.S.S.M.E., fondo SIM, div. 10, busta 199, doc. 146644 e ss.
113 See on this issue M. De Leonardis, La Gran Bretagna e la Resistenza partigiana, op. cit., passim.
More recently also T. Piffer, Gli Alleati e la Resistenza Italiana, op. cit., passim.
114 N.A.R.A., R.G. 226, Entry 143, box 9, folder 124, Report on Sixth Zone, p. 1.
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historiography of Italian military personnel 115 . This expunction must be noted
here since its explanation (or a part of it) might be useful to provide a more
balanced judgment on the Resistance movement as a whole. By and large, the
role played by Italian soldiers has been completely neglected by historiography,
including the one closest to the Italian armed forces. The reason for this ʺgapʺ,
which should now be filled, resides in large part in the prevailing role played
by OSS respect to SIM in the last phase of the Italian Campaign. This fact has
come to obscure completely the indispensable contribution made by the Italian
agents in the autumn‐winter 1943. It was objectively difficult, in fact, even for
Italian Army, to remember those ʺloyal Patriotʺ (namely, the ones who had not
eventually deserted) who had continued to serve into SIM as Italian soldiers but
had ended up a bit ingloriously rejected by OSS. More to the point, that ʺgapʺ is
also very likely due to the reticence of Italian post‐war Government, and even
more of the Italian Army, about that intricate and embarrassing problem of
Italian military personnel deserting from their national armed forces in favour
of the ranks of American OSS. To remember those former Italian soldiers,
become first agents of Washington and later saved from an imputation for
desertion by American intercession in their favour (the abovementioned
ʺcertificatesʺ) must have been a serious mortification for Italian military
leadership. According to the latter, the behaviour of those military personnel
had been in open contradiction with the duty of loyalty to the Italian nation and
its armed forces. In other words, the Italian Army was reluctant ‐
understandably ‐ to admit a contribution to the Resistance which had
undergone a strong American influence.
This explain, in short, the little awareness in Italy – also in historiography
– regarding those Italians who fought into the Italian Resistance but in
connection with the Badoglio Army. It also clarifies why, even today, in Italy
there is such a little knowledge of the close connection developed during the
period 1943‐1945 between the Italian Army and OSS. No doubt, the ʺsecretʺ
component are a still ʺthe missing dimensionʺ of Italian Resistance: a ʺgrey
multitudeʺ still ignored by traditional readings and yet important. It should
thus be carefully evaluated in all its implications and nuances.
115 On this issue Aga Rossi noted: “The Resistance of the military for many years has been left to
memoirs of those who survived and their associations, and almost ignored by historiography,
because they were events that concerned armed forces that had previously fought a ‘fascist war’
[…] the pre‐eminent initiative of soldiers and officers in the constitution of the first partisan
bands and their active presence in the Resistance [...], in other words, the ‘badogliani’ militaries
and the ‘Badoglio‐oriented’ formations [...] have been expunged by our National history”. E.
Aga Rossi, Una nazione allo sbando, op. cit., pp. 12; 17.
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Regarding this last theme, a final remark its here important, which bring
us back to the ʺempire by invitationʺ theory voiced in the introduction.
According again to Geir Lundestad: “on many occasions various outsiders [alias
western European countries] tried to influence Washington in the direction of
greater interest and more assistance” 116 .
What else did in the eighteen months of the Resistance the Badoglio
Government, and then the Bonomi one, if not exactly what Lundestad affirms?
Cannot it be said, that, in a certain sense, this Italian choice was equivalent to a
specific ʺinvitationʺ for the USA, starting from this very same ʺsecretʺ
collaboration, to solidly bind themselves to the Italian neo‐ally? In substance,
though, keeping in mind the limited Italian capacity for maneuver ‐ the
restricted Italian Government’s ʺagencyʺ during the Resistance ‐ can it not be
supposed that as of 1943 some Italian personalities, or political forces, took
advantage of the United Statesʹ need for a military boost to the Resistance
(granted through the SIM) in support of the Allied forces, thus reaping
advantages for themselves 117 ? Regarding the advantage for Italians of such a
dialectic, both internally and internationally, this benefit was probably not
immediate but none the less for that. It certainly helped Italy earn its ʺreturn
ticketʺ in the consensus of the United Nations, as Badoglio defined it; this
ʺsecretʺ partnership was most certainly used also by some political forces and
personalities to gain credit from the United States to be spent in the internal
political arena in the post‐war (not free, probably, by enduring underground
contacts).
Summarizing briefly: it can be asserted that, although in the 1943‐1945
dialectic between Washington and Rome, there were conspicuous frictions (for
instance, the recruitment of Italian soldiers as OSS personnel). However, there
was also fundamental agreement on the basic issues. First and foremost,
cooperation in defeat of Nazi‐fascism and then the cooperation in the
reconstruction of the country and perhaps not only this; which is not equivalent
to assume that both OSS and SIM, as early as in the 1943‐45, were geared out to
ʺcontainʺ Communist menace in Italy. More probably their were purely setting
up a partnership aimed to confront future problems, yet the latter were not
completely clear during the war years.
116 G. Lundestad, The American Empire and other Studies…, op. cit., pp. 55‐56.
117 In particular James Miller has underlined how in the internal debate and that of public
opinion in the USA, until June 1944, the Italy Campaign was a paramount issue, presumably
being at that time the only European war front. The importance of the Italian front, especially at
the beginning of the Italian Campaign, thus allowed Italy to play its few political cards in
coordinating its military participation with the Americans. Cfr. J.E. Miller, The United States and
Italy, 1940‐1950. The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization, Chapel Hill, North Carolina
University Press, 1984, in particular ʺIntroductionʺ.
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The question that remains is what was the role of Togliattiʹs Italian
Communist party in this context? Regarding wartime, we have already partly
answered to this question when addressing “Peedee” mission. The main choices
had already been made at Teheran and Yalta (where Togliatti had attended as
Stalin’s advisor) and, thus, mainly outside the Italian soil. Yet, it is also worth
noting that the ʺsecret Resistanceʺ had probably important consequences also
for the Italian Communism after 1945.
In the early post‐war period, despite the tensions of the Cold War and
the prejudices credited by historiography, some capacity for dialogue and
solidarity would always survive among the Parties inheritors of that shared
experience. A certain degree of admiration for American democracy would
persist in Italy. This proves that, after all, the Italian Partisans’ eulogy of the
United States commitment “to democracy and justice” (as in the letter
addressed by Communist commander Miro to General Clark) was not simply a
ʺlip serviceʺ typical of the often condemned Communist duplicity.
Very likely, this history of ʺsecretʺ men, of weapons supplied and fighting
addressed together, would continue to exert some influence in the fabric of the
country, even after the radicalization of the Cold War. Either those who had
joined the Communist ʺGaribaldiʺ Brigades; or their Italian interlocutors of the
clandestine missions (switched or not into OSS of capitalist Americans); or,
even, the ʺbadoglianiʺ remained faithful to the Italian Royal Army would
contribute to keep alive the memory of something important that had been
done together for the democracy. And the same might be said of those Italo‐
Americans encountered on the battle field and so well received by the Italian
Partisans and people. The ʺsecret Resistanceʺ, in spite of many prejudices, has
probably played a role even after the conflict in the early post‐war years,
contributing to the reconstruction of the country, cultivating a spirit of
solidarity that never completely vanished. If, then, certain of those ʺsecretʺ
figures have continued to play a covert role ‐ for ʺdemocraticʺ purposes, but not
always irreproachable ‐ this is also part of that story. Establishing this will,
however, require more documents.
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Effie Pedaliu, Britain, Italy and the Origins of the Cold War.
Useful Hints for Future Scholarly Investigations
by Claudia Nasini
Effie Pedaliu’s 2003 book Britain, Italy and the Origins of the Cold War analyzes
the British Labour Governmentʹs contribution to the post‐war reconstruction of
Italy. The book focuses on five areas addressed in five chapters. That is, the
prosecution of Italian war criminals; the reconstruction of the Italian armed
forces; the Italian elections of April 1948 and Italyʹs institutional role in Western
security arrangements and participation into NATO.
From the prospective of my research, which focuses on the peculiarities of
British involvement in Italy (mainly via SOE) during WWII and the immediate
post‐war, particularly Pedaliu’s chapters on the post‐war Italian armed forces
and on the General election of 1948 are particularly worthy of further
consideration in view of some significant amendments that I would
recommend.
