Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...
Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...
Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...
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we could. […] As you know the situation below in the v<strong>il</strong>lage [Egypt] has<br />
become bad for traders [jiha<strong>di</strong>s]. Our Upper Egyptian relatives [Islamic<br />
Group] have left the market, and we are suffering from international<br />
monopolies [ hunted by Western and intelligence services]. Conflicts take<br />
place between us for trivial reasons, due to scarcity of resources. We are<br />
<strong>di</strong>spersed over various cities. However, God had mercy on us when the<br />
Omar Brothers Company [the Taliban] here opened the market for traders<br />
and provided them with an opportunity to reorganize, may God reward<br />
them. Among the benefits of residence here is that traders from all over<br />
gather in one place under one company, which increases fam<strong>il</strong>iarity and<br />
cooperation among them” 92 .<br />
Benché <strong>di</strong> fatto la sopravvivenza <strong>del</strong> movimento continuasse a <strong>di</strong>pendere – così<br />
come avvenuto in Sudan – dal sostegno <strong>del</strong>la leadership al potere, la profonda<br />
conoscenza <strong>del</strong> territorio, gli stretti legami intessuti da Bin Laden con importanti<br />
fazioni afgane e <strong>il</strong> mito che iniziava a circondare la figura <strong>del</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta<br />
garantirono al movimento margini <strong>di</strong> manovra <strong>di</strong> molto superiori a quelli concessi<br />
dal regime <strong>di</strong> Khartoum:<br />
“Bin Laden eventually enjoyed a strong financial position in Afghanistan,<br />
thanks to Sau<strong>di</strong> and other financiers associated with the Golden Chain.<br />
Through his relation with Mullah Omar – and the monetary and other<br />
benefits that it brought the Taliban – Bin Laden was able to circumvent<br />
restrictions[…]. Bin Laden appeared to have in Afghanistan a freedom of<br />
movement that he had lacked in Sudan. Al-Qa’ida members could travel<br />
freely within the country, enter and exit it without visas or any<br />
immigration procedures, purchase and import vehicles and weapons, and<br />
enjoy the use of official Afghan Ministry of Defence license plates. Al-<br />
92 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy. Why jihad went global, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 171-172.<br />
Jason Burke fornisce un’interpretazione <strong>del</strong>la missiva leggermente <strong>di</strong>fferente, identificando i termini “below in<br />
the v<strong>il</strong>lage” e “Upper Egyptian relatives” non con i gruppi islamici ra<strong>di</strong>cali che avevano le loro basi operative<br />
nell’Alto Egitto, ma con <strong>il</strong> regime sudanese che aveva revocato <strong>il</strong> proprio sostegno al movimento guidato da Bin<br />
Laden. (Si veda Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: the true story of ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islam, Londra, 2004, p. 9)<br />
129