Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...

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proliferation network indicates that it might have been motivated by greed – the traditional motivation of organised crime (as opposed to the political motivations of terrorism). Furthermore, Dr Khan used false papers, front companies and transport arrangements put in place not by terrorists but by criminal contacts. One of Dr Khan's confederates was a Dubai-based Sri Lankan businessman, Buhary Ayed Abu Tahir. It was he that arranged for a Malaysian company to manufacture nuclear components for shipment to Libya and for Libyan technicians to be trained in the use of machines that were part of the nuclear program. Abu Tahir has also been implicated in the transfer of centrifuge units from Pakistan to Iran. It is becoming clear that both terrorists and organised crime possess resources which might be of interest to one and other. Terrorist groups realise that their activities are likely to be costly and commonly have access to financial resources large enough to interest organised crime, driven by greed. Terrorists can also be well versed in the use of a variety of different weapons, counter-intelligence training, and other skills. This knowledge might be equally applicable for criminal purposes. On the other hand, organised crime can often access both resources (such as weapons) and logistical mechanisms (such as smuggling routes) which could facilitate terrorist activities. The practical alignment of the interests of both terrorists and organised crime might best be exemplified by the international trade in narcotics – an industry which involves both terrorist organizations and organised crime. This growing relationship between terrorism and additional avenues to address nuclear and radiological terrorism. It reinforces the necessity of ensuring counter-terrorism activities are conducted within the remit of the rule of law. It also justifies recent efforts to enhance efforts to combat corruption and the financing of terrorism. It also necessitates strengthening law enforcement. International cooperation organised crime opens up on extradition laws could also be strengthened to ensure those perpetrating criminal acts cannot easily elude arrest and prosecution. Most importantly, all these activities need to be carried out throughout the world – having effective measures in a limited number of countries would undermine the 232
effectiveness of these efforts. As long as there are safe havens for the conduct of organised crime, terrorists will have easy access to many of their required resources. 1.2.5 Availability of radiological sources There are seven main sources of radiological materials: (i) Nuclear weapons; (ii) Commercial sources; (iii) Orphan sources; (iv) Nuclear power reactors; (v) Research reactors; (vi) Nuclear fuel processing plants; and (vii) Radioactive waste products. Despite the differences between these types of sources, there are two principles which appear universal: firstly, that small and insignificant (from their potential to be used in a malign manner) sources greatly out-number larger and more hazardous sources; and secondly, that fissile material (either in the form of nuclear weapons or nuclear power related materials) are under tighter controls at a much smaller number of sites than radiological sources. 158 The availability of nuclear weapons and materials, the vulnerability and widespread numbers of nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel processing plants and radioactive waste products have 158 Mullen, E., Van Tuyle, G., & York, R.L., “Potential Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Threats and Associated Technology”, ANS Winter Meeting, Washington D.C., November 18-20, 2002 [online] http://eed.llnl.gov/ans/2002/mullen/mullen_ans_2002.pdf [last accessed 07.04.05] 233
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LANDAU NETWORK - CENTRO VOLTA Ricer
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INDICE Gruppo di Lavoro 7 Introduzi
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Understanding Nuclear and Radiologi
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Gruppo di Lavoro Riccardo Redaelli,
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massa dei musulmani e i rappresenta
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mediatico; si propone quale attore
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L’analisi di molti esperti rivela
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per comprendere e contrastare dottr
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si è diffusa con successo tanto al
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egioni del mondo islamico hanno avu
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dell'islam è chiaramente percepito
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sviluppate soprattutto negli anni
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Insomma, una concezione totalizzant
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iii) principio della superiorità d
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economiche per i paesi produttori d
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estremamente radicale - s’incentr
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icorso alla violenza. Profittando d
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solo un numero “sufficiente” al
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solo una struttura terroristica, be
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tecnologica nei confronti dei propr
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islam percepito come immutabile e u
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Secondo Robert Leiken circa l’ott
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Themes of the Culture of Modern Glo
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Islamic publics and communities, wh
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definition of the enemy is flexible
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From this it is obvious that the ji
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many of the Jihadi volunteers to th
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Islamists also viewed this collapse
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Abdallah Aal al-Shaikh’s fatwa (I
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enovation of orthodox religious ide
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example—is Bin Laden's group al-Q
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Azzam, who focused on the mujaheddi
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of Islam. Thus, they based their vi
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7. The Immigrant Experience All of
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Islamist groups began to target the
