Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...
Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...
Global Jihad: temi, piste di diffusione e il fenomeno del reducismo ...
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LANDAU NETWORK - CENTRO VOLTA<br />
Ricerca CeMiSS<br />
<strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong>:<br />
<strong>temi</strong>, <strong>piste</strong> <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>ffusione e<br />
<strong>il</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>del</strong> <strong>reducismo</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>sta<br />
a cura <strong>di</strong><br />
Riccardo Redaelli
Prepared by Gaia Caverzasio<br />
Landau Network – Centro Volta<br />
Via Cantoni 1, V<strong>il</strong>la Olmo<br />
22100 COMO, Italy<br />
ph. +39 031579820<br />
landau.network@centrovolta.it<br />
2
INDICE<br />
Gruppo <strong>di</strong> Lavoro 7<br />
Introduzione – Riccardo Redaelli 9<br />
Ascesa e frammentazione <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale. Dall’islamizzazione <strong>del</strong>la<br />
modernità al jihad globale - Riccardo Redaelli<br />
17<br />
1. Il jiha<strong>di</strong>smo: evoluzione naturale o epi<strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>del</strong>l’islam? 17<br />
2. Il problema <strong>del</strong>la definizione <strong>del</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> islamista 22<br />
3. Ascesa e frammentazione <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale 27<br />
4. L’islam globale e <strong>il</strong> terrorismo jiha<strong>di</strong>sta 34<br />
5. Il neo-fondamentalismo islamico europeo 40<br />
Themes of the Culture of Modern <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong> - Revuen Paz 47<br />
Introduction 47<br />
1. <strong>Jihad</strong> movements in their own eyes 51<br />
2. Muslim Ra<strong>di</strong>calization in the West 53<br />
3. The globalization of the Islamist struggle 56<br />
4. The Ideology of <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong> 58<br />
5. Al-Qa’ida: the doctrine of Brotherhood of <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong> 62<br />
6. Muslim Communities in the West: the infrastructure of <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong> 66<br />
7. The Immigrant Experience 69<br />
8. Hotwiring the Apocalypse 71<br />
9. September 11 -- attack by “programmed terrorists” 74<br />
10. The war in Iraq – apocalyptic visions 77<br />
11. <strong>Jihad</strong>i Apocalyptic Discourse 80<br />
12 .<strong>Jihad</strong>i perceptions of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 84<br />
13. Shaykh Nasser al-Fahd’s Fatwa on WMD 85<br />
14. The Islamist Reaction to Shaykh al-Fahd 88<br />
15. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and “The Call for Islamist <strong>Global</strong> Resistance” 90<br />
16. <strong>Jihad</strong>i use of the Internet – the Open University for <strong>Jihad</strong> 96<br />
Conclusion 101<br />
3
La nuova al-Qa’ida: tra <strong>di</strong>ssoluzione e rinascita - Andrea Plebani 111<br />
Introduzione 111<br />
1. Al-Qa’ida: tra piano materiale e ideologico 112<br />
2. La storia 118<br />
2.1 Le origini <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida 119<br />
2.1.1 L’Afghanistan quale culla <strong>del</strong> movimento qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta 119<br />
2.1.2 Le brevi parentesi sau<strong>di</strong>ta e pakistana 123<br />
2.1.3 L’es<strong>il</strong>io sudanese 124<br />
2.2. Consolidamento, ascesa e caduta: <strong>il</strong> ritorno in Afghanistan: 126<br />
3. Al-Qa’ida dopo l’11 settembre 2001 135<br />
3.1 La controffensiva e la trasformazione <strong>del</strong> movimento 135<br />
3.2 La ricerca <strong>di</strong> un nuovo santuario 143<br />
3.2.1 Afghanistan 143<br />
3.2.2 Iraq 147<br />
3.3 L’Europa e i rischi legati al <strong>fenomeno</strong> dei returning jiha<strong>di</strong>sts dal fronte<br />
iracheno<br />
4. Conclusioni 161<br />
Tra virtuale e reale: le nuove <strong>piste</strong> <strong>del</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo - Marco Lombar<strong>di</strong> 164<br />
1. Il quadro <strong>di</strong> riferimento in sintesi : “al-Qa’ida” 165<br />
2. Il caso <strong>di</strong> Ansar al Islam 167<br />
3. Il caso: Guantanamo 177<br />
4. Videocassette e CD, DvD e Internet quale strumento <strong>di</strong> reclutamento. 179<br />
4.1 Nuove forme <strong>di</strong> comunicazione promozione 185<br />
4.2 Il caso <strong>del</strong> Quinto Anniversario <strong>del</strong>l’Un<strong>di</strong>ci Settembre 193<br />
5. Reclutatori, reclute e reclutamento 197<br />
5.1 Il caso <strong>di</strong> Londra 2005 198<br />
5.2 Reclute iternazionali dal campo iraqeno 200<br />
Abu Dujanah al-Qahtani (Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia) 200<br />
Abu Hummam al-Urdani (Jordan) 201<br />
Abu Radwan al-Urdani (Jordan) 202<br />
Abu Usama al-Ansari (Iraq) 203<br />
Abu As<strong>il</strong> al-Jazairi (Algeria) 203<br />
Abu Ibrahim al-Tunisi (Tunisia) 206<br />
6. Conclusioni 206<br />
4<br />
157
Understan<strong>di</strong>ng Nuclear and Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Terrorism. Threat and Countermeasures -<br />
Maurizio Martellini and Kathryn McLaughlin<br />
Introduction 210<br />
Technical Aspects 211<br />
Framing the <strong>di</strong>scussion: the faces of nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological (NR) terrorism 214<br />
1. The Magnitude of the Threat 215<br />
1.1 The “W<strong>il</strong>l” 216<br />
Assassination – the surreptitious administration of ionising ra<strong>di</strong>ation to an in<strong>di</strong>vidual 221<br />
1.2 The “Way” 223<br />
1.2.1 Nuclear weapons and materials surety 223<br />
1.2.2 Attacks against and sabotage of nuclear power plants 224<br />
Research reactors 225<br />
Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants 226<br />
Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive waste products 227<br />
1.2.3 Nuclear smuggling 228<br />
1.2.4 Organised Crime Networks 231<br />
1.2.5 Ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity of ra<strong>di</strong>ological sources 233<br />
Commercial and industrial sources 234<br />
Orphaned ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources 235<br />
1.2.6 Illicit trafficking of ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources 236<br />
1.2.7 The ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity of relevant nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological expertise 240<br />
Section 1 Conclusion 241<br />
2. International Efforts and Initiatives to Address the Threat 243<br />
2.1 A <strong>Global</strong> Counter-Terrorism Strategy 243<br />
2.2 A Counter-Nuclear-Terrorism Strategy? 246<br />
2.2.1 Dissuasion 247<br />
2.2.2 Denial 247<br />
2.2.3 Deterrence 250<br />
2.2.4 Developing State Capacity 251<br />
2.3 Basic Gap Analysis of Existing Initiatives to Counter Nuclear and<br />
Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Terrorism<br />
2.4 The <strong>Global</strong> Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) 254<br />
2.4.1 The GICNT and Dissuasion 257<br />
2.4.2 The GICNT and Denial 257<br />
2.4.3 The GICNT and Deterrence 257<br />
2.4.4 The GICNT and Developing State Capacity 258<br />
5<br />
209<br />
252
2.4.5 The GICNT and Defen<strong>di</strong>ng Human Rights 258<br />
Conclusion 259<br />
Assessing Nuclear and Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Terrorism 260<br />
Countering Nuclear and Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Terrorism 264<br />
6
Gruppo <strong>di</strong> Lavoro<br />
Riccardo Redaelli, Direttore <strong>del</strong> Middle East Program e <strong>del</strong> Central-South Asia<br />
Programe <strong>del</strong> Landau Network- Centro Volta <strong>di</strong> Como. Professore <strong>di</strong> "Storia <strong>del</strong>le<br />
civ<strong>il</strong>tà e <strong>del</strong>le culture politiche" e docente <strong>di</strong> "Geopolitica", presso la Facoltà <strong>di</strong><br />
Scienze linguistiche e letterature straniere, e Docente <strong>di</strong> "Storia dei paesi afroasiatici",<br />
presso la Facoltà <strong>di</strong> Scienze Politiche, <strong>del</strong>l’Università Cattolica <strong>del</strong> sacro<br />
Cuore <strong>di</strong> M<strong>il</strong>ano, Italia<br />
Revuen Paz, Direttore <strong>del</strong> Progetto <strong>di</strong> Ricerca sui Movimenti Islamici al Gloria<br />
Center, Istituto Inter<strong>di</strong>sciplinare <strong>di</strong> Herzliya, Israele. Esperto <strong>di</strong> organizzazioni<br />
estremiste islamiche.<br />
Andrea Plebani, Research Fellow presso <strong>il</strong> Landau Network – Centro Volta <strong>di</strong> Como,<br />
Italia.<br />
Marco Lombar<strong>di</strong>, Professore <strong>di</strong> Sociologia presso la Facoltà <strong>di</strong> Lettere e F<strong>il</strong>osofia<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’Università Cattolica <strong>del</strong> Sacro Cuore <strong>di</strong> M<strong>il</strong>ano, Italia. Membro <strong>del</strong>la<br />
International Visual Sociology Assoc. – IVSA, membro <strong>del</strong>l' International Sociological<br />
Association e Senior Research Fellow <strong>di</strong> Globis, Center for the Study of <strong>Global</strong> Issues,<br />
University of Georgia, USA.<br />
Maurizio Martellini, Segretario Generale <strong>del</strong> Landau Network – Centro Volta <strong>di</strong><br />
Como e Professore <strong>di</strong> Fisica Teorica all’Università <strong>del</strong>l’Insubria, sede <strong>di</strong> Como, Italia.<br />
Esperto <strong>di</strong> non-proliferazione, <strong>di</strong>sarmo e sicurezza internazionale.<br />
Kathryn McLaughlin, Ricercatrice e collaboratrice <strong>del</strong> Landau Network – Centro<br />
Volta <strong>di</strong> Como, Italia.<br />
7
Introduzione<br />
Riccardo Redaelli<br />
Questi ultimi decenni sono stati contrassegnati dalla crescita imprevista e<br />
<strong>di</strong>rompente <strong>di</strong> movimenti politici islamisti in quasi tutte le regioni e stati <strong>del</strong> mondo<br />
musulmano. Un evento che ha scosso brutalmente gli equ<strong>il</strong>ibri politico-sociali interni,<br />
e ha finito per con<strong>di</strong>zionare tutta la politica internazionale.<br />
Negli ultimi anni <strong>del</strong> secolo XX, la frammentazione e la de-territorializzazione <strong>di</strong><br />
questi movimenti islamisti – i quali, nonostante la loro forza, avevano fallito quasi<br />
ovunque la conquista <strong>del</strong> potere – hanno portato alla nascita <strong>di</strong> un jiha<strong>di</strong>smo<br />
violento, che pre<strong>di</strong>ca <strong>il</strong> jihad globale, combattuto non solo all’interno dei confini <strong>del</strong><br />
dar al-islam, bensì ovunque, e soprattutto ut<strong>il</strong>izzando qualsivoglia strategia. Non si<br />
devono solo combattere gli «empi governanti» e i «cattivi musulmani»: occorre<br />
colpire tanto <strong>il</strong> nemico interno che <strong>il</strong> nemico esterno, rappresentato dai «crociati<br />
cristiani» e dal «nemico sionista», come non mancano sempre <strong>di</strong> ricordare i proclami<br />
<strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida e <strong>del</strong>le altre organizzazioni terroristiche.<br />
Il <strong>di</strong>lagare <strong>del</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>del</strong> terrorismo islamico ha sequestrato <strong>di</strong> fatto <strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>battito<br />
sulla realtà <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo politico, molto più complesso e variegato, trasformando<br />
l’islam in una sorta <strong>di</strong> nemico metafisico e ontologico per l’Occidente. L’immagine<br />
<strong>del</strong>lo shahid jiha<strong>di</strong>sta, <strong>del</strong>l’attentatore suicida che fa strage <strong>di</strong> civ<strong>il</strong>i, ha trasformato <strong>il</strong><br />
nostro senso <strong>di</strong> sicurezza e ha prodotto una frattura ancora non ben compresa fra la<br />
9
massa dei musulmani e i rappresentanti riconosciuti <strong>del</strong>la religione (‘ulema’ sunniti,<br />
mullah e clero sciita, esperti <strong>di</strong> shari’a e <strong>di</strong> fiqh, <strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>ritto islamico) da un lato, e un<br />
insieme eterogeneo <strong>di</strong> gruppi, cellule e giovani auto-ra<strong>di</strong>calizzati che credono<br />
nell’idea <strong>del</strong> jihad globale, <strong>del</strong>la violenza e <strong>del</strong> martirio come via per l’affermazione<br />
<strong>del</strong> vero islam.<br />
Questo stu<strong>di</strong>o cerca <strong>di</strong> analizzare <strong>il</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> da prospettive <strong>di</strong>verse, concentrandosi<br />
su alcuni degli aspetti che destano, in Europa, la nostra maggiore attenzione e<br />
preoccupazione.<br />
Nel primo capitolo, Riccardo Redaelli <strong>del</strong>inea un breve quadro storico e culturale<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’ascesa dei movimenti islamisti e <strong>del</strong>la loro frammentazione <strong>di</strong> questi ultimi 10-15<br />
anni. Senza uno “sguardo lungo”, che abbia un minimo <strong>di</strong> prospettiva e <strong>di</strong><br />
profon<strong>di</strong>tà storica e concettuale è infatti estremamente scivoloso avventurarsi<br />
nell’analisi <strong>di</strong> questa complessa realtà. Dopo essersi interrogato sul fatto se <strong>il</strong><br />
jiha<strong>di</strong>smo rappresenti un epi<strong>fenomeno</strong> o una logica evoluzione <strong>del</strong>la religione<br />
islamica, <strong>il</strong> capitolo affronta la crescita dei movimenti islamisti, i loro fondamenti<br />
dottrinali, per poi soffermarsi sul jiha<strong>di</strong>smo salafita <strong>di</strong> questi ultimi anni e sulla<br />
trasformazione dei concetti <strong>di</strong> martire e <strong>di</strong> jihad. Altro termine-concetto <strong>di</strong> grande<br />
importanza per l’Europa è quello <strong>di</strong> neofondamentalismo islamico, ossia <strong>di</strong> quella<br />
corrente <strong>di</strong> musulmani che vivono in Occidente e che combatto la propria<br />
deculturizzazione e per<strong>di</strong>ta d’identità aderendo a una visione globalizzata <strong>di</strong><br />
islamismo astorico e privo <strong>del</strong>le sue tra<strong>di</strong>zionali peculiarità culturali e regionali. Una<br />
deriva – quella <strong>del</strong> neofondamentalismo – ab<strong>il</strong>mente sfruttata dai gruppi salafiti e<br />
jiha<strong>di</strong>sti per <strong>di</strong>ffondere <strong>il</strong> concetto <strong>di</strong> jihad globale, per reclutare terroristi e<br />
mujahed<strong>di</strong>n.<br />
Reuven Paz, si è soffermato – nel suo lungo saggio che rappresenta <strong>il</strong> secondo<br />
capitolo <strong>del</strong>lo stu<strong>di</strong>o – sul concetto <strong>di</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong>, sulla autorappresentazione fatta<br />
dai principali ideologi jiha<strong>di</strong>sti, come pure sulle più recenti evoluzioni <strong>di</strong> questo<br />
variegato <strong>fenomeno</strong> in seguito ai fatti <strong>del</strong>l’11/9 e <strong>del</strong>la guerra in Iraq. Paz analizza la<br />
trasformazione dei <strong>temi</strong> propagan<strong>di</strong>stici jiha<strong>di</strong>sti, con la <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong>l’idea che <strong>il</strong><br />
10
jihad non sia solo un mezzo <strong>di</strong> lotta contro <strong>il</strong> Nemico anti-islamico, bensì che esso sia<br />
anche - forse soprattutto – una modalità per rafforzare la fratellanza e la solidarietà<br />
panislamica, e per creare una nuova società, basata sul concetto omnicomprensivo <strong>di</strong><br />
jihad come mezzo <strong>di</strong> vita. Il jihad non è più solo un dovere religioso, un mezzo <strong>di</strong> lotta<br />
per <strong>di</strong>fendere l’islam, ma <strong>di</strong>viene una cultura esaustiva attraverso la quale ricreare la<br />
società islamica <strong>del</strong>le origini e <strong>il</strong> califfato mon<strong>di</strong>ale, e che serve anche per rafforzare <strong>il</strong><br />
senso identitario <strong>di</strong> quella gioventù islamista che autoalimenta la propria ra<strong>di</strong>calità<br />
religiosa e che fornisce <strong>il</strong> materiale umano per la strategia degli attacchi suici<strong>di</strong>,<br />
tramite la celebrazione <strong>del</strong> martirio per la vera fede.<br />
Idealmente collegato al lavoro <strong>di</strong> Reuven Paz, lo stu<strong>di</strong>o <strong>di</strong> Andrea Plebani prende in<br />
esame le origini e <strong>il</strong> progressivo sv<strong>il</strong>uppo <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida, esaminandone le mo<strong>di</strong>fiche<br />
strutturali e dottrinali e la peculiare situazione attuale. In particolar modo, Plebani<br />
sottolinea i profon<strong>di</strong> cambiamenti avvenuti all’interno <strong>del</strong> movimento in seguito alla<br />
caduta <strong>del</strong> santuario afgano e analizza lo scontro ingaggiato in Afghanistan e in Iraq,<br />
<strong>del</strong>ineando le connessioni esistenti tra lo scenario iracheno e <strong>il</strong> continente europeo,<br />
sempre più al centro <strong>del</strong>la strategia e degli obiettivi <strong>del</strong> campo jiha<strong>di</strong>sta.<br />
Marco Lombar<strong>di</strong> nel suo saggio, si sofferma su <strong>di</strong> una interessante analisi <strong>di</strong> dettaglio<br />
<strong>di</strong> alcuni movimenti jiha<strong>di</strong>sti, come Ansar al-Islam e sulla rete <strong>di</strong> collegamenti –<br />
virtuali e non – per la <strong>di</strong>ffusione e la propaganda sul web in Europa, con <strong>il</strong><br />
reclutamento <strong>di</strong> terroristi e attentatori suici<strong>di</strong>. Internet infatti rappresenta un veicolo<br />
fondamentale per <strong>il</strong> terrorismo jiha<strong>di</strong>sta, dato che <strong>il</strong> terrorismo è – come spiega<br />
Lombar<strong>di</strong> - comunicazione: questa semplice affermazione orienta <strong>il</strong> particolare<br />
interesse per internet. Lo stu<strong>di</strong>o che porta alla comprensione e spiegazione<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’azione terrorista, anche con l’obiettivo <strong>di</strong> sv<strong>il</strong>uppare adeguate pratiche <strong>di</strong><br />
risposta al <strong>fenomeno</strong>, deve dunque dotarsi <strong>di</strong> una “cassetta degli attrezzi” altamente<br />
specializzata ma inter<strong>di</strong>sciplinare in cui la <strong>di</strong>mensione comunicativa offre un<br />
in<strong>di</strong>rizzo interpretativo importante: la grande <strong>di</strong>fferenza che esiste tra un criminale e<br />
un terrorista è, infatti, che <strong>il</strong> secondo, a <strong>di</strong>fferenza <strong>del</strong> primo, ha interesse per <strong>il</strong><br />
riconoscimento simbolico che l’azione fornisce; ricerca la platea offerta dal sistema<br />
11
me<strong>di</strong>atico; si propone quale attore protagonista. Lo stu<strong>di</strong>o <strong>di</strong> Lombar<strong>di</strong> si sofferma<br />
anche sulle <strong>piste</strong> <strong>di</strong> penetrazione verso l’Europa e le possib<strong>il</strong>i strategie <strong>del</strong>la risposta.<br />
Infine, Maurizio Martellini e Cathryn MacLaughlin insistono sul problema <strong>del</strong>le armi<br />
<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>struzioni <strong>di</strong> massa e <strong>del</strong>la minaccia <strong>di</strong> un loro possib<strong>il</strong>e uso da parte <strong>di</strong><br />
organizzazioni non statuali jiha<strong>di</strong>ste. Nel loro dettagliato stu<strong>di</strong>o, affrontano questo<br />
tema – spesso banalizzato e volgarizzato dai mass me<strong>di</strong>a dato <strong>il</strong> suo impatto<br />
sull’opinione pubblica – che è in realtà ben più complesso e sfaccettato.<br />
Lo stu<strong>di</strong>o dei due autori analizza prima – con grande dettaglio tecnico – la<br />
“magnitu<strong>di</strong>ne <strong>del</strong>la minaccia” da parte <strong>di</strong> organizzazioni non statuali, soffermandosi<br />
anche sui traffici <strong>il</strong>leciti e sulla reperib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> componenti nucleari, chimiche e ra<strong>di</strong>o-<br />
batteriologiche. Nella seconda parte si sofferma sulle risposte a questa minaccia,<br />
dalla <strong>di</strong>ssuasione alla deterrenza, allo sv<strong>il</strong>uppo <strong>di</strong> specifiche iniziative nazionali e<br />
sopranazionali come la <strong>Global</strong> Initiative to Combact Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).<br />
Dai citati lavori e dall’incrocio <strong>del</strong>le loro tesi e dei dati proposti risulta con chiarezza<br />
come <strong>il</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo globale e <strong>il</strong> qa’i<strong>di</strong>smo o<strong>di</strong>erni siano frutto <strong>del</strong>la trasformazione e<br />
<strong>del</strong> sostanziale fallimento <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo politico che nei decenni ’70 – ’90 ha cercato<br />
<strong>di</strong> scalzare i regimi arabo-islamici usciti dalla decolonizzazione per creare stati<br />
veramente islamici, legati a una visione apologetica e mitizzata <strong>del</strong>l’islam <strong>del</strong>le<br />
origini. La già ricordata de-territorializzazione <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo ha favorito la nascita<br />
<strong>di</strong> un’ideologia basata sul jihad globale. Da qui la ripresa <strong>del</strong>l’idea califfale, con <strong>il</strong><br />
progetto politico <strong>di</strong> un nuovo califfato islamico che superi ogni <strong>di</strong>visione etnica,<br />
regionale e culturale in favore <strong>di</strong> una nuova presa <strong>di</strong> coscienza <strong>del</strong>la umma islamica.<br />
Lo scontro fra la «nuova jah<strong>il</strong>iyya» immaginata da Sayyid Qutb e l’islam perde ogni<br />
valenza geografica e ogni confine, e si fa ideologica e culturale. Se <strong>il</strong> Nemico è globale<br />
e pervasivo, anche <strong>il</strong> jihad deve essere globale e pervasivo, colpendo i nemici <strong>del</strong>la<br />
vera fede ovunque sia possib<strong>il</strong>e e in tutte le forme che siano possib<strong>il</strong>i.<br />
Vari analisti in questo stu<strong>di</strong>o hanno sottolineato come la semplicità, la trasmettib<strong>il</strong>ità<br />
e la fruib<strong>il</strong>ità degli slogan jiha<strong>di</strong>sti contemporanei abbiano favorito la proliferazione<br />
<strong>di</strong> gruppi jiha<strong>di</strong>sti scollegati o non <strong>di</strong>pendenti gerarchicamente, con una sorta <strong>di</strong><br />
12
franchising <strong>del</strong> terrore e <strong>del</strong> tema jiha<strong>di</strong>sta. Al-Qa’ida <strong>di</strong>viene così non solo una<br />
struttura terroristica, bensì un ombrello strategico, dottrinale e ideologico per una<br />
varietà <strong>di</strong> movimenti, <strong>di</strong> gruppi e per quella gioventù islamica auto-ra<strong>di</strong>calizzata che<br />
funge da serbatoio e da veicolo proliferante <strong>del</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo globale.<br />
Questa gioventù – per lo più ben alfabetizzata e urbanizzata – non è più intercettata<br />
solo dai movimenti islamisti più “istituzionali” e politici: spesso si tratta <strong>di</strong> piccoli<br />
gruppi che si richiamano alla ideologia jiha<strong>di</strong>sta appresa da internet, ma che non<br />
hanno vere guide dottrinali; per l’esegesi <strong>del</strong>le fonti sciaraitiche – <strong>il</strong> Corano e la<br />
Sunna fra tutte – essi spesso semplicemente bypassato gli ‘ulema’ e gli esperti <strong>del</strong>la<br />
legge religiosa ufficiali, preferendo un approccio più in<strong>di</strong>viduale, una manifestazione<br />
<strong>del</strong>la propria fede, basata sul mito <strong>del</strong> martirio e sulla professione religiosa come atto<br />
<strong>di</strong> volontà.<br />
Questa proliferazione <strong>di</strong> nuclei e gruppi jiha<strong>di</strong>sti interessa ovviamente anche <strong>il</strong><br />
nostro continente, con una penetrazione che segue linee e <strong>piste</strong> <strong>di</strong>verse, ma che è<br />
certo favorita da internet e dalla <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong>le notizie, dei proclami e <strong>del</strong>lo stesso<br />
training per le attività jiha<strong>di</strong>ste lungo la rete. Lombar<strong>di</strong> evidenzia bene i vantaggi<br />
<strong>del</strong>le ICT per l’azione jiha<strong>di</strong>sta; l’interconnettività, la comunicazione coperta, la<br />
moltiplicazione <strong>del</strong>le forze e la “sovra-esposizione” dei terroristi; non ultima la<br />
fac<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> raggiungere una molteplicità <strong>di</strong> target, in<strong>di</strong>pendentemente dal sistema<br />
me<strong>di</strong>atico formale. Le ITC permettono anche una propaganda fondamentale per<br />
l’auto-ra<strong>di</strong>calizzazione dei giovani musulmani, tanto nei loro paesi <strong>di</strong> origine quanto<br />
in Europa.<br />
Ma un ruolo molto attivo lo giocano anche i contatti con moschee e centri islamici<br />
penetrati da pre<strong>di</strong>catori ra<strong>di</strong>cali e jiha<strong>di</strong>sti (in Italia è un problema soprattutto<br />
m<strong>il</strong>anese): in questo canale <strong>di</strong> reclutamento, i “reduci”, ossia mujahed<strong>di</strong>n ra<strong>di</strong>cali,<br />
jiha<strong>di</strong>sti e salafiti che hanno partecipato ad azioni terroristiche e <strong>di</strong> guerriglia in uno<br />
dei tanti fronti aperti <strong>del</strong> jihad globale giocano un ruolo molto importante, per<br />
l’effetto imitativo e <strong>di</strong> mimesi, così come per rafforzare la convinzione che <strong>il</strong> jihad<br />
globale possa effettivamente essere combattuto e vinto.<br />
13
L’analisi <strong>di</strong> molti esperti rivela come questo sforzo <strong>di</strong> coltivare e addestrare jiha<strong>di</strong>sti e<br />
specialisti <strong>del</strong>la guerriglia urbana nel nostro continente si sia rivelata fruttuosa, non<br />
solo per creare una rete <strong>di</strong> cellule attive jiha<strong>di</strong>ste in Occidente, ma anche per<br />
raccogliere fon<strong>di</strong> e volontari da ut<strong>il</strong>izzare per le azioni <strong>di</strong> guerriglia o per gli attacchi<br />
suici<strong>di</strong> nei vari fronti aperti <strong>del</strong> jihad globale. Quanto preoccupa è <strong>il</strong> fatto che questi<br />
nuovi combattenti <strong>del</strong> jihad globale vengano reclutati fra gruppi socio-culturali molto<br />
<strong>di</strong>versi fra loro: vi sono aff<strong>il</strong>iati fra gli immigrati <strong>di</strong> prima generazione che non<br />
riescono a inserirsi nel mo<strong>del</strong>lo <strong>di</strong> vita occidentale (anche se non si tratta<br />
necessariamente <strong>di</strong> elementi socialmente marginalizzati), i quali trovano nel mo<strong>del</strong>lo<br />
islamico astorico e globale <strong>del</strong>le moschee neo-fondamentaliste europee un elemento<br />
fondamentale per la ricostruzione <strong>del</strong>la propria identità e acculturazione. Ma vi sono<br />
anche aff<strong>il</strong>iati fra gli immigrati <strong>di</strong> seconda e terza generazione che sono ormai<br />
deculturalizzati rispetto alla cultura d’origine dei loro padri. Infine, vi è anche la<br />
presenza <strong>di</strong> alcuni europei convertiti, un <strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>mente quantificab<strong>il</strong>e nella<br />
sua reale <strong>di</strong>mensione, dato che molti si convertono all’islam solo per poter sposare<br />
donne musulmane. In ogni caso, gli europei convertiti e avvicinati all’ideologia <strong>del</strong><br />
jihad globale sembrano rappresentare un obiettivo particolarmente importante per al-<br />
Qa’ida e per i vari gruppi jiha<strong>di</strong>sti, dato che essi rappresentano elementi ancor più<br />
<strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>i da controllare per le forze <strong>di</strong> sicurezza europee.<br />
Va anche notato come molte <strong>di</strong> queste cellule sembrano essere composte <strong>di</strong><br />
consanguinei e amici, che provengono dalla stessa area, e che cercano ispirazione,<br />
<strong>di</strong>rettive e addestramento attraverso internet, come <strong>di</strong>mostrato dagli attentati <strong>di</strong><br />
Londra. Come ben noto in Italia, più strutture anti-statuali sono strette da legami<br />
fam<strong>il</strong>istici e tribali (tipico <strong>il</strong> caso <strong>del</strong>la ‘ndrangheta calabrese), maggiore è la <strong>di</strong>fficoltà<br />
<strong>di</strong> penetrarle per le attività <strong>di</strong> intelligence.<br />
Il successo <strong>di</strong> questo proselitismo, deriva anche dal fatto che – <strong>di</strong>versamente rispetto<br />
a quanto sostenuto spesso, ossia che la molla principale dei jiha<strong>di</strong>sti sia<br />
nell’occupazione <strong>del</strong> proprio territorio da parte <strong>di</strong> forze allogene e nemiche o in una<br />
14
visione puramente nich<strong>il</strong>ista – <strong>il</strong> senso <strong>di</strong> frustrazione, <strong>di</strong> um<strong>il</strong>iazione percepita sia un<br />
elemento fondamentale.<br />
Insomma, secondo Scott Atran: «suicide terrorists today are not motivated<br />
exclusively or primar<strong>il</strong>y by foreign occupation, they are not <strong>di</strong>rected by a central<br />
organization, and they are not nih<strong>il</strong>istic. Most suicide terrorist today are inspired by<br />
a global jiha<strong>di</strong>sm which, despite atavistic cultural elements, is a thoroughly modern<br />
movement f<strong>il</strong>ing the popular political void in Islamic communities left in the wake of<br />
<strong>di</strong>scre<strong>di</strong>ted Western ideologies co-opted by corrupt local governments». 1<br />
Il presente stu<strong>di</strong>o analizza poi in dettaglio – grazie ai lavori <strong>di</strong> Reuven Paz e<br />
soprattutto a quello <strong>di</strong> Martellini-Maclaughlin – i pericoli <strong>del</strong>l’uso <strong>di</strong> armi <strong>di</strong><br />
<strong>di</strong>struzione <strong>di</strong> massa (WMD) da parte <strong>di</strong> gruppi jiha<strong>di</strong>sti. In realtà, finora, <strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>battito<br />
sull’uso <strong>di</strong> armi e/o materiali non convenzionali in ambito salafita e jiha<strong>di</strong>sta è stato<br />
molto limitato, e sono forti le perplessità anche da chi <strong>di</strong>fende <strong>il</strong> jihad. Tuttavia, la<br />
ricerca <strong>di</strong> effetti propagan<strong>di</strong>stici e <strong>di</strong> ut<strong>il</strong>izzare <strong>il</strong> cosiddetto “shock factor” nella lotta<br />
globale, porta naturalmente questi gruppi a considerare l’ut<strong>il</strong>izzo <strong>di</strong> queste armi per<br />
infliggere sostanziali per<strong>di</strong>te o per produrre devastanti effetti psicologici negli stati<br />
occidentali. Da questo punto <strong>di</strong> vista, più che i materiali collegati al nucleare,<br />
sembrano più fac<strong>il</strong>mente gestib<strong>il</strong>i i materiali ra<strong>di</strong>ologici. Da qui l’importanza <strong>di</strong><br />
aumentare e <strong>di</strong> coor<strong>di</strong>nare meglio la prevenzione e <strong>il</strong> controllo internazionale e<br />
sopranazionale in questo complesso campo, come sottolinea <strong>il</strong> saggio <strong>di</strong> Martellini-<br />
Maclaughlin.<br />
Diversi saggi <strong>di</strong> questo lavoro suggeriscono risposte e possib<strong>il</strong>i contro-strategie a<br />
questo <strong>fenomeno</strong>. In realtà, <strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>battito sulle contromisure necessarie per fronteggiare<br />
<strong>il</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo globale e per vincere la minaccia <strong>del</strong> terrore è immenso, ed esula dagli<br />
obiettivi e dalle possib<strong>il</strong>ità questo stu<strong>di</strong>o. E’ tuttavia evidente come non si debba<br />
parlare <strong>di</strong> “risposta”, bensì <strong>di</strong> “risposte”, <strong>di</strong>verse ed articolate. Esistono risposte più<br />
operative <strong>di</strong> breve-me<strong>di</strong>o periodo che vanno da una migliore<br />
sorveglianza/monitoraggio <strong>del</strong>la rete <strong>di</strong> internet, all’inf<strong>il</strong>trazione nelle chat jiha<strong>di</strong>ste<br />
1 Scott Atran, The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism, «The Washington Quarterly», 29 (2006), n.2, p.139.<br />
15
per comprendere e contrastare dottrinalmente la <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong>l’ideologia jiha<strong>di</strong>sta.<br />
Se è certo cruciale <strong>il</strong> lavoro per <strong>di</strong>sarticolare i network <strong>di</strong> cellule attive, soprattutto in<br />
Europa, occorre anche non <strong>il</strong>ludersi <strong>di</strong> combattere contro un <strong>fenomeno</strong> fortemente<br />
gerarchizzato. I recenti attentati in Europa mostrano la flessib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> questi gruppi e<br />
l’importanza <strong>del</strong> fattore imitativo-mimetico; anche per questo <strong>il</strong> flusso <strong>di</strong> reduci dai<br />
vari <strong>di</strong> fronti <strong>di</strong> guerra interni o esterni alla Dar al-islam è molto importante: essi non<br />
solo forniscono expertise e professionalità, ma testimoniano la possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong><br />
combattere <strong>il</strong> jihad globale, rafforzando l’idea che sia possib<strong>il</strong>e vincerlo. Molto<br />
importante è poi ridurre la possib<strong>il</strong>ità che i sis<strong>temi</strong> me<strong>di</strong>atici occidentali,<br />
<strong>di</strong>sastrosamente orientati al sensazionalismo <strong>del</strong> terrore, offrono al qa’i<strong>di</strong>smo. In<br />
questo senso è auspicab<strong>il</strong>e un ruolo <strong>del</strong>le istituzioni che, chiede Lombar<strong>di</strong>, «devono<br />
legittimare la presenza dei me<strong>di</strong>a dentro alle procedure <strong>di</strong> sicurezza che riguardano<br />
la nostra comunità».<br />
Ma è altresì evidente come una sola azione <strong>di</strong> repressione e <strong>di</strong> contro-intelligence non<br />
sia sufficiente. Occorre interiorizzare <strong>il</strong> fatto che <strong>il</strong> nich<strong>il</strong>ismo estremo non spiega <strong>il</strong><br />
jiha<strong>di</strong>smo globale, ma offre solo como<strong>di</strong> alibi per evitare <strong>di</strong> parlare degli errori e <strong>del</strong>le<br />
connivenze <strong>del</strong>l’Occidente verso sis<strong>temi</strong> corrotti, non rappresentativi, verso<br />
situazioni che um<strong>il</strong>iano i musulmani e minano la cre<strong>di</strong>b<strong>il</strong>ità occidentale. Senza una<br />
comprensione <strong>del</strong>le cause economico-sociali, politiche e cultural-identitarie <strong>di</strong> questa<br />
crisi che lacera orami da troppi decenni i molti mon<strong>di</strong> islamici, e che è <strong>di</strong>lagata in<br />
tutto <strong>il</strong> mondo anche come conseguenza <strong>del</strong>la globalizzazione e <strong>del</strong>la sempre più<br />
stretta inter<strong>di</strong>pendenza, non sarà possib<strong>il</strong>e affrontare durevolmente e cre<strong>di</strong>b<strong>il</strong>mente<br />
<strong>il</strong> problema <strong>del</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo e <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale. L’idea <strong>del</strong>lo scontro <strong>del</strong>le civ<strong>il</strong>tà<br />
è una fac<strong>il</strong>e scorciatoia per non vedere fenomeni ben più complessi e crisi ben più<br />
profonde che attanagliano tutte le civ<strong>il</strong>tà e che sono sostanzialmente interne ad ogni<br />
macro-sistema cultural-religioso.<br />
16
Ascesa e frammentazione <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale.<br />
Dall’islamizzazione <strong>del</strong>la modernità al jihad globale<br />
Riccardo Redaelli<br />
1. Il jiha<strong>di</strong>smo: evoluzione naturale o epi<strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>del</strong>l’islam?<br />
Il <strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>del</strong> terrorismo islamista e la moltiplicazione <strong>del</strong>le cellule jiha<strong>di</strong>ste in<br />
Europa come nel resto <strong>del</strong> mondo rappresentano probab<strong>il</strong>mente <strong>il</strong> problema <strong>di</strong><br />
sicurezza maggiormente percepito oggi: una sorta <strong>di</strong> nemico metafisico, <strong>di</strong> Moloch<br />
ost<strong>il</strong>e che minaccia l’Occidente e i paesi ad esso collegati – in particolare i cosiddetti<br />
paesi arabi/islamici moderati (anche se si tratta <strong>di</strong> una definizione tutt’altro che<br />
sod<strong>di</strong>sfacente e che favorisce frainten<strong>di</strong>menti ed errori <strong>di</strong> valutazione politica).<br />
Come ben sottolinea Reuven Paz nel suo saggio sul <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong> contenuto in questo<br />
stu<strong>di</strong>o, <strong>di</strong>versi gruppi islamisti hanno cercato <strong>di</strong> ricondurre le loro azioni violente<br />
all’interno <strong>di</strong> una rappresentazione ideologica <strong>di</strong>cotomica, <strong>di</strong> lotta fra la religione e<br />
civ<strong>il</strong>tà islamica contro quella occidentale. Sfortunatamente, questa visione manichea<br />
17
si è <strong>di</strong>ffusa con successo tanto all’interno <strong>del</strong> mondo islamico quanto in Occidente,<br />
anche sull’onda <strong>del</strong>la volgarizzazione mass-me<strong>di</strong>atica <strong>del</strong>la <strong>di</strong>scussa teoria <strong>di</strong> Samuel<br />
Huntington sullo «scontro <strong>del</strong>le civ<strong>il</strong>tà» 2 .<br />
All’interno <strong>del</strong> propagandato conflitto islam/Occidente, le <strong>di</strong>fferenze interne, le<br />
sfumature dottrinali, politiche, ideologiche e teologiche perdono <strong>di</strong>fferenza,<br />
lasciando <strong>il</strong> posto a una rielaborazione stereotipata e convenzionale tanto <strong>del</strong> Noi<br />
quanto <strong>del</strong>l’Altro; rielaborazione funzionale alla lettura <strong>di</strong>cotomica e conflittuale dei<br />
rapporti contemporanei fra i mon<strong>di</strong> musulmani e i mon<strong>di</strong> occidentali (volutamente al<br />
plurale). Riprendendo <strong>il</strong> pensiero <strong>di</strong> Edward Sa‘id 3 , siamo <strong>di</strong> fronte a un nuovo<br />
Orientalismo – dopo quello classico funzionale al periodo coloniale – con una visione<br />
caricaturale <strong>del</strong>l’islam quale civ<strong>il</strong>tà violenta e monolitica, contrapposto<br />
all’Occidentalismo dei gruppi islamisti, ossia l’invenzione <strong>di</strong> un Occidente coeso,<br />
aggressivo e reificato in soggetto agente nella politica internazionale: « Ciò che<br />
abbiamo chiamato ‘occidentalismo’ è <strong>il</strong> quadro <strong>di</strong>sumanizzato <strong>del</strong>l’Occidente che<br />
tratteggiano i suoi nemici» 4 .<br />
Fatto ancor più gravido <strong>di</strong> conseguenze, si è <strong>di</strong>ffusa in Occidente una lettura<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’islam come religione e come <strong>fenomeno</strong> storico, sociale e culturale non solo<br />
erronea, ma astorica e perennialista. La complessità <strong>del</strong>la realtà dei <strong>di</strong>versi mon<strong>di</strong><br />
musulmani e le variazioni nel vissuto islamico attraverso le varie epoche storiche –<br />
non <strong>di</strong>versamente da quanto avvenuto in Europa con la enorme <strong>di</strong>versità <strong>del</strong> vissuto<br />
2 Uscito dapprima come articolo su «Foreing Affairs», The Clash of Civ<strong>il</strong>ization, è <strong>di</strong>venuto poco dopo un libro dal<br />
successo mon<strong>di</strong>ale. La teoria <strong>di</strong> uno scontro fra civ<strong>il</strong>tà, che sarebbe seguita al confronto bipolare basato sulle<br />
ideologie è stata al centro <strong>di</strong> un amplissimo <strong>di</strong>battito, con sostenitori e denigratori <strong>del</strong>le idee <strong>di</strong> Huntington. Fra i<br />
tanti che sottolineano le lacune e le debolezze scientifiche <strong>del</strong>la teoria <strong>del</strong>lo scontro <strong>del</strong>le civ<strong>il</strong>tà, ricordo Oliver<br />
Roy, John Esposito e soprattutto Dieter Senghaas, autore <strong>di</strong> The Clash within civ<strong>il</strong>izations, London – New York,<br />
1998, i quali sottolineano come le tensioni che ci appaiono come apparente scontro <strong>di</strong> civ<strong>il</strong>tà, riflettono al<br />
contrario la crisi interna e la frammentazione <strong>del</strong>le stesse per effetto <strong>del</strong>la globalizzazione e dei mutamenti socioeconomici<br />
e culturali. Con<strong>di</strong>visib<strong>il</strong>e anche la critica circa le datata visione <strong>di</strong> civ<strong>il</strong>tà come soggetti storici<br />
monolitici.<br />
3 Le opere <strong>di</strong> Ewdar Sa’id e – soprattutto Orientalism – sono meno conosciute in Italia che nel resto <strong>del</strong> mondo, e in<br />
particolare nei paesi anglo-sassoni, ove l’influenza dei concetti sa’i<strong>di</strong>ani è stata fortissima negli ambienti<br />
intellettuali e universitari. Fra le sue opere ricordo, Orientalismo, M<strong>il</strong>ano, 1991 e Culture and Imperialism, London,<br />
1993.<br />
4 «Ciò che abbiamo chiamato ‘occidentalismo’ è <strong>il</strong> quadro <strong>di</strong>sumanizzato <strong>del</strong>l’Occidente che tratteggiano i suoi<br />
nemici …. È chiaro che non possono essere spiegati come un problema specificatamente islamico. Nel mondo<br />
musulmano molte cose sono andate in modo sbagliato, ma l’occidentalismo non può essere ridotto a una malattia<br />
me<strong>di</strong>orientale». Ian Burma e Avishai Margalit, Occidentalismo. L’Occidente agli occhi dei suoi nemici, Torino, 2004,<br />
p.5.<br />
18
eligioso cristiano attraverso venti secoli – non vengono percepite, <strong>di</strong>lagando una<br />
visione <strong>del</strong> vissuto islamico e <strong>del</strong>l’interpretazione <strong>del</strong>la Legge religiosa (la shari’a) che<br />
fa <strong>del</strong>l’islam un monolite immutab<strong>il</strong>e. Secondo Ghassam Salamé: «The idea of an<br />
Arab and/or Islamic ‘exceptionalism’ has thus re-emerged among both western<br />
proponents of universal democracy and established orientalists, and this in turn has<br />
encoruged a great many local apologists of ‘cultural authenticity’ in their rejection of<br />
western mo<strong>del</strong>s of government», e ancora: «una sorta <strong>di</strong> santa alleanza che unisce <strong>il</strong><br />
fondamentalismo più sguaiato all'orientalismo più folcloristico nell'affermazione,<br />
storicamente falsa, ideologicamente partigiana e intellettualmente effimera<br />
<strong>del</strong>l'ontologismo musulmano» 5 .<br />
In verità, la maggior parte degli stu<strong>di</strong>osi <strong>di</strong> islam sottolinea la non sostenib<strong>il</strong>ità<br />
scientifica <strong>di</strong> una tale rappresentazione. Non solo non esiste un solo modo <strong>di</strong><br />
applicare i precetti <strong>del</strong>la shari’a nelle <strong>di</strong>verse regioni islamiche, ma – nella storia – vi<br />
sono perio<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> straor<strong>di</strong>naria apertura culturale <strong>del</strong>l’islam, <strong>di</strong> ricettività e tolleranza,<br />
che contrastano con l’immagine stereotipata <strong>del</strong>l’islam contemporanea, che gli stessi<br />
islamisti e movimenti jiha<strong>di</strong>sti vogliono accre<strong>di</strong>tare come l’unica vera. In verità, se si<br />
analizza la storia <strong>del</strong>l’islam, si evince chiaramente come l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale sia una<br />
innovazione recente, una deviazione dalla tra<strong>di</strong>zione islamica e non un «ritorno ai<br />
fondamenti puri <strong>del</strong>la religione islamica» come pretendono gli ideologi <strong>del</strong><br />
ra<strong>di</strong>calismo e <strong>del</strong>l’attivismo violento islamisti. Ancora oggi, la maggioranza dei<br />
pensatori e dei movimenti politici islamisti rifiuta <strong>il</strong> concetto <strong>di</strong> jihad globale come<br />
mezzo per stab<strong>il</strong>ire una forma veramente islamica <strong>di</strong> governo, pur mantenendo<br />
formulazioni ambigue nel <strong>di</strong>fferenziarsi dalle violenze, e accentuando le «colpe»<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’Occidente e <strong>di</strong> Israele quali istigatori <strong>del</strong>le violenze, che sarebbero una risposta<br />
alle politiche <strong>di</strong> repressione e <strong>di</strong> accanimento contro l’islam e i musulmani.<br />
Prima <strong>di</strong> affrontare la tematica <strong>del</strong>la presente ricerca è quin<strong>di</strong> fondamentale capire<br />
questo elemento: <strong>il</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo, <strong>il</strong> ra<strong>di</strong>calismo, <strong>il</strong> qa’i<strong>di</strong>smo, <strong>il</strong> salafismo sono tutte<br />
reazioni contemporanee alla modernità e all’impatto travolgente che le <strong>di</strong>verse<br />
5 Ghassam Salamé (Ed.), Democracy without Democrats ? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, London – New<br />
York, 1994. p. 1 e citato da F. Burgat, L'islamisme en face, Parigi 1996, p. 17.<br />
19
egioni <strong>del</strong> mondo islamico hanno avuto con l’espansione coloniale prima e con <strong>il</strong><br />
<strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>del</strong>la globalizzazione poi. Un giu<strong>di</strong>zio che si evince tanto guardando da<br />
una prospettiva storico-culturale, come fanno <strong>di</strong>versi autori (G<strong>il</strong>les Kepel, John<br />
Esposito, Ghassan Salamé), quanto da una più sociologica, come fa ad esempio<br />
Olivier Roy. Pur rifiutando la modernità occidentale, questi movimenti crescono e<br />
prosperano proprio grazie ad essa, adottandone le tecniche e modalità. Secondo<br />
alcuni, anzi, la stessa al-Qa’ida «è un effetto collaterale <strong>del</strong>la globalizzazione. La<br />
caratteristica che la contrad<strong>di</strong>stingue – progettare una forma privatizzata <strong>di</strong> violenza<br />
organizzata a livello mon<strong>di</strong>ale – era impossib<strong>il</strong>e in passato» 6 .<br />
Tutto ciò non significa voler negare lo stato <strong>di</strong> profonda crisi che vive l’islam<br />
contemporaneo, una crisi che si evidenzia ormai da molti anni in tutte le <strong>di</strong>verse<br />
regioni <strong>del</strong> mondo musulmano. La questione fondamentale è se queste<br />
manifestazioni islamiste ra<strong>di</strong>cali siano una deviazione e un’aberrazione <strong>di</strong> una<br />
tra<strong>di</strong>zione religiosa ben <strong>di</strong>versa, o se esse ne siano invece <strong>il</strong> risultato naturale, poiché<br />
le cause <strong>del</strong> loro sv<strong>il</strong>uppo sono contenute nel messaggio religioso islamico? In altre<br />
parole, <strong>il</strong> ra<strong>di</strong>calismo islamisti è un epi<strong>fenomeno</strong> o una tendenza innata <strong>del</strong>l’islam 7 ?<br />
IL RADICALISMO ISLAMICO: TENDENZA INNATA O EPIFENOMENO? Estratto da<br />
un articolo <strong>di</strong> Paolo Branca pubblicato su «Annali <strong>di</strong> Scienze religiose», 4/1999.<br />
[….]<br />
Se alcuni caratteri presenti nella formulazione tra<strong>di</strong>zionale <strong>del</strong>l'islam, insieme a talune<br />
funzioni mancanti o quanto meno bloccate, sembrano favorire l'emergere <strong>del</strong> ra<strong>di</strong>calismo<br />
musulmano, non possiamo esimerci dal notare che le forme e le <strong>di</strong>mensioni da quest'ultimo<br />
recentemente assunte devono essere ricondotte anche e forse soprattutto a fattori legati a<br />
situazioni storico-politiche: "Islamic fundamentalism is both fully politics and fully<br />
religion". 8 La grande mob<strong>il</strong>itazione che ha caratterizzato la recente storia <strong>del</strong> mondo arabomusulmano<br />
ha portato fatalmente al priv<strong>il</strong>egiare un pensiero finalizzato al raggiungimento<br />
<strong>di</strong> obiettivi pratici che esso contribuiva a sostenere e legittimare, mettendo tra parentesi la<br />
funzione critica che pure dovrebbe contrad<strong>di</strong>stinguere l'azione degli intellettuali. Pur nelle<br />
mutate con<strong>di</strong>zioni storiche e culturali l'idéologie de combat persiste, con la funzione <strong>di</strong> «ridurre<br />
la complessità <strong>del</strong>le realtà storiche, sociologiche e psicologiche a un insieme <strong>di</strong> affermazioni<br />
6 John Gray, Al Qaeda e <strong>il</strong> significato <strong>del</strong>la modernità, Roma, 2004, p.5.<br />
7 Cfr. Paolo Branca, Il ra<strong>di</strong>calismo islamico: tendenza innata o epi<strong>fenomeno</strong>?, «Annali <strong>di</strong> Scienze Religiose», 1999, n.4,<br />
pp. 89-102.<br />
8 J.J.G. Jansen, The dual nature of Islamic fundamentalims, Londra 1997, p. 1.<br />
20
più o meno coerenti, destinate a valorizzare e legittimare gli obiettivi <strong>del</strong>l'azione collettiva.<br />
Non si tratta tanto <strong>di</strong> raggiungere l'obiettività - come si sforza <strong>di</strong> fare <strong>il</strong> pensiero scientifico -<br />
quanto <strong>di</strong> trasformare con<strong>di</strong>zioni <strong>di</strong> vita ritenute insopportab<strong>il</strong>i in altre che vengono<br />
idealizzate per renderle più desiderab<strong>il</strong>i». 9<br />
«La situazione culturale, politica ed economica attuale <strong>del</strong> mondo arabo fa sì che sia<br />
impossib<strong>il</strong>e, soprattutto se si è arabi e dal mondo arabo, parlare <strong>del</strong>la religione come <strong>di</strong> un<br />
<strong>fenomeno</strong> sociale totalmente spiegab<strong>il</strong>e [...] Il risultato è che ogni <strong>di</strong>scorso sulla società, sulla<br />
religione, sul <strong>di</strong>ritto suppone preventivamente una sorta <strong>di</strong> autocensura da parte <strong>di</strong> chi parla<br />
o scrive. Quest’ultima consiste nel riconoscere l’incontestab<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> alcune verità e principii<br />
per la ragione - anch’essa incontestab<strong>il</strong>e - che essi non possono essere messi in <strong>di</strong>scussione. Il<br />
massimo <strong>di</strong> libertà che ci si può permettere <strong>di</strong> fronte a tutto ciò è quin<strong>di</strong> far finta <strong>di</strong> niente,<br />
cercare <strong>di</strong> cavarsela con giochi <strong>di</strong> parole o correre <strong>il</strong> rischio <strong>del</strong>la scomunica (Ali Abdurrazik,<br />
Tahar Haddad...) o <strong>del</strong>la messa a morte (Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, giustiziato da Numeiry<br />
nel 1985). E’ dunque un <strong>di</strong>battito quasi impossib<strong>il</strong>e, poiché gli mancano due con<strong>di</strong>zioni<br />
in<strong>di</strong>spensab<strong>il</strong>i all’obiettività: l’accordo sugli strumenti d’analisi e l’autonomia <strong>di</strong> giu<strong>di</strong>zio. In<br />
generale, l'analisi <strong>del</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> religioso coinvolge colui che la conduce in prima persona e<br />
ciò non è dovuto esclusivamente a una debolezza intrinseca alla sua personalità o alla sua<br />
formazione, ma all’ambiente in cui opera. Infatti ciò che egli scriverà, a <strong>di</strong>spetto <strong>del</strong>la<br />
neutralità che si sforzerà <strong>di</strong> mantenere, sarà percepito come una scelta <strong>di</strong> campo religioso,<br />
ideologico, etnico o politico. Per quanto egli tenterà <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>ssociarsi, la società continuerà a<br />
valutarlo secondo i propri criteri e gli negherà ogni neutralità. [...] Egli lo sa e sa che,<br />
impegnandosi nella ricerca, è condannato a perdere la propria innocenza, in quanto sa che<br />
alla fine potrà essere condannato. E’ quin<strong>di</strong> <strong>del</strong> tutto naturale che - non essendo ogni<br />
intellettuale necessariamente un eroe - in tali con<strong>di</strong>zioni non tutto venga detto e che <strong>il</strong><br />
<strong>di</strong>scorso <strong>del</strong>l’intellettuale a proposito <strong>del</strong>la religione, <strong>del</strong> <strong>di</strong>ritto, <strong>del</strong>la politica sia<br />
<strong>di</strong>plomatico, fatto <strong>di</strong> s<strong>il</strong>enzi, prudenza e furbizie, sia in definitiva un <strong>di</strong>scorso corrotto». 10<br />
E' indubbio che su questa situazione hanno influito anche elementi esterni: l'incapacità <strong>di</strong><br />
contribuire alla soluzione dei conflitti, allo sv<strong>il</strong>uppo economico e al superamento <strong>di</strong><br />
con<strong>di</strong>zioni sfavorevoli all'armonica coesistenza fra <strong>di</strong>fferenti civ<strong>il</strong>tà non soltanto non<br />
contribuisce a rimuovere, ma col tempo rafforza una logica <strong>del</strong> rifiuto e <strong>del</strong>la<br />
contrapposizione che ha come conseguenza sul piano interno <strong>il</strong> ripiegamento su <strong>di</strong> sé nella<br />
ricerca <strong>di</strong> un mo<strong>del</strong>lo proprio e autosufficiente che, per quanto mitico, svolge una funzione<br />
<strong>di</strong> rifugio e <strong>di</strong> rassicurazione che contribuisce alla sua <strong>di</strong>ffusione al suo successo.<br />
[…]<br />
Credo che questi tratti possano essere riscontrati nella visione tra<strong>di</strong>zionale <strong>di</strong> molte religioni<br />
e che l'islam sembrerebbe ad<strong>di</strong>rittura più pre<strong>di</strong>sposto a sv<strong>il</strong>upparle in forza sia <strong>di</strong> alcune sue<br />
originarie <strong>di</strong>sposizioni, sia <strong>del</strong>la fase involutiva che sta attraversando, sia infine dei fattori<br />
esterni che ne con<strong>di</strong>zionano lo sv<strong>il</strong>uppo. Il ra<strong>di</strong>calismo religioso si configura così nell'islam<br />
come una sorta <strong>di</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> ritornante, esito <strong>di</strong> alcuni no<strong>di</strong> irrisolti <strong>di</strong> base uniti alla<br />
funzione che la religione è chiamata ad assolvere perio<strong>di</strong>camente da quanti la ut<strong>il</strong>izzano per<br />
legittimare la propria azione, poco importa se finalizzata al mantenimento o al<br />
rovesciamento <strong>del</strong>lo status quo. Quanto questo stato <strong>di</strong> cose sia pernicioso per la stessa sorte<br />
9 M. Arkoun, La pensée arabe, Parigi 1985 (1.a ed. 1975), p. 107.<br />
10 Yadh Ben Achour, Religion et Droit dans le Monde arabe, Tunisi 1992, pp. 28-29.<br />
21
<strong>del</strong>l'islam è chiaramente percepito da alcuni: «La religione, ben lungi dall'essere l'origine <strong>di</strong><br />
questa <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>e situazione, ne è la prima vittima». 11<br />
Nel tentativo <strong>di</strong> rispondere alla <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>e domanda che ci siamo posti e alla quale non<br />
preten<strong>di</strong>amo <strong>di</strong> aver fornito una risposta completa né definitiva, ho dato voce quasi<br />
esclusivamente ad autori musulmani. Voglio concludere sottolineando questo punto poiché<br />
mi sembra la più chiara <strong>di</strong>mostrazione che, in definitiva, qualsiasi determinismo sarebbe<br />
indebito e ingiustificato: l'islam non è un blocco monolitico e i musulmani non sono meri<br />
esponenti <strong>di</strong> un sistema statico e inalterab<strong>il</strong>e. Oltre le grida <strong>di</strong> chi fa la voce più grossa <strong>il</strong><br />
<strong>di</strong>battito è vivo e merita rispetto e considerazione più <strong>di</strong> quanto comunemente avviene. Mi<br />
sembra dunque giusto e opportuno terminare con le considerazioni <strong>di</strong> uno <strong>di</strong> quanti vi<br />
partecipano, se non altro per contribuire a fare uscire dall'ombra una <strong>del</strong>le tante figure che<br />
meriterebbero ben maggiore visib<strong>il</strong>ità: «Al <strong>di</strong> là <strong>del</strong>la crisi politica e sociale, <strong>il</strong> mondo<br />
musulmano affronta tuttavia, oggi, la sua più grande crisi religiosa. Così come la mancanza<br />
<strong>di</strong> un pensiero politico critico va <strong>di</strong> pari passo con lo strapotere <strong>del</strong>lo Stato, la mancanza <strong>di</strong><br />
un'autorità legittima religiosa seguita dai fe<strong>del</strong>i fa perdere <strong>il</strong> controllo sulle forze spirituali<br />
<strong>del</strong>la religione. Da forza d'umanizzazione e <strong>di</strong> stab<strong>il</strong>izzazione, la religione si trasforma in<br />
potenza esplosiva. Il riconoscimento <strong>di</strong> uno spazio proprio, al riparo da ogni ingerenza<br />
politica, quella <strong>del</strong>lo Stato in primo luogo, può solo permettere all'islam, oggi veramente<br />
devastato dall'accumulazione d'esigenze contrad<strong>di</strong>ttorie e <strong>di</strong>sor<strong>di</strong>nate, <strong>di</strong> ritrovare la sua<br />
purezza, la sua identità, <strong>il</strong> suo equ<strong>il</strong>ibrio interno, la rassicurazione e la ripresa spirituale». 12<br />
2. Il problema <strong>del</strong>la definizione <strong>del</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> islamista<br />
Le definizioni <strong>di</strong> “fondamentalismo islamico”, o <strong>di</strong> “ra<strong>di</strong>calismo” o <strong>di</strong> “integralismo”<br />
sono ormai entrate da anni nel linguaggio comune dei mass me<strong>di</strong>a, <strong>di</strong>venendo una<br />
comoda etichetta per definire fenomeni, tendenze e movimenti in realtà molto <strong>di</strong>versi<br />
fra loro. Come tutte le definizioni generalizzanti, anch'esse rischiano da un lato <strong>di</strong><br />
imbrigliare la complessa realtà o<strong>di</strong>erna in schemi rigi<strong>di</strong>, e dall'altro <strong>di</strong> risultare<br />
ambigue o fuorvianti.<br />
Particolare <strong>di</strong>ffusione ha avuto <strong>il</strong> termine “fondamentalismo”, ut<strong>il</strong>izzato dagli<br />
stu<strong>di</strong>osi occidentali per in<strong>di</strong>care una molteplicità <strong>di</strong> movimenti moderni a sfondo<br />
religioso. Adottato inizialmente per in<strong>di</strong>care alcuni movimenti cristiani protestanti<br />
11 B. Ghalioun, , Islam e islamismo. La modernità tra<strong>di</strong>ta, Roma 1998, p. 118.<br />
12 Ibidem, pp. 199-200.<br />
22
statunitensi <strong>di</strong> fine secolo XIX - i quali sostenevano un'interpretazione rigorosamente<br />
letterale <strong>del</strong>la Bibbia - questa parola è stata ut<strong>il</strong>izzata con sempre maggior frequenza<br />
per identificare gruppi politici e religiosi appartenenti anche ad altre religioni, come<br />
<strong>il</strong> neo-induismo, l'ebraismo, lo scintoismo e particolarmente l'islamismo.<br />
Negli ultimi decenni, <strong>il</strong> fondamentalismo è andato assumendo una connotazione<br />
marcatamente negativa, identificando ambiguamente sia movimenti che pre<strong>di</strong>cavano<br />
un ritorno alle proprie (mitizzate) origini e ai propri fondamenti religiosi, sia gruppi<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>calmente ost<strong>il</strong>i alle <strong>di</strong>namiche <strong>del</strong>la Modernizzazione, sia movimenti <strong>di</strong><br />
opposizione politica che si legittimavano religiosamente. E in particolare, larghissima<br />
<strong>di</strong>ffusione ha avuto la definizione <strong>di</strong> “fondamentalismo islamico”, per identificare<br />
dei movimenti <strong>di</strong> attivismo sociale e politico fondati sull’islam; un islam a un tempo<br />
ideologia politica e religione. In essi è fondamentale – quando non ad<strong>di</strong>rittura<br />
ossessiva – l’idea <strong>di</strong> tornare alle fonti <strong>del</strong>l’islam più puro, come <strong>il</strong> Corano (<strong>il</strong> Libro<br />
sacro che contiene le rivelazioni fatte da Dio tramite Maometto, e che è quin<strong>di</strong><br />
<strong>di</strong>rettamente parola <strong>di</strong> Dio), la shari‘a, la comunità primigenia <strong>del</strong>l’islam, <strong>del</strong> periodo<br />
<strong>del</strong> Profeta e dei primi califfi (i cosiddetti al-Rashidun, i “Ben guidati”).<br />
Molti stu<strong>di</strong>osi <strong>del</strong> mondo musulmano hanno sottolineato le vaghezze <strong>di</strong> questo<br />
termine, <strong>il</strong> suo essere ut<strong>il</strong>izzato in modo talora contrad<strong>di</strong>ttorio, caricato <strong>di</strong> significati<br />
– e anche <strong>di</strong> simboli – <strong>di</strong>versi, proponendo altre definizioni che dovrebbero<br />
sostituirlo o definirlo più nettamente.<br />
Se <strong>il</strong> termine <strong>di</strong> integralismo/integrismo è ormai scarsamente adottato, per le sue<br />
evidenti connotazioni valoriali negative <strong>di</strong> cui è così carico, maggior fortuna ha avuto<br />
la definizione <strong>di</strong> “ra<strong>di</strong>calismo”. L’islam ra<strong>di</strong>cale è un termine molto ut<strong>il</strong>izzato, talora<br />
in sostituzione <strong>del</strong> termine fondamentalismo, in altri casi per in<strong>di</strong>care un preciso<br />
momento storico all’interno <strong>del</strong>la più generale corrente <strong>del</strong> fondamentalismo: ossia <strong>il</strong><br />
periodo che segue <strong>il</strong> cosiddetto risveglio islamico e <strong>il</strong> primo riformismo islamico, e<br />
che ha fra i suoi principali ideologi Sayyid Qutb, in Mawdu<strong>di</strong> e in Khomeini (le basi<br />
ideologiche <strong>del</strong> ra<strong>di</strong>calismo – ancora allo sta<strong>di</strong>o <strong>di</strong> corrente intellettuale - si sarebbero<br />
23
sv<strong>il</strong>uppate soprattutto negli anni ’50 e ’60, dando vita a movimenti politici attivi veri<br />
e propri con gli anni ’70).<br />
Nella letteratura scientifica si è spesso ricorso anche a perifrasi come “movimenti<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’attivismo islamico”, o a definizioni come “l’islam politico”, o “islam m<strong>il</strong>itante”.<br />
Con queste parole si voleva evidenziare <strong>il</strong> fatto che i movimenti islamici che si<br />
andavano descrivendo non perseguissero tanto, o solo, un’imposizione artificiale<br />
sopra tutta la società islamica <strong>di</strong> pratiche religiose e consuetu<strong>di</strong>ni <strong>di</strong> un passato<br />
immaginato; essi tentavano piuttosto <strong>di</strong> ri-organizzare l'intero or<strong>di</strong>ne socio-politico<br />
secondo la loro lettura <strong>del</strong> religioso. L’islam era una via per risolvere tutti i numerosi<br />
problemi sociali, politici ed economici creando una “contro-utopia” alternativa<br />
all’Occidente, alla modernità e alla globalizzazione: un’ideologia per la conquista <strong>del</strong><br />
potere politico e la rie<strong>di</strong>ficazione <strong>del</strong>la società.<br />
John Esposito ha sottolineato come <strong>il</strong> termine «fondamentalismo» sia una definizione<br />
troppo imbevuta <strong>di</strong> presupposti cristiani e <strong>di</strong> stereotipi occidentali, e che spinga alla<br />
visione erronea <strong>di</strong> una minaccia monolitica che in realtà non esiste. Da qui l’idea <strong>di</strong><br />
ut<strong>il</strong>izzare <strong>il</strong> termine <strong>di</strong> «revival islamico», o <strong>di</strong> «attivismo islamico» - definizione<br />
quest’ultima spesso adotta in questo stu<strong>di</strong>o – che sembrano più legati alla storia<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’islam. Esso, infatti, possiede una lunga tra<strong>di</strong>zione <strong>di</strong> revivalismo religioso (taj<strong>di</strong>d)<br />
come <strong>di</strong> riformismo (islah), che includono anche l’attivismo sociale e politico che ha<br />
caratterizzato lunghi perio<strong>di</strong> <strong>del</strong>la storia islamica, dai primi secoli post Egira ai giorni<br />
nostri 13 .<br />
Negli ultimi anni si è andato <strong>di</strong>ffondendo nel nostro paese la definizione <strong>di</strong><br />
“islamismo” e <strong>di</strong> “islamisti” – movimenti islamismi, ideologia islamista, etc. – per<br />
definire queste realtà. E’ un termine ripreso dal francese les islamistes (a sua volta<br />
derivato dall’arabo al-islamiyyun), ma che ha trovato <strong>del</strong>le resistenze per i suoi<br />
possib<strong>il</strong>i frainten<strong>di</strong>menti, dato che in Italia, l’islamista è anche lo stu<strong>di</strong>oso <strong>di</strong> cose<br />
islamiche, l’esperto <strong>di</strong> islam.<br />
13 Cfr. John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, Oxford, 1999, pp.6 sgg. Dello stesso autore ve<strong>di</strong> anche<br />
l’interessante Guerra Santa? Terrore nel nome <strong>del</strong>l’Islam, M<strong>il</strong>ano, 2004.<br />
24
In ogni caso, quale sia la definizione ut<strong>il</strong>izzata, essa rimane comunque un’etichetta<br />
data dall’esterno, che viene generalmente rifiutata dalla maggior parte dei pensatori<br />
e degli attivisti <strong>del</strong>l’islam m<strong>il</strong>itante. Questi ultimi – fondamentalisti, ra<strong>di</strong>cali, islamisti<br />
che <strong>di</strong>r si voglia – si auto-definiscono come al-islamiyyun, oppure come salafiti, dalla<br />
parola salaf (i pii antenati <strong>del</strong> tempo <strong>del</strong> Profeta e <strong>del</strong>le generazioni imme<strong>di</strong>atamente<br />
succesive), riallacciandosi così all’idea <strong>di</strong> un islam puro <strong>del</strong>le origini. Essi,<br />
insod<strong>di</strong>sfatti dalla comune qualifica <strong>di</strong> "musulmani" (muslimûn), pongono l'accento<br />
non tanto sulla loro fede come fatto personale, quanto la loro adesione a un sistema<br />
religioso totalizzante <strong>di</strong> cui si priv<strong>il</strong>egia l'aspetto istituzionale rispetto all’accettazione<br />
in<strong>di</strong>viduale, riproponendo, <strong>il</strong> prevalere <strong>del</strong>la legge sulla teologia che caratterizza da<br />
sempre l’islam.<br />
Secondo alcuni stu<strong>di</strong>osi arabi, come ad esempio M. `Imâra 14 (uno stu<strong>di</strong>oso che<br />
simpatizza con i movimenti ra<strong>di</strong>cali islamisti), la definizione <strong>di</strong> "fondamentalisti"<br />
(usûliyyûn) è completamente inesatta, dato che essa qualifica in Occidente un insieme<br />
<strong>di</strong> movimenti conservatori, mentre nel mondo islamico si tratta – a suo <strong>di</strong>re - <strong>di</strong><br />
movimenti rivoluzionari e riformisti. Egli opta così per la definizione <strong>di</strong> islâmî,<br />
ripresa da antiche opere classiche <strong>del</strong>la tra<strong>di</strong>zione islamica (cf. al-Ash`arî, Maqâlât al-<br />
islâmiyyîn, <strong>del</strong> X sec.), anche se secondo Paolo Branca, a ‘Imara sfugge la <strong>di</strong>fferenza<br />
fondamentale che, in quelle opere classiche, <strong>il</strong> termine designava in<strong>di</strong>stintamente<br />
tutte le <strong>di</strong>verse correnti <strong>del</strong> pensiero musulmano, riconoscendone implicitamente la<br />
qualifica <strong>di</strong> “islamicità”". Al contrario gli attivisti islamisti <strong>di</strong> questi anni considerano<br />
veramente islamica solo la propria posizione, mettendo in <strong>di</strong>scussione l’islamicità <strong>di</strong><br />
quanti non con<strong>di</strong>vidono <strong>il</strong> loro pensiero.<br />
M.A. al-`Alim 15 suggerisce <strong>il</strong> termine <strong>di</strong> usuliyya per definire <strong>il</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong>, ossia<br />
l'attenersi alla lettera a tali princìpi (usûl) così come si trovano nei testi, e la<br />
conseguente tendenza ad applicarli al quoti<strong>di</strong>ano in modo acritico e totalizzante,<br />
prescindendo dai singoli casi e dall’analisi <strong>del</strong>le realtà contingenti.<br />
14 M. `Imâra, al-Usûliyya bayna al-gharb wal-islâm (Il fondamentalismo tra occidente e islam), Il Cairo 1998, pp. 16-<br />
17.<br />
15 M. A. al-`Alim, al-Fikr al-`arabî bayna al- khusûsiyya wa-l-kauniyya (Il pensiero arabo fra particolarismo e<br />
universalismo), Il Cairo 1996, pp. 100-101.<br />
25
Insomma, una concezione totalizzante e autoreferenziale, che rifiuta tutto ciò che<br />
percepisce come non omogeneo ad essa, e promovendo una visione dualistica e<br />
<strong>di</strong>cotomica <strong>del</strong> mondo, <strong>di</strong>viso fra bene e male, lecito e <strong>il</strong>lecito, credente e<br />
miscredente, e traendo infine da questa <strong>di</strong>cotomia una giustificazione superiore per<br />
la violenza <strong>del</strong>le loro politiche.<br />
Sayyid Qutb e le “Pietre M<strong>il</strong>iari” <strong>del</strong> ra<strong>di</strong>calismo islamico<br />
Lo scrittore egiziano Sayyid Qutb (1906 - 1966) è stato l’ideologo più influente dei Fratelli<br />
Musulmani dopo la morte <strong>del</strong> loro fondatore, Hasan al-Banna, avvenuta nel 1949, ed è ancor<br />
oggi un riferimento teoretico per l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale e jiha<strong>di</strong>sta.<br />
Qutb, un funzionario <strong>del</strong> Ministero egiziano <strong>del</strong>l’istruzione, si avvicinò all’Associazione dei<br />
Fratelli Musulmani dopo un soggiorno <strong>di</strong> circa due anni negli Stati Uniti (1948 - 50);<br />
quest’esperienza ra<strong>di</strong>cò in lui la convinzione <strong>del</strong>la profonda alterità e inconc<strong>il</strong>iab<strong>il</strong>ità fra<br />
modernità occidentale e islam. Paradossalmente, Qutb ha involontariamente assorbito idee e<br />
linguaggi rivoluzionari e d’opposizione tipici <strong>del</strong>l’Europa <strong>del</strong> XIX secolo, e <strong>del</strong><br />
contro<strong>il</strong>luminismo europeo abbinata a «l’estetica postkantiana <strong>del</strong>l’in<strong>di</strong>vidualismo liberale»,<br />
quando afferma la fede c0me impegno personale espresso attraverso un atto <strong>di</strong> volontà16. Dopo la rivoluzione degli “Ufficiali Liberi” <strong>del</strong> 1952 egli collaborò per breve tempo con la<br />
nuova <strong>di</strong>rigenza rivoluzionaria, ma profonde <strong>di</strong>fferenze ideologiche portarono Qutb su<br />
posizioni sempre più critiche. Arrestato nel 1954 e condannato all’ergastolo, rimase in carcere<br />
fino al 1964 allorché venne r<strong>il</strong>asciato per un breve periodo. Già l’anno dopo era nuovamente<br />
in carcere. Condannato per tra<strong>di</strong>mento fu infine impiccato nell’agosto <strong>del</strong> 1966.<br />
In carcere Qutb scrisse o completò alcune opere che hanno rappresentato i testi <strong>di</strong><br />
riferimento principali per i movimenti <strong>del</strong>l’attivismo islamico più ra<strong>di</strong>cali: dall’imponente<br />
commentario in 30 volume <strong>del</strong> Corano, dal titolo Fi z<strong>il</strong>al al-Qur’an (All’ombra <strong>del</strong> Corano) al<br />
libro Ma’alim fi al-tariq (Pietre M<strong>il</strong>iari), apparso nel 1964. In quest’opera Qutb riprendeva –<br />
dandogli forti connotazioni ideologiche – i concetti <strong>di</strong> jah<strong>il</strong>iyya e <strong>di</strong> takfir. Il primo termine<br />
in<strong>di</strong>ca semplicemente <strong>il</strong> periodo prima <strong>del</strong>la rivelazione <strong>di</strong> Maometto, ossia “pre-islamico”;<br />
Qutb ne fa una definizione a-temporale, dai significativi profondamente negativi, <strong>di</strong> periodo<br />
barbaro, corrotto, anti-islamico, e la usa per definire le società contemporanee <strong>del</strong> mondo<br />
musulmano. Esse non sono islamiche perché non vivono secondo i precetti <strong>del</strong>la Legge<br />
religiosa, e si sono lasciate corrompere dalla modernità occidentale. I loro governanti sono<br />
per Qutb colpevoli <strong>di</strong> una <strong>del</strong>le colpe più gravi per un musulmano, ossia l’apostasia<br />
volontaria (takfir). Volontariamente essi hanno abbandonato l’islam: una colpa che va punita<br />
con la morte. Inoltre essi sono <strong>di</strong>venuti parte <strong>del</strong>la “grande cospirazione contro l’islam”, un<br />
altro tema molto ricorrente in Qutb: una lotta permanente ingaggiata da forze ost<strong>il</strong>i all’islam,<br />
che ha per obiettivo la <strong>di</strong>struzione <strong>del</strong>l’islam stesso, e che vede molti musulmani asserviti<br />
all’«intruso occidentale». Una lotta <strong>del</strong>la miscredenza e <strong>del</strong> materialismo contro la vera fede<br />
e la spiritualità.<br />
16 Cfr. Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, Chicago, 1988, p.193.<br />
26
E’ evidente la riflessione <strong>di</strong> tipo binario, basata sull’antitesi, <strong>del</strong> pensiero <strong>di</strong> Qutb, e la sua<br />
natura <strong>di</strong> pensiero reattivo a un presente rifiutato, che irrigi<strong>di</strong>sce <strong>il</strong> pensiero dei Fratelli<br />
Musulmani e ne favorisce la deriva violenta, ra<strong>di</strong>cale e <strong>il</strong> dogmatismo ideologico, come<br />
sottolineato anche da Tariq Ramadan 17.<br />
3. Ascesa e frammentazione <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale<br />
Lo sv<strong>il</strong>uppo e l’ascesa dei movimenti <strong>del</strong>l’attivismo islamico riformista e ra<strong>di</strong>cale,<br />
violenti o meno che siano, è un argomento che esula dal presente stu<strong>di</strong>o. Si tratta in<br />
ogni caso <strong>di</strong> un processo storico che attraversa la seconda metà <strong>del</strong> secolo XIX e tutto<br />
<strong>il</strong> secolo XX; un processo <strong>di</strong> straor<strong>di</strong>naria complessità e pluralità, sul quale la<br />
bibliografia occidentale è amplissima.<br />
La molteplicità storica e socio-culturale <strong>di</strong> questi movimenti non può certo essere<br />
sovrasemplificata per essere riassunta in poche righe. In ogni caso, pur sottolineando<br />
questa pluralità e la <strong>di</strong>versità <strong>del</strong>le manifestazioni islamiste, sembra <strong>di</strong> poter scorgere<br />
alcuni elementi che ne rappresentano i tratti caratteristici”: 18<br />
«i) principio <strong>del</strong>l'inerranza, relativo al contenuto <strong>del</strong> Libro sacro, assunto nella sua<br />
interezza, come una totalità <strong>di</strong> senso e <strong>di</strong> significati che non possono essere<br />
scomposti, e soprattutto che non possono essere interpretati liberamente dalla<br />
ragione umana, pena lo stravolgimento <strong>del</strong>la verità che <strong>il</strong> Libro racchiude;<br />