The book is one of the few monographs covering a rather important yet
still neglected period of Anglo‐Italian relations. These are namely the years
between 1945 and 1949 when the peninsula was pondering on its future
international collocation. The volume highlights the two main threads of the
British Labour Government’s foreign policy in this span of time. Firstly,
Britain’s attempt to prevent the spreading of Communism in Italy. Secondly
British effort to project her influence in the Mediterranean basin in a way that
would enable her to compete with both the US and the USSR in that
strategically important region.
One of the main strongpoints of the volume is that it delves into the
pivotal biennium of 1945‐1947 highlighting the extent to which the wartime
legacy still strongly affected post‐war Italy. In this respect the book represents
the first attempt to show how the WWII Anglo‐Italian connections endured
beyond the end of the conflict both in the military/security forces circles as well
as in the strictly political context. British influence via these two Italian vectors
nurtured and protected Italy during the critical time the United States was
beginning to contemplate its responsibility as a superpower. On the other hand,
the book also claims that from early 1947, the progressive encroachment of
bipolarity in the dynamics of international relations put the Anglo‐Italian ties to
a severe test. The Americans, in fact, in their effort to strengthen Italy as a
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bastion against the westward Communist advance, tended to by‐pass Britain’s
initiatives in the region 1 .
The volume is overall an important milestone in balancing traditional
historical accounts. Especially Italian historians, in fact, have claimed that
Labourite Britain’s foreign policy towards Italy, after 1945, remained
prevalently a “negative policy” like during the Conservative‐dominated war
years: i.e. aiming to contain and contrast the strengthening of Italy and its
influence in the Mediterranean 2 .
The second chapter, The Reconstruction of the Postwar Italian Armed Forces,
explains why after 1945 Britain considered it important to cultivate close ties
with Italian Army and police forces circles. It also provide an analysis of some
of the reasons that contributed to frustrate a stronger development of these
connections.
According to Pedaliu there were three prevalent factors which pushed
Britain to action in Italy. Firstly, it was needed in order to maintain “law and
order” inside the country against the supposed PCIʹs subversive threat.
Furthermore, a British enforcement effort was considered necessary to protect
the peninsulaʹs frontier along the Northern‐Eastern border from neighbouring
Yugoslavia. The widespread British perception of international events also
played an important part in directing British policy‐makers. In fact, Togliattiʹs
supposed bid for “internal” power and Yugoslavia’s “external” attack were
interpreted in Britain as a “by‐product of an orchestrated Soviet campaign to
wear down the West, rather than two distinct problems” 3 . Finally, the
participation in the reconstruction of Italian armed forces was considered as a
means for preserving British influence in post‐treaty Italian affairs. It would
“bolster British position vis‐á‐vis the ascendency of American power in the
1 E.G.H. Pedaliu, Britain, Italy and the Origins of the Cold War, Basingstoke‐New York, 2003,
“Introduction”.
2 Among the partly biased interpretation in this sense see, for instance, L. Nuti, L’esercito italiano
nel secondo dopoguerra, 1945‐1950. La sua ricostruzione e l’assistenza militare alleata, Roma, Ufficio
Storico dello Stato Maggiore Esercito, 1989, passim.
3 E.G.H. Pedaliu, op. cit., p. 39. Pedaliu adds: “Since Yugoslavia was not able to take on the West
single‐handedly, the British concluded that it would not dare use force against Italy to resolve
territorial disputes without having first secured the prior agreement of Soviet Union […] thus
the Italo‐Yugoslav rift over Italy’s north‐eastern border was soon identified as a potential
‘flashpoint’ between East and West. This perception was intensified by the continuing Greek
Civil war and the fear of Communist expansion into the Western sphere it engendered”.
°°°°
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region and Soviet encroachment” 4 . A more mundane corollary to this political
involvement was the desire to make Italy a “client state” of the British arms
industry through procurement.
British considerations also reflected previous Britainʹs deep involvement
in Italy during the co‐belligerency when the task of reorganizing the post‐
armistice Italian armed forces and police for the Regno del Sud (Southern
Kingdom) had already fallen on British shoulders. This enforcement had been
particularly implemented through the “British dominated” MMIA (Allied
Military Mission to the Italian Army) under the tutelage of Major General L.
Browning.
Overall this involvement in the peninsula reflected the foreign policy
pursued by the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. Britain’s first rank standing in
the Mediterranean, along with its preeminent influence in the adjacent Middle
East, was traditionally associated with its status as a world power.
Consequently, considerations on involvement in Italy were vital ones such as:
“the security of the imperial lines of communication, the preservation of the
Empire and the safe access to oil supplies” (p. 42).
As early as in mid‐1945 the British had tried to involve the Americans in the
task of the reorganization of Italian armed forces in order to partly share some
of the financial burden of the task. Yet, the Americans until the second half of
1946 showed a reluctance to be drawn in any commitment. After some months
of intense discussion in London concerning the size and equipment of the
Italian interim forces (which should not prejudice the eventual shape of the
military clauses of the Peace Treaty), in spring 1946, the British Government
opted for action. The best way to provide assistance was thought to be through
the attachment of missions to the Italian armed and police forces – as a
continuation of the close relationship fostered within the MMIA 5 – which would
provide training, technical advice and equipment.
According to Pedaliu, the British “long term aim” was to have a mission
per service and to preserve them in situ even after the signing of the Peace
treaty.
4 E.G.H. Pedaliu, op. cit., p. 35.
5 On the Anglo‐Italian collaboration through the MMIA see the highly appreciative opinion
towards British aid in the volume by General Mario Montanari, cfr. M. Montanari, Politica e
strategia in cento anni di guerre italiane, Vol. IV, “La guerra di Liberazione”, Roma, S. M. E. Ufficio
storico, 2010, p. 100 and fll.
°°°°
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Since December 1945 the British Government had tried to obtain the go‐
ahead from the Italian Prime Ministers, Ferruccio Parri (June 1945‐December
1945), for sending the missions. Parri, however, had then expressed the same
concern that in mid‐1946 the new Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi posed to
the British. Apparently both the Italian Governments deemed themselves not in
the position of accepting military advisors consisting of “British‐only”
representatives since the leftist parties (PCI and PSI) within the coalition
Government would reject any foreigner missions which did not also include the
Soviet ally. Furthermore, the Italians did not want to antagonize the USSR
before the signing of the Peace Treaty.
By February 1946, the Foreign Office – prevalently its Western Department
– had become very concerned about the ability of Italian police forces to be able
to uphold law and order inside the country. The Attlee government thus
decided for the insinuation of a “covert” British police mission in Italy. The
mission was attached to the still existing MMIA and entrusted with advising
and training both the Carabinieri (the militarized arm of the police) and possibly
also the Pubblica Sicurezza (the civil police service).
In May 1946, military review reports revealed the condition of
“deterioration” of Italian land forces passed to Italian control in December 1945.
Pedaliu stresses that the state of deterioration was due to the fact that most of
the equipment of the Italian army came from indigenous forces or from the
Allied “disposal agencies” (that is, allied weaponry left behind in 1945) and was
made of obsolete material. In any case, by summer 1946, it was obvious that
should the Communists mount a challenge the Italian army would not be in a
position to contain it. Furthermore, Italian administrative elections showed that
if the PCI and PSI were to combine their forces they might gain power in Italy.
Elections also revealed a dramatic increase in PCI membership (p. 46).
The security situation worsened through the autumn 1946 when the
economic crisis produced a lot of social turmoil and unrest. Yet, De Gasperi
continued to refuse the sending of British missions. Apparently, according to
Pedaliu, the main reason behind Italian continuing refusal, beyond the
opposition of the leftist parties, was the final version of the Peace Treaty which
in Italy had engendered hostility towards Britain deemed responsible for not
having shielded the country. Although efforts were made by the Foreign Office
to appease the Italian politicians (i.e. the six‐month Foreign Minister Pietro
Nenni) the situation did not improve. Nor did it see any advance with 1947.
