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492 JOHN A. DAVIS while the Procuratore del Re was responsible for polizia giudiziaria. The Carabinieri, although ultimately dependent on the Ministry of War, acted on the instructions of the Questore. While on one hand, the Questore's jurisdiction became at least comparable to that of the military authorities (through the Carabinieri), their authority was greatly increased at the expense of the municipal authorities (the sindaci and town councils), 20• In 1860 these arrangements were extended to the newly annexed territories, together with the Piedmontese Regolamenti di Pubblica Sicurezza of 1859. The history of the policing of urban Italy after Unification has still to be written and much more research is required before generalizations can be made with any confidence 21. But the information that was collected in 1887 when Crispi set about a major reorganization of civil policing indicates that practice was very different from theory. The total law-keeping forces in Italy at that time amounted to 47,049 men of whom 24,626 were RRCC, in contrast to only 4,505 Guardie di P. S. There were also 9,434 municipal guards and 8,484 Guardie Forestali, paid for by local administrations. The ·total annual cost for the State was 36.1 million lire, of which the RRCC alone accounted for 20.7 million (57,3%) 22• Although the RRCC had been transformed into a national police force in the years after Unification, this had not been accomplished easily. The longer term of service (5 years, as opposed to 3 in the infantry) and poor pay meant that it was not easy to find recruits for the Arma. The onset of the agrarian crisis in the early 1880s eased the situation, but although the size ofthe force was increased by 2,000 men between 1881 and 1887 it stili fell far short of its establishment of 24,626 men. Of these, only 3,518 had mounts - a considerable handicap, since the main task of the RRCC was rural policing. At the time of the Sicilian Fasci it was revealed that hardly any rural stations were equipped with telegraphic communications 23 . The correspondence that resulted from Crispi's inquiry also made it clear that the distinction between urban and rural policing was not in practice observed, mainly because the number of civil police (Guardie di PS) and municipal police were quite inadeguate. But the attempts to introduce a more effective divisi o n of labour between urban an d rural, civil an d military policing w ere warmly supported by the Commando Generale dell'Arma dei 2o See esp: ACSR, Carte Crispi, b. 78/13. 21 For a generai survey of existing research see ]. A. DAVIS, (1988) cit. 22 ACSR, Carte Crispi, b. 78/2 . 23 Ibid., b. 78/4. THE ARMY AND PUBLIC ORDER IN ITALIAN CITIES 493 RRCC, who replied as follows to Crispi's proposal in May 1887 that the RRCC should no longer perform 'qualsiasi servizio di P.S. nell'interno delle Città sedi di un Ufficio di Questura': ' ... riconosco oggidi che nei grandi centri l'azione dell'Arma, sia per l'ostacolo che vi oppone la divisa, sia perché i molti e svariati servizi che ivi ad esso incombono estranei alla p.s. le impediscono di prendere larga conoscenza delle località e degli abitanti, sia infine per molte altre circostanze, non può mai riuscire di molta efficacia ... 2 4 . The Commander requested that in compensation the numbers of RRCC in smaller towns and in rural stations should be increased and that the number of mounted troopers should be increased as a matter of urgency. But the development of clearer distinctions between the roles and functions of the RRCC and the Guardie di PS proved far from easy. The recruitment difficulties that beset the RRCC were even greater in the case of the Guardie di PS. Following the regulations laid down in the law of March 20th 1865 (amended in the law of 21st December 1890), the PS Guards were to be mainly ex-soldiers - either veterans or 2nd category conscripts who had received basic milìtary training. Service in the PS counted as full military service and the PS guards were exempt from all 'chiamate sotto le armi'. Only bachelors and childless widowers were admitted, and all recruits were required to pass a medicai examinatìon (conducted by an army surgeon), to be aged no more than 40 and to be at least 1.6 meters tali. They were also expected to be able to read and write, to have completed their military service satsifactorily and without having been dismissed, and they were no t to have any criminal conviction exceeding five days imprisonment 25. The realities were very different, above all because ofthe great difficulty in finding recruits willing to join the PS Guards. The Questore of Milan drew the Interior Minister's attention to the fact that it was difficult if not impossible to recruit PS agents: ' ... conoscendosi che le guardie si arruola; no dove si presentano e che le Provincie dell'Alta Italia (Milano, Torino, Genova, Bologna) non danno alcuno contingente' 26. Similar observations on the difficulty of recruiting PS guards were made by the Prefects of other cities. In 1884 the Prefect of Firenze noted in his 2 4 Ibid., b. 79/2 (May 1887). 25 Ibid., b. 47, Fascic. 694 (Doc 5). 26 lbid., b. 236/16 (pp. 23-4).

