Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...

saboteur. Attacks on radioactive waste in storage are also a valid concern. Most often
there are too few waste disposal sites to deal with the various types of radioactive
waste (low, medium and high-activity) and often the radioactive waste disposal is
carried out by the producers. This in itself presents concerns over the safety and
security of storage of the waste, as there is far more waste than can be disposed of
quickly and fully which means that radioactive waste products must be stored at the
facility. 152 One solution to this is the development and maintenance of centralised
storage facilities under direct control of the government which would improve
security by having all the waste in only a few places and under constant vigilance.
1.2.3 Nuclear smuggling
In relation to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors, the issue is
more complicated than simply examining the smuggling nuclear material, although
this
remains a problem. As already noted, perhaps the most efficient method for a
non-state actor to acquire a nuclear weapon would be to divert one from existing
stockpiles. Such an act would
then necessitate the weapon to be smuggled to its
intended
detonation point. Fortunately, there are few indications that the smuggling
of complete nuclear weapon systems is currently a problem. The same cannot be said
the illicit transfer of special nuclear material –a key element in any attempt to
produce an IND. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported at
least 18 confirmed seizures of stolen plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU)
over the past decade. 153
152 See: www.ananuclear.org/CARTYfactsheet.html
153 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), "Facts & Figures: The IAEA's Database on Illicit Trafficking of
Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials" (press release, Vienna, Austria, October 8, 2002).
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