Conversely, at that point, the Foreign Office’s resolute decision to submit
to the Italian Government a formal proposal for the reequipping of the Italian
Air forces produced some positive outcomes. Bevin’s scheme, concerted in
accordance with the British Air Ministry, was in fact put in action through the
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summer and autumn of 1947 when London started providing Italy with Spitfire
aircraft and equipment. Nevertheless, even the implementation of this
agreement was not a straight forward affair. The Air Ministry’s original scheme
was in fact a mixed plan, that is, an assistance package including both free and
chargeable elements. As Pedaliu explains, the Italians, “while willing to absorb
the cost‐free elements of the British scheme, were rather reluctant to incur the
costs of those elements which required payment”. (p. 53). As a result the
improvement of Italian air forces was limited. Despite the difficulties, Britain’s
interest in Italy continued and supply of British aids to the peninsula persisted
(p 53). Probably also in consideration of this attitude, when in October 1947 the
new Italian Foreign Minister, Carlo Sforza, visited London he assured Bevin of
the Italian Government’s new disposition in accepting British missions. Yet,
contrary to what announced by Sforza, in May 1948 the Italian Government
notified Bevin with the final rejection of any foreigner military advisor for Italy.
From then on, as Pedaliu concludes, the sporadic visits of Italian officers,
belonging to both the armed and polices forces, for periodic training courses in
Britain was the last vestige of the Anglo‐Italian military cooperation.
An Appreciation of the Second Chapter on the Italian Armed Forces and its
interrelation with British Support
Overall Pedaliu’s volume correctly identifies the factors that frustrated British
attempts with the Italian military: the presence of the PCI in all Italian
Governments until spring 1947; the impact of Britainʹs own financial problems;
and finally the change of policy in the US after 1946, when the new American
engagement in the Mediterranean afforded De Gasperi the confidence to reject
British‐only missions.
The volume is a thoroughly researched monograph on the British
Government archives. Particularly the Foreign Office documentation includes
papers of several different departments which are investigated in depth. On the
other hand, more scant is the official documentation from Italian Archives
addressed in the volume. In particular the whole British involvement with the
Carabinieri is addressed in general terms and it does not allow for important
post‐war Anglo‐Italian ties to emerge.
A preliminary analysis of the Italian Army’s Historical Archives (AUSSME
in Rome) has revealed the existence of further significant documentation not
covered in the book. Included in this Italian documentation particularly
noteworthy are the files in AUSSME, Fondo I3 busta 119. This is a large folder
on the activity of the allied MMIA in Italy between 1943 and 1947. This
documentation, which cover the period of the insinuation of “covert” British
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police missions into the MMIA (from February 1946), could shed some light on
how, after that date, the Italian authorities dealt with the issue of reorganizing
both its police forces, the Carabinieri and the Pubblica Sicurezza. Some important
hints on the role played by the British “covert” police officers might be
contained in this folder. This is not a secondary issue in order to appreciate the
continuation of British influence on Italy aside from official governmental
decisions.
During WWII Britain put a lot of emphasis on the important
“containment” role that the Carabinieri could play in Italy to guarantee the
respect of the law and to prevent social unrest. In fact, as Pedaliu herself admits,
since the immediate end of the war, Britain was willing to tolerate some
breaches to the interim provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty concerning the
Italian police forces. These included personnel of the Carabinieri above the fixed
ceiling limits and the arming of the Pubblica Sicurezza to such a degree that it
possessed more firepower then the British counterpart. As a matter of fact, the
British had exerted a very strong influence on the Italian Carabinieri since the
early phase of the Allied Military Administration of Italy when the Carabinieri
had been reorganized in Southern Italy under British tutelage. In fact, the
Comando Arma Reali Carabinieri dell’Italia Liberata (Italian Command of Royal
Carabinieri of Liberated Italy) was re‐established in Bari in November 1943 in
order to help the Allied Military Government to maintain public order. The
command of the Carabinieri was under the control of the Civil Affairs Division
of the Allied Control Commission, a division that throughout the whole course
of the war remained under British command.
The story of the Carabinieri (CC.RR.) was one of not easy relations with the
Fascist regime which was suspicious of these armed forces because of their
strong allegiance to the Italian House of Savoy rather than to the State. The
main historian of the Allied Military Administration of Italy, British historian
Charles R.S. Harris, recalls how after 1943 the problem of maintaining public
order in the liberated areas of Italy was soon solved by the re‐organization of
“mobile squadrons” of Carabinieri 6 . The latter during the Allied advance in
occupied territories, moved forwards with the “spearhead” Civil Affairs officers
while larger Carabinieri detachments followed behind. The duties of these police
forces consisted in reorganizing the local police, posting Allied proclamations
and reporting on issues (from mines to movements of suspected individuals)
which might be dangerous for the armies as well as for the population. In this
respect, they were a useful support to both the allied Military Police and Field
Security Service units. As Harris affirms “Indeed it would be hard to over‐
6 C.R.S. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943‐1945, London, Her Majestyʹs
Stationery Office, 1957, pp. 156‐157 and fll.
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estimate the contribution made by the Carabinieri under the leadership of the
AMG Public Safety officers for the prevention of unrest” (p. 158). In order to
fulfil their task, mobile squadrons of Carabinieri, sometimes amounting to 2000
officers, were trained and equipped in Sardinia and soon their “ceiling limit” as
fixed by the armistice agreement was breached and enlarged. (p. 162 and fll.).
When in November 1943 the Carabinieri were reconstituted in Southern Italy,
Badoglio entrusted their command to Giuseppe Piéche, a former Carabinieri
general who in the Thirties had served in the counterespionage “Bonsignore”
Division of the Italian SIM (Italian Secret Military Intelligence). The
headquarters, initially located in Bari, moved to Rome in July 1944 after the
liberation of the capital.
The important aspect, which is not mentioned in Pedaliu’s volume, is the
role of General Piéche within the Carabinieri and how he maintained a rather
prominent role in Italian internal security affairs even in the immediate
aftermath of the conflict. His position even increased in importance in
coincidence with the disbandment of Italian SIM after the beginning of 1945. On
that date the Allies by and large disbanded SIM partly as a consequence
political pressure from Italian Resistance which deemed SIM has being
constituted by former Fascists. Although the General Chief of Staff of the Italian
army was allowed, under certain restrictions, to preserve an internal
Intelligence section (Ufficio I), the vacation of the national intelligence
organization lasted until 1948. On the other hand, it would be inaccurate to
assert that Italy lacked an intelligence apparatus during those almost three
years. On the contrary, there is some preliminary evidence from several
chronicles that during that time several Italian representatives, generally
holding posts within the Ministry of Interior, played a prevalently intelligence
role. Among them, certainly Giuseppe Piéche exerted his influence on the
maintaining of “law and order” 7 . In 1946, within the Italian Ministry of the
Interior (under democratic socialist Giuseppe Romita as we shall discuss later) a
division called Servizio Protezione Civile and Antincendio was established, again
entrusted to the command of General Piéche. According to some accounts,
never confirmed by a thoroughly researched study, Piéche in that capacity, in
coincidence with the administrative elections of June 1946, was responsible for
the dismissal of almost the totality of the former Partisans whom at the end of
the war had joined the civil police (Pubblica Sicurezza) 8 . These Partisans had
been enrolled in the Pubblica Sicurezza under pressure from the Italian CLNs
7 See in particular on this G. De Lutiis, I servizi segreti in Italia, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1998, p. 54
and fll.
8 On this specific aspect see A. Vento, In silenzio gioite e soffrite. Storia dei servizi segreti italiani dal
Risorgimento alla Guerra Fredda, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 2010, p. 286.
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(the Partisan leadership) but Piéche decided to replace almost the totality of
them with professional personnel. In other words, Piéche substituted the
“ideologically suspicious” ex‐Partisans with more reliable personnel.
Furthermore, Piéche’s Protezione Civile established its own representatives in
every questura (civil police headquarters).
Later, in 1948, Piéche continued his “public safety” activity in accordance
with another re‐established division of the Ministry of the Interior (at that time
under the Italian conservative Luigi Scelba) called Servizio Affari Generali e
Riservati entrusted to the questore Gesualdo Barletta. According again to another
rather apocryphal account, Barletta was the person whom after the beginning of
the Corean War had suggested Allen Dulles that the American Government
should request Italy to declare the illegality of the Italian Communist Party
(PCI) and consequently suppress it 9 . For Italian historian Mario Del Pero the
Minister of the Interior, Scelba, refused the American suggestion of banishing
the PCI on the assumption that the provision would inescapably precipitate
Italy into a civil war 10 .
Several other quite apocryphal accounts on the other hand affirm that also
General Piéche was at long in contact with both the American and British
intelligence services in the post‐war. Italian scholar Andrea Vento (one of the
few who has addressed the history of Italian intelligence although without
examining SOE and OSS archives) affirms that Piéche in the mid‐Forties was in
contact with James Jasus Angleton, Earl Brennan, Henry Tasca and other
American “Cold Warriors” participating in organizing the containment of
Communism in Italy.
