Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...

was uncovered when the factory sent a shipment of iridium to St. Petersburg instead
of to the local Kyshtym Customs Post. This led to the realization that the radiation
level of the shipment did not match the radiation level stated on the customs
documentation. Investigations into the incident revealed that similar cases of illicit
trafficking had been occurring for a period of at least two years.
Another example involved the export of over 100 kilograms of LEU and other
assorted radioactive materials from the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in Ust- Kamenogorsk,
Kazakstan. It was reported that a former employee of the site recruited a number of
mid-level employees to divert from their
intended use a variety of radiological
sources, including: LEU, thorium, tantalum, and other radioactive metals. The
material s were then sold on to a group which included a form er Customs agent who
used his detailed knowledge of the export control regime to send the material
abroad. Charges filed following the action of security forces to interdict some of the
material specified the theft of 146 kg of LEU, 439kg of thorium, 58kg of thallium,
20kg of indium, and an undisclosed amount of tantalum.
It has been noted that recent incidents have involved a variety of different sources
which have,
not since 1994, involved weapons-grade material.
When considering weapons grade material, it is necessary to examine the period
prior to 2003. Between 1992 and 1994, there were at least seven unambiguous cases of
diversion and recovery
of weapons-usable nuclear material that appeared to be
linked to the former Soviet Union. The Western nonproliferation community has
referred to these as “significant cases” because they provided unequivocal evidence
that it was possible for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the essential
ingredients of nuclear weapons, to be stolen and traded on the black market. The first
significant case involved the diversion of 1.5 kilograms (kg) of 90-percent-enriched
HEU in 1992 from the Luch Scientific Production Association, a Russian nuclear
research facility located outside Moscow in the town of Podolsk. The last case
involved the recovery of 2.72 kg of 87.7-percent-enriched HEU in Prague, Czech
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