ii) principio <strong>del</strong>l'astoricità <strong>del</strong>la verità e <strong>del</strong> Libro che la conserva; l'astoricità significa<br />
che è preclusa alla ragione umana la possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> collocare <strong>il</strong> messaggio religioso in<br />
una prospettiva storica o <strong>di</strong> adattarlo alle mutate con<strong>di</strong>zioni <strong>del</strong>la società umana;<br />
17 Tariq Ramadan, nipote <strong>di</strong> Hassan el-Banna e controverso stu<strong>di</strong>oso musulmano residente in Europa sottolinea lo<br />
spostamento ideologico e la ra<strong>di</strong>calizzazione <strong>del</strong> pensiero dei Fratelli Musulmani attuata da Sayyid Qutb rispetto<br />
al pensiero <strong>del</strong> fondatore <strong>del</strong>la Fratellanza. Cfr. Tariq Ramadan, Il riformismo islamico. Un secolo <strong>di</strong> rinnovamento<br />
musulmano, Troina (Enna), 2004, pp.411 sgg.<br />
18 E. Pace, R. Guolo, I fondamentalismi, Bari 1998, p. 6.<br />
27
iii) principio <strong>del</strong>la superiorità <strong>del</strong>la Legge <strong>di</strong>vina su quella terrena, secondo cui dalle<br />
parole scritte nel Libro sacro scaturisce un mo<strong>del</strong>lo integrale <strong>di</strong> società perfetta,<br />
superiore a qualsiasi forma <strong>di</strong> società inventata e configurata dagli esseri umani;<br />
iv) primato <strong>del</strong> mito <strong>di</strong> fondazione: un vero e proprio mito <strong>del</strong>le origini che ha la<br />
funzione <strong>di</strong> segnalare l'assolutezza <strong>del</strong> sistema <strong>di</strong> credenza cui ogni fe<strong>del</strong>e è chiamato<br />
ad aderire e <strong>il</strong> senso profondo <strong>di</strong> coesione che stringe tutti coloro che ad essa fanno<br />
riferimento (etica <strong>del</strong>la fraternità).»<br />
E’ soprattutto alla fine degli anni ’70, che si registra <strong>il</strong> prepotente ritorno sulla scena<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’islam. Il mondo si confronta con movimenti <strong>del</strong>l’attivismo islamico che vedono e<br />
ut<strong>il</strong>izzano l’islam soprattutto come una ideologia politica tesa alla conquista <strong>del</strong><br />
potere, una forza “rivoluzionaria e popolare” capace <strong>di</strong> mob<strong>il</strong>itare le masse e <strong>di</strong><br />
pre<strong>di</strong>care la rottura <strong>del</strong>l’or<strong>di</strong>ne costituito. Quasi tutti i regimi <strong>del</strong> mondo musulmano<br />
ne sono scossi, e gli islamisti <strong>di</strong>vengono rapidamente in Occidente l’emblema <strong>di</strong> una<br />
alterità culturale minacciosa e pericolosa, la variab<strong>il</strong>e principale per analizzare i<br />
possib<strong>il</strong>i sv<strong>il</strong>uppi politici e sociali <strong>di</strong> tutto <strong>il</strong> Dar al-islam. Si tratta <strong>di</strong> movimenti molto<br />
aggressivi, che affermano <strong>di</strong> rifiutare l’Occidente in quanto civ<strong>il</strong>tà irriconc<strong>il</strong>iab<strong>il</strong>e con<br />
l’islam. Ma contemporaneamente combattono anche l’islam praticato<br />
meccanicamente dagli ‘ulema’ tra<strong>di</strong>zionali, combattono le visioni riformiste <strong>del</strong>la<br />
religione – che appaiono loro come un allontanamento dai precetti coranici e dalla<br />
perfezione <strong>del</strong>l’islam <strong>del</strong>le origini – e combattono con forza anche le spinte<br />
secolariste e nazionaliste (<strong>il</strong> «nemico interno». «l’intruso occidentale» stigmatizzato<br />
da tanti pensatori islamisti).<br />
Il nazionalismo in particolare, che era stata l’ideologia dominante in tutto <strong>il</strong> Me<strong>di</strong>o<br />
Oriente nei decenni precedenti, è attaccato con forza dal nuovi movimenti islamisti. I<br />
partiti e i leader <strong>del</strong>la lotta contro <strong>il</strong> colonialismo e gli alfieri <strong>del</strong>la modernità<br />
nazionale – come <strong>il</strong> Partito <strong>del</strong>la Resurrezione Araba, Nasser, <strong>il</strong> regime imperiale<br />
<strong>del</strong>lo shah Pahlavi, per citarne alcuni – sono visti negativamente: <strong>il</strong> nazionalismo,<br />
secondo essi, indebolisce la umma (la comunità dei credenti), imponendo <strong>di</strong>visioni<br />
artificiali e contrarie all’or<strong>di</strong>ne voluto da Dio. Disgregando l’unità dei fe<strong>del</strong>i, e<br />
28
indebolendo quin<strong>di</strong> l’islam, <strong>il</strong> nazionalismo finisce per <strong>di</strong>venire una <strong>di</strong>mostrazione <strong>di</strong><br />
miscredenza.<br />
Queste idee e questi movimenti non nascono dal nulla. Fra la fine degli anni ’70 e gli<br />
anni ’90 essi hanno goduto <strong>di</strong> un prepotente successo, che ha attirato loro <strong>il</strong> consenso<br />
<strong>di</strong> masse <strong>di</strong> studenti, <strong>di</strong> esponenti <strong>del</strong> ceto me<strong>di</strong>o esclusi dal potere, <strong>del</strong>la masse <strong>di</strong><br />
<strong>di</strong>seredati e <strong>del</strong> sottoproletario formatosi nelle megalopoli per effetto dei processi <strong>di</strong><br />
inurbamento e per la crisi <strong>del</strong>le società tra<strong>di</strong>zionali. Ma le loro origini risalgono a<br />
molto prima. Sono <strong>il</strong> frutto <strong>del</strong>la riflessione e <strong>del</strong>l’attivismo <strong>di</strong> pensatori e <strong>di</strong><br />
movimenti che iniziano a muoversi negli anni ’30 e ’40. L’associazione deI Fratelli<br />
Musulmani in Egitto, con la <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong> pensiero <strong>del</strong> suo fondatore, Hasan al-<br />
Banna, e <strong>del</strong> già ricordato Sayyid Qutb, <strong>del</strong>l’in<strong>di</strong>ano musulmano Abu ‘Ala Mawdu<strong>di</strong><br />
– la cui influenza sopra i movimenti islamisti <strong>del</strong>la regione araba è speso<br />
sottostimata, ma è in realtà notevolissima – e <strong>del</strong>l’ayatollah sciita iraniano Ruhollah<br />
Khomeini, sono i riferimenti principali per l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale: essi faranno<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’islam un’ideologia rivoluzionaria e d’opposizione capace <strong>di</strong> sconvolgere l’assetto<br />
politico-istituzionale <strong>di</strong> tutto <strong>il</strong> mondo musulmano.<br />
Un’utopia affascinante, che promette <strong>di</strong> restaurare la società giusta dei primor<strong>di</strong><br />
<strong>del</strong>l’islam, <strong>di</strong> trovare soluzioni ai fallimenti economici dei nuovi regimi usciti dalla<br />
fase <strong>di</strong> decolonizzazione, <strong>di</strong> eliminare gli squ<strong>il</strong>ibri sociali e la <strong>di</strong>lagante corruzione, <strong>di</strong><br />
proteggere le famiglie dalle impetuose trasformazioni sociali imposte dalla<br />
modernizzazione, <strong>di</strong> dare voce al <strong>di</strong>ssenso e <strong>di</strong> combattere l’autoritarismo e la<br />
soppressione <strong>del</strong>le libertà civ<strong>il</strong>i. Un pensiero fac<strong>il</strong>mente traducib<strong>il</strong>e in slogan efficaci<br />
e che semplificano dualisticamente la complessa realtà contemporanea. Il tutto<br />
restaurando in pieno i valori profon<strong>di</strong> <strong>del</strong>la civ<strong>il</strong>tà islamica, espressi nel Corano. Il<br />
ritorno inderogab<strong>il</strong>e alla Legge, la shari‘a, e la sua piena applicazione nella società<br />
sono obiettivi conclamati. Non è l’islam che deve adattarsi alla modernità. E’ la<br />
modernità che deve essere islamizzata.<br />
Importante, è stato anche <strong>il</strong> ruolo giocato in questi anni dall’Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta, che era<br />
stata, come noto, la maggiore beneficiaria <strong>del</strong> vertiginoso aumento <strong>di</strong> risorse<br />
29
economiche per i paesi produttori <strong>di</strong> petrolio prodotto prima crisi petrolifera <strong>del</strong><br />
1973. Il regno sau<strong>di</strong>ta ut<strong>il</strong>izzò questa nuova ricchezza per rafforzare sia <strong>il</strong> proprio<br />
ruolo <strong>di</strong> potenza regionale politicamente moderata (contrapposta alle repubbliche<br />
rivoluzionarie arabe <strong>di</strong> Siria, Iraq, Libia, etc.), sia per esportare nel resto <strong>del</strong> mondo<br />
islamico la propria visione <strong>del</strong>l’islam – legata al movimento <strong>del</strong> wahhabismo 19 - fino<br />
ad allora estremamente marginale.<br />
Fino agli anni ’60, infatti, la corrente wahhabita era considerata come un movimento<br />
settario e “arretrato” rispetto al mondo moderno dalla maggior parte dei giurisperiti<br />
e dei teologi musulmani. Ma nella seconda metà degli anni ’70 la situazione iniziò a<br />
mutare. La crisi <strong>del</strong>le ideologie nazionaliste e modernizzanti favorì questo progetto<br />
<strong>di</strong> esportazione <strong>del</strong>la propria “visione” islamica. L’Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta finanziò un po’<br />
ovunque centri religiosi, inviò ‘ulema’ hanbaliti (la scuola giuri<strong>di</strong>ca hanbalita,<br />
vigente in Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta è la più rigorista e rigida <strong>del</strong>le scuola giuri<strong>di</strong>che canoniche)<br />
per <strong>di</strong>rigere nuove moschee, creò scuole religiose, etc.. A ciò si è aggiunto <strong>il</strong><br />
<strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>del</strong>l’immigrazione lavorativa: conta<strong>di</strong>ni, artigiani, <strong>di</strong>plomati e laureati,<br />
giovani professori emigravano dalle <strong>di</strong>verse regioni <strong>del</strong> mondo islamico per trovare<br />
lavoro nelle ricche monarchie petrolifere <strong>del</strong> Golfo. Qui assorbirono almeno in parte<br />
le forme <strong>di</strong> religiosità <strong>del</strong> luogo, che riporteranno nei loro paesi <strong>di</strong> origine, alla fine<br />
19 Wahhabismo è un termine che identifica un movimento rigorista sunnita <strong>di</strong>ffusosi nell’Arabia centrale attorno<br />
alla metà <strong>del</strong> XVIII secolo, a opera <strong>di</strong> Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703 - 1792). Tale definizione è per la<br />
verità rifiutata dai wahhabiti stessi che preferiscono definirsi muwahhidun (ossia “sostenitori, <strong>di</strong>fensori<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’Unicità <strong>di</strong> Dio”). Al-Wahhab riprese e rielaborò <strong>il</strong> pensiero <strong>del</strong>l’insigne teologo e giurista musulmano Ibn<br />
Taymiyya (1263 - 1328), vissuto in uno dei momenti più critici <strong>del</strong>la storia islamica, subito dopo la fine <strong>del</strong><br />
califfato e durante <strong>il</strong> periodo <strong>del</strong> dominio mongolo sul mondo iranico e <strong>il</strong> Levante. Questi r<strong>il</strong>anciò gli<br />
insegnamenti <strong>del</strong>la scuola giuri<strong>di</strong>ca (madhhab) hanbalita - la più rigorosa e intransigente <strong>del</strong>le quattro scuole<br />
giuri<strong>di</strong>che classiche sunnite, fondata dal giurista Ibn Hanbal (m. 855 d.C.) – rivitalizzandone gli insegnamenti e<br />
contribuendo alla sua <strong>di</strong>ffusione. Adottando una interpretazione molto rigida e “purista” <strong>del</strong>la dottrina hanbalita<br />
e <strong>del</strong> pensiero <strong>di</strong> Ibn Taymiyya, i wahhabiti hanno sempre avversato ogni presunta “deviazione” dalla purezza<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’islam <strong>del</strong>le origini, ogni forma <strong>di</strong> ostentazione <strong>del</strong> lusso, mostrando una decisa ost<strong>il</strong>ità verso <strong>il</strong> misticismo, le<br />
forme popolari <strong>di</strong> fede (come <strong>il</strong> culto dei santi, da essi aborrito) e una certa avversione agli sciiti. Il wahhabismo<br />
crebbe <strong>di</strong> importanza fra la fine <strong>del</strong> XVIII e l’inizio <strong>del</strong> XIX secolo, arrivando a controllare parte <strong>del</strong>la penisola<br />
arabica, prima <strong>di</strong> essere sconfitto dagli ottomani, che gli inviarono contro <strong>il</strong> governatore d’Egitto, Muhammad<br />
‘Ali (1805 - 1849). Sostenuti politicamente da uno degli antenati degli attuali sovrani sau<strong>di</strong>ti, Ibn al-Sa‘ud, i<br />
wahhabiti riemersero quale primario elemento politico e m<strong>il</strong>itare <strong>del</strong>la penisola arabica nel primo dopoguerra,<br />
con la fondazione <strong>del</strong> regno <strong>del</strong>l’Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta (1924). Proprio <strong>il</strong> loro rigorismo estremo ha a lungo impe<strong>di</strong>to una<br />
più vasta <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong> movimento. A partire dagli anni ’70, l’Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta ha investito somme notevoli per<br />
l’esportazione <strong>del</strong> pensiero wahhabita nel resto <strong>del</strong> mondo islamico, dando vita a una pluralità <strong>di</strong> movimenti<br />
islamisti estremamente ra<strong>di</strong>cali (spesso definiti come movimenti neo-wahahbiti), spesso legati al <strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>del</strong><br />
terrorismo islamico (in particolare nell’area afgano-pakistana, nel Caucaso, nell’Asia centrale e nel Sud-est<br />
asiatico).<br />
30
<strong>del</strong> loro periodo <strong>di</strong> lavoro nel Golfo. Il risultato è stato quello <strong>di</strong> una crescita dei<br />
movimenti ra<strong>di</strong>cali islamici e una sempre più esasperata attenzione verso le pratiche<br />
islamiche “corrette” in molti paesi musulmani, e soprattutto in Pakistan e nel sud-est<br />
asiatico.<br />
Questo ambizioso programma teso all’affermazione <strong>del</strong> ruolo regionale sau<strong>di</strong>ta e alla<br />
creazione <strong>di</strong> un network <strong>di</strong> movimenti e ideologi islamisti nelle <strong>di</strong>verse aree <strong>del</strong><br />
mondo islamico “ben <strong>di</strong>sposti” verso la casa regnante <strong>di</strong> Riyad è riuscito però solo in<br />
parte. Il trattamento sprezzante dei lavoratori stranieri, l’espulsione <strong>di</strong> molti <strong>di</strong> essi<br />
con <strong>il</strong> sopraggiungere <strong>del</strong>la crisi economica negli anni ’90, la palese contrad<strong>di</strong>zione<br />
fra la dottrina professata e gli st<strong>il</strong>i <strong>di</strong> vita <strong>del</strong>la famiglia reale, <strong>il</strong> ricorso alla<br />
protezione degli Stati Uniti in seguito all’invasione <strong>del</strong> Kuwait da parte <strong>del</strong>l’Iraq <strong>di</strong><br />
Saddam Hussein (1990), con la cessione <strong>di</strong> basi m<strong>il</strong>itari permanenti agli americani sul<br />
“sacro suolo” <strong>del</strong>l’Arabia – che contiene le città sante <strong>di</strong> Mecca e Me<strong>di</strong>ca, precluse ai<br />
non musulmani – sono tutti motivi che hanno finito per vanificare gran parte <strong>di</strong><br />
questo progetto.<br />
Le conseguenze più pericolose <strong>di</strong> questa politica <strong>di</strong> sostegno ai movimenti islamici<br />
sunniti più dogmatici e ra<strong>di</strong>cali si sono però palesate solo nella seconda metà degli<br />
anni ’90, con lo sv<strong>il</strong>uppo <strong>di</strong> movimenti islamisti estremamente violenti e ra<strong>di</strong>cali,<br />
fortemente ost<strong>il</strong>i all’occidente e agli stessi sau<strong>di</strong>ti. La presenza Usa nel Golfo e <strong>il</strong><br />
sostegno politico-m<strong>il</strong>itare dato ad essi dalle monarchie petrolifere ha scatenato<br />
l’opposizione politica. I <strong>di</strong>versi gruppi islamismi d’opposizione hanno così finito per<br />
rafforzare progressivamente la loro cooperazione trans-nazionale, sfruttando aree <strong>di</strong><br />
tensione come l’Afghanistan, la Cecenia e <strong>il</strong> Kashmir.<br />
In ogni caso, i risultati politici <strong>di</strong> questi movimenti islamisti sono stati estremamente<br />
<strong>del</strong>udenti, dato che quasi ovunque essi – pur influenzando e trasformando le società<br />
islamiche e ottenendo un aumento <strong>del</strong> conformismo religioso e l’adozione <strong>di</strong> norme<br />
giuri<strong>di</strong>che “sciaraitiche” – hanno fallito la conquista <strong>del</strong> potere, anche per via <strong>del</strong>la<br />
violenta repressione attuata da molti regimi “secolari” con <strong>il</strong> sostegno occidentale (ad<br />
esempio, l’Egitto, l’Algeria, la Tunisia, etc.). L’ideologia <strong>di</strong> questi gruppi –<br />
31
estremamente ra<strong>di</strong>cale – s’incentrava sulla retorica <strong>del</strong>la <strong>di</strong>fesa <strong>del</strong>l’islam dagli<br />
attacchi <strong>del</strong>l’Occidente e dei “sionisti”, ma gli obiettivi principali <strong>del</strong>l’azione erano<br />
principalmente <strong>di</strong>retti all’interno <strong>del</strong> mondo islamico: <strong>il</strong> loro obiettivo era scar<strong>di</strong>nare<br />
i regimi (politicamente) moderati per creare veri stati islamici. Ironicamente, fra gli<br />
obiettivi primari vi era anche <strong>il</strong> governo sau<strong>di</strong>ta, a lungo uno degli “appren<strong>di</strong>sti<br />
stregoni” <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale sunnita.<br />
I movimenti islamisti che si muovevano in un’ottica – per così <strong>di</strong>re – nazionale, ossia<br />
miranti a prendere <strong>il</strong> potere nei singoli stati islamici abbattendone i «regimi empi»,<br />
per affermarsi dall’interno, dovevano riuscire a operare una sintesi politica e<br />
ideologica fra gruppi sociali <strong>di</strong>versi, che erano portatori <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>verse agende sociali.<br />
G<strong>il</strong>les Kepel 20 parla <strong>del</strong>la necessità – per questi movimenti – <strong>di</strong> aggregare oltre alla<br />
intellighenzia islamista, le masse urbane <strong>di</strong> giovani, spesso emarginate dal regime o<br />
che vivono situazioni sociali ed economiche estremamente frustranti, come<br />
conseguenza <strong>del</strong> boom demografico che ha caratterizzato la seconda metà <strong>del</strong> XX<br />
secolo, e che ha prodotto enormi tensioni socio-economiche in tutti i paesi afro-<br />
asiatici. Ma fondamentale è per i movimenti islamisti riuscire ad aggregare anche <strong>il</strong><br />
ceto me<strong>di</strong>o religioso tra<strong>di</strong>zionale(<strong>il</strong> ceto <strong>del</strong> bazar) , che forma un ceto sociale spesso<br />
nebuloso ma in<strong>di</strong>spensab<strong>il</strong>e per rafforzare <strong>il</strong> consenso popolare, generalmente<br />
scontento dei regimi al potere ma che rifugge gli eccessi <strong>del</strong>l’attivismo islamico più<br />
violento.<br />
Nonostante gli indubbi successi parziali <strong>di</strong> molti <strong>di</strong> questi movimenti nel re-<br />
islamizzare parzialmente le società in cui operavano, ottenendo significative<br />
concessioni dai vari regimi a ci si opponevano (come ad esempio in Egitto) o<br />
riuscendo a venire cooptati (come nel caso <strong>del</strong>l’Indonesia, <strong>del</strong> Pakistan e <strong>del</strong>la<br />
Malaysia) in tema <strong>di</strong> shari’a, <strong>di</strong> co<strong>di</strong>ci <strong>di</strong> famiglia, <strong>di</strong> scuole coraniche, etc., essi hanno<br />
mancato quasi ovunque la conquista <strong>del</strong> potere.<br />
20 Cfr alcuni lavori <strong>di</strong> G<strong>il</strong>les Kepel, Fitna. Guerra nel cuore <strong>del</strong>l’islam, Roma-Bari, 2004; idem, <strong>Jihad</strong>. Ascesa e declino<br />
<strong>del</strong>la guerra santa, Roma, 2001; idem, The Tra<strong>il</strong> of Political Islam, Opendemocracy.net, luglio 2002<br />
(www.opendemocracy.net).<br />
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All’inizio degli anni ’90 si è così assistito a una trasformazione <strong>del</strong> pensiero islamico<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>cale che per alcuni anni non è stato percepito nella sua interezza in Occidente: vi<br />
è stata una ra<strong>di</strong>calizzazione dei movimenti islamisti, e una loro crescente<br />
frammentazione. L’aumento <strong>del</strong>le violenze e la crescente ra<strong>di</strong>calità <strong>del</strong>le posizioni ha<br />
finito per favorire <strong>il</strong> frazionamento <strong>di</strong> questi movimenti, e ne ha ridotto <strong>il</strong> sostegno<br />
popolare, in particolare presso <strong>il</strong> ceto me<strong>di</strong>o tra<strong>di</strong>zionale. Afghanistan, Kashmir,<br />
Cecenia sono <strong>di</strong>venuti dei centri <strong>di</strong> training per cellule terroristiche, per singoli<br />
combattenti in nome <strong>del</strong>l’islam; si sono formati gruppi para-m<strong>il</strong>itari dotati <strong>di</strong> un’alta<br />
mob<strong>il</strong>ità nelle <strong>di</strong>verse “aree calde” internazionali (dal Me<strong>di</strong>o Oriente, al Maghreb, dal<br />
Sudan alla Bosnia, al Sud-est asiatico), grazie a un network <strong>di</strong> movimenti e<br />
organizzazioni clandestine sempre più ramificato (al-Qa’ida ne è l’esempio più<br />
famoso). Il <strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>del</strong> <strong>reducismo</strong> <strong>di</strong> combattenti mujahed<strong>di</strong>n, i quali ritornavano<br />
nei propri paesi dopo aver combattuto i «nemici <strong>del</strong>l’islam» in Afghanistan, Sudan,<br />
Kashmir, Cecenia, ex Jugoslavia, Algeria, etc. ha favorito l’emergere <strong>di</strong> gruppi<br />
islamisti e jiha<strong>di</strong>sti spesso non legati ai tra<strong>di</strong>zionali movimenti islamico ra<strong>di</strong>cali più<br />
strutturali, o comunque non controllab<strong>il</strong>i.<br />
La spirale <strong>di</strong> violenze, la fuga verso posizioni sempre più massimaliste, <strong>il</strong> clamore<br />
<strong>del</strong>le azioni <strong>di</strong> alcuni gruppi m<strong>il</strong>itanti (come gli attentati <strong>del</strong> settembre 2001 a<br />
Washington e New York) ha enfatizzato oltre misura la loro azione e <strong>il</strong> loro peso<br />
effettivo all’interno <strong>del</strong> Dar al-islam. In realtà proprio queste tendenze sembrano aver<br />
ridotto la capacità <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale, e ne hanno favorito una<br />
<strong>di</strong>varicazione fra movimenti islamisti politici e gruppi jiha<strong>di</strong>sti.<br />
Per quanto spesso ambigui nei loro rapporti con l’uso <strong>del</strong>la violenza e nel<br />
condannare gli attacchi terroristici, gruppi come i Fratelli Musulmani in Egitto e in<br />
Giordania, gli elementi più moderati <strong>del</strong> FIS, i partiti islamici pakistani – sol per fare<br />
alcuni esempi –hanno un’agenda che è essenzialmente sociale e politica, molto più<br />
secolarizzata <strong>di</strong> quanto la loro retorica e la loro ideologia potrebbe lasciar intendere.<br />
Da questi movimenti sono usciti gruppi sempre più ra<strong>di</strong>cali e violenti, che hanno<br />
finito per indebolire i gruppi islamisti che perseguono i loro obiettivi rifiutando <strong>il</strong><br />
33
icorso alla violenza. Profittando <strong>del</strong> clima <strong>di</strong> allarme generale, molti governi (si<br />
vedano ad esempio i casi <strong>del</strong>lo Hizb-e Tahrir in Uzbekistan e <strong>del</strong>la Malaysia) hanno<br />
attuato una repressione <strong>del</strong>l’opposizione islamista non-violenta.<br />
Alcuni stu<strong>di</strong>osi occidentali hanno già parlato <strong>di</strong> “tramonto”, <strong>di</strong> “declino”<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale come ideologia politica, travolta dalla sanguinosa ascesa e<br />
dalle violenze <strong>del</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo salafita. Le variab<strong>il</strong>i storiche e culturali, in realtà, sono<br />
così numerose – e così complesse – da rendere ardua ogni previsione univoca. Certo<br />
è che le varie espressioni <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo sono risultate generalmente incapaci <strong>di</strong><br />
tramutarsi da opposizione politica a forza <strong>di</strong> governo (finendo in molti casi per<br />
scivolare verso forme <strong>di</strong> opposizione violenta che hanno favorito la loro brutale<br />
repressione da parte dei regimi al potere). Nei pochi casi in cui essi sono<br />
effettivamente riusciti a ottenere un ruolo politico e amministrativo, i loro risultati<br />
sono risultati per lo più estremamente <strong>del</strong>udenti.<br />
4. L’islam globale e <strong>il</strong> terrorismo jiha<strong>di</strong>sta<br />
La lotta in Afghanistan contro <strong>il</strong> regime comunista <strong>di</strong> Kabul e le truppe<br />
d’occupazione sovietiche da parte dei muhajed<strong>di</strong>n (ve<strong>di</strong> box sul jihad) è stata, come già<br />
ricordato, un turning point fondamentale, assieme alla vittoria <strong>del</strong>la rivoluzione<br />
popolare in Iran, che permise a Khomeyni <strong>di</strong> instaurare una repubblica islamica<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>cale. Dopo la vittoria sul comunismo in Afghanistan – e la successiva caduta per<br />
implosione <strong>di</strong> tutto <strong>il</strong> sistema <strong>di</strong> potere sovietico è stata letta dagli islamisti ra<strong>di</strong>cali<br />
come un effetto <strong>del</strong>la loro lotta m<strong>il</strong>itante – <strong>il</strong> nucleo duro <strong>di</strong> combattenti formatisi<br />
sugli impervi campi <strong>di</strong> battaglia centroasiatici continuarono la loro battaglia, vuoi<br />
ritornando nei loro paesi d’origine per alimentare nuovi e più violenti gruppi<br />
jiha<strong>di</strong>sti che combattono contro <strong>il</strong> regime al potere, vuoi spostandosi in altri<br />
quadranti geostrategici per alimentare lotte contro chi minacci l’islam: «the Islamist<br />
34
victory against the Soviets re-energized Salafi jiha<strong>di</strong>sm and moved it from a local to a<br />
global struggle: the inward-looking doctrine of bin Laden’s Salafi-Wahhabism was<br />
transformed by the transnational jiha<strong>di</strong>sm of the followers of Qutb» 21 .<br />
Questa nuova <strong>di</strong>mensione panislamista e a-nazionale «risponde anche alla necessità <strong>di</strong><br />
mantenere vivo <strong>il</strong> mito panislamista ma è anche <strong>il</strong> tentativo <strong>di</strong> sfuggire alla riduzione<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’islamismo a fattore locale […] l’ideologia panislamista ha funzionato per molti anni più<br />
da mito <strong>di</strong> riferimento che come pratica effettiva. Ma dopo le dure sconfitte subite negli<br />
scenari nazionali, in particolare in Egitto e in Algeria, gli “internazionalisti” hanno cercato <strong>di</strong><br />
trasformare tale riferimento in progetto politico» 22 . Da qui la ripresa <strong>del</strong>l’idea califfale, con <strong>il</strong><br />
progetto politico <strong>di</strong> un nuovo califfato islamico che superi ogni <strong>di</strong>visione etnica, regionale e<br />
culturale in favore <strong>di</strong> una nuova presa <strong>di</strong> coscienza <strong>del</strong>la umma islamica. Se per anni, i<br />
movimenti islamisti si sono mossi su base nazionale, mirando alla presa <strong>del</strong> potere nei singoli<br />
stati, molto più efficace – e fianco ideologicamente e m<strong>il</strong>itarmente comodo – è stato<br />
deterritorializzare la lotta jiha<strong>di</strong>sta, unendo <strong>il</strong> «nemico interno», «l’empio governante», ai<br />
«crociati cristiani» e al tra<strong>di</strong>zionale «nemico sionista». Lo scontro fra la jah<strong>il</strong>iyya e l’islam<br />
perde ogni valenza geografica e ogni confine, e si fa ideologica e culturale. Se <strong>il</strong> Nemico è<br />
globale e pervasivo, anche <strong>il</strong> jihad deve essere globale e pervasivo, colpendo i nemici <strong>del</strong>la<br />
vera fede ovunque sia possib<strong>il</strong>e e in tutte le forme che siano possib<strong>il</strong>i.<br />
Il complesso significato <strong>del</strong> termine jihad<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong> è un termine <strong>di</strong> lingua araba entrato ormai nel linguaggio comune, spesso tradotto<br />
imprecisamente come “guerra santa” – una guerra che i musulmani dovrebbero combattere<br />
contro “gli infe<strong>del</strong>i”.<br />
Si tratta <strong>di</strong> una interpretazione estremamente limitata e che genera frainten<strong>di</strong>menti. Da un<br />
punto <strong>di</strong> vista f<strong>il</strong>ologico, la parola jihad deriva dalla ra<strong>di</strong>ce jhd, che in<strong>di</strong>ca lo “sforzo”,<br />
“l’applicarsi verso qualcosa”.<br />
Maometto parla <strong>di</strong> jihad come <strong>di</strong> sforzo, <strong>di</strong> impegno sulla via <strong>di</strong> Dio. La dottrina giuri<strong>di</strong>ca<br />
musulmana classica ha poi co<strong>di</strong>ficato quattro modalità in cui è possib<strong>il</strong>e attuare <strong>il</strong> jihad: con<br />
l’animo, con la parola, con la mano e con la spada. I primi tre rimangono nella sfera<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’impegno etico e morale personale – e sono talora definiti come “grande jihad”. Il “piccolo<br />
jihad” sarebbe l’ultimo, ossia quello con la spada.<br />
In ogni caso <strong>il</strong> jihad con la spada è un obbligo che <strong>di</strong> solito attiene alla comunità dei<br />
musulmani (umma), non al singolo in<strong>di</strong>viduo (non vincola cioè tutti i singoli i credenti, ma<br />
21 M<strong>il</strong>itant <strong>Jihad</strong>ism Ra<strong>di</strong>calization, Conversion, Recruitment, «ITAC Presents», 2006, n.4, p.5.<br />
22 Renzo Guolo, Il partito <strong>di</strong> Dio. L’islam ra<strong>di</strong>cale contro l’Occidente, M<strong>il</strong>ano, 2004, pp.88-89.<br />
35
solo un numero “sufficiente” all’interno <strong>del</strong>la comunità, a meno che sia in pericolo l’esistenza<br />
<strong>del</strong>la comunità). E non può essere ut<strong>il</strong>izzato per in<strong>di</strong>care <strong>il</strong> concetto <strong>di</strong> guerra (<strong>di</strong> conquista,<br />
<strong>di</strong> bottino, etc.) in generale. E’ un conflitto armato teso alla <strong>di</strong>fesa o all’espansione <strong>del</strong>l’islam<br />
– da qui la ripresa <strong>del</strong> concetto <strong>di</strong> “guerra santa” - che può essere combattuto solo in certi<br />
casi, rigidamente definiti dai giuristi classici musulmani, e solo contro certe categorie sociali.<br />
Per la dottrina classica, <strong>il</strong> jihad deve essere combattuto:<br />
i) contro i pagani, i politeisti e gli idolatri (kafirun), ma solo dopo aver formulato<br />
chiari inviti alla loro conversione, e dopo aver accertato <strong>il</strong> loro rifiuto. Non può esser<br />
combattuto contro ebrei, cristiani e zoroastriani – a meno che essi minaccino l’umma<br />
islamica - dato perché essi godono <strong>di</strong> uno statuto particolare e non sono considerati<br />
kafirun (infe<strong>del</strong>i);<br />
ii) contro gli apostati (irtidad), una colpa molto grave nell’islam, che la shari‘a<br />
sanziona con la pena <strong>di</strong> morte;<br />
iii) contro i ribelli politici, se la loro ribellione al legittimo imam minaccia l’unità e la<br />
sicurezza <strong>del</strong>la comunità musulmana<br />
iv) per la <strong>di</strong>fesa <strong>del</strong>le frontiere <strong>del</strong> Dar al-islam, ossia tutti i territori in cui prevalga<br />
l’islam, e viga la shari‘a (questa forma <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>fesa viene chiamata ribat).<br />
In ogni caso – secondo la dottrina - esso deve risparmiare donne, bambini, vecchi e infermi, e<br />
può essere proclamato solo da ‘ulema’ ab<strong>il</strong>itati, capaci <strong>di</strong> valutarne i rischi e i vantaggi. Un<br />
punto su cui oggi esiste un <strong>di</strong>battito molto vivo nel mondo musulmano dato che esso<br />
contrasta con la dottrina jiha<strong>di</strong>sta contemporanea <strong>del</strong>la lotta globale contro ogni occidentale<br />
e con ogni espe<strong>di</strong>ente, sfruttando la forza <strong>del</strong> martirio per la vera fede.<br />
Nell’epoca contemporanea <strong>il</strong> jihad è <strong>di</strong>venuto via via una potente arma ideologica per la lotta<br />
politica interna ai vari stati <strong>del</strong> mondo musulmano, per scre<strong>di</strong>tare e <strong>del</strong>egittimare<br />
l’avversario, e per giustificare azioni violente anceh all’interno <strong>del</strong> mondo musulmano. Il<br />
jihad, infatti, va combattuto anchecontro gli apostati, fra cui vi sono tutti quei musulmani che<br />
rifiutano la vera interpretazione <strong>del</strong>l’islam e che servono l’Occidente. Uno degli esempi più<br />
noti e quello <strong>del</strong>l’uccisione <strong>del</strong> presidente egiziano Anwar Sadat da parte <strong>di</strong> gruppi islamicora<strong>di</strong>cali:<br />
per loro, Sadat era <strong>di</strong>venuto un apostata, e la sua uccisione un dovere <strong>del</strong>la<br />
comunità islamica. Il termine è stato r<strong>il</strong>anciato dalla guerriglia tribale e islamica contro <strong>il</strong><br />
regime comunista <strong>di</strong> Kabul dopo <strong>il</strong> colpo <strong>di</strong>stato comunista <strong>del</strong> 1978 e <strong>il</strong> successivo<br />
intervento sovietico: i guerriglieri si definirono mujahed<strong>di</strong>n, ossia combattenti <strong>il</strong> jihad,<br />
<strong>di</strong>fensori <strong>del</strong> Dar al-islam. Il termine si rivelò un potente ed efficacissimo veicolo <strong>di</strong><br />
propaganda in tutto <strong>il</strong> mondo islamico, attirando un variegato insieme <strong>di</strong> combattenti non<br />
afgani che si mob<strong>il</strong>itarono per <strong>di</strong>fendere la fede.<br />
La <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong> concetto <strong>di</strong> jihad e la sua r<strong>il</strong>ettura con un canone teoretico innovativo, <strong>del</strong><br />
resto, era già avvenuta con i gran<strong>di</strong> ideologi <strong>del</strong> ra<strong>di</strong>calismo islamico, ossia Mawdu<strong>di</strong> e Qutb.<br />
Per quest’ultimo, chiunque avesse compreso la vera natura <strong>del</strong>l’islam si sarebbe reso conto<br />
<strong>del</strong>la «assoluta necessità che <strong>il</strong> movimento islamico non si limiti alla pre<strong>di</strong>cazione e al<br />
proselitismo, ma comprenda anche la lotta armata» 23. Il jihad, inoltre, non è da considerasi<br />
come un’azione <strong>di</strong>fensiva, bensì uno strumento <strong>di</strong> liberazione <strong>del</strong>l’uomo che non esista a<br />
ricorre a tutti gli strumenti necessari per ottenere la vittoria contro <strong>il</strong> Nemico e per <strong>il</strong> trionfo<br />
23 Sayyid Qutb, Ma’alim fi al-tariq (Le pietre m<strong>il</strong>iari), Beirut, 1978, p.60.<br />
36
<strong>del</strong>l’islam. Una lettura ra<strong>di</strong>cale che si è rivelata uno straor<strong>di</strong>nario volano propagan<strong>di</strong>stico,<br />
ma che sembra allontanarsi dalle interpretazioni <strong>del</strong>la giurisprudenza classica.<br />
In questi anni, <strong>il</strong> termine jiha<strong>di</strong>smo identifica una pluralità <strong>di</strong> movimenti, cellule terroristiche<br />
e pensatori, che si collega all’idea <strong>di</strong> una guerra totale, de-territorializzata negli obiettivi, su<br />
cui si soffermano vari saggi <strong>di</strong> questo stu<strong>di</strong>o, e in particolare <strong>il</strong> lavoro sul <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong> <strong>di</strong><br />
Reuven Paz.<br />
Il jiha<strong>di</strong>smo salafita si è così deterritorializzato, rinunciando a perseguire una via<br />
nazionale alla re-islamizzazione <strong>del</strong>la società, a favore <strong>di</strong> un vagheggiato ritorno<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’idea califfale, con la creazione <strong>di</strong> un grande stato a-nazionale che includa tutta la<br />
umma islamica, e capace <strong>di</strong> far avanzare le frontiere <strong>del</strong> dar al-islam fin dentro<br />
l’Occidente; in questo <strong>di</strong>segno <strong>il</strong> jihad è <strong>il</strong> mezzo per restaurare l’autentico islam <strong>del</strong>le<br />
origini (basato sui valori e sulle pratiche <strong>del</strong> tempo <strong>di</strong> Muhammad e dei cosiddetti<br />
califfi al-rashidun, i ben guidati – 622-661 d.Cr.) 24 .<br />
I proclami <strong>di</strong> Osama bin Laden, soprattutto dopo <strong>il</strong> 1998 e la creazione <strong>di</strong> un «Fronte<br />
islamico per <strong>il</strong> jihad» sono un esempio tipico <strong>di</strong> questo slittamento teoretico:<br />
sfruttando l’arma <strong>del</strong> martirio, ossia <strong>di</strong> attentatori suici<strong>di</strong>, la battaglia per l’autentica<br />
fede deve essere combattuta ovunque e adottando qualsivoglia stratagemma. Essa<br />
deve portare a un’unione dei gruppi jiha<strong>di</strong>sti locali per una mon<strong>di</strong>alizzazione <strong>del</strong>la<br />
lotta. Come sottolinea Andrea Plebani nel suo stu<strong>di</strong>o, l’obiettivo principe <strong>del</strong> leader<br />
sau<strong>di</strong>ta non era tanto creare un vero e proprio esercito alle sue <strong>di</strong>rette <strong>di</strong>pendenze –<br />
fattore che, tra l’altro, avrebbe rischiato <strong>di</strong> alienargli le simpatie dei nuovi leader <strong>del</strong><br />
Paese – ma rafforzare i legami intessuti con le organizzazioni islamiche ra<strong>di</strong>cali con<br />
le quali era entrato in contatto, così da creare un network potenzialmente in grado <strong>di</strong><br />
agire a livello globale.<br />
In realtà, sull’unione e sul presunto coor<strong>di</strong>namento fra gruppi jiha<strong>di</strong>sti non vi è un<br />
vero accordo da parte degli esperti. Per molti, al contrario, è proprio la semplicità, la<br />
trasmettib<strong>il</strong>ità e la fruib<strong>il</strong>ità degli slogan jiha<strong>di</strong>sti contemporanei a favorire la<br />
proliferazione <strong>di</strong> gruppi jiha<strong>di</strong>sti scollegati o non <strong>di</strong>pendenti gerarchicamente, con<br />
una sorta <strong>di</strong> franchising <strong>del</strong> terrore e <strong>del</strong> tema jiha<strong>di</strong>sta. Al-Qa’ida <strong>di</strong>viene così non<br />
24 Cfr. Marc Sageman, Understan<strong>di</strong>ng Terror Networks, Pennsylvania, 2004.<br />
37
solo una struttura terroristica, bensì un ombrello strategico, dottrinale e ideologico<br />
per una varietà <strong>di</strong> movimenti, <strong>di</strong> gruppi e per quella gioventù islamica auto-<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>calizzata che funge da serbatoio e da veicolo proliferante <strong>del</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo globale.<br />
Questa gioventù – per lo più ben alfabetizzata e urbanizzata – non è più intercettata<br />
solo dai movimenti islamisti più “istituzionali” e politici: spesso si tratta <strong>di</strong> piccoli<br />
gruppi che si richiamano alla ideologia jiha<strong>di</strong>sta appresa da internet, ma che non<br />
hanno vere guide dottrinali; per l’esegesi <strong>del</strong>le fonti sciaraitiche – <strong>il</strong> Corano e la<br />
Sunna fra tutte – essi spesso semplicemente bypassato gli ‘ulema’ e gli esperti <strong>del</strong>la<br />
legge religiosa ufficiali, preferendo un approccio più in<strong>di</strong>viduale, una manifestazione<br />
<strong>del</strong>la propria fede, basata sul mito <strong>del</strong> martirio e sulla professione religiosa come atto<br />
<strong>di</strong> volontà (riprendendo l’esempio <strong>di</strong> Sayyid Qutb).<br />
Questa separazione fra islamisti politici e ‘ulema’ accre<strong>di</strong>tati e giovani jiha<strong>di</strong>sti<br />
salafisti – che a mio giu<strong>di</strong>zio riproduce a ben vedere la spaccatura <strong>del</strong> primo<br />
riformismo islamico fra ‘ulema’ tra<strong>di</strong>zionalisti e nuovi pensatori religiosi che<br />
volevano <strong>il</strong> rinnovamento <strong>del</strong>l’islam, tipico <strong>del</strong> mondo musulmano a cavallo dei<br />
secoli XIX e XX – rappresenta una vera e propria fitna, ossia una <strong>di</strong>visone, una<br />
frattura gravida <strong>di</strong> pericolose conseguenze per le società <strong>del</strong> mondo islamico,come<br />
sostiene Kepel. Secondo lo stu<strong>di</strong>oso francese: «Gli ulema <strong>del</strong>l’islam contemporaneo<br />
hanno perduto <strong>il</strong> controllo <strong>del</strong>la <strong>di</strong>chiarazione <strong>di</strong> jihad, non hanno più i mezzi per<br />
ammonire i fe<strong>del</strong>i contro l’avvento <strong>del</strong>la fitna: sono stati superati dai m<strong>il</strong>itanti attivi<br />
che possono fare a meno <strong>del</strong>la cautela, e soprattutto ignorano <strong>del</strong>iberatamente la<br />
lunga storia <strong>del</strong>le società musulmane, ma padroneggiano le tecnologie postmoderne,<br />
navigano su internet e p<strong>il</strong>otano aerei, nutriti da una visione <strong>del</strong>l’universo fortemente<br />
limitata» 25 . Questa spaccatura accentua la ricerca <strong>del</strong> martirio – e li rende<br />
letteralmente «avi<strong>di</strong> <strong>del</strong>la propria morte» - certi che <strong>il</strong> loro sacrificio avrà una valenza<br />
salvifica e catartica, con una visione m<strong>il</strong>lenarista che era fino a pochi anni fa<br />
patrimonio più <strong>del</strong>l’islam sciita che <strong>di</strong> quello sunnita. Secondo Faisal Devji, pur non<br />
essendo possib<strong>il</strong>e <strong>del</strong>ineare un chiaro processo genealogico che ha prodotto <strong>il</strong><br />
25 G<strong>il</strong>les Kepel, Fitna. Guerra nel cuore <strong>del</strong>l’islam, Roma-Bari, 2004, p.275.<br />
38
jiha<strong>di</strong>smo globale m<strong>il</strong>itante, risulta chiaro come esso sia <strong>il</strong> prodotto «of the<br />
fragmentation of tra<strong>di</strong>tional structures of Muslim authority within new global<br />
landscapes» 26 .<br />
Tuttavia, occorre essere molto attenti a non sovrastimare <strong>il</strong> nich<strong>il</strong>ismo <strong>di</strong> questi<br />
movimenti, o l’idea che essi vogliano semplicemente <strong>di</strong>struggere e annich<strong>il</strong>ire<br />
l’Occidente. Esistono cause e motivazioni che si è cercato qui <strong>di</strong> descrivere, e che<br />
sarebbe ingiusto e sbagliato negare o non considerare. In particolare, risulta sempre<br />
più evidente <strong>il</strong> ruolo <strong>di</strong> catalizzatore <strong>del</strong>le violenze che gioca la percezione <strong>di</strong> essere<br />
um<strong>il</strong>iati, <strong>di</strong> vedere calpestati (o <strong>di</strong> immaginare calpestati, che fa lo stesso) i propri<br />
valori e <strong>il</strong> proprio co<strong>di</strong>ce d’onore – ancora così importante nel vissuto quoti<strong>di</strong>ano <strong>di</strong><br />
molte popolazioni musulmane.<br />
Lo Shahid<br />
Il concetto <strong>di</strong> shahid, ossia martire, è stato per gran parte <strong>del</strong>la storia islamica un concetto<br />
marginale, collegato soprattutto alla tra<strong>di</strong>zione <strong>del</strong>le varie correnti <strong>del</strong>lo sciismo. Gli sciiti,<br />
infatti soffrirono spesso sconfitte, persecuzioni e dovettero affrontare <strong>il</strong> martirio <strong>di</strong> molti dei<br />
loro imam.<br />
E’ Khomeyni che – nel suo pensiero rivoluzionario - r<strong>il</strong>ancia la figura <strong>del</strong> martire, e la rende<br />
popolare anche nel mondo sunnita, facendola progressivamente <strong>di</strong>venire una <strong>del</strong>le armi <strong>di</strong><br />
propaganda e <strong>di</strong> lotta più efficaci dei vari movimenti islamisti. Ma anche qui, Khomeyni<br />
sottolinea aspetti nuovi: <strong>il</strong> martire non è più solo colui che accetta la morte per testimoniare<br />
la sua fede, non è solo una accettazione <strong>del</strong>la volontà <strong>di</strong>vina; per Khomeyni, la morte <strong>del</strong><br />
martire non è solo espressione <strong>di</strong> santità, bensì è un sacrificio rivoluzionario nel tentativo <strong>di</strong><br />
abbattere un regime <strong>di</strong>spotico. Anche l’evento più luttuoso in assoluta <strong>del</strong>la storia sciita,<br />
l’uccisione <strong>del</strong>l’imam Husayn - figlio <strong>di</strong> ‘Ali, primo legittimo imam dopo Maometto, <strong>di</strong> cui era<br />
cugino e genero (ve<strong>di</strong> box 3 <strong>del</strong> capitolo 1) - avvenuta per mano dei califfi sunniti omayya<strong>di</strong><br />
durante la battaglia <strong>di</strong> Kerbela <strong>del</strong> 870 AD è da lui r<strong>il</strong>etto. Husayn muore nel tentativo <strong>di</strong><br />
sconfiggere un regime <strong>il</strong>legittimo e <strong>di</strong>spotico, un tentativo non “<strong>di</strong> testimonianza”, sapendo<br />
<strong>di</strong> dover perdere, ma attuato con <strong>il</strong> proposito <strong>di</strong> vincere, e <strong>di</strong> restaurare <strong>il</strong> vero governo<br />
islamico.<br />
Soprattutto, a partire dagli anni ’80, la repubblica islamica usa l’arma dei martiri durante la<br />
guerra con l’Iraq, con masse <strong>di</strong> bassiji, giovani volontari che si immolano praticamente<br />
<strong>di</strong>sarmati sui campi <strong>di</strong> battaglia. Poco dopo, gruppi sciiti ra<strong>di</strong>cali (Amal prima e poi<br />
Hezbollah) che si ispirano al leader <strong>del</strong>la repubblica islamica iraniana riprendono in Libano<br />
l’idea <strong>del</strong> martire come attentatore suicida. Il successo <strong>di</strong> questa tecnica, che permette ai<br />
movimenti islamisti <strong>di</strong> compensare almeno in parte la fortissima inferiorità m<strong>il</strong>itare e<br />
26 Faisal Devji, Landscapes of the <strong>Jihad</strong>, New York, 2005. Cfr ancheStefan M. Aubrey, The New Dimension of<br />
International Terrorism, Zurich, 2004, in particolare capp.7 e 8, pp.53-213.<br />
39
tecnologica nei confronti dei propri “nemici”, Israele fra tutti, fac<strong>il</strong>ita la <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong>l’idea<br />
contemporanea <strong>del</strong>lo shahid come attentatore-suicida ache nei movimenti sunniti. Fino a<br />
perio<strong>di</strong> molto recenti, in ambito sunnita, infatti, <strong>il</strong> suici<strong>di</strong>o era considerato un gravissimo<br />
peccato contro Dio. La morte <strong>del</strong>iberata <strong>del</strong> fedayn, <strong>del</strong> combattente la guerriglia, era quin<strong>di</strong><br />
solo l’estrema inelu<strong>di</strong>b<strong>il</strong>e scelta.<br />
Non casualmente, ‘ulema’ jiha<strong>di</strong>sti hanno giustificato sciaraticamente l’idea <strong>del</strong>l’attentatore<br />
suicida, fornendo un “ombrello” dottrinale e giuri<strong>di</strong>co al numero crescente <strong>di</strong> nuovi<br />
aspiranti martiri.<br />
5. Il neo-fondamentalismo islamico europeo<br />
Da anni, ormai, l’islam si è trasferito a Ovest. Un “trasferimento” non avvenuto<br />
sull’onda <strong>di</strong> conquiste m<strong>il</strong>itari o proselitismo religioso, come per quasi tutte le terre<br />
entrate a far parte <strong>del</strong>la dar al-islam ma come conseguenza <strong>del</strong>la migrazione verso<br />
l’Europa <strong>di</strong> m<strong>il</strong>ioni <strong>di</strong> musulmani, attratti dalle migliori possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> vita e dalla<br />
prospettiva <strong>di</strong> un lavoro stab<strong>il</strong>e. M<strong>il</strong>ioni <strong>di</strong> musulmani, provenienti dalle più <strong>di</strong>verse<br />
regioni dei mon<strong>di</strong> islamici e portatori <strong>di</strong> ortoprassi religiose, sociali e culturali<br />
estremamente variegate, si sono ritrovati in società percepite come ost<strong>il</strong>i o che<br />
tendevano a relegarli ai loro margini.<br />
Questo processo sociologico – estremamente complesso e <strong>di</strong>fferente per mo<strong>di</strong> e tempi<br />
a seconda dei paesi europei coinvolti – ha prodotto enormi conseguenze sociali,<br />
politiche e culturali tanto fra le popolazioni europei, quanto fra gli immigrati<br />
musulmani. Quanto qui interessa far emergere è <strong>il</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> cosiddetto <strong>del</strong>la re-<br />
islamizzazione conservatrice e <strong>di</strong> un neo-fondamentalismo islamico che inventa una<br />
tra<strong>di</strong>zione e un’identità panislamica sia per accre<strong>di</strong>tare i rappresentanti auto-<br />
proclamatisi come rappresentanti ufficiali e riconosciuti <strong>del</strong>l’islam, sia come effetto<br />
<strong>del</strong>la per<strong>di</strong>ta <strong>di</strong> identità culturale e <strong>di</strong> straniamento.<br />
In altre parole, la re-islamizzzione degli immigrati musulmani, anche <strong>di</strong> seconda o<br />
terza generazione, permette in primo luogo <strong>di</strong> riaffermare la propria identità. Ma<br />
40
soprattutto, consente <strong>di</strong> «accompagnare» <strong>il</strong> processo <strong>di</strong> acculturazione che <strong>il</strong> vivere in<br />
una società profondamente allogena come quelle occidentali comporta. La per<strong>di</strong>ta<br />
progressiva <strong>del</strong>la propria identità in<strong>di</strong>viduale, legata alle tra<strong>di</strong>zioni locali e agli st<strong>il</strong>i<br />
<strong>di</strong> vita dei singoli immigrati, è compensata da una reislamizzazione che trasforma <strong>il</strong><br />
vissuto religioso quoti<strong>di</strong>ano, fino ad allora parte <strong>di</strong> un bagaglio <strong>di</strong> valori e <strong>di</strong> simboli<br />
identitari più complesso, che mischiava lingue e tra<strong>di</strong>zioni locali, tribali e prassi<br />
religiosa, etc. Ora, immersi nella civ<strong>il</strong>tà occidentale, l’inevitab<strong>il</strong>e processo <strong>di</strong><br />
acculturazione viene gestito e fatto proprio esaltando la propria adesione a un islam<br />
universale a-storico e a-culturale e idealizzando l’età <strong>del</strong>l’oro musulmana.<br />
Ciò ha portato alla crescita <strong>di</strong> visib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> quel <strong>fenomeno</strong> che è stato definito come<br />
«neofondamentalismo» 27 , ossia <strong>di</strong> una spinta che va oltre l’islamismo politico, per<br />
sostenere una versione “globalizzata” e teologicamente banalizzata <strong>del</strong>l’islam, e con<br />
in più un’attenzione verso la questione sociale molto modesta. Il trascurare la<br />
<strong>di</strong>mensione sociale <strong>di</strong>fferenzia questa corrente dai movimenti tipici <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>cale, come Hamas, Hezbollah, la Fratellanza Musulmana; questi ultimi hanno<br />
infatto sempre ut<strong>il</strong>izzato l’impegno sociale come via per penetrare cap<strong>il</strong>larmente<br />
nelle società in cui operano, per acquisire cre<strong>di</strong>b<strong>il</strong>ità e come forma <strong>di</strong> impegno che<br />
precede la crescita politica. Ossessiva è invece la visione rigorosa, dogmatica e<br />
letterale <strong>del</strong>la rivelazione coranica, con l’esaltazione <strong>del</strong>l’unicità <strong>di</strong> Dio (tawhid)<br />
Corano, <strong>del</strong>la sunna e <strong>del</strong>la shari’a, mentre si fa tabula rasa <strong>del</strong>la tra<strong>di</strong>zione più tarda,<br />
rigettata come un allontanamento dal vero messaggio iniziale: si nega valore alle<br />
<strong>di</strong>stinzioni fra scuole giuri<strong>di</strong>che (una <strong>di</strong>fferenza ra<strong>di</strong>cata nel mondo islamico), si<br />
rifiuta <strong>il</strong> sufismo e <strong>il</strong> riformismo islamico come contaminazioni non islamiche, si<br />
esalta con <strong>il</strong> concetto <strong>di</strong> jihad e <strong>di</strong> martirio per <strong>di</strong>fendersi<br />
Il neofondamentalismo europeo si sv<strong>il</strong>uppa dopo <strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>stacco dalla sua cultura<br />
d’origine (la fase <strong>di</strong> deculturizzazione), cercando <strong>di</strong> ricostruire una comunità astratta,<br />
che prescinde dai particolarismi etnici-culturali-linguistici, e che viene immaginata<br />
come strutturata sul rispetto dogmatico e univoco <strong>di</strong> precetti, norme e valori <strong>di</strong> un<br />
27 Oliver Roy, <strong>Global</strong> Muslim. Le ra<strong>di</strong>ci occidentali nel nuovo Islam, Feltrinelli, 2003, in particolare cap.VI, pp.103 sgg.<br />
41
islam percepito come immutab<strong>il</strong>e e unico. Negando valore a ogni <strong>di</strong>fferenza etnica e<br />
culturale, paradossalmente, <strong>il</strong> neofondamentalismo islamico in occidente costruire<br />
una «neoetnicità», che inventa una nuova etnia: i musulmani.<br />
Basta pensare alla percezione tra<strong>di</strong>zionale europea e italiana, che <strong>di</strong>stingue gli<br />
immigrati per provenienza etnica o geografica (i f<strong>il</strong>ippini, i sudamericani, gli slavi, gli<br />
albanesi), tranne per gli immigrati provenienti dalla Dar al-islam, etichettati come “gli<br />
islamici”. Questa invenzione neoetnica favorisce tanto gli autoproclamatisi<br />
rappresentanti <strong>del</strong>l’islam europeo - come i capi <strong>del</strong>le associazioni islamiche, <strong>del</strong>le<br />
moschee, etc. – quanto gli attivisti <strong>del</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo locale. Entrambi infatti lavorano per<br />
eliminare la percezione <strong>del</strong>le <strong>di</strong>versità e <strong>del</strong>le particolarità identitarie degli immigrati<br />
dalla dar al-islam, a favore <strong>di</strong> una visione astorica <strong>del</strong> credente musulmano, più<br />
manipolab<strong>il</strong>e e indubbiamente percepito come “altro” dalla società ospitante. La<br />
riduzione <strong>del</strong>le peculiarità storiche e culturali, così come <strong>del</strong>le <strong>di</strong>fferenze<br />
nell’ortoprassi <strong>del</strong>l’islam quoti<strong>di</strong>ano, rafforza la percezione <strong>di</strong> alterità e <strong>di</strong><br />
comunanza.<br />
Va anche sottolineato come <strong>il</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo globale sia stato estremamente ab<strong>il</strong>e a<br />
penetrare in questi “interstizi” culturali e <strong>di</strong>sagi socio-identitari, facendo proseliti<br />
anche fra i musulmani <strong>del</strong>la terza o quarta generazione, creando cellule salafite e<br />
jiha<strong>di</strong>ste estremamente <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>i da localizzare e neutralizzare. Gli esperti <strong>di</strong> sicurezza<br />
<strong>di</strong>battono da tempo se i gruppi salafiti e jiha<strong>di</strong>sti attivi in Europa siano controllati e<br />
<strong>di</strong>retti da al-Qa’ida o siano una sorta <strong>di</strong> gruppi in “franchising”, ispirati dal<br />
messaggio <strong>del</strong> jihad globale ma sostanzialmente autonomi. Nei vari saggi <strong>del</strong><br />
presente stu<strong>di</strong>o emerge questa pluralità <strong>di</strong> possib<strong>il</strong>ità. In ogni caso, è evidente come –<br />
quale sia <strong>il</strong> tipo <strong>di</strong> command-and-control esercitato da al-Qa’ida durante gli attacchi o<br />
i tentativi <strong>di</strong> attacco <strong>di</strong> questi ultimi anni in Europa – <strong>il</strong> suo sforzo <strong>di</strong> coltivare e<br />
addrestare jiha<strong>di</strong>sti e specialisti <strong>del</strong>la guerriglia urbana nel nostro continente, in<br />
particolare attraverso internet, si sia rivelata fruttuosa 28 . Dall’analisi dei siti fatta da<br />
28 Cfr. Michael Scheuer, Assessing the London and Sharm al-Sheikh Bombings: The Role of Internet Intelligence and<br />
Urban Warfare Training, «Terrorism Focus», II, n.15, agosto 2005<br />
42
Scheuer e altri 29 emerge la complessità <strong>del</strong> training, <strong>del</strong>le istruzioni, <strong>del</strong>la copertura<br />
dottrinale e ideologico, così come dei suggerimenti per rendere queste cellule più<br />
efficienti, capaci <strong>di</strong> attrarre altri giovani al jiha<strong>di</strong>smo, per evitare l’effetto domino in<br />
caso <strong>di</strong> arresto, favorendo una struttura a nuclei 30 , per ridurre l’attenzione <strong>del</strong>le forze<br />
<strong>di</strong> sicurezza per ridurre l’attenzione <strong>del</strong>le forze <strong>di</strong> sicurezza occidentali, e così via 31 .<br />
In sostanza, sembrerebbe esservi almeno tre tipi <strong>di</strong>stinti <strong>di</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>sti “europei” 32 :<br />
i) <strong>il</strong> primo è quello rappresentato dagli immigrati <strong>di</strong> prima generazione che<br />
non riescono a inserirsi nel mo<strong>del</strong>lo <strong>di</strong> vita occidentale (e non si tratta<br />
necessariamente <strong>di</strong> elementi socialmente marginalizzati);<br />
ii) <strong>il</strong> secondo è quello degli immigrati <strong>di</strong> seconda e terza generazione che sono<br />
ormai deculturalizzati rispetto alla cultura d’origine dei loro padri, ma che<br />
interiorizzano una visione apologetica e dogmatica <strong>del</strong>l’islam<br />
neofondamentalista (ve<strong>di</strong> pagine precedenti). In questa loro riconversione<br />
giocano un ruolo importantissimo tanto le moschee e gli imam ra<strong>di</strong>cali<br />
presenti in Europa, quanto l’auto-ra<strong>di</strong>calizzazione dei giovani attraverso<br />
internet e ideologi improvvisati, esterni alle scuole religiose riconosciute<br />
<strong>del</strong> mondo islamico;<br />
iii) <strong>il</strong> terzo è quello degli europei convertiti, un <strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>mente<br />
quantificab<strong>il</strong>e nella sua reale <strong>di</strong>mensione, dato che molti si convertono<br />
all’islam solo per poter sposare donne musulmane. In ogni caso, gli<br />
europei convertiti e avvicinati all’ideologia <strong>del</strong> jihad globale sembrano<br />
rappresentare un obiettivo particolarmente importante per al-Qa’ida e per i<br />
vari gruppi jiha<strong>di</strong>sti, dato che essi rappresentano elementi ancor più<br />
<strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>i da controllare per le forze <strong>di</strong> sicurezza europee.<br />
29 Si vedano in particolare i saggi <strong>di</strong> Marco Lombar<strong>di</strong> e quello <strong>di</strong> Reuven Paz contenuti in questo stu<strong>di</strong>o.<br />
30 Secondo Scott Atran: «’Al-Qaeda’ terrorist actions are now chiefly executed by self-forming cells of firends that<br />
swarm for attack, then <strong>di</strong>sappear or <strong>di</strong>sperse to from new swarms». Scott Atran, The Moral Logic…, op cit., p.135.<br />
31 Cfr l’interessante raccolta <strong>di</strong> analisi in Christopher Heffelfinger (ed.), Unmasking Terror. A <strong>Global</strong> Review of<br />
Terrorist Activities, Washington DC, 2005.<br />
32 Michael Taarnby, The European Battleground, «Terrorism Monitor», II, n.23, <strong>di</strong>cembre 2004.<br />
43
Secondo Robert Leiken circa l’ottanta per cento degli jiha<strong>di</strong>sti vivono in «<strong>di</strong>aspora<br />
communities» (ma non solo in Occidente), che sono spesso marginalizzati dalle<br />
società ospitanti, e fisicamente <strong>di</strong>sconnesse fra <strong>di</strong> loro 33 . Molte cellule sembrano<br />
essere composte <strong>di</strong> consanguinei e amici, che provengono dalla stessa area, e che<br />
cercano ispirazione, <strong>di</strong>rettive e addestramento attraverso internet.<br />
Va detto che questa attività <strong>di</strong> reclutamento, non è solo finalizzata a creare una<br />
rete <strong>di</strong> cellule attive jiha<strong>di</strong>ste in Occidente, ma anche per raccogliere volontari da<br />
ut<strong>il</strong>izzare per le azioni <strong>di</strong> guerriglia o per gli attacchi suici<strong>di</strong> nei vari fronti aperti<br />
<strong>del</strong> jihad globale. E’ questo <strong>il</strong> caso tipico <strong>del</strong>l’Italia e in particolare <strong>del</strong>le attività<br />
salafite e jiha<strong>di</strong>ste a M<strong>il</strong>ano. Diverse indagini <strong>del</strong>le forze <strong>di</strong> sicurezza italiane<br />
hanno mostrato la rete <strong>del</strong>le attività <strong>di</strong> questi gruppi nel Nord <strong>del</strong> paese, e la<br />
pesante compromissione <strong>di</strong> alcune moschee e centri islamici m<strong>il</strong>anesi, nel<br />
reclutamento <strong>di</strong> attentatori suici<strong>di</strong> o <strong>di</strong> muhajed<strong>di</strong>n per operazioni in Bosnia negli<br />
anni ’90 34 , cosi’ come i legami con Ansar al-Islam per combattere la presenza<br />
statunitense in Iraq, e legami con cellule nord-africane. In questi ultimi anni<br />
sembrano accertate le inf<strong>il</strong>trazioni jiha<strong>di</strong>ste in queste moschee e la pratica <strong>di</strong><br />
creare moschee e centri islamici satelliti minori in tutto <strong>il</strong> paese, rafforzando nel<br />
contempo legami a livelli operativi con altre cellule europee.<br />
La possib<strong>il</strong>ità che si installi anche in Europa <strong>il</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>del</strong> <strong>reducismo</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>sta,<br />
con <strong>il</strong> ritorno nel continente <strong>di</strong> gruppi <strong>di</strong> combattenti sempre più numerosi dai<br />
vari fronti <strong>di</strong> guerra aperti «contro i crociati» non deve essere sottostimato. Le<br />
esperienze degli anni ’90 e <strong>del</strong>la prima parte <strong>del</strong> nuovo m<strong>il</strong>lennio avute da tanti<br />
paesi islamici - dall’Algeria all’Egitto, all’Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta, solo per citarne alcuni<br />
fra i più evidenti – rivelano la pericolosità e l’effetto catalizzatore <strong>di</strong> questi reduci<br />
jiha<strong>di</strong>sti 35 .<br />
33 Robert Leiken, Bearers of <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong>. Immigration and National Security After 9/11, 25 marzo 2004, Nixon Center<br />
publication (wwww.nixoncenter.org).<br />
34 Cfr Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s <strong>Jihad</strong> in Europe. The Afghan-Bosnian Network, Oxford, New York, 2004, in<br />
particolare capp.II e V.<br />
35 Si veda anche <strong>il</strong> capitolo <strong>di</strong> Andrea Plebani <strong>di</strong> questa ricerca.<br />
44
Tuttavia, una azione basta solo sulla repressione o sulla contro-intelligence, per<br />
quanto fondamentale essa certamente sia, non deve far <strong>di</strong>menticare che <strong>il</strong> jihad<br />
globale deve essere affrontato anche in una <strong>di</strong>mensione <strong>di</strong> lungo termine in modo<br />
ben <strong>di</strong>verso, analizzando e cercando <strong>di</strong> dare risposte al <strong>di</strong>sagio cultural-<br />
identitario e sociologico <strong>del</strong>le crescenti minoranze musulmane in Occidente,<br />
evitando le stereotipizzazioni nei confronti <strong>del</strong>le <strong>di</strong>verse comunità musulmane, e<br />
soprattutto, evitando <strong>di</strong> rafforzare l’idea <strong>del</strong>la neoetnicità islamica,<br />
paradossalmente ut<strong>il</strong>e tanto ai fautori <strong>del</strong> neofondamentalismo islamico e <strong>del</strong><br />
jiha<strong>di</strong>smo quanto ai cantori <strong>di</strong> un inevitab<strong>il</strong>e scontro fra le civ<strong>il</strong>tà (forse la più<br />
pericolosa <strong>del</strong>le moderne «self-fulf<strong>il</strong>ling prophecies», come è stata definita).<br />
45
Themes of the Culture of Modern <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong><br />
Introduction<br />
Reuven Paz<br />
In the past decade, since the emergence of al-Qa’ida as the lea<strong>di</strong>ng element of the<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>i-Salafi clash with the West and its terrorist arm worldwide, the focus of<br />
Western societies and governments has been on confronting the problem primar<strong>il</strong>y in<br />
the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism. The September 11 attacks in the United<br />
States highlighted the clash and gave it the image of a clash of civ<strong>il</strong>izations, the new<br />
global cold war, a clash between the free world and democracy vis-à-vis “the Axis of<br />
Ev<strong>il</strong>,” and other titles. The Western world found it <strong>di</strong>fficult not only to cope with the<br />
worldwide terrorist operations or <strong>Jihad</strong>i insurgencies, but also to understand the<br />
motivations, spirit, and state of mind behind this phenomenon.<br />
Many Islamic movements have an unfortunate tendency to portray their struggles as<br />
part of a larger clash between Muslim and Western religions and civ<strong>il</strong>izations. Many<br />
47
Islamic and Islamist groups emphasize the struggle against Jews and Judaism as<br />
well, highlighting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the supposedly global scope of<br />
Jewish influence, particularly on U.S. policy, culture and decisionmaking. The violent<br />
struggle of Hamas and Hizballah primar<strong>il</strong>y since the 1990s, when the prospects of<br />
reconc<strong>il</strong>iation between Israel and the Palestinians seemed close, emphasized the<br />
religious <strong>di</strong>mension of this old conflict. National and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans<br />
and Central Asia during this time had the same effect, and contributed to the<br />
globalization of the Islamist struggle. Consequently, in many Western societies, Islam<br />
in general has come to be identified with violence, terror, and fanaticism, and is<br />
considered a threat on their in<strong>di</strong>vidual and communal security.<br />
This association is mislea<strong>di</strong>ng but unfortunately popular among both Muslim and<br />
Western publics. Terms such as “fundamentalist”, “extremist”, “Islamic”, “Islamist”,<br />
and “political Islam”, are misused by many politicians, decisionmakers, journalists,<br />
citizens, and even scholars in the West. Sim<strong>il</strong>arly, Arab regimes—which generally<br />
control the press and to a certain extent, public opinion—tend not to <strong>di</strong>stinguish<br />
between various kinds of Islamic movements, organizations, groups, and<br />
in<strong>di</strong>viduals. Although Western influence is partly responsible for this phenomenon,<br />
its roots lie in the fact that many Arab regimes now feel threatened by any movement<br />
that is linked to Islam.<br />
Nevertheless, the “Islam versus the West” para<strong>di</strong>gm has grown, partly because<br />
<strong>di</strong>fferent Islamist groups have succeeded in gaining the legitimacy of Islamic<br />
establishments and in presenting parts of their sociopolitical and cultural doctrines<br />
to much of the Arab and Muslim worlds as the only true commentary of Islam. Their<br />
success has been fac<strong>il</strong>itated by a number of factors, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng the Arab-Israeli and<br />
Palestinian-Israeli conflicts, the socio-economic problems of Muslim countries,<br />
opposition to most of the local governments, and the general public host<strong>il</strong>ity toward<br />
the West and the United States—a host<strong>il</strong>ity that has equally been encouraged by<br />
various secular, socialist and even semi-Marxist, and nationalist elements in the<br />
region. This success is also attributable to the interdependent structure of <strong>di</strong>fferent<br />
48
Islamic publics and communities, which can be viewed as a pyramid of sorts. At the<br />
wide base of that pyramid stands a variety of social and non-political Islamic<br />
movements and Sufi orders that create an “Islamic atmosphere” throughout the<br />
region. At the next level are the fundamentalist Islamic groups with sociopolitical<br />
aims, like the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world, the Jamaat-I-Islam (Islamic<br />
Group) in In<strong>di</strong>a and Pakistan, or the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami)<br />
in Central Asia. Such groups contribute to the anti-Western sentiment felt in many<br />
parts of the Muslim world, and serve as greenhouse for the emergence of extremist<br />
groups. At the top of the pyramid stand the various groups whose main message is<br />
jihad in the form of terrorism. Since each level contributes to the one above it, the<br />
natural tendency of the West is to view all Islamic movements as a threat, and in part<br />
Islam as a religion too.<br />
Therefore, it is important to <strong>di</strong>stinguish between the terms “Islamic” and “Islamist”<br />
in <strong>di</strong>scussion of terrorism. In general, Islamic movements are those that employ<br />
nonviolent means, however subversive, to restore the past—that is to found a single,<br />
unified Islamic state (Kh<strong>il</strong>afah), whose sole constitution is the Islamic law (shari’a).<br />
Since there is no <strong>di</strong>stinction in Islam between religion and politics, these groups<br />
recruit support through political efforts alongside their social-welfare and cultural<br />
activities, all of which they call Da`wah. In contrast, Islamists <strong>di</strong>rect all their efforts<br />
toward fulf<strong>il</strong>ling the duty of jihad by violence and terror, which often necessitates<br />
excommunicating their Muslim rivals and the secular parts of Muslim society along<br />
with the non-Muslim world. These Islamist groups are the primary subject of this<br />
paper.<br />
Over the past decade, various assessments have pre<strong>di</strong>cted a decline in these violent<br />
groups due to better international cooperation in countering terrorism in general,<br />
and Islamist terrorism in particular. Yet, it seems that this kind of terrorism is st<strong>il</strong>l<br />
growing in scope. The September 11 attacks in the United States--and the subsequent<br />
exposure of the global infrastructure that supports such attacks—showed that this<br />
kind of large-scale Islamist terrorism may not have reached its peak yet. In fact, there<br />
49
is a real threat that the impact of these violent ideologies and activities on the one<br />
hand, and of the global counterterrorism campaign led by the United States on the<br />
other, w<strong>il</strong>l speed up two major developments, whose signs have been visible<br />
throughout the past decade: namely the ra<strong>di</strong>calization of Muslim communities in the<br />
West, and the increasing host<strong>il</strong>ity and alienation that many younger Muslims feel<br />
toward the West, often based on socio-political secular grievances.<br />
Following the September 11 attacks, and mainly after the campaign against global<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorism and the occupation of Iraq, al-Qa’ida and <strong>Jihad</strong>i groups aff<strong>il</strong>iated<br />
with its ideology, adopted the doctrine that jihad is not just a means to fight, but first<br />
of all a means to consolidate a global Islamist solidarity and brotherhood, on the way<br />
to create a new kind of society, based upon jihad as a way of life. <strong>Jihad</strong> is supposed to<br />
be not just a religious duty, a means of war or struggle, but a global comprehensive<br />
culture in the process of a nation-bu<strong>il</strong><strong>di</strong>ng.<br />
Since the emergence of al-Qa’ida, and only throughout ten years, there has been the<br />
emergence of a global <strong>Jihad</strong>i culture, which turned al-Qa’ida from a <strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorist<br />
organization into an ideological, doctrinal, and strategic umbrella for a variety of<br />
movements, groups, and self-ra<strong>di</strong>calized youth, a phenomenon that has several<br />
characteristics. Above all, this is a development of the “culture of the oppressed,”<br />
whether oppression is taking place or is just part of the feeling of large segments in<br />
the Arab and Muslim world. Furthermore, this umbrella is targeting the Arab and<br />
Muslim youth through the Internet as kind of an “open university for jihad stu<strong>di</strong>es,”<br />
and thus its main activity is the indoctrinating of a generation, not only terrorist<br />
operations.<br />
Four major elements are taking place in motivating, fee<strong>di</strong>ng, and hotwiring this<br />
phenomenon:<br />
• Sense of global conspiracy against the Islamic world.<br />
• Sense of the apocalypse in the “clash of cultures.”<br />
• The search for symmetry with the enemy in every field of the clash, wh<strong>il</strong>e the<br />
50
definition of the enemy is flexible and expanded, as happens primar<strong>il</strong>y in Iraq.<br />
• <strong>Jihad</strong> as a doctrine of self-defense and hence, every doctrine or Modus Operan<strong>di</strong><br />
is religiously justified.<br />
The most important of them, at least in the level of the religious nature and<br />
interpretation of this clash, is the apocalyptic one. It seems to be shaping the whole<br />
mindset of the culture of modern <strong>Jihad</strong>is.<br />
1. <strong>Jihad</strong> movements in their own eyes<br />
On the grounds of the afore mentioned, it is interesting to see the Islamist view and<br />
definition of the global jihad movement, and the terms they use. The best possible<br />
definition has been written by Omar Mahmoud Abu Omar “Abu Qutada,” a<br />
Palestinian resi<strong>di</strong>ng in London since 1993, and one of the main ideologues of this<br />
phenomenon. In an article titled “The comprehension of the civ<strong>il</strong>izational view and<br />
the duty of jihad” 36 from his colloection of “Articles between two Doctrines”(Maqalat<br />
bayn Minhajain) he wrote:<br />
When we talk about the jihad movements in the Islamic world we mean those groups<br />
and organizations that were established in order to eliminate the ev<strong>il</strong> (Taghutiyyah)<br />
heretic (Kafirah) regimes in the apostate countries (B<strong>il</strong>ad al-Riddah), and to revive the<br />
Islamic government that w<strong>il</strong>l gather the nation under the Islamic Chaliphate.<br />
But, the “True jihad movements” <strong>di</strong>ffer from the variety of other Islamic groups that<br />
act in the various Muslim countries and seek political legitimacy of the “heretic”<br />
regimes. In such case, the conflict between these last groups and the government is<br />
36 Omar Abu Omar “Abu Qatada al-F<strong>il</strong>astini”, “Shumuliyat al-Ru’ya al-Hadhariyyah wa-Far<strong>di</strong>yyat al-<strong>Jihad</strong>”,<br />