Yet, one might wonder if it is not strange that after all the effort made
during the co‐belligerency in order to reorganize the Carabinieri along British
lines, the British should suddenly withdraw their assistance to them in favour
of an American all‐embracing interventionism.
In other words, the preservation of British influence on Italy through the
Carabinieri and the Ministry of the Interior deserve further investigation.
In this respect, again a preliminary investigation of the AUSSME archive
in Rome has brought to light some documentation of interest. In particular,
AUSSME, Fondo I3 contains a folder on the Allies’ policy regarding the Italian
police and armed forces until November 1946.
At the same time, the aforementioned folder on the MMIA covering until
the end of 1947 could also be of interest.
9 Ibidem.
10 M. Del Pero, The United States and ‘Psychological Warfare’ in Italy, 1948‐1955, in «The Journal of
American History», vol. 87, n. 4, Mar., 2001, pp. 1304‐1334.
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Finally the files on Italian SIM contains many references to the Italian
Carabinieri after the end of the war, i.e. AUSSME Fondo SIM, 1 st Division.
Furthermore, an investigation in the Italian Archivio Centrale dello Stato in
Rome is also important concerning the activity of both the abovementioned
Divisions of the Ministry of the Interior between 1946 and 1948, that is, the
Servizio Protezione Civile under Giuseppe Piéche and the Ufficio Affari Generali e
Riservati under Gesualdo Barletta.
Furthermore, another aspect of WWII Anglo‐Italian cooperation is
important as a possible source of important post‐war reflections. This form of
cooperation again involved a large number of Carabinieri. It started in 1943,
when after the re‐organization of SIM in Southern Italy, the Allies realized that
their counterintelligence activities, normally entrusted to MI6 (alias, Field
Security Services) and SCI (Service Counter Intelligence) needed the support of
the Italians.
As early as in November 1943 a unit formed of prevalently (but not
exclusively) former Italian counterintelligence personnel was enrolled in a
battalion named 808° Bt. CS (Counterintelligence) and put in duty under allied
control. The battalion was attached to the British 8 th Army and operationally
accountable to the British command. It depended only administratively from
the Italian SIM’s counterintelligence division (alias “Bonsignore”) located in
Brindisi and later in Rome. In December 1943, an identical battalion was created
and attached at the 5 th Army but again under British operational control. The
personnel were entrusted to support the counterintelligence work of the Allies
neutralizing possible spies and political agitators as well as saboteurs of the
allied war effort. Furthermore, the Italian personnel were also in charge of
seizing and putting to trial members of the enemy secret services (German or
Italian Fascist Republic intelligences). In this respect, their activity was very
profitable since the 808° Bt. CS personnel was well acquainted (also through
SIM’s records) with both the Nazi intelligence as well as with all the several
Italian underground political movements and possible agitators.
According to a preliminary study by Italian scholar Gabriella Pasqualini
the 808° Bt. CS was highly considered by the Allies and accomplished a lot in
the security field 11 . For this reason, in September 1944 the British decided to
fully integrate the 808° Bt. CS personnel in their organic of war and
consequently 69 officials and 931 privates of Italian nationality became in all
11 M.G. Pasqualini, “Brevi note su alcuni aspetti dell’amministrazione militare anglo‐americana
in territori liberati dell’Italia dal 1943 al 1948”, in Military Conflicts and Civil Populations. Total
Wars, Limited Wars, Asymmetric Wars, ACTA (34 th Congress of the International Commission of
Military History), Vol. 1, Roma, 2009, in particular pp. 433‐434 and passim.
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respect fully‐fledged British soldiers 12 . Nor did this enrolment cease with the
end of the war. In fact, when in 1945 the Allies, as already mentioned, decided
to disband the Italian SIM they decided to preserve the 808° Bt. CS and to
continue to employ the by‐then British battalion in counterintelligence task
under the command of the AFHQ in Italy 13 .
A preliminary investigation of National Archives and Records
Administration (from now on NARA) in Washington DC, has shown that
documentation concerning the 808° Bt. CS is today available in the United
States (in the OSS Archives) since copies of the battalion’s reports were
routinely sent to both London and Washington 14 . Apparently only in summer
1946 the 808° Bt. CS was returned to the Italian Ministry of War for operational
control 15 .
One of these reports (dated March 1946) traced in the OSS archives
illustrates the several functions that the battalion covered for the Allies. They
continued to seize and interrogate former Nazi spies (in the sole month of
March they arrested 40 suspected individuals) 16 . They supported the Allies in
controlling and contrasting the activity of Yugoslavia’s intelligence agents in
the Friuli Venezia Giulia region 17 . They extensively reported on the Italian
public opinion both concerning their major source of dissatisfaction (i.e. goods
shortage; monetary inflation and popular reaction to Peace Treaty clauses) and
on their attitude towards the Italian Government activity (legislation
concerning the institutional referendum on the fate of Monarchy in Italy;
regulations concerning the authority of the Constituent Assembly as well as the
relations with the Vatican) 18 . In other words, the 808° Bt. CS reports allowed the
Allies, prevalently the British, to have an extremely reliable and updated view
on the general situation of Italy.
In sum, after the end of the war the bulk of the surviving Italian
intelligence, i.e. its counterintelligence division, continued to operate in Italy
under strong British tutelage. Although the British might have been
antagonized by several Italian post‐war political factions/politicians in
continuing to maintain an official tutelage on Italian armed forces, it cannot be
said that the British influence in fact ceased with the end of the war.
12 Ivi, p. 432.
13 Ivi, pp. 435 and fll.
14 Cfr. NARA, Rg. 226, E. 108 A, b. 272, f. jzx – 7740, Ministero della Guerra, Stato Maggiore
Regio Esercito, 808° Battaglione Controspionaggio.
15 M.G. Pasqualini, op. cit., p. 433.
16 NARA, Rg. 226, E. 108 A, b. 272, f. jzx – 7740.
17 Ibidem.
18 Ibidem.
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Finally, a further investigation of the British involvement in the
strengthening of the Italian police forces, in compliance with selected Italian
interlocutors, might shed light on several ambiguous episodes during the
immediate aftermath of the war.
In this respect, for instance, this persisting dialogue with the British might
better explain the attitude of Italian Socialist politician Giuseppe Romita in
charge of the Ministry of the Interior from December 1945 to July 1946. Several
of Romita’s decisions during his term in office have remained unclear for the
Italian historical debate which has often found a discrepancy between Romita’s
socialist leaning and his ministerial action. For instance, in the spring of 1946
Romita’s compliance with Piéche’s decision of removing the former Partisans
from the Pubblica Sicurezza and substituting them with more professional, alias
“ideologically non‐suspicious” personnel. One might wonder if British Labour
concerns on the loyalty of Italian police forces infiltrated by ex‐Partisans did not
influence to some extent Romita’s decision.
Also a further similarly enigmatic aspect might be clarified. According to
some accounts in fact during the aftermath of the war, there was a prolonged
contention between the Italian Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the
Defence concerning the use of the material from the Allied “disposal agencies”,
namely, weaponry, vehicles and scraps. Some military historians have claimed
that this was due to the fact that the Ministry of the Interior, entrusted to a
Socialist like Romita, wanted to prevent the strengthening of the Italian Army
traditionally considered dominated by right‐wings Italians if not ex‐Fascists.
Differently, for Pedaliu: the “Italian government was so pressed for the few
resources it had or had been given by the Allies, that it poured these into civil
rehabilitation and not military use” 19 . Unlike what Pedaliu affirms, it is perhaps
plausible to affirm that the Minister of Interior, alias Romita, needed the
material from the “disposal agency” also for other tasks rather than exclusively
for civil rehabilitations. Among these, under possibly firm and reiterate British
suggestion, there was the necessity to provide the Carabinieri and Pubblica
Sicurezza with the equipment that would allow them to guarantee public order
and law.
In conclusion, the analysis of British role in the enforcement of internal
security in Italy deserves a further investigation.
There is preliminary evidence of the Labour Government’s ability to
overcome some forms of domestic opposition and perpetuate his influence on
the peninsula in this area. This was probably mainly achieved by the British
through a constructive dialogue with selected interlocutors within the Italian
19 E.G.H. Pedaliu, op. cit., p. 36.
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non‐Communist forces. This dialogue deserves a further investigation not only
because it illustrate how this activity was of vital importance to the eventual
pro‐Western orientation of Italy (prior to the American commitment) but also
because it encompassed a rather larger political spectrum than previously
assumed. i.e. It included strands of the Italian Socialism which possibly
encompassed Pietro Nenni himself.