494 ]OHN A. DA VIS annual report to the Ministero dell'Interno that there were very few recruits available for the PS guards and that 'i nuovi arruolati appartengono quasi tutti alla classe degli agricoltori e quasi tutti sono trovatelli'. He doubted whether the situation could be improved since: ' ... è per ora invincibile nella classe operaia, come nelle campagne, l'antipatia verso gli Agenti della Forza Pubblica (non esclusa l'Arma dei RRCC) e ciò, per le ragioni che qui sarebbe ozioso di discutere, segna un permanente abbassamento del senso morale (e) non è d'altronde meno grave difficoltà nel promuovere l'arruolamento . .. ' 27. Crispi's investigations exposed the confusion that stili existed in the policing of even the major Italian cities twenty years after Unification. The outcry that followed the murder of a jeweller named Ida Carcano in Milano in 1889, for example, revealed that there were only 200 PS agents in the whole city. The Prefect of Milan claimed that most of these were: 'Individui nei quali il peso degli anni paralizza l'attività e la prontezza che nelle operazioni di polizia giudiziaria sono primo . .. ' 28• The Prefect also noted that these deficiencies could not be made good by the RRCC 'i quali neppure possono essere utilmente adibiti a servizio di prevenzione e d'indagini causa l'attenzione che su di essi è richiamata dall'uniforme ... '. But there were other obstacles as well to relieving the RRCC of policing duties in the larger cities, not least the hostility shown by the municipal authorities to any attempts to strengthen the Guardie di PS which was seen as a further expansion of the powers of centrai government. At the time of these events in Milan Italy was already in the throes of the the financial crisis and commerciai depression which ushered in the peri od of acute social an d politica! tensions with wich the century of Unification was to dose. In the situation of growing emergency there was no room for reform or reorganization and successive governments resorted to more traditional and ad hoc expedients in the face of rising urban and rural disorders. 27 Ibid. , Min. Int., Rapporti dei Prefetti; Firenze (gennaio 1884). 28 Ibid., Carte Crispi, b. 236/1 (27.11.1890). THE ARMY AND PUBLIC ORDER IN ITALIAN CITIES 495 Crispi 's Reforms and the Crisis of the 1890s Crispi' s proposed reforms of the RRCC an d civil policing were a casualty of the crisis, and ironically the RRCC actually fell in size between 1891 and 1896 as did its budget. However, the recognised inadequancies ofboth the RRCC and the PS Guards may well have been important factors in determining the response of successive governments to the crisis that finally carne to head with the disturbances in Sicily and the Lunigiana in 1894. While lack of confidence in the normal apparatus of policing was neither the major nor most important factor, it did leave the authorities with little alternative but to look to the army for safety. This was particularly evident in the cities. As early as 1890 steps were taken to strengthen the garrison in Milan before the May Day processions and 10,000 additional troops were brought into the city as reinforcements 29. As in the 1860s, the cities were the again principal object of concern an d the need t o keep large numbers of troops stationed in them made it all the more difficult to respond to rural disorder that began to occur up and down the peninsula and its principal islands. The recourse to the state of siege in 1894 and again in 1898 conformed to the logic of relying on the army as the ultimate instrument of internai policing. But the deployment of the army in 1894 and 1898 was not necessarily exceptional and while it is true that the civil authorities and the judiciary in Italy showed less strenuous opposition to the suspension of civil law than in other European states, and that the Cassation court endorsed the legality of the state of siege in 1894, the army was or could be used in comparable circumstances in most European states in this period. It was not so much that the army's role in urban policing in Italy was unusual but that it was particularly visible, especially in moments of crisis. Certainly the lack of alternative means of urban policing contributed to this, but, it was by no means the case that the military authorities willingly embarked on these duties. The relish that Generai Bava Beccaris showed for his task in Milan in 1898 was less typical than the repugnance which his fellow generals - Pelloux in Puglia and Heusch in the Lunigiana - showed when they were forced to become policemen rather than soldiers. It is also worth noting that neither Pelloux nor Heusch were prepared to perform the essentially repressive and reactionary roles assigned them. Both showed much deeper sensitivity than the ordinary policing officials 29 V. HUNECKE, op. cit.,, p. 367.