Maqalat Bayn Minhajayn (Articles between two Doctrines). The book is a collection of 98 articles he wrote in 1994,<br />
in which he presented his worldview. There is no information whether it has been published in hard copy. The<br />
articles are ava<strong>il</strong>able on-line in the web site of his Palestinian colleague Abu Muhammad al-Maq<strong>di</strong>si --<br />
http://www.tawhed.ws/a?i=3<br />
51
etween a Muslim regime and its citizens, and not between “Heretic and apostate<br />
state and a group that seeks to eliminate and change it”.<br />
Another important definition, accor<strong>di</strong>ng to Abu Qutada is:<br />
It is very important to note that the jihad movements are not those that carry<br />
weapons or believe only in using it. This is a mistaken view of many of the jihad<br />
youth. The jihad movement is the one that posseses the comprehensive civ<strong>il</strong>izational<br />
view, that comes from the perception of true unity [of Allah] (Tawhid) on its both<br />
parts: the unity of serving (`Ibadah) and following (Ittiba`) the Lord. The one that has<br />
an historic <strong>di</strong>mension… and future view of a world totally controled by Islam.<br />
Abu Qutada suggested a new term: the jihad movement of future hope (Al-Harakah<br />
al-<strong>Jihad</strong>iyyat al-Amal), which is:<br />
A movement of Salafi worldview, perceptions, doctrines, and way; totally cleansed<br />
from any remains of the Sufi wrong doctrine; does not belong to any school or trend<br />
besides that of the Qur’an and Sunna… If we acknowledge that, we can see that the<br />
present jihad movements in the Islamic world has not reached these expectations of<br />
future hope, but they are in the right path.<br />
Abu Qutada criticized all the movements that named themselves jihad movements,<br />
even the revivalist Salafiyyah movement in Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia, led by the scholars Safar al-<br />
Hawali and Salman al-Awdah. In his opinion, these groups and their <strong>di</strong>rect conflicts<br />
with their governments, are doomed to fa<strong>il</strong>, like other groups in the past. The<br />
solution is, therefore, not in fighting for jihad in their homelands:<br />
What I mean is that these [<strong>Jihad</strong>i] movements should open new arenas for the jihad<br />
outside their countries. Such a place could serve for preparations only, or, if there is<br />
hope for achieving the expected goal in a certain place – then, the jihad movement<br />
should view itself as one unit, since the nature of the conflict is of a battle. The<br />
commander is the one who can achieve this target, or benefit from the circumstances.<br />
The other [leaders] even if they were older and preceded him, should join this new<br />
hope and help him. They should serve as sol<strong>di</strong>ers of the new commander…<br />
52
From this it is obvious that the jihad movements are those that are progressing in its<br />
understan<strong>di</strong>ng of Islam and are the hope.<br />
The description or vision of Abu Qutada, written in 1994, is that of the front of al-<br />
Qa’ida under Osama Bin La<strong>di</strong>n: various groups that left their homelands; gathered in<br />
Afghanistan, where the prospects/hopes for establishing their vision of true Islamic<br />
state came true due to the Taliban regime; gave their loyalty and confidence to a new<br />
commander, Bin La<strong>di</strong>n; and launched a global struggle against what they perceived<br />
as their definition of “Axis of Ev<strong>il</strong>”— the United States and the Jews.<br />
2. Muslim Ra<strong>di</strong>calization in the West<br />
New and larger bases of Islamist ra<strong>di</strong>calism and terrorism seem to be developing in<br />
Muslim communities in Europe and North America. The notion is of global jihad as a<br />
religious duty, aimed at a perceived global conspiracy against Islam as a religion,<br />
culture, and a way of life. Another cause is the emerging doctrine of the “non-<br />
territorial Islamic state.” This doctrine views Muslim communities as a kind of loose-<br />
knit Islamic state, though without the territorial and religious mission of<br />
reestablishing a Kh<strong>il</strong>afah. Islamic scholars in the United Kingdom have long<br />
provided the impetus for this view by emphasizing the cultural, economic, and<br />
political consolidation of these Muslim communities. Furthermore, the democratic<br />
and liberal environment of Western countries fostered Islamic pluralism, giving free<br />
rein to the activities of many <strong>di</strong>fferent groups reflecting many <strong>di</strong>fferent trends of<br />
Islamic thought. Despite this pluralism, however, many of these groups went on<br />
carrying the the fundamentalist banner of many of the Islamic movements in their<br />
homelands.<br />
53
The interaction in the West between Muslim immigrants from various countries,<br />
cultures and ideologies, has grately fac<strong>il</strong>itated the growth of the Kh<strong>il</strong>afah doctrine.<br />
Such interaction has promoted both solidarity and a shared sense of a global threat to<br />
Islam and the Muslims. These factors have in turn led to the doctrine of global jihad<br />
and to the brotherhood felt by its adherents. As the worldwide investigations since<br />
the September 11 attacks and the al-Qa’ida terrorist network has shown, this new<br />
doctrine of brotherhood resulted in a new operational development—the<br />
establishment of multinational and multiorganizational terrorist cells among Muslim<br />
immigrants in the West. Apparently, some of these cells in Europe were, just as<br />
responsible for planning and carrying out these attacks as their commanders and<br />
leaders in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere.<br />
Another emerging development among Islamist groups is the ra<strong>di</strong>calism brought on<br />
by social <strong>il</strong>ls and alienation—that is, terrorism motivated primar<strong>il</strong>y by elements such<br />
as xenophobia (both by and against Muslims), growing unemployment, economic<br />
circumstances, <strong>di</strong>fficulties in coping with Western modernization, the changing and<br />
<strong>di</strong>smantling of tra<strong>di</strong>tional values and fam<strong>il</strong>y ties, and so forth. For example, in an<br />
unsigned 1991 article appearing in its main journal, the Palestinian Hamas offered<br />
the following best introduction of sorts to the doctrine of global jihad:<br />
The whole world is persecuting you and the satanic powers ambush you. The whole<br />
world is your front, and do not exclude yourself from the confrontation… The life of<br />
misery [keeps] you from the meaning of life and [turns] your life into death. You live<br />
as a dead man. . . We stand today in a crossroad: life or death, but life without<br />
martyrdom [is] death. Look for death and you are given life. 37<br />
This rhetoric would clearly appeal to those already afflicted by a sense of<br />
hopelessness or resentment. The implicit alienation in such statements becomes all<br />
the more striking when one considers that the September 11 hijackers lived in<br />
relative comfort in the United States for long periods of time before carrying out their<br />
operation, yet were apparently undeterred from their plans. The same applies to<br />
37 "`Ars al-Shahadah,"F<strong>il</strong>astin al-Muslimah”, no. 9 (September 1991), p. 63.<br />
54
many of the <strong>Jihad</strong>i volunteers to the <strong>Jihad</strong>i insurgency in Iraq, or supporters of global<br />
jihad in many other places. Of course, other groups of immigrants are susceptible to<br />
social <strong>il</strong>ls as well. Yet, the growing Islamist activity among Muslim immigrants,<br />
along with their shared notion of global struggle against the West, have encouraged<br />
a more rapid spread of ra<strong>di</strong>cal doctrines among younger Muslim generations.<br />
Furthermore, the prof<strong>il</strong>es of many of the people arrested in the West since the<br />
September 11 attack—most on suspicion of links to al-Qa’ida —are quite <strong>di</strong>fferent<br />
from those of the typical Arab extremists in Afghanistan. The former are generally<br />
more educated and fam<strong>il</strong>iar with Western culture. Yet, instead of using this<br />
fam<strong>il</strong>iarity for personal benefits and for greater integration with Western culture, as<br />
their fathers <strong>di</strong>d in the past, these “terrorists of alienation” hold on to their host<strong>il</strong>ity<br />
and exploit the weaknesses of the societies in which they reside.<br />
This process is not new in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Many university students<br />
and graduates tend to adopt ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islamic positions and fight the regimes of their<br />
homelands as a result of their strong social awareness. In many cases they view<br />
themselves as social elites who must sacrifice themselves for the sake of their society.<br />
This sense does not change when they live outside their homelands. Their ra<strong>di</strong>cal<br />
positions are also a result of various ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islamist trends that developed in the<br />
1960s and 1970s. During this period, under the influence of the Egyptian ideologue<br />
Sayyed Qutb, social justice became the key criterion by which Islamists began to<br />
judge their ruling elites and to acuse some of fac<strong>il</strong>itating Western culture’s<br />
conspiracy against Islam. Therefore, some of these ra<strong>di</strong>cals <strong>di</strong>d not necessar<strong>il</strong>y fit<br />
what was then the prof<strong>il</strong>e of the typical Islamist—that is, one whose religious<br />
observation is total.<br />
This sense of social mission is equally visible among Islamists who have left their<br />
homelands. Many such emigrants have sought to preserve in entirety their<br />
homeland culture, unlike previous generations, who <strong>di</strong>d their best to adopt the<br />
cultures of their new environments. This element has in turn fac<strong>il</strong>itated the<br />
globalization of the jihad. At the root of this phenomenon lies the inab<strong>il</strong>ity of many<br />
55
Muslims to cope with the technological, cultural, or economic aspects of Western<br />
modernization. Many of them blame this fa<strong>il</strong>ure on the secular cultures and<br />
ideologies that have influenced various modern Middle Eastern regimes; thus they<br />
look for salvation in a return to the glorious past of Islam. Since orthodox Islam is<br />
identified with Islamic establishments whose source of power is these regimes, many<br />
Muslims now support those who represent the opposite culture: the ra<strong>di</strong>cal activists<br />
who opposes the national state and its interpretation of Islam.<br />
3. The globalization of the Islamist struggle<br />
The prospects for cooperation between various Islamist groups have improved<br />
during the past decade—and particularly over the past two years—for several<br />
reasons. Chief among them was the fall of the Soviet Union. Islamists perceived this<br />
collapse as a victory over “The Kingdom of Ev<strong>il</strong>” and as an historic step toward the<br />
global triumph of Islam and the Muslims. Twelve years earlier, the success of the<br />
Islamic revolution in Iran had been viewed in a sim<strong>il</strong>ar fashion—it gave even the<br />
Sunni Islamic groups a revolutionary Islamic mo<strong>del</strong>, although they had many<br />
reservations about its content. The Soviet collapse, however, heralded a new stage in<br />
the global war between Islam and Western culture.<br />
This fall served also as a reminder that the global conspiracy against Islam—the one<br />
political and cultural perception that all Islamist groups held in common—st<strong>il</strong>l<br />
existed. The United States had become the sole lea<strong>di</strong>ng force in this conspiracy,<br />
though and a more dangerous one than the Soviet Union. To Islamists, the United<br />
States represents the lea<strong>di</strong>ng edge of the Western threat to the Islamic world, not so<br />
much through its m<strong>il</strong>itary force or political colonialism, but rather through its<br />
cultural influence.<br />
56
Islamists also viewed this collapse as a consequence of their contribution to the<br />
Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, and many Arab volunteers in that war sought to<br />
continue the momentum of their victory in other places. Hence, a pattern Islamist<br />
involvement emerged in various religious-national conflicts around the world:<br />
Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan, Macedonia, Kashmir, and elsewhere.<br />
The war in Iraq and the <strong>Jihad</strong>i insurgency that follows it, served also as a waking call<br />
for other <strong>di</strong>sputes, within the Muslim world itself, primar<strong>il</strong>y the Sunni-Shi`i one.<br />
Many observers have come to view this phenomenon of “Afghan Arabs,” “Arab<br />
Chechens,” or Arab volunteers in Iraq—what the Islamists call Ansar—as a kind of<br />
“Islamist Internacional,” sim<strong>il</strong>ar in many ways to the “International Brigades” of<br />
socialist and communist volunteers in the Spanish civ<strong>il</strong> war during the 1930s. <strong>Jihad</strong><br />
was no longer simply a matter of separate groups fighting to defeat the secular<br />
regimes in their homelands and to establish a “true” Islamic state; it has become a<br />
war against “Satanic” and “Crusader” forces worldwide. As the scope of nationalist<br />
and religious conflict expanded beyond the Israeli-Palestinian arena and into various<br />
parts of Europe and Asia, the center of Islamist struggle moved from the Arab world<br />
to the margins of the Middle East. From the Balkans to the Ph<strong>il</strong>ippines, Malaysia, and<br />
East Timor, the globalization of Islamist movements eventually consolidated in<br />
Afghanistan, the meeting point between Arab and Asian Islamists.<br />
This trend was compounded by two phenomena: the oppression that most Arab<br />
regimes brought to bear on various Islamist groups and in<strong>di</strong>viduals, and the growing<br />
Muslim population in the Western World, mainly in Europe and North-America.<br />
Many of the Islamists who survived persecution in their homelands were pushed to<br />
find refuge in “the lands of the enemy”, where they found democracy, liberal<br />
attitude, political asylum, freedom of activity and speech, and even citizenship. The<br />
growing Muslim population in these lands provided Islamists with a sympathetic<br />
environment for their political and religious rhetoric, fundraising efforts,<br />
publications, communications, recruitment, and so forth.<br />
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4. The Ideology of <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong><br />
All of these factors have given rise to new ideological trends that have fac<strong>il</strong>itated the<br />
growth of Islamist terrorist activity outside the Middle East. For example, the<br />
continuance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has marked by the permanent rise of<br />
religious elements in it, as exemplified by the broad support for Hamas and the<br />
renewal of the <strong>di</strong>spute over Jerusalem. This trend eventually expanded to<br />
Afghanistan and other areas of interfaith conflict, thus creating the social, political<br />
and ideological common ground for operational cooperation among various Islamist<br />
networks, and for the exchange of doctrines that resulted in a new ideology of <strong>Global</strong><br />
jihad. This ideology has developed not only among groups of ex<strong>il</strong>es and warlords in<br />
Muslim countries, but also among growing numbers of Islamist sympathizers,<br />
scholars and organizations in Muslim communities in the West.<br />
Another term for this new consolidation of several existing doctrines—“The Islamic<br />
Salafist fighting movement” (Al-Harakah al-Islamiyyah al-Salafiyyah al-mujahidah)—was<br />
coined by one of the lea<strong>di</strong>ng proponenets, the Palestinian Abu Qatadah. In one of his<br />
books he promoted the idea that Islamists should fight in every place possible:<br />
“The <strong>Jihad</strong>i movements… should open new places for jihad other than their<br />
countries. Such places could be just for preparations and planing, or for operating in<br />
order to achieve the expected object. In this case the <strong>Jihad</strong>i movement should view<br />
itself [as] one united unit, since the nature of the conflict is of a war”. 38<br />
One specific fighting strategy that has been granted legitimacy in certain Muslim<br />
circles worldwide is the use of suicide terrorism, whether in Lebanon, Israel, eastern<br />
Africa, Kashmir, Chechnya, Yemen, the United States, London, Iraq, or elsewhere.<br />
Islamic support and legitimacy for this method became most apparent in Apr<strong>il</strong> 2001,<br />
when a huge wave of host<strong>il</strong>e greeted Sau<strong>di</strong> grand mufti Shaikh Abd al-Aziz bin<br />
38 Omar Abu Omar “Abu Qatadah”, Al-<strong>Jihad</strong> wal-Ijtihad, p. 39. The book is ava<strong>il</strong>able on-line in:<br />
www.almaqdese.com/abuqatada.jihad.zip<br />
58
Abdallah Aal al-Shaikh’s fatwa (Islamic ruling) against it 39 . Since it was issued by the<br />
chief Sau<strong>di</strong> religious authority, this stance was likely intended to forestall possible<br />
suicide operations in the Kingdom, but it had some larger, unintended effects as<br />
well. The principal criticism of his fatwa came in the form of massive Arab and<br />
Islamic support for suicide operations by Palestinians against Israel, and for many<br />
people, this support quickly expanded to include any suicide operation in the name<br />
of Islam.<br />
This same phenomenon was apparent in the contra<strong>di</strong>ctory Islamic rulings that were<br />
issued following the September 11 attacks in the United States 40 . The subsequent<br />
American attack on Afghanistan and Iraq, and the U.S. efforts to create a wide<br />
coalition of support in the Arab and Muslim worlds generated sim<strong>il</strong>ar debates, much<br />
like the Gulf War had in 1991. These debates in turn fostered a measure of support<br />
and legitimacy within the Islamic establishments for Islamist terrorist groups and<br />
their means of struggle. Secular regimes often demand that their religious<br />
establishment oppose Islamist terrorism, but many clerics tend to legitimize violence<br />
against Israel and the Western world. In some cases, these <strong>di</strong>sputes reflect internal<br />
conflicts between the religious and political establishments, such as in Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia,<br />
Egypt, and Pakistan. In such cases the Islamic establishments appeals to the notion of<br />
public and popular hatred of the West or Western culture, calling for revenge against<br />
Westerners as those who are responsible for social problems in the Muslim world.<br />
Another important element in this trend of doctrinal consolidation was the recent<br />
adoption of the Palestinian cause by many Islamist groups that had fa<strong>il</strong>ed to embrace<br />
it in the past. Furthermore, many Palestinian Islamist scholars have been intensely<br />
involved in the development of the new ideology, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng: Dr. Abdallah Azzam in<br />
Afghanistan, the spiritual father of the idea of al-Qa’ida; Sheikh Issam al-Burqawi<br />
39 On the Sau<strong>di</strong> Fatwa and the reaction toward it, see Reuven Paz, The Sau<strong>di</strong> Fatwa against Suicide Terrorism,<br />
PEACEWATCH No. 323, May 2 nd 2001, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.<br />
40 For example, see the religious arguments of Anti-Western rhetoric of one Sau<strong>di</strong> Sheikh in Fatwa on Recent<br />
Events by Shaykh Humud al-'Uqla al-Shuaibi. Both the fatwa and accompanying commentary are also ava<strong>il</strong>able online:<br />
http://www.sunnahonline.com/<strong>il</strong>m/contemporary/0017.htm<br />
59
Abu Muhammad al-Maq<strong>di</strong>si in Jordan; the already mentioned Abu Qutada in<br />
London; and Dr. Fathi Shqaqi in the Palestinian territories, who introduced to the<br />
Sunni Arab world the global aspirations of Islamic revolutionary Iran and the<br />
doctrines of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. They were joined by a number of Sau<strong>di</strong>-<br />
Wahhabi oppositionist scholars and Egyptian <strong>Jihad</strong>i-Takfiri scholars. Thus, the new<br />
ideology took on the <strong>di</strong>mensions of a global terrorist struggle, justified by the<br />
perception that the jihad, like the Palestinian struggle, was an act of self-defense<br />
against a Western-Jewish global conspiracy.<br />
Although the September 11 attacks sparked a world-wide investigation into this<br />
seemingly new phenomenon of global jihad, the ideological and operational roots of<br />
these attacks had developed decades earlier. The historical <strong>di</strong>mension is therefore<br />
essential to understan<strong>di</strong>ng the present implications of this phenomenon and the<br />
prospects of countering it. The roots of <strong>Global</strong> jihad lie in the collaboration of<br />
Egyptian and Palestinian Islamic jihad during the late 1970s and early 1980s; in the<br />
flow of Arab volunteers of <strong>di</strong>fferent nationalities to Afghanistan during the 1980s; in<br />
the flow of volunteers from all over the Arab and Muslim world to Bosnia, Albania,<br />
Kosovo, and Chechnya during the 1990s, and to Iraq in the 2000s; in the massive<br />
terrorism against Israel over the past three decades; in the extensive massacres in<br />
Algeria during the 1990s; and in the growing support for Islamist doctrines during<br />
the 1990s, particularly among certain social, cultural, and welfare foundations,<br />
charity funds, and research institutes, in the West, many of which served as fronts for<br />
other activities.<br />
Thus, any investigation of, for example, the complicated Islamist terrorist networks<br />
in Europe should first consider the protocols of the Egyptian courts in the trials of the<br />
various Islamists who returned from Bosnia and Albania in the 1990s. One should<br />
also consider the ideologies and doctrines expressed in the writings, speeches, and<br />
interviews of Islamist scholars in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Egypt, the Palestinian<br />
territories, and less obvious places (e.g., London).<br />
At first glance, the doctrines of ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islamists might appear to constitute a major<br />
60
enovation of orthodox religious ideas and principles. Yet, their roots do not change<br />
at all; these groups continue to rely on the fundamental doctrines that were<br />
developed in the Arab world during the 1960s and the 1970s. Even in other regions of<br />
the world—Europe, North America, and Central and Southeast Asia—the lea<strong>di</strong>ng<br />
elements of Islamists primar<strong>il</strong>y Arabs, who have exported the basic elements and<br />
interpretations of the renaissance of ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islam that began in the 1970s.<br />
Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to Russian observers, for example, the Arab element in Chechnya is the<br />
principal force fighting the Russians there. The importance of the Arab element has<br />
become even more apparent in the wake of September 11 attacks; many of the<br />
hundreds of people arrested worldwide during the post-attack investigation were<br />
Arabs, and during the last phase of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the “Arab<br />
Afghans”—members of al-Qa’ida or its front groups—were the last forces to fight the<br />
opposition Northern Allience, even after the Taliban surrendered.<br />
Thus, the growth of the global jihad movement has not been dependent on ra<strong>di</strong>cal<br />
religious revisionism; in many cases, Islamists have had the greatest ideological<br />
influence on those Muslims whose religious knowledge is poor. As a consequence of<br />
social pressures, such Muslims tend to emphasize social and political confrontation<br />
in their actions rather than religious rules or norms. The basic, albeit ra<strong>di</strong>cal,<br />
ideology of jihad as ordered by the Prophet is therefore appealing to many of them.<br />
In recent cases against members of al-Qa’ida and various Egyptian terrorist groups,<br />
U.S. prosecutors claimed that this element has been exploited by Bin Laden and his<br />
allied groups through international companies and relief organizations that served as<br />
fronts; some of these fronts communicated regularly with U.S. residences through<br />
faxes, satellite phones, and coded letters. 41<br />
The simplistic understan<strong>di</strong>ng of jihad is perhaps best <strong>il</strong>lustrated in the letter carried<br />
by the suicide hijackers of September 11. 42 The letter <strong>di</strong>rected them to do the<br />
41 The New York Times, 23 January 2000.<br />
42 Copies of this letter—which was probably written by the suspected leader of the operation, Muhammad Atta—<br />
were found among the remains of three of the planes that crashed in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. An<br />
English translation of the text is provided in Appen<strong>di</strong>x 2. The original Arabic text was published by the FBI on<br />
September 28, 2001(see www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/letter.htm).<br />
61
following on the morning of the operation:<br />
Tighten up your clothes [for] this is the medal of the righteous predecessors… They<br />
used to tighten up their clothes before battle... And do not forget to take some of the<br />
booty, even a cup … of water to gratify yourself and your companions [another norm<br />
of the Prophet].<br />
In other words, the hijackers were supposed to view themselves throughout the<br />
operation as if they had returned to the seventh century, as Companions of the<br />
Prophet (Sahabah). The tone of the letter is one of men preparing themselves for battle<br />
in the manner of ancient warriors, not for a suicide operation against unarmed<br />
airplane passengers. The enemy in question is not an in<strong>di</strong>vidual country—neither<br />
“the United States” nor “America” are named even once in the letter—but rather a<br />
“civ<strong>il</strong>ization of <strong>di</strong>sbelievers” or, more often, an amorphous, faceless ev<strong>il</strong>.<br />
This basic understan<strong>di</strong>ng of Islam has become an initiation of sorts for adherents of<br />
global jihad. They tend to adopt norms of behavior that are simple to understand,<br />
and these norms in turn create a basis for unity among <strong>di</strong>fferent groups and<br />
in<strong>di</strong>viduals, thus sidestepping the <strong>di</strong>fficult terrain of ideological and theological<br />
interpretation. In past decades, Islamists in the Arab and Muslim worlds tended to<br />
split into numerous factions, generally on ideological grounds. Now, however, their<br />
tendency is to put ideological conflicts aside and cooperate on a far more practical<br />
basis--their duties within the wide framework of jihad. The dominance of the Arab<br />
element in most Islamist groups has fac<strong>il</strong>itated this consolidation.<br />
5 . Al-Qa’ida: the doctrine of Brotherhood of <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong><br />
The most famous example of this trend—certainly not, as many believe, the only<br />
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example—is Bin Laden's group al-Qa’ida (The base). This group developed from the<br />
civ<strong>il</strong>ian and social infrastructure of the Afghan groups that fought against the Soviet<br />
Union in 1980-89, called "Maktab al-Khidamat” (The Office for Services). This office—<br />
established by Dr. Abdallah Azzam, a Palestinian who moved to Afghanistan from<br />
Jordan in 1980—gave the Afghan groups of mujahed<strong>di</strong>n a religious, cultural, and<br />
social basis for their struggle. In Apr<strong>il</strong> 1988, Azzam published an article in the<br />
magazine Al-<strong>Jihad</strong>—the central organ of the Afghan groups, one that he founded and<br />
e<strong>di</strong>ted—called "The Solid Base" (Al-Qa’idah al-Sulbah), 43 which laid the groundwork<br />
for the new group al-Qa’ida. Toward the end of his article, Azzam left a kind of a<br />
prophecy, one which seems to have come true in the years that followed:<br />
“Now America is trying to grab the fruits of this great jihad and to rule without<br />
recourse to Allah’s book. Accor<strong>di</strong>ngly, the solid base (Al-Qa’idah al-Sulbah) has to face<br />
international pressures and temptations from all over the world. But they refused to<br />
bow their heads before the storm. They decided to continue their march along a path<br />
of sweat, tears, and blood.<br />
Sim<strong>il</strong>arly, in an important book he first published in 1984, 44 Azzam wrote:<br />
It is about time to think about a state that would be a solid base for the <strong>di</strong>stribution of<br />
the [Islamic] creed, and a fortress to protect the preachers from the hell of the<br />
Jah<strong>il</strong>iyyah [the pre-Islamic period].<br />
This description rea<strong>di</strong>ly fits the Afghanistan and parts of Iraq of recent years—the<br />
solid base for those fighting against the West.<br />
Azzam’s implicit theme was the establishment of an Islamic army, with the Afghani<br />
struggle against the Soviets as its modern mo<strong>del</strong> and the fight of Muhammad the<br />
Prophet and his companions, its old one. The idea was to create a pioneering<br />
generation of fighters who would prepare themselves for a constant struggle against<br />
the West and its allies in the Muslim World. His mo<strong>del</strong> was not the Muslim world<br />
43 Al-<strong>Jihad</strong> 41 (Apr<strong>il</strong> 1988), p. 46.<br />
44 Aayat al-Rahman fi <strong>Jihad</strong> al-Afghan [The <strong>di</strong>vine miracles in the Afghan <strong>Jihad</strong>] (several e<strong>di</strong>tions since 1984 and a<br />
revised e<strong>di</strong>tion in 1988). Ava<strong>il</strong>able on-line in: http://www.tawhed.ws/a?i=77<br />
63
ut the Afghan scene. Wh<strong>il</strong>e visiting the United States in 1988, in order to recruit<br />
American Muslims for the fight in Afghanistan, Azzam described the Afghan<br />
mujahed<strong>di</strong>n as the sublime mo<strong>del</strong> of Islamic fighters who would lead the Muslim<br />
world toward a kind of eternal struggle against the ev<strong>il</strong> powers of Western culture. 45<br />
Another important element in the theory of al-Qa’ida was the sense of elitism that<br />
characterized this vanguard army. This elitism was spurred by two branches of Islam<br />
that had developed in Egypt and Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia long before—Takfir (refutation) and<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>cal Wahhabism. Many of the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n in Afghanistan and later on in Iraq—<br />
especially those who came from other countries, either as ex<strong>il</strong>es or on a voluntary<br />
basis—adopted the Takfir principles of creating an isolated society of true Muslims<br />
and waging jihad against the rest. They also seized upon the extreme brand of<br />
Wahhabism practiced in the 1930s by the Wahhabi Ikhwan zealots, who settled on<br />
the borders of the new Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabian kingdom and developed ra<strong>di</strong>cal ideas that<br />
were counter to the rest of their society. Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to Abdallah Azzam the only way<br />
to consolidate all of these ideas was through protracted jihad. As Omar Abu Omar<br />
put it in, “The only legitimate state that could represent the correct nature of Islam<br />
and rely on its essence, is the state that would be established through the armed<br />
struggle of jihad”. 46<br />
Azzam’s “Solid base” article is sim<strong>il</strong>ar to others published in the late 1970s and early<br />
1980s in two Islamic magazines—Al-Mukhtar al-Islami [The Islamic assortment] in<br />
Cairo and Al-Tali`ah al-Islamiyyah [The Islamic Vanguard] in London. The lea<strong>di</strong>ng<br />
e<strong>di</strong>tors of these magazines were Dr. Fathi Shqaqi and Dr. Bashir Nafi` (who used the<br />
name of Ahmad Sa<strong>di</strong>q), the co-founders of the Palestinian Islamic <strong>Jihad</strong>. Wh<strong>il</strong>e<br />
studying me<strong>di</strong>cine in Egypt, they were in close contact with the founders of the<br />
Egyptian Islamic <strong>Jihad</strong> and the Egyptian Islamic Groups (Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyyah) 47 .<br />
Initially, Shqaqi and Nafi` tended to focus on the Palestinian issue, as opposed to<br />
45 Exerpts from Azzam’s presentations in American mosques can be viewed in Steve Emerson’s 1994 PBS<br />
documentary, <strong>Jihad</strong> in America.<br />
46 Omar Abu Omar “Abu Qatadah”, Al-<strong>Jihad</strong> wal-Ijtihad, p. 58.<br />
47 On the relations between the Palestinian and Egyptian <strong>Jihad</strong> groups, see: Anwar Abd al-Ha<strong>di</strong> Abu Taha,<br />
Harakat al-<strong>Jihad</strong> al-Islami fi F<strong>il</strong>astin, chapter 2, on the official web site of Palestinian Islamic <strong>Jihad</strong>:<br />
www.qudsway.com/Links/Jehad/4/Html_Jehad4/<strong>Jihad</strong>bolkhtml/4hje1-3.htm<br />
64
Azzam, who focused on the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n in Afghanistan. From 1996 on, however,<br />
Osama bin Laden worked to combine these two Islamic struggles, in an effort to<br />
make the Palestinian issue the most unifying element of the global jihad. In his long<br />
"Declaration of War against the American Occupying the Land of the Two Holy<br />
Places", a Fatwa first published in the London-based Al-Sharq al-Awsat in August<br />
1996, 48 , Bin Laden stated:<br />
"My Muslim Brothers of the World, your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the<br />
two Holy Places [Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia] are calling your help and asking you to take part in<br />
fighting against the enemy--your enemy and their enemy--the Americans and the<br />
Israelis… Our Lord, the people of the Cross had come to with their horses and<br />
occupied the land of the two Holy places, and the Zionist Jews fiddling as they wish<br />
with Al-Aqsa Mosque, the route of the ascendance of the messenger of Allah. Our<br />
Lord, shatter their gathering, <strong>di</strong>vide them, shake the earth under their feet and give<br />
us control over them".<br />
The struggle against the Crusader-Jewish conspiracy was the main theme of another<br />
Bin Laden Fatwa, the "World Islamic Front for the <strong>Jihad</strong> against the Jews and the<br />
Crusaders", first published in the London-based Al-Quds al-Arabi on February 23 rd<br />
1998. 49 This time, however, Bin Laden was joined by the leaders of Egyptian Islamic<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>, the Egyptian Islamic Groups, Jamiat-ul-ulema-e-Pakistan (Association of<br />
Pakistani clerics), and the Islamic movement of Bangladesh.<br />
The union of the Islamic world, the Afghan base, and the Palestinian struggle, was<br />
the center of Bin Laden's famous interview on Al-Jazirah television following the first<br />
American attack on Afghanistan in early October 2001. Yet, the ideology of global<br />
jihad —a combination of jihad, Takfir, and Wahhabism—had been developed many<br />
years prior to the creation of its global terrorist infrastructure.<br />
48 Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), 23 February 1998. Several English translations are ava<strong>il</strong>able on line (e.g. see<br />
www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html and<br />
www.azzam.com/html/articlesdeclaration.htm)<br />
49 English translation ava<strong>il</strong>able on-line<br />
(www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html).<br />
65
6. Muslim Communities in the West: the infrastructure of <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong><br />
Long before the establishment of groups like al-Qa’ida, Islamic and Islamist<br />
movements regularly spoke of conspiracy against Islam and advocated attacks on the<br />
United States, Israel, and Western Culture. Anti-Western and anti-Jewish feelings<br />
have long proliferated in the Muslim world, even among groups and regimes. A<br />
major new element that arose in the past decade, however, was the Islamists’ success<br />
in translating the doctrine of <strong>Global</strong> jihad into efficient terrorist activity, and popular<br />
support for jihad in the form of terrorism. This element was made possible by their<br />
inf<strong>il</strong>tration of Muslim communities in the West, which provided them with essential<br />
ideological and financial support.<br />
Yet, Western-based support for Islamist groups, which is so vital to their success<br />
worldwide, cannot be fully understood without some analysis of the social and<br />
psychological factors underlying the Islamic sociopolitical renaissance in the Muslim<br />
world.<br />
Over the past three decades, Islamic and Islamist movements have been able to plant<br />
their notion of global cultural war in Arab and Muslim societies, convincing many in<br />
the region that Islam is under attack. Thus, concepts synonymous in Western<br />
political culture with terrorism—such as jihad, Takfir (refutation or ex-<br />
communication), Istishhad (Martyrdom, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng by suicide), and Shahid (Martyr)—<br />
are now commonly viewed by many in the Islamic world as religious duties. The<br />
central feeling among most Islamists—from those who carry out terrorist acts to<br />
those who provide a supportive atmosphere for such activity—is that of being under<br />
siege. Thus, all means of self-defense are justified in their eyes, particularly when<br />
these means are granted religious legitimacy.<br />
Islamist movements have also succeeded in convincing many in the Muslim world<br />
that they represent the true contemporary interpretation of Islam. Yet, most of these<br />
movements developed out of a perceived need to return to the earliest fundamentals<br />
66
of Islam. Thus, they based their views on Islamic scholars like Ibn Hanbal and Ibn<br />
Taymiyyah of the Middle ages, and Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab of the eighteenth Century,<br />
all of whom were the most unyiel<strong>di</strong>ng fundamentalist religious scholars of their<br />
time.<br />
The religious success of the Islamists lies in the basic <strong>di</strong>versity of Islam, and in the<br />
lack of a central Islamic authority that enjoys both the confidence of the majority of<br />
the Muslim public and control over the religious establishments in in<strong>di</strong>vidual<br />
countries. Such establishments are viewed by large parts of the Muslim public as<br />
puppets of the modern secular state (`Ulama’ al-Salatin), whose interpretations and<br />
rulings conform to the interests of their regimes. Thus, Islamists have become the<br />
spiritual guides for a large portion of the Islamic population, and maintain a great<br />
deal of power and influence.<br />
Given this influence, most of the Islamic movements that emerged over the past<br />
several decades have worked to portray Arab and Muslim regimes—in some cases<br />
rightfully—as symbols of arbitrary oppression and <strong>di</strong>stortion of the social justice that<br />
is inherent in orthodox Islam. Thus, they have gained some support as the supposed<br />
protectors of the weaker elements of society, in many cases over those engaged in<br />
social, political, cultural and economic protest against various regimes.<br />
This Islamic sociopolitical revival, has also been linked to the formation of an<br />
educated middle class in <strong>di</strong>fferent Muslim countries, particularly since the 1960s.<br />
This middle class partly <strong>di</strong>stanced itself from the Western secular modernization and<br />
the institutions of the modern state: the m<strong>il</strong>itary, government administration, social<br />
and economic institutions controlled by the state, the public me<strong>di</strong>a, and so forth.<br />
Some in this class—mainly professionals such as physicians, lawyers, pharmacists,<br />
engineers, academic scholars, and merchants—suffered from the state’s tendency to<br />
nationalize the economy, and looked to the Islam propounded by modern Islamist<br />
movements as an ultimate solution. This phenomenon created a large and highly<br />
educated group of in<strong>di</strong>viduals who viewed themselves as a social Avant-garde and<br />
adopted various Islamic and Islamist theories as a basis for their social struggle.<br />
67
The next stage of this revival was characterized by massive activity within the<br />
existing Islamic groups, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng the formation of more ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islamist groups and<br />
the publication of new doctrines that <strong>di</strong>d not necessar<strong>il</strong>y correspond with orthodox<br />
Islam. Many of these new doctrines won many adherents during the violent<br />
struggles that accompanied these changes. As these Islamist groups gained more<br />
power and public support, they were able to attract elements de<strong>di</strong>cated to the<br />
broader struggle for human and civ<strong>il</strong> rights.<br />
Yet, aside from these <strong>di</strong>rect efforts of Islamist involvement to expand their influence,<br />
their success in both the Muslim world and the West is due to large part to what we<br />
have already described as the “Islamic atmosphere”—that is, the often in<strong>di</strong>rect<br />
framework of support created by groups that are not connected to political violence<br />
or terrorism, some of whom even publicly condemn such methods. These groups<br />
carry out the vast majority of political, social, cultural and educational work in the<br />
name of Islam, both in Muslim countries and among Muslim communities in the<br />
West. Therefore, they preserve the Islamic atmosphere in which more extremist and<br />
violent Islamist groups thrive; they serve as a greenhouse of sorts of such ra<strong>di</strong>cal<br />
groups and for the growth of views that are host<strong>il</strong>e toward the West or Western<br />
culture.<br />
Furthermore, the social, political, cultural, economic, educational, and charitable<br />
infrastructure of some of these groups serve in part as the main source of finance and<br />
support for Islamic projects that are used also as a by-product for the financing of<br />
Islamist terrorist groups. Since many of their primary activities involve consolidating<br />
Muslim communities in the West, these groups often set the grounds, inadvertently<br />
or not, for massive fundraising, political support, and even recruitment on the part<br />
of Islamist movements. In many cases, Islamic social work has become a form of<br />
social protest, against either secular Muslim regimes or Western societies, and this<br />
protest often fac<strong>il</strong>itates the activity of Islamists.<br />
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7. The Immigrant Experience<br />
All of these elements contributed to the growth of the support for jihad movements<br />
among Muslim communities in the West, and to the increasing alienation felt by<br />
many Muslims in Western societies. Hatred of foreigners in not uncommon in these<br />
societies, particularly in Europe. Furthermore, many Muslim immigrants face<br />
poverty, unemployment, <strong>di</strong>fficulties in coping with Western modernization and<br />
values, and <strong>di</strong>sintegration of their own fam<strong>il</strong>y values, all of which have encouraged<br />
significant Islamist social and political activity among them. Furthermore, Islamist<br />
groups tend to view every symbol and element of Western modern culture as part of<br />
conspiracy against Muslim culture. A Fatwa against Valentine Day, issued in<br />
February 2002 by the group of the Al-Muhajiroun in London, may serve as a good<br />
example of the <strong>di</strong>fficulties of Muslim immigrants to cope with Western culture. Even<br />
Islamic social-welfare movements, which are not part of the ra<strong>di</strong>cal trend, help to<br />
create the Islamic atmosphere that <strong>di</strong>rectly and in<strong>di</strong>rectly assists the ra<strong>di</strong>cals.<br />
The major conflicts of the 1990s—the Gulf war, Iraq’s campaign against its Kurds,<br />
and conflicts in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, and<br />
Somalia—brought waves of Muslim immigrants to Western Europe, all seeking<br />
refuge and work. Many of these immigrants entered <strong>il</strong>legally, and thus do not appear<br />
in official statistics. The United Kingdom faced its own significant increase of<br />
asylum-seekers and refugees in the second half of the 1990s, which prompted the<br />
government to announce in July 1998 “an administrative reform to clear the huge<br />
backlog of asylum applications in a parliamentary ‘White Book` called “Fairer,<br />
Faster, Firmer–a modern approach to immigration and asylum”. 50<br />
Muslim immigrants to the United States are a minority among the enormous number<br />
of immigrants from all over the world, but both American and UN statistics show a<br />
significant increase in Muslim immigration applicants over the past decade. The<br />
50 U.S. Committee for Refugees, Country Report: United Kingdom [1999]. Ava<strong>il</strong>able on-line:<br />
www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/europe/united_kingdom.htm<br />
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United Stated has long been active in seeking resettlement of refugees from areas of<br />
risk to other countries, but during the 1990s, it had to increase the admission of<br />
refugees into its own borders as well. 51 Statistics on asylum cases covered by U.S.<br />
immigration judges between 1989 and 1999 show that only 22.4 percent of the<br />
applications were approved. Yet, the majority of applications from most Muslim<br />
countries (particularly Bosnia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Iran, and Iraq), were<br />
approved. 52<br />
The increasing number of Muslim immigrants in Europe and the United States was<br />
also a result of the political violence that occurred and goes on in Muslim countries<br />
since the 1990s. In many cases these immigrants and asylum seekers had supported<br />
or been actively involved in violent activities and were thus eas<strong>il</strong>y affected by<br />
Islamist ideas once they arrived in the West.<br />
The Islamists’ increasing focus on Muslim immigrants was in part a practical move.<br />
Oftentimes, the long-term goals of Islamist groups are vague. They tend to speak in<br />
terms of an eternal global mission in accordance with the basics of orthodox Islam, in<br />
which victory, although guaranteed, w<strong>il</strong>l be achieved only in the far future. Thus,<br />
they often eschew normal political observance and are not pragmatic unless they are<br />
confronted by force, as happened in the second half of the 1990s. When Arab regimes<br />
started confronting Islamists forcefully, many terrorist groups began to demand that<br />
they be treated as legitimate political movements. This happened during 1998-99 in<br />
Egypt, Algeria, and Yemen, even affecting relations between Hamas and the<br />
Palestinian National Authority. As a result of their murderous operations, many<br />
Islamist groups experienced a significant decline of public support in their<br />
homelands. For example, the terrorist attack in Luxor on November 17 th , 1997—in<br />
which 59 tourists from various countries were gunned down—shocked both the<br />
Egyptian public and the Islamic establishment. Partly as a result of such changes,<br />
51 Steve Edminster, “UNHCR, U.S. Government Gear up to Double Refugee Admissions from the Middle East<br />
and South Asia,” Refugee Reports 20, no. 11 (December 1999). Also ava<strong>il</strong>able on-line:<br />
www.refugees.org/world/articles/unhcr_rr99_11.htm<br />
52 U.S. Committee for Refugees, Asylum Cases Decided by Immigration Judges Approved or Denied, by Selected Country<br />
of Origin [1999] [table]. Ava<strong>il</strong>able on-line: www.refugees.org/world/statistics/wrs00_table3.htm<br />
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Islamist groups began to target the growing Muslim communities in the West in<br />
order to seek support.<br />
The social changes that have occurred among Muslim communities in the West over<br />
the past two decades have also contributed to the economic success of Islamist<br />
movements. The expectations that many second- and third-generation Muslim<br />
immigrants had in the West often went unfulf<strong>il</strong>led, thus reinforcing their alienation<br />
from their Western societies. They were granted generous economic support in many<br />
countries (primar<strong>il</strong>y the United Kingdom, Scan<strong>di</strong>navia, and Germany), as well as<br />
freedom of speech, organizational support, and education. More often than not,<br />
though, it was the flood of financial support from the wealthier Muslim countries<br />
that allowed them to bu<strong>il</strong>d up, and become vocal advocates for, their own<br />
communities. Westerners’ resentment of foreigners in their midst, along with<br />
ongoing clashes of cultures and values (e.g., modernity versus tra<strong>di</strong>tion), encouraged<br />
the formation of a wide range of Islamic infrastructures, many of which thrived<br />
under Western democracy. This infrastructures have served as a potent greenhouse<br />
for Islamist movements. For example, a variety of associations in London, or research<br />
institutes in the United States, could serve as the principal front through which<br />
Islamist terrorist groups meet their <strong>di</strong>verse goals: recruitment, fundraising,<br />
publications, communications, and so forth. Thus, the growing feeling of alienation<br />
among younger Muslim generations has had far-reaching effects on the global jihad<br />
movement, and is perhaps the most important factor in analyzing the prospects of<br />
future Islamist terrorism in general, and the financing of terrorist groups.<br />
8. Hotwiring the Apocalypse<br />
The most important theme of the culture of global jihad in the 2000s, is the sense of<br />
the coming apocalypse. <strong>Jihad</strong>i apocalyptic <strong>di</strong>scourse, either by <strong>Jihad</strong>i-Salafi scholars<br />
or clerics, or by supporters of global jihad is one of the main innovations of <strong>di</strong>scourse<br />
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that followed the September 11 attacks. Waves of apocalyptic <strong>di</strong>scourse are not new<br />
in the modern Arab Islamic world. They accompanied almost every major war or<br />
<strong>di</strong>saster that occurred in the Arab World in modern times. Such major events were<br />
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the last Muslim Caliphate in 1922-24; The<br />
1948 war—the “<strong>di</strong>saster” or Nakbah in Arab and Palestinian eyes—which resulted in<br />
the establishment of the State of Israel; The 1967 war—the calamity or Naksah in Arab<br />
and Muslim eyes—which resulted in the Israeli occupation all over Palestine,<br />
Jerusalem, and Al-Aqsa mosque, and marked a hum<strong>il</strong>iating Arab defeat; The first<br />
Gulf war in 1991, following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, which marked the first<br />
round of American massive m<strong>il</strong>itary involvement in the Middle East. These wars,<br />
and some more minor events such as “Black September” and the sudden death of the<br />
wi<strong>del</strong>y admired Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Naser in September 1970, The<br />
Islamic revolution in Iran in February 1979; The Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement the<br />
same time; The Iran-Iraq war between 1980-88, or the Israeli occupation of South-<br />
Lebanon in June 1982, created waves of apocalyptic <strong>di</strong>scourse. It also gave rise to<br />
more religious sentiments and many people approached apocalyptic Arab Islamic<br />
literature, such as the most famous book of “Interpretation of Dreams” by the Arab<br />
scholar of Me<strong>di</strong>aeval times Ibn Sirrin. 53<br />
Interpretation of visions—Tafsir or Ta’w<strong>il</strong> al-Ru’a—is a legitimate science in Islam,<br />
and people tend in hard times or “historical earthquakes” to consult such old<br />
literature or living scholars who are known in this field. In modern times there are<br />
only few such persons that profess the interpretation of visions accor<strong>di</strong>ng to all the<br />
Islamic criteria and rules. It is a result of feelings of crisis, insecure, instab<strong>il</strong>ity, or fear<br />
of the future. Since all the afore-mentioned cases were a result of a sense of defeat,<br />
political instab<strong>il</strong>ity, or national and personal <strong>di</strong>sasters, a sense of doom-day or the<br />
Day of Judgment in its Islamic meaning, became widespread, and visions related to it<br />
spread among many Muslims.<br />
53 Muhammad Ibn Sirrin, Tafsir al-Ahlam al-Kabir. Ibn Sirrin lived in the 8 th century and is regarded as the biggest<br />
authority in Islamic history for interpretation of dreams and visions, after the Prophet.<br />
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The September 11 attacks, unlike the afore-mentioned events, were perceived in a<br />
totally <strong>di</strong>fferent way. This was the first time in modern Islamic history in which the<br />
West was hum<strong>il</strong>iated by such a sophisticated attack and on its own so<strong>il</strong>. It was<br />
perceived in Islamic and Western eyes as a turning point in the relations between the<br />
two parties, and a continuance of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan in 1988-89 and its<br />
final collapse in 1990. Muslims felt for the first time in their modern history as if they<br />
were going to reconstruct the spread of Islam in the 7 th century and the defeat of the<br />
Crusaders in the 12 th century. The American response was viewed also in terms of a<br />
global war and an envision of the global conspiracy against Islam and the Muslims in<br />
general, not just the “terrorists” among them.<br />
Arab rulers have always sought to link their wars to the glory of past Islamic history.<br />
The last one was Saddam Hussein in 1980-88, 1991 and 1998. Osama bin Laden <strong>di</strong>d so<br />
in his declaration of war against the Jews and the Crusaders in February 1998. Arab<br />
secular regimes have even sought to link their countries to pre-Islamic history—<br />
ancient Egypt, Babylon, or the Phoenicians—in order to provide their nationalism a<br />
long and glorified historic <strong>di</strong>mension. The late Iranian Shah linked himself to Koresh<br />
and celebrated it in 1970, with the fanciest festival ever made in the Middle East. The<br />
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is shaped by claims and aspirations derived from the<br />
Bible, the Qur’an, and earliest history of both sides. Palestinian secular scholars relate<br />
themselves to the Kananites who lived in Biblical Palestine before the Exodus of the<br />
Israelites from Egypt, thus “proving” their rights over the territory. Even the global<br />
war against <strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorism led by the United States these days, bears a notion of<br />
fundamentalist Christian aspirations of the Good against the Ev<strong>il</strong>, a kind of reflection<br />
of the Divine eternal struggle. Fundamentalist Christian preachers in the U.S. also<br />
shape the global war against <strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorism in kind of apocalyptic worldview.<br />
There is a kind of reflection of mutual jihad / Crusader war, in which history,<br />
religion, and myths, are playing major roles. Such an atmosphere is an ideal<br />
greenhouse for growing sense of the Apocalypse and apocalyptic <strong>di</strong>scourse,<br />
especially by young supporters of global jihad, who sense that the turning point of<br />
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history is in their favor. This sense of the apocalypse became the essence of the<br />
culture of modern global jihad.<br />
Elements of this culture lie in the connection and integration between apocalyptic<br />
<strong>di</strong>scourse and m<strong>il</strong>itant and violent jiha<strong>di</strong>st activity by <strong>di</strong>scussing the potential for<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>is to "hotwire" the apocalypse in such a <strong>Jihad</strong>i culture—How are Muslim clerics<br />
and scholars, past and present, propoun<strong>di</strong>ng a hotwired Apocalypse? How do<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>is see themselves as activators of the Apocalypse, and would they for example<br />
be more tempted to resort to WMD? How does WMD factor into <strong>Jihad</strong>i <strong>di</strong>scussions<br />
suggesting hotwiring?<br />
9. September 11 -- attack by “programmed terrorists”<br />
The September 11 attacks, the highlight of the <strong>Jihad</strong>i mindset so far, were carried out<br />
by a group of Arab <strong>Jihad</strong>is who were supposed to touch the “wings of early Islamic<br />
history.” They were acting as if they had been programmed to enter this mood<br />
throughout their preparations, wh<strong>il</strong>e living in the “world of the infi<strong>del</strong>s” and<br />
towards the highlight of the operation in the last day of their life. Right after the<br />
attacks, three copies were found of a hand-written letter in Arabic with instructions<br />
for the attackers. The deta<strong>il</strong>ed instructions aimed at shaping their behavior in every<br />
minute of their last day on earth. The letter reminds us in this context the description<br />
of the recruitment of Japanese suicide p<strong>il</strong>ots in World War II. The p<strong>il</strong>ots crashed their<br />
planes into the American naval ships in the Pacific Ocean in 1944 when the United<br />
States attempted to invade the Ph<strong>il</strong>ippines, which signified to the Japanese the<br />
beginning of their defeat. The description goes as follows:<br />
“There was no lack of volunteers, and there was even a waiting list… It was the<br />
desire to win wh<strong>il</strong>e striking the enemy, which brought about the decision to <strong>di</strong>e<br />
74
voluntar<strong>il</strong>y. The enthusiasm for self-sacrifice merged with cold, calculated logic.<br />
This was the basis for their recruitment and training. The battle was already lost, but<br />
the desire to <strong>di</strong>e w<strong>il</strong>lingly was ensconced. A senior officer would gather about thirty<br />
officers, and speak to them movingly about the homeland and about the need to<br />
sacrifice for its sake. He would ask to hear their answers that very evening, each<br />
officer in<strong>di</strong>vidually. Only infrequently <strong>di</strong>d one of the officers defer the honor being<br />
offered to them. It is possible that that more courage was required to stand up<br />
against this appointment than to agree to volunteer… In letters, which they left for<br />
their parents, they generally referred to their pre<strong>di</strong>cament by saying such things as:<br />
Do not mourn us; we <strong>di</strong>e happy and proud for the sake of the Caesar and victory.” 54<br />
One of the Japanese suicide p<strong>il</strong>ots, Kosonuki Masashiga, even wrote that “he hoped<br />
to be reborn several times over in order to relive the same life he lived during the<br />
war.” It is impossible not to be reminded of the same tra<strong>di</strong>tion put forward in the<br />
Ha<strong>di</strong>th by the Prophet Muhammad, of which there are several versions. Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to<br />
this tra<strong>di</strong>tion, the “Shahid’s most fervent w<strong>il</strong>l is to be reborn several times over in<br />
order to reenact the same deeds.”<br />
The identity of the author of the letter is unknown and investigators of the FBI tend<br />
to assume it was Muhammad Atta. But, regardless of the author, the letter provides<br />
us with one of the most vivid and penetrating glimpses into the mind of the planners<br />
of the attacks, and the mental state of the suicide hijackers. The main theme of the<br />
letter is planting in the hijackers’ mind that there is a <strong>di</strong>rect line between them and<br />
the companions (Sahabah) of the Prophet in the 7 th Century. In all their preparations<br />
for the attack and during taking over the planes, they should have seen themselves<br />
and behaved as if they were fighting alongside their ancestors. They were instructed<br />
to tie their clothes “in the same manner our good predecessors had done before you”;<br />
to be courageous, “as our predecessors <strong>di</strong>d when they came to the battle”; to press<br />
their teeth together “as the predecessors used to do”; and to recite “other sim<strong>il</strong>ar<br />
verses that our predecessors used to mention in battlefield”. They were instructed<br />
54 Maurice Pinguet, Voluntary Death in Japan (Cambridge; Polity Press, 1993), pp. 229-230.<br />
75
“not to forget to take some booty, even a cup or a glass of water”. Taking of booty<br />
was an important element in the norms of fighting in early Islamic history.<br />
Another important theme was to look for death and forget this world. Heroism is an<br />
important element of such Islamist groups in most of their writings. But, not just for<br />
the success of the fight and acceptance of death, but in order to prove the cowar<strong>di</strong>ce<br />
of their enemies, those who prefer the present world on the other one, or those who<br />
became the agents of the Dev<strong>il</strong>. Those that “admire the civ<strong>il</strong>ization of the West and<br />
drink their love and their worship with cold water”. This is typical to Islamic<br />
writings of such groups that deal with death or committing suicide attacks. This is<br />
the perception of the true believers versus the Party of the Dev<strong>il</strong>. The same as the<br />
view of the death in battle and becoming a martyr (Shahid) as marriage. This is a<br />
repeated element in w<strong>il</strong>ls of Palestinian suicide bombers, and probably one of the<br />
elements of self-persuasion prior to the operation. The same is with the beautiful<br />
ever-virgin women who wait for them in Para<strong>di</strong>se. The entire tone of these<br />
paragraphs is aimed at people who were going to a real battle with an armed enemy,<br />
and not with innocent unarmed civ<strong>il</strong>ians in a plane. There was also in some cases the<br />
use of the verb “slaughter” and not just “k<strong>il</strong>l”. They are supposed to “apply the<br />
tra<strong>di</strong>tion of captivity and capture among them and k<strong>il</strong>l them, as God almighty said”.<br />
The September 11 attackers, like many other <strong>Jihad</strong>ists in the past decade, are<br />
“programmed” with a mental sense of history, heroism, self-sacrifice, the search for<br />
symmetry with the enemy, and a long mental indoctrination based upon the<br />
demonization of the enemy. The definition of the enemy is dynamic and changing,<br />
unt<strong>il</strong> it includes with the growing influence of Takfiri doctrines, almost all those who<br />
do not adhere to the <strong>Jihad</strong>i interpretations. The demonization of the enemy adds a lot<br />
to the historical sense of the apocalypse. The <strong>di</strong>fficulty of the “enemy” to confront the<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>i enthusiasm and martyrdom also adds to the feeling of the historical<br />
determination between the Al-Haqq/good and Al-Bat<strong>il</strong>/ev<strong>il</strong>.<br />
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10. The war in Iraq – apocalyptic visions<br />
The war in Iraq and the <strong>Jihad</strong>i insurgency there are naturally accompanied by<br />
reactions of al-Qa’ida, its front groups, and its many supporters and sympathizers in<br />
the Arab and Muslim world. It serves also as an important element in recruiting and<br />
creating more anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Jewish feelings among much<br />
wider circles of Arabs and Muslims. The war is also a source for apocalyptic visions<br />
for many Muslim youngsters, who express their views freely through the “virtual<br />
global jihad” of the Internet.<br />
Many of these supporters look at al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, as “those who raise the<br />
black banners” (Ashab al-rayat al-sud), that would come from the East on the eve of<br />
the Islamic victory and proclaim the end of the world, to pave the way for the<br />
appearance of the Mah<strong>di</strong>. The longest article on this topic, based on many Islamist<br />
sources, was posted on the net in March 9 th 2003, by its author Osama Azzam. 55 The<br />
author based his consequences on primary sacred Islamic sources, but also on the<br />
writings of contemporary scholars, mainly Abu Qutadah al-F<strong>il</strong>astini—one of the<br />
lea<strong>di</strong>ng scholars of global jihad in the Arab world and Europe—and his famous book<br />
Ma`alim Al-Tai’fah al-Mansurah (Characteristics of the secured community). 56<br />
Azzam’s main conclusions are:<br />
1. We are facing the coming end of the world:<br />
“Following the above said, is there anyone that st<strong>il</strong>l doubts that we are approaching<br />
the end of the world? Does anyone think that the hour is far? We are on the eve of<br />
the total <strong>di</strong>smantling that would be followed by our clear victory”.<br />
2. The characteristics of “the owners of the black banners and the secured<br />
community” are identical to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban:<br />
55 Osama Azzam, Hal Taliban wal-Qa’idah hum Ashab al-Rayat al-Sud? 9 March 2003. See on-line in:<br />
www.dawh.net/vb/showthread.threa<strong>di</strong>d?php=12125<br />
56 See on-line in: http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=733<br />
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“I have no doubt that the leaders of the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n of al-Qa’ida, and the Taliban are<br />
the owners of the black banners who w<strong>il</strong>l assist the Mah<strong>di</strong>.”<br />
The reader should decide whom to support -- al-Qa’ida, Taliban, and the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n?<br />
The Arab and Muslim governments and their clerics and Islamic establishments,<br />
which insist on naming themselves Muslims? Or the Crusader West and the enemies<br />
of Allah on earth.<br />
“Who is going to support the Mah<strong>di</strong> except these men and clerics, and their<br />
followers? After this war, which has no precedence in human history and in the fight<br />
between the community of the believers and the Dev<strong>il</strong> and its followers, does anyone<br />
doubt that these are the days of the Mah<strong>di</strong>?”<br />
Another platform for these apocalyptic views that attracts many Islamic youngsters<br />
these days is an on-line forum of “the Jinn and the Demons” 57 It includes a special<br />
sector for interpretations of dreams and visions. 58 The forum is full of apocalyptic<br />
visions that result from the war in Iraq and the growing Anti-American feelings in<br />
the Arab world. Many of these visions deal with the end of the United States, as the<br />
Sau<strong>di</strong> supervisor of the sector wrote:<br />
These visions and their alike, of which many were sent to me, propagate the<br />
destruction of this ev<strong>il</strong> country and the punishments, <strong>di</strong>sasters, and <strong>di</strong>smantling, that<br />
w<strong>il</strong>l occur there. This is the way Allah deals with oppressors…. The punishment of<br />
this super oppressor is very close. We ask Allah to heal the hearts of the believers<br />
from its influence, and grant the Muslims all of its finance and equipment as booty.<br />
The apocalyptic visions seemed to be denied by Salafi scholars of al-Qa’ida. In an<br />
unsigned article published in what has been al-Qa’ida’s main web site in the past—<br />
The Center for Islamic Stu<strong>di</strong>es and Research—in February 2003, there was an attempt<br />
to <strong>di</strong>squalify these ideas. The article—“Allah has not assigned our nation to know the<br />
57 Muntada al-Jinn wal-`Afarit:<br />
http://www.jazanvoice.net/vb/index.php?s=d6e3962ff3363e10e6ffa799fdc8e284<br />
58 See:<br />
http://www.jazanvoice.net/vb/forum<strong>di</strong>splay.php?s=09676bd441afa83467c79a96220906c1&forumid=32<br />
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person of the Mah<strong>di</strong> prior to his appearance” 59 —criticized those who were looking<br />
for the Mah<strong>di</strong> to establish the Islamic State, but in the meantime do nothing to<br />
promote its establishing. Those that believe in this Islamic principle “have fallen into<br />
a lot of exaggerations… and based their religion on false issues, unt<strong>il</strong> their religion<br />
turned feebler than the nest of a spider.” Moreover, the anonymous author who<br />
officially wrote on behalf of al-Qa’ida, attacked the theories of “the Black Banners that<br />
w<strong>il</strong>l appear from the East”, as based on very weak Ha<strong>di</strong>th stories. His main source of<br />
support was Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi of the 14 th Century, one of the lea<strong>di</strong>ng authorities<br />
for the Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines. In general, some Islamic scholars throughout<br />
the centuries—the most prominent of them was famous historian Ibn Khaldun—have<br />
argued that the Mah<strong>di</strong> was a myth and superstition. Nonetheless, most Muslims<br />
throughout history have accepted the idea of an eschatological <strong>del</strong>iverer known as<br />
the Mah<strong>di</strong>.<br />
The article by al-Qa’ida mentioned the name of Osama bin Laden regar<strong>di</strong>ng these<br />
false theories only once, but his message was clear:<br />
We recommend our brothers not to twist the texts and mix the weak and the well-<br />
based [Ha<strong>di</strong>th], in order to make them suit reality. We also recommend all our<br />
brothers to act and say what might benefit the nation… You should support the jihad<br />
against Allah’s enemies rather than harm the jihad and the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n by nonsense<br />
ideas, which have no benefit.<br />
Yet, this opposition is perceived as an attempt to prevent the glorification of persons<br />
not the ideas.<br />
The issue of such apocalyptic visions and the sense of an Armageddon might be<br />
natural on the eve and during the war in Iraq and the jihad insurgency there. This<br />
war is perceived by many in the Arab and Muslim world, primar<strong>il</strong>y youngsters<br />
whose knowledge of Islam is quite poor, as global attack against Islam and integral<br />
59 The Center for Islamic Stu<strong>di</strong>es and Research, Nahnu Ummah lam yukallifna Allah bi-ma`rifat al-Mah<strong>di</strong> qabla<br />
khurujihi, February 2003. See on-line in:<br />
www.conrado.net/_vit_inf/print.php?id=989&ty=pr&img=no (the addresses of this web site changes<br />
frequently. This address was valid in 2003.<br />
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part of a global conspiracy. The expectations from Bin Laden to launch further<br />
attacks by al-Qa’ida, and on American so<strong>il</strong>, are enormous. The search for a new Salah<br />
al-Din al-Ayyubi to confront the Crusaders is playing an important role for Arab<br />
Islamists. Yet, the more interesting issue is the denial of such perceptions by Bin<br />
Laden and al-Qa’ida. The denial might be first of all a result of the pure Wahhabi<br />
nature of the Sau<strong>di</strong> element of the organization. Another reason could be the<br />
personality of Bin Laden, who has not made so far any attempt to create around him<br />
an image of an Islamic savior. The idea of al-Qa’ida is to establish solid solidarity of a<br />
new generation, front, or movements, which are not dependent upon in<strong>di</strong>viduals or<br />
miracles but on a united strategy and the hard work and the struggle of a<br />
community.<br />
The idea of the Mah<strong>di</strong> has not <strong>di</strong>ed yet. Many books speculating on the Mah<strong>di</strong>, and<br />
precisely when he w<strong>il</strong>l emerge to <strong>del</strong>iver the Islamic community from its <strong>di</strong>re straits,<br />
have been published in the Sunni Arab world in the last several decades, most of<br />
them since 1979—the date not only of the Islamic Revolution in Iran but also of the<br />
abortive attempt to overthrow the Sau<strong>di</strong> regime.<br />
11. <strong>Jihad</strong>i Apocalyptic Discourse<br />
In the past four years that followed the September 11 attacks, the collapse of the<br />
Taliban in Afghanistan, the declaration of a global war against <strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorism, and<br />
throughout the American occupation of Iraq on one hand, and the <strong>Jihad</strong>i Sunni<br />
insurgency there on the other, there was a major development in apocalyptic <strong>Jihad</strong>i<br />
<strong>di</strong>scourse. <strong>Jihad</strong>i scholars and sympathizers were viewing the historic moment as<br />
clear signs for the start of the process that would lead to the Day of Judgment or<br />
Resurrection, with all the apocalyptic rituals that should precede it accor<strong>di</strong>ng to the<br />
Islamic belief. The tra<strong>di</strong>tional Islamic terms of the Dulab—circle of a century between<br />
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each Mah<strong>di</strong>; The Mah<strong>di</strong>; Mujad<strong>di</strong>d al-Zaman—the person who renews the apocalyptic<br />
signs; Al-Masih al-Dajjal—the false Messiah or Anti-Christ that would appear before<br />
the Day of Resurrection; Al-Rayat al-Sud—the black flags that w<strong>il</strong>l come to fight from<br />
Khorasan in the East; Armageddon; Lot of Ru’yah—visions; Ahlam—dreams; all these<br />
terms became commonly used in the <strong>Jihad</strong>i forums. We should also bear in mind that<br />
all this started only a short wh<strong>il</strong>e after the M<strong>il</strong>lennium of the year 2000, and<br />
apocalyptic visions that swept the whole world, either by religious emotions, or the<br />
fear of the global collapse of the computer systems.<br />
Quite a lot of <strong>Jihad</strong>ists published in the <strong>Jihad</strong>i forums their dreams and visions of the<br />
Salaf, the Prophet, historic events from early Islamic history, and all kind of other<br />