°°°°
“The British Way to Socialism: British Intervention in the Italian Election of
April 1948 and its Aftermath” chapter analyses the Labour Government
involvement in Italy, prevalently between early 1947 and 1948, in order to
ensure that the non‐Communist Italian political forces were able to win the
General Election. According to the author the degree of action undertaken in
Italy by Labour was impressively “breath‐taking” and “ferocious” especially
when confronted with the by then overall retrenchment of British foreign
policy 20 . Firstly, in fact, as Pedaliu affirms, by 1948 the British were considering
a significant contraction of their action in the Northern shores of the
Mediterranean. Secondly, Britain had also already accepted to play a
prevalently supportive role to the Americans in Italian affairs 21 . Yet, Pedaliu
indicates that there were both strategic and ideological considerations at play in
Labour Britain’s impressive intervention in Italian elections. First of all, it was
meant to safeguard the last vestige of British influence on the strategically
important peninsula. At the same time, a more incisive British action was
considered important in order to make Italy safe from Communism and in so
doing also safeguarding Britainʹs interest in enhancing a political
transformation within Italy. The latter, from an ideological point of view, would
allow for the emergence in Italy of a real “democratic socialist” party based on
the ideals of the British Labour’s way to Socialism 22 . In sum, the bigger the
Social Democrats were to become in Italy, as opposed to maximalist Socialists
aligned with Moscow, the greater the influence the Labour Government could
assert through its connection with those forces on the peninsula. In general this
interpretation was in line with the idea that Labourite Britain was better placed
than the Americans in being able to offer European countries a “more attractive
ideological alternative” to Communism 23 .
20 Ivi, p. 59.
21 Ibidem.
22 Ibidem.
23 Ibidem.
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According to Pedaliu, Bevin’s assumption concerning the feasibility of a
political transformation of Italy, or rather of Italian Socialism, was based on the
set of tools that Labour Britain was able to mobilize. That is, not only the
apparatus of the British state but also several Labour Party departments
(especially the International one under the charismatic leadership of David
Healey) and single Labour representatives which had a long history of relations
with the Italian Socialists counterpart. On the other hand, Pedaliu enumerates
another tactic of intervention adopted by Bevin right before the 1948 election,
that is, the repeated British attempt to push the De Gasperi Government into
adopting a restructuring of its action “to tackle the chronic and complex
problems of poverty, ill‐distribution of wealth and lack of agrarian and social
reforms” 24 . The latter were the main issues that were seen at the root of the
appeal of Communism in Italy. Yet, Bevin was aware that any official British
initiative to influence Italian domestic policy had to be followed by a series of
informal manoeuvres in order to achieve optimum results. In fact, the British
tactic was influenced by “Bevin’s firm belief that the most productive course
was to encourage and capitalize on developments taking place within the
Italian body‐politic” 25 .
After the June 1946 election for the Italian Constituent Assembly (where
the proved Communists quite strong) and the October 1946 reconfirmation of
the wartime “Unity of Action Pact” between the PCI and the PSI, the anti‐
Communist forces both in Italy and in Britain became positively alarmed. There
was enough evidence that the coupling of forces by the Leftist parties could
enable the PCI to gain power in the Italian Parliament. As a result of these
alarming events, at the beginning of 1947 there was a split, the so called Palazzo
Barberini schism, within the Italian Socialist movement which until then had
encountered the unconditional support of the Labour government. The old
Italian PSI separated into two political bodies: Nenni’s PSIUP (Partito Socialista
di Unità Proletaria) aligned with Moscow and Saragat’s PSIL (Partito Socialista dei
Lavoratori Italiani) which instead refused this association with the Soviet Union.
PSIL eventually changed its name to Italian Democratic Socialist Party, PSDI, in
1951. The Italians endorsing Saragat’s secessionist line encompassed several
influential post‐1940s Italian politicians as well as Giuseppe Romita (the
abovementioned 1946 Italian Minister of Interior and later leader of the PSDI).
The Palazzo Barberini split had two important outcomes for Italy, one in
the domestic sphere and another in the international realm. As a consequence of
24 Ivi, p. 60.
25 Ibidem.
°°°°
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the schism, the Christian Democrats leader and Prime Minister De Gasperi felt
stronger and decided to engineer the “exclusion crisis of May 1947” which was
resolved with the Leftist parties ‐ PCI and PSIUP ‐ being evicted from
government 26 . In the international setting, the Socialist split determined a
realignment of Labour government’s policy towards the various Italian
groupings. In fact, as Pedaliu claims, Labour Britain redirected its Italian policy,
until then aiming to detach Nenni from the Pact with the Communists, towards
encouraging non‐Communist elements within PSIUP to break ranks with the
Nenni and join Saragat. On the other hand, as the author recalls, other
developments were still to influence the British conduct in the second half of
1947. Firstly, the bitter realization that Saragat’s secessionist faction lacked any
mass‐based support among the Italian Socialists. Secondly, also the quasi‐
revolutionary state of the Italian internal situation, as a consequence of the
exclusion of the Left from government, influenced British action. Togliatti in
fact retorted to what political scientists have termed as the “strategy of doppiezza
(duplicity)”. According to the latter, while still prevalently claiming willingness
to reach power through democratic means (alias the ballot‐box), Togliatti on
several occasion also fomented social protest igniting popular strikes and
revolutionary aspirations. Togliatti’s threats coupled with the inclusion of the
Italian PCI in the newly founded Soviet Cominform (Communist Information
Bureau) in September 1947 generated an almost hysterical climate among the
non‐Communists Italian and British.
From then on, as Pedaliu stresses, British efforts concentrated on
ascertaining ways to undermine the strength of the PCI. Once it was assured,
via the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD), that the main source of
support for the PCI came from its dominant position in the Italian trade union
movement (where the Communists had succeeded in winning all the top posts),
Bevin recommended that Communist activities within the CGIL (Confederazione
Generale Italiana del Lavoro) must be closely monitored. At the same time, Bevin
officially declared that the Labour government and Party condemned
Communism, instead encouraging “Italian socialist resistance to it” 27 . As
Pedaliu’s own analysis suggests, therefore, until the beginning of 1948 there
was still an attempt on Bevin’s part to advocate a “Socialist unity” in the
continent to counter the threat of Communist advance.
According to the author, what drove a final wedge Between Bevin and
Nenni was the Czech coup of February 1948. Pedaliu claims that after the Czech
coup, Bevin’s policy changed from a previous goal of “precipitating changes
within Italian Socialism” to a more aggressive action aiming to build up Saragat
26 See on this in particular P. Craveri, De Gasperi, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006.
27 E.G.H. Pedaliu, op. cit., p. 67.
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and Lombardo as “the only alternative for democratic socialist voters” 28 .
Consequently, “the British government took steps to legitimize the Palazzo
Barberini split and ensure that the Saragat faction was treated by the Labour
Party, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) as well as the international Socialist
movement as the real Socialist Party of Italy” 29 .
In fact, as a consequence of the British‐led campaign, Nenni’s
collaborationist line was publicly and overtly repudiated by the whole
international Socialist movements on two subsequent public occasions. The first
time, it occurred in March 1948 during the meeting of the Socialist Parties of the
16 countries participating in the European Recovering Program (ERP). On that
occasion, after the TUC invited an Italian CGIL grouping (which unlike the
majority of the Union decided not to turn down the invitation), Nenni’s
delegates within the union group were heavenly contested over both their
policy of rejection of the Marshall Plan and their association with PSIUP. On a
second occasion, the following April, during a meeting of the Committee of
International Socialist Conference (COMISCO) Lombardo and Saragat were
welcomed by all their peers whereas, in compliance with Labour Party
indication, Nenni’s delegates were again isolated and condemned for their links
with the PCI. Finally, Pedaliu recalls how immediately after that second
meeting, two outstanding Labour figures, like David Healey and the Secretary
of the Labour Party, Morgan Phillips, were dispatched to Rome to continue
their propaganda campaign against Nenni. The goal of the mission was to
identify Nennite‐Socialist members who, after the condemnation experienced at
COMISCO, might be finally resolved to sever their links with the PSIUP and
side with Saragat. Furthermore, Pedaliu also adds how, once back in Britain,
both Healey and Phillips publicly endorsed Saragat and instead rejected
Nenni’s PSIUP which was enabling the Communist to gain power in Italy.
