Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...

State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSACs), strengthening the security of
radioactive materials other than nuclear material, assessing the security/safety
vulnerabilities of nuclear facilities, responding to malicious acts and threats, ensuring
compliance with international agreements and guidelines and co-ordinating
information on nuclear security. 183
2.3 Basic Gap Analysis of Existing Initiatives to Counter Nuclear and Radiological
Terrorism
By comparing the areas covered by existing initiatives in the above discussion to the
list of activities identified as warranting attention as derived from the adaptation of
the UN Secretary-General’s framework for counter-terrorism strategies, it is possible
to identify areas in which further development might be desirable. These include:
i) addressing conditions conducive to exploitation by terrorists to win support for the use of
weapons of mass destruction
Whilst States reserve the right to develop and use nuclear and radiological weapons,
it will be
hard to persuade everyone that their possession and use are anything but
legitimat e. Terrorists could argue that they are a legitimate weapon as they are to be
found in the arsenals of even the most powerful States. To counter this argument
real
progress would have to be made towards complete global nuclear
disarmament. This
would send a clear message that nuclear terrorism will not be tolerated and go a long
way towards
undermining these arguments.
ii) denying
access to relevant intangible resources via the Internet
183 Dodd, B., and Reber, E., “Initiatives by the International Atomic Energy Agency to Prevent Radiological
Terrorism”, Winter Meeting, American Nuclear Society, Washington D.C., USA., 17-21 November 2002, [Online]
www.ans.org/meetings/pdfs/2002/wm2002-final.pdf [Last Accessed 12/04/04]
252