visions, asking for solutions, interpretations, and explanations that would prove that<br />
Bin Laden, Zarqawi, al-Qa’ida, modern jihad, the September 11 attacks and other<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorist operations, are all signs of the coming apocalypse. One Sau<strong>di</strong><br />
scholar—Abu Bashir al-Naj<strong>di</strong>—became the “leader” of the interpreters of <strong>Jihad</strong>i<br />
visions.<br />
There are even several Islamist web sites and sections in Islamist forums, which are<br />
de<strong>di</strong>cated to dreams and visions and thus, promoting the sense of the Apocalypse.<br />
All of them are related to al-Qa’ida, global jihad and the rise of <strong>Jihad</strong>i “forces” to<br />
confront the “Ev<strong>il</strong> West.” Two of the more popular of these web sites are these<br />
days—the “forum of Hermageddon” 60 and the web site and forums of the “Charms<br />
and Wars.” 61 The phenomenon in general is interesting from another aspect, which is<br />
the spread of apocalyptic visions, even though within the Islamic doctrines, by<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>i-Salafis, primar<strong>il</strong>y Sau<strong>di</strong> supporters of global jihad who were educated by a<br />
Wahhabi educational system. Wahhabis have always used to fight many of these<br />
apocalyptic visions, fearing the deviant effect they might spread. Islamist<br />
m<strong>il</strong>lenarianism in Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia around the year 1400H—1978—was one of the<br />
reasons for the seize of the Ka`bah by Juhayman al-`Utaybi and his group of<br />
followers, which caused a trauma in the kingdom. Yet, the apocalyptic writings of<br />
60 See Muntada Hermageddon: http://hrmageddon.com/vb/index.php<br />
61 See Muntada al-Malahem wal-Fitan: http://alfetn.net/vb3/index.php?<br />
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Al-`Utaybi found a respected place in the largest “library” of <strong>Jihad</strong>i-Salafi in the web<br />
site of Abu Muhammad al-Maq<strong>di</strong>si. 62 The `Utaybi affair is also used as a legitimate<br />
fight against the “apostate Sau<strong>di</strong> kingdom.” Al-Maq<strong>di</strong>si is one of the lea<strong>di</strong>ng <strong>Jihad</strong>i-<br />
Salafi scholars to attack the Sau<strong>di</strong> apostasy and his fundamental book Al-Kawashef al-<br />
Jaliyyah fi Kufr al-Dawlah al-Su`u<strong>di</strong>yyah—The Clear Signs of the Apostasy of the Sau<strong>di</strong><br />
State—is very popular among supporters of global jihad. 63 In his analysis of the<br />
`Utaybi affair in this book, Al-Maq<strong>di</strong>si forgave `Utaybi and his group, which he<br />
admitted to know them personally. He described them as “naïve and miserable<br />
people,” who just believed in the idea that “Muhammad bin Abdallah al-Qahtani<br />
was the Mah<strong>di</strong> and `Utaybi had just planned to declare his loyalty to him accor<strong>di</strong>ng<br />
to the Islamic doctrines.”<br />
The apocalyptic aspirations of supporters of global jihad, especially as they appear in<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>i web sites and forums, are all linked to al-Qa’ida, Osama bin Laden, the “new<br />
Crusaders,” the wish to reconstruct the victory of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, and the use<br />
of WMD. There is also a yearning for creating symmetric war between the Muslim<br />
world and the West. Between the lines one could sense that the equality and<br />
symmetry between the two civ<strong>il</strong>izations was the ultimate target in <strong>del</strong>eting the sense<br />
of Muslim hum<strong>il</strong>iation by the West. Another element to notice here was the eager<br />
search for Islamic heroes and war heritage, which would renew the spirit of the<br />
Salaf—the first generation of Muslims and the companions of the Prophet. It was not<br />
just a result of Islamic influence or religious sentiments, but also a result of social<br />
factors and segments of Arab culture.<br />
One of the principal books that reflects these apocalyptic aspirations was written by<br />
the Sau<strong>di</strong> scholar Abu Jandal al-Az<strong>di</strong>—Fares bin Shawwal al-Zahrani—one of the<br />
lea<strong>di</strong>ng younger scholars of al-Qa’ida in Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia, under the title “Bin Laden –<br />
the Renovate of Times and Oppressor of the Americans,” in 606 pages. 64 The book is<br />
62 See: http://www.tawhed.ws/a?i=90 It should be noted that most of his writings were posted on this site in<br />
2005.<br />
63 The book has been downloaded from the Internet 53039 times.<br />
64 Fares bin Shawwal al-Zahrani, Osama Bin Laden Mujad<strong>di</strong>d al-Zaman wa-Qaher al-Amrikan. See the book on-line<br />
in: www.tawhed.ws/r?i=972<br />
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using terms, superlatives, and perceptions that place Bin Laden in a line with the<br />
greatest Islamic scholars of history, such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad bin Abd al-<br />
Wahhab, or Hasan al-Bana, even though Bin Laden is far from being a cleric or<br />
scholar. Yet, his ab<strong>il</strong>ity to create such a tremendous turning point in Islamic history<br />
makes him a can<strong>di</strong>date for such a position in the eyes of the <strong>Jihad</strong>i Salafists.<br />
From time to time we can see in <strong>Jihad</strong>i forums persistent posts about the connection<br />
between al-Qa’ida and recently the Taliban too to the Islamic prophecies of the<br />
Apocalypse. In a recent one from March 6 th 2006, the author is trying to prove<br />
through a very deta<strong>il</strong>ed analysis of the Islamic prophecies and tra<strong>di</strong>tions on the issue<br />
and the present confrontation between the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n and the West, that we are<br />
witnessing the signs of the Apocalypse 65 -- Osama’s army is the army of the Mah<strong>di</strong>.<br />
This army w<strong>il</strong>l conquer Iraq, Syria, and Palestine—Bayt al-Maq<strong>di</strong>s—and w<strong>il</strong>l give the<br />
authority to the Mah<strong>di</strong>, then to Jesus/Issa and from here the defeat of the enemy—Al-<br />
Dajjal—is secured. No one in the forum opposed his analysis.<br />
One of the enthusiastic supporters of engaging in looking for apocalyptic signs, and<br />
on a permanent basis, is the Sau<strong>di</strong> Sheikh Sulayman al-`Alawan, another one of the<br />
lea<strong>di</strong>ng Sau<strong>di</strong> clerics in supporting global jihad. In one of his articles titled “The<br />
Disputes over the Mah<strong>di</strong>, which was also viewed as a Fatwa, he encouraged the<br />
mujahed<strong>di</strong>n to deal with the subject. 66<br />
Dealing with [the issue of] the Mah<strong>di</strong> and the signs of the hour—a`lam al-Sa`ah—is<br />
one of the most important elements to encourage innovative effort of thinking—<br />
Ijtihad—and to sa<strong>il</strong> on the boat of salvation… It is the best thing to do in order to<br />
spread religion, to prepare the soul for meeting Allah, and to promote the Divine<br />
Law.<br />
The <strong>Jihad</strong>i-Salafi encouragement in ad<strong>di</strong>tion to the sense of a historic moment, plus<br />
the great expectations created by al-Qa’ida, has brought about a greenhouse for<br />
65 See on-line in: http://www.alhesbah.org/v/showthread.php?t=56593<br />
66 Sulayman bin Naser al-`Alawan, Al-Naza`at fi al-Mah<strong>di</strong>, published in 23 January 2003 on his web site www.alalwan.org<br />
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apocalyptic views. The ongoing <strong>Jihad</strong>i insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan, and<br />
Chechnya, and worldwide <strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorism, give rise to this sense.<br />
12. <strong>Jihad</strong>i perceptions of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)<br />
In recent years, al-Qa’ida and aff<strong>il</strong>iated groups have issued only a few<br />
pronouncements in which they threatened the use of WMD. The first <strong>di</strong>rect reference<br />
appeared on December 26, 2002. Abu Shihab al-Kandahar, the then moderator of the<br />
Islamist Internet forum al-mojahedoon.net, published a short article titled “Nuclear<br />
War is the Solution for the Destruction of the United States.”<br />
The article could be viewed as a simple threat, exploiting a number of rumors from<br />
various sources. It might have also been <strong>del</strong>iberate <strong>di</strong>sinformation regar<strong>di</strong>ng al-<br />
Qa’ida possession of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Or, it could be a case<br />
of propaganda aimed at encouraging Islamists. Regardless of its ultimate aim, al-<br />
Kandahari’s article marked the first time that such a threat had been publicly issued<br />
by supporters of al-Qa’ida, or at least by a figure known to have been close to the<br />
propaganda apparatus of <strong>Global</strong> jihad.<br />
The article was short and lacked the sweeping theoretical elements typical of the<br />
writings of Islamist scholars of jihad against the United States or the West. Yet, even<br />
though this could be a false alarm, it <strong>di</strong>d seem to embody another stage in the<br />
escalation of the tone of al-Qa’ida’s propaganda. As such, it could raise the<br />
expectations of Islamists for an apocalyptic “mega-operation” using WMD against<br />
the United States or Russia.<br />
Thus far, the main modus operan<strong>di</strong> of al-Qa’ida has been suicide or martyrdom<br />
operations. Martyrdom attacks are not only a tactical tool of terrorism; they have also<br />
played a central role in the indoctrination of al-Qa’ida recruits. Over the past decade,<br />
the propaganda machinery of al-Qa’ida and global jihad has kept asking the question<br />
posed by one of their adherents in an article titled “Has the <strong>Global</strong> Crusader Alliance<br />
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Learned the Lessons of the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n?” The author wrote: “We are really puzzled to<br />
see the Americans and their followers in the Western world think that they are able<br />
to confront people who wish to <strong>di</strong>e more than they [the Americans] want to live.”<br />
This idea of self-sacrifice has since been reinforced as the phenomenon of suicide<br />
operations has spread across many parts of the world, not to mention by the<br />
worldwide increase of support of Muslim publics for the suicide attacks against<br />
civ<strong>il</strong>ians in Israel.<br />
It is significant to note that this method, which was once controversial among Islamic<br />
clerics and scholars, enjoys growing support within religious and political<br />
communities alike. Thus far, in fact, it seems that ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islam’s focus has been not<br />
on mass-k<strong>il</strong>lings, but primar<strong>il</strong>y on self-sacrifice and on the proliferation of its attacks<br />
to <strong>di</strong>fferent regions and places across the globe. The focus on personal martyrdom<br />
and suicide attacks among the groups that adhere to the culture of <strong>Global</strong> jihad —<br />
inclu<strong>di</strong>ng al-Qa’ida, as well as groups with local and national aspirations, such as the<br />
Chechen Islamists and the Arab volunteers there, Kashmiri groups, the Kur<strong>di</strong>sh<br />
Ansar al-Islam, or the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic <strong>Jihad</strong> (PIJ)—might explain why<br />
these groups have so far refrained from any large-scale use of WMD. Very rarely do<br />
clerics, scholars, or Islamist intellectuals who supply the ideological and doctrinal<br />
support for the culture of <strong>Global</strong> jihad, mention the issue of WMD. Given the central<br />
role played by this ideological network, the relative absence of a <strong>di</strong>scussion over<br />
WMD in the past is significant.<br />
13. Shaykh Nasser al-Fahd’s Fatwa on WMD<br />
Some recent Islamist pronouncements in<strong>di</strong>cate that this past emphasis on personal<br />
sacrifice and martyrdom operations may be changing to include increased demand<br />
to acquire and use WMD. On May 21, 2003, the Sau<strong>di</strong> Shaykh Nasser bin Hamad al-<br />
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Fahd published the first fatwa on the use of WMD. The author is 40 years old, and<br />
among the younger lea<strong>di</strong>ng clerics of the Sau<strong>di</strong> Islamist opposition that support the<br />
culture of <strong>Global</strong> jihad, and the m<strong>il</strong>itant struggle against the West. To date, Shaykh al-<br />
Fahd has published dozens of m<strong>il</strong>itant books and articles, some of which are viewed<br />
by the followers of <strong>Global</strong> jihad as religious rulings that legitimate the fight against<br />
the United States.<br />
Because of his preaching against the Sau<strong>di</strong> monarchy, Shaykh al-Fahd was arrested in<br />
June 2003 by the Sau<strong>di</strong> authorities and is st<strong>il</strong>l imprisoned without trial. Later on he<br />
was forced, along with two of his colleagues, to publicly renounce several of his<br />
rulings against the Sau<strong>di</strong> government. In January 2005 he rescinded from prison his<br />
former renunciation through his supporters over Islamist Internet forums. Shaykh al-<br />
Fahd has been at the forefront of a new effort to rethink the strategy of asymmetric<br />
warfare shared by many Islamists. For example, on September 21, 2002 al-Fahd<br />
published an article titled “The Divine Verses about the September Attack” in which<br />
he praised the execution of the 9/11 attacks, especially for its technical sophistication<br />
and use of planes. One of his arguments was that the 9/11 attacks were an air battle<br />
or “dogfight” of sorts. “If the Americans are using F-15 or Tornado [and they are<br />
allowed], then if the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n used Boeing or AirBus are they not allowed?”<br />
Shaykh al-Fahd has repeatedly used such analogy with the West to provide Islamic<br />
legal justification for terrorist tactics in his other writings. When asked, for example,<br />
by an anonymous person whether the use of WMD is allowed, his answer was<br />
straightforward: ‘yes’, it is allowed:<br />
If the Muslims could defeat the infi<strong>del</strong>s only by using these kinds of weapons, it is<br />
allowed to use them even if they k<strong>il</strong>l them all, and destroy their crops and cattle.<br />
Following the answer, Shaykh al-Fahd wrote a long and deta<strong>il</strong>ed memorandum on<br />
the relevant Islamic sources that he used as the basis for his ruling. First, he<br />
<strong>di</strong>squalified any terms of international law used by the West, since they are not part<br />
of the Islamic <strong>di</strong>vine law. Second, he claimed that those countries that lead the<br />
campaign against the use of WMD—the United States and the United Kingdom—<br />
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have already used WMD in the past against their enemies, not to mention that they,<br />
plus “the Jews,” possess these weapons.<br />
Third, he based his arguments on the saying of the Prophet in the Ha<strong>di</strong>th: “Allah has<br />
ordered you to do everything perfectly. Hence, if you k<strong>il</strong>l, do it perfectly, and if you<br />
slaughter, do it perfectly. Everyone should sharpen his blade and ease his slaughter.”<br />
He also relied on another saying of the Prophet: “If you are ordered to do<br />
something—do it accor<strong>di</strong>ng to your best ab<strong>il</strong>ity.” In al-Fahd’s view, this principle is<br />
essential: The Muslims should act accor<strong>di</strong>ng to their ab<strong>il</strong>ities. If there is no other way<br />
the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n can defeat the enemy, then they should k<strong>il</strong>l them, all of them, by every<br />
means possible. This principle is valid even if they have to k<strong>il</strong>l women and ch<strong>il</strong>dren,<br />
or even Muslims.<br />
In al-Fahd’s eyes, the principles of using WMD are <strong>di</strong>vided into two categories. The<br />
first category concerns the general acceptance of their use in the case of jihad. The<br />
second category concerns the legitimacy of the use of WMD in a certain period<br />
against a certain enemy—an enemy that, in al-Fahd’s eyes, clearly means the Goliath<br />
the United States.<br />
One controversial issue among Sau<strong>di</strong> scholars following the attacks against “infi<strong>del</strong>s”<br />
in Riyadh in May and November 2003, and the attacks in Istanbul in November<br />
2003—not to mention the murderous ongoing attacks in Iraq—has been the fact that<br />
innocent Muslims are also being k<strong>il</strong>led by these attacks. The case is also controversial<br />
with regard to suicide operations. Al-Fahd unambiguously believes, however, that if<br />
the k<strong>il</strong>ling of Muslims is necessary and there is no other choice, then it is permissible.<br />
In his view, which is based on previous rulings of Islamic scholars such as the<br />
fourteenth century theologian Ibn Taymiyyah, there are no limits at all to using<br />
WMD against the Western “infi<strong>del</strong>s.”<br />
The ruling of Shaykh Nasser al-Fahd set a precedent in the Islamist debate on the use<br />
of WMD. Since this was an answer to a question by an anonymous person, we cannot<br />
know if the question was a real one, or whether it was implanted by the Shaykh or<br />
any other element linked to al-Qa’ida. Yet, the clear acceptance of the use of WMD is<br />
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very significant.<br />
It is interesting to look also at the timing of the ruling by Shaykh Naser al-Fahd.<br />
Taken together with the declarations issued by Ayman Zawahiri, the ruling might<br />
constitute a campaign of threats or <strong>di</strong>sinformation. Such a link, if it indeed<br />
constitutes a carefully planned campaign, does not necessar<strong>il</strong>y mean that al-Qa’ida is<br />
already planning such an attack by using WMD, or that it has already acquired such<br />
weapons. Were al-Qa’ida or any aff<strong>il</strong>iated Islamist group planning to use WMD,<br />
however, they have now received the necessary endorsement to do so from an<br />
Islamic point of view.<br />
14. The Islamist Reaction to Shaykh al-Fahd<br />
Any <strong>di</strong>spute or <strong>di</strong>scussion <strong>di</strong>d not accompany Shaykh al-Fahd’s ruling. In fact, those<br />
who follow the many ra<strong>di</strong>cal <strong>Jihad</strong>i websites, forums, and chat rooms—the main<br />
arena of the <strong>di</strong>scourse for ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islamists—may well have been surprised by the<br />
absence of any coherent debate on WMD of any kind among Islamists. In some cases,<br />
Islamists expressed their hopes and desires that al-Qa’ida use chemical, biological,<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological or nuclear weapons (CBRN) against the West. These expressions,<br />
however, are more reminiscent of the apocalyptic visions aroused by Bin Laden, the<br />
fall of Saddam Hussein, the occupation of Iraq, and the Islamist insurgency there.<br />
Some Islamists described WMD as “Doomsday” weapons that would accompany the<br />
end of the world. Moreover, to date neither Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, nor any<br />
other lea<strong>di</strong>ng figure of al-Qa’ida has <strong>di</strong>rectly mentioned such WMD threats—even<br />
though these in<strong>di</strong>viduals can publicize their worldviews and doctrines with virtually<br />
no limits, given that their first au<strong>di</strong>ence is not the West, but the Islamic world.<br />
Since the ruling of Shaykh al-Fahd in May 2003, al-Qa’ida and aff<strong>il</strong>iated groups carried<br />
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out major terrorist operations in various places. These include attacks in Riyadh,<br />
Istanbul, Casablanca, Madrid, London and twice in Egypt/Sinai, in ad<strong>di</strong>tion to<br />
numerous attacks against the American and allied troops in Iraq, and against the<br />
Iraqi Shi’is and Iraqi officials of the new elected regime. Most of these operations<br />
were suicide attacks, with the sole exception of the Madrid bombings, where remote<br />
controlled devices were used. M<strong>il</strong>lions of Islamist supporters, as well as Western<br />
security and intelligence services, anticipated a “Mega Attack” on Christmas and<br />
New Year 2003. St<strong>il</strong>l, the Islamist <strong>di</strong>scourse on the topic has fa<strong>il</strong>ed to mention even in<br />
one word the use of WMD against the United States or the West.<br />
The strongest evidence of the relatively low regard for WMD within Islamist ra<strong>di</strong>cal<br />
<strong>di</strong>scourse is the m<strong>il</strong>itary manuals that are <strong>di</strong>stributed on the Internet by various<br />
global <strong>Jihad</strong>ist groups. In the Arabic-language manuals or <strong>di</strong>rectories written by<br />
Islamists, or in those translated from other languages to Arabic, only a handful of<br />
references in<strong>di</strong>cate planning for the use of such weapons.<br />
In the instances where the manuals do refer to WMD, the emphasis is on the use of<br />
chemical weapons, which at any rate are easy to obtain and can be handled with<br />
relative ease, even in home laboratories. Indeed, Islamist web sites contain a rather<br />
large number of instructions on how to make homemade bombs using chemicals.<br />
Yet, we should ask ourselves whether such chemical bombs, as dangerous as they<br />
may be, fall under the category of WMD. Ultimately, the ab<strong>il</strong>ity of Islamist terrorist<br />
groups to k<strong>il</strong>l hundreds of people by conventional means through martyrdom<br />
operations might be more attractive to them, as they are able to demonstrate their<br />
heroism.<br />
One m<strong>il</strong>itary-related Islamist web site, which was shut down in February 2004,<br />
contained information on how to develop weapons and ammunition (Mawqi` al-<br />
aslihah wal-dhakhaer) 7 Even on this web site, however, references to WMD were rare.<br />
In October 2005 appeared in several <strong>Jihad</strong>i forums a document in 80 pages with a<br />
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deta<strong>il</strong>ed “encyclope<strong>di</strong>a” on how to bu<strong>il</strong>d a nuclear bomb. 67 The document created lot<br />
of enthusiastic responses, but remained as kind of “wishful thinking” that could not<br />
use a real basis for developing such a weapon at home.<br />
15. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and “The Call for Islamist <strong>Global</strong> Resistance”<br />
In December 2004, a new attitude about asymmetric warfare has emerged in the<br />
Islamist <strong>di</strong>scourse, one that challenges the <strong>Global</strong> jihad’s emphasis on “heroism” and<br />
its relative lack of emphasis on acquiring and using WMD. Mustafa Sit-Maryam—<br />
AKA Omar Abd al-Hakim, but better known as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri—a former<br />
lea<strong>di</strong>ng trainer and scholar of al-Qa’ida, published two significant documents calling<br />
for a new organization of <strong>Global</strong> jihad: “The Islamist <strong>Global</strong> Resistance.” One was a 9-<br />
page letter published in December 2004, and the other was a huge book totaling 1600<br />
pages about the strategy of <strong>Global</strong> jihad.<br />
In many ways, Al-Suri elaborated on the fam<strong>il</strong>iar lines of Islamist criticism of al-<br />
Qa’ida and its aff<strong>il</strong>iated groups, primar<strong>il</strong>y in the Iraqi arena. Al-Suri in fact returns to<br />
the original <strong>Jihad</strong>i doctrines of Abdallah Azzam, the spiritual mentor of al-Qa’ida,<br />
and challenges some of the strategies that have been adopted by the new generation<br />
of jiha<strong>di</strong>sts, saying that they prefer to “jump” into holy war without first completing<br />
the long stage of ideological indoctrination (Tarbiyyah). Al-Suri also uses the same<br />
term that Azzam <strong>di</strong>d—“the solid base”—to define the mo<strong>del</strong> of the <strong>Jihad</strong>i group and,<br />
like Azzam, he emphasizes the quality of the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n, not their quantity.<br />
In his open letter to the State Department, Al-Suri talks at length about the<br />
importance of using WMD against the United States as the only means to fight it<br />
from a point of equality. He even criticizes Osama bin Laden for not using WMD in<br />
67 See on-line in: http://alfirdaws.org/forums/showthread.php?t=5268&page=1&pp=10<br />
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the September 11 attacks: “If I were consulted in the case of that operation I would<br />
advise the use of planes in flights from outside the U.S. that would carry WMD.<br />
Hitting the U.S. with WMD was and is st<strong>il</strong>l very complicated. Yet, it is possible after<br />
all, with Allah’s help, and more important than being possible—it is vital.” Al-Suri<br />
states, “the Muslim resistance elements [must] seriously consider this <strong>di</strong>fficult yet<br />
vital <strong>di</strong>rection.” Al-Suri also surprises his readers by sen<strong>di</strong>ng requests to North<br />
Korea and Iran to continue developing their nuclear projects. It is most unlikely for a<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>i-Salafi scholar to hint at possible cooperation with countries like Shiite Iran or<br />
Stalinist North Korea, both of which are generally regarded as infi<strong>del</strong> regimes.<br />
However, Al-Suri seems to advise that <strong>Jihad</strong>i Sunni readers should cooperate with<br />
the dev<strong>il</strong> to defeat the “bigger dev<strong>il</strong>.”<br />
Al-Suri does not see much benefit from the guerr<strong>il</strong>la warfare waged against the U.S.<br />
by al-Qa’ida in Iraq. Hence, “the ultimate choice is the destruction of the United States<br />
by operations of strategic symmetry through weapons of mass destruction, namely<br />
nuclear, chemical, or biological means, if the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n can achieve it with the help<br />
of those who possess them or through buying them.” One other option, he says, is by<br />
“the production of basic nuclear bombs, known as “<strong>di</strong>rty bombs.’”<br />
The focus on the use of WMD as the “ultimate choice” of the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n is a<br />
significant feature in Al-Suri’s book, too. In about 100 pages of the book, Al-Suri<br />
sketches his <strong>Jihad</strong>i m<strong>il</strong>itary strategy, which accor<strong>di</strong>ng to him is the core of the book.<br />
One of his most significant recommendations is the need to <strong>di</strong>vide the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n<br />
into four <strong>di</strong>fferent kinds of groups: Squads of popular resistance (al-Muqawamah al-<br />
Sha`biyyah) with limited training and fac<strong>il</strong>ities, m<strong>il</strong>itary squads (al-Saraya al-<br />
`Askariyyah al-`Ammah) with limited training in light weapons, and squads of quality<br />
resistance (al-Muqawamah al-Naw`iyyah), which are well-trained for both terrorist<br />
operations and guerr<strong>il</strong>la warfare.<br />
The fourth type of squad is for strategic operations (al-`Amaliyyat al-Istratijiyyah).<br />
Members who fully understand the strategic goals of the resistance should command<br />
these elite squads. They should have plenty of financial support and good<br />
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knowledge of using WMD “when there is a need to counter attack or to achieve<br />
strategic symmetry with the United States.”<br />
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s pronouncement on WMD marks a new phase in the overall<br />
development of the Islamist <strong>di</strong>scourse on the issue. There is a question whether his<br />
book is intended merely as a platform for better-organized global jihad, or if there is<br />
already an organization or group behind him. Yet, his focus on well-planned,<br />
strategic operations should be noted. His best example is the Madrid bombings in<br />
March 11 2004, in which one operation by a small squad of operatives created a<br />
larger strategic effect across Europe.<br />
The question that we should ask ourselves is “why are there so few references to<br />
WMD within the Islamist <strong>di</strong>scourse of al-Qa’ida or related groups?” Although there is<br />
no single, satisfying explanation, several assessments can be made:<br />
• WMD <strong>di</strong>d receive some attention prior to October-November 2001, when<br />
Afghanistan, under the Taliban, served as a greenhouse and safe haven for al-<br />
Qa’ida and other Islamist groups. Unt<strong>il</strong> that time, al-Qa’ida maintained better<br />
relations with regimes and scientists involved in developing WMD such as<br />
Pakistan, Sudan, the Islamic republics of Central Asia, and perhaps with Iraq.<br />
After November 2001, however, most of the al-Qa’ida fac<strong>il</strong>ities in Afghanistan<br />
were destroyed or seized by the United States or Pakistan under President<br />
Musharraf, and the Islamist forces were pushed into certain areas in East<br />
Afghanistan. It is possible that the culture of <strong>Global</strong> jihad embraced “heroism”<br />
and the tactics of martyrdom operations as a result of these setbacks.<br />
• When they had a base in Afghanistan, al-Qa’ida’s attempt to acquire CBRN<br />
fac<strong>il</strong>ities was handled in secret by a small group of operatives, the vast<br />
majority of which <strong>di</strong>d not possess the capab<strong>il</strong>ities of dealing with CBRN,<br />
except for crude homemade bombs. Due to the loss of their Afghan safe<br />
haven, and due to the <strong>di</strong>fficulties of handling such weapons in occupied Iraq,<br />
only one arena remains where such weapons can be handled—namely, among<br />
Muslim communities in the West, especially in Europe.<br />
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• In many of the Islamist writings, the term “WMD” refers to a broad array of<br />
social and moral <strong>di</strong>seases associated with the West, such as AIDS, cigarette<br />
smoking and drug use. It is not presented as part of the Islamist struggle, but<br />
rather as a term denoting the destructive <strong>di</strong>seases that w<strong>il</strong>l eventually ruin the<br />
Western societies from inside.<br />
Following the above analysis, we should ask ourselves whether or not the threat<br />
posed by Islamist terrorist groups acquiring and using CBRN or WMD is real.<br />
Before the War in Iraq, much information about attempts by al-Qa’ida to<br />
develop such ab<strong>il</strong>ity was <strong>di</strong>sseminated. The American insistence that Saddam<br />
Hussein’s Iraq was developing such weapons, and the linkage between Iraq<br />
and al-Qa’ida that the administration claimed existed helped to inflate the<br />
image of an active threat. In the past year, meanwh<strong>il</strong>e, some terrorism experts<br />
have become more skeptical about the extent to which a CBRN threat<br />
emanates from these groups. They cite four main factors:<br />
• The occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq prevented the continuance of earlier<br />
attempts by Islamist groups to develop or acquire such weapons.<br />
• Islamist scholars, clerics, intellectuals, and even most or<strong>di</strong>nary Islamist<br />
extremists seem to refrain from supporting the use of WMD by Islamist<br />
groups, fearing the consequences of such use for the entire Muslim world.<br />
• Al-Qa’ida and aff<strong>il</strong>iated groups, as well as Islamist scholars tend to focus their<br />
ideology and doctrines on self-sacrifice and technical sophistication, and<br />
hence they adopt terrorist tactics like suicide operations. So far, the world has<br />
no answer to the threat of martyrdom operations.<br />
• Martyrdom operations need no technical training at all and perfectly suit the<br />
relative lack of technical infrastructure ava<strong>il</strong>able to the Islamists in the post-<br />
9/11 era. Islamists also use the idea of martyrdom for the purpose of<br />
indoctrinating their ranks and creating the mythology in the minds of Muslim<br />
youngsters that the battle against America is a glorious and heroic one, sim<strong>il</strong>ar<br />
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to David’s fight against Goliath.<br />
If our main source of assessment would be the mind of the present generation of<br />
Islamists, mo<strong>del</strong>ed by al-Qa’ida, the threat of an imme<strong>di</strong>ate use of WMD is of<br />
low feasib<strong>il</strong>ity. Yet, we should bear in mind two other factors:<br />
• Al-Qa’ida is mutating on the background of the Iraqi scene, and we might face<br />
a new generation of Islamists, who are not part of “the Afghan Alumni” but<br />
are “Iraqi Alumni.” The war and continuing insurgency in Iraq have possibly<br />
improved the ab<strong>il</strong>ities of al-Qa’ida, as well as of other groups such as the<br />
Algerians, or the Jordan-influenced Tawhid groups, to recruit a new<br />
generation of operatives from among Muslim communities in Europe. This<br />
new generation of recruits is not necessar<strong>il</strong>y under the control of Sau<strong>di</strong> clerics<br />
or scholars, and might reveal itself to possess fewer reservations about the<br />
acquisition and use of CBRN or WMD. Based on the Madrid bombings,<br />
perhaps this new generation w<strong>il</strong>l also be less w<strong>il</strong>ling to carry out martyrdom<br />
operations.<br />
• A new generation of Islamists or Islamist groups might be more w<strong>il</strong>ling to<br />
cooperate with non-Islamic groups on one hand, or with Iran and Shiite<br />
groups such as Hizballah, on the other. Al-Suri hints to such a possib<strong>il</strong>ity in<br />
his book, and even points to North Korea as a possible strategic partner.<br />
Ad<strong>di</strong>tionally, a new generation of Islamist scholars might follow the fatwa of<br />
Shaykh al-Fahd or the book of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, and encourage the use of<br />
such weapons if and when the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n find they have no other alternative.<br />
These developments could accelerate attempts made by Islamist groups to acquire<br />
and use WMD, although it is unclear how feasible this w<strong>il</strong>l be in the imme<strong>di</strong>ate term.<br />
We should, therefore, bear in mind that the w<strong>il</strong>l might be there, but the fac<strong>il</strong>ities and<br />
ab<strong>il</strong>ities, so far, are not.<br />
The view of WMD as a “Doom Day” weapon is an integral part of the apocalyptic<br />
aspirations of the “au<strong>di</strong>ence” of global jihad, but not necessar<strong>il</strong>y of its clerics or<br />
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scholars. Yet, it seems that the decision to use such weapons, whether nuclear,<br />
biological, or more probably chemical, would not be necessar<strong>il</strong>y subjected to<br />
religious rulings or authorization by lea<strong>di</strong>ng Salafi clerics. In ad<strong>di</strong>tion to operational<br />
calculations or considerations, it might also be a result of the effect of apocalyptic<br />
expectations. These expectations slowly increase with the ongoing insurgency in Iraq<br />
and the threats made by Bin Laden or Zawahiri. In the past year there is an escalation<br />
of these threats, which creates among the supporters of global jihad a sense of a close<br />
“explosion” in the field, either in Iraq, Europe, or the United States. This sense<br />
receives apocalyptic form, whether it is accor<strong>di</strong>ng to the Islamic prophecies and<br />
tra<strong>di</strong>tions, or not.<br />
We should also note that we can cautiously say that the effect of religiously based<br />
debates among <strong>Jihad</strong>i scholars or between scholars and Islamic institutions is<br />
weakening. Supporters of global jihad, especially those that have access to the<br />
Internet, are more “thirsty” to watch video clips that document behea<strong>di</strong>ng,<br />
bombings, or terrorism against their various “enemies” rather than to read<br />
innovative Islamic rulings. Hence, a sense of apocalyptic aspirations, Islamist or of<br />
another type, linked to in<strong>di</strong>vidual “can<strong>di</strong>dates” for Mah<strong>di</strong>sm, might increase. So far<br />
it seems that leaders such as Bin Laden or Zawahiri do not encourage such a<br />
development. There is no sign that might show that they perceive themselves as<br />
future Khalifah or even that they might lead a Kh<strong>il</strong>afah. This is typical to Sunni ra<strong>di</strong>cal<br />
leaders or scholars. Hasan al-Bana or Sayyed Qutb <strong>di</strong>d not do it either. But, al-Qa’ida<br />
is mutating and on the margins of <strong>Jihad</strong>i-Salafiyyah there might emerge in<strong>di</strong>viduals<br />
or groups that might develop into a new Juhayman al-`Utaybi. The “thirst” for a<br />
Mah<strong>di</strong> is there, as a result of many factors. Such a self-portrayed Mah<strong>di</strong> might decide<br />
to use non-conventional means, but his chances to become an influential leader of the<br />
“mainstream” <strong>Jihad</strong>i-Salafiyyah are very low.<br />
An important question to note here is how far a sense of the Apocalypse is driving<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>ists to act now, and not to “wait for the Mah<strong>di</strong> to appear.” This is a significant<br />
question on the ground of the <strong>Jihad</strong>i line of Arab volunteers to the insurgency in Iraq,<br />
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as well as the reasons that drove 19 Arabs to carry out the September 11 attacks.<br />
Before dealing with the possible effect of apocalyptic visions on the use of WMD, we<br />
should look for these visions regar<strong>di</strong>ng suicide terrorism, blind <strong>di</strong>scipline that drives<br />
Sunni <strong>Jihad</strong>ists to mass k<strong>il</strong>lings of Shi`is, or the growing hatred and demonization of<br />
the “enemy,” whoever he is. One of the significant factors of this growing w<strong>il</strong>lingness<br />
might be the visually effect of horrors as reflected through the Internet. Bloody video<br />
clips, demonized graffiti, or the total freedom of speech on this me<strong>di</strong>um, has a<br />
growing effect too. Here again, the Islamic nature or rules of the Apocalypse are<br />
secondary to the power of the demonization.<br />
16. <strong>Jihad</strong>i use of the Internet – the Open University for <strong>Jihad</strong><br />
The main platform for developing and pushing the culture of global jihad forward is<br />
in recent years, the Internet. There are several main reasons why <strong>Jihad</strong>i movements,<br />
groups, clerics, and scholars, turned the Internet into their main, and sometimes<br />
only, vehicle for propaganda, indoctrination, publicity, and teaching of their<br />
messages. Besides the known advantages of this me<strong>di</strong>um of communication, several<br />
factors should be noted:<br />
• Most Arab and Muslim countries face oppositions that are oppressed and<br />
groups that are persecuted, rendering the Internet their only alternative to<br />
spread their messages. Citizens and groups are prevented from freely<br />
publishing books and newspapers, or from giving open lectures. Moreover, in<br />
most Arab and Muslim countries they have no access to the tra<strong>di</strong>tional means<br />
of Islamic religious indoctrination, such as mosques, Friday sermons, religious<br />
universities and colleges, or religious ceremonies.<br />
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• The nature of the <strong>Jihad</strong>ist ideology and doctrines, as well as the core of <strong>Jihad</strong>i<br />
mission is to create a global solidarity and brotherhood. To that end the<br />
Internet is nowadays the best means to promote this goal cheaply and rapidly,<br />
wh<strong>il</strong>e reaching the broadest possible au<strong>di</strong>ence.<br />
• The Internet is the best means ava<strong>il</strong>able today to create a spectrum of<br />
doctrines, new interpretations, and a multitude of new groups, but also to<br />
create an image of a large volume of activity.<br />
• The Internet is intensively surfed and read by the global me<strong>di</strong>a. Every <strong>Jihad</strong>i<br />
event or message is instantly exposed to the world, circulated by news<br />
agencies, and cited in Muslim countries, whose populations do not read<br />
Arabic.<br />
• The past decade, has witnessed a heightened significance and weight of this<br />
me<strong>di</strong>um in the eyes of <strong>Jihad</strong>is, due to a number of highly important events.<br />
These include the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent global war on terrorism; the<br />
occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq; <strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorist operations all over the<br />
globe; the image of a global clash of religions and civ<strong>il</strong>izations; and the rise of<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorism as a global strategic factor in the West. There is a growing<br />
dynamic in the mutual relationship between the <strong>Jihad</strong>i groups that use the<br />
Internet and the global me<strong>di</strong>a.<br />
• The strategy of the global <strong>Jihad</strong>i doctrines is to target the Arab and Muslim<br />
youth—the largest, most educated—and in terms of the Internet—most<br />
connected segment of Muslim societies. Besides, the use of the Internet for<br />
various goals, and the access to it in many Arab and Muslim countries is<br />
growing rapidly, alongside the growing development of education in many of<br />
these publics, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng of females.<br />
Most importantly for the purposes of understan<strong>di</strong>ng the <strong>Jihad</strong>i mindset is the fact<br />
that these groups are above all targeting their own societies and not Western regimes<br />
and their citizens. The Internet may be used to intimidate Western publics, knowing<br />
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the au<strong>di</strong>ences’ wide exposure to the global me<strong>di</strong>a and the huge effect that exposure<br />
has upon the sense of security in the West. <strong>Jihad</strong>is know that the wi<strong>del</strong>y circulated<br />
video clips of beheaded foreigners and Muslims in Iraq terrorize Western publics.<br />
Even so, the main reason why <strong>Jihad</strong>is circulate these clips, photos, au<strong>di</strong>o material,<br />
books, articles, or m<strong>il</strong>itary manuals, is to indoctrinate their own Arab and Muslim<br />
au<strong>di</strong>ences; plant feelings of pride, a sense of belonging, and a new identity in their<br />
minds; and recruit their support. The Internet provides by far the best means to<br />
achieve the desired goal of virtual nation bu<strong>il</strong><strong>di</strong>ng of the Muslim nation—Ummah—<br />
an aspiration anchored in the doctrines of the <strong>Jihad</strong>i-Salafi currents. In other words,<br />
the Internet is the global Open University for jihad.<br />
One of the documents of indoctrination published in 2003 and recently re-circulated<br />
by the <strong>Global</strong> Islamic Me<strong>di</strong>a Front (GIMF) 68 is talking about the nature of the<br />
university of global jihad. 69 The author, nicknamed Ahmad al-Wathiq bi-Allah,<br />
deputy <strong>di</strong>rector of GIMF, presents al-Qa’ida as an “organization, state, and<br />
university”:<br />
Since the operation of USS Cole [November 2000] and the glorious events of<br />
Manhattan [September 2001] unt<strong>il</strong> the present events of this blessed month<br />
[Ramadan 2005] hundreds of Muslims from all over the world join this global <strong>Jihad</strong>i<br />
university, in which they study all the stu<strong>di</strong>es of the jihad, its rules and kinds… This<br />
is a non-central university, with no geographic borders, which has its presence<br />
everywhere and each person zealous for his religion and nation can join it… This<br />
university has its own presidency, whose role is to incite, guide, indoctrinate, and<br />
encourage the awareness of the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n. Its presidency is the leadership of the<br />
mujahed<strong>di</strong>n headed by Osama bin Laden… The university includes several faculties,<br />
among them for electronic jihad, martyrdom, and the technology of side bombs and<br />
car bombs.”<br />
68 An organ of Al-Qaeda and global <strong>Jihad</strong> with a growing intensive virtual activity in the past year.<br />
69 The article was published in most of the <strong>Jihad</strong>i forums. See on-line in:<br />
http://www.al-farouq.com/vb/showthread.php?t=2682<br />
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The article bears propagan<strong>di</strong>st overtones, but it clearly summarizes the<br />
indoctrinative nature of global jihad, and thus, the center of gravity of this<br />
phenomenon, i.e. the Muslim au<strong>di</strong>ence. If this is the main au<strong>di</strong>ence then there is<br />
almost no room for <strong>di</strong>sinformation. An intensive rea<strong>di</strong>ng of these web sites, and<br />
especially of the most ra<strong>di</strong>cal 15-25 <strong>Jihad</strong>i forums 70 and dozens of message groups,<br />
reveals the highly serious approach and attitude of their participants, i.e., those who<br />
are targeted by this global indoctrination. In some Muslim communities in the West,<br />
but especially in the Arab world, we can trace a growing role of this indoctrination in<br />
the w<strong>il</strong>lingness to support, justify, and volunteer to join <strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorist groups. Since<br />
2001, these <strong>Jihad</strong>i web sites have gradually replaced the old Madrassa as a tool of<br />
recruiting the first generation of <strong>Jihad</strong>is in the 1980-90s. The Internet in fact, has<br />
become one global madrassa.<br />
Another recent publication by GIMF—an analysis of the global strategy of al-Qa’ida<br />
—is even more lucid. Under the title “al-Qa’ida’s War is Economic not M<strong>il</strong>itary,” 71 the<br />
author, a Sau<strong>di</strong> scholar and supporter of global jihad, analyzes the significant role<br />
that indoctrination plays in the global movement:<br />
We should <strong>di</strong>rect some of these efforts to other targets that could serve another goal,<br />
namely to promote the glory of the Muslims, especially among the youth, who are<br />
swimming in the oceans of pleasures and lust. Those youth are in fact unused petrol,<br />
wh<strong>il</strong>e many efforts are de<strong>di</strong>cated to confront those clerics who are selling their minds<br />
to the <strong>di</strong>ctatorships, and who are useless too. These moral attacks would have a<br />
tremendous impact on the souls of the defeated youth.<br />
Many idle youngsters were motivated to join the jihad by a photo or a video such as<br />
of the USS Cole, or Badr al-Riyadh, or by watching the crash of the planes into the<br />
high bu<strong>il</strong><strong>di</strong>ngs. Those youngsters, even though they were not fully aware of the<br />
impact of the attacks upon them, turned their minds and bo<strong>di</strong>es towards the jihad.<br />
70 The number varies since these forums are often closed by security services, Western hosting companies, or as a<br />
result of technical problems, and reappear in other addresses.<br />
71 Abu Mus`ab al-Naj<strong>di</strong>, Ma`rakat al-Qaeda – Ma`rakah Iqtisa<strong>di</strong>yyah la `Askariyyah, 3 October 2005. See on-line in:<br />
http://www.al-farouq.com/vb/showthread.php?t=3383<br />
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Here comes the role of indoctrination and developing the thinking of these people. It<br />
is a mistake to leave these youngsters with their superficial understan<strong>di</strong>ng of the<br />
nature of the war.<br />
Whoever listens to the calls of Osama bin Laden senses in his words his care for the<br />
indoctrination of the supporters of the <strong>Jihad</strong>i current, like for example in the Gulf<br />
States, in order to target the o<strong>il</strong> fields. The Sheikh, I think, could <strong>di</strong>rect the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n<br />
through personal secret messages. However, he wanted the indoctrination to be<br />
public, in order that the crowds of people, who wait for his speeches through the TV<br />
channels or the Internet, would internalize his targets and follow them. If these<br />
messages would be clandestine and then the o<strong>il</strong> field would be attacked, the masses<br />
of sympathizers might not approve it and might even turn to the opposite side and<br />
withdraw their support. Public statements by the Sheikh or the many videos of the<br />
mujahed<strong>di</strong>n can avoid such a negative impact of such an attack.<br />
In the final analysis the culture of modern global jihad must use open indoctrination<br />
in order to sustain and broaden its au<strong>di</strong>ence in general, and its younger generations<br />
in particular. Open indoctrination is incompatible with <strong>di</strong>sinformation. Therefore,<br />
even though we should be selective and careful in our selection of which information<br />
on <strong>Jihad</strong>i web sites we follow, once we have established the authenticity of a <strong>Jihad</strong>i<br />
web site, we can be reasonably certain that the words we read from their lips are<br />
cre<strong>di</strong>ble. The <strong>Jihad</strong>ist instigators cannot allow themselves to mislead the “Solid<br />
Base”— al-Qa’ida al-Sulbah—the base of the future pioneering <strong>Jihad</strong>i generations.<br />
Furthermore, we should understand the role of jihad played by the present<br />
ideological umbrella of global jihad. This role is not merely one of terrorism but, and<br />
perhaps more importantly so, a crucial p<strong>il</strong>lar in the current solidarity among Arabs<br />
and Muslims, as well as in the nation bu<strong>il</strong><strong>di</strong>ng process of the future Muslim<br />
Caliphate. In Apr<strong>il</strong> 1988, Dr. Abdallah Azzam, the spiritual father of modern global<br />
jihad, wrote so very clearly in the article in which he established the idea of al-<br />
Qa’ida: 72<br />
72 Abdallah Azzam, “Al-Qa`idah al-Sulbah,” Al-<strong>Jihad</strong> (Afghanistan), No. 41 (Apr<strong>il</strong> 1988), pp. 46-49.<br />
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“The Islamic society cannot be established without an Islamic movement that goes<br />
through the fire of tests. Its members need to mature in the fire of trials. This<br />
movement w<strong>il</strong>l represent the spark that ignites the potential of the nation. It w<strong>il</strong>l<br />
carry out a long jihad in which the Islamic movement w<strong>il</strong>l provide the leadership,<br />
and the spiritual guidance. The long jihad w<strong>il</strong>l bring people’s qualities to the fore and<br />
highlight their potentials. It w<strong>il</strong>l define their positions and have their leaders assume<br />
their roles, to <strong>di</strong>rect the march and channel it…<br />
Hol<strong>di</strong>ng of arms by the group of believers before having undergone this long<br />
educating training—Tarbiyyah—is forbidden, because those carrying arms could turn<br />
into ban<strong>di</strong>ts that might threaten people’s security and do not let them live in peace.”<br />
The long jihad with which the West—and indeed much of the world—is currently<br />
facing uses the Internet to provide both <strong>Jihad</strong>ists and us, a wide spectrum of<br />
<strong>di</strong>versified information. Western intelligence and security analysts can learn more<br />
about the culture of jihad by rea<strong>di</strong>ng the lips of <strong>Jihad</strong>i clerics, scholars, operatives,<br />
commanders, leaders, and above all their growing au<strong>di</strong>ence. Improving their ab<strong>il</strong>ity<br />
to do so and above all in the original language must be our priority.<br />
Conclusion<br />
During the middle ages and later periods, Muslims tended to view the campaigns of<br />
Christian Crusaders as something akin to their own jihad —that is, as a clearly<br />
spiritual duty that <strong>di</strong>d not <strong>di</strong>stinguish between religion and politics. The perception<br />
of the Crusader era as a triumphant phase in Islamic history has been revived and<br />
emphasized in the last few decades by Islamist movements. When Bin Laden named<br />
his front “World Islamic Front for the jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders”, his<br />
meaning was clear to the entire Muslim World. Furthermore, such language<br />
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provided both his imme<strong>di</strong>ate followers and wider Islamic circles with hope for a<br />
better and victorious future and a sense of the apocalypse. By exploiting feelings of<br />
hatred developed mainly on social and economic grounds, Bin Laden and al-Qa’ida<br />
also succeeded in convincing many Muslims that their future lay in terrorizing the<br />
West. The American occupation of Iraq and recently the sense by many Arab Sunnis<br />
of a forthcoming threat by Iran, added to the sense of the apocalypse the Sunni-Shi`i<br />
conflict as well. This conflict is in turn another renewal of past Islamic history.<br />
The root of the Islamist violence lies in the inab<strong>il</strong>ity of many Muslims to cope with<br />
Western modernization. Islamic fundamentalism is in many ways a search for the<br />
glorious past of Islam, in the middle ages, and the ideal mo<strong>del</strong> of the first generation<br />
of Muslim history: the Salaf al-Saleh. The ra<strong>di</strong>calization of this phenomenon lies in the<br />
pursuit of an imme<strong>di</strong>ate renewal of this glorious past, based on great expectations<br />
developed since September 11 attacks. The continuous sense of retreat felt by many<br />
Muslims during the second half of the twentieth century brought impatience that led<br />
to support for violence. Over the past few years, the doctrine of long-term social<br />
revolution—expounded by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World and by<br />
Jama`at-I-Islam in In<strong>di</strong>a and the non-Arab Muslim World—lost much of its appeal<br />
for these Muslims. They were searching for an imme<strong>di</strong>ate improvement in their<br />
social con<strong>di</strong>tions, and therefore rea<strong>di</strong>ly adopted the notions of the culture of global<br />
jihad as a clash between civ<strong>il</strong>izations.<br />
The current trend among Islamist groups is to move away from terrorism that is<br />
confined to their in<strong>di</strong>vidual countries and <strong>di</strong>rected against the “heretic” regimes that<br />
persecute them, and toward operations that are global in scope. This trend is rooted<br />
in two organizationally <strong>di</strong>stinct—yet ideologically connected—events of the previous<br />
decade. One was the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. The second was the<br />
participation of Islamist volunteers in conflicts in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo,<br />
Chechnya, Kashmir, and Dagestan throughout the 1990s. These two lines eventually<br />
merged through the establishment of an international Islamist front in Afghanistan.<br />
This union was also soli<strong>di</strong>fied by the oppression and violence that Islamists<br />
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experienced under various Arab regimes, which created a camp of Islamist refugees<br />
who could no longer act in their homelands. In one sense, then, they were forced to<br />
pursue the new route of global terrorism. When they lost Afghanistan in December<br />
2001, they moved to Iraq in 2003, and started the intensive indoctrination through the<br />
Internet since then, in the rest of the Arab and Muslim world.<br />
This global phenomenon has been exacerbated by a relatively old process, one that<br />
actually accelerates in the coming years: the ra<strong>di</strong>calization of Muslim, primar<strong>il</strong>y Arab<br />
immigrants in the West. This process is largely a consequence of the alienation that<br />
many second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants feel within Western<br />
societies, whether due to irreconc<strong>il</strong>able values, quashed expectations, or other<br />
factors. One result of this process has been the rapid development of an Islamic<br />
activist infrastructure within Western democracies, such that any number of<br />
organizations in Europe and the United States could serve as the logistical and<br />
financial backbone of Islamist terrorist groups.<br />
This problem of social alienation among younger Muslims merits a study of its own.<br />
In short, though, any solution w<strong>il</strong>l require a better understan<strong>di</strong>ng in the West of the<br />
roots of Islamist violence as part of the culture of global jihad. The antiterrorism steps<br />
currently being taken by the United States and other Western countries—such as new<br />
legislation, better cooperation in the intelligence field, encouragement of<br />
counterterrorism efforts by Arab and Muslim states, and extra<strong>di</strong>tion of arrested<br />
terrorists—are all important. Yet, these measures do not address the fundamental<br />
causes of the problem, and may even enhance the notion that the Islamist struggle is<br />
an ideological global clash between civ<strong>il</strong>izations.<br />
The September 11 attacks and the war against Islamist terrorism pave the way for<br />
new ideological interpretations among <strong>Jihad</strong>i scholars, clerics, and groups, and<br />
produce new methods of dealing with the facts in light of Islamic constants. Islamist<br />
groups and Muslim intellectuals that determine this new vision publish fresh stu<strong>di</strong>es<br />
and <strong>di</strong>ssertations. Formerly, the general vision and intellectual <strong>di</strong>ssertations by<br />
Islamist groups were limited in scope to their regional problems. For example, the<br />
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Islamist groups in Egypt and Algeria used to focus on ways of rebelling against the<br />
governing regimes and ways of respon<strong>di</strong>ng to violators of Islam. In the Palestinian<br />
arena and Kashmir the visions and related stu<strong>di</strong>es were focused on fighting<br />
occupation, exhorting Muslims to fight for this goal, and expoun<strong>di</strong>ng the shari’a<br />
principles that governed this activity. Unlike that, the <strong>Jihad</strong>i insurgency in Iraq and<br />
lately the renewal of the <strong>Jihad</strong>i struggle in Afghanistan, produce a variety of wide-<br />
range doctrines, debates, and indoctrinative principles, which are shared by a rapidly<br />
growing class of supporters of global jihad through the Internet.<br />
Add to this the sense of alienation that preva<strong>il</strong>s in the ranks of many intellectuals in<br />
the Arab and Muslim worlds. All this might cause the Islamist movements to<br />
rearrange their action strategies in line with Islamic constants. They w<strong>il</strong>l deal with<br />
the facts but without giving up their ideological constants, abandoning the defense of<br />
oppressed Muslims, or giving up their sanctities regardless of the sacrifices that<br />
might be required. They might do so without reckless zeal in areas and situations<br />
where calmness, sobriety, and wisdom are better qualities in working and making<br />
decisions. This is especially important when one remembers that the objective of the<br />
war against terrorism is viewed by the Islamists as aimed to destroy every Islamist<br />
activity and to lure the Islamists into battles where they can be eliminated, prior to<br />
weakening Islamist groups everywhere and decisively destroying their capab<strong>il</strong>ities.<br />
An important consequence of the war against Islamist terrorism, primar<strong>il</strong>y in Iraq,<br />
and a corner-stone in the <strong>Jihad</strong>i strategy is the shift of terrorist activity back to the<br />
Arab World and the Middle East. Despite the global nature of the Islamist<br />
phenomenon in recent years, their ideal remained the establishment of what they<br />
perceive as the true Islamic state in the heart of the Muslim world. The hard core of<br />
the global jihad movement is composed primar<strong>il</strong>y of Arab Islamists, and the lost of the<br />
Afghan base brought them back to square one: their homeland. The American<br />
occupation in Iraq added to the shift. Dr. Ayman Zawahiri, the Egyptian right-hand<br />
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of Bin Laden, has written about it in his book of memoirs, 73 published in December<br />
2001:<br />
Victory by the armies cannot be achieved unless the infantry occupies the territory.<br />
Likewise, victory for the Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot be<br />
attained unless these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab<br />
region… mob<strong>il</strong>izing and arming the nation w<strong>il</strong>l be up in the air, without any tangible<br />
results, unt<strong>il</strong> a fundamentalist state is established in the region… the establishment of<br />
a Muslim state in the heart of the Islamic world is not an easy or close target.<br />
However, it is the hope of the Muslim nation to restore its fallen caliphate and regain<br />
its lost glory…<br />
Zawahiri goes on to set a new mode of activity for the Islamist groups, which might<br />
be an outcome of the lesson that they learned from their past fa<strong>il</strong>ure in the Arab<br />
world:<br />
The jihad movement must come closer to the masses, defend their honor, fend off<br />
injustice, and lead them to the path of guidance and victory. It must step forward in<br />
the arena of sacrifice and excel to get its message across in a way that makes the right<br />
accessible to all seekers and that makes access to the origin and facts of religion<br />
simple and free of the complexities of terminology and the intricacies of composition.<br />
The jihad movement must de<strong>di</strong>cate one of its wings to work with the masses, preach,<br />
provide services for the Muslim people, and share their concerns through all<br />
ava<strong>il</strong>able avenues for charity and educational work. We must not leave a single area<br />
unoccupied. We must win the people's confidence, respect, and affection. The people<br />
w<strong>il</strong>l not love us unless they felt that we love them, care about them, and are ready to<br />
defend them…<br />
73 The book, Fursan tahta Rayat al-Nabi (Knights under the Prophet’s Banner), was published in eleven parts by<br />
the Sau<strong>di</strong>-owned London-based Al-Sharq al-Awsat, between 2-12 December 2001<br />
(www.assharqalawsat.com/pcda<strong>il</strong>y/pcstatic/ny-attack/zawahri.html). Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to the paper the manuscript<br />
was smuggled from Afghanistan. The paper named it “The last w<strong>il</strong>l”, referring to the possib<strong>il</strong>ity that the book<br />
was the last work of Zawahiri and a w<strong>il</strong>l for the coming generations. Exerpts from the book were translated to<br />
English by FBIS (Document No. FBIS-NES-2002-0108, date: 1/10/02).<br />
Zawahiri wrote in the opening chapter: “I have also written this book to perform my duty to our generation and<br />
the generations that w<strong>il</strong>l follow. Perhaps I w<strong>il</strong>l not be able to write more amid all these worrying circumstances<br />
and changing con<strong>di</strong>tions.”<br />
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In short, in waging the battle the jihad movement must be in the middle, or ahead, of<br />
the nation. It must be extremely careful not to get isolated from its nation or engage<br />
the government in the battle of the elite against the authority… We must not blame<br />
the nation for not respon<strong>di</strong>ng or not living up to the task. Instead, we must blame<br />
ourselves for fa<strong>il</strong>ing to <strong>del</strong>iver the message, show compassion, and sacrifice…<br />
Liberating the Muslim nation, confronting the enemies of Islam, and launching jihad<br />
against them require a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land that raises<br />
the banner of jihad and rallies the Muslims around it. Without achieving this goal our<br />
actions w<strong>il</strong>l mean nothing more than mere and repeated <strong>di</strong>sturbances that w<strong>il</strong>l not<br />
lead to the aspired goal, which is the restoration of the caliphate and the <strong>di</strong>smissal of<br />
the invaders from the land of Islam.<br />
This goal must remain the basic objective of the Islamic jihad movement, regardless of<br />
the sacrifices and the time involved.<br />
A good and even “doubled” reason to return to the Arab world, revealed in<br />
Zawahiri’s words, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:<br />
The jihad movement's opportunity to lead the nation toward jihad to liberate Palestine<br />
is now doubled. All the secular currents that paid lip service to the issue of Palestine<br />
and competed with the Islamic movement to lead the nation in this regard are now<br />
exposed before the Muslim nation following their recognition of Israel's existence<br />
and adoption of negotiations and compliance with the international resolutions to<br />
liberate what is left, or permitted by Israel, of Palestine. These currents <strong>di</strong>ffer among<br />
themselves on the amount of crumbs thrown by Israel to the Muslims and the Arabs.<br />
The fact that must be acknowledged is that the issue of Palestine is the cause that has<br />
been firing up the feelings of the Muslim nation from Morocco to Indonesia for the<br />
past 50 years. In ad<strong>di</strong>tion, it is a rallying point for all the Arabs, be they believers or<br />
non-believers, good or ev<strong>il</strong>.<br />
As it seems so far, the phenomenon of the global jihad movement is not likely to<br />
reach the end of its way. It is capable of adjusting to arranging its ranks, groups, and<br />
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fronts, and moving its activity to other parts of the world, probably back to the<br />
Middle East on one hand, and to Muslim communities in the West, on the other. The<br />
global earthquake of September 11 attacks in the United States, and the global war<br />
against terrorism, <strong>di</strong>d not actually change the roots of Islamist rage, that feeds this<br />
phenomenon and its violent expressions, and encourages Muslim publics to support,<br />
if not Islamist terrorism at least the ideas that it represents.<br />
Five years after the September 11 attacks—the turning point of global terrorism—TV<br />
channels, newspapers and journals, are inundated with reports, articles, op-eds,<br />
analysises, speeches, and other forms of assessments, on the current status of al-<br />
Qa’ida. Their various authors provide their opinions whether al-Qa’ida is declining, is<br />
increasing its power, is on the eve of its demise, or is unabatedly promoting its<br />
threatening capab<strong>il</strong>ities on a global scale. The conclusions of these assessments are<br />
oftentimes contra<strong>di</strong>ctory, leaving the Western public confused as to how it should<br />
regard the last five years of global <strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorism.<br />
Naturally, Western lea<strong>di</strong>ng elements in the fight against <strong>Jihad</strong>i terrorism are<br />
interested in portraying the threat and image of al-Qa’ida and global jihad as one in<br />
decline. They point at various successes such as the thwarting of terrorist plots and<br />
other operations; the k<strong>il</strong>ling and capturing of several senior al-Qa’ida operatives;<br />
improved cooperation in the field of global counter-terrorism; and a growing<br />
awareness among the society in many countries to the needs of tighter security<br />
measures. Western leaders also tend to belittle the role of the <strong>Jihad</strong>i insurgency in<br />
Iraq, Afghanistan, or Somalia, in affecting Western security. Some underestimate and<br />
misjudge the adaptive capab<strong>il</strong>ity and dynamism of global jihad, arguing that the<br />
targets of global jihad are static and independent of developments in certain regions.<br />
Furthermore, some Western leaders tend to point at the slow but positive advance of<br />
the democratic process in Middle Eastern countries, referring to general elections in<br />
Iraq, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority (PA), municipal elections in Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia,<br />
as well as to changes in the status of women in the Gulf States, and the “white<br />
revolution” that helped oust Syria out of Lebanon. They tend, however, to keep s<strong>il</strong>ent<br />
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as to the implications of the victory of the Islamic Hamas in the January 2006<br />
elections in the PA, the growth of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, whose possible<br />
triumph was blocked only through governmental oppression during the run-up to<br />
the elections in November 2005; or the increasingly anarchic situation following the<br />
democratic process in Iraq. Only recently, in the attempt to separate Iraqi Kur<strong>di</strong>stan<br />
from the rest of the country, whose president is a fellow nationalist Kurd, the<br />
Kur<strong>di</strong>sh autonomous government abolished the Iraqi flag in its territories.<br />
Reality since 9/11 suggests that in the past five years al-Qa’ida has managed to either<br />
initiate or inspire fatal terrorist attacks throughout the world. These attacks included<br />
several hundreds of suicide operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sinai, Jordan, In<strong>di</strong>a,<br />
Indonesia, Kenya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Europe. Western counter-terrorism<br />
successes notwithstan<strong>di</strong>ng these attacks, as well as a multitude of fo<strong>il</strong>ed attempts are<br />
clear evidence that al-Qa’ida and its aff<strong>il</strong>iates, as well as more loosely aff<strong>il</strong>iated local<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>ist initiatives, are st<strong>il</strong>l capable of planning and executing major attacks.<br />
Moreover, the recently uncovered plot in the United Kingdom involving attacks on<br />
international aviation, shows that some of the planned operations are at least as, if<br />
not more sophisticated than the September 11 attacks. As a result of these ongoing<br />
threats, issues and terms such as immigration, “home-growing <strong>Jihad</strong>ists,”<br />
”prof<strong>il</strong>ing,” “red alerts,” suicide bombings, charities, money-laundering, or “clash of<br />
civ<strong>il</strong>izations and religions,” have firmly penetrated Western life and the vocabulary<br />
of Western <strong>di</strong>scourse.<br />
Moreover, global jihad has clearly won the battle over the Internet. As a means of<br />
indoctrination, al-Qa’ida and its aff<strong>il</strong>iates dominate this me<strong>di</strong>um, wh<strong>il</strong>e the West and<br />
the Muslim world have so far fa<strong>il</strong>ed to devise and affect a serious “counter-<strong>Jihad</strong>i”<br />
response. On a da<strong>il</strong>y basis the entire Western me<strong>di</strong>a community is swimming in the<br />
sea of <strong>Jihad</strong>i web sites. The <strong>Jihad</strong>i response is swift, technologically advanced, highly<br />
adaptive to changing situations, and consumed by the Western me<strong>di</strong>a as a serious<br />
source of information. The most significant role of the <strong>Jihad</strong>i Internet is that of “the<br />
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open university for jihad stu<strong>di</strong>es,” the most effective means of <strong>Jihad</strong>i indoctrination<br />
and inspiration.<br />
Ad<strong>di</strong>ng to these setbacks is the fa<strong>il</strong>ure by the United States and its allies to<br />
apprehend the genuine leadership of al-Qa’ida, which in the fall of 2006, not only<br />
remains at large, but also manages to hotwire the apocalyptic senses of their<br />
followers by means of frequent airing of au<strong>di</strong>o and video cassettes. The <strong>di</strong>stribution<br />
of these tapes has helped al-Qa’ida gain the popularity of a rock band, revered both<br />
by its supporters as well as by the Western me<strong>di</strong>a. Between July and mid-September<br />
2006 alone, Ayman Zawahiri himself has “posted” four tapes out of a total of 27 tapes<br />
posted since September 2001. This means of communication with both the supporters<br />
of global jihad and Western publics and governments, provides al-Qa’ida and<br />
especially its two leaders, with a wealth of power, exercised with what seems to be a<br />
soaring level of self confidence. A close examination and analysis of all the tapes<br />
released by Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri in the past five years, strongly<br />
suggests that their self confidence has developed tremendously in that period. In the<br />
past three years these two al-Qa’ida leaders, and especially Zawahiri, have portrayed<br />
themselves as respected scholars who talk to their “citizens” like pseudo Prime<br />
Ministers. An ad<strong>di</strong>tional example of al-Qa’ida’s domination of the realm of the me<strong>di</strong>a<br />
were the large number of tapes featuring Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi in the period of<br />
2003-mid-2006, and the thousands of video clips from Iraq, Chechnya, Afghanistan,<br />
and elsewhere, documenting almost every terrorist operation. These releases in<strong>di</strong>cate<br />
that the propaganda and indoctrination machinery of al-Qa’ida, which is initiated by<br />
a very small number of people, is well-o<strong>il</strong>ed and highly effective.<br />
The vast body of assessments on the state of al-Qa’ida also features some experts who<br />
attempt to find the “golden path,” claiming that five years since 9-11; al-Qa’ida has<br />
mutated and is weaker as an organization or terrorist group, but much stronger as a<br />
source of inspiration and as an ideology. <strong>Jihad</strong>is traveling to Iraq to explode<br />
themselves, “home-grown immigrants” carrying out terrorist operations in Europe,<br />