Healey and Phillips’ initiative, according to Pedaliu’s, had “a general positive
impact on the Italian ‘democratic socialist’ vote” 30 .
Finally, Pedaliu discusses the visit of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowitt, to
Rome from 2 February to 5 March 1948. Although the visit was made in a
private capacity, the author claims that it had a significant impact because,
when meeting with important Italian personalities, Jowitt “let it be known,
beyond any doubt, that the Nennite PSIUP had the profound disapproval of the
British Labour government and movement. […] the visit signalled to the Italian
government that the Lombardo‐Saragat grouping had the indubitable support
28 Ivi, p. 70.
29 Ibidem.
30 Ivi, p. 72.
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of the British government” 31 . Meanwhile, the British government also continued
in its efforts aimed to convince De Gasperi (prevalently via the British
Ambassador Victor Mallet) of the necessity of progressive reforms. As the
author recalls, the persistent lack of action in this sense was putting Bevin in a
very difficult position at home. Every time in fact Bevin advocated help for Italy
at the British Parliament a plethora of complaints emerged accusing the Foreign
Secretary of defending an “Italian government with reactionary leanings” one
which was “contrary to the principles of a social democratic country like
Britain” 32 .
An appreciation of Chapter Four on the Exchanges between British and Italian Socialist
credo between 1945 and 1948
After a careful analysis of the chapter it seems conceivable to agree with the
impression that in 1948 the same American official observers verbalized. As
Pedaliu reveals, the Unites States uttered serious concerns regarding Bevin’s
attitude towards the Italian election. Especially the State Department, which at
that time lamented on several occasions that Bevin’s position towards Italy was
too “subtle and anodyne” and that “Britain could do a lot more to influence the
outcome of the elections” 33 .
Pedaliu asserts that Bevin’s “ferocious” and nevertheless “low‐profile”
action towards the Italian Socialism was informed by one main concern. As the
Secretary often retorted to the Americans, a higher‐profile interventionist line
could backfire against the British government, since it could be exploited by the
Communist propaganda as a sign of gross interference in Italian domestic
affairs. Consequently, as again Pedaliu affirms, Bevin favoured a more “behind
the scenes” action where an endorsement of the Saragat‐Lombardo faction was
to come from the whole international socialist movement rather than just from
the British government.
What still remains unconvincing is the whole timing of Bevin’s action
towards the Italian Socialism.
According to Pedaliu until the beginning of 1947 the Labour government
worked to precipitate changes within the Italian PSIUP, or, in other words,
convincing Nenni’s party to break with the Communists. Later on, given the
lack of results in this sense, Bevin decided to put all British weight in support of
the Saragat faction. Yet, one might wonder why, given the fact that the Palazzo
Barberini split occurred at the beginning of January 1947, the British
31 Ivi, p. 67.
32 Ivi, p. 68.
33 Ivi, p. 70‐71.
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Government preferred wait until one month before the General Election of
April 1948 to repudiate the PSIUP. The repudiation, on the other hand, was not
even straight‐forwardly formulated by the Labour Government or Party but
delivered to the Nenni‐led party and followers via the intercession of the
International Socialist movement. Pedaliu justifies the British delay in assuming
a final position towards Nenni’s PSIUP through two main observations. First of
all, Pedaliu puts a lot of emphasis on the impact that the Czech coup had on
prompting the ultimate formula of British policy towards Nenni. Secondly, the
author also stresses the influence of Bevin’s personal view and the Foreign
Secretary’s unquestioned ability to formulate the official foreign policy of the
country. Pedaliu, in other words, by and large presents the British decision to
boycott Nenni in February 1948 as a straightforward consequence of Bevin’s
ultimate decision.
On the other hand, whereas the ascendency of the Czech coup on the post‐
February 1948 British line towards the Italian PSIUP can be a plausible
satisfactory explanation for a definitive adjustment of police, to by‐pass all the
Labour Party’s internal debate, as Pedaliu tends to do, over an important issue
such as the unity of continental Socialism makes the final thesis of the author
less convincing. As scholar Richard Stammers has demonstrated, when
extending the approach beyond Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office and
studying mid‐Forties British foreign policy within the broader context of the
Labour Party as a whole, a different picture often emerge 34 . As Stammers
affirms: “The Attlee government’s foreign policy was not merely a product of
ministers’ ideas and the influence of the Foreign Office. Britain’s foreign policy
position throughout this period owed much to the influence of the Labour
Party’s peculiarities, traditions, debates, rivalries, personalities and ideology,
and how these interacted with international developments” 35 .
In particular there is evidence that on Labour Britain position towards the
unity and strategy of the International Socialist movement in 1948 Europe,
Bevin had quite little free room for manoeuvre with respect to the rest of the
Labour Party. On the contrary, during the previous biennium Bevin had been
heavenly criticized on several occasions for his choices of foreign policy which
had been deemed as in fact against the socialist credo. Consequently, the
decision to repudiate Nenni’s PSIUP did not happen without extensive intra‐
party squabbles and even open and entranced opposition 36 . In other words,
even in February 1948 the “Keep Left” militants within the Labour Party still
34 R. Stammers, The British Labour Party and the Emergence of Bipolarity 1943‐1949, University of
Cambridge PhD dissertation, February 2002.
35 Ivi, “Introduction”, p. IX.
36 Ivi, chapter VI and VII, in particular p. 279 and fll.
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had a certain degree of capacity in inhibiting Bevin’s political action and
continuing to restrain his inherent disposition to move “ferociously” against
Communism by‐passing inherently Socialist concerns 37 .
On the other hand, following Pedaliu’s own line of reasoning, if Bevin’s
policy concerning Nenni was so much influenced by the events in Prague, is it
still possible to attribute to the Foreign Secretary’s action towards the Italian
maximalist Socialism, even prior to the 1948, the tenacity and persistence, the
ferociousness, that she instead claims it undoubtedly had? Is it still possible to
agree with Pedaliu when she affirms that Bevin had a “breathtaking”
interventionist attitude towards pre‐General Election Italy?
Or rather, is it not possible to assert that Bevin’s foreign policy, either for
internal party constrains or out of personal conviction attempted until the very
end to comply with the dogma of the unity of International Socialism hoping to
use it as an ideological lever to sever the links between the largest part of
Nenni’s PSIUP and the PCI? Also in consideration of the small following of the
Saragat’s grouping (as early as in January 1947 at the General congress of Italian
Socialists the PSLI emerged as an extremely weak faction) the only chance for
Labour of having a “British‐like way to Socialism” in Italy still rested on the
possibility that sooner or later much larger numbers of Italians than those
militating with Saragat would decide to cast their vote against Moscow.
Finally, one might wonder if the idea, that emerges from the Pedaliu’s
reasoning is plausible, i.e. that an expert top union leader such as Bevin would
unreservedly entrust to Saragat (considered by the Secretary “a vain
intellectual” 38 ) and his followers (which lacked any overall mass‐based support
from voters) the task of igniting in Italy those social democratic reforms that the
country so much necessitated. Is it accurate to maintain with Pedaliu that the
Labour leadership deemed Saragat’s PSLI as realistically in the position to be
able to infuse a reformist approach in Italy against the conservative
encroachment of Southern landowners and Northern industrialists so dominant
in the Italian governments by 1948?
One might similarly wonder whether Bevin’s political viewpoint (and
tactic) towards the Italian Socialism in effect shifted during the course of the
1946‐1948 period, but presumably far less than claimed by Pedaliu. From the
author’s final analysis it in fact emerges that Labour Britain was by 1947 forced
to put its political weight behind Saragat and consequently to limit her action to
backing the victory of the Christian Democrats. On the other hand, what the
author did not discuss are the important consequences of the policy that she
attributed to Bevin. Limiting the British action to building of Saragat’s Party as
37 Ibidem.
38 E.G.H. Pedaliu, op. cit., p. 61.
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a possible coalition ally for the Italian DC would mean to voluntarily relegate
Britain to a completely subordinate position to the Americans in Italy. In fact, in
the absence of any substantial mass‐based social democratic representation in
the Italian government the Labour British influence on Italian affairs was soon
destined to be overcome by the entrenchment of capitalist America siding with
the Christian Democrats.
The final outcome depicted by Pedaliu seems quite negative if one
considers the geostrategic importance that historians (and also Pedaliu) ascribe
to post‐war Italy in the mid‐Forties British strategy in the Mediterranean region
and in Western Europe. It seems even glummer when this strategy is measured
against the overall project that historians (and again also Pedaliu) attribute to
Bevin in 1946: that is, the wish of transforming London into the Mecca of
European Social Democratic forces.
