esercito e città dall'unità agli anni trenta. tomo i - Sistema ...

496 JOHN A. DAVIS
(including the RRCC) to the wider issues that had provoked popular unrest
and Pasquale Villari's praise for the way in which Heusch behaved in the
aftermath of the emergency in Carrara does no t seem unjustified. It was also
Villari who made the generai observation that:
'In tutti questi tumulti italiani è sempre stata continuamente notata la insufficienza
e la incapacità della nostra polizia la quale si lasciò sempre prendere
alla sprovvista ... non sembra avere la più lontana idea dell'alto carattere morale
che essa dovrebbe avere in un paese libero e civile' 30 .
This judgement did not differ greatly from Crispi's own assessment of
the PS service, and one conseguences of the crisis was that in 1894-5 the
budget for the service was increased to l O. 5 million lire an d the senior ranks
were thoroughly purged - 85 senior officers were retired and another 80
sacked for incompetence:
'Con l'eliminazione di gran parte del personale vecchio, inetto per condizioni
fisiche, per scarsa cultura o per deplorevole condotta privata, e col temporaneo
risanguinamento del personale di pubblica sicurezza con elementi
giovani, vigorosi, educati secondo richiedono le nuove esigenze dei
tempi. . .' 3 1 .
Giolitti and the projessionalization of Urban Policing
The crisis of the 1890s, and in particular the 'Fatti di Maggio' in Milan
in 1898, served to accelerate the development of more specialist forms of
urban policing, an d most of the features that Fosdick note d approvingly in
his survey of 1911 dated from after this peri od 3 2. The reorganization of
the PS forces that Crispi had begun did not begin to bear fruit until after
1900, but it did ultimately lead to the establishment of more professionalized
structures of policing in Italian citi es an d a sharper differentation between
civil and military policing.
The crisis of the 1890s had also revealed that the army was an extremely
clusmy weapon to deploy even during moments of major urban distur-
3° Cf. P. VILLANI, Scritti sulla Questione Sociale, Firenze 1902, p. 178-9; L. PELLOUX,
Quelques souvenir de ma vie, ed. G. Manacorda, Roma 1967.
31 ACSR, Carte Crispi, B. 47, Fasic. 694 (Doc. 5).
32 See F. FosDICK, European Police Systems, New York 1911.
THE ARMY AND PUBLIC ORDER IN ITALIAN 497
bances, since its actions could easily exacerbate the disturbances they were
designed to suppress. As has been noted, the actions of the military - particularly
in Milan in 1898 - contributed to the popular anti-militarism that
spread through many urban working class communities at the turn of the
century.
The expansion of the civil police force may therefore have been welcomed
by many officers since it relieved them of a duty that was considered
not only demeaning and a diversion from the preparation of the army as
a fighting force, but also a dangerous cause of widespread hostility to an
army that wished to project itself as a fundamental institution of national
unity and cohesion.
As John Whittam has argued 33 , the Giolittian era was as criticai for the
development of the Italian army as for other institutions of Italian society.
Since it was a period of important change in military technologies and
strategies, but also one in which Giolitti's policies gave domestic investment
a new priority on Italy's hard-pressed budget, it was not an easy period for
the professional soldier. The years between.l898 and 1908 witnessed a new
restlessness amongst an officer corps whose career opportunities were poor,
and this may have spread to the ranks as well. It was certainly believed that
ordinary soldiers were less willing to act as policemen and that there was
deep resentment when they were deployed to break strikes.
It must also be bome in mind, however, that the military authorities
had become increasingly alarmed during the 1890s at the prospect of
seditious ideas spreading amongst enlisted men 34 . This may w eli ha ve
undermined their confidence in the willingness of the troops to perform
policing duties. Together with the demands of technological progress this
certainly contributed to the new interest shown in teaching and training conscripts,
and in the strategy of 'istruzione di caserma' associated with Niccola
Marselli 35. The concern to 'educate' and the fears of the diffusion of
subversive ideas may well have served to make the garrison troops more
isolated from the cities in which they were stationed.
The government's non-interventionist policies in industriai relations after
1901, meant that the use of troops (at least in the cities) became more restrained,
however. It remained an axiom in Italy - as in other European states
- that the army was the ultimate instrument in times of major civil comma-
33 ]. WHITTAM, The Politics oj the Italian Army 1861-1918, London 1977, pp. 150-3.
34 See eg. BOLTON K!NG & T. 0KEY, ltaly Today, London 1901, p. 72.
3 5 L 'Esercito Italiano dal l o Tricolore al l o Centenario, Ufficio Storico dello Stato
Maggiore, Roma 1961, p. 191.