or activists of <strong>Jihad</strong>i political subversion active in the Arab and Muslim world, have<br />
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not been recruited by al-Qa’ida. They “recruited” themselves to the service of global<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>i ideology. The vast majority of them undergo virtual mental, indoctrinational,<br />
and practical training through the Internet, not in training camps in Afghanistan or<br />
madrassas in Pakistan.<br />
Furthermore, the ideological and doctrinal developments, which affect a growing<br />
number of youngsters, are not necessar<strong>il</strong>y inspired merely by religious<br />
interpretations, but are also influenced by socio-political developments, taking place<br />
primar<strong>il</strong>y within the Arab world. On the other end—among Western societies—there<br />
is a growing sense that a clash with Muslim communities is inevitable, which results<br />
among other things in stronger support for harsher means of security, even at the<br />
price of certain limitations on civ<strong>il</strong> liberties.<br />
Generally speaking, during the past five years, al-Qa’ida seems to have slowly<br />
expanded as source of support and appeal from among larger segments of Islamic,<br />
primar<strong>il</strong>y Arab, societies. Its organizational power, meanwh<strong>il</strong>e, has not declined<br />
significantly. But, its probably biggest success does not lie in its survival, but in the<br />
development of the culture of global jihad as a kind of entity by itself. This kind of<br />
entity is the main framework of strategy and ideology, which is independent of any<br />
persons or in<strong>di</strong>viduals, nor a certain terrorist operation. Around this culture emerged<br />
within just 10-20 years a community. This community, which is global too, is st<strong>il</strong>l a<br />
minority in the entire Muslim world, but manages to gather around its strategy and<br />
ideology a growing number of supporters, whose sense of the apocalypse on one<br />
hand, and oppression on the other, assists in promoting its targets, at least in the<br />
meantime.<br />
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La nuova al-Qa’ida : tra <strong>di</strong>ssoluzione e rinascita<br />
Introduzione<br />
Andrea Plebani<br />
Cos’è al-Qa’ida. Rispondere a questo interrogativo rappresenta un elemento<br />
in<strong>di</strong>spensab<strong>il</strong>e per comprendere l’attuale fase storica e contribuire alla fine <strong>del</strong>lo<br />
scontro che lacera <strong>il</strong> sistema internazionale; eppure, a cinque anni dall’attentato che<br />
ha scosso le fondamenta <strong>del</strong> mondo occidentale, al-Qa’ida rimane ancora avvolta da<br />
un alone <strong>di</strong> mistero.<br />
Comprendere la reale natura, l’ideologia e la struttura che la contrad<strong>di</strong>stinguono,<br />
così come le modalità attraverso cui essa è riuscita ad assurgere al rango <strong>di</strong> principale<br />
nemico <strong>del</strong>l’unica superpotenza rimasta non rappresenta un mero esercizio<br />
accademico, ma costituisce un elemento fondamentale per elaborare una strategia in<br />
grado <strong>di</strong> porre fine alla minaccia che essa rappresenta.<br />
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Questo saggio non può avere la pretesa <strong>di</strong> fornire la risposta ultima e definitiva<br />
all’interrogativo che ne ha aperto la trattazione, ma si prefigge l’obiettivo <strong>di</strong> fornire<br />
una visione <strong>di</strong> insieme <strong>del</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> al-Qa’ida, in grado <strong>di</strong> collegare tra loro gli<br />
elementi storici, ideologici e strutturali che hanno portato questa realtà a <strong>di</strong>venire<br />
uno dei principali attori <strong>del</strong>l’attuale sistema internazionale e a prevederne le possib<strong>il</strong>i<br />
strategie future.<br />
1. Al-Qa’ida: tra piano materiale e ideologico<br />
Gruppo jiha<strong>di</strong>sta, network operante su scala globale, realtà guida <strong>del</strong> campo<br />
islamista ra<strong>di</strong>cale, organizzazione terroristica. Questi sono solo alcuni dei termini più<br />
comunemente impiegati per definire al-Qa’ida. Eppure, nessuno <strong>di</strong> essi pare essere in<br />
grado <strong>di</strong> definire compiutamente questa realtà.<br />
Le tesi in merito alla reale natura <strong>di</strong> questo <strong>fenomeno</strong> sono molteplici e variano dalla<br />
ormai superata concezione <strong>di</strong> un movimento strutturato attorno a una ristretta<br />
leadership posta al centro <strong>di</strong> un complesso sistema <strong>di</strong> relazioni che avvolgerebbero<br />
l’intero scenario internazionale, alla più recente, e <strong>di</strong>ametralmente opposta, posizione<br />
che vede in al-Qa’ida niente più che una semplice sigla, un brand <strong>di</strong> successo che<br />
permetterebbe alle realtà che decidessero <strong>di</strong> adottarlo <strong>di</strong> godere <strong>di</strong> una visib<strong>il</strong>ità<br />
senza paragoni, e <strong>di</strong> assurgere così al ruolo <strong>di</strong> attori <strong>di</strong> primo piano <strong>del</strong> complesso<br />
scenario post-post Guerra Fredda.<br />
Già <strong>il</strong> fatto che da più parti si affermi che l’attuale conflitto possa essere visto come<br />
una sorta <strong>di</strong> rie<strong>di</strong>zione <strong>del</strong>lo scontro che ha opposto Stati Uniti e Unione Sovietica<br />
fornisce una chiara visione <strong>di</strong> quanto questo <strong>fenomeno</strong> sia poco conosciuto.<br />
Senza considerare l’enorme <strong>di</strong>vario tecnologico e operativo che separa i due attuali<br />
“contendenti” e l’estrema complessità <strong>del</strong>la realtà qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta (ora non più riconducib<strong>il</strong>e<br />
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a un polo decisionale unitario definito né legato ad una specifica realtà territoriale), la<br />
stessa ignoranza che circonda uno dei due attori costituisce uno degli elementi<br />
principali che impe<strong>di</strong>scono anche <strong>il</strong> semplice accostamento dei due perio<strong>di</strong> storici.<br />
Benché durante gli anni <strong>del</strong>la Guerra Fredda <strong>il</strong> mondo sia stato vicino come non mai<br />
allo scoppio <strong>di</strong> un conflitto che avrebbe potuto potenzialmente tradursi nella mutual<br />
assured destruction dei due contendenti, la conoscenza <strong>del</strong>le capacità, <strong>del</strong>le strutture e<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’impianto ideologico <strong>del</strong>l’avversario garantiva, <strong>di</strong> fatto, solide basi su cui operare<br />
le proprie scelte strategiche. Si trattava, in sostanza, <strong>di</strong> un mondo pur sempre in<br />
transizione e soggetto a profonde mo<strong>di</strong>fiche, ma dalle “regole” ben definite, che <strong>il</strong><br />
conflitto o<strong>di</strong>erno non contempla.<br />
La peculiarità strutturale <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida, <strong>il</strong> suo porsi al centro <strong>di</strong> un sistema con<br />
fondamenta poste tanto nel mondo materiale che sul piano ideologico-religioso e la<br />
sua stessa natura multiforme ed estremamente flessib<strong>il</strong>e impe<strong>di</strong>scono <strong>di</strong> <strong>del</strong>ineare in<br />
maniera precisa e chiara <strong>il</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> e, <strong>di</strong> conseguenza, <strong>di</strong> definire con chiarezza la<br />
strategia da adottare. In sostanza, viene a mancare quella conoscenza <strong>del</strong>l’avversario<br />
che era stata un fattore determinante e caratterizzante <strong>del</strong>la Guerra Fredda. Basti<br />
pensare al <strong>di</strong>battito sorto in merito alle reali capacità <strong>del</strong> movimento, alla sua<br />
struttura o alla apparentemente semplice questione relativa alla sua denominazione.<br />
Benché <strong>di</strong> fatti <strong>il</strong> termine al-Qa’ida sia ormai <strong>di</strong> uso comune e associato senza dubbio<br />
alcuno all’organizzazione guidata da Osama bin Laden, esso parrebbe rappresentare<br />
più uno strumento da noi adottato per definire una realtà sfuggente e dai contorni<br />
tutt’altro che definiti, che <strong>il</strong> nome prescelto dal movimento stesso.<br />
Le stesse ra<strong>di</strong>ci <strong>del</strong> termine non contribuiscono a gettar maggior luce sulla questione:<br />
se da una parte infatti esso rimane ancorato al piano materiale, rimandando al<br />
concetto <strong>di</strong> “base”, “casa” o “fondamenta”, dall’altra esso può designare anche una<br />
serie <strong>di</strong> principi, massime e regole. Lo stesso Jason Burke 74 in<strong>di</strong>ca come esso venisse<br />
usato negli anni <strong>del</strong>la battaglia in Afghanistan sia nella sua accezione più materiale -<br />
per in<strong>di</strong>care le basi operative da cui prendevano avvio gli attacchi agli avamposti<br />
74 Si veda Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: the true story of ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islam, Londra, 2004<br />
113
sovietici - che in quella più legata al piano ideologico, come <strong>di</strong>mostra l’uso fattone,<br />
nel corso <strong>di</strong> uno dei suoi più famosi <strong>di</strong>scorsi, da Abdullah Azzam per sottolineare<br />
come fosse necessario creare un’avanguar<strong>di</strong>a <strong>di</strong> credenti che si ponesse alla guida <strong>del</strong><br />
moto <strong>di</strong> rinnovamento mirante a scuotere l’intero mondo musulmano.<br />
Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and [to] put up with<br />
heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly<br />
nor heavenly, that does not require […] a vanguard that gives everything<br />
it possesses in order to achieve victory. […] It carries the flag all along the<br />
sheer, endless and <strong>di</strong>fficult path unt<strong>il</strong> it reaches its destination in the<br />
reality of life, since Allah has destined that it should make it and manifest<br />
itself. This vanguard constitutes the strong foundation (al-qaeda al-sulbah)<br />
for the expected society 75 .<br />
Le parole <strong>di</strong> Azzam aprono uno spiraglio su una <strong>del</strong>le molteplici sfaccettature <strong>del</strong><br />
mosaico qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta. Ancor prima che un’organizzazione terroristica operante su scala<br />
globale, al-Qa’ida è la trasposizione materiale <strong>di</strong> una corrente che, muovendo le<br />
proprie basi dal pensiero dai padri fondatori <strong>del</strong> fondamentalismo islamico e dalla<br />
necessità <strong>di</strong> riformare profondamente, sulla base <strong>del</strong>la purezza <strong>del</strong> messaggio<br />
profetico, l’intero sistema islamico, si è progressivamente tradotta nel più totale<br />
rifiuto <strong>del</strong>la via moderata da essi propugnata, per abbracciare come unica soluzione<br />
lo scontro <strong>di</strong>retto contro i nemici che mirano a <strong>di</strong>videre e annientare l’intera ummah.<br />
Al-Qa’ida non costituisce quin<strong>di</strong> che l’avanguar<strong>di</strong>a e <strong>il</strong> principale alfiere <strong>di</strong> una<br />
corrente interna al composito fronte fondamentalista. Essa non rappresenta nella<br />
maniera più assoluta le posizioni <strong>del</strong>l’intera ummah, né <strong>del</strong> complesso campo<br />
fondamentalista, e non detiene, inoltre, neppure <strong>il</strong> “monopolio ideologico” sulla<br />
corrente islamica “ra<strong>di</strong>cale” ( realtà da sempre tutt’altro che monolitica e segnata da<br />
profonde <strong>di</strong>visioni interne), pur essendone ormai <strong>di</strong>ventata l’emblema e la principale<br />
rappresentante.<br />
75 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda, New York, 2002, pp. 4-5<br />
114
Comprendere questo fattore è fondamentale per giungere all’elaborazione <strong>di</strong> una<br />
strategia in grado <strong>di</strong> contrastare efficacemente <strong>il</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> al-Qa’ida.<br />
Impostare l’attuale fase storica come uno scontro inevitab<strong>il</strong>e che contrappone <strong>il</strong><br />
mondo occidentale al “terrorismo internazionale” e al cosiddetto “Asse <strong>del</strong> Male”<br />
non può che avvicinare lo “scontro <strong>di</strong> civ<strong>il</strong>tà” prospettato da Samuel Huntington 76 e<br />
teorizzato dallo stesso Sayyid Qutb – l’ideologo universalmente riconosciuto come<br />
padre <strong>del</strong> ra<strong>di</strong>calismo islamico – che affermava che <strong>il</strong> mondo fosse <strong>di</strong>viso in due<br />
blocchi contrapposti e inconc<strong>il</strong>iab<strong>il</strong>i: dar al-Islam e dar al-Harb 77 .<br />
“Although branded a ‘War against Terrorism’ by the US, the fight is<br />
against a ra<strong>di</strong>cal ideology producing Muslim youth w<strong>il</strong>ling to k<strong>il</strong>l and <strong>di</strong>e<br />
and wealthy Muslims w<strong>il</strong>ling to support and suffer incarceration. For the<br />
al-Qa’ida umbrella […] the fight is against a civ<strong>il</strong>ization. The reality is that,<br />
it is a fight between the vast majority of progressive Muslims and the<br />
miniscule percentage of Ra<strong>di</strong>cal Muslims. It is not a clash of civ<strong>il</strong>ization<br />
but a clash among civ<strong>il</strong>izations – a fight that must essentially be fought<br />
within the Muslim world” 78 .<br />
Alla luce <strong>di</strong> tali considerazioni, la cosiddetta guerra al terrorismo non può più essere<br />
orientata esclusivamente alla <strong>di</strong>struzione <strong>del</strong>le cellule operative e <strong>di</strong> sostegno <strong>di</strong> al-<br />
Qa’ida, ma colpire duramente le tesi e le basi ideologiche <strong>del</strong> movimento per scalfirne<br />
la legittimità agli occhi dei suoi sostenitori e limitarne l’appeal sulle fasce più<br />
fac<strong>il</strong>mente raggiungib<strong>il</strong>i dal suo messaggio.<br />
“By only attacking the terrorist cells that are planning and preparing<br />
attacks, you can never destroy a terrorist organization. Terrorists,<br />
especially the al-Qa’ida brand of terrorists, have a very high capacity for<br />
replenishing human losses. In order to fight terrorism, it is very<br />
important, in parallel with the strategy of targeting al-Qa’ida operation<br />
76 Si veda Samuel Huntington, The clash of civ<strong>il</strong>ization and remaking of world order, 1996<br />
77 Con <strong>il</strong> primo termine si in<strong>di</strong>cano quei territory sottoposti al controllo <strong>del</strong>l’Islam. Con <strong>il</strong> secondo, le aree non<br />
poste sotto tale dominio e quin<strong>di</strong> potenzialmente “aperte alla guerra”.<br />
78 Rohan Gunaratna, The rise and decline of al Qaeda, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks<br />
upon the United States, 9 luglio 2003, p. 9<br />
115
cells, to attack their ideological bases. If one only targets the operational<br />
infrastructure and does not target the ideological motivation, then<br />
certainly these organizations w<strong>il</strong>l survive. That means we w<strong>il</strong>l have to<br />
fight terrorism for another hundred years” 79 .<br />
La lotta “sul campo” all’organizzazione guidata da Osama bin Laden è infatti<br />
sicuramente fondamentale per porre fine a questa minaccia ma non può costituire<br />
che una parte <strong>del</strong>le misure da adottarsi; <strong>il</strong> confronto e la demolizione <strong>del</strong>le basi<br />
ideologiche che sono alla base <strong>del</strong> movimento qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta rappresentano parimenti un<br />
elemento imprescin<strong>di</strong>b<strong>il</strong>e per debellare questa realtà che è riuscita a sopravvivere<br />
all’impressionante serie <strong>di</strong> contromisure adottate.<br />
Nonostante la campagna scatenata contro l’organizzazione abbia coinvolto l’intera<br />
comunità internazionale e si sia tradotta in un formidab<strong>il</strong>e impegno sotto <strong>il</strong> prof<strong>il</strong>o<br />
m<strong>il</strong>itare, economico e politico, la minaccia al mondo occidentale rimane ancora<br />
altissima e ben lungi dall’esaurirsi in un orizzonte <strong>di</strong> breve periodo. La caduta <strong>del</strong><br />
santuario afgano, la cattura e l’uccisione <strong>di</strong> molti tra i più importanti esponenti<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione e le imponenti contromisure adottate, pur essendo riuscite a<br />
<strong>di</strong>minuire notevolmente le capacità operative <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida, non si sono tradotte in una<br />
sostanziale <strong>di</strong>minuzione degli attacchi ad essa più o meno <strong>di</strong>rettamente riconducib<strong>il</strong>i<br />
(si veda Fig. 1).<br />
1<br />
1998<br />
0<br />
1999<br />
1<br />
2000<br />
1<br />
2001<br />
9<br />
2002<br />
Fig1. Attacchi perpetrati da al-Qa’ida e dalle organizzazioni ad essa aff<strong>il</strong>iate 80 - Gennaio 1998-Maggio 2006<br />
79 Rohan Gunaratna in Al Qaeda Now. Understan<strong>di</strong>ng today’s terrorists, Karen J. Greenberg, Cambridge, 2005, p. 43<br />
80 Fonte: Intel Center, <strong>Jihad</strong>i Ops Tempo Statistics (JOTS), 19 Maggio 2006, p. 7, http://www.intelcenter.com/JOTS-<br />
PUB-v1-4.pdf . Per una analisi più analitica degli attentati riconducib<strong>il</strong>i ad al-Qaida e alle realtà ad essa aff<strong>il</strong>iate si<br />
116<br />
8<br />
2003<br />
20<br />
2004<br />
10<br />
2005<br />
4<br />
2006<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0
Cosa ancora più importante, benché la quasi totalità degli analisti sia sostanzialmente<br />
concorde nell’affermare che l’organizzazione abbia subito danni tali da limitare in<br />
maniera determinante l’effettivo controllo <strong>del</strong>la leadership sul movimento, esso pare<br />
essere riuscito ad adattarsi al nuovo e mutato contesto, abbandonando la<br />
“tra<strong>di</strong>zionale” struttura, a favore <strong>di</strong> una realtà strutturata su base orizzontale, su cui<br />
la “leadership storica” avrebbe un controllo limitato.<br />
Sarebbe quin<strong>di</strong> sorto un nuovo organismo, non più fondato e basato esclusivamente<br />
sul nucleo storico <strong>del</strong> movimento ma sul contributo garantito da una serie <strong>di</strong> attori<br />
dotati <strong>di</strong> ampia autonomia, che, in molti casi, manterrebbero con l’organizzazione<br />
madre solo un legame <strong>di</strong> aff<strong>il</strong>iazione e non <strong>di</strong> reale subor<strong>di</strong>nazione. Si tratterebbe, in<br />
sostanza, <strong>del</strong>l’affermazione <strong>di</strong> un nuovo <strong>fenomeno</strong> che solo parzialmente<br />
risponderebbe alla caratteristiche <strong>del</strong>la “vecchia” al-Qa’ida e che sarebbe invece<br />
maggiormente basato su un rapporto simbiotico che legherebbe le singole realtà<br />
locali all’organizzazione “madre”. Questo sodalizio garantirebbe alle singole<br />
organizzazioni la possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> sfruttare <strong>il</strong> brand qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta e la sua eccezionale<br />
visib<strong>il</strong>ità, e ad al-Qa’ida le forze operative necessarie per portare a compimento quegli<br />
attacchi che essa potrebbe non essere più in grado <strong>di</strong> condurre <strong>di</strong>rettamente.<br />
Esaminare esclusivamente la conformazione attuale <strong>del</strong> movimento fornirebbe però<br />
un’analisi parziale <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione. Come già precedentemente sottolineato, <strong>il</strong><br />
<strong>fenomeno</strong> al-Qa’ida si estende ben al <strong>di</strong> là <strong>del</strong>la sua semplice struttura, giungendo a<br />
toccare <strong>il</strong> complesso sistema <strong>di</strong> relazioni facenti capo alla sua leadership e <strong>il</strong> ruolo<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione all’interno <strong>del</strong>l’eterogeneo scenario islamico ra<strong>di</strong>cale. Per<br />
rispondere alla domanda che ha aperto questo saggio, occorre quin<strong>di</strong> prendere in<br />
esame le principali tappe <strong>del</strong>la storia <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida, muovendosi dalle peculiari<br />
con<strong>di</strong>zioni esistenti in Afghanistan negli anni ’80 (che ne hanno permesso la graduale<br />
formazione), passando attraverso <strong>il</strong> fondamentale ruolo giocato <strong>del</strong> Sudan e<br />
nuovamente <strong>del</strong>l’Afghanistan nel consolidamento e nell’ascesa <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione<br />
nel decennio successivo, e, infine, analizzando la complessa fase attuale <strong>del</strong><br />
consulti <strong>il</strong> Terrorism Knowledge Base <strong>del</strong> MIPT (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism),<br />
http://www.tkb.org/<br />
117
movimento, impegnato in un <strong>del</strong>icato processo <strong>di</strong> rinascita e sempre più orientato a<br />
trasformare Iraq e Afghanistan nelle nuove basi operative da cui far ripartire <strong>il</strong><br />
richiamo al jihad su scala globale.<br />
2. La storia<br />
Al-Qa’ida nasce storicamente in Afghanistan durante <strong>il</strong> jihad intrapreso contro le<br />
forze sovietiche che avevano occupato <strong>il</strong> Paese. Eppure, questa realtà, sorta<br />
all’interno <strong>del</strong> complesso mondo dei volontari afgani e legata in maniera inscin<strong>di</strong>b<strong>il</strong>e<br />
alla figura <strong>di</strong> Osama bin Laden, si struttura in maniera compiuta solo in un secondo<br />
momento, dopo essersi consolidata e ampliata in Sudan ed essere tornata a calcare <strong>il</strong><br />
suolo afgano nella seconda metà degli anni ’90.<br />
È in questo momento che nasce l’organizzazione terroristica capace <strong>di</strong> portare a<br />
compimento gli attacchi <strong>del</strong>l’11/9 e <strong>di</strong> proporsi come nuova antagonista <strong>del</strong> sistema<br />
<strong>di</strong> sicurezza sorto sulle ceneri <strong>del</strong> periodo post Guerra Fredda. È <strong>di</strong> questa<br />
organizzazione profondamente ra<strong>di</strong>cata nella regione <strong>del</strong>l’Hindu Kush e <strong>del</strong><br />
Khorasan – eppure in nessun modo ad essa circoscritta – che è figlia la “nuova” al-<br />
Qa’ida sopravvissuta all’operazione Enduring Freedom e evolutasi nella complessa<br />
realtà attuale.<br />
Comprendere le modalità attraverso cui l’organizzazione fondata da Bin Laden si sia<br />
strutturata nel tempo <strong>di</strong>viene quin<strong>di</strong> fondamentale per capire la nuova realtà<br />
qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta e le sue principali caratteristiche.<br />
118
2.1 Le origini <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida<br />
2.1.1 L’Afghanistan quale culla <strong>del</strong> movimento qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta<br />
Il ruolo giocato dall’Afghanistan nell’ascesa <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida è stato senza alcun dubbio<br />
fondamentale. Questo Paese non ha dato solamente i natali all’organizzazione ma ha<br />
rappresentato anche un campo <strong>di</strong> addestramento eccezionale per <strong>il</strong> movimento,<br />
ponendolo <strong>di</strong> fronte ad un formidab<strong>il</strong>e schieramento <strong>di</strong> forze ritenute tra le meglio<br />
addestrate ed equipaggiate <strong>del</strong> mondo e affinandone le tecniche <strong>di</strong> guerriglia.<br />
L’Afghanistan è stato però molto più che un semplice “training ground”. Per quasi<br />
un decennio esso è stato <strong>il</strong> principale campo <strong>di</strong> battaglia che ha visto contrapporsi<br />
forze musulmane a invasori “infe<strong>del</strong>i” e, come tale, ha acquisito una visib<strong>il</strong>ità e<br />
un’importanza eccezionali per l’intera ummah.<br />
Esso <strong>di</strong>venne l’epicentro <strong>di</strong> una nuova chiamata alle armi che investì l’intero mondo<br />
musulmano. Decine <strong>di</strong> migliaia <strong>di</strong> giovani, rispondendo a questo appello,<br />
abbandonarono i loro Paesi, spesso senza alcuna preparazione e addestramento<br />
m<strong>il</strong>itare, per contribuire alla riconquista <strong>del</strong>l’ennesima provincia <strong>del</strong> mondo islamico<br />
caduta in mani nemiche.<br />
Soprattutto, l’Afghanistan finì col rappresentare <strong>il</strong> principale punto <strong>di</strong> incontro <strong>di</strong><br />
coloro che, abbandonato <strong>il</strong> proprio Paese per le forti pressioni a cui i <strong>di</strong>versi<br />
movimenti fondamentalisti erano sottoposti o per la volontà <strong>di</strong> lottare per un ideale<br />
che trascendesse una realtà nella quale non si riconoscevano, avevano deciso <strong>di</strong><br />
abbracciare la causa jiha<strong>di</strong>sta. Provenienti da movimenti, organizzazioni e realtà<br />
spesso estremamente <strong>di</strong>fferenti (e talvolta in aperto conflitto) tra loro, questi guerrieri<br />
sperimentarono sulla propria pelle le privazioni e gli orrori <strong>del</strong>la guerra, rinsaldando<br />
o creando ex nih<strong>il</strong>o forti legami <strong>di</strong> fratellanza in grado <strong>di</strong> superare barriere<br />
linguistiche, etniche ed ideologiche.<br />
119
Nacque in questo contesto la composita ed estremamente eterogenea realtà dei<br />
“volontari afgani”, all’interno <strong>del</strong>la quale al-Qa’ida avrebbe ampiamente attinto sia<br />
per consolidare i propri ranghi, che per garantire <strong>il</strong> necessario supporto economico,<br />
logistico, e operativo alle proprie attività terroristiche.<br />
Questo processo non avvenne però imme<strong>di</strong>atamente. Identificare al-Qa’ida con <strong>il</strong><br />
composito <strong>fenomeno</strong> sopra <strong>del</strong>ineato significherebbe interpretare erroneamente <strong>il</strong><br />
peso e la natura <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione fondata da Osama bin Laden. Essa è infatti <strong>il</strong><br />
risultato <strong>di</strong> una complessa serie <strong>di</strong> avvenimenti e relazioni la cui creazione può essere<br />
fatta risalire al periodo <strong>del</strong> conflitto afgano, ma che si strutturarono e consolidarono<br />
in una realtà definita solo in un secondo momento.<br />
A pochi anni dallo scoppio <strong>del</strong> conflitto contro le truppe sovietiche, Osama bin<br />
Laden ricopriva ancora un ruolo marginale all’interno <strong>del</strong> complesso scenario<br />
afgano. Giunto nel Paese al seguito <strong>di</strong> Abdullah Azzam - suo mentore, nonché figura<br />
guida <strong>del</strong> jihad afgano e fondatore <strong>del</strong> Mekhtab al-Khadamat 81 (l’organizzazione<br />
preposta al raccoglimento <strong>di</strong> fon<strong>di</strong> da destinare al conflitto in Afghanistan e al<br />
reclutamento <strong>di</strong> volontari provenienti dall’intera ummah) – egli agì, soprattutto nei<br />
primi anni, come fund raiser per sostenere la lotta dei mujahiddeen .<br />
Bin Laden mise al servizio <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione i suoi contatti con alcune <strong>del</strong>le<br />
principali casate sau<strong>di</strong>te riuscendo a garantire un ingente flusso <strong>di</strong> donazioni<br />
tradottesi – tra l’altro - nella fondazione <strong>di</strong> una serie <strong>di</strong> centri <strong>di</strong> addestramento,<br />
rifornimento e aggregazione per i mujahiddeen che avrebbero combattuto contro le<br />
forze sovietiche. Il primo <strong>di</strong> tali complessi, <strong>il</strong> Beit al-Ansar, rappresentò la pietra <strong>di</strong><br />
posa <strong>di</strong> un sistema che si sarebbe ben presto esteso al <strong>di</strong> fuori <strong>del</strong>la città chiave <strong>di</strong><br />
Peshawar e che si sarebbe rivelato determinante per la formazione e l’ascesa <strong>di</strong> al-<br />
Qa’ida, fornendo assistenza e addestramento a un numero impressionante <strong>di</strong><br />
volontari.<br />
Stimare in maniera precisa <strong>il</strong> numero <strong>di</strong> guerriglieri che fruirono dei servizi garantiti<br />
dal Mekhtab al-Khadamat è impresa pressoché impossib<strong>il</strong>e. Le analisi sino ad ora<br />
81 Si veda Kenneth Katzman, Al Qaeda: Prof<strong>il</strong>e and Threat Assessment, CRS Report for Congress, 17 Agosto 2005, p. 2<br />
120
condotte variano notevolmente e <strong>del</strong>ineano un intervallo che comprenderebbe un<br />
numero <strong>di</strong> guerrieri incluso tra le 25.000 e le 250.000 unità 82 . Ciò che è certo però è<br />
che l’organizzazione <strong>di</strong>venne un vero punto <strong>di</strong> riferimento per i volontari stranieri<br />
accorsi nel Paese ricoprendo un ruolo determinante sia nel corso <strong>del</strong> conflitto che<br />
negli anni imme<strong>di</strong>atamente successivi.<br />
È in quegli anni che <strong>il</strong> futuro leader <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida conobbe e instaurò forti legami con<br />
alcuni tra i principali esponenti <strong>del</strong>la resistenza afgana, quali Burhanud<strong>di</strong>n Rabbani e<br />
Ahmed Shah Masood (Jamaat-i-Islami), Abdul Rasool Sayaf (Itehar-i-Islami) e<br />
Gu<strong>il</strong>bud<strong>di</strong>n Hekmatyar (leader <strong>del</strong> movimento Hizb-i-Islami vicino al servizi <strong>di</strong><br />
intelligence pakistani) ma anche e, soprattutto, alcune tra le più importanti<br />
personalità <strong>del</strong> complesso movimento fondamentalista internazionale ed egiziano,<br />
come lo sheikh cieco Ab<strong>del</strong> Omar Rahman e Ayman al Zawahiri 83 .<br />
L’incontro con Ayman al Zawahiri costituisce uno dei momenti fondamentali <strong>del</strong>la<br />
storia <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida poiché segna l’inizio <strong>di</strong> un percorso che porterà Osama bin Laden<br />
ad assumere una posizione sempre più antitetica rispetto a quella <strong>di</strong> Abdullah<br />
Azzam, in un momento estremamente critico per le sorti <strong>del</strong> conflitto afgano legato al<br />
progressivo ritiro <strong>del</strong>le forze sovietiche nel febbraio 1989. La presenza degli<br />
“infe<strong>del</strong>i” aveva infatti rappresentato <strong>il</strong> vero collante che aveva mantenuto unite le<br />
<strong>di</strong>verse fazioni afgane contrapposte. Con la partenza <strong>del</strong> contingente sovietico veniva<br />
meno <strong>il</strong> principale motivo che era stato alla base <strong>del</strong>la creazione <strong>del</strong>la composita<br />
coalizione e riemergevano quin<strong>di</strong> le profonde fratture interne.<br />
Questa situazione si ripropose, sebbene in toni minori, anche all’interno <strong>del</strong>la<br />
complessa realtà facente capo alla Mekhtab al-Khadamat. La partenza <strong>del</strong>l’invasore<br />
poneva <strong>di</strong> fatto la questione relativa al futuro <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione, che aveva assunto<br />
una posizione <strong>di</strong> primo piano all’interno <strong>del</strong> composito panorama jiha<strong>di</strong>sta<br />
internazionale. In particolare, emerse sempre più <strong>il</strong> dualismo tra <strong>il</strong> leader<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’associazione, Abdullah Azzam, e <strong>il</strong> suo vecchio <strong>di</strong>scepolo, compagno e<br />
82 Si veda Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda, New York, 2002, p. 28 e Peter. L. Bergen, Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret<br />
World of Osama Bin Laden, New York, 2001, p. 45<br />
83 Stefan Aubrey, The new <strong>di</strong>mension of international terrorism, Zurigo, 2004, p. 149<br />
121
successore designato, Osama bin Laden, ormai <strong>di</strong>venuto una figura <strong>di</strong> primo piano<br />
nel complesso panorama afgano, sempre più legato alle ra<strong>di</strong>cali posizioni <strong>di</strong> Ayman<br />
al Zawahiri.<br />
A <strong>di</strong>fferenza <strong>del</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta, Azzam intendeva concentrare le future attività<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione più verso scopi <strong>di</strong>fensivi che offensivi, impiegandola come forza<br />
<strong>di</strong> reazione rapida in grado <strong>di</strong> sostenere i musulmani perseguitati nelle <strong>di</strong>verse aree<br />
<strong>del</strong> pianeta, in primo luogo in Palestina. Soprattutto, egli si opponeva strenuamente<br />
all’impiego <strong>di</strong> tattiche terroristiche (aveva a tal proposito affermato esplicitamente<br />
come tali pratiche fossero inconc<strong>il</strong>iab<strong>il</strong>i con la legge islamica ) e all’estensione <strong>del</strong><br />
jihad afgano ai regimi “apostati” sostenuti dall’Occidente.<br />
“Azzam focused almost exclusively on the Afghan war against Russians<br />
and opposed meddling in the internal affairs of Arab and Muslim<br />
countries, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng Afghanistan. He also eschewed terrorism, targeting<br />
civ<strong>il</strong>ians, and taking jihad global, stating that unless <strong>di</strong>rected into the right<br />
path, jiha<strong>di</strong>s could turn into ban<strong>di</strong>ts that might threaten people’s security<br />
and would not let them live in peace” 84<br />
Sicuramente, le posizioni <strong>di</strong> Azzam erano dettate dagli stretti legami intessuti con la<br />
casa regnante sau<strong>di</strong>ta – sua principale “sponsor” e sostenitrice - ma esse<br />
sottendevano anche l’adesione a una visione <strong>del</strong>l’Islam più legata alla tra<strong>di</strong>zione e<br />
alla “via moderata” <strong>del</strong>l’Associazione dei Fratelli Musulmani e meno propensa ad<br />
abbracciare la visione ra<strong>di</strong>cale ed estremista sorta in particolar modo all’interno <strong>del</strong><br />
complesso mosaico egiziano.<br />
L’attentato che <strong>il</strong> 24 novembre 1989 causò la morte <strong>di</strong> Azzam pose fine alla contesa<br />
che si andava <strong>del</strong>ineando sempre più chiaramente con Osama bin Laden e segnò <strong>di</strong><br />
fatto l’ascesa <strong>di</strong> quest’ultimo e dei suoi fe<strong>del</strong>issimi alla guida <strong>del</strong> Mekhtab al-<br />
Khadamat. Benché questo risultato rappresentasse una grande vittoria per la fazione<br />
<strong>del</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta, esso avvenne in un momento estremamente complesso <strong>del</strong><br />
conflitto afgano.<br />
84 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy. Why jihad went global, Cambridge, 2005, p. 136<br />
122
La ripresa dei conflitti interni alla resistenza non si tradusse infatti solamente in un<br />
rallentamento <strong>del</strong>la campagna contro le forze facenti capo al governo f<strong>il</strong>o-sovietico <strong>di</strong><br />
Muhammad Najibullah, ma nello scoppio <strong>di</strong> vere e proprie faide e nella progressiva<br />
marginalizzazione dei volontari accorsi da tutto <strong>il</strong> mondo musulmano. Molti <strong>di</strong> loro<br />
posero fine alla loro esperienza in Afghanistan e fecero ritorno ai propri Paesi<br />
d’origine. Tra essi vi era lo stesso Osama bin Laden.<br />
2.1.2 Le brevi parentesi sau<strong>di</strong>ta e pakistana<br />
Benché l’accoglienza riservatagli in patria fosse inizialmente estremamente positiva,<br />
<strong>il</strong> sodalizio con la famiglia regnante sau<strong>di</strong>ta era però destinato a un rapido declino.<br />
L’invasione irachena <strong>del</strong> Kuwait nell’agosto 1990 e la richiesta <strong>di</strong> intervento <strong>di</strong> forze<br />
statunitensi a <strong>di</strong>fesa <strong>del</strong> Regno formalizzata dalla casata regnante segnarono la<br />
formazione <strong>di</strong> un’insanab<strong>il</strong>e rottura. La permanenza <strong>di</strong> truppe “infe<strong>del</strong>i” sul<br />
territorio sau<strong>di</strong>ta anche alla fine <strong>del</strong>la fase più intensa <strong>del</strong>l’operazione “Desert<br />
Storm” costituiva una con<strong>di</strong>zione inaccettab<strong>il</strong>e per Osama bin Laden che denunciò<br />
apertamente la condotta <strong>del</strong>la leadership <strong>del</strong> Paese, rendendolo <strong>di</strong> fatto uno dei<br />
principali oppositori <strong>del</strong> regime. La rottura con l’establishment sau<strong>di</strong>ta fu quin<strong>di</strong><br />
inevitab<strong>il</strong>e, così come <strong>il</strong> suo “allontanamento” alla volta <strong>del</strong> Pakistan 85 .<br />
L’esperienza pakistana fu però <strong>di</strong> breve durata. Benché <strong>il</strong> peso <strong>del</strong> Mekhtab al-<br />
Khadamat fosse ancora notevole, gli stretti legami intessuti ai tempi <strong>del</strong>la guerra<br />
afgana con l’Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) si erano fatti sempre più lab<strong>il</strong>i e non<br />
poterono garantire a lungo l’intoccab<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>del</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta, anche a causa <strong>del</strong>la sua<br />
posizione fortemente ost<strong>il</strong>e a Benazir Bhutto, allora alla guida <strong>del</strong> Paese, e degli<br />
stretti legami che univano Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta e Pakistan. Proprio nel momento in cui<br />
pareva che <strong>il</strong> cerchio attorno ad Osama bin Laden si stesse per chiudere<br />
85 In realtà al leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta, al quale era stata revocata la possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> abbandonare <strong>il</strong> Paese, era stata concessa<br />
una deroga in modo da permettergli <strong>di</strong> raggiungere l’Afghanistan per fungere da me<strong>di</strong>atore tra tra le <strong>di</strong>verse<br />
fazioni che in lotta. Bin Laden però decise <strong>di</strong> non tornare in patria e <strong>di</strong> recarsi in Pakistan<br />
123
inesorab<strong>il</strong>mente, Hasan al-Turabi, la guida spirituale <strong>del</strong> Fronte Nazionale Islamico<br />
(FNI), salito al potere in Sudan nel 1989, presentò al movimento l’unica via d’uscita<br />
esperib<strong>il</strong>e al momento: la trasposizione <strong>del</strong>la sua guida e <strong>di</strong> gran parte dei suoi più<br />
stretti collaboratori nel Paese che si can<strong>di</strong>dava a <strong>di</strong>venire la nuova frontiera <strong>del</strong><br />
composito movimento fondamentalista internazionale.<br />
2.1.3 L’es<strong>il</strong>io sudanese<br />
La “cattività sudanese” si rivelò ben presto molto più che una semplice tappa<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’esodo <strong>di</strong> bin Laden. La presenza <strong>di</strong> Omar al-Bashir e <strong>di</strong> Hasan al-Turabi garantì<br />
infatti al leader arabo <strong>il</strong> sostegno necessario per riorganizzare le f<strong>il</strong>a <strong>del</strong>la propria<br />
organizzazione e, soprattutto, gli permise <strong>di</strong> allargare la propria rete <strong>di</strong> contatti. La<br />
salita al potere <strong>del</strong> FNI aveva infatti favorito l’afflusso nel Paese <strong>di</strong> molteplici gruppi<br />
islamici ra<strong>di</strong>cali in fuga o alla ricerca <strong>di</strong> una nuova base operativa e aveva anche<br />
permesso al movimento <strong>di</strong> fruire <strong>del</strong> supporto <strong>di</strong> realtà già fortemente ra<strong>di</strong>cate nello<br />
scenario internazionale come Hezbollah o alcune componenti <strong>del</strong> complesso mosaico<br />
iraniano 86 . Questo periodo segnò quin<strong>di</strong> un momento cruciale nel processo <strong>di</strong><br />
formazione <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida, permettendo alla leadership <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione <strong>di</strong><br />
estendere i propri contatti ben oltre Pakistan, Afghanistan e regione me<strong>di</strong>orientale e<br />
instaurando nuovi legami - e spesso veri e propri rapporti <strong>di</strong> collaborazione - con<br />
attivisti algerini e tunisini, ma anche tagiki, ceceni e azeri, oltre che giordani ed<br />
eritrei 87 .<br />
L’importanza <strong>del</strong> periodo sudanese non è però legata esclusivamente alla sua<br />
centralità all’interno <strong>del</strong>lo scenario islamico ra<strong>di</strong>cale. Il Paese <strong>di</strong>venne infatti <strong>il</strong> centro<br />
<strong>di</strong> un vasto complesso <strong>di</strong> società e compagnie 88 nate per finanziare le attività <strong>del</strong><br />
86 Rohan Gunaratna, The rise and decline of al Qaeda, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks<br />
upon the United States, 9 luglio 2003, p. 2<br />
87 Stefan Aubrey, The new <strong>di</strong>mension of international terrorism, Zurigo, 2004, p. 150<br />
88 Si veda D. P. Sharma, The New Terrorism: Islamist International, New Dehli, 2005, pp. 123-124<br />
124
movimento guidato da bin Laden e per <strong>di</strong>versificarne gli investimenti in un<br />
momento particolarmente <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>e per <strong>il</strong> leader arabo, sempre più ostracizzato<br />
dall’establishment sau<strong>di</strong>ta.<br />
Non solo, esso fornì all’organizzazione la possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> instaurare con <strong>il</strong> governo<br />
sudanese un particolare rapporto <strong>di</strong> collaborazione che si sarebbe poi manifestato<br />
più compiutamente in Afghanistan: in cambio <strong>del</strong>la protezione e <strong>del</strong>la libertà<br />
d’azione concessa all’organizzazione, la leadership <strong>del</strong> Paese poté contare su una<br />
massiccia campagna <strong>di</strong> investimenti a suo favore sia <strong>di</strong>retti che in<strong>di</strong>retti e sul suo<br />
sostegno nella campagna avviata contro le m<strong>il</strong>izie cristiane nel sud <strong>del</strong> Paese.<br />
“Bin Laden […] within two years of his arrival in the country, had spent<br />
ten of m<strong>il</strong>lions of dollars bu<strong>il</strong><strong>di</strong>ng a highway across the desert from<br />
Khartoum to Port Sudan, contributing to a new airport for Khartoum and<br />
keeping al-Turabi’s administration financially afloat during a series of<br />
foreign exchange crises that threatened to leave the country without<br />
fuel” 89<br />
In questo modo <strong>il</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta riuscì a consolidare le basi economiche <strong>del</strong>la propria<br />
organizzazione e a <strong>di</strong>sporre <strong>di</strong> risorse sufficienti per addestrare, armare e finanziare<br />
altre realtà legandole alla propria causa.<br />
"Wh<strong>il</strong>e in Sudan, Osama played a dual role, as both terrorist and<br />
businessman. In keeping with Sudan’s clandestine support for Islamist<br />
movements around the world, he bu<strong>il</strong>t a parallel organization to augment<br />
Khartoum’s efforts. After establishing links with about twenty Islamists<br />
groups engaged in guerr<strong>il</strong>la warfare and terrorism, he supported them<br />
with funds, training and weapons” 90 .<br />
La crescente attenzione posta sul Sudan non si tradusse però in una per<strong>di</strong>ta <strong>di</strong><br />
importanza <strong>del</strong> fronte afgano e pakistano. Benché <strong>il</strong> centro operativo ed esecutivo <strong>del</strong><br />
composito movimento guidato da bin Laden si fosse <strong>di</strong> fatto trasferito nel Paese<br />
89 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: the true story of ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islam, Londra, 2004, p. 145<br />
90 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda, New York, 2002, p. 41<br />
125
guidato da al-Turabi e al-Bashir, le strutture <strong>di</strong> supporto e i centri <strong>di</strong> addestramento<br />
<strong>di</strong>slocati in Afghanistan e Pakistan continuarono a ricoprire un ruolo <strong>di</strong> primo piano,<br />
garantendo al leader <strong>il</strong> mantenimento <strong>di</strong> un’importante testa <strong>di</strong> ponte che si sarebbe<br />
rivelata fondamentale nel prosieguo <strong>del</strong> proprio programma.<br />
La crescente attività <strong>del</strong> movimento in Sudan – e soprattutto gli in<strong>di</strong>zi che lo<br />
collegavano in vario modo al fallito attentato ai danni <strong>del</strong> presidente egiziano Hosni<br />
Mubarak ad Ad<strong>di</strong>s Abeba nel giugno 1995 – attirò infatti sul Paese la condanna <strong>di</strong> un<br />
ampio fronte internazionale guidato dagli Stati Uniti che intensificarono<br />
notevolmente le proprie pressioni in modo da porre fine alla minaccia costituita da<br />
uno stato che si apprestava a <strong>di</strong>venire la base <strong>del</strong> fronte internazionale <strong>del</strong> terrore.<br />
Questa situazione spinse la leadership sudanese a revocare <strong>il</strong> proprio supporto ad<br />
Osama bin Laden che decise quin<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> partire alla volta <strong>del</strong>l’Afghanistan per<br />
ricostruire, questa volta su scala molto più ampia, <strong>il</strong> sistema <strong>di</strong> relazioni e interessi<br />
creato in Sudan.<br />
2.2. Consolidamento, ascesa e caduta: <strong>il</strong> ritorno in Afghanistan<br />
La per<strong>di</strong>ta <strong>del</strong> santuario sudanese aveva rappresentato un duro colpo per i progetti<br />
<strong>di</strong> Bin Laden. L’espulsione <strong>del</strong> movimento – coincisa con <strong>il</strong> definitivo tramonto <strong>di</strong> al-<br />
Turabi e lo spostamento degli equ<strong>il</strong>ibri <strong>di</strong> potere interni a favore <strong>del</strong>l’altro uomo<br />
forte <strong>del</strong> regime, Omar al-Bashir – non aveva solo privato l’organizzazione <strong>di</strong> una<br />
base sicura da cui poter progettare le proprie attività e continuare l’addestramento<br />
dei volontari, ma aveva <strong>di</strong> fatto vanificato gli sforzi fatti in quegli anni per garantire<br />
al movimento solide basi economiche.<br />
“Bin Laden’s departure from Sudan marked a setback for him. The Sau<strong>di</strong><br />
government had frozen his assets three years earlier, and the Sudanese<br />
126
government expropriated his assets there after he left Sudan. The financial<br />
stresses contributed to strained relations with some of his associates, who<br />
used the move back to Afghanistan as an occasion to break from al-<br />
Qa’ida” 91 .<br />
Le ingenti risorse finanziarie <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione avevano da sempre rappresentato<br />
uno dei principali motivi alla base <strong>del</strong> suo successo. Le ristrettezze economiche nelle<br />
quali si trovava ad operare Bin Laden rischiavano quin<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> influire negativamente<br />
sulla rete <strong>di</strong> contatti e relazioni consolidatasi nel corso <strong>del</strong>la sua permanenza in<br />
Sudan e <strong>di</strong> minare la coesione <strong>del</strong> gruppo <strong>di</strong> fe<strong>del</strong>issimi che lo avevano seguito. Non<br />
solo, gli anni seguiti alla sua partenza dall’Afghanistan ne avevano profondamente<br />
mo<strong>di</strong>ficato gli equ<strong>il</strong>ibri <strong>di</strong> potere interni: la lotta per la supremazia sul Paese era<br />
tutt’altro che cessata con la partenza dei sovietici e la caduta <strong>di</strong> Muhammad<br />
Najibullah nell’apr<strong>il</strong>e <strong>del</strong> 1992, e nuovi attori si erano prepotentemente inseriti nel<br />
complesso sistema afgano.<br />
Isolato, privo <strong>del</strong>le risorse economiche che ne avevano fatto una <strong>del</strong>le personalità<br />
chiave <strong>del</strong> jihad afgano e alle prese con un ambiente tutt’altro che favorevole, Bin<br />
Laden si trovava in una situazione ancora più critica <strong>di</strong> quella che lo aveva spinto a<br />
muoversi alla volta <strong>di</strong> Khartoum.<br />
Eppure, l’Afghanistan, così come aveva segnato l’ascesa <strong>di</strong> Bin Laden negli anni ’80,<br />
<strong>di</strong>venne <strong>il</strong> luogo dove al-Qa’ida avrebbe trovato la sua definitiva consacrazione.<br />
Benché in una situazione estremamente complessa, <strong>il</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta non era<br />
totalmente privo <strong>di</strong> risorse: sebbene <strong>il</strong> Sudan fosse <strong>di</strong>ventato <strong>il</strong> centro <strong>del</strong>le attività<br />
economiche <strong>del</strong> movimento, i canali <strong>di</strong> finanziamento creati ai tempi <strong>del</strong> conflitto<br />
afgano erano ancora attivi. Egli godeva, inoltre, ancora <strong>di</strong> un forte sostegno nella<br />
zona tribale ai confini con <strong>il</strong> Pakistan e poteva contare sugli stretti legami intessuti ai<br />
tempi <strong>del</strong> jihad afgano con alcuni dei principali capi dei mujahiddeen.<br />
91 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Overview of the Enemy, Staff Statement<br />
No.15, Agosto 2005, p. 6,<br />
127
Soprattutto però, <strong>il</strong> ritorno <strong>di</strong> Bin Laden aveva preceduto <strong>di</strong> pochi mesi la definitiva<br />
ascesa <strong>del</strong> movimento dei Talebani che, nel settembre 1996, erano riusciti ad<br />
occupare Kabul e Jalalabad, portando a compimento la conquista <strong>del</strong>la quasi totalità<br />
<strong>del</strong> Paese. La vittoria dei Talebani, unita al forte sostegno <strong>di</strong> cui essi godevano ad<br />
Islamabad, poneva <strong>di</strong> fatto al centro <strong>del</strong> complesso ed eterogeneo sistema afgano una<br />
leadership che, benché non potesse mantenere l’assoluto controllo sull’intero<br />
territorio, era in grado <strong>di</strong> limitare la spirale <strong>di</strong> violenze che aveva sconvolto <strong>il</strong> Paese<br />
nell’ultimo decennio.<br />
E una leadership forte, ma al tempo stesso interessata alla creazione <strong>di</strong> un sistema<br />
logistico e operativo in grado <strong>di</strong> consolidare la sua presa sul paese e <strong>di</strong> contrastare le<br />
ultime sacche <strong>di</strong> resistenza, era ciò <strong>di</strong> cui Bin Laden aveva bisogno per avviare un<br />
rapporto <strong>di</strong> collaborazione qualitativamente superiore a quello che lo aveva legato<br />
all’establishment sudanese.<br />
Ovviamente, questo processo non fu imme<strong>di</strong>ato. Il ritorno <strong>di</strong> Bin Laden era infatti<br />
visto da alcuni dei principali esponenti dei Talebani con sospetto, e le relazioni tra i<br />
due schieramenti non furono sin dal principio improntate alla massima<br />
cooperazione. Eppure, la forte personalità <strong>del</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta, e gli efficaci argomenti<br />
<strong>di</strong> cui poteva <strong>di</strong>sporre, gli garantirono nel giro <strong>di</strong> pochi mesi una salda alleanza con <strong>il</strong><br />
leader dei Talebani, <strong>il</strong> Mullah Omar, che non sarebbe mai venuto meno agli impegni<br />
assunti anche nei momenti più <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>i.<br />
L’importanza <strong>del</strong>la base afgana per <strong>il</strong> movimento guidato da Bin Laden può essere<br />
fac<strong>il</strong>mente compresa esaminando una lettera scritta da Ayman al-Zawahiri ad un suo<br />
sottoposto nel maggio <strong>del</strong> 2001 che, attraverso l’impiego <strong>di</strong> un linguaggio in co<strong>di</strong>ce,<br />
evidenziava le con<strong>di</strong>zioni estremamente positive che <strong>il</strong> Paese poteva garantire, la fine<br />
<strong>del</strong> <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>e periodo coinciso con l’espulsione <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione dal Sudan e la<br />
definitiva sconfitta dei movimenti islamici ra<strong>di</strong>cali operanti sul suolo egiziano :<br />
“The most important step was starting the school [al-Qa’ida], the<br />
programs of which have been started. We have also provided the teachers<br />
[mujahedeen] with means of conducting profitable trade [jihad] as much as<br />
128
we could. […] As you know the situation below in the v<strong>il</strong>lage [Egypt] has<br />
become bad for traders [jiha<strong>di</strong>s]. Our Upper Egyptian relatives [Islamic<br />
Group] have left the market, and we are suffering from international<br />
monopolies [ hunted by Western and intelligence services]. Conflicts take<br />
place between us for trivial reasons, due to scarcity of resources. We are<br />
<strong>di</strong>spersed over various cities. However, God had mercy on us when the<br />
Omar Brothers Company [the Taliban] here opened the market for traders<br />
and provided them with an opportunity to reorganize, may God reward<br />
them. Among the benefits of residence here is that traders from all over<br />
gather in one place under one company, which increases fam<strong>il</strong>iarity and<br />
cooperation among them” 92 .<br />
Benché <strong>di</strong> fatto la sopravvivenza <strong>del</strong> movimento continuasse a <strong>di</strong>pendere – così<br />
come avvenuto in Sudan – dal sostegno <strong>del</strong>la leadership al potere, la profonda<br />
conoscenza <strong>del</strong> territorio, gli stretti legami intessuti da Bin Laden con importanti<br />
fazioni afgane e <strong>il</strong> mito che iniziava a circondare la figura <strong>del</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta<br />
garantirono al movimento margini <strong>di</strong> manovra <strong>di</strong> molto superiori a quelli concessi<br />
dal regime <strong>di</strong> Khartoum:<br />
“Bin Laden eventually enjoyed a strong financial position in Afghanistan,<br />
thanks to Sau<strong>di</strong> and other financiers associated with the Golden Chain.<br />
Through his relation with Mullah Omar – and the monetary and other<br />
benefits that it brought the Taliban – Bin Laden was able to circumvent<br />
restrictions[…]. Bin Laden appeared to have in Afghanistan a freedom of<br />
movement that he had lacked in Sudan. Al-Qa’ida members could travel<br />
freely within the country, enter and exit it without visas or any<br />
immigration procedures, purchase and import vehicles and weapons, and<br />
enjoy the use of official Afghan Ministry of Defence license plates. Al-<br />
92 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy. Why jihad went global, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 171-172.<br />
Jason Burke fornisce un’interpretazione <strong>del</strong>la missiva leggermente <strong>di</strong>fferente, identificando i termini “below in<br />
the v<strong>il</strong>lage” e “Upper Egyptian relatives” non con i gruppi islamici ra<strong>di</strong>cali che avevano le loro basi operative<br />
nell’Alto Egitto, ma con <strong>il</strong> regime sudanese che aveva revocato <strong>il</strong> proprio sostegno al movimento guidato da Bin<br />
Laden. (Si veda Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: the true story of ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islam, Londra, 2004, p. 9)<br />
129
Qa’ida also used the Afghan state-owned Ariana airlines to courier money<br />
into the country” 93 .<br />
Questa situazione permise al leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta <strong>di</strong> riattivare pienamente la rete logistica<br />
e <strong>il</strong> sistema <strong>di</strong> campi <strong>di</strong> reclutamento e addestramento creati durante <strong>il</strong> jihad afgano.<br />
Non solo, grazie alla liberta <strong>di</strong> azione concessagli, Bin Laden poté estendere questo<br />
sistema all’intero Afghanistan, in modo da consentire ad un numero sempre più<br />
elevato <strong>di</strong> volontari <strong>di</strong> fluire nel Paese e da trasformarlo nuovamente nel principale<br />
punto <strong>di</strong> riferimento <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale internazionale.<br />
“The alliance with the Taliban provided al-Qa’ida a sanctuary in which to<br />
train and indoctrinate fighters and terrorists, import weapons, forge ties<br />
with other jihad groups and leaders, and plot and staff terrorist schemes.<br />
Wh<strong>il</strong>e Bin Laden maintained his own al-Qa’ida guesthouses and camps for<br />
vetting and training recruits, he also provided support to and benefited<br />
from the broad infrastructure of such fac<strong>il</strong>ities Afghanistan made<br />
ava<strong>il</strong>able to the global network of Islamist movements. U.S. intelligence<br />
estimates put the total number of fighters who underwent instruction in<br />
Bin Laden-supported camps in Afghanistan from 1996 through 9/11 at<br />
10.000 to 20.000” 94 .<br />
L’obiettivo principe <strong>del</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta non era tanto creare un vero e proprio esercito<br />
alle sue <strong>di</strong>rette <strong>di</strong>pendenze – fattore che, tra l’altro, avrebbe rischiato <strong>di</strong> alienargli le<br />
simpatie dei nuovi leader <strong>del</strong> Paese – ma rafforzare i legami intessuti con le<br />
organizzazioni islamiche ra<strong>di</strong>cali con le quali era entrato in contatto, così da creare<br />
un network potenzialmente in grado <strong>di</strong> agire in ogni angolo <strong>del</strong> globo. Per questo<br />
motivo, <strong>del</strong>le migliaia <strong>di</strong> m<strong>il</strong>itanti passati attraverso i campi <strong>di</strong> addestramento afgani<br />
solo un numero estremamente ridotto entrò a far parte dei ranghi <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida. Al-<br />
Qa’ida era e doveva rimanere un movimento d’avanguar<strong>di</strong>a in grado <strong>di</strong> adattarsi alle<br />
93 The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 66<br />
94 The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, pp. 66-67<br />
130
mo<strong>di</strong>fiche <strong>del</strong>l’ambiente nel quale si trovava a operare e <strong>di</strong> porsi al centro <strong>del</strong>la<br />
complessa ed eterogenea galassia <strong>di</strong> movimenti islamici ra<strong>di</strong>cali.<br />
La graduale ascesa <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione spinse <strong>il</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta ad abbandonare <strong>il</strong><br />
sistema decisionale e organizzativo sino ad allora ut<strong>il</strong>izzato 95 a favore <strong>di</strong> una<br />
struttura più definita (si veda Fig. 2), in grado <strong>di</strong> rispondere alle nuove esigenze <strong>di</strong><br />
una realtà in costante espansione, e <strong>di</strong> mantenere al tempo stesso un grado <strong>di</strong><br />
flessib<strong>il</strong>ità sufficiente per permetterle <strong>di</strong> adeguarsi a scenari e teatri <strong>di</strong> azione<br />
<strong>di</strong>fferenti e in continua evoluzione.<br />
Bin Laden continuò a ricoprire un ruolo <strong>di</strong> primo piano, ponendosi a capo <strong>di</strong> una<br />
struttura piramidale che vedeva nel leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta la chiave <strong>di</strong> volta <strong>del</strong>l’intero<br />
sistema (amir). Subito al <strong>di</strong> sotto <strong>del</strong>la guida suprema si collocava un ristretto<br />
consiglio (majlis al shura) composto dai suoi più stretti e fidati collaboratori e <strong>di</strong>viso in<br />
quattro sezioni <strong>di</strong>stinte, ognuna responsab<strong>il</strong>e <strong>di</strong> una particolare ambito (m<strong>il</strong>itare,<br />
religioso, finanziario e me<strong>di</strong>atico). Questo consiglio rispondeva <strong>di</strong>rettamente all’amir<br />
e aveva <strong>il</strong> compito <strong>di</strong> trasmettergli le informazioni principali e <strong>di</strong> valutare con lui le<br />
iniziative da intraprendere.<br />
Al <strong>di</strong> sotto <strong>di</strong> questa struttura si collocavano i quadri <strong>di</strong> livello più basso affiancati<br />
dalla cosiddetta Brigata 55, un corpo m<strong>il</strong>itare posto a sostegno <strong>del</strong>le forze talebane<br />
nella lotta che contrapponeva <strong>il</strong> regime alle truppe <strong>del</strong>l’Alleanza <strong>del</strong> Nord.<br />
95 Prima <strong>del</strong>la “ristrutturazione” <strong>del</strong> movimento, al-Qaida, più che una vera e propria organizzazione strutturata,<br />
era una realtà che si potrebbe definire “Osama bin Laden-centrica”. Il leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta rappresentava l’unico vero<br />
polo decisionale <strong>del</strong> movimento, circondato da una rete <strong>di</strong> collaboratori molto flessib<strong>il</strong>e e non strutturata come<br />
quella realizzata nella seconda metà degli anni ’90. Questo mo<strong>del</strong>lo aveva potuto funzionare fino a che <strong>il</strong><br />
movimento non era <strong>di</strong>venuto una realtà talmente ramificata e complessa da richiedere un sistema organizzativo<br />
più definito e strutturato, in grado <strong>di</strong> rispondere all’aumento esponenziale degli imput provenienti dall’ambiente<br />
e - al tempo stesso - <strong>di</strong> salvaguardare la centralità <strong>di</strong> Bin Laden all’interno <strong>del</strong> sistema.<br />
131
Comitato religioso<br />
Comitato finanziario<br />
AMIR<br />
Majlis al shura<br />
Comitato m<strong>il</strong>itare<br />
Fig. 2. Struttura organizzativa <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan: 1996-2001 96<br />
Comitato me<strong>di</strong>atico<br />
La riforma strutturale <strong>del</strong> movimento non interessò solamente <strong>il</strong> sistema decisionale<br />
e organizzativo. Così come avvenuto per la gestione interna <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione,<br />
anche <strong>il</strong> sistema <strong>di</strong> relazioni intessute con i <strong>di</strong>versi gruppi islamici ra<strong>di</strong>cali operanti in<br />
vari angoli <strong>del</strong> globo e nominalmente in<strong>di</strong>pendenti da al-Qa’ida - ma ad essa<br />
<strong>di</strong>rettamente o in<strong>di</strong>rettamente aff<strong>il</strong>iati – venne ridefinito.<br />
La struttura orizzontale e informale sino ad allora impiegata venne sostituita da un<br />
sistema più strutturato e definito, concretizzatosi nel Fronte Islamico Mon<strong>di</strong>ale per <strong>il</strong><br />
<strong>Jihad</strong> contro gli Ebrei e i Crociati, la cui creazione venne comunicata <strong>il</strong> 23 febbraio <strong>del</strong><br />
1998.<br />
Questa <strong>di</strong>chiarazione, sebbene non abbia avuto effetti particolarmente r<strong>il</strong>evanti sulla<br />
conformazione <strong>del</strong> complesso movimento islamico ra<strong>di</strong>cale internazionale 97 ,<br />
rappresentò un momento <strong>di</strong> eccezionale importanza per al-Qa’ida, poiché segnò la<br />
definitiva fusione <strong>del</strong> movimento con l’organizzazione guidata da Ayman al-<br />
Zawahiri e poiché pose <strong>di</strong> fatto <strong>il</strong> movimento, e Bin Laden stesso, al centro <strong>di</strong> una<br />
coalizione mirante a <strong>di</strong>venire <strong>il</strong> polo <strong>di</strong> aggregazione <strong>del</strong>la eterogenea galassia<br />
islamista internazionale.<br />
96 Per ulteriori informazioni si veda Stefan Aubrey, The new <strong>di</strong>mension of international terrorism, Zurigo, 2004, p. 152<br />
e Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda, New York, 2002<br />
97 Essa venne firmata infatti, oltre che da Osama bin Laden, da Ayman al-Zawahiri (organizzazione egiziana al-<br />
<strong>Jihad</strong>), da Munir Hamza ( segretario <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione degli ulema [Pakistan]), da Fazlur Rahman Khal<strong>il</strong> (amir<br />
<strong>di</strong> Harakat al-ansar [Pakistan]), dallo sheikh ‘Abd al-Salam Muhammad Khan (amir <strong>di</strong> Harakat al-jihad<br />
[Bangladesh]) e da Abu Yassir Rifa‘i Ahmad Taha (membro <strong>del</strong> consiglio <strong>di</strong> al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya [Egitto])<br />
132
È fondamentale però non interpretare erroneamente questo momento: benché <strong>di</strong><br />
fatto esso segni la definitiva consacrazione <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida all’interno <strong>del</strong> campo<br />
fondamentalista internazionale e denoti un significativo rafforzamento <strong>del</strong>le<br />
relazioni intessute dall’organizzazione con le altre realtà cofirmatarie <strong>del</strong>la<br />
<strong>di</strong>chiarazione, la flessib<strong>il</strong>ità relativa al tipo e al grado <strong>di</strong> cooperazione con i gruppi<br />
“esterni” continuò a rimanere l’elemento fondante e caratterizzante <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida.<br />
Fe<strong>del</strong>e al proprio ruolo <strong>di</strong> avanguar<strong>di</strong>a e all’impianto ideologico che già Abdullah<br />
Azzam aveva tratteggiato, in nessun momento essa volle imporre la propria guida<br />
all’intero campo fondamentalista, preferendo riconoscersi in un sistema <strong>di</strong> relazioni<br />
identificab<strong>il</strong>e con <strong>il</strong> concetto <strong>di</strong> primus inter pares.<br />
La <strong>di</strong>chiarazione <strong>del</strong> febbraio 1998 non ha però avuto importanti risvolti solo per <strong>il</strong><br />
sistema <strong>di</strong> relazioni “esterne” <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida; essa ha sottolineato nuovamente la ferrea<br />
volontà <strong>del</strong> movimento <strong>di</strong> muovere guerra al “nemico <strong>di</strong>stante” - gli Stati Uniti e i<br />
suoi alleati – in<strong>di</strong>cato come principale sostenitore dei regimi apostati responsab<strong>il</strong>i<br />
<strong>del</strong>la persecuzione e <strong>del</strong>la <strong>di</strong>struzione <strong>del</strong>le cellule islamiche ra<strong>di</strong>cali operanti sul<br />
loro territorio.<br />
Questa <strong>di</strong>chiarazione costituisce, inoltre, un passo in avanti rispetto alla Dichiarazione<br />
<strong>di</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong> contro gli americani che occupano <strong>il</strong> Paese dei due luoghi santi (Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta) <strong>del</strong><br />
23 agosto 1996 98 . In essa Bin Laden non si limita a chiedere che <strong>il</strong> popolo musulmano<br />
imbracci le armi per scacciare gli infe<strong>del</strong>i dalla Penisola Arabica e dagli altri territori<br />
occupati ma, dopo aver in<strong>di</strong>cato i principali crimini <strong>di</strong> cui si sono macchiati gli<br />
americani e i loro alleati, esorta l’intera ummah a colpirli ovunque si trovino, siano<br />
essi m<strong>il</strong>itari o civ<strong>il</strong>i.<br />
“[…] Tutti questi avvenimenti e crimini da parte degli americani,<br />
costituiscono una vera <strong>di</strong>chiarazione <strong>di</strong> guerra contro Dio ed <strong>il</strong> Suo<br />
Profeta. […] Perciò, conformemente all’or<strong>di</strong>ne <strong>di</strong> Dio, ren<strong>di</strong>amo pubblico<br />
a tutti i musulmani <strong>il</strong> seguente responso. Uccidere gli americani e i loro<br />
98 Si veda G<strong>il</strong>les Kepel, Al-Qaeda: i testi. Scritti <strong>di</strong> Osama bin Laden, ´Abdallah ´Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri e Abu<br />
Mus´ab al-Zarqawi, Roma, 2006, pp. 37-43<br />
133
alleati, siano essi civ<strong>il</strong>i o m<strong>il</strong>itari, è un dovere che si impone ad ogni<br />
musulmano che sia in grado, in qualsiasi Paese in cui ritroverà, e questo<br />
fino al momento in cui saranno liberate dal loro influsso la moschea al-<br />
Aqsa e la grande moschea <strong>del</strong>la Mecca, e fino a che i loro eserciti non<br />
saranno fuori da ogni territorio musulmano, con le mani paralizzate, le ali<br />
spezzate, incapaci <strong>di</strong> minacciare un solo musulmano. […] Chiamiamo, se<br />
Dio lo permette, ogni musulmano credente e desideroso <strong>di</strong> essere<br />
ricompensato da Lui a ottemperare all’or<strong>di</strong>ne <strong>di</strong> Dio e ad uccidere gli<br />
americani e a saccheggiare i loro beni, ovunque si trovino e in ogni<br />
momento” 99 .<br />
Con questa <strong>di</strong>chiarazione Bin Laden forzava agli estremi <strong>il</strong> concetto <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>visione tra<br />
dar al-Islam e dar al-Harb e rompeva chiaramente con l’interpretazione classica <strong>del</strong><br />
jihad armato – sino ad allora legato ad una specifica <strong>di</strong>mensione territoriale –<br />
trasformandolo in una lotta da estendersi all’intero pianeta.<br />
Si trattava <strong>di</strong> una svolta dottrinale <strong>di</strong> portata epocale ma, soprattutto, <strong>del</strong> guanto <strong>di</strong><br />
sfida lanciato da Bin Laden al mondo occidentale, che <strong>di</strong> lì a poco avrebbe<br />
sperimentato quanto le parole <strong>del</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta non fossero minacce vuote prive <strong>di</strong><br />
alcun fondamento ma l’inizio <strong>di</strong> una campagna che avrebbe segnato in maniera<br />
in<strong>del</strong>eb<strong>il</strong>e la storia <strong>del</strong> XXI secolo.<br />
Il 7 agosto 1998 le ambasciate americane <strong>di</strong> Nairobi (Kenya) e Dar es-Salaam<br />
(Tanzania) vennero colpite da due attacchi suici<strong>di</strong> condotti quasi simultaneamente,<br />
causando la morte <strong>di</strong> 252 persone (tra cui do<strong>di</strong>ci citta<strong>di</strong>ni statunitensi) e circa 5.000<br />
feriti. Senza tralasciare <strong>il</strong> pesante tributo richiesto in termini <strong>di</strong> vite umane, questi<br />
attacchi evidenziarono imme<strong>di</strong>atamente quanto <strong>il</strong> dato simbolico e scenico ricoprisse<br />
un peso determinante per al-Qa’ida: gli attentati erano stati portati a compimento <strong>il</strong><br />
giorno <strong>del</strong>l’ottavo anniversario <strong>del</strong> <strong>di</strong>slocamento <strong>del</strong>le truppe statunitensi in Arabia<br />
Sau<strong>di</strong>ta nell’ambito <strong>del</strong>l’operazione Desert Shield, avevano colpito due obiettivi<br />
99 G<strong>il</strong>les Kepel, Al-Qaeda: i testi. Scritti <strong>di</strong> Osama bin Laden, ´Abdallah ´Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri e Abu Mus´ab al-<br />
Zarqawi, Roma, 2006, pp. 49-52<br />
134
lontani migliaia <strong>di</strong> ch<strong>il</strong>ometri a <strong>di</strong>stanza <strong>di</strong> pochi minuti l’uno dall’altro - quasi a<br />
sottolineare le elevate capacità operative <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida e l’impotenza <strong>del</strong> sistema<br />
<strong>di</strong>fensivo statunitense – e, fattore tutt’altro che trascurab<strong>il</strong>e, erano stati realizzati<br />
ricorrendo a commando suici<strong>di</strong> perfettamente consapevoli <strong>del</strong> prezzo che la loro<br />
missione avrebbe comportato.<br />
La reazione statunitense, concretizzatasi nella <strong>di</strong>struzione <strong>di</strong> una fabbrica<br />
farmaceutica sudanese sospettata <strong>di</strong> essere collegata a Bin Laden e le misure<br />
economiche prese dall’amministrazione americana per congelare i depositi bancari<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione e impe<strong>di</strong>re che qualsiasi compagnia statunitense entrasse in<br />
affari con <strong>il</strong> leader sau<strong>di</strong>ta non influirono in alcun modo sulle capacità<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione. Il 12 ottobre <strong>del</strong> 2000, nel porto <strong>di</strong> Aden (Yemen), un attacco<br />
suicida colpì l’incrociatore USS Cole causando la morte <strong>di</strong> 17 marinai e <strong>il</strong> ferimento <strong>di</strong><br />
39. Era <strong>il</strong> prelu<strong>di</strong>o agli eventi <strong>del</strong>l’11 settembre 2001.<br />
3. Al-Qa’ida dopo l’11 settembre 2001<br />
3.1 La controffensiva e la trasformazione <strong>del</strong> movimento<br />
L’11 settembre 2001 ha rappresentato una svolta eccezionale per al-Qa’ida, mostrando<br />
al mondo intero le reali capacità <strong>del</strong> movimento. Non più attore marginale, o<br />
quantomeno secondario, al-Qa’ida è stata proiettata al centro <strong>del</strong> complesso scenario<br />
internazionale, occupando, in un certo qual modo, <strong>il</strong> vacuum lasciato dalla<br />
<strong>di</strong>ssoluzione <strong>del</strong> sistema sovietico e <strong>di</strong>venendo – assieme agli Stati facenti parte <strong>del</strong><br />
cosiddetto “Asse <strong>del</strong> Male” – la nuova vera minaccia alla “pax americana” seguita<br />
alla fine <strong>del</strong>la Guerra Fredda.<br />
135
Gli eventi <strong>del</strong>l’11 settembre hanno quin<strong>di</strong> trasformato al-Qa’ida – almeno a livello <strong>di</strong><br />
immagine – nella nemesi <strong>del</strong>la potenza statunitense, segnando l’apice <strong>del</strong>la parabola<br />
ascendente <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione.<br />
Questa prova <strong>di</strong> forza ha però richiesto un pesante tributo. La controffensiva<br />
scatenata dalle forze <strong>del</strong>la coalizione ha infatti investito <strong>di</strong>rettamente molte <strong>del</strong>le<br />
principali basi qa’i<strong>di</strong>ste, sancendo – in primis – la caduta <strong>del</strong> santuario afgano e<br />
traducendosi nella cattura o nell’uccisione <strong>di</strong> figure <strong>di</strong> primo piano <strong>del</strong> movimento<br />
(si veda la Fig. 3.1)<br />
Catturati<br />
Abu Faraj al-Libi – Senior Operational Manager<br />
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad – Senior al-Qa’ida External Operations<br />
Chief<br />
Riduran bin Isomud<strong>di</strong>n – Senior al-Qa’ida and Jemaah Islamiyah<br />
Operational Planner<br />
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri – Al-Qa’ida Operational Chief for Arabian<br />
Peninsula<br />
Issa al-Hin<strong>di</strong> – Western al-Qa’ida Operative<br />
Abu Bakr al-Az<strong>di</strong> – Al-Qa’ida Operational Planner and Sau<strong>di</strong><br />
Arabian Cell Leader<br />
Abu Zubaydah – Al-Qa’ida -Associate Logistic Coor<strong>di</strong>nator<br />
Sharif al-Masri – Fac<strong>il</strong>itator and Operational Manager<br />
Mustafa Setmariam Nasar – <strong>Jihad</strong>ist Theorist<br />
Uccisi<br />
Mohammad Atef – Al-Qa’ida Deputy<br />
Hamza Rabla – Senior al-Qa’ida External Operations Chief<br />
Abu Hajir al-Naj<strong>di</strong> – Senior Operations Planner in the Persian Gulf<br />
Yusif al-Uyayri – Fac<strong>il</strong>itator and Propagan<strong>di</strong>st in Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia<br />