The distance between the initial aspiration of Bevin for Social democracy
in Europe and what Pedaliu affirms to be the Foreign Secretary’s goal in April
1948, bring one to wonder if instead Bevin did not still nurture some further
future hope of advancement for the progressive forces of the peninsula rather
than simply, and unreservedly, supporting the foreseeable entrenchment in
power of the over‐conservative and equally “ideologically suspicious”
Christian Democrats. Might it be possible, as among others also historian Sean
Greenwood claims, that Bevin still had the European “Third force” option in
mind even after the Prague events and prior to the Italian General Election 39 ?
Possibly Bevin’s mid‐1948 adaptation of the original “Third force” ideal was to
some extent more moderate than the one of 1946 which exclusively envisaged
the alignment of purely socialist European countries. This softening also caused
by the by then large involvement of the United States in European economic
affairs. On the other hand, even in this supposed later adaptation of his strategy
– one that G. Warner has termed the Bevin’s “dumb‐bell” concept of Atlantic
relations 40 ‐ Bevin presumably still saw and wanted Britain to remain the
pivotal country as well as nurturing aspirations for this British‐led bloc being
able to pursue a foreign policy somehow independent of both the American
allies and the Soviet antagonists 41 .
A more careful analysis of the British government’s and Labour Party’s
involvement with the Italian Socialism might better clarify if in the case of the
39 S. Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, 1945‐1991, London, Macmillan, 2000.
40 See G. Warner, “The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western Europe”, in R. Ovendale
(ed. by), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945‐1951, Leicester University
Press, Leicester, 1984, p. 79.
41 R. Stammers also claims that the “Third Force” option was still alive within part of the “Soft
left” and the whole “Hard left” of the Labour Party even in 1949. Cfr, Id., op. cit., passim.
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Italian election of 1948 Bevin was still pursuing a distinct foreign policy from
that of the United States. If Bevin still felt as possible and desirable ‐ even after
the Czech coup and also thanks to it ‐ the distancing from the PCI of a much
larger part of Italian Socialism than the one represented by the PSLI. This wish,
on the other hand, was something that surely necessitated an extremely
prudent (and then therefore “low profile”) British foreign policy in pre‐General
Election Italy. On the fulfilment of this hope rested not only the possibility of a
truly social democratic evolution for post‐war Italy but also of a Labourite‐like
electoral alternative to the Christian Democrats bloc. A larger non‐maximalist
Italian Socialism was in fact presumably considered as much better
ideologically equipped than the members of the Italian DC to prosecute a
profitable dialogue between Italy and Labour Britain. The two parties would in
some way strengthen each other and might have been presented internally and
internationally as a valuable alternative to both Stalinization and
Americanization.
In conclusion, a further investigation of specific archives seems desirable
in order to better appreciate the possible subtleties contained in Bevin’s Italian
policy for 1948. In particular the Labour Party Archive at the Museum of
Labour History in Manchester is certainly a valuable source. It contains the
papers of the International Department and thus of its International Secretary
David Healey. Similarly, documentation of the Labour Party’s Secretary
Morgan Phillips is also deposited in Manchester. This Archive might contain
important information concerning the visit to Rome of the two Labour leaders
before the General Election and also details of their exchanges with the several
groupings and exponents of the Italian Socialism.
The Trade Union Congress Library at the University of Northern London,
which also contains documentation related to foreign affairs, might possible
retain further information on British action towards the CGIL and Nenni’s and
Saragat’s delegates during the two abovementioned Socialist conferences of
early 1948.
Finally, it seems also important, on the one hand, to further investigate
relevant Foreign Office’s papers on British official contacts with Italian Socialist
members between 1946 and 1948 (i.e. with Nenni in his capacity of Foreign
Minister as well as possibly with Saragat and Lombardo) and, on the other, to
compare and contrast these sources with documentation on the same issue
contained in the Italian PSIUP archives (since 1986 collected at the ACS,
Archivio Centrale dello Stato di Roma) at the Italian PSIL Archives and
Saragatʹs collections held at the Filippo Turati Foundation in Florence.
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Stefano Petrungaro. Balcani. Una storia di violenza?
Carocci Editore, Roma 2012
di Alessandra Teichner
“Valutare la violenza, questo è uno degli obiettivi del libro che il lettore tiene in
mano” 1 : con queste parole Petrungaro apre il suo Balcani. Una storia di violenza?,
pubblicato da Carocci nel marzo 2012. E in effetti l’intento dell’autore è chiaro
già dal titolo: dare una risposta ad una domanda, ovvero se è esistita, o esiste,
una “violenza balcanica”, vale a dire una violenza che nel territorio in questione
assuma un volto differente rispetto alle altre, in particolare rispetto a quella
europea. La risposta non è però facilmente rintracciabile, né tantomeno
scontata, perché racchiude in sé, come ribadito più volte nel corso di tutte le 185
pagine, interi secoli di pregiudizi che la popolazione europea ha nutrito nei
confronti di quella della confinante penisola balcanica.
L’autore, Stefano Petrungaro, che ha conseguito un dottorato di ricerca in
Storia sociale europea all’Università “Ca’ Foscari” di Venezia ed è oggi
ricercatore presso l’Institut für Ost‐und Südosteuropaforschung di Regensburg
e visiting lecturer presso l’Università di Zagabria, chiarisce ancora le sue
intenzioni specificando:
La violenza in questione ha avuto luogo nei Balcani. Ma basta questo per definirla balcanica?
Ha quella violenza qualcosa che la distingua chiaramente dalle violenze che si sono manifestate
nel resto del pianeta? 2
Il fine dell’autore – recensito positivamente anche da «Osservatorio
Balcani e Caucaso» ‐ è stato quello, dunque, di decostruire uno degli stereotipi
più comuni che l’Europa occidentale ha generalmente costruito nei confronti
della popolazione del suo versante più orientale: il loro essere
ingiustificatamente violenta.
Decostruire uno stereotipo, s’intenda, non giustificare comportamenti di
talvolta reale eccessiva violenza. Perché di violenza ce ne è stata sicuramente,
soprattutto negli ultimi decenni del Novecento, quando gli eventi si rivelarono
tanto gravi e tanto pregni di brutalità da indurre l’ONU ad istituire una corte ad
hoc per valutare l’entità dei crimini commessi: l’International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia, istituita nel 1993 per giudicare i fatti successivi al 1991.
1 Stefano Petrungaro, Balcani. Una storia di violenza?, Carocci Editore, Roma 2012, p. 9.
2 Ibidem.
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Petrungaro, che si è occupato inoltre della storia sociale e culturale della
Croazia e della Slovenia nell’Ottocento, pubblicando in proposito Pietre e fucili.
La protesta sociale nelle campagne croate di fine Ottocento, Viella, Roma 2009, cerca
quindi di sciogliere i contorti intrecci che caratterizzano la storia balcanica per
darne una spiegazione razionale, prendendo in considerazione non solo i
singoli casi di eccessiva brutalità, ma la storia tutta degli abitanti della penisola,
nella sua complessa rete di relazioni mondiali, esimendosi da preconcetti e
tabù.