492 JOHN A. DAVIS<br />

while the Procuratore del Re was responsible for polizia giudiziaria. The<br />

Carabinieri, although ultimately dependent on the Ministry of War, acted<br />

on the instructions of the Questore. While on one hand, the Questore's<br />

jurisdiction became at least comparable to that of the military authorities<br />

(through the Carabinieri), their authority was greatly increased at the expense<br />

of the municipal authorities (the sindaci and town councils), 20• In 1860<br />

these arrangements were extended to the newly annexed territories, together<br />

with the Piedmontese Regolamenti di Pubblica Sicurezza of 1859.<br />

The history of the policing of urban Italy after Unification has still to<br />

be written and much more research is required before generalizations can<br />

be made with any confidence 21. But the information that was collected in<br />

1887 when Crispi set about a major reorganization of civil policing indicates<br />

that practice was very different from theory.<br />

The total law-keeping forces in Italy at that time amounted to 47,049<br />

men of whom 24,626 were RRCC, in contrast to only 4,505 Guardie di P.<br />

S. There were also 9,434 municipal guards and 8,484 Guardie Forestali, paid<br />

for by local administrations. The ·total annual cost for the State was 36.1<br />

million lire, of which the RRCC alone accounted for 20.7 million<br />

(57,3%) 22•<br />

Although the RRCC had been transformed into a national police force<br />

in the years after Unification, this had not been accomplished easily. The<br />

longer term of service (5 years, as opposed to 3 in the infantry) and poor<br />

pay meant that it was not easy to find recruits for the Arma. The onset of<br />

the agrarian crisis in the early 1880s eased the situation, but although the<br />

size ofthe force was increased by 2,000 men between 1881 and 1887 it stili<br />

fell far short of its establishment of 24,626 men. Of these, only 3,518 had<br />

mounts - a considerable handicap, since the main task of the RRCC was<br />

rural policing. At the time of the Sicilian Fasci it was revealed that hardly<br />

any rural stations were equipped with telegraphic communications 23 .<br />

The correspondence that resulted from Crispi's inquiry also made it clear<br />

that the distinction between urban and rural policing was not in practice<br />

observed, mainly because the number of civil police (Guardie di PS) and<br />

municipal police were quite inadeguate. But the attempts to introduce a<br />

more effective divisi o n of labour between urban an d rural, civil an d military<br />

policing w ere warmly supported by the Commando Generale dell'Arma dei<br />

2o See esp: ACSR, Carte Crispi, b. 78/13.<br />

21 For a generai survey of existing research see ]. A. DAVIS, (1988) cit.<br />

22 ACSR, Carte Crispi, b. 78/2 .<br />

23 Ibid., b. 78/4.<br />

THE ARMY AND PUBLIC ORDER IN ITALIAN CITIES 493<br />

RRCC, who replied as follows to Crispi's proposal in May 1887 that the RRCC<br />

should no longer perform 'qualsiasi servizio di P.S. nell'interno delle Città<br />

sedi di un Ufficio di Questura':<br />

' ... riconosco oggidi che nei grandi centri l'azione dell'Arma, sia per l'ostacolo<br />

che vi oppone la divisa, sia perché i molti e svariati servizi che ivi ad<br />

esso incombono estranei alla p.s. le impediscono di prendere larga conoscenza<br />

delle località e degli abitanti, sia infine per molte altre circostanze, non può<br />

mai riuscire di molta efficacia ... 2 4 .<br />

The Commander requested that in compensation the numbers of RRCC<br />

in smaller towns and in rural stations should be increased and that the number<br />

of mounted troopers should be increased as a matter of urgency.<br />

But the development of clearer distinctions between the roles and functions<br />

of the RRCC and the Guardie di PS proved far from easy. The recruitment<br />

difficulties that beset the RRCC were even greater in the case of the<br />

Guardie di PS. Following the regulations laid down in the law of March 20th<br />

1865 (amended in the law of 21st December 1890), the PS Guards were to<br />

be mainly ex-soldiers - either veterans or 2nd category conscripts who had<br />

received basic milìtary training. Service in the PS counted as full military<br />

service and the PS guards were exempt from all 'chiamate sotto le armi'.<br />

Only bachelors and childless widowers were admitted, and all recruits were<br />

required to pass a medicai examinatìon (conducted by an army surgeon),<br />

to be aged no more than 40 and to be at least 1.6 meters tali. They were<br />

also expected to be able to read and write, to have completed their military<br />

service satsifactorily and without having been dismissed, and they were no t<br />

to have any criminal conviction exceeding five days imprisonment 25.<br />

The realities were very different, above all because ofthe great difficulty<br />

in finding recruits willing to join the PS Guards. The Questore of Milan<br />

drew the Interior Minister's attention to the fact that it was difficult if not<br />

impossible to recruit PS agents: ' ... conoscendosi che le guardie si arruola;<br />

no dove si presentano e che le Provincie dell'Alta Italia (Milano, Torino, Genova,<br />

Bologna) non danno alcuno contingente' 26.<br />

Similar observations on the difficulty of recruiting PS guards were made<br />

by the Prefects of other cities. In 1884 the Prefect of Firenze noted in his<br />

2 4 Ibid., b. 79/2 (May 1887).<br />

25 Ibid., b. 47, Fascic. 694 (Doc 5).<br />

26 lbid., b. 236/16 (pp. 23-4).

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