Abu- Musab al-Zarqawi – Al-Qa’ida Leader in Iraq<br />
Fig. 3.1 Principali esponenti <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida uccisi o catturati dall’11 settembre 2001 100<br />
100 Fonte: Al-Qaeda: the many faces of an islamist extremist threat, Report of the U.S. House Permanent Select<br />
Committee on Intelligence, giugno 2006, p. 9<br />
136
La per<strong>di</strong>ta <strong>del</strong>le basi afgane (che avevano indubbiamente avuto un peso<br />
determinante nell’ascesa <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida) non si è però tradotta nell’annientamento<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione e nella sua definitiva caduta. Sebbene la reazione m<strong>il</strong>itare seguita<br />
agli attacchi <strong>del</strong> 2001 sia <strong>di</strong> fatto riuscita a <strong>di</strong>struggere quasi completamente i<br />
profon<strong>di</strong> legami instaurati dal movimento con <strong>il</strong> tessuto politico, economico e sociale<br />
afgano, essa non è riuscita a infliggere <strong>il</strong> colpo <strong>di</strong> grazia ad al-Qa’ida che, pur avendo<br />
trovato nel Paese le con<strong>di</strong>zioni ideali per la propria ascesa, non si era mai<br />
autoconfinata al suo interno, né aveva mai rinunciato alla propria vocazione<br />
internazionale.<br />
Al contrario, proprio queste operazioni paiono aver accentuato ulteriormente questa<br />
sua caratteristica, traducendosi in una profonda trasformazione <strong>del</strong> sistema qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta<br />
e in una fortissima internazionalizzazione <strong>del</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong>.<br />
La presa <strong>di</strong> Kabul da parte <strong>del</strong>le forze alleate non si è tradotta nella <strong>di</strong>ssoluzione <strong>del</strong><br />
movimento, né nel suo annientamento, ma in una sorta <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>spersione-<br />
<strong>di</strong>sseminazione. Sebbene braccati dalle forze <strong>di</strong> sicurezza internazionali, molti<br />
m<strong>il</strong>itanti sono riusciti ad abbandonare <strong>il</strong> Paese e a trovare rifugio in aree non<br />
sottoposte al controllo <strong>di</strong>retto o in<strong>di</strong>retto <strong>del</strong>le forze statunitensi e dei loro alleati.<br />
Allo stesso modo i quadri <strong>di</strong>rettivi superstiti, sfruttando i forti legami intessuti con<br />
importanti realtà tribali (soprattutto lungo <strong>il</strong> confine tra Pakistan e Afghanistan) e <strong>il</strong><br />
network creato per collegare le principali organizzazioni islamiche ra<strong>di</strong>cali <strong>di</strong>slocate<br />
su scala globale, sono riusciti a evitare la cattura e a porre le basi per una rinascita <strong>del</strong><br />
movimento.<br />
Questa nuova <strong>di</strong>aspora ha sicuramente segnato la fine <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida così come<br />
strutturatasi in Afghanistan nella seconda metà degli anni ’90, ma ha favorito la<br />
formazione <strong>di</strong> una nuova e <strong>di</strong>fferente realtà sorta sulle sue ceneri.<br />
“The nearest thing to ‘al-Qa’ida’, as popularly understood, existed for a<br />
short period, between 1996 and 2001. Its base had been Afghanistan, and<br />
what I had seen at Tora Bora were the final scenes of its destruction. What<br />
137
we have currently is a broad and <strong>di</strong>verse movement of ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islamic<br />
m<strong>il</strong>itancy” 101<br />
Eppure, sebbene non vi sia alcun dubbio che ci si trovi in presenza <strong>di</strong> un nuovo<br />
soggetto, non è possib<strong>il</strong>e affermare che le vestigia <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida siano semplicemente<br />
confluite all’interno <strong>del</strong> complesso scenario islamico ra<strong>di</strong>cale internazionale. Molti<br />
elementi legano questa nuova realtà all’organizzazione fondata da Bin Laden, e<br />
proprio queste costanti fanno in modo che l’attuale fase possa essere vista come uno<br />
sta<strong>di</strong>o <strong>di</strong> un processo evolutivo più ampio e non come la semplice <strong>di</strong>ssoluzione <strong>del</strong><br />
<strong>fenomeno</strong> al-Qa’ida.<br />
Benché fortemente limitata - almeno sotto <strong>il</strong> piano operativo e <strong>di</strong> gestione <strong>di</strong>retta - la<br />
leadership storica <strong>del</strong> movimento ha assunto, se possib<strong>il</strong>e, un ruolo ancora più<br />
importante sotto <strong>il</strong> prof<strong>il</strong>o ideologico e propagan<strong>di</strong>stico; Tora Bora e la continua fuga<br />
da allora intrapresa non ne hanno minimamente scalfito l’immagine e, anzi, hanno<br />
rafforzato ancor <strong>di</strong> più l’aura <strong>di</strong> inafferrab<strong>il</strong>ità e <strong>il</strong> mito che la circonda.<br />
Soprattutto, la <strong>di</strong>struzione <strong>del</strong>la base afgana pare essere coincisa con l’abbandono <strong>di</strong><br />
una connotazione territoriale ben definita e con la conseguente estensione <strong>del</strong>l’ombra<br />
qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta all’intero mondo musulmano: ben lungi dall’essere messa a tacere, la voce<br />
<strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida si è quin<strong>di</strong> paradossalmente rafforzata ed è riuscita a valicare quei<br />
confini geografici e sociali che ne avevano fatto una realtà leader <strong>di</strong> un “prodotto”<br />
importante, ma pur sempre <strong>di</strong> “nicchia”. La sconfitta in Afghanistan invece che<br />
segnare la fine <strong>del</strong> movimento lo ha quin<strong>di</strong> spinto ad aggre<strong>di</strong>re l’intero mercato.<br />
La riforma strutturale avviata nella seconda metà degli anni ’90 ha giocato in tal<br />
senso un ruolo fondamentale poiché ha favorito l’ascesa <strong>di</strong> nuovi esponenti<br />
potenzialmente in grado <strong>di</strong> portare avanti <strong>il</strong> progetto comune, anche nel caso in cui i<br />
principali centri decisionali dovessero venir meno e ha contribuito a intensificare la<br />
cooperazione con movimenti “esterni” ad al-Qa’ida considerati da molti analisti una<br />
minaccia potenzialmente superiore allo stesso nucleo storico <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione.<br />
101 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: the true story of ra<strong>di</strong>cal Islam, Londra, 2004, p. XXV<br />
138
“Although it [al-Qa’ida] has no resources to carry out theatrical or<br />
spectacular attacks, it has a clandestine network to move, experts,<br />
messages and money to associate groups. All in<strong>di</strong>cations are that al-Qa’ida<br />
is not deserting from the 1520-m<strong>il</strong>e long Pakistan-Afghanistan border but<br />
its leadership is actively and aggressively tasking its membership and<br />
ideologizing associate groups. From the centre of Afghanistan and<br />
Pakistan, al-Qa’ida’s technical experts and financiers, organizers of attacks<br />
and operatives are gravitating to lawless zones in Asia, Horn of Africa,<br />
Caucasus, Balkans and the Middle East widening the perimeter of the<br />
conflict.” 102<br />
La nuova al-Qa’ida mostra quin<strong>di</strong> forti elementi <strong>di</strong> continuità con l’organizzazione<br />
consolidatasi in Afghanistan ma, rispetto a essa, pare aver accentuato alcune<br />
caratteristiche che hanno contribuito a incrementarne notevolmente la vocazione<br />
internazionale e che ne hanno profondamente mo<strong>di</strong>ficato la struttura. Senza<br />
pretendere <strong>di</strong> sezionare un <strong>fenomeno</strong> caratterizzato proprio dalla sua complessità e<br />
dalla intersezione <strong>del</strong>le sue componenti, muovendo le basi dall’analisi <strong>del</strong>lo stato <strong>del</strong><br />
movimento fatta da Hoffman e da alcuni tra i maggiori analisti <strong>del</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> al-<br />
Qa’ida a livello internazionale 103 , è possib<strong>il</strong>e scomporre questa nuova realtà in tre<br />
macro elementi:<br />
a. Il “nocciolo duro” <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione. Formato dagli esponenti sopravissuti<br />
all’epurazione <strong>di</strong> questi anni, esso comprende, da una parte, Osama bin Laden<br />
e Ayman al-Zawahiri - la leadership storica <strong>del</strong> movimento impegnata<br />
attivamente a intensificare la propria propaganda e a in<strong>di</strong>care le future linee<br />
guida da adottarsi - dall’altro, i “fe<strong>del</strong>issimi” sopravvissuti alla caduta <strong>del</strong><br />
102 Rohan Gunaratna, The rise and decline of al Qaeda, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks<br />
upon the United States, 9 luglio 2003, p. 7<br />
103 Si vedano Bruce Hoffman, Combating al Qaeda and the M<strong>il</strong>itant Islamic Threat, Testimony presented to the House<br />
Armed Service Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capab<strong>il</strong>ities, 16 febbraio<br />
2006; Bruce Hoffman, Lessons of 9/11, Testimony submitted for the Committee Record to the United States Joint<br />
September 11, 2001 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 8 ottobre 2001; Rohan<br />
Gunaratna, The rise and decline of al Qaeda, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the<br />
United States, 9 luglio 2003; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda, New York, 2002; Ph<strong>il</strong>ippe Errera, Three Circles of<br />
Threat, Survival, vol. 47, no. 1, Primavera 2005, pp. 71-88; Stefan Aubrey, The new <strong>di</strong>mension of international<br />
terrorism, Zurigo, 2004.<br />
139
santuario afgano e alle successive operazioni e nuovi esponenti che hanno<br />
rapidamente scalato le gerarchie interne. Sebbene fortemente limitato dalle<br />
attuali circostanze, questo “nocciolo duro” eserciterebbe ancora un ruolo<br />
importante in termini <strong>di</strong> coor<strong>di</strong>namento, pianificazione e organizzazione <strong>di</strong><br />
attacchi condotti sotto l’egida qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta;<br />
b. Le organizzazioni aff<strong>il</strong>iate. Questa categoria include gran parte <strong>del</strong> network<br />
creato da Bin Laden sin dagli anni <strong>del</strong> jihad afgano, ma anche realtà <strong>di</strong> più<br />
recente aff<strong>il</strong>iazione (come l’organizzazione fondata da al-Zarqawi in Iraq) e<br />
comprende movimenti legati a vario titolo ad al-Qa’ida da accor<strong>di</strong> formali, da<br />
forme <strong>di</strong> cooperazione più o meno strette o da un più tenue legame dovuto<br />
alle attività <strong>di</strong> sostegno che Bin Laden aveva avviato già in Sudan con molti<br />
gruppi islamici ra<strong>di</strong>cali operanti in teatri estremamente <strong>di</strong>fferenti. Uno<br />
stu<strong>di</strong>o 104 pubblicato nel 2006 dalla RAND Corporation prende in esame i<br />
principali movimenti connessi ad al-Qa’ida, analizzandone <strong>il</strong> tipo e <strong>il</strong> grado <strong>di</strong><br />
aff<strong>il</strong>iazione attraverso l’in<strong>di</strong>viduazione <strong>di</strong> 12 criteri e valutandoli attraverso<br />
una scala compresa tra i valori 0-4 (0 inesistente, 1 possib<strong>il</strong>e, 2 probab<strong>il</strong>e, 3<br />
confermato, 4 confermato e tuttora esistente)<br />
104 RAND, Beyond al-Qaeda. The <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Jihad</strong>ist Movement, 2006, p. 79<br />
140
Fig. 3.2 Principali realtà aff<strong>il</strong>iate ad al-Qaida: tipo e grado <strong>di</strong> aff<strong>il</strong>iazione<br />
c. Realtà/in<strong>di</strong>vidui non <strong>di</strong>rettamente aff<strong>il</strong>iati ad al-Qa’ida, entrati però in<br />
contatto con le strutture o l’ideologia <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione e “persuasi” da<br />
essa o dalla possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> sfruttarne <strong>il</strong> brand per incrementare <strong>il</strong> proprio<br />
peso politico e me<strong>di</strong>atico. Questa categoria <strong>del</strong>inea uno scenario<br />
estremamente complesso e <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>mente definib<strong>il</strong>e. Al suo interno possiamo<br />
in<strong>di</strong>viduare due sotto-categorie<br />
i) in<strong>di</strong>vidui o gruppi <strong>di</strong> in<strong>di</strong>vidui che hanno ricevuto addestramento<br />
(o qualche altra forma limitata <strong>di</strong> sostegno) da al-Qa’ida ma che non<br />
141
fanno parte <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione, e i cui legami con essa sono<br />
inesistenti o quantomeno estremamente lab<strong>il</strong>i.<br />
ii) in<strong>di</strong>vidui o gruppi <strong>di</strong> in<strong>di</strong>vidui che non hanno alcun <strong>di</strong>retto<br />
collegamento con l’organizzazione madre e i suoi aff<strong>il</strong>iati, ma che<br />
hanno deciso <strong>di</strong> perseguirne gli obiettivi e <strong>di</strong> ricalcarne le orme.<br />
La nuova al-Qa’ida costituisce quin<strong>di</strong> un soggetto ancora più complesso<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione consolidatasi in Afghanistan e tende a configurarsi come una<br />
galassia <strong>di</strong> realtà estremamente <strong>di</strong>fferenti tra loro, spesso solamente connesse da una<br />
comune (generica) ideologia o dalle potenzialità offerte dalla rete telematica.<br />
In particolar modo, sebbene sia opinione comune che le realtà facenti parte <strong>del</strong>le<br />
prime due categorie (a,b) – grazie all’esistenza <strong>di</strong> legami e strutture più o meno<br />
consolidate – rappresentino la minaccia più imme<strong>di</strong>ata nell’attuale fase storica, <strong>il</strong><br />
terzo gruppo (c) pare rappresentare, in un orizzonte <strong>di</strong> me<strong>di</strong>o-lungo periodo, una<br />
nuova importante sfida per <strong>il</strong> sistema <strong>di</strong> sicurezza internazionale. Sebbene infatti le<br />
realtà incluse in questa categoria non possano contare sui vantaggi correlati alla<br />
cooperazione con un network ben definito e su strutture consolidate, proprio per<br />
questo motivo esse tendono a sfuggire al monitoraggio dei servizi <strong>di</strong> sicurezza<br />
internazionali, costretti a confrontarsi con gruppi spesso molto ristretti e quin<strong>di</strong><br />
estremamente <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>i da in<strong>di</strong>viduare.<br />
Al momento attuale però <strong>il</strong> nucleo storico <strong>del</strong> movimento continua a rappresentare la<br />
principale minaccia da affrontare, anche alla luce <strong>del</strong> suo accresciuto peso me<strong>di</strong>atico<br />
e <strong>del</strong> suo ancora importante ruolo organizzativo e decisionale. Soprattutto, in<br />
mancanza <strong>di</strong> una leadership alternativa e <strong>di</strong> una figura in grado <strong>di</strong> unificare le<br />
<strong>di</strong>verse fazioni, esso rimane l’unica realtà in grado <strong>di</strong> mantenere un minimo <strong>di</strong><br />
coesione interna e <strong>di</strong> porre le basi per la rinascita <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione.<br />
Anche in tal senso va letta la decisione <strong>di</strong> al-Zarqawi <strong>di</strong> far confluire la sua<br />
organizzazione all’interno <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida e <strong>di</strong> accettare – seppure con la garanzia <strong>di</strong><br />
ampi margini <strong>di</strong> manovra – <strong>di</strong> ricoprire un ruolo teoricamente subor<strong>di</strong>nato alla<br />
leadership storica <strong>del</strong> movimento. Bin Laden e al-Zawahiri rimangono infatti, a<br />
142
tutt’ora, gli unici leader in grado <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>sporre <strong>del</strong> carisma e <strong>del</strong>la legittimità necessari<br />
per riunire i m<strong>il</strong>itanti <strong>di</strong>spersi e per creare un nuovo santuario da cui far ripartire la<br />
propria campagna. Sebbene l’organizzazione sia riuscita a sopravvivere e ad<br />
adattarsi al mutato contesto seguito alla per<strong>di</strong>ta <strong>del</strong> santuario afgano,<br />
l’identificazione <strong>di</strong> un nuovo “safeheaven” rimane una priorità assoluta per<br />
contrastare le spinte <strong>di</strong>sgreganti interne e le forti pressioni esterne. In tal senso vanno<br />
letti i continui appelli all’intensificazione <strong>del</strong>la lotta in Afghanistan e, soprattutto, in<br />
Iraq: dall’esito <strong>del</strong>lo scontro <strong>di</strong>penderà infatti buona parte <strong>del</strong> futuro <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida<br />
come soggetto unitario.<br />
3.2 La ricerca <strong>di</strong> un nuovo Santuario<br />
Afghanistan<br />
Enduring Freedom avrebbe dovuto segnare la fine <strong>del</strong>la presa talebana nel Paese e, con<br />
essa, la definitiva <strong>di</strong>ssoluzione <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida. A <strong>di</strong>stanza <strong>di</strong> 5 anni dalla rapida<br />
conclusione <strong>del</strong>le operazioni belliche, entrambi questi obiettivi paiono ben lontani<br />
dall’essere raggiunti.<br />
I Talebani, dopo una prima fase nella quale tutto faceva sperare in una loro definitiva<br />
eliminazione, sono tornati a contendere <strong>il</strong> controllo <strong>del</strong> Paese a un governo centrale<br />
lacerato da profonde <strong>di</strong>visioni interne e non adeguatamente sostenuto dalla<br />
comunità internazionale. Dal canto suo, al-Qa’ida, pur avendo notevolmente ridotto<br />
la propria presenza nella regione, è riuscita a riunire i m<strong>il</strong>itanti sopravvissuti<br />
all’epurazione <strong>del</strong> 2001 nelle aree tribali al confine tra Afghanistan e Pakistan – da<br />
sempre roccaforti storiche <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione – e a intensificare le proprie azioni a<br />
sostegno <strong>del</strong>la battaglia ingaggiata dai Talebani.<br />
143
Proprio dalle Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) - aree a maggioranza<br />
Pashtun poste sul confine sud-orientale afgano (nominalmente sotto la giuris<strong>di</strong>zione<br />
<strong>di</strong> Islamabad ma da sempre caratterizzate da una fortissima in<strong>di</strong>pendenza) - è partita<br />
la riorganizzazione <strong>del</strong> movimento. I lab<strong>il</strong>i confini tra Pakistan e Afghanistan e i<br />
soli<strong>di</strong> legami con le principali tribù locali hanno permesso all’organizzazione <strong>di</strong><br />
riavviare i contatti con le cellule qa’i<strong>di</strong>ste <strong>di</strong>sperse nella regione e <strong>di</strong> rinnovare la<br />
propria alleanza con le forze talebane.<br />
Le Federally Administered Tribal Areas hanno quin<strong>di</strong> permesso ad al-Qa’ida <strong>di</strong><br />
riorganizzare le proprie f<strong>il</strong>a e <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>sporre <strong>di</strong> teste <strong>di</strong> ponte rivelatesi fondamentali per<br />
<strong>il</strong> suo ritorno in Afghanistan. I forti legami stretti con la componente tribale locale, la<br />
secolare in<strong>di</strong>pendenza <strong>di</strong> questa regione dal governo <strong>di</strong> Islamabad e l’estrema<br />
porosità dei confini che <strong>di</strong>vidono Pakistan e Afghanistan hanno permesso<br />
all’organizzazione <strong>di</strong> operare in un ambiente ideale, in grado <strong>di</strong> ostacolare<br />
pesantemente l’operato dei servizi <strong>di</strong> intelligence alleati ma anche <strong>di</strong> permettere<br />
all’organizzazione <strong>di</strong> sostenere attivamente l’insurrezione talebana.<br />
144
Benché vi siano in<strong>di</strong>cazioni che m<strong>il</strong>itanti qa’i<strong>di</strong>sti operino a stretto contatto con le<br />
m<strong>il</strong>izie talebane sui campi <strong>di</strong> battaglia 105 , al-Qa’ida pare giocare un ruolo<br />
fondamentale non tanto per <strong>il</strong> sostegno <strong>di</strong>retto alle operazioni m<strong>il</strong>itari, quanto per<br />
l’apporto logistico e in termini <strong>di</strong> addestramento che ha <strong>di</strong>mostrato <strong>di</strong> poter<br />
garantire. In particolare, come <strong>di</strong>mostra <strong>il</strong> forte aumento <strong>di</strong> attentati suici<strong>di</strong> –<br />
tipologia <strong>di</strong> attacco sino ad ora sostanzialmente mai riscontrata nella tormentata<br />
storia afgana – l’adozione <strong>di</strong> tattiche <strong>di</strong> guerriglia impiegate con successo<br />
dall’insurrezione irachena contro le forze alleate e l’ut<strong>il</strong>izzo sempre più massiccio <strong>di</strong><br />
IEDs (improvised explosive devises), essa pare essere riuscita a creare un f<strong>il</strong>o <strong>di</strong>retto<br />
– almeno a livello <strong>di</strong> trasferimento <strong>di</strong> conoscenze - tra le due insurrezioni.<br />
“[…] evidence has surfaced that several Taliban leaders have travelled to<br />
Iraq in order to observe insurgent operations and <strong>di</strong>sseminate the<br />
knowledge they gain to their organizations in Afghanistan. […]In what<br />
are essentially educational exchanges, these trips are apparently designed<br />
to teach Taliban leaders more advanced explosive and urban warfare<br />
tactics being used by jiha<strong>di</strong>sts in Iraq. […] Wh<strong>il</strong>e it is unclear exactly how<br />
Taliban leaders are moving into and out of Iraq, one likely route may be<br />
the drug-smuggling networks originating from Baluchistan, a region of<br />
Pakistan bordering southern Afghanistan. […] Given the dramatic<br />
increase in the regional drug trade after the fall of the Taliban, the ab<strong>il</strong>ity<br />
of the Taliban and al-Qa’ida personnel to remain hidden wh<strong>il</strong>e traversing<br />
increasingly popular smuggling routes w<strong>il</strong>l likely lead to a greater<br />
increase in the number of these jiha<strong>di</strong>sts «educational exchanges»” 106 .<br />
Il ruolo giocato dalle regioni <strong>di</strong> confine tra Pakistan e Afghanistan ricopre quin<strong>di</strong> un<br />
ruolo fondamentale nel conflitto, anche perché i rapporti intessuti con i signori <strong>del</strong>la<br />
droga che gestiscono i traffici dal Paese possono rappresentare un importante valore<br />
aggiunto per la causa insurrezionista. Questo fattore non è sfuggito ai servizi <strong>di</strong><br />
105 Hekmat Karzai, Afghanistan and the <strong>Global</strong>isation of Terrorist Tactics, IDSS Commentaries (1/2006), 4 gennaio<br />
2006, p. 2<br />
106 Shawn Brimley, Tentacles of <strong>Jihad</strong>: Targeting Transnational Support Networks, Parameters, estate 2006, pp. 36-<br />
37<br />
145
intelligence alleati che hanno esercitato forti pressioni su Islamabad tradottesi, nel<br />
2004, in una massiccia offensiva nel Waziristan <strong>del</strong> nord e <strong>del</strong> sud volta a eliminare le<br />
basi e le strutture logistiche qa’i<strong>di</strong>ste e pro-talebane. Il <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>e contesto operativo, la<br />
forte ost<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>del</strong>la popolazione e le ingenti per<strong>di</strong>te subite hanno però spinto<br />
Islamabad a porre fine alle operazioni e a scendere a patti con le forze<br />
antigovernative 107 , favorendo <strong>di</strong> fatto un ulteriore rafforzamento <strong>del</strong>l’insurrezione<br />
afgana.<br />
Come <strong>di</strong>mostrato dal massiccio attacco sferrato l’estate scorsa dalle forze talebane<br />
(poi sventato dalle truppe NATO) per ottenere <strong>il</strong> controllo <strong>del</strong>la città chiave <strong>di</strong><br />
Kandahar, la loro presa sul Paese è tutt’altro che scomparsa soprattutto nelle<br />
province meri<strong>di</strong>onali.<br />
“Taliban-led insurgency has become ever more daring and deadly in the<br />
southern and eastern parts of the country, wh<strong>il</strong>e exten<strong>di</strong>ng its presence all<br />
the way to the outskirts of Kabul. […] Meanwh<strong>il</strong>e, the effectiveness of the<br />
Taliban’s limited institutions and the ruthlessness of their retribution<br />
against ‘collaborators’ neutralized much of the Afghan population. […] In<br />
some areas, there is now a parallel Taliban state, and locals are<br />
increasingly turning to Taliban-run courts, which are seen as more<br />
effective and fair than the corrupt official system” 108 .<br />
L’Afghanistan rimane quin<strong>di</strong> uno degli avamposti principali <strong>del</strong>la “guerra al<br />
terrore”. Sottovalutare i sintomi <strong>del</strong>la rinascita talebana e non intensificare in<br />
maniera adeguata <strong>il</strong> sostegno economico e m<strong>il</strong>itare al governo centrale non può<br />
quin<strong>di</strong> che vanificare gli sforzi sino ad ora sostenuti e garantire ad al-Qa’ida<br />
l’occasione <strong>di</strong> riottenere un avamposto sicuro e in grado <strong>di</strong> influire pesantemente<br />
anche sulle sorti <strong>del</strong> conflitto iracheno.<br />
107 Si veda <strong>il</strong> rapporto <strong>del</strong>l’International Crisis Group, Pakistan’s tribal Areas: Appeasing the M<strong>il</strong>itants, 11 <strong>di</strong>cembre<br />
2006<br />
108 Barnett Rubin, Saving Afghanistan, Foreign Affaire, gennaio-febbraio 2007, p. 2-3<br />
146
Iraq<br />
Benché l’Afghanistan continui a ricoprire un obiettivo prioritario per al-Qa’ida, esso<br />
non rappresenta che una <strong>del</strong>le possib<strong>il</strong>i opzioni in<strong>di</strong>viduate dall’organizzazione per<br />
ricostituire un proprio santuario e far ripartire <strong>il</strong> proprio jihad su scala globale.<br />
In tale contesto, la totalità degli analisti è concorde nell’affermare che, sebbene al-<br />
Qa’ida continui ad operare attivamente su una pluralità <strong>di</strong> fronti <strong>di</strong>fferenti, l’Iraq<br />
rappresenti <strong>il</strong> vero obiettivo <strong>del</strong> movimento: la collocazione geografica, <strong>il</strong> peso storico<br />
e culturale così come l’estremamente critica situazione interna contribuiscono a farne<br />
una realtà potenzialmente in grado <strong>di</strong> ricoprire un ruolo ancora più determinante <strong>di</strong><br />
quello sostenuto dall’Afghanistan negli ultimi decenni.<br />
A <strong>di</strong>fferenza <strong>del</strong>lo scenario afgano che, sebbene <strong>di</strong> primaria importanza, rappresenta<br />
pur sempre una realtà ai margini <strong>del</strong> mondo islamico, l’Iraq è da sempre uno dei<br />
centri nevralgici <strong>del</strong>l’intera ummah, sia sotto <strong>il</strong> prof<strong>il</strong>o religioso, politico e culturale<br />
che sotto quello economico. Un’eventuale caduta <strong>di</strong> Baghdad (o, più realisticamente,<br />
<strong>di</strong> una parte significativa <strong>di</strong> territorio iracheno) nelle mani <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida segnerebbe<br />
una svolta <strong>di</strong> eccezionale importanza per la guerra al terrorismo, potenzialmente in<br />
grado <strong>di</strong> spostare significativamente gli equ<strong>il</strong>ibri <strong>del</strong>l’attuale conflitto a favore <strong>del</strong>la<br />
causa estremista.<br />
Inoltre, mantenendo la sua presenza in Iraq, al-Qa’ida non solo <strong>di</strong>mostra <strong>di</strong> poter<br />
tener testa alle forze statunitensi e ai suoi alleati ma si erge in un certo qual modo a<br />
unico reale <strong>di</strong>fensore dei <strong>di</strong>ritti <strong>del</strong>la “nazione araba”, e <strong>del</strong> mondo musulmano in<br />
generale, incrementando ulteriormente <strong>il</strong> suo status all’interno <strong>del</strong>le frange più<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>cali <strong>del</strong>la popolazione araba, da sempre estremamente ost<strong>il</strong>e a qualsiasi forma <strong>di</strong><br />
ingerenza straniera e caratterizzata da forti legami <strong>di</strong> solidarietà, ere<strong>di</strong>tà <strong>del</strong><br />
panarabismo – esperimento fallito a livello politico, ma le cui basi sono pur sempre<br />
molto forti e ra<strong>di</strong>cate nella popolazione – e <strong>del</strong>la m<strong>il</strong>lenaria storia regionale.<br />
147
“The war in Iraq[…]has broadened and deepened the pools of recruits for<br />
jiha<strong>di</strong>st extremists in the Muslim world, by ‘demonstrating’ beyond Bin<br />
Laden’s w<strong>il</strong>dest dreams that the true American objective was to invade<br />
the land of Islam. […] Previous battlegrounds for al-Qa’ida types were on<br />
the periphery of the Arab world […]. With Iraq, these battlegrounds are<br />
now at the heart of the Arab Middle East. By fighting the invader, these<br />
terrorists strike a strong chord everywhere in the Arab world, even<br />
among those who, in Iraq, were indeed liberated as they were invaded. By<br />
casting the war in Iraq as a key stage in ‘the war on terror’, President Bush<br />
seemed once again to play into Bin Laden’s and Zarqawi’s agendas –<br />
especially given the fact that the war was seen by the world as a war of<br />
choice, not a war of necessity” 109<br />
Infine, <strong>il</strong> Paese pare rispondere perfettamente all’identikit <strong>del</strong>l’avamposto ideale<br />
tracciato da Ayman al Zawahiri, che, in un passaggio <strong>del</strong> suo scritto “Knights under<br />
the Prophet’s Banner”, afferma che l’instaurazione <strong>di</strong> una base qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta nel cuore <strong>del</strong><br />
mondo arabo rappresenti una precon<strong>di</strong>zione irrinunciab<strong>il</strong>e e da attuarsi a qualsiasi<br />
costo per la vittoria finale:<br />
“ «Victory for the Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot be<br />
attained unless these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of<br />
the Arab region» He notes that mob<strong>il</strong>izing and arming the nation w<strong>il</strong>l not<br />
yeld tangible results unt<strong>il</strong> a fundamentalist base is established in the<br />
region: «The establishment of a Muslim state in the hearth of the Islamic<br />
world is not an easy or close target. However, it is the hope of the Muslim<br />
nation to restore its fallen caliphate and regain its lost glory… We must<br />
not despair of the repeated strikes and calamities. We must never lay<br />
down our arms no matter how much losses or sacrifices we endure. Let us<br />
start again after every strike, even if we had to begin from scratch» ” 110 .<br />
109 Ph<strong>il</strong>ippe Errera, Three Circles of Threat, Survival, vol. 47, no. 1, Primavera 2005, p 82<br />
110 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, in Ely Karmon, Al-Qa’ida and the War on Terror after the<br />
War in Iraq, Middle East Review of International Affairs,Vol. 10, No.1, Marzo 2006,p. 1<br />
148
Al <strong>di</strong> là <strong>del</strong>l’eccezionale ruolo che la “presa” <strong>del</strong>l’Iraq potrebbe potenzialmente avere<br />
sui <strong>del</strong>icatissimi equ<strong>il</strong>ibri regionali e sulle sorti <strong>del</strong>l’attuale conflitto, uno dei fattori<br />
alla base <strong>del</strong>la campagna condotta da al-Qa’ida in Iraq è costituito dal <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>e<br />
scenario interno, sempre più segnato da profonde fratture etnico-religiose e sull’orlo<br />
<strong>di</strong> una vera e propria guerra civ<strong>il</strong>e, che consente alle forze qa’i<strong>di</strong>ste <strong>di</strong> operare con<br />
ampi gra<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> autonomia e <strong>di</strong> mantenere sempre attiva la loro offensiva contro le<br />
truppe statunitensi (e loro alleati), rispondendo così al duplice obiettivo <strong>di</strong><br />
riorganizzare le proprie f<strong>il</strong>a e <strong>di</strong> continuare la lotta al far enemy.<br />
Proprio questo punto ha rappresentato, e rappresenta tutt’ora, uno dei fattori alla<br />
base <strong>del</strong> forte interesse qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta. Prima <strong>del</strong>la campagna anglo-statunitense volta a<br />
rovesciare <strong>il</strong> regime <strong>di</strong> Saddam Hussein, al-Qa’ida sembrava sull’orlo <strong>del</strong>la definitiva<br />
eliminazione: alcuni tra i principali esponenti erano stati uccisi o catturati, i suoi<br />
attivisti erano <strong>di</strong>spersi e braccati dalle forze <strong>di</strong> sicurezza internazionali e numerosi<br />
attentati erano stati sventati grazie al rafforzamento <strong>del</strong>le misure <strong>di</strong> controllo e alla<br />
cooperazione dei servizi <strong>di</strong> intelligence <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>fferenti Paesi.<br />
Iraqi Freedom e le <strong>di</strong>fficoltà seguite alla prima fase <strong>di</strong> operazioni belliche hanno però<br />
mo<strong>di</strong>ficato sensib<strong>il</strong>mente la situazione, sottoponendo l’Amministrazione a fortissime<br />
pressioni interne ed esterne e permettendo all’organizzazione <strong>di</strong> invertire <strong>il</strong><br />
pericoloso trend sino ad allora instauratosi, caratterizzato dall’adozione <strong>di</strong> una tattica<br />
quasi totalmente <strong>di</strong>fensiva, dall’incapacità <strong>di</strong> implementare un’offensiva adeguata<br />
contro le forze alleate, e <strong>di</strong> riproporsi come l’unica realtà in grado <strong>di</strong> contrastare lo<br />
strapotere americano.<br />
“The crisis, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng increasing civ<strong>il</strong>ian casualties, the horror of the abuse<br />
of the Iraqi prisoners, and the cultural clash between occupier and<br />
occupied, is a welcome development for bin Laden and his associates,<br />
who have exploited it to justify their global jihad against America and its<br />
allies. The American war in Iraq was a God-sent opportunity for bin<br />
Laden and Zawahiri. America’s imperial endeavour has given them a<br />
149
new opening to make inroads, if not into mainstream Arab hearts and<br />
minds, into a large pool of outraged Muslims from the Middle East and<br />
elsewhere and uprooted young European-born Muslims and who want to<br />
resist what they perceive as the U.S.-British onslaught on their<br />
coreligionists” 111<br />
Questo non significa però che l’Iraq sia ormai <strong>di</strong>venuto <strong>il</strong> “nuovo Afghanistan”, come<br />
<strong>di</strong>versi analisti hanno affermato. I punti <strong>di</strong> convergenza in chiave futura possono<br />
infatti essere molteplici, ma è necessario sottolineare come molte aree rimangano<br />
quasi <strong>del</strong> tutto estranee agli episo<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> violenza che insanguinano <strong>il</strong> Paese (si veda<br />
Fig. 3.3) e come <strong>il</strong> governo centrale – al pari <strong>del</strong>la stragrande maggioranza <strong>del</strong>le<br />
principali fazioni irachene - seppur fortemente limitato dalla crisi attuale e dalle<br />
profonde <strong>di</strong>visioni interne, sia tutt’altro che propenso a scendere a patti con<br />
l’organizzazione e a permetterle <strong>di</strong> instaurare un nuovo santuario sul proprio<br />
territorio.<br />
Figura 3.3 Numero <strong>di</strong> attacchi per provincia. 12 agosto – 10 novembre 2006 112<br />
Soprattutto, sebbene al-Qa’ida continui a rimanere, nonostante le ingenti per<strong>di</strong>te<br />
subite e l’uccisione Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, uno dei principali attori operanti nel<br />
Paese, <strong>il</strong> suo peso non può essere paragonab<strong>il</strong>e a quello detenuto dalle <strong>di</strong>verse m<strong>il</strong>izie<br />
111 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Iraq War: Planting the Seeds of al-Qaida’s Second Generation, 27 ottobre 2005, p. 2<br />
112 Measuring Stab<strong>il</strong>ity and Security in Iraq, report, novembre 2006, p. 21<br />
150
sorte negli ultimi anni né a quello <strong>del</strong>l’insurrezione interna <strong>di</strong> matrice sunnita 113 , che<br />
è riuscita a sottrarre a più riprese ampie porzioni <strong>di</strong> territorio al controllo<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’autorità centrale.<br />
A <strong>di</strong>fferenza <strong>di</strong> queste realtà, fortemente sostenute a livello popolare, al-Qa’ida<br />
continua a rimanere un <strong>fenomeno</strong> marcatamente “esterno” e come tale è percepita da<br />
gran parte <strong>del</strong>la popolazione. Sebbene le operazioni altamente spettacolari<br />
implementate dall’organizzazione abbiano senza alcun dubbio richiesto la<br />
cooperazione <strong>di</strong> elementi locali, a <strong>di</strong>stanza <strong>di</strong> quattro anni dalla sua progressiva<br />
ascesa nel Paese, i quadri <strong>di</strong>rigenti, così come buona parte <strong>del</strong>le forze operative,<br />
continuano a rimanere composti da guerriglieri stranieri.<br />
Proprio questo limite, che avrebbe potuto segnare – in un orizzonte <strong>di</strong> me<strong>di</strong>o-lungo<br />
periodo – la sostanziale sconfitta <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione e la sua estromissione dallo<br />
scenario iracheno, ha <strong>di</strong> fatto rappresentato la causa principale <strong>del</strong>la peculiare<br />
strategia adottata da al-Zarqawi.<br />
Non potendo <strong>di</strong>sporre né <strong>di</strong> sufficiente sostegno popolare né <strong>di</strong> forze adeguate per<br />
conseguire autonomamente i propri obiettivi, e dovendo confrontarsi con <strong>il</strong> rischio<br />
sempre più elevato che l’insurrezione <strong>di</strong> matrice sunnita deponesse le armi a favore<br />
<strong>di</strong> una partecipazione <strong>di</strong>retta al nuovo sistema politico iracheno, al-Zarqawi avviò<br />
una campagna <strong>di</strong> operazioni cruente e attentati altamente spettacolari miranti a<br />
compensare l’incapacità <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione <strong>di</strong> ricoprire un ruolo dominante sul<br />
territorio con un massiccia campagna volta a causare un fortissimo impatto<br />
me<strong>di</strong>atico.<br />
Questo modus operan<strong>di</strong>, <strong>di</strong>venuto nel corso degli ultimi anni uno dei “marchi <strong>di</strong><br />
fabbrica” più <strong>di</strong>stintivi <strong>del</strong>la strategia qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta, non è però rimasto fine a se stesso,<br />
ma è stato implementato in modo tale da avere un impatto <strong>di</strong>retto sul peculiare<br />
sistema iracheno, caratterizzato da una forte commistione <strong>di</strong> etnie, culture e<br />
113 Per una descrizione dei movimenti insurrezionalisti iracheni si veda Andrea Plebani, The Iraqi Challenge:<br />
Political Troubles, Insurgency and Economic Trends in The New Iraq: Stab<strong>il</strong>ization, Reconc<strong>il</strong>iation, Institution-Bu<strong>il</strong><strong>di</strong>ng<br />
and the Regional Scenario, Giugno 2006, Quaderno Ispi <strong>Global</strong> Watch, n. 36, pp. 24-52<br />
151
confessioni che, nei piani <strong>del</strong> leader giordano, se adeguatamente sollecitate,<br />
avrebbero potuto travolgere <strong>il</strong> Paese in una spirale <strong>di</strong> violenze senza fine.<br />
È in quest’ottica che vanno analizzati gli attentati perpetrati ai danni <strong>del</strong>la<br />
componente sciita <strong>del</strong>la popolazione: soffiare sulle braci <strong>del</strong>l’o<strong>di</strong>o mai sopito tra sciiti<br />
e sunniti e fomentare in questi ultimi la paura <strong>di</strong> rimanere relegati al ruolo <strong>di</strong><br />
comparse <strong>di</strong> un Iraq f<strong>il</strong>o iraniano e “Shi’a – led” rappresentava l’unica strategia<br />
esperib<strong>il</strong>e per ribaltare le con<strong>di</strong>zioni iniziali e favorire l’instaurazione <strong>di</strong> un ambiente<br />
non ost<strong>il</strong>e e ricettivo al messaggio jiha<strong>di</strong>sta.<br />
“Targeting [Shi’a] i religious, political and m<strong>il</strong>itary depth w<strong>il</strong>l provole<br />
them to show the Sunnis their rabies … and bare the teeth of the hidden<br />
rancor working in their breasts. If we succeed in dragging them into the<br />
arena of sectarian war, it w<strong>il</strong>l become possible to awaken the inattentive<br />
Sunnis as they feel imminent danger and annih<strong>il</strong>ating death at the hands<br />
of the Sabbeans [Shiites]” 114<br />
Il timore che la strategia adottata da al-Zarqawi in Iraq potesse tradursi<br />
nell’esplosione <strong>di</strong> una vera e propria fitna (guerra intestina) in grado <strong>di</strong> estendersi<br />
all’intero mondo musulmano spinse molteplici esponenti, sia esterni che interni al<br />
campo islamico ra<strong>di</strong>cale 115 , a condannare duramente tali azioni che richiedevano un<br />
ingente tributo <strong>di</strong> sangue alla popolazione civ<strong>il</strong>e. La stessa leadership qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta si era<br />
schierata su posizioni sostanzialmente antitetiche a quelle <strong>del</strong> leader giordano (che<br />
era inoltre uno dei principali oppositori <strong>del</strong>la teoria <strong>del</strong>la primazia <strong>del</strong>la lotta al far<br />
enemy), sottolineando come fosse necessario che <strong>il</strong> popolo iracheno combattesse unito<br />
nella lotta contro le forze <strong>di</strong> occupazione e non cadesse preda <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>visioni interne.<br />
Sebbene queste <strong>di</strong>vergenze non fossero state completamente appianate, la leadership<br />
storica <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida, alla luce <strong>del</strong>le <strong>di</strong>fficoltà nelle quali si trovava ad operare e al<br />
rischio <strong>di</strong> perdere la guida <strong>del</strong>la corrente islamica ra<strong>di</strong>cale (a favore magari <strong>del</strong><br />
114 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, lettera r<strong>il</strong>asciata dalla Coalition Provisional Authority, 12 febbraio 2004, www.cpairaq.org/transcripts/20040212_zarqawi_full.html<br />
115 Lo stesso mentore <strong>di</strong> al-Zarqawi, Abu Muhammad al-Maq<strong>di</strong>si, criticò duramente e a più riprese la condotta <strong>del</strong><br />
leader giordano avviando una vera e propria <strong>di</strong>sputa con quest’ultimo. Si veda Ely Karmon, Al-Qa’ida and the War<br />
on Terror after the War in Iraq, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, Marzo 2006, p. 7<br />
152
“nuovo Salah al-Din”, <strong>il</strong> leader <strong>di</strong> Hezbollah Hasan Nasrallah, o <strong>di</strong> altre nuove realtà<br />
emergenti) decise <strong>di</strong> accettare la proposta <strong>di</strong> fusione <strong>di</strong> al-Zarqawi, riconoscendo al<br />
leader giordano <strong>il</strong> ruolo <strong>di</strong> comandante in capo <strong>del</strong>le forze qa’i<strong>di</strong>ste nel Paese,<br />
sostenendo <strong>di</strong> fatto - almeno parzialmente – <strong>il</strong> suo modus operan<strong>di</strong> e dando vita a<br />
Tandhim Qa’idat al-Jihan fi B<strong>il</strong>ad al-Rafidayn 116 (AQI).<br />
“On December 27, 2004, bin Laden designated "honored comrade Abu<br />
Mus’ab al-Zarqawi" as the "commander [Amir] of al-Qa’ida organization<br />
in the land of the Tigris and the Euphrates", and asked "the comrades in<br />
the organization" to obey him“ 117 .<br />
In questo modo al-Qa’ida, seppur attraverso la “scomoda” leadership <strong>di</strong> al-Zarqawi,<br />
riguadagnava un ruolo <strong>di</strong> primo piano in uno dei teatri <strong>di</strong> guerra più <strong>del</strong>icati e<br />
nevralgici <strong>del</strong> conflitto in corso e <strong>il</strong> leader giordano poteva riunire sotto la sua guida<br />
nuovi m<strong>il</strong>itanti, rispondendo così al pressante bisogno <strong>di</strong> aumentare gli effettivi sotto<br />
<strong>il</strong> suo <strong>di</strong>retto controllo.<br />
“During Zarqawi’s tenure as emir, AQI’s relationship with al-Qa’ida was a<br />
function of strategic convenience rather than doctrinal agreement. For al-<br />
Qa’ida, attaching its name to Zarqawi’s activities enabled it to maintain<br />
relevance even as its core forces were destroyed or on the run. Zarqawi,<br />
meanwh<strong>il</strong>e, used the al-Qa’ida brand to fac<strong>il</strong>itate recruiting” 118 .<br />
Questa decisione non pose però fine alla <strong>di</strong>sputa ideologica sulla liceità ( e sulla<br />
convenienza) o meno <strong>di</strong> colpire la popolazione sciita per rispondere agli obiettivi<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione. In una lettera <strong>del</strong> luglio 2005 inviata da Ayman al-Zawahiri al<br />
nuovo capo <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida in Iraq, emergono chiaramente le preoccupazioni relative alla<br />
convenienza <strong>di</strong> proseguire questa tattica, anche alla luce dei rischi che molti m<strong>il</strong>itanti<br />
rifugiati in Iran avrebbero potuto correre a causa <strong>di</strong> questa strategia.<br />
116 L’organizzazione <strong>di</strong> al-Qaida nella Terra dei due Fiumi (Iraq).<br />
117 Ely Karmon, Al-Qa’ida and the War on Terror after the War in Iraq, Middle East Review of International Affairs,<br />
Vol. 10, No. 1, Marzo 2006, p. 7<br />
118 Brian Fishman, After Zarqawi: The D<strong>il</strong>emmas and Future of al Qaeda in Iraq, The Washington Quarterly, Autunno<br />
2006, p. 21<br />
153
“Zawahiri […] admits that the "collision between any state based on the<br />
mo<strong>del</strong> of prophecy with the Shi’a is a matter that w<strong>il</strong>l happen sooner or<br />
later." The question he and " mujahed<strong>di</strong>n circles" ask Zarqawi is "about the<br />
correctness of this conflict with Shi’a at this time. […] Moreover, Zawahiri<br />
reminds Zarqawi that "more than one hundred prisoners – many of<br />
whom are from the leadership who are wanted in their countries – are in<br />
the custody of the Iranians". The attacks against the Shi’a in Iraq could<br />
compel "the Iranians to take counter measures" ” 119 .<br />
La continuazione degli attacchi contro la popolazione sciita ha sottolineato come la<br />
leadership storica qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta si trovasse in una situazione estremamente <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>e,<br />
dovendosi b<strong>il</strong>anciare tra la necessità <strong>di</strong> sfruttare al-Zarqawi per fini propagan<strong>di</strong>stici e<br />
operativi e <strong>il</strong> rischio <strong>di</strong> perdere progressivamente <strong>il</strong> controllo e la guida non solo<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione operante in Iraq ma <strong>di</strong> gran parte <strong>del</strong>le realtà connesse al nucleo<br />
storico <strong>del</strong> movimento.<br />
L’uccisione <strong>di</strong> al-Zarqawi <strong>il</strong> 7 giugno 2006 ha rappresentato un momento decisivo per<br />
le sorti <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione, privandola <strong>di</strong> una guida indubbiamente carismatica e<br />
determinata (sebbene non pienamente con<strong>di</strong>visa e accettata da tutti e spesso<br />
responsab<strong>il</strong>e <strong>di</strong> eclatanti fallimenti – come nel caso <strong>del</strong>l’attentato terroristico <strong>del</strong><br />
novembre 2005 che colpì tre hotel ad Amman causando la morte e <strong>il</strong> ferimento <strong>di</strong><br />
<strong>di</strong>versi invitati ad uno sposalizio ) ed evidenziando la chiara inf<strong>il</strong>trazione <strong>di</strong> agenti<br />
legati ai servizi <strong>di</strong> intelligence alleati al suo interno (oltre che <strong>il</strong> probab<strong>il</strong>e<br />
coinvolgimento <strong>di</strong> elementi legati alla componente tribale sunnita).<br />
La morte <strong>del</strong> leader giordano avrebbe potuto quin<strong>di</strong> segnare l’inizio <strong>del</strong>la<br />
<strong>di</strong>sgregazione <strong>di</strong> AQI, eppure la nuova leadership pare essere riuscita a sfruttare<br />
appieno la spirale <strong>di</strong> violenza interetnica che infiamma <strong>il</strong> Paese per rinsaldare i<br />
propri ranghi, ridefinire i rapporti con l’insurrezione <strong>di</strong> matrice sunnita e ripensare<br />
le proprie strategie.<br />
119 Ely Karmon, Al-Qa’ida and the War on Terror after the War in Iraq, Middle East Review of International Affairs,<br />
Vol. 10, No. 1, Marzo 2006, p. 7<br />
154
La nomina <strong>di</strong> Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (alias Abu Ayub al-Masri) a capo <strong>di</strong> AQI, oltre<br />
a sottolineare l’esistenza <strong>di</strong> una realtà altamente strutturata in grado <strong>di</strong> sostituire una<br />
leadership importante, quale quella <strong>di</strong> al-Zarqawi, in un breve lasso <strong>di</strong> tempo, ha<br />
posto le basi per un riavvicinamento <strong>del</strong> movimento all’organizzazione-madre e alla<br />
sua leadership storica. Pur senza sconfessare le tesi <strong>di</strong> al-Zarqawi, <strong>il</strong> nuovo leader è<br />
riuscito a ricucire gli strappi creati dal protagonismo e dall’intransigenza <strong>del</strong> leader<br />
giordano, proseguendo gli attacchi volti a intensificare gli scontri interetnici nel<br />
Paese ma anche affrontando <strong>di</strong>rettamente le forze <strong>del</strong>le Coalizione e le forze<br />
governative irachene e conc<strong>il</strong>iando così le due anime <strong>del</strong> movimento.<br />
Soprattutto, però, al-Masri pare essere riuscito a <strong>di</strong>minuire notevolmente la <strong>di</strong>stanza<br />
tra l’organizzazione e la popolazione e i gruppi legati alla resistenza sunnita e aver<br />
posto le basi per una sempre maggior “irachizzazione” 120 <strong>di</strong> AQI – premessa<br />
essenziale per poter dar vita ad una realtà in grado <strong>di</strong> sopravvivere nel tempo senza<br />
<strong>il</strong> continuo supporto <strong>del</strong> network internazionale qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta e <strong>di</strong> continuare la lotta in<br />
corso – limitando gli effetti <strong>di</strong> quello che Brian Fishman ha definito “the Gharib<br />
Paradox”. Secondo Fishman, infatti, la sostanziale connotazione “straniera” <strong>di</strong> AQI<br />
non sarebbe dovuta esclusivamente allo scarso appeal <strong>del</strong>l’ideologia e <strong>del</strong> progetto<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione, ma anche – e forse soprattutto – ad un modus operan<strong>di</strong><br />
fortemente connesso alla figura <strong>di</strong> al-Zarqawi.<br />
“All terrorist groups face an important ideological paradox. Their ideas<br />
must appeal to popular au<strong>di</strong>ence, but they also must be insular to<br />
maintain internal group cohesion in the face of external criticism. […]<br />
Zarqawi dealt with this paradox by favouring internal group cohesion<br />
over popular appeal, a tendency <strong>il</strong>lustrated by his long-stan<strong>di</strong>ng<br />
nickname, al-Gharib, or the Stranger. […] This definition of identity – an<br />
outsider from mainstream society – embraces and expropriates isolation<br />
from the majority so that, instead of being a source of despair and<br />
weakness, seclusion promotes unity and strength. […] Zarqawi’s<br />
120 Si veda, tra gli altri, <strong>il</strong> famoso Baker-Ham<strong>il</strong>ton Report, ma anche l’affermazione r<strong>il</strong>asciata da al-Masri <strong>il</strong> 10<br />
novembre 2006 secondo cui AQI potrebbe contare ormai su una compagine <strong>di</strong> 12.000 uomini.<br />
155
approach to the gharib paradox made AQI res<strong>il</strong>ient but impeded his<br />
ab<strong>il</strong>ity to bu<strong>il</strong>d social consensus in the Sunni community that would be<br />
strong enough to assert any real political control in Iraq.” 121 .<br />
Il progressivo allontanamento <strong>di</strong> AQI dal “Gharib Paradox” e dalla linea dura e<br />
intransigente adottata dalla leadership precedente paiono aver rappresentato un<br />
elemento fondamentale per <strong>il</strong> riavvicinamento <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione alla<br />
popolazione e alle realtà connesse all’eterogenea insurrezione sunnita,<br />
allontanando lo spettro <strong>di</strong> una definitiva rottura e, quin<strong>di</strong>, l’inevitab<strong>il</strong>e<br />
indebolimento <strong>del</strong> movimento che non sarebbe stato quasi certamente in grado<br />
<strong>di</strong> sostenere l’apertura <strong>di</strong> un nuovo fonte <strong>di</strong> scontro.<br />
La nuova <strong>di</strong>rigenza qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta quin<strong>di</strong>, pur non <strong>di</strong>sponendo né <strong>del</strong> carisma né <strong>del</strong><br />
fascino me<strong>di</strong>atico <strong>di</strong> al-Zarqawi, pare essere riuscita a <strong>di</strong>ssipare i numerosi dubbi<br />
relativi alla sua capacità <strong>di</strong> guidare un movimento che si riteneva inestricab<strong>il</strong>mente<br />
legato alla ormai mitica figura <strong>del</strong> proprio fondatore e a porre le basi per una<br />
duratura permanenza <strong>di</strong> AQI nel Paese.<br />
Al <strong>di</strong> là <strong>del</strong>le considerazioni relative alla capacità <strong>di</strong> ricreare in Iraq le stesse<br />
con<strong>di</strong>zioni che avevano favorito l’ascesa <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione in Afghanistan, è ormai<br />
evidente che AQI sia riuscita a inserirsi efficacemente nel sistema iracheno e a<br />
costituire una struttura volta a <strong>di</strong>spiegare i suoi effetti non solo nell’ambito <strong>del</strong>lo<br />
scontro attuale ma anche in ottica futura. L’Iraq, infatti, non rappresenta per al-<br />
Qa’ida solamente <strong>il</strong> principale teatro <strong>di</strong> battaglia che contrappone <strong>il</strong> movimento alle<br />
forze “infe<strong>del</strong>i”, ma anche – e forse soprattutto – <strong>il</strong> principale training ground <strong>del</strong>la<br />
nuova generazione <strong>di</strong> m<strong>il</strong>itanti qa’i<strong>di</strong>sti.<br />
Allo stesso modo, è ormai evidente che <strong>il</strong> Paese si stia apprestando a <strong>di</strong>venire uno dei<br />
più importanti bacini <strong>di</strong> reclutamento per <strong>il</strong> movimento, anche alla luce <strong>del</strong> sempre<br />
maggior coinvolgimento <strong>di</strong> m<strong>il</strong>itanti iracheni e <strong>del</strong>l’enorme eco che la campagna<br />
contro le forze <strong>del</strong>la Coalizione sta avendo all’interno <strong>del</strong> mondo musulmano.<br />
121 Brian Fishman, After Zarqawi: The D<strong>il</strong>emmas and Future of al Qaeda in Iraq, The Washington Quarterly, Autunno<br />
2006, p. 21-22<br />
156
Lungi dal costituire solo uno dei teatri d’azione <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione, l’Iraq è quin<strong>di</strong><br />
<strong>di</strong>venuto uno dei punti nevralgici <strong>del</strong>la campagna intrapresa da al-Qa’ida: le<br />
eccezionali con<strong>di</strong>zioni <strong>del</strong>lo scenario iracheno combinate al mutato contesto interno<br />
seguito all’uccisione <strong>di</strong> al-Zarqawi e al graduale inserimento <strong>di</strong> AQI nel tessuto<br />
sociale <strong>del</strong> Paese hanno contribuito a intensificare l’interesse <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida nel Paese e a<br />
trasformare l’Iraq nel principale teatro <strong>del</strong>lo scontro ingaggiato con gli Stati Uniti e i<br />
suoi alleati.<br />
3.3 L’Europa e i rischi legati al <strong>fenomeno</strong> dei returning jiha<strong>di</strong>sts dal fronte iracheno<br />
L’Europa ha da sempre rappresentato una <strong>del</strong>le basi logistiche ed operative<br />
principali per al-Qa’ida. La presenza <strong>di</strong> una massiccia comunità musulmana (stimata<br />
attorno ai 15-20 m<strong>il</strong>ioni <strong>di</strong> in<strong>di</strong>vidui), la tra<strong>di</strong>zionale accoglienza riservata agli<br />
attivisti politici perseguitati nei loro Paesi <strong>di</strong> origine, unita alle deboli misure <strong>di</strong><br />
controllo dei processi migratori e alla possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> percorrere <strong>il</strong> continente senza<br />
dover temere continui controlli alle frontiere, hanno rappresentato alcuni degli<br />
elementi che hanno spinto al-Qa’ida a sfruttare una fitta rete <strong>di</strong> cellule e strutture <strong>di</strong><br />
sostegno per progettare, finanziare, supportare e implementare le proprie operazioni.<br />
“[…] it should come as no surprise that almost every single attack carried<br />
out or attempted by al-Qa’ida throughout the world has some link to<br />
Europe, even prior to 9/11. A Dublin-based charity provided material<br />
support to some of the terrorists who attacked the US Embassies in Kenya<br />
and Tanzania in 1998[…] False documents provided by a cell operating<br />
between Belgium and France allowed to al-Qa’ida operatives to portray<br />
themselves as journalists and assassinate Ahmed Shah Massoud, the<br />
commander of the Afghan Northern Alliance […] And the attacks of 9/11<br />
were partially planned in Hamburg, Germany, where three of the four<br />
157
p<strong>il</strong>ots of the hijacked planes had lived and met, and from where they<br />
received financial and logistical support unt<strong>il</strong> the day of the attacks. After<br />
9/11 […] the cells operating in Europe gained even ad<strong>di</strong>tional importance<br />
. Most of the planning for the Apr<strong>il</strong> 2002 bombing of a synagogue in the<br />
Tunisian resort town of Djerba […] was done in Germany and France.<br />
Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to Moroccan authorities, the fund for the May 2003 Casablanca<br />
bombings came from Moroccan cells operating between Spain, Italy and<br />
Belgium. “ 122 .<br />
Al <strong>di</strong> là <strong>del</strong>la fornitura <strong>di</strong> supporto logistico e operativo, la rete europea è riuscita a<br />
garantire a al-Qa’ida un ingente afflusso <strong>di</strong> capitali ottenuti attraverso <strong>il</strong> ricorso ad<br />
attività criminali che spaziano dal furto e dalla contraffazione <strong>di</strong> documenti sino allo<br />
sfruttamento <strong>di</strong> traffici <strong>di</strong> droga e <strong>del</strong>l’immigrazione clandestina. 123<br />
Benchè questi network abbiano tra<strong>di</strong>zionalmente ricoperto essenzialmente un ruolo<br />
<strong>di</strong> sostegno, gli attacchi a Madrid e a Londra, così come la scoperta <strong>di</strong> numerose<br />
cellule attive e dormienti, hanno sottolineato come <strong>il</strong> continente non rappresenti più<br />
solamente un importante centro <strong>di</strong> supporto logistico e operativo ma sia <strong>di</strong>venuto a<br />
tutti gli effetti uno dei principali teatri <strong>del</strong> conflitto ingaggiato da al-Qa’ida.<br />
In tale contesto, <strong>il</strong> ruolo <strong>del</strong> conflitto iracheno rappresenta un elemento <strong>di</strong> eccezionale<br />
importanza. L’invasione <strong>del</strong>l’Iraq da parte <strong>del</strong>le forze anglo-statunitensi ha infatti<br />
avuto un fortissimo impatto sull’intera ummah, incrementando l’ost<strong>il</strong>ità nei confronti<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’imperialismo statunitense e favorendo un netto aumento <strong>del</strong> sostegno alla causa<br />
qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta.<br />
“Needless to say, opposition to the Iraq War does note equal support for<br />
terrorism.[…] Equally, though, the dominance of the Iraq issue among<br />
European Muslims has made some of them more susceptible […] to the<br />
political <strong>di</strong>scourse offered by Salafi jiha<strong>di</strong>sts. The invasion by Western<br />
forces of a country at the heart of the Muslim world, more forcefully than<br />
122 Lorenzo Vi<strong>di</strong>no in Islamic Extremism in Europe, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging<br />
Threats of the Committee on International Relations, 27 apr<strong>il</strong>e 2005, p. 25<br />
123 Ibidem, p. 27<br />
158
any of the local conflicts invoked by bin Laden and others in the past,<br />
seemed to confirm the notion that the West is at war with Islam. Indeed,<br />
in a recent ICM poll, seven out of ten British Muslims agreed with the<br />
statement that the ‘war against terrorism’ is, in reality, a ‘war against<br />
Islam’, with over 80% saying the Iraq War was unjustified and the<br />
promise of a democratic, sovereign Iraq was a lie” 124 .<br />
Questo fattore ha permesso ad al-Qa’ida <strong>di</strong> invertire la pericolosa deriva <strong>del</strong><br />
movimento e <strong>di</strong> registrare un sensib<strong>il</strong>e incremento <strong>di</strong> adesioni, limitando i <strong>di</strong>sastrosi<br />
effetti derivanti dalla caduta <strong>del</strong> santuario afgano e alla campagna scatenata contro <strong>il</strong><br />
movimento. Cosa ancora più importante, questo <strong>fenomeno</strong> non si è manifestato<br />
solamente all’interno <strong>del</strong>le aree <strong>del</strong> mondo islamico tra<strong>di</strong>zionalmente e storicamente<br />
più influenzate dal messaggio qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta, ma anche all’interno <strong>del</strong>lo stesso continente<br />
europeo, come <strong>di</strong>mostrato dal numero in continuo aumento <strong>di</strong> m<strong>il</strong>itanti <strong>di</strong> origine<br />
europea presenti al fronte.<br />
“Such assessments are underscored by numerous reports about attempts<br />
of young European Muslims to join the fighting in Iraq. Wh<strong>il</strong>e the actual<br />
number of European jiha<strong>di</strong>sts in Iraq may be relatively low – French<br />
intelligence believes that there are as few as 10-50 Europeans among the<br />
1,000-3,000 foreign jiha<strong>di</strong>sts – there is evidence that significant numbers<br />
have been recruited and made their way to Syria, Turkey and Jordan,<br />
where they are receiving basic m<strong>il</strong>itary training. The French anti-terrorist<br />
magistrate Jean-Francois Ricard asserts that there are ‘dozes of new cells’<br />
in France whose sole purpose it is to provide recruits for the jihad in Iraq.<br />
The UK authorities estimate that at least 70 in<strong>di</strong>viduals have left the<br />
country for Iraq, whereas the Germans believe that between ten and 50<br />
young Muslims have been recruited in the state of Bavaria alone.” 125<br />
124 Peter Neumann, Europe’s <strong>Jihad</strong>ist D<strong>il</strong>emma, Survival, vol. 48 n. 2, estate 2006, p. 75<br />
125 Peter Neumann, Europe’s <strong>Jihad</strong>ist D<strong>il</strong>emma, Survival, vol. 48 n. 2, estate 2006, p. 76<br />
159
Sebbene <strong>il</strong> numero <strong>di</strong> m<strong>il</strong>itanti europei non possa essere paragonab<strong>il</strong>e a quello <strong>di</strong> aree<br />
“storicamente” legate al movimento, l’importanza <strong>di</strong> questo trend non può essere<br />
sottovalutata, soprattutto se esaminata in un orizzonte <strong>di</strong> me<strong>di</strong>o-lungo periodo.<br />
La r<strong>il</strong>evanza <strong>di</strong> questo <strong>fenomeno</strong> non è infatti tanto da in<strong>di</strong>viduarsi negli effetti che<br />
esso avrà sul corso <strong>del</strong> conflitto iracheno, quanto sulle conseguenze legate<br />
all’esperienza che questi m<strong>il</strong>itanti acquisiranno sul campo, ed è <strong>di</strong> natura sia tattica<br />
che strategica.<br />
Per quanto concerne <strong>il</strong> primo fattore, le maggiori preoccupazioni sono legate al fatto<br />
che, a <strong>di</strong>fferenza <strong>del</strong>lo scenario afgano, <strong>il</strong> teatro <strong>di</strong> scontro iracheno è essenzialmente<br />
urbano e presenta quin<strong>di</strong> forti analogie con l’ambiente nel quale questi m<strong>il</strong>itanti si<br />
troverebbero a operare, nel caso venisse implementata una campagna terroristica in<br />
Europa. L’impiego <strong>di</strong> tattiche <strong>di</strong>mostratesi eccezionalmente efficaci in un contesto<br />
urbano, unita alla profonda conoscenza <strong>del</strong>la cultura e <strong>del</strong> teatro <strong>di</strong> scontro,<br />
garantirebbero a questi guerriglieri un importante vantaggio sia sotto <strong>il</strong> prof<strong>il</strong>o<br />
organizzativo che sotto quello operativo e segnerebbero l’avvio <strong>di</strong> uno scontro<br />
destinato ad incidere pesantemente sulle sorti <strong>del</strong>la guerra al terrorismo.<br />
In relazione al secondo punto, invece, <strong>il</strong> rischio è legato all’influenza che questi<br />
m<strong>il</strong>itanti potrebbero avere, una volta tornati nei loro Paesi d’origine, sull’intera<br />
comunità islamica residente in Europa. Prendendo come termine <strong>di</strong> paragone<br />
l’impatto che i “returning jiha<strong>di</strong>s ” ebbero sui loro Paesi al loro ritorno dal jihad<br />
afgano, è possib<strong>il</strong>e <strong>del</strong>ineare scenari estremamente critici per <strong>il</strong> futuro <strong>del</strong> nostro<br />
continente. Se si analizza infatti <strong>il</strong> caso egiziano – da sempre segnato dalla presenza<br />
<strong>di</strong> forti movimenti fondamentalisti (ra<strong>di</strong>cali e non) – è infatti possib<strong>il</strong>e notare come<br />
l’acuirsi <strong>del</strong>lo scontro tra le forze governative e le cellule islamiche ra<strong>di</strong>cali si sia<br />
registrato in concomitanza con <strong>il</strong> ritorno dei mujahiddeen dal fronte afgano. Il ritorno<br />
<strong>di</strong> questi m<strong>il</strong>itanti, infatti, non si è solamente tradotto in un sensib<strong>il</strong>e incremento <strong>del</strong>le<br />
capacità operative <strong>di</strong> queste realtà, ma anche – e soprattutto – in una netta<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>calizzazione <strong>del</strong>le posizioni e <strong>del</strong>l’ideologia <strong>di</strong> questi movimenti, spesso sino ad<br />
allora schierati su posizioni sostanzialmente moderate. L’influenza dei veterani<br />
160
iracheni potrebbe quin<strong>di</strong> rivelarsi fondamentale per cooptare quei segmenti <strong>del</strong>la<br />
comunità islamica europea più sensib<strong>il</strong>i al messaggio qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta e integrarli nel<br />
network operante in Europa.<br />
Il <strong>fenomeno</strong> dei returning jiha<strong>di</strong>sts potrebbe quin<strong>di</strong> avere un impatto fortissimo sulle<br />
sorti <strong>del</strong>la guerra al terrorismo e tradursi in una spirale <strong>di</strong> violenza in grado <strong>di</strong><br />
alterare i già precari e <strong>del</strong>icati equ<strong>il</strong>ibri esistenti all’interno <strong>del</strong>la società europea. In<br />
questo contesto, la campagna irachena assume un significato ancora più r<strong>il</strong>evante e si<br />
inserisce all’interno <strong>di</strong> uno scenario che non è e non potrà mai essere solamente<br />
regionale o limitato alle aree storicamente legate al mondo islamico ma che riguarda<br />
<strong>di</strong>rettamente l’intera comunità internazionale.<br />
4. Conclusioni<br />
A cinque anni dalla caduta <strong>del</strong> santuario afgano, al-Qa’ida pare quin<strong>di</strong> essere riuscita<br />
a uscire dall’impasse nella quale era precipitata, dando vita a una nuova offensiva<br />
che ha <strong>il</strong> suo epicentro in Iraq e Afghanistan ma che si prefigge <strong>di</strong> colpire su scala<br />
globale.<br />
La graduale rinascita <strong>del</strong> movimento ha però imposto altissimi costi e ra<strong>di</strong>cali<br />
cambiamenti che hanno trasformato al-Qa’ida, da un’organizzazione fortemente<br />
coesa e strutturata, in una sorta <strong>di</strong> “nebulosa” che racchiude sotto la sua sigla<br />
numerose realtà dotate <strong>di</strong> ampia autonomia.<br />
Questa trasformazione ha permesso al movimento <strong>di</strong> estendere <strong>il</strong> proprio raggio <strong>di</strong><br />
azione e <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>venire un <strong>fenomeno</strong> sempre più globale ma ha anche minato<br />
seriamente la sua struttura <strong>di</strong> comando e <strong>il</strong> grado <strong>di</strong> controllo esercitato dalla<br />
leadership storica, tanto che <strong>di</strong>versi analisti hanno sottolineato come al-Qa’ida non<br />
esista più come organizzazione.<br />
161
Sebbene sia innegab<strong>il</strong>e che <strong>il</strong> movimento abbia subito danni estremamente r<strong>il</strong>evanti,<br />
non è possib<strong>il</strong>e affermare – quantomeno allo stato attuale – che al-Qa’ida si sia<br />
trasformata in una semplice ideologia o in un mero brand.<br />
Oltretutto, sebbene sia evidente che la caccia scatenata contro la leadership e i quadri<br />
<strong>di</strong>rigenti qa’i<strong>di</strong>sti abbia comportato una seria limitazione <strong>del</strong>le loro capacità<br />
decisionali e operative, <strong>il</strong> loro ruolo, a tutt’oggi, pare tutt’altro che marginale,<br />
soprattutto qualora si tenga in considerazione <strong>il</strong> peso, in termini <strong>di</strong> influenza sul<br />
campo ra<strong>di</strong>cale, detenuto da Bin Laden e al-Zawahiri e <strong>il</strong> controllo che ancora essi<br />
sono in grado <strong>di</strong> esercitare sull’organizzazione.<br />
In tale contesto è quin<strong>di</strong> fondamentale non sottovalutare le capacità operative <strong>di</strong> cui<br />
ancora <strong>di</strong>spone <strong>il</strong> nucleo storico <strong>del</strong> movimento; parimenti, è altrettanto importante<br />
considerare come, in questi ultimi anni, si sia registrata l’ascesa <strong>di</strong> nuove realtà e<br />
guide carismatiche – <strong>di</strong> cui al-Zarqawi rappresentava uno dei più conosciuti<br />
esponenti – potenzialmente in grado <strong>di</strong> contendere nel lungo periodo la leadership<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione e frammentarla.<br />
Al <strong>di</strong> là <strong>del</strong>la questione relativa all’effettivo controllo <strong>del</strong>la leadership sull’intero<br />
movimento, è necessario tener presente che lo stato <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida non può essere<br />
valutato solamente da un punto <strong>di</strong> vista strutturale e organizzativo. Al-Qa’ida rimane<br />
infatti un <strong>fenomeno</strong> a cavallo tra piano materiale e ideologico e l’accresciuto status<br />
ottenuto dal movimento in questo seconda <strong>di</strong>mensione non può che influire<br />
<strong>di</strong>rettamente sull’attuale conflitto.<br />
In tale contesto, una strategia totalmente ed esclusivamente improntata allo scontro<br />
<strong>di</strong>retto non potrà segnare la sconfitta <strong>del</strong> fronte qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta. A fianco <strong>del</strong>le fondamentali<br />
operazioni m<strong>il</strong>itari – e <strong>del</strong>le altrettanto essenziali attività <strong>di</strong> intelligence e <strong>di</strong><br />
<strong>di</strong>struzione dei canali <strong>di</strong> finanziamento <strong>del</strong> movimento – è necessario quin<strong>di</strong> avviare<br />
un serio programma volto a <strong>del</strong>egittimare <strong>il</strong> messaggio <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida, attingendo agli<br />
stessi mezzi impiegati dall’organizzazione. Se da un lato sarà quin<strong>di</strong> fondamentale <strong>il</strong><br />
ruolo <strong>del</strong>l’imam per confutare le tesi qa’i<strong>di</strong>ste, dall’altro sarà altrettanto importante<br />
162
sostenere un’efficace contro-campagna me<strong>di</strong>atica per raggiungere <strong>di</strong>rettamente la<br />
popolazione e soprattutto le fasce potenzialmente più esposte e sensib<strong>il</strong>i al fascino<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’Islam ra<strong>di</strong>cale.<br />
163
Tra virtuale e reale: le nuove <strong>piste</strong> <strong>del</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo<br />
Marco Lombar<strong>di</strong><br />
Il processo evolutivo <strong>del</strong> jihad è passato e sta passando attraverso alcune fasi<br />
significative quali: la ra<strong>di</strong>calizzazione, la frammentazione, la deterritorializzazione, <strong>il</strong><br />
“franchising”. La conseguenza <strong>di</strong> questo processo è una nuova forma <strong>di</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo<br />
più flessib<strong>il</strong>e ma meno coor<strong>di</strong>nato; aperto a nuovi mercati <strong>di</strong> reclutamento ma meno<br />
omogenei sul piano culturale; me<strong>di</strong>aticamente r<strong>il</strong>evamente ma per questo più<br />
<strong>di</strong>pendente dalle tecnologie e competenze <strong>del</strong>la comunicazione.<br />
Questo approfon<strong>di</strong>mento si propone <strong>di</strong> affrontare questi aspetti attraverso l’analisi<br />
<strong>del</strong>la comunicazione via web, attraverso <strong>il</strong> monitoraggio dei siti significativi e<br />
l’analisi <strong>del</strong>la comunicazione proposta. Infatti, nella comunicazione web si ritrovano<br />
tutti i segni <strong>del</strong>la frammentazione come incremento <strong>del</strong>le fonti legittimate a<br />
comunicare; <strong>del</strong>la deterritorializzazione nella sintesi <strong>del</strong>la nuova umma virtuale;<br />
<strong>del</strong>la promozione <strong>del</strong> brand presso nuovi mercati. Il risultato <strong>di</strong> questa analisi<br />
evidenzia quelle rotte virtuali sulle sulle quali si muove <strong>il</strong> moderno jiha<strong>di</strong>smo.<br />
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Accompagnano questa analisi alcuni dati rispetto alla rotte <strong>del</strong> reclutamento<br />
attraverso la verifica <strong>del</strong>le liste dei prigionieri arrestati per terrorismo islamico.<br />
1. Il quadro <strong>di</strong> riferimento in sintesi : “al-Qa’ida”<br />
Oggi “al-Qa’ida” può essere definita come:<br />
• un’organizzazione terroristica globale, flessib<strong>il</strong>e, a cellule cioè composta da<br />
numerose cellule i cui membri non si conoscono reciprocamente, affinché in<br />
caso <strong>di</strong> per<strong>di</strong>ta <strong>di</strong> una cellula le altre si mantengano operative. Essa fa<br />
riferimento a quattro principali network:<br />
1) La rete originale Arabo-Afghana;<br />
2) Una nuova rete in “franchise” costituita in <strong>di</strong>fferenti paesi;<br />
3) Un’organizzazione ombrello <strong>di</strong> gruppi islamici dal Marocco alla<br />
Cina;<br />
4) Una rete <strong>di</strong> imitatori ed emulatori;<br />