Petrungaro, che risulta tra le altre cose anche coautore, insieme a Laura
Cerasi e Rolf Petri, del volume Porti di frontiera. Il sistema portuale e industriale
altoadriatico tra le due guerre (Viella, Roma 2009), propone di osservare gli
avvenimenti storici da un punto di vista “altro” rispetto a quello cui siamo
abituati, indagando nella storia della popolazione peninsulare come quella di
genti che sono state, negli ultimi decenni, e in parte lo sono ancora oggi, in
cammino per formare degli stati nazionali indipendenti a tutti gli effetti, allo
stesso modo di ciò che è avvenuto in Europa circa un secolo prima. Si legge
infatti nel libro:
Le maggiori forme di violenza di massa, nei Balcani come altrove, sono legate alla costruzione e
alla distruzione di strutture statuali. Mettere in piedi uno stato significa conquistare un
territorio, in genere combattere un avversario, sottomettere una popolazione. E la
rimodulazione degli stati, attraverso i ‘vuoti di potere’ e i loro riempimenti, attraverso il crollo
di uno stato e la sua sostituzione con uno nuovo, travasa fiotti di violenza istituzionalizzata da
un contesto statale all’altro. Se questo è quanto avvenuto e tuttora avviene in tutto il mondo, in
cosa si differenziano i Balcani? 3
Petrungaro, che nel 2006 ha pubblicato anche Riscrivere la storia. Il caso della
manualistica croata, 1918‐2004, Stylos, Aosta 2006 (ed. croata: Pisati povijest
iznova, Srednja Europa, Zagreb 2009), illustra esaustivamente come la violenza
di queste regioni sia in gran parte riconducibile ai molti anni di assimilazione e
al comportamento degli occupanti (vedi ad esempio la Devshirme, il tributo di
sangue da offrire ai turchi 4 ), alle grandi migrazioni cui i balcanici sono stati
costretti di volta in volta, alle truppe di eserciti stranieri che attraversarono i
loro territori in lungo e in largo seminando terrore tra gli abitanti. È bene
sottolineare, però, che non si tratta di proporre una visione “vittimistica” di
3 Ivi, p. 29.
4 La Devshirme era una forma di arruolamento coatto di ragazzi in giovane età, organizzata sotto
forma di tassa: per ordine del sultano le popolazioni ebree e cristiane (ovvero i cosiddetti zimmi,
i “popoli del Libro”), con scadenza triennale o quinquennale, dovevano consegnare agli
ottomani un numero prestabilito di giovani, i quali, strappati dalle famiglie e portati ad Istanbul
per ricevere una particolare educazione, erano destinati al corpo dei giannizzeri o ad essere
futuri amministratori dell’Impero.
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paesi che avrebbero passivamente subito agenti esterni, ma solamente di dare a
questa brutalità, di cui tutti parlano, un senso all’interno di un più ampio
contesto.
Resta il fatto che la violenza…
… quand’è balcanica, sembra sempre anormale, abnorme, apparentemente collocandosi,
proprio per via di quel suo anomalo eccesso, al di fuori della sfera occidentale, che avrebbe
preso forma attraverso la costruzione, tra l’altro, di Stati moderni e civili. 5
Per rispondere in maniera definitiva alla domanda che si pone all’inizio
del libro, l’autore, che è oggi redattore di «900. Per una storia del tempo
presente» e corrispondente di «Passato e presente», rivista di storia
contemporanea, racconta, sia pure in modo forse un po’ rapido per chi dovesse
essere completamente digiuno sull’argomento, quali siano tutti i fatti accaduti
nella storia per i quali viene attribuito l’aggettivo “violenta” a questa
popolazione e che hanno influenzato in modo importante la sua realtà, odierna
e passata: il tradizionale conflitto tra città e campagne, quasi sempre degenerato
in lotte armate; le molte ribellioni legate alla dominazione ottomana, spesse
volte sedate con l’uso della violenza; il fenomeno del banditismo; gli
spostamenti forzati di popolazione (non solo da parte turca, con la nota
migrazione secentesca, ma anche per iniziativa interna alla penisola); le
violenze causate dal razzismo; i numerosi casi di stupri, sistematici e, in alcuni
casi, genocidiari; le numerose guerre che hanno coinvolto la popolazione civile,
o anzi, come la definisce Petrungaro, la “guerra ai civili”, e tanti altri.
Particolari poi sono proprio i crimini perpetuati tra popolazioni balcaniche
stesse: secondo l’autore, hanno molto spesso preso spunto da contemporanei
modelli occidentali, come avvenne ad esempio durante la seconda guerra
mondiale:
… L’ideologia degli ustascia croati, com’è noto, si alimentò di elementi fascisti e nazisti e non
può essere compresa al di fuori del più ampio contesto europeo e ciò vale anche per tutti gli
altri movimenti politici dell’area. È questa un’importante indicazione, che aiuta a capire quanto
avvenuto nella penisola balcanica quando i carnefici non erano occupanti stranieri, ma i
balcanici stessi. 6
Una violenza che va dunque non certo giustificata (anzi, come ogni
violenza è giusto condannarla), ma compresa, prendendo ad esame i vari
processi storici che hanno portato i paesi balcanici ad essere ciò che sono oggi;
processi che si sono ovviamente concatenati con le faccende europee e mondiali,
in un rapporto di evidente squilibrio. Esemplificativa in questo senso la frase
5 Ibidem.
6 Ivi, p. 95.
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dell’autore: “I Balcani non sono un’isola della storia”. A cui aggiunge: “Anche
in quest’ottica sono davvero una penisola, cioè saldamente ancorata al suo
contesto, che è anzitutto danubiano‐mediterraneo, quindi europeo e
mondiale” 7 .
Tirando le somme, nell’ultimo dei dieci capitoli, intitolato
significativamente “Cosa c’è di tanto balcanico?”, Petrungaro ritorna
nuovamente alla domanda iniziale, ovvero: “È esistita, esiste, una violenza
balcanica?” 8
Eccome se esiste, pensa qualcuno, e sai la sua caratteristica qual è? È la crudeltà. Perché è vero
che la violenza, nella sua varietà esiste sempre e dovunque, ma lì, in quella maledetta terra, la
gente esagera. Qui starebbe la cifra della violenza balcanica: il suo estremismo. 9
Una violenza “più crudele” agli occhi degli osservatori europei, una
violenza “più cattiva”, una violenza in un certo senso “più violenta”. Una
violenza che viene richiamata all’ordine ogni qualvolta si pronunci il nome di
uno degli stati peninsulari, Serbia, Bosnia, Croazia e così via, quasi ne fosse
ormai un complemento da questi inseparabile. Una violenza che viene sfoggiata
in modo crudo nelle immagini dei telegiornali come fosse una pubblicità, che
entra nelle case dei comuni cittadini servita attraverso la cornice del
teleschermo e che fa giungere ognuno di noi all’equazione ormai perfetta (e
scontata verrebbe da dire a questo punto) “Balcani = violenza”.
Ma i Balcani hanno forse l’esclusiva sull’orrore? Lo hanno forse praticato maggiormente di
altri? Bisogna aver scordato molta, molta storia per poterlo affermare. Già solo limitandosi alle
vicende europee moderne e contemporanee come è possibile sostenere una simile tesi? Le
pulizie etniche legate alla costruzione degli stati nazionali non sono forse avvenute anche sul
suolo dell’attuale Europa occidentale? I massacri della religione? Le torture, le amputazioni, di
corpi vivi e di cadaveri? E la profanazione del corpo del nemico ucciso, non è forse una pratica
conosciuta, fino all’età contemporanea, anche dagli europei occidentali, i quali la praticano sia
nelle madrepatrie che nelle colonie? […] No, la crudeltà non viene da est. E non è nemmeno un
relitto del passato. La crudeltà accompagna la guerra e la violenza, fin nell’estrema
contemporaneità. 10
Oltre a tutto questo, scrive l’autore, né il Novecento né l’Ottocento
balcanici, così come quelli europei, sempre strettamente connessi, sono fatti solo
di buio, ma anche di luminosi momenti di convivenza pacifica, di progresso
politico, di “costruzione di ‘società civili’, di civili conflitti legati alla difesa dei
diritti delle minoranze” 11 . Anche il pacifismo e la solidarietà si sono manifestati
7 Ivi, p. 163.
8 Ibidem.
9 Ivi, p. 164.
10 Ibidem.
11 Ivi, p. 175.
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nei Balcani, persino in anni recenti, ritenuti spesso i più foschi. “Alla storia di
violenza si potrebbe affiancare una storia, ad esempio, della diserzione o della
solidarietà balcaniche. Non dico che la bilancia si riequilibrerebbe del tutto, ma
la percezione complessiva della storia ne gioverebbe di certo” 12 . Ché poi,
secondo Petrungaro, porre troppa enfasi sugli orrori del Novecento, per quanto
indubbiamente gravi, rischia di limitarne la comprensione.
Occorre non farsi accecare dalle nefandezze del secolo scorso, che non hanno nessun bisogno,
enormi già come sono, di essere ulteriormente ingigantite. Occorre invece studiarle, senza
mitizzarle, ma sottoponendole ad un paziente lavoro di contestualizzazione che si sforza senza
posa di rispondere alle domande sul chi, come e perché. 13
Petrungaro riesce nel suo intento dunque: “cercare di avere uno sguardo
lungo, senza dipartite mitizzanti in tempi arcaici o in questioni astoriche” 14 ma
che leghi il Novecento “come minimo al secolo che lo ha preceduto, al fine di
individuare le radici storiche dei fenomeni attuali” 15 .
12 Ibidem.
13 Ibidem.
14 Ivi, p. 177.
15 Ibidem.
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