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The September 11 attacks, unlike th
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voluntarily. The enthusiasm for sel
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10. The war in Iraq - apocalyptic v
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person of the Mahdi prior to his ap
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each Mahdi; The Mahdi; Mujaddid al-
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using terms, superlatives, and perc
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Learned the Lessons of the mujahedd
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have already used WMD in the past a
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out major terrorist operations in v
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the September 11 attacks: “If I w
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• In many of the Islamist writing
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scholars. Yet, it seems that the de
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• The nature of the Jihadist ideo
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The article bears propagandist over
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“The Islamic society cannot be es
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experienced under various Arab regi
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of Bin Laden, has written about it
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fronts, and moving its activity to
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open university for jihad studies,
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La nuova al-Qa’ida : tra dissoluz
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a un polo decisionale unitario defi
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Comprendere questo fattore è fonda
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Cosa ancora più importante, bench
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2.1 Le origini di al-Qa’ida 2.1.1
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condotte variano notevolmente e del
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La ripresa dei conflitti interni al
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movimento guidato da bin Laden e pe
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government expropriated his assets
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we could. […] As you know the sit
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modifiche dell’ambiente nel quale
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È fondamentale però non interpret
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lontani migliaia di chilometri a di
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La perdita delle basi afgane (che a
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“Although it [al-Qa’ida] has no
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Fig. 3.2 Principali realtà affilia
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tutt’ora, gli unici leader in gra
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Benché vi siano indicazioni che mi
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Iraq Benché l’Afghanistan contin
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Al di là dell’eccezionale ruolo
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sorte negli ultimi anni né a quell
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“nuovo Salah al-Din”, il leader
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La nomina di Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (
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Lungi dal costituire solo uno dei t
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any of the local conflicts invoked
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iracheni potrebbe quindi rivelarsi
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sostenere un’efficace contro-camp
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Accompagnano questa analisi alcuni
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necessariamente connessi a elementi
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economico che il governo iraqeno ap
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peshmerga del PUK intorno a fine di
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uccisi molti erano arabi come al Su
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• Cosa facevi prima? o Studiavo s
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3. Il caso: Guantanamo La maggior p
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4. Videocassette e CD, DvD e Intern
Page 181 and 182: Oggi si può sicuramente affermare
Page 183 and 184: Come è stato sottolineato, la rete
Page 185 and 186: distribuzione, quella che si conclu
Page 187 and 188: di i.Toot è di “ to build a new
Page 189 and 190: Iran. In questo caso, gli approfond
Page 191 and 192: Afghanistan. Nel caso dell’Afghan
Page 193 and 194: ovvero che tipo di rispetto vuole l
Page 195 and 196: Osama negli anfratti afghani; rievo
Page 197 and 198: 5. Reclutatori, reclute e reclutame
Page 199 and 200: della questione potrebbe fornire al
Page 201 and 202: led by [Abu Dujanah] and commander
Page 203 and 204: Abu Usama al-Ansari (Iraq) A former
Page 205 and 206: Recentemente, dicembre 2006, è app
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Page 209 and 210: Understanding Nuclear and Radiologi
Page 211 and 212: Technical Aspects Nuclear terrorism
Page 213 and 214: accident occurred in Goiânia, Braz
Page 215 and 216: This work assesses the threat of nu
Page 217 and 218: This axiom, however, has to be cons
Page 219 and 220: Threats and attempts at nuclear ter
Page 221 and 222: in the “means” that internation
Page 223 and 224: 1.2 The “Way” Terrorist desire
Page 225 and 226: (DEFRA) - was undertaken “to assi
Page 227 and 228: edundant buildings on-site have bee
Page 229 and 230: Nuclear smuggling also incorporates
Page 231: information on how and where to acq
Page 235 and 236: Orphaned radioactive sources Far to
Page 237 and 238: Substance Number of Reported Cases
Page 239 and 240: Republic in December 1994. In all o
Page 241 and 242: classified literature, could possib
Page 243 and 244: 2. International Efforts and Initia
Page 245 and 246: There are five principles which aid
Page 247 and 248: counter-terrorism strategy against
Page 249 and 250: The goal of Nunn-Lugar is to lessen
Page 251 and 252: • Attempting to commit or partici
Page 253 and 254: Although controlling the informatio
Page 255 and 256: “…prevent the acquisition, tran
Page 257 and 258: 2.4.1 The GICNT and Dissuasion The
Page 259 and 260: Conclusion Although not all experts
Page 261 and 262: Radiological weapons scenarios incl
Page 263 and 264: esources, knowledge, experience and
Page 265 and 266: furthering non-proliferation object
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