• un movimento ra<strong>di</strong>cale <strong>del</strong> mondo islamico che ha i propri obiettivi politici.<br />
Infatti, da parte <strong>del</strong>la “shura majlis” (consiglio) è necessario garantire una<br />
relazione <strong>di</strong> coor<strong>di</strong>namento tra i quattro network (da qui l’uso funzionale dei<br />
me<strong>di</strong>a e <strong>del</strong>l’ “Umma Virtuale” costituita nel web), soprattutto affinché i suoi<br />
leader come al-Zawahiri e Osama possano essere i promotori in un esercizio<br />
senza precedenti <strong>di</strong> “corrupting, misinterpreting and misrepresenting” <strong>del</strong><br />
jihad come guerra santa;<br />
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• una moderna organizzazione res<strong>il</strong>iente, capace <strong>di</strong> approfittare<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’innovazione tecnologica per raggiungere i propri fini, muovendosi<br />
rapidamente in cerca <strong>di</strong> nuove opportunità.<br />
Alla luce degli ultimi avvenimenti si può ipotizzare una alleanza tattica sotto forma<br />
<strong>di</strong> un network <strong>del</strong> “terrore nich<strong>il</strong>ista” - composta<br />
1. da frange <strong>di</strong> fondamentalisti islamici m<strong>il</strong>itanti <strong>del</strong> jihad;<br />
2. dalla resistenza irachena sicuramente inf<strong>il</strong>trata da elementi <strong>del</strong> terrorismo e<br />
che non può essere confusa con l’idea occidentale <strong>di</strong> “partigiani”;<br />
3. da gruppi terroristici ed eversivi europei;<br />
4. da circoli anti-imperialisti.<br />
L’organizzazione non è definita attraverso un progetto strategico-politico, ma<br />
attraverso un modus operan<strong>di</strong> che deve portare a massimizzare <strong>il</strong> numero <strong>di</strong> vittime,<br />
alla spettacolarizzazione globale <strong>del</strong>l’atto terroristico e all’abbattimento <strong>di</strong> ogni limite<br />
e tabù, <strong>il</strong> tutto sotto la griffe <strong>di</strong> “al-Qa’ida”.<br />
“Al-Qa’ida”, in sintesi, depende da:<br />
1. la “cassa <strong>di</strong> risonanza” fornita dai me<strong>di</strong>a globali e da Internet;<br />
2. dalla “howala”, <strong>il</strong> sistema informale <strong>di</strong> finanziamento.<br />
Una tale organizzazione flessib<strong>il</strong>e e sempre più destrutturata sembrerebbe lasciare<br />
più spazio non solo a suicider bombers (islamici), i martiri <strong>del</strong> jihad, ma anche a<br />
m<strong>il</strong>itanti “non-islamici”. In questa prospettiva, è pensab<strong>il</strong>e che nei Paesi Europei o<br />
negli Stati Uniti, la hol<strong>di</strong>ng <strong>del</strong> terrore globale possa far uso anche <strong>di</strong> quadri locali<br />
non associati al fondamentalismo islamico ra<strong>di</strong>cale. Un ulteriore aspetto, che<br />
complica <strong>il</strong> quadro operativo, è l’uso sempre più massiccio da parte <strong>di</strong> “al-Qa’ida”, o<br />
<strong>del</strong>la galassia che va sotto <strong>il</strong> suo nome, <strong>di</strong> “imported suicider bombers”, come è<br />
caratteristico in molti attentati in Israele da parte <strong>di</strong> organizzazioni terroristiche<br />
Palestinesi. Questo <strong>fenomeno</strong> dovrebbe altresi segnalarci un potenziale pericolo<br />
futuro: quello che si crei una “scuola mon<strong>di</strong>ale” <strong>di</strong> suicider bombers non<br />
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necessariamente connessi a elementi islamici. Il meccanismo psicologico è quello<br />
<strong>del</strong>la “politicizzazione” <strong>del</strong> suicider bombers e <strong>del</strong>le <strong>di</strong>namiche <strong>di</strong> “appartenenza a<br />
un gruppo”. Questo è già avvenuto per terroristi politici/eversivi come quelli<br />
appartenenti alla banda Baader-Meinhof e all’IRA. E’ possib<strong>il</strong>e che se <strong>il</strong> <strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>di</strong><br />
“export & import” <strong>di</strong> suicider bombers dovesse crescere nel futuro, questo potrebbe<br />
essere un segnale <strong>di</strong> “attraversamento” <strong>del</strong>la soglia religiosa e l’adozione <strong>del</strong><br />
terrorismo suicida da parte <strong>di</strong> elementi non-islamici.<br />
Questa forma <strong>di</strong> reclutamento si accompagna alla definizione più efficace che può<br />
essere attribuita ad “al-Qa’ida”: un movimento in franchising<br />
“al-Qa’ida” è una griffe, e al tempo stesso una “rete <strong>del</strong> terrorismo” internazionale, che<br />
elabora e trasmette documenti e fatwe, che <strong>del</strong>inea le <strong>di</strong>rettrici generali <strong>del</strong> jihad e<br />
scan<strong>di</strong>sce i tempi <strong>del</strong>le varie offensive, ma che poi <strong>del</strong>ega, o semplicemente<br />
“propone”, la fase operativa ai gruppi inse<strong>di</strong>ati localmente aventi un grado totale o<br />
parziale <strong>di</strong> autonomia. Questi gruppi possono essere tra loro in<strong>di</strong>pendenti o<br />
debolmente connessi– con proprie strategie, meto<strong>di</strong> e tecnologie <strong>di</strong> esecuzione <strong>del</strong><br />
terrore – e avere, con la leadership <strong>di</strong> “al-Qa’ida”, una debole oppure nessuna<br />
relazione storica. In ogni caso, agire sotto la griffe <strong>di</strong> “al-Qa’ida”, permetterà a questi<br />
gruppi <strong>di</strong> ottenere la massima visib<strong>il</strong>ità me<strong>di</strong>atica, <strong>di</strong> raccogliere nuovi finanziamenti<br />
dalle opere <strong>di</strong> carità arabe e, in ultimo, reclutare nuovi m<strong>il</strong>itanti per <strong>il</strong> jihad totale.<br />
2. Il caso <strong>di</strong> Ansar al Islam<br />
L’organizzazione <strong>di</strong> Ansar Al Islam, con particolare riferimento al reclutamento, alla<br />
struttura e alla leadership mette nuovamente in evidenza la <strong>di</strong>mensione<br />
internazionale dei gruppi <strong>del</strong> terrorismo islamico.<br />
Ansar Al Islam nasce in Kur<strong>di</strong>stan iraqeno, nel settembre 2001, coagulando intorno a<br />
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se una molteplicità <strong>di</strong> movimenti, quale risultato degli ultimi 10 anni <strong>di</strong> storia <strong>del</strong>le<br />
organizzazioni islamiche estremiste nell’area e con <strong>di</strong>rette connessioni con la<br />
<strong>di</strong>mensione internazionale <strong>del</strong> terrorismo islamico.<br />
Un aiuto alla ricostruzione <strong>di</strong> questo processo <strong>di</strong> costituzione viene dato dalle<br />
informazioni raccolte presso le agenzie <strong>di</strong> sicurezza kurde a Sulaimani e Kirkuk, in<br />
particolare da Sarkout Hasan Jalal, responsab<strong>il</strong>e dei servizi <strong>di</strong> sicurezza a Sulaimani,<br />
<strong>il</strong> quale ricorda come si debba fare riferimento a “Bzutnawai Islami (Movimento<br />
Islamico) che nacque nel 1979 in Iran, per poi costituirsi in Kur<strong>di</strong>stan come partito<br />
politico legittimo dopo la rivolta <strong>del</strong> 1991”. Ma le posizioni abbastanza moderate <strong>del</strong><br />
movimento non sod<strong>di</strong>sfacevano un congruo numero <strong>di</strong> aderenti, spostato verso<br />
posizioni estremiste, che cominciarono a riunirsi in gruppi spontanei ma senza<br />
interrompere le relazioni formali con Bzutnawai Islami. Si tratta <strong>di</strong> una fase che<br />
caratterizza gli anni dal 1994 al 1998 circa, dove non si assiste alla organizzazione <strong>di</strong><br />
gruppi in<strong>di</strong>pendenti quanto, piuttosto, al formarsi <strong>di</strong> correnti interne al Movimento,<br />
che saranno <strong>il</strong> prodomo ai futuri movimenti islaimici kur<strong>di</strong> <strong>del</strong>la fine degli anni<br />
Novanta: “nei <strong>di</strong>ntorni <strong>del</strong> confine <strong>di</strong> Halabja hanno fondato Hamas, ancora<br />
segretamente e senza annunciarlo. Un altro gruppo a Erb<strong>il</strong> ha fondato<br />
un’organizzazione estremista <strong>di</strong> nome Al Tawhid (Riunificazione), anche questi non<br />
erano d’accordo con <strong>il</strong> programma <strong>del</strong> Movimento Islamico sulla questione <strong>del</strong> jihad<br />
e sulla creazione <strong>di</strong> una regione islamica in Kur<strong>di</strong>stan. C’era anche un altro<br />
movimento nell’ambito <strong>di</strong> Bzutnawai Islami che veniva chiamato la Hezi Dui Soran<br />
(Forza 2 <strong>del</strong> Soran, una regione <strong>del</strong> Kur<strong>di</strong>stan.), coor<strong>di</strong>nati da un gruppo <strong>di</strong> giovani<br />
estremisti. C’era anche un altro gruppo che chiamavano Islah (Miglioristi), questi<br />
dall’inizio erano coor<strong>di</strong>nati dal Mullah Krekar” (Sarkout Hasan Jalal), cioè da<br />
Najmud<strong>di</strong>n Faraj Ahmad, rifugiato in Norvegia, inse<strong>di</strong>ato nell’area <strong>di</strong> Golp e<br />
Halabja 126 .<br />
Le ragioni <strong>del</strong> progressivo ra<strong>di</strong>camento <strong>del</strong>l’islamismo ra<strong>di</strong>cale e fondamentalista<br />
organizzato in gruppi estremisti in Kur<strong>di</strong>stan trova ragioni pratiche nell’embargo<br />
126 Le aree in<strong>di</strong>cate si trovano nell’area montuosa kurdo iraqena confinante con l’Iran.<br />
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economico che <strong>il</strong> governo iraqeno applicò alla regione dopo <strong>il</strong> 1991: la situazione<br />
economica interna era <strong>di</strong> piena recessione e tutte le entrate <strong>del</strong> Governo Regionale<br />
<strong>del</strong> Kur<strong>di</strong>stan, che erano basate soprattutto sui dazi doganali, si erano ormai ridotte.<br />
In questo contesto “i gruppi islamici sono venuti per sfruttare la situazione, sfruttare<br />
la povertà <strong>del</strong>la gente attraverso alcune organizzazioni legate all’Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta:<br />
aiutavano gli orfani, le vedove, gli anziani. Questo coor<strong>di</strong>namento lo facevano le<br />
organizzazioni islamiche e tutto ciò per attirare l’attenzione <strong>del</strong>la gente. La gente<br />
stessa in quel periodo era povera perciò i sol<strong>di</strong> li influenzavano” (Sarkout Hasan<br />
Jalal).<br />
Si avviò in quella fase turbolenta <strong>di</strong> metà anni Novanta, una sistematica costruzione<br />
<strong>di</strong> moschee finanziate dalle associazioni sau<strong>di</strong>te in cui si “impartivano lezioni ai<br />
bambini nelle moschee e li abituavano alle idee <strong>del</strong>l’Islam. Dopo aver fatto questo gli<br />
islamici estremisti attraverso i loro uomini nelle moschee estremizzavano i giovani<br />
parlandogli <strong>del</strong> jihad con le loro tesi e con le idee <strong>del</strong> jihad”, specifica Sarkout Hasan<br />
Jalal, confermato dalle numerose testimonianze raccolte nei v<strong>il</strong>laggi <strong>di</strong> montagna<br />
soprattutto nell’area orientale <strong>del</strong> Kur<strong>di</strong>stan. La situazione comincia a cambiare dopo<br />
la risoluzione 986 <strong>del</strong> 1995 <strong>del</strong>le Nazioni Unite, a seguito <strong>del</strong>la quale <strong>il</strong> governo<br />
kurdo decide <strong>di</strong> intervenire avversando questa progressiva politica <strong>di</strong> arabizzazione,<br />
perché “noi siamo una società a maggioranza islamica, ma ciò che facevano loro era<br />
<strong>di</strong>verso, loro rendevano l’islam politico e questo è <strong>di</strong>verso dalla religione. Inoltre<br />
Ansar e Jiund Al Islam dopo aver fatto tanti atti terroristici <strong>di</strong>edero una brutta<br />
immagine degli islamici politicizzati” (Sarkout Hasan Jalal).<br />
Dunque la chiave per comprendere la nascita <strong>di</strong> Ansar Al Islam sta proprio nelle<br />
complesse <strong>di</strong>namiche che ruotano attorno al Kur<strong>di</strong>stan sul finire degli anni Novanta,<br />
che non riguardano solo <strong>il</strong> tentativo <strong>di</strong> penetrazione “politica assistenziale”<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’Islam, ma rimandano a specifiche <strong>di</strong>rettive che evidenziano un nuovo<br />
coor<strong>di</strong>namento internazionale <strong>del</strong> terrorismo islamico, basato in Afghanistan, sotto la<br />
leadership <strong>di</strong> Osama Bin Laden. E’ <strong>il</strong> 2000 quando al-Qa’ida fa pressioni sulle<br />
<strong>di</strong>fferenti organizzazioni kurde, affinché queste confluiscano in un gruppo operativo<br />
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unificato “al-Qa’ida ha detto ‘le frammentazioni ci danneggiano, dovete unirvi’”<br />
(Sarkout Hasan Jalal) e Bin Laden affida la promozione <strong>del</strong>l’iniziativa al suo uomo<br />
Abu Abd Al Raman Al Suri. Nel corso <strong>del</strong> 2000, intorno a maggio, <strong>il</strong> gruppo <strong>di</strong><br />
Hamas con quello <strong>di</strong> Al Tawhid si riuniscono nel Fronte Islamico Unito, ma è circa<br />
un mese più tar<strong>di</strong> la partecipazione <strong>di</strong> Hezi Dui Soran che porta alla fondazione <strong>di</strong><br />
Jund Al Islam: è <strong>il</strong> primo settembre 2000. Questo era un gruppo estremista inse<strong>di</strong>ato<br />
nelle regioni <strong>di</strong> Tawela e Biyara, a nord est <strong>del</strong> Kur<strong>di</strong>stan verso <strong>il</strong> confine con l’Iran<br />
dove “hanno aperto un ufficio con <strong>il</strong> nome <strong>di</strong> Jund Al Islam e hanno appoggiato al-<br />
Qa’ida e da essi ricevevano tutte le <strong>di</strong>rettive” e, sembra, un finanziamento <strong>di</strong> 600.000<br />
USD. Il leader era proprio Abu Abd Al Raman Al Suri, alla cui morte in battaglia con<br />
i peshmerga kur<strong>di</strong> si sostituì Abu Abdullah Shafii. Il compito <strong>del</strong> gruppo era<br />
destab<strong>il</strong>izzare l’area e formare nuovi terroristi reclutati tra gli estremisti kur<strong>di</strong>,<br />
secondo uno schema <strong>di</strong> celle in<strong>di</strong>pendenti organizzate in sei reggimenti.<br />
E’ nel 2001 che finalmente nasce Ansar Al Islam, come coronamento <strong>di</strong> questo sforzo<br />
<strong>di</strong> riunificazione, quando <strong>il</strong> gruppo <strong>di</strong> Mullah Krekar (Najmud<strong>di</strong>n Faraj Ahmad),<br />
Islah, si unisce a Jund Al Islam. Proprio quest’ultimo ne assume la leadership: “dopo<br />
la creazione <strong>di</strong> Ansar Al Islam, Krekar <strong>di</strong>venne <strong>il</strong> loro emiro. Abu Abdullah Shafi con<br />
Asso I Hauleri <strong>di</strong>vennero i suoi vice” (Sarkout Hasan Jalal). La medesima linea <strong>di</strong><br />
comando, anche nelle sue interazioni con l’Afgahnistan <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida, è confermata<br />
dalle interviste a Didar Khalid Khaled e Keis Abu Assim (Abu Assi,) terroristi <strong>di</strong><br />
Ansar.<br />
La prima azione <strong>di</strong> Ansar fu un’imboscata alle forze <strong>del</strong> PUK, che procurò loro 42<br />
morti, poi nel febbraio 2002 assassinò Franso Hariri, governatore <strong>di</strong> Erb<strong>il</strong> e in<br />
primavera cercò <strong>di</strong> eliminare Barham Salih, Primo Ministro <strong>del</strong> Governo PUK e<br />
attuale Vice Presidente iraqeno. Nell’attacco fallito furono tuttavia uccise cinque<br />
guar<strong>di</strong>e <strong>del</strong> corpo e due dei tre terroristi <strong>del</strong> commando, <strong>il</strong> terrorista <strong>di</strong> Ansar<br />
sopravvissuto è Keis Abu Assim (Abu Assi,), da me incontrato nelle prigioni <strong>di</strong><br />
Sulaimani. Le azioni <strong>di</strong> Ansar continuano per tutto l’anno con imboscate e attentati<br />
suici<strong>di</strong>: i terroristi <strong>di</strong> Ansar parlano <strong>di</strong> un attacco con circa 100 morti e 120 feriti ai<br />
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peshmerga <strong>del</strong> PUK intorno a fine <strong>di</strong>cembre 2002, attacco che tuttavia non è stato<br />
confermato dai governativi. In questo periodo le connessioni internazionali <strong>di</strong> Ansar<br />
emergono ancora più chiaramente: lo stesso Primo Ministro <strong>del</strong>la Giordania <strong>di</strong>chiara<br />
che Abu Musab Al Zarqawi (Sheikh Fe<strong>del</strong> Nazzel Khalayleh) si trova presso Ansar<br />
Al Islam ed è l’ispiratore sia <strong>del</strong>l’attacco a Salih sia <strong>del</strong>l’assassinio <strong>di</strong> Laurence Foley,<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’U.S. Agency for International Development.<br />
E’ stato l’avvio <strong>del</strong>la guerra in Iraq che ha permesso agli uomini <strong>del</strong>la coalizione,<br />
soprattutto truppe speciali americane e uomini <strong>del</strong>la CIA nell’area orientale e<br />
specialisti inglesi in quella occidentale, con i peshmerga kur<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> attaccare ed<br />
eliminare le basi <strong>di</strong> Ansar Al Islam nella regione: “avevano un rapporto <strong>di</strong>retto con<br />
al-Qa’ida e con <strong>il</strong> governo iraqeno che li addestrava, fino a quando l’America li ha<br />
attaccati e loro sono fuggiti in Iran. Le loro forze sono cadute e molti <strong>di</strong> loro sono<br />
stati uccisi, molti sono agli arresti e <strong>il</strong> resto scappati in Iran. Tehran fece imprigionare<br />
un gruppo <strong>di</strong> loro per pochi giorni, salvo poi rispe<strong>di</strong>rceli in<strong>di</strong>etro. Le nostre forze,<br />
ancora una volta, li hanno costretti a ritornare in Iran, così si sono stab<strong>il</strong>iti nelle città<br />
<strong>di</strong> Marivan, Sanandaj, Mahabad. Molti degli arabi sono andati verso Tehran. Dopo la<br />
caduta <strong>del</strong> regime iraqeno e l’ingresso Usa, si sono riorganizzati in Iran a gruppi<br />
hanno mandato gente in Iraq, ma i gruppi maggiori sono entrati con i pellegrinaggi<br />
sciiti a Najaf e Kerbala, per anni vietati da Saddam, per visitare le tombe <strong>di</strong> Hassan,<br />
Hussein e Ali. Si sono inf<strong>il</strong>trati tra i pellegrini per <strong>di</strong>rigersi nel centro sud <strong>del</strong>l’Iraq<br />
raggiungendo altri gruppi <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida e <strong>di</strong> arabi non iracheni arrivati per attaccare<br />
l’America insieme all’esercito iraqeno. Questi erano tutti gruppi <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida, che ha<br />
colto l’occasione per inviare altre persone in Iran dove si sono organizzati” (Sarkout<br />
Hasan Jalal).<br />
Le informazioni raccolte rispetto all’inse<strong>di</strong>amento in Iran <strong>di</strong> Ansar Al Islam<br />
evidenziano un aspetto critico, ambiguo e poco chiaro: quello <strong>del</strong> rapporto tra Iran e<br />
le organizzazioni <strong>del</strong> terrorismo islamico internazionale. Secondo <strong>di</strong>verse fonti<br />
(soprattutto turche e iraqene) al-Qa’ida avrebbe in Iran un vero e proprio terreno <strong>di</strong><br />
transito e <strong>di</strong> riposo che accoglie quadri <strong>di</strong> alto livello <strong>del</strong>l’organizzazione. Le più<br />
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ecenti vicende <strong>del</strong>’autunno 2006, che suggeriscono un certa pressione iraniana per<br />
ricollocare nei quadri qa’i<strong>di</strong>sti <strong>di</strong> “alto livello” alcuni profughi afghani “ospitati”<br />
nelle caserme <strong>del</strong>le guar<strong>di</strong>e <strong>del</strong>la rivoluzione, approfittando <strong>di</strong> una evidente<br />
debolezza <strong>del</strong> capo storico. Fatto attestato dalle ormai scarse apparizioni life <strong>di</strong><br />
Osama. In particolare, Saif al-A<strong>del</strong>, egiziano, 46 anni, ricercato per gli attenati africani<br />
agli americani, sicuro ospite a Teheran, sarebbe uno dei favoriti. Se Teheran riuscisse<br />
nell’operazione la scalata <strong>di</strong> al-A<strong>del</strong> potrebbe aprire le porte ad una generazione <strong>di</strong><br />
nuovi leader <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida f<strong>il</strong>o-iraniani e l’Iran potrebbe fornire uomini e logistica<br />
all’organizzazione terroristica<br />
È un fatto che, negli ultimi tre anni Tehran avrebbe accordato, con conoscenza <strong>di</strong><br />
causa, visti e fac<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> transito a corrieri e altri responsab<strong>il</strong>i <strong>del</strong>la struttura centrale<br />
qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta. Questa politica si giustifica probab<strong>il</strong>mente con <strong>il</strong> fatto che l’Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta,<br />
uno degli obiettivi <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida, resta un avversario naturale per la Repubblica<br />
Islamica <strong>del</strong>l’Iran, ma non spiega per intero la presenza <strong>del</strong> jihad sul suo suolo e pone<br />
interrogativi su ruolo <strong>del</strong>l’Iran nell’attuale contesto politico internazionale. D’altra<br />
parte l’ospitalità ad Ansar era già messa in dubbio per via dei legami <strong>del</strong> Mullah<br />
Krekar con l’Iran, dove passò <strong>di</strong>versi anni <strong>del</strong>la sua vita e da dove proveniva quando<br />
fu arrestato all’aeroporto <strong>di</strong> Amsterdam. Sempre in relazione ad Ansar quale gruppo<br />
kurdo, una possib<strong>il</strong>e ragione <strong>di</strong> supporto <strong>del</strong>l’Iran può essere <strong>il</strong> timore <strong>di</strong> avere nel<br />
futuro un vicino stato kurdo democratico e islamico, quale risultato <strong>del</strong>la<br />
stab<strong>il</strong>izzazione <strong>del</strong>la regione. Infine, <strong>il</strong> supporto ai gruppi islamici potrebbe essere<br />
letto nel quadro <strong>di</strong> una manovra <strong>di</strong> “controllo” iraniano sul futuro assetto iraqeno.<br />
Tuttavia, queste ipotesi non sono tanto lineari e prive <strong>di</strong> ambiguità da non fare<br />
pensare a possib<strong>il</strong>i <strong>di</strong>vergenze tra <strong>di</strong>fferenti ambiti iraniani...<br />
Sarkout Hasan Jalal - responsab<strong>il</strong>e dei servizi cur<strong>di</strong> a Sulaimani – in un colloquio<br />
privato ci tiene a specificare che “c’erano anche gli arabi, tanti arabi, sau<strong>di</strong>ti, siriani,<br />
palestinesi, algerini, marocchini, yemeniti e anche qualeche iracheno. Gli arabi non<br />
iracheni venivano chiamati arab-afghan perché erano mandati dall’Afghanistan.<br />
Nelle battaglie (nota: si fa riferimento agli scontri <strong>del</strong> maggio 2003) quelli che sono stati<br />
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uccisi molti erano arabi come al Suri, ucciso nel <strong>di</strong>cembre 2001, siriano e messaggero<br />
<strong>di</strong> Osama. C’erano <strong>di</strong> tutte la razze arabe che accettavano <strong>il</strong> programma <strong>del</strong> jihad ed<br />
erano membri <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida. Venivano qui (nota in Kur<strong>di</strong>stan) e facevano guerra contro<br />
<strong>di</strong> noi. Loro, anche se avevano una piccola zona sotto controllo, avevano<br />
un’organizzazione molto più vasta. Anche perché dopo l’attacco all’afghanistan non<br />
avevano più un posto dove nascondersi e perciò hanno scelto questa zona, <strong>il</strong><br />
kur<strong>di</strong>stan, dove non c’era tanto controllo su tutto <strong>il</strong> territorio. Aiutavano le loro genti<br />
fuggite dall’afghanistan dopo l’attacco Usa e che hanno <strong>di</strong>sgregato l’organizzazione<br />
<strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida e dei talebani. Quelli non afghani piano piano hanno raggiunto <strong>il</strong><br />
kur<strong>di</strong>stan.<br />
La storie <strong>di</strong> Didar Khalid Khaled 127 e <strong>di</strong> Keis Abu Assim (Abu Assi) 128 sono, per certi<br />
versi, emblematiche rispetto a questo tema <strong>del</strong> reclutamento internazionale.<br />
Dall’intervista a Didar Khalid Khaled:<br />
• Perché sei qui? (Nota: nelle carceri kurde <strong>di</strong> Sulaimani).<br />
o Sono stato catturato perché ero <strong>di</strong> Ansar Al Islam. Sono entrato con loro a<br />
<strong>di</strong>ciotto anni.<br />
• Come hai conosciuto questa organizzazione?<br />
o Ero amico <strong>di</strong> uno che mi ha fatto conoscere Ansar Al Islam. Volevamo fare<br />
jihad.<br />
• Perché ti sei messo con loro?<br />
o Perché ero con questo amico e mi sono fidato <strong>di</strong> lui.<br />
• Quale era l’obiettivo <strong>del</strong> gruppo <strong>di</strong> Ansar Al Islam?<br />
o La ragione principale, come mi hanno fatto capire durante i loro <strong>di</strong>scorsi,<br />
127 Terrorista <strong>di</strong> Ansar Al Islam che doveva farsi esplodere in un ministero kurdo ma, per un attimo <strong>di</strong> incertezza,<br />
è stato arrestato dalla forze <strong>di</strong> sicurezza ed è in prigione a Sulaimani. Ha ventanni e ha fatto la scuola superiore a<br />
Erb<strong>il</strong>. Oggi, si <strong>di</strong>chiara pentito.<br />
128 Terrorista <strong>di</strong> Ansar Al Islam, unico sopravvissuto <strong>del</strong> comando che attentò alla vita <strong>del</strong> Primo Ministro kurdo<br />
Barham Salih, è stato arrestato dalla forze <strong>di</strong> sicurezza ed è in prigione a Sulainami. E’ kurdo <strong>di</strong> Erb<strong>il</strong>, ha ventotto<br />
anni, parla arabo perché si rifiuta <strong>di</strong> parlare altra lingua (<strong>il</strong> kurdo).<br />
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era quella <strong>di</strong> fare <strong>il</strong> jihad per l’Unico Grande Dio.<br />
• Come Kurdo perché credevi nel jihad?<br />
o Ciascuno <strong>di</strong> noi ha una propria convinzione e io allora avevo quella.<br />
• Cosa è successo quel giorno?<br />
o Avevo addosso un g<strong>il</strong>et con una cintura esplosiva (Nota: 5 kg <strong>di</strong> TNT), ma<br />
quando sono entrato tra <strong>di</strong> loro nel luogo…ho avuto paura <strong>di</strong> farmi esplodere. E poi<br />
mi <strong>di</strong>spiaceva farmi uccidere per uccidere degli altri….<br />
• Ma allora eri <strong>di</strong>sposto a farlo. Perché?<br />
o Perché farmi uccidere e uccidere gli altri fa parte <strong>del</strong> jihad.<br />
• Come era strutturato <strong>il</strong> tuo gruppo <strong>di</strong> Ansar?<br />
o Ansar ha degli uomini che venivano a parlare con me o con altri ragazzi<br />
per convincerli a eseguire atti terroristici, suici<strong>di</strong> e attentati.<br />
• Sì, d’accordo ma <strong>di</strong>mmi come era organizzato <strong>il</strong> tuo gruppo, c’era un capo che impartiva<br />
or<strong>di</strong>ni…?<br />
o Eravamo sette persone nel nostro gruppo, ognuna <strong>di</strong> noi doveva uccidersi<br />
in qualsiasi modo, e Abdullah Raman Shafiici coor<strong>di</strong>nava.<br />
• Eravate tutti kur<strong>di</strong>?<br />
o Sì. Ma i membri <strong>di</strong> Ansar che coor<strong>di</strong>navano erano in rapporto con al-<br />
Qa’ida.<br />
Dall’intervista a Keis Abu Assim (Abu Assi):<br />
• Chi sei?<br />
o Sono un mujahid <strong>del</strong> jihad e lavoravo con Ansar Al Islam e al-Qa’ida, che<br />
sono due organizzazioni che collaborano e hanno <strong>il</strong> medesimo programma.<br />
• Quando sei entrato in Ansar?<br />
o Nel 2000 ho cominciato a collaborare con loro e sono uno dei fondatori.<br />
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• Cosa facevi prima?<br />
o Stu<strong>di</strong>avo stu<strong>di</strong> scientifici islamici.<br />
• Come era strutturato <strong>il</strong> tuo gruppo <strong>di</strong> Ansar Al Islam?<br />
o C’era un emiro, un vice e 20 membri <strong>di</strong> un Consiglio. Dietro <strong>di</strong> loro ci sono<br />
7 basi con ognuna 100 persone.<br />
• Quale è <strong>il</strong> nome <strong>del</strong>l’emiro?<br />
o Abu Adbullah Shafii<br />
• Come mantenevano i contatti con al-Qa’ida?<br />
o Abbiamo un buon rapporto con al-Qa’ida, l’anello <strong>di</strong> collegamento era un<br />
gruppo <strong>di</strong> arabi venuto qui da noi. Dopo <strong>di</strong> ciò alcuni kur<strong>di</strong> sono andati in<br />
Afghanistan a fare gli addestramenti. Sia loro che altri gruppi <strong>di</strong> arabi sono poi<br />
tornati qui da noi.<br />
Il sistema <strong>di</strong> reclutamento che emerge, sia dalle interviste sia da informazioni<br />
concorrenti, è quantomeno conosciuto: da una parte ci si rivolge agli studenti <strong>del</strong>le<br />
scuole islamiche e dall’altra ai giovani, spesso marginali, che in un pericoloso gioco<br />
<strong>di</strong> emulazione reciproca, rinforzata da una ossessiva e continua pressione<br />
informativa e formativa dei reclutatori, si trovano poi a unirsi al movimento. Questo<br />
meccanismo <strong>di</strong> reclutamento è r<strong>il</strong>evab<strong>il</strong>e sia in loco (per esempio in Kur<strong>di</strong>stan) sia nei<br />
paesi occidentali: gli arresti in Italia <strong>di</strong> fine anno 2003, hanno proprio evidenziato una<br />
sistematica iniziativa <strong>di</strong> aff<strong>il</strong>iazione promossa sia nell’ambito dei luoghi <strong>di</strong><br />
aggregazione religiosa sia in riferimento alle fasce <strong>del</strong>l’immigrazione meno<br />
“integrata”. D’altra parte, sappiamo dai prigionieri detenuti nella base <strong>di</strong><br />
Guantanamo che alcuni dei mujahed<strong>di</strong>n provengono dai paesi europei o hanno la<br />
doppia nazionalità, e una <strong>del</strong>le due nazionalità sarebbe europea. Rispetto alle<br />
informazioni che reputano essere <strong>di</strong> circa 20.000 i terroristi addestrati da al-Qa’ida<br />
prima <strong>del</strong>l’11 settembre, <strong>di</strong> cui circa 2.000 morti in Afghanistan, una semplice<br />
proiezione che si basa su questi 18.000 attivi, a cui aggiungere circa 3/4.000<br />
sopravvissuti alla guerra tra Afghani e sovietici, suggerisce un paio <strong>di</strong> migliaia <strong>di</strong><br />
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mujahed<strong>di</strong>n con passaporto europeo. Probab<strong>il</strong>mente un numero in crescita proprio<br />
grazie alla attività <strong>di</strong> reclutamento sempre più attiva nei paesi occidentali, <strong>di</strong> cui<br />
Ansar ha fornito un esempio.<br />
Ancora, le due interviste fanno riferimento a Abu Abdullah<br />
Al Shafii quale emiro loro capo. Per quanto r<strong>il</strong>evato, Abu<br />
Abdullah Al Shafii è un arabo afghano, forse <strong>di</strong> origine<br />
egiziana o siriana, che ha guidato Jund Al Islam e poi<br />
inseritosi come “numero due” nella leadership <strong>di</strong> Ansar.<br />
Infatti, come già evidenziato <strong>il</strong> leader carismatico <strong>di</strong> Ansar è <strong>il</strong><br />
Mullah Krekar (Najmud<strong>di</strong>n Faraj Ahmad), arrestato nel<br />
settembre 2002 dalle autorità olandesi, al suo sbarco da un<br />
aereo proveniente da Tehran. La vicenda <strong>di</strong> Krekar è significativa: rifugiato in<br />
Norvegia, a Oslo, è stato e arrestato <strong>il</strong> 2 gennaio 2004, su richiesta <strong>del</strong>l’Oekokrim,<br />
l’unità contro la criminalità economica norvegese, e poi r<strong>il</strong>asciato <strong>il</strong> 5 gennaio 2003.<br />
L’accusa per <strong>il</strong> fondatore <strong>del</strong> gruppo islamico che si ritiene collegato ad al-Qa’ida era<br />
<strong>di</strong> pianificazione e partecipazione a tentativi <strong>di</strong> omici<strong>di</strong>o, anche con attacchi suici<strong>di</strong>,<br />
contro membri <strong>del</strong> PUK, in un periodo che va dal <strong>di</strong>cembre 2001 al maggio 2002.<br />
L’Oekokrim aveva chiesto che <strong>il</strong> Mullah Krekar restasse in carcere per quattro<br />
settimane al fine <strong>di</strong> avviare un’indagine che producesse supporti alle accuse. Sono<br />
numerose le testimonianze che legano Ansar ad al-Qa’ida e Krekar ad Ansar, ma i<br />
complessi sis<strong>temi</strong> normativi nazionali europei e la mancanza <strong>di</strong> determinazione<br />
politica forniscono, ancora una volta, la possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> eludere <strong>il</strong> “<strong>di</strong>ritto alla pena”<br />
che spetta a ogni criminale terrorista. L’ultima intervista a Krekar, <strong>del</strong> marzo 2006,<br />
riporta <strong>il</strong> suo pensiero <strong>di</strong> una guerra in corso tra l’Occidente e l’Islam, insieme alla<br />
sua sicurezza <strong>di</strong> una prossima vittoria islamica e alla sua preghiera per Osama bin<br />
Laden.<br />
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3. Il caso: Guantanamo<br />
La maggior parte dei detenuti nella base navale americana <strong>di</strong> Guantanamo furono<br />
arrestati in Afghanistan o in Pakistan tra <strong>il</strong> novembre 2002 e <strong>il</strong> gennaio 2003, in<br />
conseguenza <strong>del</strong>la risposta americana all’attacco <strong>del</strong>l’Un<strong>di</strong>ci Settembre. Ma alcuni<br />
furono anche arrestati in zone <strong>di</strong>stanti dal conflitto come la Bosnia (<strong>del</strong>la quale sei <strong>di</strong><br />
nazionalità algerina hanno la residenza), Gambia, Malawi e Zambia.<br />
Il 20 apr<strong>il</strong>e 2006 è stata resa pubblica dalle autorità americane una lista dei prigionieri<br />
detenuti a Guantanamo, <strong>di</strong> cui <strong>il</strong> grafico che segue mostra la <strong>di</strong>stribuzione per<br />
nazionalità degli incarcerati: in totale 505. Tuttavia, la <strong>di</strong>scussione sulla “contab<strong>il</strong>ità”<br />
dei detenuti è aperta e i numeri variano <strong>di</strong> alcune centinai <strong>di</strong> unità.<br />
Quanto appare evidente è l’ampia frammentazione <strong>del</strong>le nazionalità <strong>di</strong> provenienza<br />
(40) anche se oltre <strong>il</strong> 50% dei prigionieri è afghano, sau<strong>di</strong>ta o yemenita. Spiccano le<br />
origini francesi e britanniche <strong>di</strong> sei detenuti e la presenza relativamente forte <strong>di</strong><br />
combattenti <strong>di</strong> area centro asiatica e cinese. Quest’ultima ampia area <strong>di</strong> provenienza<br />
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sottolinea quella che è, e sarà sempre <strong>di</strong> più, una possib<strong>il</strong>e area <strong>di</strong> reclutamento e<br />
conflitto: le ex repubbliche sovietiche centro asiatiche e l’occidente islamico cinese.<br />
Guantanamo – lista 20 apr<strong>il</strong>e 2006<br />
Nazionalità Valore Assoluto Percentuale<br />
Afghanistan 120 23,8<br />
Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia 117 23,2<br />
Yemen 89 17,6<br />
Algeria 25 5,0<br />
China 22 4,4<br />
Kuwait 11 2,2<br />
Libya 11 2,2<br />
Pakistan 10 2,0<br />
Morocco 9 1,8<br />
Syria 9 1,8<br />
Tunisia 9 1,8<br />
Sudan 8 1,6<br />
Iraq 6 1,2<br />
Tajikistan 6 1,2<br />
Uzbekistan 6 1,2<br />
Bahrain 4 0,8<br />
Egypt 4 0,8<br />
Jordan 4 0,8<br />
France 3 0,6<br />
Kazakhstan 3 0,6<br />
Mauritania 3 0,6<br />
U.K. 3 0,6<br />
West Bank 3 0,6<br />
Belgium 2 0,4<br />
Iran 2 0,4<br />
Somalia 2 0,4<br />
Australia 1 0,2<br />
Azerbaijan 1 0,2<br />
Bangladesh 1 0,2<br />
Bosnia 1 0,2<br />
Canada 1 0,2<br />
Chad 1 0,2<br />
Ethiopia 1 0,2<br />
Lebanon 1 0,2<br />
Mal<strong>di</strong>ves 1 0,2<br />
Qatar 1 0,2<br />
Russia 1 0,2<br />
Turkey 1 0,2<br />
U.A.E. 1 0,2<br />
Uganda 1 0,2<br />
Totale 505 100<br />
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4. Videocassette e CD, DvD e Internet quale strumento <strong>di</strong> reclutamento<br />
Il terrorismo è comunicazione: questa semplice affermazione orienta <strong>il</strong> particolare<br />
interesse per internet. La stu<strong>di</strong>o che porta alla comprensione e spiegazione<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’azione terrorista, anche con l’obiettivo <strong>di</strong> sv<strong>il</strong>uppare adeguate pratiche <strong>di</strong><br />
risposta al <strong>fenomeno</strong>, deve dunque dotarsi <strong>di</strong> una “cassetta degli attrezzi” altamente<br />
specializzata ma inter<strong>di</strong>sciplinare in cui la <strong>di</strong>mensione comunicativa offre un<br />
in<strong>di</strong>rizzo interpretativo importante: la grande <strong>di</strong>fferenza che esiste tra un criminale e<br />
un terrorista è, infatti, che <strong>il</strong> secondo, a <strong>di</strong>fferenza <strong>del</strong> primo, ha interesse per <strong>il</strong><br />
riconoscimento simbolico che l’azione fornisce; ricerca la platea offerta dal sistema<br />
me<strong>di</strong>atico; si propone quale attore protagonista.<br />
L’uso <strong>del</strong>le nuove tecnologie, soprattutto <strong>del</strong>la comunicazione, è in progressivo<br />
aumento e perfezionamento nel mondo jiha<strong>di</strong>sta: esse permettono, a basso costo, sia<br />
<strong>di</strong> mantenere le relazioni sia <strong>di</strong> garantire visib<strong>il</strong>ità. Ma allo stesso modo le ICT<br />
“lasciano tracce”: per esempio attraverso i meccanismi <strong>di</strong> up/down load, l’analisi<br />
<strong>del</strong>le pagine in HTML, l’evoluzione <strong>del</strong>le strategie criptografiche,… ognuno <strong>di</strong> questi<br />
aspetti è un inevitab<strong>il</strong>e segno lasciato dal jiha<strong>di</strong>smo che fornisce informazione sulle<br />
competenze specifiche e sulla organizzazione <strong>del</strong>la rete.<br />
I vantaggi <strong>del</strong>le ICT si possono riassumere in:<br />
- interconnettività: comunicazione e networking all’intero e all’esterno;<br />
- comunicazione “coperta” e anonimato;<br />
- bassi costi: con pochi sol<strong>di</strong> <strong>il</strong> campo <strong>di</strong> intervento tramite internet è globale;<br />
- la moltiplicazione <strong>del</strong>le forze e la “sovra-rappresentazione” dei terroristi. Il<br />
terrorismo ha così raggiunto un livello <strong>di</strong> influenza mai avuto prima da altre sim<strong>il</strong>i<br />
organizzazioni. Perché le ICT costituiscono “la fine <strong>del</strong>le <strong>di</strong>stanze” e l’eliminazione<br />
dei confini tra “vittima e carnefice”;<br />
- <strong>di</strong> raggiungere con fac<strong>il</strong>ità una molteplicità <strong>di</strong> target, in<strong>di</strong>pendentemente dal<br />
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sistema me<strong>di</strong>atico formale.<br />
Ma come si è detto, le tecnologie lasciano tracce: <strong>il</strong> presupposto è la presenza <strong>di</strong><br />
specifiche competenze me<strong>di</strong>ali tra i jiha<strong>di</strong>sti, da cui la costituzione <strong>di</strong> un probab<strong>il</strong>e<br />
“centro me<strong>di</strong>a” e <strong>di</strong> strategie <strong>di</strong> promozione e reclutamento ad hoc. Allo stato attuale<br />
si può <strong>di</strong>re che l’informazione circa l’in<strong>di</strong>rizzo <strong>di</strong> un prossimo attacco è presente in<br />
rete, si tratta <strong>di</strong> deco<strong>di</strong>ficarla. Di seguito, si farà riferimento ai materiali raccolti dal<br />
gruppo <strong>di</strong> lavoro ITSTIME (www.itstime.it) che ha da akcuni anni cominciato uno<br />
specifico monitoraggio <strong>del</strong> web, ut<strong>il</strong>izzando strumenti <strong>di</strong> web searching and<br />
monitoring avanzati, che ha portato alla raccolta <strong>di</strong> circa 10 giga <strong>di</strong> materiali e al<br />
controllo <strong>di</strong> oltre 150 siti.<br />
Il lavoro <strong>di</strong> ricerca è stato de<strong>di</strong>cato alla analisi <strong>del</strong>la comunicazione <strong>del</strong> terrorismo<br />
attraverso <strong>il</strong> web, con l’obiettivo <strong>di</strong> identificare <strong>il</strong> centro me<strong>di</strong>atico <strong>di</strong> produzione<br />
<strong>del</strong>la comunicazione, le strategie comunicative <strong>di</strong> promozione e reclutamento, le<br />
possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> sv<strong>il</strong>uppare azioni efficaci <strong>di</strong> risposta. Tale attività deve essere<br />
sv<strong>il</strong>uppata nel futuro attraverso più precise analisi semiotiche, non solo linguistiche,<br />
per favorire l’elaborazione dei prof<strong>il</strong>i dei potenziali can<strong>di</strong>dati jiha<strong>di</strong>sti. Inoltre, tale<br />
analisi può sv<strong>il</strong>upparsi in modo specifico intorno ai web site <strong>di</strong> origine/lingua<br />
italiana <strong>di</strong> ispirazione islamica e ai mirror, potenzialmente fiancheggiatori, <strong>di</strong> origine<br />
anarco-insurrezionalista. Questi ultimi, oggi offrono notevoli opportunità <strong>di</strong> ricerca<br />
perché spesso garantiscono la persistenza <strong>del</strong> materiale jiha<strong>di</strong>sta sui loro mirror.<br />
Il monitoraggio sistematico dei siti web, reso <strong>di</strong>fficoltoso dalla spesso scarsa<br />
permanenza dei medesimi e dalla molteplicità <strong>di</strong> livelli che ciascuno <strong>di</strong> essi offre, è<br />
particolarmente attentato ai materiali au<strong>di</strong>o-visivi <strong>di</strong>stribuiti. Tale scelta è dovuta al<br />
forte impatto che questi hanno sul pubblico <strong>di</strong> riferimento e alla possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong><br />
articolazione in prodotti specifici che si offre. Tuttavia, <strong>il</strong> materiale au<strong>di</strong>o e testuale<br />
risulta <strong>di</strong> grande importanza per <strong>il</strong> ruolo che gioca soprattutto in chat e forum, in<br />
quanto portatore <strong>di</strong> informazioni specifiche e, tendenzialmente, essendo materiale<br />
più adatto a sv<strong>il</strong>uppare anche azioni <strong>di</strong> controterrorismo proprio nei luoghi in cui<br />
viene <strong>di</strong>stribuito (chat e forum).<br />
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Oggi si può sicuramente affermare che da una fase “naiv” <strong>del</strong>la comunicazione<br />
terroristica si è passati a una fase più sofisticata, che richiede mezzi, competenze e<br />
strategie specifiche: tutti “oggetti” che lasciano tracce potenziali, perché implicano<br />
l’esistenza <strong>di</strong> un centro organizzativo <strong>di</strong> queste competenze per massimizzare le<br />
potenzialità <strong>del</strong> web.<br />
Attraverso l’analisi <strong>del</strong> web è possib<strong>il</strong>e comprendere:<br />
• come questo me<strong>di</strong>a centre lavora: l’uso dei mezzi sia sul campo sia nella post-<br />
produzione confrontando i materiali grezzi raccolti dalle unità <strong>di</strong> fuoco e la loro<br />
successiva rielaborazione comunicativa. Si tratta <strong>di</strong> un passo importante per<br />
<strong>di</strong>stinguere le strategie sv<strong>il</strong>uppate e comprendere i <strong>di</strong>fferenti target <strong>del</strong>la<br />
comunicazione, in particolare i potenziali jiha<strong>di</strong>sti identificati per la<br />
comunicazione <strong>di</strong> reclutamento;<br />
• la rete <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>stribuzione dei materiali, attraverso le complesse mappe <strong>di</strong> link e<br />
backlink che si creano e attraverso le pratiche <strong>di</strong> up/down load;<br />
• l’evoluzione <strong>del</strong>le strategie <strong>di</strong> reclutamento, realizzando un’operazione <strong>di</strong> “back<br />
prof<strong>il</strong>ing” sulla base dei target <strong>del</strong>la comunicazione.<br />
Esempio <strong>di</strong> mappatura <strong>di</strong> link e back link <strong>di</strong> un sito monitorato<br />
Link Backlink<br />
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Già negli attacchi a Madrid nel marzo 2004, internet ebbe un ruolo significativo<br />
nell’in<strong>di</strong>rizzare verso specifici target le azioni <strong>del</strong> terrorismo. Per esempio, un<br />
classico sito, caratterizzato dalla usuale volat<strong>il</strong>ità spesso dovuta alle azioni <strong>di</strong><br />
hakkeraggio mirato, è www.al-farouq.com/vb/ dove si pssono trovere le<br />
comunicazione <strong>del</strong> <strong>Global</strong> Islamic Me<strong>di</strong>a Front (GIMF) che annunciava la “al-Qa’ida<br />
University of jihad Stu<strong>di</strong>es.” Ahmad al-Wathiq B<strong>il</strong>lah, <strong>il</strong> cosiddetto “Deputy General<br />
Emir” <strong>del</strong> GIMF, offre allo studente <strong>di</strong> pasare “through faculties devoted to the cause<br />
of the caliphate through morale boosting and bombings,” per questo <strong>il</strong> sito offre<br />
specializzazioni in “electronic, me<strong>di</strong>a, spiritual and financial jihad.”<br />
Secondo Weimann, che insegna comunicazioni alla Università <strong>di</strong> Haifa, <strong>il</strong> numero <strong>di</strong><br />
siti che promuovono <strong>il</strong> terrorismo e la violenza politica, in <strong>di</strong>eci anni è passato da una<br />
dozzina a circa 5.000. Un incremento <strong>di</strong> 400 volte circa, molto più r<strong>il</strong>evante rispetto<br />
all’incremento complessivo dei siti web nel medesimo arco <strong>di</strong> tempo, pari a circa 50-<br />
100 volte. Secondo Weiman i siti <strong>del</strong>l’islamiso ra<strong>di</strong>cale e jiha<strong>di</strong>sti hanno contributo a<br />
questo incremento per <strong>il</strong> 70% circa.<br />
Rispetto alla struttura decentralizzata e frammentata assunta da “al-Qa’ida” internet<br />
non è solo <strong>il</strong> me<strong>di</strong>um perfetto per la comunicazione ma anche incorpora idealmente <strong>il</strong><br />
misto <strong>di</strong> “frammentazione anarchica” che sta caratterizzando <strong>il</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo. Madrid,<br />
Londra, Bali hanno tutti in comune <strong>di</strong> essere attentati messi in atto da forme flessib<strong>il</strong>i<br />
<strong>del</strong>la pseudo organizzazione <strong>del</strong> terrore, aggregazione che si costitutiscono e si<br />
<strong>di</strong>sperdono, <strong>il</strong> cui modus operan<strong>di</strong> medesimo si ritrova nelle geometrie virtuali ed<br />
elusive <strong>del</strong>la rete. Se le cosè stanno così, anche a causa <strong>del</strong>la rete si possono in futuro<br />
aspettare nuovi attcchi terroristci <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>mente prevede<strong>di</strong>b<strong>il</strong>i.<br />
Tornando a Madrid, si ricorda come su uno dei computer ritrovati dopo l’attacco <strong>del</strong><br />
marzo 2004 ci fossero numerosi f<strong>il</strong>e scaricati da siti islamici che mostrano una attività<br />
sistematica <strong>di</strong> ricerca sul web da parte dei terroristi, tra cui <strong>il</strong> noto documento “<strong>Jihad</strong>i<br />
Iraq: Hopes and Dangers,” che circolava sulla rete pochi mesi prima <strong>del</strong> marzo 2004,<br />
in cui si suggeriva la Spagna tra i target degni <strong>di</strong> essere colpiti.<br />
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Come è stato sottolineato, la<br />
rete è luogo <strong>di</strong><br />
comunicazione priv<strong>il</strong>egiato:<br />
ciò comporta meccanismi<br />
sempre più professionali <strong>di</strong><br />
produzione <strong>del</strong> materiale<br />
<strong>di</strong>stribuito, anche attraverso<br />
canali più tra<strong>di</strong>zionali.<br />
Tra le agenzie me<strong>di</strong>atiche <strong>del</strong><br />
jihad più conosciute<br />
sicuramente ha un posto<br />
r<strong>il</strong>evante As-Sahab, probab<strong>il</strong>mente collocata nelle province occidentali <strong>del</strong> Pakistan.<br />
Il monitoraggio a cui la produzione <strong>di</strong> As-Sahab è sottoposta dal 2002 mostra dati<br />
interessanti, che evidenziano <strong>il</strong> progressivo incremento <strong>del</strong>l’uso <strong>di</strong> materiale<br />
multime<strong>di</strong>ale nella guerra jiha<strong>di</strong>sta. E lo “starring” dei personaggi chiave, quali<br />
Zawahiri e bin Laden.<br />
Il miglioramento <strong>del</strong>le tecnologie e la <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong>la banda larga ha sicuramente<br />
promosso la <strong>di</strong>ffusione via rete <strong>di</strong> queste comunicazioni <strong>di</strong> promozione e<br />
reclutamento, soprattutto quelle rivolte al circuito <strong>di</strong> emulatori ed estremisti residenti<br />
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in occidente. Nelle aree più soggette a “<strong>di</strong>gital <strong>di</strong>vide” i canali comunicativi sono<br />
ancora legati a una <strong>di</strong>stribuzione tra<strong>di</strong>zionale (soprattutto nei negozi <strong>di</strong> elettronica e<br />
<strong>di</strong> video) e a supporti quali <strong>il</strong> dvd e <strong>il</strong> cd, che stanno rapi<strong>di</strong>ssimamente scalzando la<br />
videocassetta vhs.<br />
Le foto scattatate qui a<br />
fianco risalgono al<br />
giugno 2006 e sono<br />
state prese in uno dei<br />
tanti negozie <strong>di</strong> video<br />
<strong>di</strong> Miran Shah,<br />
capitale <strong>del</strong>la regione pakistana <strong>del</strong> Waziristan (un acquirente legge la copertina <strong>di</strong><br />
un dvd jiha<strong>di</strong>sta, messo in ven<strong>di</strong>ta con un poster <strong>di</strong> bin Laden e Zarqawi); e <strong>di</strong><br />
Chaman, vicino al confine con l’Afghanistan.<br />
La maggior parte <strong>del</strong> materiale grezzo è raccolto da cameramen che affiancano le<br />
unità <strong>di</strong> fuoco, <strong>di</strong> cui riprendono le azioni. Questo materiale viene poi post-prodotto<br />
con <strong>di</strong>mostrazione <strong>di</strong> buone – e ormai ottime – competenze tecniche che non fanno<br />
pensare a un significativo indebolimento <strong>del</strong>la struttura jiha<strong>di</strong>sta: si stima che attorno<br />
ad Al- Zawahiri circolino una dozzina <strong>di</strong> operatori <strong>di</strong> as- Sahab pronti a riprendere le<br />
<strong>di</strong>verse situazioni, soprattutto <strong>di</strong> origine araba e spesso “reciprocamente<br />
sconosciuti”. Dalla testimonianza <strong>di</strong> uno <strong>di</strong> questi in Pakistan, tal Yusuf, si è avuta la<br />
descrizione <strong>di</strong> un efficace stu<strong>di</strong>o mob<strong>il</strong>e <strong>di</strong> As-Sahab organizzato su un van<br />
fac<strong>il</strong>mente mimetizzab<strong>il</strong>e nel traffico, a bordo <strong>del</strong> quale si effettua la prima post-<br />
produzione. Qualora si rendesse necessario un e<strong>di</strong>ting più sofisticato, i corrieri<br />
trasportano <strong>il</strong> video a Peshawar o a Lahore, dove anche una trasmissione “via etere”<br />
risulta più <strong>di</strong>ffic<strong>il</strong>mente scannerizzab<strong>il</strong>e tra le onde citta<strong>di</strong>ne. Racconta Yusuf: “we<br />
make the movie on a small cassette, which we shift to the computer and e<strong>di</strong>t. We<br />
make it into a CD or a cassette and then we take it from place to place. We do the<br />
e<strong>di</strong>ting, but we do not use the satellite where we f<strong>il</strong>m. The cassettes are sent to the<br />
city area to special places and we give them to these people." La catena <strong>di</strong><br />
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<strong>di</strong>stribuzione, quella che si conclude nei numerosi shop <strong>del</strong> bazar, appare senza una<br />
chiara catena <strong>di</strong> comando, ma si articola in una grande quantità <strong>di</strong> mani che spesso<br />
appartengono anche a membri alcune organizzazioni politiche e religiose (Jamaat-e-<br />
Islami, Hezb-e-Islami).<br />
4.1. Nuove forme <strong>di</strong> comunicazione<br />
Chat, forum, room, blog, V-blog: la rete si adatta sempre <strong>di</strong> più alle esigenze dei suoi<br />
utenti e offre sempre più spazi <strong>di</strong> autonomia e assenza <strong>di</strong> controllo. La vicenda <strong>del</strong>le<br />
vignette apparse sul quoti<strong>di</strong>ano danese Jyllands-Posten ha goduto <strong>di</strong> un’ampia<br />
attenzione da parte dei me<strong>di</strong>a tra<strong>di</strong>zionali e ci permette <strong>di</strong> analizzare la sua<br />
comunicazione come caso specifico <strong>di</strong> impiego dei blog nella comunicazione islamica<br />
moderata, ra<strong>di</strong>cale e jiha<strong>di</strong>sta.<br />
La mappa allegata (tratta da Wikipe<strong>di</strong>a:<br />
http://en.wikipe<strong>di</strong>a.org/wiki/Image:Cartoonmap-key.png ), mostra la risonanza<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’accaduto (pubblicazione <strong>del</strong>le vignette su Maometto) all’interno <strong>del</strong>le testate<br />
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giornalistiche: più la tonalità <strong>di</strong> blu è intensa, maggiore è <strong>il</strong> numero dei quoti<strong>di</strong>ani<br />
che hanno ristampato le vignette satiriche. Il colore rosso, invece, è ut<strong>il</strong>izzato per<br />
segnalare le aree nelle quali si sono verificate sia proteste da parte dei citta<strong>di</strong>ni <strong>di</strong><br />
religione musulmana, sia azioni <strong>di</strong> boicottaggio nei confronti <strong>di</strong> prodotti danesi.<br />
Anche in quest’ultimo caso, la tonalità è in<strong>di</strong>ce <strong>di</strong> una maggiore asprezza <strong>del</strong>le<br />
proteste. Come si può notare, alcuni paesi sono <strong>di</strong> colore viola (come la Francia). Il<br />
viola si riferisce ad un elevato numero <strong>di</strong> quoti<strong>di</strong>ani che hanno stampato i cartoons e<br />
a gravi azioni <strong>di</strong> protesta e boicottaggio.<br />
E’ interessante mettere in luce che i paesi musulmani nord-africani si<br />
contrad<strong>di</strong>stinguono più per le proteste più o meno violente che per la comparsa sui<br />
quoti<strong>di</strong>ani <strong>del</strong>le strisce incriminate (con l’eccezione <strong>del</strong>l’Algeria e <strong>del</strong> Marocco).<br />
Sebbene sia preve<strong>di</strong>b<strong>il</strong>e una minore possib<strong>il</strong>ità da parte dei citta<strong>di</strong>ni <strong>di</strong> questi paesi <strong>di</strong><br />
accedere a <strong>di</strong>verse fonti informative, non va <strong>di</strong>menticato “un altro tipo <strong>di</strong> mondo”<br />
che non è rappresentato sulla cartina. Mi riferisco agli utenti <strong>di</strong> Internet che hanno<br />
avuto modo <strong>di</strong> vedere i cartoons e <strong>di</strong> esprimere la loro opinione in merito. La<br />
<strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>di</strong> Internet è, infatti, in continua crescita. Anche se non si hanno a<br />
<strong>di</strong>sposizione dati statistici certi, è possib<strong>il</strong>e abbozzare alcune ipotesi. La prima<br />
riguarda gli utenti dei quali ci occuperemo nel seguito, ovvero chi ha aperto uno<br />
spazio personale, generalmente un weblog, per commentare i fatti culturali e <strong>di</strong><br />
cronaca <strong>del</strong> proprio paese. Questi bloggers rappresentano un’eccezione in quanto<br />
scrivono in lingua inglese al fine <strong>di</strong> raggiungere <strong>il</strong> maggior numero <strong>di</strong> persone al <strong>di</strong><br />
fuori dei confini <strong>del</strong>lo stato in cui vivono e, <strong>di</strong> conseguenza, si pensa abbiano una<br />
cultura me<strong>di</strong>o-alta rispetto ai propri concitta<strong>di</strong>ni. Il livello <strong>di</strong> conoscenza <strong>del</strong>la lingua,<br />
infatti, è piuttosto elevato così come la capacità <strong>di</strong> mettere a <strong>di</strong>sposizione risorse<br />
informative <strong>di</strong>mostra una notevole padronanza <strong>del</strong>lo strumento. Una seconda ipotesi<br />
è quella già accennata in precedenza e riguarda la <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong> mezzo e la crescente<br />
attenzione da parte degli utenti in termini <strong>di</strong> potenzialità offerte. Basti pensare che è<br />
stato recentemente aperto un sito chiamato i.Toot (http://www.itoot.net) nato<br />
dall’esigenza <strong>di</strong> raccogliere le numerose voci provenienti dai blogger arabi che<br />
sentivano <strong>il</strong> desiderio <strong>di</strong> con<strong>di</strong>videre le proprie conoscenze o storie <strong>di</strong> vita. Lo scopo<br />
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<strong>di</strong> i.Toot è <strong>di</strong> “ to bu<strong>il</strong>d a new me<strong>di</strong>um in which intelligent voices from and for<br />
Arabia are brought together and presented to a wider community; where passionate<br />
readers and writers can share and communicate without f<strong>il</strong>tering”. Colpisce<br />
l’accenno finale alla libertà <strong>di</strong> espressione nonché alla selezione <strong>del</strong>le “voci<br />
intelligenti” al fine <strong>di</strong> garantire interventi <strong>di</strong> buona qualità e rendere più gradevole la<br />
lettura. I.Toot è l’equivalente <strong>di</strong> technorati (http://www.technorati.com) nell’ambito<br />
blogosfera araba e monitora un centinaio <strong>di</strong> blog prevalentemente in lingua inglese.<br />
Si aggiunga, inoltre, l’attenzione che la Harvard Law School sta de<strong>di</strong>cando al<br />
<strong>fenomeno</strong> dei blogger - attraverso <strong>il</strong> sito <strong>Global</strong> voices<br />
(http://www.globalvoicesonline.org) - che si esprimono in paesi generalmente poco<br />
considerati nella “big conversation” <strong>del</strong> World Wide Web, come quelli africani,<br />
coreani, iraniani, afghani ecc… All’interno <strong>del</strong> panorama italiano, invece, <strong>il</strong> sito <strong>di</strong><br />
riferimento sembra essere Bloggers senza frontiere<br />
(http://bloggersenzafrontiere.blogosfere.it) nato per far “conoscere e ascoltare le<br />
voci <strong>di</strong> coloro che vivono in paesi in guerra (come l’Iraq), o in nazioni oppresse da<br />
regimi autoritari (come in Iran, Cina, Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta) o in luoghi dove è in atto un<br />
lento processo <strong>di</strong> democratizzazione (Egitto, Marocco, Barhain, Sud Africa), o <strong>di</strong><br />
sv<strong>il</strong>uppo (Tanzania)”.<br />
I.Toot, globalvoices e Blogger senza frontiere sono soltanto tre esempi <strong>del</strong> fermento<br />
che negli ultimi anni contrad<strong>di</strong>stingue i cybernauti <strong>del</strong> mondo arabo (e non solo) e<br />
sono le nuove modalità <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>ffusione incontrollab<strong>il</strong>e <strong>del</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo. Per questi motivi,<br />
abbiamo deciso <strong>di</strong> occuparci <strong>di</strong> come i cartoons sono stati commentati in alcuni<br />
importanti blog marocchini, iraniani, giordani e afghani, a titolo <strong>di</strong> esempio rispetto a<br />
queste nuove realtà comunicative.<br />
Prima <strong>di</strong> analizzare la reazione dei blogger arabi ci siamo chiesti quale fosse l’entità<br />
dei post scritti all’interno <strong>del</strong>la blogosfera mon<strong>di</strong>ale inerenti all’argomento preso in<br />
esame. Per valutarlo, abbiamo fatto una ricerca all’interno <strong>di</strong> Technorati<br />
(http://www.technorati.com), <strong>il</strong> più grande motore <strong>di</strong> ricerca sui blog attualmente<br />
187
esistente, volta a comprendere nel corso <strong>di</strong> un anno quanti post fossero focalizzati<br />
sulla vicenda.<br />
I post de<strong>di</strong>cati al <strong>fenomeno</strong> <strong>del</strong>le vignette sono maggiormente concentrati nel mese <strong>di</strong><br />
febbraio 2006 quando anche i me<strong>di</strong>a tra<strong>di</strong>zionali hanno de<strong>di</strong>cato ampio spazio alle<br />
proteste in corso. In linea generale, dunque, nonostante la vicenda <strong>del</strong>la<br />
pubblicazione dei cartoons risalga al mese <strong>di</strong> settembre <strong>del</strong>l’anno precedente, i<br />
blogger si sono conformati all’agenda setting imposta dai me<strong>di</strong>a. La gerarchizzazione<br />
e la selezione <strong>del</strong>le notizie, cioè, si è articolata seconda le medesime modalità<br />
espresse sui giornali o in televisione. Questo denota, in<strong>di</strong>pendentemente dalla<br />
188<br />
profon<strong>di</strong>tà <strong>del</strong>le analisi, un<br />
ut<strong>il</strong>izzo <strong>del</strong> mezzo che, al<br />
contrario <strong>di</strong> ciò che si potrebbe<br />
pensare, rispecchia gli argomenti<br />
già proposti a livello istituzionale.<br />
Passiamo ora a cercare <strong>di</strong><br />
comprendere le reazioni <strong>di</strong> alcuni<br />
blogger alle luce <strong>del</strong>la <strong>di</strong>cotomia<br />
tolleranza versus intolleranza
Iran. In questo caso, gli approfon<strong>di</strong>menti più interessanti compaiono all’interno <strong>di</strong><br />
siti<br />
in lingua persiana. Grazie a un blog scritto italiano (http://iran.blogosfere.it),<br />
abbiamo recuperato le traduzioni <strong>di</strong> alcuni post la cui linea portante sembra essere la<br />
questione dei confini <strong>del</strong>la libertà <strong>di</strong> espressione. Alcuni si chiedono se libertà<br />
significhi offendere la fede altrui, altri nonostante riconoscano <strong>il</strong> valore <strong>del</strong> <strong>di</strong>ritto <strong>di</strong><br />
esprimere le proprie opinioni, non capiscono perché i vignettisti abbiano voluto<br />
infierire sui musulmani. Ciò nonostante, viene espresso <strong>di</strong>sappunto nei confronti<br />
<strong>del</strong>le violente proteste verso le ambasciate danesi. C’è chi si appella alle<br />
organizzazioni internazionali affinché intervengano per impe<strong>di</strong>re le offese nei<br />
confronti <strong>del</strong>le religioni, solo in questo modo potrebbero essere evitati episo<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong><br />
fanatismo. I blogger religiosi inoltre si chiedono come potrebbe reagire <strong>il</strong> mondo<br />
occidentale se venissero pubblicate <strong>del</strong>le vignette sull’olocausto.<br />
Marocco. Uno dei più conosciuti blog marocchini, è certamente<br />
quello scritto da<br />
Samir,<br />
autore <strong>di</strong> The view from Fez (http://riadzani.blogspot.com). Samir in un<br />
post (http://riadzani.blogspot.com/2006/02/morocco-opens-inquiry-into-<br />
newspaper) si in<strong>di</strong>gna sia nei confronti <strong>del</strong>la poco oculata scelta <strong>del</strong> quoti<strong>di</strong>ano<br />
danese, sia per la violenza scatenatasi <strong>di</strong> conseguenza, frutto <strong>di</strong> gruppi estremisti.<br />
Gli “islamofobici”, afferma <strong>il</strong> blogger, stanno approfittando <strong>del</strong>le reazioni violente<br />
dei fanatici per creare più scontri ed evitare <strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>alogo. Non tutti i governi hanno<br />
<strong>di</strong>mostrato <strong>di</strong> essere all’altezza <strong>del</strong>la situazione, quello marocchino sembra però<br />
essersi comportato in modo corretto e responsab<strong>il</strong>e. I giornali marocchini che hanno<br />
pubblicato le vignette sono stati sottoposti a giu<strong>di</strong>zio nonostante, come sostiene<br />
l’e<strong>di</strong>tore Ab<strong>del</strong>hakim Ba<strong>di</strong>aa, alcune strisce fossero già comparse nel mese <strong>di</strong> ottobre<br />
senza destare alcuna reazione a livello istituzionale. Nel paese è stata anche proibita<br />
la ven<strong>di</strong>ta <strong>del</strong>le testate giornalistiche che hanno pubblicato i cartoons. Samir ha<br />
anche dato spazio alle ema<strong>il</strong> e ai commenti dei lettori pubblicando quelli degni <strong>di</strong><br />
nota, come la riflessione <strong>del</strong>la blogger Kal<strong>il</strong>a che si chiede come la stampa danese<br />
abbia potuto pubblicare quelle vignette offensive senza pensare a cosa sarebbe<br />
potuto succedere. Non si tratta <strong>di</strong> mettere sotto accusa l’intero mondo occidentale,<br />
189
ensì <strong>di</strong> chiedere spiegazioni agli organi <strong>di</strong> stampa.<br />
Bsima, sul suo blog scritto in francese, condanna in modo più netto la violenza<br />
generata dalla pubblicazione<br />
(http://bsima.canalblog.com/archives/2006/02/06/1334853.html) affermando che<br />
le reazioni avrebbero dovuto essere più “ponderate, più giuste e, soprattutto, più<br />
me<strong>di</strong>tate” in quanto una religione che pre<strong>di</strong>ca la pace non dovrebbe proporre<br />
un’immagine sim<strong>il</strong>e. I commenti al suo post sono molto vari e interessanti. Alcuni<br />
sono d’accordo con l’autrice <strong>del</strong> blog mentre altri sottolineano <strong>il</strong> fatto che la violenza<br />
è l’unica cosa che gli occidentali capiscono e che comunque la maggior parte dei<br />
musulmani sono tolleranti. La violenza e <strong>il</strong> fanatismo appartengono anche<br />
all’Occidente.<br />
Secondo un altro blogger marocchino, Medlykos, “chi semina vento, raccoglie<br />
tempesta” (http://medlykos.canalblog.com/archives/2006/02/06/1332132.html)<br />
ma è anche molto<br />
lucido nell’affermare che i citta<strong>di</strong>ni hanno <strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>ritto <strong>di</strong> vedere le<br />
vignette per giu<strong>di</strong>care se siano o meno offensive: “on a tous besoin de voir de nos<br />
propres yeux pour émettre un jugement...pas suivre la masse comme du béta<strong>il</strong>!”. Le<br />
proteste avvenute in paesi quali l’Ingh<strong>il</strong>terra dove i musulmani non rappresentano<br />
certo una minoranza, non sembrano stupire <strong>il</strong> blogger <strong>il</strong> quale sottolinea ciò che ha<br />
già espresso chiaramente nel titolo, “non bisogna giocare con <strong>il</strong> fuoco”. Per “loro”,<br />
<strong>di</strong>ce Medlykos, la libertà <strong>di</strong> espressione è un <strong>di</strong>ritto costituzionale e non esistono<br />
zone grigie, soprattutto dopo <strong>il</strong> teorema espresso da Bush “Musulmani = terroristi”.<br />
Rivolgendosi <strong>di</strong>rettamente al mondo occidentale, egli scrive: “potete fare le<br />
caricature dei vostri primi ministri e dei vostri presidenti ma non avete alcun <strong>di</strong>ritto<br />
<strong>di</strong> prendervi gioco dei profeti, soprattutto <strong>del</strong> nostro! Siate onesti: chi vi impe<strong>di</strong>sce<br />
<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>segnare <strong>del</strong>le vignette sull’Olocausto? Non lo fate per una questione <strong>di</strong> rispetto,<br />
ma perché non volete scatenare l’ira <strong>di</strong> Israele”. E ancora “prima <strong>di</strong> chiedervi se gli<br />
episo<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> violenza dei musulmani siano esagerati, incominciate a riflettere su come<br />
vi siete comportati voi.”<br />
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Afghanistan. Nel caso <strong>del</strong>l’Afghanistan abbiamo preso in considerazione un unico<br />
esempio, quello <strong>di</strong> Sanjar (http://www.sanjar.blogspot.com). In un lungo post<br />
(http://sanjar.blogspot.com/2006/02/cartoon-crisis.html)<br />
<strong>il</strong> blogger si esprime a<br />
favore <strong>di</strong> scuse ufficiali che dovrebbero provenire dal governo danese. E’<br />
interessante <strong>il</strong> riferimento al giornale polacco<br />
Rzeczospolita che ha pubblicato le<br />
vignette nei giorni successivi allo scandalo. Mentre Sanjar sembra comprendere<br />
l’atteggiamento <strong>del</strong>le società secolari e laiche dei paesi scan<strong>di</strong>navi, non riesce a<br />
giustificare la decisione <strong>del</strong> giornale polacco in quanto si tratta <strong>di</strong> uno stato con<br />
profonde tra<strong>di</strong>zioni religiose. Come può un paese “più religioso <strong>del</strong>l’Italia”,<br />
insultare in tal modo i credenti <strong>di</strong> un’altra fede? L’articolo si conclude ironicamente<br />
con <strong>il</strong> riferimento su cosa avrebbe fatto Maometto seavesse visto le caricature. Si <strong>di</strong>ce<br />
che <strong>il</strong> profeta era dotato <strong>di</strong> grande senso <strong>del</strong>l’umorismo, probab<strong>il</strong>mente la sua<br />
reazione sarebbe stata un buon precedente per i suoi seguaci.<br />
Giordania. I casi dei blog giordani sono i più interessanti. In particolare un blog<br />
(http://www.360east.com) curato dal designer e impren<strong>di</strong>tore<br />
Ahmad Humeid ha<br />
attirato<br />
l’attenzione <strong>di</strong> molti. Va ricordato che Humeid è uno dei promotori <strong>del</strong> sito<br />
al quale ci siamo riferiti in precedenza, i.Toot. Humeid ha posto la questione già<br />
avanzata dal blogger afghano inerente la possib<strong>il</strong>e risposta <strong>del</strong> profeta alle caricature<br />
“Wondering how the Prophet might have responded to the cartoons”. Per abbozzare<br />
una risposta, egli si rifà a tre episo<strong>di</strong> <strong>del</strong>la vita <strong>di</strong> Maometto. Il primo racconto<br />
riguarda la storia <strong>del</strong> vicino ebreo che gli getta la spazzatura sui gra<strong>di</strong>ni <strong>di</strong> casa. Un<br />
giorno, non vedendo i sacchi <strong>del</strong>la spazzatura, <strong>il</strong> profeta si reca a trovare <strong>il</strong> vicino e<br />
lo trova a letto ammalato. Gli augura <strong>di</strong> riprendersi presto e <strong>il</strong> vicino, colpito<br />
dall’atteggiamento <strong>di</strong> Maometto, si converte all’Islam. Il secondo si riferisce ai<br />
bambini <strong>del</strong>la città <strong>di</strong> Ta’if che lo prendono a sassate nei confronti dei quali reagisce<br />
pacificamente pregando Dio affinché rinsaviscano. L’ultimo concerne gli uomini<br />
<strong>del</strong>la sua tribù dopo la conquista <strong>del</strong>la Mecca. Molti <strong>di</strong> essi, infatti, non avevano mai<br />
creduto in lui arrivando persino a cospirare contro <strong>il</strong> profeta. Maometto, una volta<br />
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conquistata la Mecca, si rivolge a loro <strong>di</strong>cendo che sono liberi <strong>di</strong> andarsene. Nello<br />
spirito <strong>del</strong>la vita <strong>del</strong> Profeta, afferma Humeid, ci sono cinque <strong>di</strong>fferenti mo<strong>di</strong> in cui <strong>il</strong><br />
mondo musulmano avrebbe potuto rispondere alle vignette danesi:<br />
1. organizzare una grande mostra –finanziata dai governi arabi- sulla vita <strong>di</strong><br />
Maometto e la storia <strong>del</strong>l’Islam. La mostra avrebbe dovuto essere pubblicizzata<br />
attraverso i me<strong>di</strong>a danesi;<br />
2. invitare 100 bambini danesi a vivere con altrettante famiglie musulmane in modo<br />
da comprendere <strong>il</strong> mondo islamico;<br />
3. invitare gli e<strong>di</strong>tori <strong>del</strong> giornale danese a un grande incontro culturale a Doha,<br />
Quatar, o a Copenhagen;<br />
4. le ambasciate dei paesi arabi e<br />
e alla vita all’interno dei paesi<br />
musulmani;<br />
musulmani avrebbero potuto promuovere la<br />
nascita <strong>di</strong> un sito web in lingua danese de<strong>di</strong>cato ai pensatori islamici contemporanei<br />
5. approntare i sottotitoli in danese per <strong>il</strong> f<strong>il</strong>m “The message” e provvedere alla<br />
<strong>di</strong>stribuzione in Danimarca.<br />
Un altro post <strong>di</strong>mostra un notevole grado <strong>di</strong> approfon<strong>di</strong>mento. Si intitola “Decision<br />
time for global muslim culture” (http://www.360east.com/?p=311) e pone la<br />
questione <strong>del</strong>le vignette in termini<br />
essenzialmente culturali. Humeid, infatti, ricorda<br />
che la cultura islamica non è ancora pronta ad accettare critiche né provocazioni. Le<br />
violente reazioni da parte dei musulmani sono state lette in termini <strong>di</strong> “<strong>di</strong>fesa<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’Islam; l’atteggiamento <strong>di</strong>fensivo riflette un senso <strong>di</strong> insicurezza culturale che<br />
deriva dall’incapacità <strong>di</strong> integrazione all’interno <strong>del</strong> mondo contemporaneo. Per<br />
quanto riguarda la religione, inoltre, è importante ricordare che ogni pretesa <strong>di</strong><br />
superiorità –sia da parte occidentale che islamica- è fuori luogo. L’indubbio<br />
vantaggio <strong>del</strong>le società occidentali sembra risiedere nel percorso storico degli ultimi<br />
secoli che le ha portate ad elaborare <strong>il</strong> moderno concetto <strong>di</strong> libertà, la stessa <strong>del</strong>la<br />
quale godono gli islamici che vivono in occidente. Lo sbaglio <strong>del</strong>le società<br />
musulmane è stato quello <strong>di</strong> non saper far tesoro <strong>di</strong> ciò che c’è <strong>di</strong> buono in Occidente<br />
e <strong>di</strong> non mostrare gli aspetti tolleranti <strong>del</strong>l’Islam. La domanda che si pone Humeid è<br />
la seguente: “what kind of respect does the global Muslim culture want today?”,<br />
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ovvero che tipo <strong>di</strong> rispetto vuole la cultura musulmana? Il rispetto non dovrebbe<br />
passare attraverso <strong>il</strong> timore suscitato da episo<strong>di</strong> violenti –come le proteste nei<br />
confronti dei cartoons- bensì dovrebbe essere ispirato dal ricco patrimonio storico-<br />
culturale.<br />
4.2. Il caso <strong>del</strong> Quinto Anniversario <strong>del</strong>l’Un<strong>di</strong>ci Settembre<br />
Una serie <strong>di</strong> nuovi prodotti me<strong>di</strong>atici era attesa in occasione<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’anniversario <strong>del</strong><br />
Nine Eleven e As-Sahab aveva annunciato nei forum una sua realizzazione. La prima<br />
uscita<br />
è <strong>di</strong> sabato 2 settembre 2006, con un un video <strong>di</strong> 41 minuti: “As-Sahab Me<strong>di</strong>a<br />
Productions presents An Invitation to Islam by Sheikh Ayman Az-Zawahiri and brother<br />
Mujahid Adam Yahya Gadahn -’Azzam Al Amiriki”.<br />
Il giorno 7 settembre al- Jazeera e CNN hanno poi messo in onda <strong>il</strong> secondo video<br />
garantito da As-Sahab, dove accanto a Osama compaiono numerosi “fratelli”<br />
riconoscib<strong>il</strong>i in Sheikh Abu Abdullah, Ramzi Binashibah<br />
(coinvolto nel 9/11), Dr.<br />
Ayman, Abu Hafs al-Misri (l’Atef ucciso durante un raid nel 2001), KSM. Sono<br />
presenti anche i due fratelli al-Shehri, Wa<strong>il</strong> e Walee: Wa<strong>il</strong> al-Shehri, che era a bordo<br />
<strong>del</strong> volo 11, e Hamza al-Gham<strong>di</strong>, a bordo <strong>del</strong> volo 175, comunicano le loro ultime<br />
193<br />
volontà prima <strong>del</strong>l’attacco al WTC. E<br />
ricompare per la quinta volta Azzam<br />
al-Ameriki, figura centrale <strong>del</strong> video <strong>di</strong><br />
sabato 2/9. Nel complesso si tratta <strong>di</strong><br />
un assemblaggio <strong>di</strong> vecchi materiali<br />
che mostrano i preparativi all’attacco<br />
alla Torri Gemelle: una sorta <strong>di</strong> tra<strong>il</strong>er<br />
che sembra annunciare altro.
