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Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...

Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...

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acquisition and transfer operations must have been carried out. Intelligence records<br />

in<strong>di</strong>cate that suspicions of such activities developed in a number of western states<br />

during the 1990s. By the end of the century, a more complete picture had emerged.<br />

These proliferation activities appeared not to be isolated events. There were<br />

in<strong>di</strong>cations of the existence of an international proliferation network involving Dr<br />

Khan. For example, the Joint Intelligence Committee in the UK was reporting that<br />

they had information linking Dr Khan attempts to acquire uranium enrichment<br />

technology by one middle eastern country (believed to be Libya). Within a year, Dr<br />

Khan had been removed as <strong>di</strong>rector of the KRL but retained as a special advisor to<br />

the government. He has been shielded ever since from <strong>di</strong>rect investigation by other<br />

states or the international community.<br />

Efforts to establish just what proliferation activities Dr Khan had or may continue to<br />

be involved in, however, managed to progress despite the lack of access to the man<br />

himself. Statements from US officials in<strong>di</strong>cate that they possess intelligence linking<br />

Dr Khan to the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. Dr Khan, it was later<br />

proven, helped to provide North Korea with centrifuge designs, complete centrifuges<br />

and lists of components for centrifuge production. 154<br />

Ad<strong>di</strong>tionally, in October 2003 links to Dr Khan emerged through the international<br />

inspections of the Iranian nuclear programme. In early March 2005, Pakistan<br />

acknowledged A. Q. Khan had provided centrifuges to Iran. 155<br />

Equally, a shipment of centrifuge parts destined for Libya, inter<strong>di</strong>cted in October<br />

2003, were also linked to Dr Khan. Surve<strong>il</strong>lance by the UK’s Joint Intelligence<br />

Committee revealed Dr Khan had expanded his activities to mass-produce the<br />

components for centrifuge cascades and had established his own production<br />

fac<strong>il</strong>ities, in Malaysia. Libya was also reportedly provided by the Dr Khan with<br />

154 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/khan-dprk.htm [last accessed 24.10.06]<br />

155 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/khan-iran.htm [last accessed 24.10.06]<br />

230

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