Vale tuttavia la pena <strong>di</strong> puntualizzare<br />
qualcosa a proposito <strong>del</strong>l’Americano,<br />
cioè <strong>di</strong> Adam Pearlman aka Adam<br />
Yahiye Gadahn presentato proprio al<br />
grande pubblico – ma già bene<br />
conosciuto in video e voce – da Ayman<br />
Al-Zawahiri nel primo video <strong>del</strong> 2<br />
settembre. Gadahn nasce come Adam<br />
Pearlman, figlio <strong>del</strong> musicista<br />
americano Ph<strong>il</strong> Pearlman convertito al crisitianesimo<br />
essendo <strong>di</strong> famiglia ebraica.<br />
Carl Pearlman, infatti, padre <strong>di</strong> Ph<strong>il</strong> e nonno <strong>di</strong> Adam-Gadahn, è un noto chirurgo<br />
ebreo. La famiglia allevava anche oche secondo la regola halal nella fattoria in<br />
Winchester – Riverside county, California, per venderle ad alcuni negozianti<br />
musulmani. Adam descrive la sua conversione in un post affidato al web nel 1995, e<br />
intitolato “Becoming a Muslim”, partendo dalle sue esperienze <strong>di</strong> giovane osc<strong>il</strong>lante<br />
tra le musica heavy metal “dura” e i sermoni intransigenti <strong>del</strong>le ra<strong>di</strong>o cristiane<br />
americane. Nel 1998 si trasferisce in Pakistan dove sposa una rifugiata afghana.<br />
Comincia quin<strong>di</strong> la sua ascesa come traduttore <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida: è la sua voce fuori campo<br />
o <strong>il</strong> doppiatore degli anchor-man consolidati, poi star <strong>del</strong> me<strong>di</strong>a system jiha<strong>di</strong>sta<br />
rivolto al nuovo target <strong>del</strong> pubblico occidentale.<br />
L’Americano, infatti, si inserisce molto bene nella comunicazione più recente <strong>del</strong><br />
terrorismo, quella che ormai prevede i sottotitoli in inglese,<br />
<strong>il</strong> medesimo protagonista<br />
non solo <strong>di</strong> lingua inglese ma evidentemente un convertito, proponendosi<br />
esplicitamente a un pubblico che non è ancora ne musulmano né jiha<strong>di</strong>sta.<br />
A conferma che la battaglia che si sta conducendo attraverso i me<strong>di</strong>a è la più<br />
importante e determinante - <strong>il</strong> cui successo jiha<strong>di</strong>sta si misura nel rinfoltimento<br />
<strong>del</strong>le<br />
f<strong>il</strong>e <strong>del</strong> terrorismo con uomini nuovi, cresciuti in occidente e mimetizzati dentro<br />
all’occidente - <strong>il</strong> video <strong>del</strong> 7/9 conferma anche le tendenze già affermate. Dunque,<br />
accanto ai sottotitoli in inglese e all’Americano anche i “fratelli” <strong>di</strong> battaglia <strong>di</strong><br />
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Osama negli anfratti afghani; rievocazioni dei passati successi jae<strong>di</strong>sti ma possib<strong>il</strong>i<br />
minacce future celate in alcuni visi resi <strong>di</strong> proposito non riconoscib<strong>il</strong>i (<strong>il</strong> che significa<br />
che “sono tuttora in pista”); esempi <strong>di</strong> esercitazioni fisiche ru<strong>di</strong> e <strong>di</strong> tecniche d’arti<br />
marziali. Tutto questo premia la comunicazione jiha<strong>di</strong>sta che trova ampio e<br />
consenziente spazio sui me<strong>di</strong>a occidentali: in pratica <strong>il</strong> 7 settembre è stato fatto<br />
troppo clamore gratuito dai me<strong>di</strong>a occidentali (con annunci ai telegiornali <strong>del</strong> nuovo<br />
video apparso su internet) intorno a un video jiha<strong>di</strong>sta non particolarmente<br />
interessante, ma non per questo meno pericoloso in termini <strong>di</strong> propaganda,<br />
promozione e reclutamento.<br />
Di nuovo, <strong>il</strong> giorno 10 settembre, la produzione jiha<strong>di</strong>sta <strong>di</strong> As-Sahab è uscita con un<br />
documentario <strong>di</strong> 90 minuti, <strong>di</strong>viso in due parti, intitolato : “Knowledge is for Acting<br />
Upon”. Si tratta <strong>di</strong> 950 Mb <strong>di</strong> buona qualità, <strong>di</strong> cui ho identificato sulla rete circa 450<br />
link <strong>di</strong>visi tra le due parti, <strong>di</strong>sponb<strong>il</strong>i in formato .avi .rm o .3gp, e circa 60 link che<br />
rimandano a una versione unificata <strong>del</strong>le due parti, ridotta a circa 150 Mb. Dunque<br />
una <strong>di</strong>stribuzione ampia e cap<strong>il</strong>lare attraverso la maggior parte degli hosting free per<br />
<strong>il</strong> donwload, che <strong>di</strong>mostra la <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong>la banda larga.<br />
Il video, come al solito sottotitolato in inglese, appare come un mix <strong>di</strong> f<strong>il</strong>m d’azione<br />
degli anni Ottanta e un documentario <strong>del</strong>la BBC. Ma <strong>il</strong><br />
linguaggio <strong>di</strong> Osama bin<br />
Laden e <strong>di</strong> Ayman al-Zawahiri è denso <strong>di</strong> riman<strong>di</strong> religiosi e poetici <strong>di</strong> grande<br />
capacità evocativa.<br />
L’obiettivo <strong>del</strong> video sembra essere quello <strong>di</strong> celebrare l’anniversario attraverso una<br />
comunicazione pedagogica<br />
che <strong>il</strong>lustra le ragioni d’essere <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida passando per<br />
la nascita <strong>del</strong>lo Stato <strong>di</strong> Israele, la presenza <strong>del</strong>le truppe americane in Arabia Sau<strong>di</strong>ta<br />
e nel Me<strong>di</strong>o Oriente, fino alla guerra in Iraq. Il documentario è sostanzialmente<br />
costruito con materiale d’archivio che ci presenta tutte le star jiha<strong>di</strong>ste tra<strong>di</strong>zionali<br />
quali Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri e Abdallah Azzam, e quelle più recenti:<br />
Hamza al-Gham<strong>di</strong> e Wa’el al-Shihri, tra i kamikaze <strong>del</strong> Nine Eleven, che qui sono<br />
riproposti nella <strong>di</strong>chiarazione <strong>del</strong> loro testamento con le immagini <strong>del</strong> “tra<strong>il</strong>er” <strong>del</strong> 7<br />
settembre. Il f<strong>il</strong>o rosso è garantito da una voce narrante fuori campo <strong>di</strong> uno speaker<br />
195
non identificato, che lega ipotetici spettatori jiah<strong>di</strong>sti posti <strong>di</strong> fronte a un Pc piuttosto,<br />
che alla televisione, con le evidenti immagini <strong>di</strong> repertorio riproposte da questi<br />
me<strong>di</strong>a: sempre meno “informazione” e sempre più “fiction”….<br />
Ma non è finita, ancora <strong>il</strong> giorno 10 sempre As-Sahab <strong>di</strong>stribuisce un video <strong>di</strong> un’ora<br />
e se<strong>di</strong>ci minuti <strong>del</strong> quale è protagonista al-Zawahiri, dal titolo “Hot issues”: vestito <strong>di</strong><br />
bianco <strong>di</strong> fronte a una libreria, <strong>il</strong> numero due ideologo <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida espone le ragioni<br />
<strong>del</strong> conflitto tra occidente e islam. Il video, al contrario dei precedenti, è recente<br />
citando gli avvenimenti libanesi e <strong>il</strong> rapimento da parte <strong>di</strong> Hamas dei m<strong>il</strong>itari<br />
israeliani. La fattura <strong>del</strong> prodotto è decisamente buona, la doppia lingua con<br />
sottotitoli in inglese è garantita, l’intervista è ben condotta attraverso <strong>del</strong>le domande<br />
specifiche.<br />
Questi video sono interessanti per <strong>di</strong>verse ragioni.<br />
La prima ragione riguarda i contenuti, che continuando una linea intrapresa da al-<br />
Qa’ida negli ultimi messaggi, sostengono con orgoglio<br />
la preparazione, organizazione<br />
e realizzazione <strong>del</strong>l’attentato <strong>del</strong> Nine Eleven da parte qa’i<strong>di</strong>sta, portando evidenze<br />
contro i presupposti complotti americani e sionisti presenti <strong>di</strong>etro all’attacco: al-<br />
Qa’ida è l’autore, che ha preparato gli uomini che si sono avviati all’impresa con la<br />
bene<strong>di</strong>zione <strong>di</strong> Osama, Zawahiri, al-Suri e altri leader <strong>del</strong> terrorismo islamico.<br />
La seconda ragione riguarda la <strong>di</strong>stribuzione dei video: ampia e cap<strong>il</strong>lare; la<br />
anticipazione con <strong>il</strong> tra<strong>il</strong>er <strong>del</strong> 7 settembre; l’intensa presenza sui circuiti me<strong>di</strong>atici<br />
occidentali. Prodotti me<strong>di</strong>atici <strong>di</strong> buon livello ma sempre meno “informativi” e<br />
sempre più legato alla <strong>di</strong>mensione “drammaturgica”: in tal senso è legittimo chiedere<br />
quanto la loro <strong>di</strong>stribuzione sia più un contributo all’informazione o più un<br />
contributo al brand me<strong>di</strong>atico <strong>di</strong> al-Qa’ida .<br />
Infine: legittimano la domanda sulla leadership <strong>di</strong> Osama, apparso solo in immagini<br />
<strong>di</strong> repertorio.<br />
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5. Reclutatori, reclute e reclutamento.<br />
Recenti rapporti provenienti<br />
dall’Europa Centro Settentrionale evidenziano un<br />
incremento <strong>del</strong>la presenza <strong>di</strong> giovani nord africani nei circuiti <strong>di</strong> reclutamento<br />
jiha<strong>di</strong>sta: la maggior parte <strong>di</strong> questi giovani sono nati nel paese <strong>di</strong> accoglienza o<br />
almeno vi abitano fin da bambini, avendo dunque partecipato al porcesso <strong>di</strong><br />
socializzazione <strong>del</strong> paese <strong>di</strong> destinazione <strong>del</strong>l’emigrazione. Le interviste mostrano<br />
spesso persone che sono passate attraverso profonde crisi identititarie, non risolte dai<br />
processi integrativi offerti, che li hanno condotti ad avvicinarsi a un islam ra<strong>di</strong>cale,<br />
frequentemente estraneo alle loro stesse famiglie <strong>di</strong> provenienza. A costoro la rete è<br />
stata tesa da altri immigrati residenti – legalmente o <strong>il</strong>legalmente – per la maggior<br />
parte caratterizzati dall’avere un trascorso da mujahed<strong>di</strong>n, concretizzatosi in qualche<br />
forma <strong>di</strong> istruzione religiosa rigorosa e <strong>di</strong> addestramento m<strong>il</strong>itare nei capi qa’i<strong>di</strong>sti<br />
in Afghanistan. Alcuni <strong>di</strong> questi reclutatori sono combattenti <strong>di</strong> ritorono dal fronte<br />
iraqeno. I luoghi <strong>di</strong> contatto preferiti r<strong>il</strong>evati dagli operatori sul campo sono<br />
solitamente: le moschee più ra<strong>di</strong>cali, i centri islamici, gli internet caffee ma anche le<br />
prigioni: i detenuti stranieri sembrano (almeno così è per l’Olanda sicuramente)<br />
essere <strong>di</strong>ventati tra i target preferiti dei reclutatori. A seguito <strong>di</strong> una <strong>di</strong>sponb<strong>il</strong>ità<br />
mostrata dopo i primi contatti, <strong>il</strong> can<strong>di</strong>dato viene prograssivamente isolato dalla sua<br />
rete abituale <strong>di</strong> amicizie e parentele e sottoposto a un duro processo <strong>di</strong><br />
indottrinamento. Lo stesso processo r<strong>il</strong>evato nelle interviste avute in Kur<strong>di</strong>stan con i<br />
due mujahed<strong>di</strong>n <strong>di</strong> Ansar: “non sono mai stato abbandonato, qualcuno era insieme a<br />
me 24 ore su 24. Per almeno sei mesi. Mi ha accompagnato fino a dove dovevo<br />
saltare….” (Didar Khalid Khaled). Infine <strong>il</strong> processo <strong>di</strong> reclutamento si completa con un<br />
training m<strong>il</strong>itare e si conclude con qualche forma pubblica <strong>di</strong> testimonianza <strong>di</strong><br />
appartenenza: fossa anche l’ultima, l’usuale testamento prima <strong>di</strong> farsi esplodere.<br />
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5.1. Il caso <strong>di</strong> Londra luglio 2005<br />
Nello specifico degli attacchi a Londra, l’analisi comunicativa comincia dalle<br />
riven<strong>di</strong>cazioni e dalla subitanee smentite: entrambe <strong>di</strong> origine islamica. La<br />
riven<strong>di</strong>cazione è comparsa sul sito <strong>di</strong> Qal3ah, che è connesso a Sa’ad Rashed<br />
Mohammad Al-Fagih, considerato appartenente ad al-Qa’ida e al jihad da circa <strong>di</strong>eci<br />
anni. Fagih – sau<strong>di</strong>ta con residenza a Londra – secondo gli USA ha fornito supporto<br />
logistico agli attentati alla ambasciata americana in Africa nel 1998 e poi si è occupato<br />
<strong>di</strong> mantenere la comunicazione via rete tra i jiha<strong>di</strong>sti. Queste operazioni rimandano<br />
alla sua organizzazione “MIRA” e, appunto, a un’altra identità in rete denominata “Il<br />
Castello”. Di più, la pista informatica porta a islah.org e miraserve.com, che non sono<br />
registrati a nome <strong>di</strong> Al-Fagih o <strong>di</strong> MIRA, tuttavia re-in<strong>di</strong>rizzano al sito <strong>di</strong> MIRA<br />
(islahi.net). Inoltre attraverso le informazioni <strong>di</strong> registrazione dei domini portano a<br />
Al-Fagih, attraverso la “charity” <strong>di</strong> Hamas con base in Gran Bretagna, denominata<br />
Interpal. Pertanto, almeno <strong>il</strong> luogo virtuale in cui la riven<strong>di</strong>cazione ha avuto<br />
manifestazione è congruente. La smentita ha, anch’essa, avuto una origine jiha<strong>di</strong>sta è<br />
ha fornito ad alcuni l’alibi <strong>del</strong>la speranza: se la smentita è vera forse non è jihad. Tale<br />
atteggiamento è spia significativa <strong>di</strong> una cultura <strong>del</strong> rifiuto <strong>del</strong>la possib<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> essere<br />
oggetto <strong>del</strong> terrorismo islamico che ormai non ha più senso e crea debolezza. Ma<br />
soprattutto pone un interrogativo: perché smentire?<br />
Un altro aspetto comunicativo allarga le <strong>di</strong>mensioni <strong>del</strong> problema. Imme<strong>di</strong>atamente<br />
dopo Londra ecco l’uccisione, riven<strong>di</strong>cata, <strong>del</strong>l’Ambasciatore egiziano in Iraq. Perché<br />
tanta fretta? In fin dei conti era nelle loro mani, assassinarlo contiguamente a Londra<br />
significa avere perso una opportunità comunicativa: le due notizie penetrano su<br />
“mercati” – cioè pubblici – <strong>di</strong>versi, uno occidentale e uno arabo. Le due notizie<br />
tendono a elidersi a vicenda e non a rafforzarsi. Al contrario, l’assassinio<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’Ambasciatore, <strong>di</strong>stante più tempo dalla riven<strong>di</strong>cazione, avrebbe rinforzato<br />
l’allarme generato dagli attacchi <strong>di</strong> luglio. Allora perché? La lettura comunicativa<br />
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<strong>del</strong>la questione potrebbe fornire alcune informazioni circa la struttura <strong>del</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo<br />
in Europa.<br />
La<br />
risposta alla domanda <strong>di</strong> cui sopra, relativa alla <strong>di</strong>mensione comunicativa, sembra<br />
evidenziare una forma <strong>di</strong> comunicazione interna: l’assassinio <strong>del</strong>l’Ambasciatore<br />
egiziano assomiglia a un atto <strong>di</strong> reazione tra un jihad me<strong>di</strong>o orientale e un jihad<br />
europea che non sono coor<strong>di</strong>nate. Insomma, una sorta <strong>di</strong> affermazione <strong>di</strong> potere tra<br />
entità attive su un progetto comune ma senza una comune centrale <strong>di</strong> controllo. Le<br />
medesima percezione può essere confermata dall’attacco a Sharm el Sheik: due fronti<br />
<strong>di</strong>versi con due linguaggio <strong>di</strong>versi (Europa ed Egitto), che ci aiutano a comprendere<br />
una struttura cellulare in evoluzione in Europa, fatta <strong>di</strong> imitatori <strong>di</strong> una rete in<br />
“franchising”. Se questa lettura è corretta, <strong>il</strong> jihad può attraversare un momento <strong>di</strong><br />
<strong>di</strong>fficoltà organizzative (questo è l’aspetto positivo) ma anche può presentarsi<br />
sempre più frammentata e impreve<strong>di</strong>b<strong>il</strong>e (e questo è l’aspetto negativo).<br />
Tale impreve<strong>di</strong>b<strong>il</strong>ità è rafforzata dalla tipologia <strong>del</strong>le nuove reclute: rispetto a<br />
Madrid, si inserisce la terrificante novità dei kamikaze e <strong>di</strong> terroristi allevati in casa.<br />
Il kamikaze evidenzia un mutamento <strong>di</strong> strategia – una baghda<strong>di</strong>zzazione o<br />
palestinizzazione - <strong>del</strong>lo scontro. E sostiene l’idea <strong>di</strong> “fase riorganizzativa” in atto,<br />
piuttosto che <strong>di</strong> una escalation degli attacchi. A Madrid non venne ut<strong>il</strong>izzato e i<br />
terroristi erano <strong>di</strong> “importazione”. A Londra è stato ut<strong>il</strong>izzato e proprio “dagli<br />
inglesi”. Questa è la nuova pista, estremamente pericolosa.<br />
Altro che terroristi <strong>di</strong> rientro dal me<strong>di</strong>o oriente: al contrario immigrati insod<strong>di</strong>sfatti<br />
<strong>di</strong> seconda generazione invasati nelle tollerate moschee lon<strong>di</strong>nesi. Costoro scontano<br />
la probab<strong>il</strong>e mancata integrazione <strong>del</strong>la prima generazione – senza aprire <strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>battito<br />
accademico ma sostanziale sul mo<strong>del</strong>lo <strong>del</strong> ghetto inglese – che, raggiunto <strong>il</strong><br />
benessere ed esaurito l’entusiasmo forzato <strong>del</strong>la spinta alla migrazione, comunque<br />
riversa sui figli la frustrazione nostalgica <strong>del</strong>l’immigrato. A ciò si aggiunge una<br />
ricerca <strong>di</strong> identità forte che si risolve spesso nelle <strong>il</strong>lusioni che riempiono le moschee.<br />
E rispetto all’Italia la supposta neutralità e la sicurezza acquistata dal Paese,<br />
chiudendo qualche occhio sulle opportunità logistiche fornite all’organizzazione <strong>del</strong><br />
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terrorismo (falsi documenti, flussi <strong>di</strong> finanziamento, strategie <strong>di</strong> reclutamento), non<br />
funziona più. Questa seconda generazione ha i documenti in regola e la rete <strong>di</strong><br />
supporto: dunque <strong>il</strong> rischio è <strong>di</strong>fferente e massimo.<br />
5.2. Reclute iternazionali dal campo iraqeno<br />
Una modalità <strong>di</strong> promozione ormai consueta terrorismo, rimanda alla pubblicazione<br />
in Internet <strong>del</strong>le biografie dei martiri jiha<strong>di</strong>sti proposti come esempio <strong>di</strong> perfetta<br />
applicazione <strong>del</strong>l’islam. Quelli che seguono sono alcuni esempi che sottolineano la<br />
componente internazionale <strong>del</strong>le nuove reclute, pubblicati nel corso <strong>del</strong> 2006.<br />
Abu Dujanah al-Qahtani (Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia)<br />
“Abu Dujanah al-Qahtani… was a former resident of Riyadh. He was married,<br />
and in the past worked for the Sau<strong>di</strong> National Guard driving armored<br />
personnel carriers and other armored vehicles… The martyr rushed to Iraq<br />
where he joined an anti-aircraft unit that specialized in the heavy 14.5mm<br />
[weapon]… Abu Dujanah loved the Kalashnikov very much<br />
and used it to send<br />
many enemies of Allah to hell on your behalf.”<br />
“Blessed Allah honored Abu Dujanah and he was wounded in an anti-aircraft<br />
operation launched in blessed Al-Qaim. He sustained an injury to his face as a<br />
result of shrapnel from a rocket launched by one of the crusader Apache<br />
helicopters. Afterwards, this helicopter along with another were shot down. The<br />
martyr was happy as if he had been given a gift or a reward of some kind…<br />
Abu Dujanah took part in many operations, such as the first attack in usaybah,<br />
launched alongside his comrade in life and in death Abu Bakr al-Qasimi [from<br />
Sau<strong>di</strong> Arabia]. Launched from several <strong>di</strong>rections, the attack [in Husaybah] was<br />
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led by [Abu Dujanah] and commander Abu Ibrahim al-Tunisi [from Tunisia],<br />
may Allah have mercy on his soul. Our friend was positioned along a frontline<br />
that was in imme<strong>di</strong>ate proximity to the enemies of Allah. He unleashed hell<br />
from his weapon, and Allah honored him by inflicting casualties upon them…<br />
He was k<strong>il</strong>led in a face-to-face battle with the apostates in the Sadda area after<br />
managing to k<strong>il</strong>l the commander of the m<strong>il</strong>itary checkpoint and his personal<br />
assistant who ordered them to stop. The brothers managed to recover his body<br />
three days later and noticed that it had not changed at all, and that he was st<strong>il</strong>l<br />
blee<strong>di</strong>ng, with his index finger pointing upward as if he were k<strong>il</strong>led only a few<br />
minutes before. Abu Dujanah was buried alongside his friend and comrade Abu<br />
Bakr al-Qasimi (who we have mentioned earlier) in the Al-Shuhadaa cemetery<br />
in the al-Karab<strong>il</strong>ah area… The sound of explosions and bombing by F-18 aircraft<br />
rocked the area as the brothers buried his body in broad daylight. The martyr<br />
looked<br />
calm and content, just as he had been during the battles and<br />
confrontations. Farewell, Abu Dujanah, and may you rest in peace alongside the<br />
beautiful black-eyed virgins in para<strong>di</strong>se.”<br />
Abu Hummam al-Urdani (Jordan)<br />
“Abu Hummam al-Urdani [from Jordan]… Head toward righteous Baghdad<br />
and then turn south to the Sunni triangle, or the ‘Triangle of Death’ as it is often<br />
referred to by the American cowards. Even more<br />
specifically, there is an area<br />
that the enemy is very fam<strong>il</strong>iar with from the havoc we have wreaked upon<br />
him. It is the region of al-Maq<strong>di</strong>si, al-Sharqi, al-Masri, and others that is also<br />
known as Al-Yousifiya, and this is where you w<strong>il</strong>l find the grave of Abu<br />
Hummam, may Allah almighty have mercy on his soul. When you see him, you<br />
w<strong>il</strong>l not think much of him, with his small frame and short height. Nonetheless,<br />
the martyr had an athletic bu<strong>il</strong>d and was a Tae Kwon Do self-defense instructor<br />
who earned a level 2 black belt. Abu Hummam would constantly prepare<br />
himself for jihad in the cause of Allah, and was passionate about it. He was<br />
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married and his wife gave birth to a baby daughter shortly before his death.<br />
Although he never saw her and <strong>di</strong>d not even know her name, he was very<br />
happy to hear this news. The martyr, may Allah have mercy on his soul,<br />
worked in a metal and wooden furniture manufacturing company in Jordan. As<br />
soon as he heard the call for jihad coming from Iraq, he rushed over there,<br />
hoping to join the ranks of the heroic mujahed<strong>di</strong>n in Iraq—whose courage awed<br />
our enemies even before it awed the rest of us.”<br />
“Abu Hummam arrived in Al-Qaim and signed himself up on the ‘honor list’—<br />
the list of volunteer martyrs. Nevertheless, the m<strong>il</strong>itary commander objected<br />
and insisted that our brother continue to train the brothers with the gifts that<br />
Allah had bestowed upon him by serving as a martial arts and physical<br />
education instructor. Our brother Abu Hummam was supposed to take part in<br />
the third assault against Abu Ghraib also known as the ‘Revenge Battle of Abu<br />
Anas al-Shami’, may Allah have mercy on his soul… Abu Hummam assumed<br />
responsib<strong>il</strong>ity for training at the desert-based Rawa m<strong>il</strong>itary camp, along with a<br />
Yemeni brother. They <strong>di</strong>d a superb job and became famous for the rigorous<br />
training<br />
regimen they established at the training camp”.<br />
Abu Radwan al-Urdani (Jordan)<br />
Better known as Raed al-Banna, a law student from Salt, Jordan who spent time<br />
working in the United States, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng during the period of September 11, 2001<br />
“when the men of Islam finally struck and wrought destruction in the heartland<br />
of America in broad daylight.” Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n, the weight of 9/11<br />
“moved Abu Radwan and so he embraced blessed Allah once again.” Abu<br />
Radwan, a.k.a. Raed al-Banna, later volunteered as an al-Qa’ida suicide bomber<br />
in Iraq targeting Shiites in the town of H<strong>il</strong>la. The devastating attack that he<br />
carried out “claimed the lives of 150 cursed enemies, and wounded more than<br />
300--we ask Allah that they do not recover from their injuries.”<br />
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Abu Usama al-Ansari (Iraq)<br />
A former <strong>il</strong>legal arms smuggler during the regime of Saddam Hussein who<br />
reformed himself and became a mujahid after the U.S. invasion in 2003.<br />
Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n, Abu Usama “was inspired by the Shaykh and<br />
mujahid, Abu Anas al-Shami [a.k.a. Omar Yousef Jumah]... who spent a period<br />
of time resi<strong>di</strong>ng at Abu Usama’s house, urging people to join the fight. Abu<br />
Usama used to teach his brothers many of the lessons and sayings of Abu<br />
Anas.”<br />
Abu As<strong>il</strong> al-Jazairi (Algeria)<br />
A former senior official in the comparatively moderate Muslim Brotherhood<br />
movement who was “eventually guided toward the righteous path” and used<br />
his “administrative and organizational experience” to help al-Qa’ida instead.<br />
Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to the mujahed<strong>di</strong>n, Abu As<strong>il</strong> “was assigned the responsib<strong>il</strong>ity of<br />
overseeing the borders [of Iraq]. In other words, he was responsible for all the<br />
Arab brothers that came to fight in the jihad... He loved<br />
to quote from Shaykh<br />
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s statements... and <strong>di</strong>d this so frequently that he<br />
practically knew all of his speeches verbatim<br />
by heart.”<br />
Abu Ibrahim al-Tunisi (Tunisia)<br />
A veteran Tunisian mujahed<strong>di</strong>n commander who “spent most of his life fighting<br />
on the frontlines and practicing jihad in Afghanistan, Europe [presumably<br />
Bosnia-Herzegovina], and Iraq. He was responsible for Shaykh Usama Bin<br />
Laden’s guesthouses in Afghanistan... [and later] arrived in Rawa [Iraq], the city<br />
of martyrs, where he spent some time and assumed the role of commander of<br />
[al-Qa’ida’s] security branch.”<br />
Questi<br />
medaglioni biografici sono oggi spesso inseriti in percorsi multime<strong>di</strong>ali<br />
complessi, in cui immagini <strong>di</strong> repertorio e immagini biografiche si fondono per<br />
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organizzare un messagio <strong>il</strong> cui obiettivo è proporre, emblematicamente, <strong>il</strong> percorso<br />
dei martiri<br />
<strong>del</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo per promuovere <strong>il</strong> reclutamento.<br />
Quelli<br />
che seguono sono alcuni esempi <strong>di</strong> fotogrammi tratti da altri video dei martiri<br />
<strong>del</strong> jihad.<br />
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Recentemente, <strong>di</strong>cembre 2006, è apparso in rete un nuovo video che riunisce quanto<br />
finora qui sottolineato. Si tratta, infatti, <strong>di</strong> un prodotto multime<strong>di</strong>ale sottotitolato in<br />
turco in cui si esalta come martire Eymen Muhammed Salim Cude (Ebu Zubeyr): un<br />
cameramen ucciso mentre riprendeva<br />
l’azione. Il video <strong>di</strong>stribuito ut<strong>il</strong>izza le ultime<br />
immagine registrate, documentando la caduta <strong>del</strong>l’operatore e la registrazione che<br />
prosegue senza contollo. Con <strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>cembre 2006 la comunicazione jiha<strong>di</strong>sta ha <strong>il</strong> suo<br />
primo martire ufficiale: una nuova figura da proporre al reclutamento, secondo un<br />
canone che ormai mette sul medesimo piano la telecamera e l’AK47.<br />
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6. Conclusioni<br />
In ultima analisi, la sopravvivenza <strong>di</strong> ogni gruppo terrorista <strong>di</strong>pende dalla sua<br />
capacità <strong>di</strong> reclutare nuovi membri, cioè dalla sua ab<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>di</strong> mantere e promuovere<br />
gruppi <strong>di</strong> suopporter “attivi” e gruppi <strong>di</strong> simpatizzanti “passivi”. In questo processo<br />
<strong>di</strong> reclutamento e mantenimento degli attivisti e dei simpatizzanti <strong>il</strong> ruolo <strong>del</strong>la<br />
comunicazione è centrale, perché da esso <strong>di</strong>pende sia <strong>il</strong> costante<br />
approvvigionamento <strong>di</strong> combattenti nel movimento sia<br />
<strong>il</strong> progressivo<br />
coinvolgimento<br />
dei simpatizzanti. Ancora una volta: senza comunicazione non può<br />
esserci terrorismo.<br />
L’analisi fin qui condotta intorno ai processi comunicativi <strong>del</strong> jiha<strong>di</strong>smo, mostra<br />
come in questi anni <strong>il</strong> processo <strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>del</strong>l’estremismo islamico sia stato reso<br />
possib<strong>il</strong>e anche con modalità e conseguendo successi non preventivab<strong>il</strong>i. Oggi, ogni<br />
gruppo terrorista può <strong>di</strong>sporre <strong>del</strong> suo sito web in internet, probab<strong>il</strong>mente è in grado<br />
<strong>di</strong> mantenere più siti, organizzati in lingue <strong>di</strong>fferenti per colpire una molteplicità <strong>di</strong><br />
bersagli.<br />
Mai come adesso, per mezzo <strong>di</strong> strumenti e modalità comunicative <strong>di</strong>gitali sofisticate<br />
che includono video, au<strong>di</strong>o, fotografie <strong>di</strong>gitali, “fotogrammi” montati dentro a<br />
presentazioni multime<strong>di</strong>ali, flash, au<strong>di</strong>o clip e comunque web site <strong>di</strong> grande impatto<br />
emotivo, <strong>il</strong> terrorismo ha potuto raggiungere un pubblico tanto vasto, così<br />
rapidamente e con tanta efficacia.<br />
Perché dunque stupirsi <strong>del</strong> successo <strong>del</strong> terrorismo?<br />
Un tale rivoluzione nella comunicazione <strong>del</strong> terrore è destinata a perdurare,<br />
migliorare in qualità, per contenuti trasmessi e per capacità <strong>di</strong> trasmissione: la<br />
capacità<br />
comunicativa <strong>del</strong> terrorismo evolve tanto quanto evolvono le ICT, si riduce<br />
<strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>gital <strong>di</strong>vide, si <strong>di</strong>ffonde la globale società <strong>del</strong>la comunicazione.<br />
Certamente possiamo sostenere che dopo l’Un<strong>di</strong>ci Settembre <strong>il</strong> jihad ha perso molte<br />
<strong>del</strong>le sue basi operative, molti dei suoi santuari, ma questi sono stati rapidamente<br />
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sostituti dai “santuari virtuali”, che sono altrettanto efficaci nel reclutare, formare,<br />
mantenere coesione, organizzare e orientare.<br />
Sorprendersi <strong>di</strong> tutto ciò, significa non applicare alla realtà tutta i medesimi mo<strong>del</strong>li<br />
interpretativi che applichiamo alle nostre realtà locali occidentali. E dunque, non<br />
essere capaci <strong>di</strong> leggere le vulnerab<strong>il</strong>ità dei nostri sis<strong>temi</strong> organizzati che forniscono<br />
allo stesso terrorismo le opportunità tecnologiche e cognitive per colpirci.<br />
In questo quadro, in cui tecnologie tra<strong>di</strong>zionali analogiche e <strong>di</strong>gitali <strong>di</strong> rete si mixano,<br />
una risposta articolata è pertanto necessaria.<br />
Le attività tra<strong>di</strong>zionali, orientate a fornire altri punti <strong>di</strong> vista alle platee, a ri-/contro-<br />
orientare, informare<br />
non possono essere affidate ai soli strumenti ra<strong>di</strong>o e televisivi.<br />
Se consideriamo gli Stati Uniti, <strong>il</strong> Dipartimento <strong>di</strong> Stato ha avviato gran<strong>di</strong> programmi<br />
in tal senso, de<strong>di</strong>cati al mondo islamico: la televisione in lingua araba al-Hura, la<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>o al-Sawa e l’aumento <strong>del</strong>le trasmissioni in lingua araba <strong>di</strong> Voice of America<br />
sono tutti segni <strong>di</strong> questa attenzione alla guerra me<strong>di</strong>atica. Ma tutto ciò sortisce scarsi<br />
effetti, e appare ad<strong>di</strong>rittura anacronistico, se non si interviene allo stesso modo nel<br />
mondo <strong>del</strong>la<br />
comunicazione <strong>di</strong>gitale per colpire au<strong>di</strong>ence sempre più recettive al<br />
messaggio jiha<strong>di</strong>sta (giovani e giovani adulti musulmani anche residenti in paesi non<br />
islamici) e consumatori <strong>di</strong> internet e TV satellitare.<br />
Per esempio, è fondamentale partecipare al <strong>di</strong>battito che coinvolge i movimenti<br />
<strong>del</strong>l’estremismo islamico soprattutto per mostrare a quel pubblico l’intrinseca<br />
debolezza e <strong>di</strong>visione che si cela<br />
<strong>di</strong>etro la supposta monoliticità <strong>del</strong> movimento<br />
stesso. Nella storia <strong>del</strong> terrorismo si è sempre r<strong>il</strong>evato l’interesse a mostrare ogni<br />
gruppo come altamente coeso, unito, senza conflitti interni.<br />
Ma nella realtà non è mai<br />
stato così: <strong>il</strong> conflitto appartiene al carattere evolutivo <strong>di</strong> ogni gruppo per sua<br />
costituzione. Partecipare al regime comunicativo <strong>del</strong> gruppo ci permette <strong>di</strong> “cogliere<br />
l’occasione”, per rompere questa immagine <strong>di</strong> coesione che è determinante quando si<br />
chiede adesione e partecipazione ai “nuovi arrivati”.<br />
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Nello sv<strong>il</strong>uppare una strategia me<strong>di</strong>atica che cerchi <strong>di</strong> contere per esempio <strong>il</strong><br />
reclutamento e la promozione jiha<strong>di</strong>sta è fondamentale <strong>il</strong> coor<strong>di</strong>namento interno ed<br />
esterno.<br />
Sul piano interno la pubblicazione multime<strong>di</strong>ale prima commentata, in occasione <strong>del</strong><br />
Quinto Anniversario <strong>del</strong> 9/11, mostra come ormai <strong>il</strong> jihad non solo sappia usare le<br />
tecniche <strong>di</strong> post produzione ma sappia sfruttare le debolezze dei sis<strong>temi</strong><br />
me<strong>di</strong>atici<br />
occidentali, <strong>di</strong>sastrosamente orientati al sensazionalismo <strong>del</strong> terrore e sempre<br />
<strong>di</strong>sponib<strong>il</strong>i a fornire spazi a possib<strong>il</strong>i “breaking news” qa’i<strong>di</strong>ane. Tanto è vero che <strong>il</strong><br />
tra<strong>il</strong>er (l’annuncio) “paga” in termini comunicativi quanto <strong>il</strong> video annunciato. In<br />
questa prospettiva emerge una duplice responsab<strong>il</strong>ità: quella dei me<strong>di</strong>a a non<br />
prestarsi al gioco <strong>del</strong>la comuncazione <strong>del</strong> terrorismo contrabbandando <strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>ritto<br />
all’informazione con <strong>il</strong> <strong>di</strong>ritto all’incasso a ogni costo; quella <strong>del</strong>le istituzioni che<br />
devono legittimare la presenza dei me<strong>di</strong>a dentro alle procedure <strong>di</strong> sicurezza che<br />
riguardano la nostra comunità, conferendo loro titolarità <strong>di</strong> interpreti e non <strong>di</strong><br />
esecutori.<br />
Sul piano esterno, la battaglia sul campo me<strong>di</strong>atico richiede ancor più strette<br />
alleanze che sul campo <strong>del</strong>la realtà: la virtualità annulla i confini e, dunque, richiede<br />
l’assoluta con<strong>di</strong>visione dei fini tra gli alleati e<br />
la massima transitab<strong>il</strong>ità <strong>del</strong>le<br />
informazioni. Una falla, nella rete <strong>di</strong> controllo <strong>di</strong>gitale, determina risultati pari<br />
all’assenza <strong>del</strong>la rete medesima: non esiste <strong>di</strong>scriminazione in livelli<br />
<strong>di</strong> grigio rispetto<br />
ai gra<strong>di</strong> <strong>di</strong> efficienza <strong>del</strong> controllo, ma solo presenza o assenza <strong>di</strong> esso.<br />
In pratica, la <strong>di</strong>ffusione <strong>di</strong> siti <strong>di</strong> istruzione, promozione e supporto esplicito al jihad<br />
rende praticamente inut<strong>il</strong>e la battaglia <strong>del</strong>l’intelligence e <strong>del</strong> controterrorismo sul<br />
campo, orientata alla eliminazione fisica dei referenti jiha<strong>di</strong>sti, nella misura in cui a<br />
essa non si affianca una battaglia nel mondo virtuale, dove viene garantita<br />
permanenza oltre la morte agli scritti, orientamenti e insegnamenti dei leader <strong>del</strong><br />
terrorismo jiha<strong>di</strong>sta.<br />
208
Understan<strong>di</strong>ng Nuclear and Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Terrorism.<br />
Threat and Countermeasures<br />
Maurizio Martellini and Kathryn McLaughlin<br />
“…We looked forward to working together with other like-minded nations and the IAEA to<br />
expand and accelerate efforts that develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism<br />
on a determined and systematic basis…[in International Security of the Chair’s Summary,<br />
G8 Summit, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation – 17 July 2006]”<br />
209
Introduction 129<br />
Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to many world leaders the greatest threat to international peace and<br />
security this century is the confluence between terrorism and weapons of mass<br />
destruction – nuclear, chemical, biological and ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons.<br />
Those with<br />
access to the most up-to-date<br />
intelligence on international terrorist activities have<br />
reiterated<br />
the seriousness of this threat time and time again. They warn it is not a<br />
question<br />
of ‘if’ but only of ‘when’.<br />
Although<br />
the terrorist use of chemical or biological weapons is a truly horrifying<br />
possib<strong>il</strong>ity, it is considerably more <strong>di</strong>fficult than ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism<br />
and would<br />
likely cause less damage than nuclear terrorism. This paper, therefore, focuses on<br />
these two <strong>di</strong>stinct but clearly linked threats – the possible acquisition and use of<br />
nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons by non-state actors. In particular it examines<br />
technical aspects of nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism, its possible motivations, the<br />
capacity which have to be acquired to implement<br />
such attacks and the existing<br />
countermeasures.<br />
129 DISCLAIMER: All data for the paper has been extracted from recent open source research and reports, in<br />
particular, published documents and public websites. Therefore, the data is only as accurate as is reported in the<br />
public sphere. Any possible inaccuracies are the sole responsib<strong>il</strong>ity of the LNCV General Secretariat. It should be<br />
noted that issues relating to the security of high-activity ra<strong>di</strong>ological sources and deta<strong>il</strong>s of their malicious use are<br />
sensitive in nature. They can often be considered as sensitive to national security and as a result are classified. No<br />
such resources have been used in the development of this work and as a result there are areas within it which<br />
may appear sparse to those with the opportunity to have a thorough groun<strong>di</strong>ng in this information. The authors<br />
beg the indulgence of these in<strong>di</strong>viduals.<br />
210
Technical Aspects Nuclear terrorism can be broadly defined as an<br />
attack, outside of conventional m<strong>il</strong>itary operations,<br />
involving nuclear materials. Such an attack can be<br />
either <strong>di</strong>rect or oblique.<br />
A <strong>di</strong>rect attack would involve the detonation<br />
of a<br />
yield-producing nuclear explosive – either a nuclear warhead, or a crude or<br />
explosives (or an equivalent<br />
source of explosive power) upon a nuclear fac<strong>il</strong>ity or<br />
power plant.<br />
In order to achieve nuclear terrorism, the perpetrators must either steal or buy a<br />
nuclear weapon or its components, or alternatively, fabricate their own special<br />
nuclear material (SNM). In the in<strong>di</strong>rect scenario, a conventional attack may be made<br />
upon nuclear reactors or spent nuclear fuel (SNF).<br />
In nuclear weapons, it is the fission<br />
and fusion of certain ra<strong>di</strong>oactive<br />
materials that release energy<br />
causing explosion. Ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
weapons (RDDs) are simply<br />
conventional explosives used to<br />
scatter ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material.<br />
improvised device using nuclear materials, commonly referred to as an improvised<br />
nuclear device (IND). An IND could consist of <strong>di</strong>verted nuclear weapon components,<br />
a mo<strong>di</strong>fied nuclear weapon, or in<strong>di</strong>genous-designed device, and can be categorised<br />
into two types: implosion and gun assembled. 130<br />
The possib<strong>il</strong>ity of in<strong>di</strong>rect nuclear terrorism is envisaged as an attack upon nuclear<br />
materials themselves – such a scenario includes an attack with conventional<br />
The affect of the detonation of a nuclear weapon is well known. Images following the<br />
attacks on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1946 portray the sheer scale of damage and<br />
suffering that ensue. These images have been seared into the public consciousness.<br />
These attacks also demonstrated the twin nature of the use of a nuclear weapon –<br />
there is an imme<strong>di</strong>ate impact which occurs within minutes or seconds of a<br />
detonation and causes tremendous damage due to the shockwave, thermal ra<strong>di</strong>ation<br />
130 Terrorist CBRN: Materials and Effects<br />
(url: https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/terrorist_cbrn/terrorist_CBRN.htm) [last accessed 10/10/06]<br />
211
(heat) and ionising ra<strong>di</strong>ation; there is also a more <strong>del</strong>ayed effect which manifests<br />
from hours after the event and can persist for centuries afterwards which cause<br />
health<br />
and environmental damage due to ra<strong>di</strong>oactive fallout. The imme<strong>di</strong>ate effects<br />
are confined to the area surround the detonations wh<strong>il</strong>st<br />
then <strong>del</strong>ayed effect can<br />
manifest in more <strong>di</strong>verse geographical locations.<br />
Ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism, by contrast, refers to <strong>di</strong>spersal<br />
devices designed to use or<br />
<strong>di</strong>stribute ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material<br />
to cause a harmful<br />
someone. l weapon (popularly called a<br />
131 The main aim in using a ra<strong>di</strong>ologica<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material and explosive. A passive RDD<br />
is a system in which unshielded<br />
- often called a "<strong>di</strong>rty bomb" - is any system that uses the explosive force of<br />
detonation to <strong>di</strong>sperse ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material. An atmospheric RDD is any system in<br />
which ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material is converted into a form that is eas<strong>il</strong>y transported by air<br />
currents.<br />
Examples of accidental contamination with an<br />
industrial ra<strong>di</strong>ation sources exemplified the<br />
potential for a terrorist group to traumatise an<br />
unsuspecting population. A serious ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
effect upon something or<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological <strong>di</strong>spersal device or RDD) is therefore to ut<strong>il</strong>ise the ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material<br />
to contaminate areas and/or injure targets, as opposed to a nuclear weapon where<br />
the destructive explosive power is the aim and ra<strong>di</strong>ological contamination is merely<br />
a secondary effect. RDDs can be almost any size, defined only by the amount of<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material is <strong>di</strong>spersed or placed manually at the target. An explosive RDD<br />
Ra<strong>di</strong>ological devices require no<br />
deta<strong>il</strong>ed technical understan<strong>di</strong>ng<br />
beyond that required for the<br />
manipulation of the conventional<br />
explosives which would be used in<br />
the case of an RDD, or in basic<br />
aerial <strong>di</strong>spersal in the case of a<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ation emission device.<br />
131 Ra<strong>di</strong>oactivity is the property or con<strong>di</strong>tion of certain elements that results in the spontaneous transformation, or<br />
decay, of the nucleus of an unstable atom. As the unstable atom tries to change to a stable state, it releases energy<br />
in the form of ra<strong>di</strong>ation. This energy is release in one of three forms: alpha ra<strong>di</strong>ation, which is equivalent to a<br />
helium nucleus and can be stopped by a thick piece of paper; beta ra<strong>di</strong>ation, which is equivalent to an electron<br />
and w<strong>il</strong>l be stopped by human skin; and gamma ra<strong>di</strong>ation, which is an energy wave and capable of greater<br />
penetration than either of the other two forms. Substances that undergo this transformation process are called<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>oisotopes, or more commonly, ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials. Once the substances are processed into a usable form,<br />
such as pellets or powder, they are called ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources. Depen<strong>di</strong>ng upon the amount of energy release and<br />
the form it takes these ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources<br />
can be classified as low-activity, interme<strong>di</strong>ate-activity, or high-activity<br />
sources.<br />
212
accident occurred in Goiânia, Braz<strong>il</strong> in September 1987, when a high activity source,<br />
Caesium-137 132 , was inadvertently removed from a therapy unit and <strong>di</strong>smantled by<br />
scrap dealers. It was found that 249 people were contaminated. Of the 249<br />
contaminees, 21 presented acute ra<strong>di</strong>ation syndrome, ten of which were in a serious<br />
con<strong>di</strong>tion. Four of these <strong>di</strong>ed. It has been argued that overall, the accident affected all<br />
inhabitants of the city, either <strong>di</strong>rectly or in<strong>di</strong>rectly, and the Goiás State as a whole, in<br />
terms of social, emotional, economic, psychological, and health-related issues. Clean-<br />
up operations took over a month, which is the minimum time, and the waste<br />
removed from the contaminated sites was not <strong>di</strong>sposed of unt<strong>il</strong> 1991. 133 The Goiânia<br />
incident shows that a ra<strong>di</strong>ological event in an urban setting can have devastating<br />
consequences, and also that each incident w<strong>il</strong>l be unique to the setting within which<br />
it occurs.<br />
The effects of a ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapon are more <strong>di</strong>fficult to pre<strong>di</strong>ct than the effects of a<br />
nuclear explosion. Environmental con<strong>di</strong>tions, such as temperature, time of day,<br />
relative humi<strong>di</strong>ty and wind con<strong>di</strong>tions all affect the size of the affected area. The type<br />
of material and method of <strong>di</strong>spersion also affects the size of the contaminated area<br />
and the level of <strong>di</strong>spersed ra<strong>di</strong>oactivity. Even low levels of contamination could have<br />
a severe impact<br />
on an urban population.<br />
RDDs may be made with any ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material,<br />
although the level of effects<br />
depends upon the level of ra<strong>di</strong>oactivity of the material<br />
used. Suitable ra<strong>di</strong>oactive<br />
materials vary wi<strong>del</strong>y from relatively weak sources,<br />
such as Strontium 90, to high<br />
levels of ra<strong>di</strong>oactivity such as that possessed by the fissionable materials plutonium<br />
and uranium. An RDD is therefore a very flexible weapon. This type of weapon can<br />
have a wide range of effects from creating a panic situation based on fear of<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ation, a general denial of territory due to local contamination, the murder of a<br />
specific in<strong>di</strong>vidual(s), to creating a mass casualty event. 134<br />
132 50.9 TBq 137C<br />
133 For a more in-depth account of the accident, see: Vinhas, L.A., ‘Overview of the Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Accident in<br />
Goiânia’, Security of Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive Sources, Procee<strong>di</strong>ngs of an international conference, 10-13 March 2003 (IAEA), pp.347-<br />
355<br />
134 Nichelson, S.M. & Medlin, D.D., ‘Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Weapons of Terror’, Apr<strong>il</strong> 1999<br />
213
These key <strong>di</strong>fferences between nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons necessitate<br />
<strong>di</strong>fferent approaches to analysing the magnitude of the threat posed by each, and<br />
their control and counter-measures.<br />
Framing the <strong>di</strong>scussion: the faces of nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological (NR) terrorism<br />
Nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism is most often <strong>di</strong>scussed together but it must be<br />
stressed from the outset that there are fundamental and intrinsic <strong>di</strong>fferences between<br />
the two that<br />
affect how <strong>di</strong>scussions of terrorism using these weapons should be<br />
framed, and how countermeasures should be approached. Both types of terrorism,<br />
however, are usefully <strong>di</strong>scussed by assessing the threat in terms of specific likely<br />
scenarios on how a terrorism event may be perpetrated. By identifying these<br />
scenarios, further key <strong>di</strong>fferences between the two become apparent.<br />
Nuclear terrorism is most often examined by looking at four main scenarios –<br />
clear terrorism. 135 popularly known as the four faces of nu<br />
Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to Ferguson,<br />
Potter et al, these are:<br />
• The theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon<br />
• The theft or purchase of fiss<strong>il</strong>e material lea<strong>di</strong>ng to the fabrication and<br />
detonation of a crude nuclear weapon – an improvised nuclear device (IND)<br />
• Attacks against and sabotage of nuclear fac<strong>il</strong>ities, in particular nuclear power<br />
plants, causing the release of large amounts of ra<strong>di</strong>oactivity<br />
• The unauthorized acquisition of ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials<br />
contributing to the<br />
fabrication and detonation of a ra<strong>di</strong>ological <strong>di</strong>spersal device (RDD) – a<br />
“<strong>di</strong>rty<br />
bomb” – or ra<strong>di</strong>ation emission device.<br />
135 see Ferguson, Charles D., & Potter, W.C.,et al, Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey Institute of<br />
International Stu<strong>di</strong>es, Monterey: 2004)<br />
214
This work assesses the threat of nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism separately, and<br />
therefore <strong>di</strong>scusses the dangers associated with RDDs under the rubric of<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism, ad<strong>di</strong>ng a further scenario – that of ra<strong>di</strong>ological assassination.<br />
1. The Magnitude of the Threat<br />
The extent of the danger posed by each of these scenarios is best evaluated by<br />
assessing the various elements that must converge in order to produce favourable<br />
con<strong>di</strong>tions for an attack. Each in<strong>di</strong>vidual factor is a necessary pre-con<strong>di</strong>tion, but not<br />
sufficient in and of itself to lead to an NR terrorist event. These factors are:<br />
• The intention of a sub-national group to pursue, and ultimately use, a nuclear<br />
or ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapon;<br />
• The ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity of sufficient nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological sources;<br />
• The means to obtain the necessary technologies and materials;<br />
• The technical<br />
knowledge and expertise to use the materials and technologies<br />
to create a viable weapon<br />
The factors can be more simply described as the w<strong>il</strong>l and the way.<br />
215
1.1 The “W<strong>il</strong>l”<br />
The w<strong>il</strong>l denotes the desire, intent and w<strong>il</strong>lingness of a sub-state group to pursue,<br />
develop and deploy high impact weapons and devices.<br />
There<br />
are many variables which could affect a sub-state’s group choice as to whether<br />
to pursue the acquisition and use of NR weapons. Commonly cited influences<br />
include group motivations, target au<strong>di</strong>ence, structure and organisation, history and<br />
learning behaviour,<br />
the education level of members, the level of state support (or<br />
independent finances), intended targets and the ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity of material. 136<br />
Recent reviews have proposed the advent of “new terrorism”, which calls into<br />
question the classical notion that terrorists are more interested in gaining an au<strong>di</strong>ence<br />
than in k<strong>il</strong>ling their potential au<strong>di</strong>ence. Scholars and experts have suggested<br />
that this<br />
mo<strong>del</strong> may only be true for secularly motivated terrorist organisations. Proponents<br />
of the “new terrorism” identify a small number<br />
of sub-state actors with a malign<br />
intent which do not appear to fit comfortably into this characterisation,<br />
inclu<strong>di</strong>ng<br />
religious fundamentalists or extremist groups. It has been argued that three other<br />
factors coalesce in such groups to separate them from their more tra<strong>di</strong>tional<br />
equivalents: a <strong>del</strong>iberate quest to acquire or develop high impact weapons; a<br />
w<strong>il</strong>lingness to accept martyrdom;<br />
and, a perception that the only “au<strong>di</strong>ence” of<br />
worth is that of a deity.<br />
Current<br />
analytical literature tends to argue that, within islamist ra<strong>di</strong>cal groups, a<br />
new<br />
mass-casualty concept has developed. This has been tied to a belief that their<br />
cause is part of a higher plan, either as a battle between ‘good’ and ‘ev<strong>il</strong>’ or as a<br />
precursor to an apocalypse, which detaches them from moral “norms” or other social<br />
constraints.<br />
136 ‘Chemical, Biological, Ra<strong>di</strong>ological, and Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to the Current Unclassified<br />
Literature’, Report by Centre for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 31 May 2002, p2-3,<br />
[Online]<br />
http://www.ndu.edu/centercounter/CBRN_Annotated_Bib.pdf [Last Accessed 12/04/05]<br />
216
This axiom, however, has to be considered less than absolute. As the harsh<br />
condemnations issued by prominent clerics (but also from important islamist ra<strong>di</strong>cal<br />
leaders)<br />
against al-Qa’ida 9/11 attacks have shown, the islamist field is not<br />
monolithic and the risk of new deep fractures remains extremely high.<br />
Furthermore, islamist ra<strong>di</strong>cal organizations have always considered<br />
legitimacy as<br />
one of the main p<strong>il</strong>lars of their struggle and they have always avoided to violate<br />
universally recognized Islamic principles without a valid justification guaranteed by<br />
a recognized religious authority. This stance is due to the fact that, especially in the<br />
complex Islamic environment, legitimacy represents one of the key of the popular<br />
support which is fundamental to prolong the struggle these organization<br />
are<br />
fighting.<br />
In this regard, it is important to underline that, unt<strong>il</strong> 2003, no religious authority –<br />
except ayatollah Khomeini in the Shia world – has issued any pronouncement on the<br />
issue related to the un-Islamic character of WMDs. On May 2003 this s<strong>il</strong>ence was<br />
broken by Shayk Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd’s fatwa which legitimates the use of such<br />
weapons against enemies responsible for k<strong>il</strong>ling thousands of the faithful and against<br />
whom this kind of weapon represents the only possible means of achieving final<br />
victory, even this could k<strong>il</strong>ling innocent Muslims too 137 .<br />
This fatwa represents an important step towards the threat represented by the<br />
acquisition of WMD by islamist ra<strong>di</strong>cal organizations but it is also necessary to<br />
consider that, even if there<br />
hasn’t been any official confutation of al-Fahd’s thesis, the<br />
issue remains extremely controversial and clarified in a definitive way.<br />
An ad<strong>di</strong>tional motive for the use of high impact weapons has also been suggested -<br />
that of the ‘shock factor’. The threat of use of these weapons incites substantial<br />
psychological, political and economic damage to the affected State and its population<br />
(and possibly its neighbours). It has been noted:<br />
137 Sammy Salama – Ly<strong>di</strong>a Hansell, Does intent equal capab<strong>il</strong>ity? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction,<br />
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005, pp. 627-628<br />
217
…in the case of ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons, despite the fact that the number of casualties would<br />
likely be far lower than those of a successful biological or nuclear attack, the potential for<br />
widespread public fear of ra<strong>di</strong>ation would likely nevertheless inspire acute psychological<br />
damage far in excess of the physical damage resulting from the attack. 138<br />
Not all commentators agree that it is an issue of when, as opposed to if, sub-state<br />
actors obtain such capab<strong>il</strong>ities. Some analysts point to the scarcity of events involving<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological sources and interpret this rarity as a sign of a lack of interest. Figures<br />
developed by the Monterey Institute of International Stu<strong>di</strong>es suggest that between<br />
1975 and 2004 there were around fifty incidents involving ra<strong>di</strong>ological material in<br />
comparison to over three hundred chemical-based incidents and almost a hundred<br />
with biological.<br />
Furthermore, these commentators point out that of these few recorded incidents, the<br />
majority are not in<strong>di</strong>cative of a concerted effort on the behalf of sub-state groups to<br />
acquire weapons capab<strong>il</strong>ities, but can be better characterised as in<strong>di</strong>viduals<br />
committing opportunistic offences with no clear aim in mind.<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Biological Chemical Nuclear Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Combination<br />
FIGURE 1: Incident Involving Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Agents between 1975 and 2004<br />
Parallel to this debate over the intent of sub-state actors to acquire ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
weapons, a second debate is ongoing as to the likely<br />
damage from an attack using<br />
these weapons. The small data set relating to such incidents increases the <strong>di</strong>fficulty<br />
for assessing the risks.<br />
138 ‘Chemical, Biological, Ra<strong>di</strong>ological, and Nuclear Terrorism’ ,Ibid, p5<br />
218
Threats and attempts at nuclear terrorism allow for less debate over interpretation.<br />
Trial testimony has revealed that al-Qa’ida training camps offered instruction in<br />
urban warfare against Western installations inclu<strong>di</strong>ng nuclear power plants. In<br />
November 2001, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) was<br />
requested to translate and analyse documents recovered in the aftermath of the<br />
Taliban’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. It was subsequently <strong>di</strong>scovered that these<br />
documents included:<br />
“…instructor guides on making conventional explosives; e<strong>di</strong>ted, mass-produced<br />
instructional materials; nuclear weapon documents; student notebooks; and<br />
information about the activities and plans of Pakistani nuclear scientists in<br />
Afghanistan.” 139<br />
However, a subsequent report by the ISIS expressed doubt that al-Qa’ida, under<br />
leadership of Osama bin Laden, possessed nuclear weapons or capab<strong>il</strong>ities, stating<br />
the ISIS:<br />
“…found no cre<strong>di</strong>ble evidence that either bin Laden or al-Qa’ida<br />
possesses nuclear<br />
weapons<br />
or sufficient fiss<strong>il</strong>e material to make them. However, if al-Qa’ida obtained<br />
enough plutonium or highly enriched uranium, we believe it is capable of bu<strong>il</strong><strong>di</strong>ng a<br />
crude nuclear explosive, despite several <strong>di</strong>fficult steps. We cannot say absolutely<br />
whether al-Qa’ida possesses fiss<strong>il</strong>e material, but to our knowledge no evidence of<br />
possession has surfaced.” 140<br />
What is known, however, is that al-Qa’ida has previously, unsuccessfully, attempted<br />
to procure highly enriched uranium in the mid-1990s in Africa, Europe, and Russia.<br />
Bin<br />
Laden has loudly proclaimed his desire for nuclear capab<strong>il</strong>ity, and on 9<br />
November 2001, he told a Pakistani journalist that he already has nuclear weapons.<br />
139 Al Qaeda Nuclear and Conventional<br />
Explosive Documents: CNN - ISIS Collaboration (http://www.isis-<br />
online.org/publications/terrorism/intro.html)<br />
[last accessed 12.10.06]<br />
140 Albright, D., Beulhler, K., and Higgins, H., “Bin Laden and the Bomb”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,<br />
January/February 2002 (vol. 58, no. 01), pp. 23<br />
(http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=jf02albright_027) [last<br />
accessed: 17.10.06]<br />
219
In 1986, the Nuclear Control Institute, in cooperation with the Institute for Stu<strong>di</strong>es in<br />
International Terrorism of the State University of New York, convened the<br />
International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, comprised of 26<br />
nuclear scientists and industrialists, current and former government officials, and<br />
experts on terrorism from nine countries. The report issued by the Task Force, along<br />
with more than 20 commissioned stu<strong>di</strong>es, remains the most definitive examination of<br />
nuclear terrorism in the unclassified literature.<br />
The Task Force warned that the "probab<strong>il</strong>ity of nuclear terrorism is increasing"<br />
because of a number of factors inclu<strong>di</strong>ng "the growing incidence, sophistication and<br />
lethality of conventional forms of terrorism," as well as the vulnerab<strong>il</strong>ity of nuclear<br />
power and research<br />
reactors to sabotage and of weapons-usable nuclear materials to<br />
theft. The Task Force's warnings and its recommendations for reducing<br />
vulnerab<strong>il</strong>ities, many of which went unheeded, are all the more relevant in today's<br />
threat environment<br />
of sophisticated and suicidal terrorists de<strong>di</strong>cated to mass k<strong>il</strong>ling<br />
and destruction.<br />
A definitive conclusion to this debate surroun<strong>di</strong>ng terrorist interest in, and<br />
w<strong>il</strong>lingness to use, nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons is only possible in one way: an<br />
attempt, or successful attack, by a terrorist organisation using a nuclear or<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapon. Unt<strong>il</strong> then it can be persuasively argued that the threat of an<br />
NR event remains real. It is<br />
the belief of the author that this danger w<strong>il</strong>l be ever-<br />
present in potentia: with the advent of the nuclear age, the genie is well and truly out<br />
of the bottle. As long as NR technology and weapons exist, so too w<strong>il</strong>l the risk of<br />
terrorist acquisition and ultimate use.<br />
With the rise of the so-called “New Terrorism” where terrorist groups strive to<br />
execute increasingly destructive attacks upon their targets, it is no simple matter to<br />
era<strong>di</strong>cate the “w<strong>il</strong>l” to use more powerful and high impact weapons, especially in<br />
cases where the group believes their cause to be one of a higher purpose, either as<br />
part of a religious war, or as a precursor to an apocalypse. It is, therefore, primar<strong>il</strong>y<br />
220
in the “means” that international, regional and domestic initiatives can act effectively<br />
to deny terrorists the ab<strong>il</strong>ity to perpetrate their attacks.<br />
Assassination – the surreptitious administration of ionising ra<strong>di</strong>ation to an<br />
in<strong>di</strong>vidual<br />
The possib<strong>il</strong>ity of using ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials as a tool for assassination has largely<br />
been ignored in these times, where the focus of the associated dangers of NR<br />
terrorism is tra<strong>di</strong>tionally on mass casualty events. However, given the relative ease of<br />
access to ra<strong>di</strong>ological materials (as <strong>di</strong>scussed in the following section) and its<br />
flexib<strong>il</strong>ity to be used as equally for poisoning in<strong>di</strong>viduals and for contaminating<br />
large areas, this possib<strong>il</strong>ity<br />
must not be ignored.<br />
There are a number of advantages attractive to a non-state actor in using ra<strong>di</strong>ation to<br />
murder another. Firstly, there is no known cure to acute ra<strong>di</strong>ation poisoning;<br />
secondly, the public response to such an act would be of the greatest magnitude in<br />
these times of heightened sensitivity to use of unconventional weapons; and, thirdly,<br />
as with biological and many chemical agents, in<strong>di</strong>viduals cannot normally detect<br />
ionising ra<strong>di</strong>ation by hearing, sight, odour, touch, or other normal sense without<br />
specialised equipment. It is <strong>di</strong>fficult to detect ra<strong>di</strong>ation prior to becoming poisoning<br />
and the likelihood therefore of contracting<br />
the <strong>il</strong>lness is higher.<br />
There have been very few cases of proven or suspected <strong>del</strong>iberate ra<strong>di</strong>ation<br />
poisoning, among these there is the case of a Soviet Secret Agent, Nikolai Khokhlov,<br />
who, in 1954, gave himself up to U.S. authorities rather than carry out an<br />
assassination in West Germany. He subsequently joined the emigrant Russian<br />
revolutionary movement centred in West Germany. In 1957, wh<strong>il</strong>e atten<strong>di</strong>ng a<br />
Frankfurt conference, he became sick with nausea, vomiting and fainting. Having<br />
221
een hospitalised for acute gastritis, on the sixth day he developed widespread<br />
ecchymoses. At the same time, it was <strong>di</strong>scovered that his hair was falling out and<br />
thallium<br />
poisoning was suspected. Upon review of his activities on the day he<br />
became sick, he recalled a bad-tasting cup of coffee after his speech; he thought this<br />
coffee may have been poisoned. His con<strong>di</strong>tion worsened with the development of<br />
marrow fa<strong>il</strong>ure lea<strong>di</strong>ng to anaemia and leucopoenia on the seventh day of<br />
hospitalisation.<br />
He was transferred to the U.S. m<strong>il</strong>itary hospital in Frankfurt for<br />
treatment. It was a month after onset before he was released. No definitive toxicology<br />
is known to have been done; the thallium <strong>di</strong>agnosis was made on clinical grounds.<br />
Some time later, American consultants reviewing the case suggested that ra<strong>di</strong>oactive<br />
thallium ingested in food could most eas<strong>il</strong>y explain the syndrome. 141<br />
The <strong>del</strong>eterious effects of ra<strong>di</strong>ation poisoning are well documented and are amply<br />
demonstrated by the case of a 19 year old research worker in a ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
laboratory in Moscow who decided to commit suicide because of unfavourable<br />
relationships with his fam<strong>il</strong>y. He took a hermetically<br />
sealed aluminium capsule f<strong>il</strong>led<br />
with ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material. The mean doses of ra<strong>di</strong>ation he ultimately received were<br />
extremely large, lea<strong>di</strong>ng rapidly to nausea and weakness, followed by acute<br />
abdominal pain and <strong>di</strong>arrhoea. He also developed necrotic burns developed around<br />
the trunk of his body and death occurred after fifteen days.<br />
The most recent and controversial case is the death of Mr. Alexander Litvienko, a<br />
former Soviet spy who <strong>di</strong>ed on November 23 2006 after having been in contact with<br />
Polonium 210 more than three weeks before.<br />
These examples show that wh<strong>il</strong>e a political assassination with ra<strong>di</strong>ation could be<br />
committed, it also could be detected at a later time. Of course, at that later time it<br />
might be <strong>di</strong>fficult or impossible to demonstrate who administered the dose, or<br />
indeed, the perpetrators may wish to claim responsib<strong>il</strong>ity.<br />
141 Khokhlov, N.: In the Name of Conscience. Fredrick Muller, London, 1959 (in Postscript - - "the Poison Rays")<br />
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1.2 The “Way”<br />
Terrorist desire to obtain NR weaponry, technology and materials, and their<br />
w<strong>il</strong>lingness to use them becomes a greater concern when there exists the means by<br />
which to acquire them. Insufficient safeguards, security and controls, the existence of<br />
nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological smuggling, <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking and organised crime networks,<br />
and the wide ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity of ra<strong>di</strong>ological sources and materials all contribute to this<br />
significant danger.<br />
1.2.1 Nuclear weapons and materials surety<br />
Nuclear weapons surety is “the materiel, personnel, and procedures that contribute to the<br />
safety, security, reliab<strong>il</strong>ity and control of nuclear weapons, thus assuring no nuclear<br />
accidents, incidents, unauthorized use, or degradation in performance.” 142 It should be<br />
clarified that the terms “incidents” and “unauthorized use” in<br />
essence refer to<br />
nuclear weapons sabotage, theft, <strong>di</strong>version and loss. Although intact nuclear<br />
weapons are most often well-secured and protected by stringent security and<br />
accounting procedures and mechanisms, the significant threats of nuclear theft and<br />
<strong>di</strong>version remain, particularly in countries such<br />
as the Russian Federation and in the<br />
NIS. Wh<strong>il</strong>st nuclear security has vastly improved across the globe, largely due to<br />
focussed initiatives such as the <strong>Global</strong> Threat Reduction Initiative and the<br />
Cooperative Threat Reduction programmes of the US and EU, security upgrades are<br />
urity are daunting. 143<br />
incomplete at many sites, and the challenges to effective sec<br />
142 http://www.acq.osd.m<strong>il</strong>/ncbdp/nm/nuclearweaponssurety.html [last accessed 02.10.06]<br />
143 Bunn, W., and Weir, A., Securing the Bomb 2006, Nuclear Threat Initiative: July 2006, Executive Summary<br />
223
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the uncertain status of nuclear<br />
weapons, fiss<strong>il</strong>e materials and nuclear scientists in Russia and other former Soviet<br />
republics<br />
are wi<strong>del</strong>y regarded as posing perhaps the most imme<strong>di</strong>ate threat of<br />
nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Despite significant assistance from the<br />
United States over the last ten years, many of Russia’s nuclear fac<strong>il</strong>ities seem poorly<br />
secured, and there is st<strong>il</strong>l no comprehensive, verifiable system of nuclear materials<br />
accountancy.<br />
Connected to the risk from inadequately secured nuclear and fiss<strong>il</strong>e materials and<br />
weaponry is the sheer number of such stocks<br />
worldwide. It is a long and arduous<br />
task<br />
to install adequate protection and security levels at all the sites and in the<br />
meantime,<br />
accor<strong>di</strong>ng to one report, civ<strong>il</strong> stocks alone of plutonium and highly<br />
enriched uranium (HEU) total 1850 tonnes as of the end of 2003. M<strong>il</strong>itary stocks total<br />
a further 1880 tonnes, meaning that 3730 tonnes<br />
of these materials are theoretically<br />
ulnerable to theft and sabotage. 144<br />
v<br />
1.2.2 Attacks against and sabotage of nuclear power plants<br />
Nuclear power plants (NPP) are <strong>di</strong>sseminated all over the world. Unlike with the<br />
commercial and orphaned sources <strong>di</strong>scussed later, the threats posed to NPPs are<br />
those of sabotage or a conventional attack to release their high-activity ra<strong>di</strong>oactive<br />
sources. Furthermore, sabotaging or attacking an NPP could cause economic and<br />
socio-political damage, or provide access to ra<strong>di</strong>oactive or fiss<strong>il</strong>e materials to be used<br />
in the construction of an RDD.<br />
A report made by the UK Department of the Environment, Transport and the<br />
Regions (DETR) - now the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs<br />
144 see Table 1 <strong>Global</strong> Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), Assigned to Civ<strong>il</strong> or M<strong>il</strong>itary Stocks, end<br />
2003, in tonnes; in <strong>Global</strong> Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials: Summary Tables and Charts,<br />
July 12, 2005<br />
(http://www.isis-online.org/global-stocks/end2003/tableofcontents.html) [last accessed 01.11.06]<br />
224
(DEFRA) - was undertaken “to assist in the definition of potential threats from<br />
overseas nuclear reactor accidents”. 145 The study examined a large number of<br />
reactors and data for NPPs in Western Europe, Russia, the seven Central and Eastern<br />
European Countries (CEECs) seeking membership of the European Union, and the<br />
Newly Independent States (NIS) with operable NPPs. 146 It demonstrates that<br />
incidents in one country can affect its neighbours and, indeed, perhaps a whole<br />
region, depen<strong>di</strong>ng upon environmental con<strong>di</strong>tions.<br />
In ad<strong>di</strong>tion to nuclear power plants of the type <strong>di</strong>scussed above, a further two related<br />
plant types warrant mention: commercial research reactors and nuclear fuel<br />
reprocessing plants (which produces and stores nuclear spent fuel), in ad<strong>di</strong>tion to the<br />
threat of attacks on ra<strong>di</strong>oactive waste products.<br />
Research reactors<br />
The IAEA maintains a list of past, present and future research<br />
reactors, which it<br />
makes ava<strong>il</strong>able on its website. 147 When queried as to those fac<strong>il</strong>ities in or around the<br />
European<br />
Union, the IAEA database identified 183 operational research reactors, 189<br />
shut down reactors, 154 decommissioned reactors, as well as two ad<strong>di</strong>tional fac<strong>il</strong>ities<br />
under construction with an ad<strong>di</strong>tional two planned. Commercial research reactors<br />
are neither as well guarded and secured, nor as structurally able to withstand a<br />
powerful attack. With the large number of targets ava<strong>il</strong>able worldwide, this is a<br />
significant cause for concern.<br />
145 Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, ‘Estimates of Probab<strong>il</strong>ity of Severe Accidents at<br />
European Reactors Potentially Lea<strong>di</strong>ng to Fallout in the UK’, DEFRA Report No: DEFRA/RAS/01.001, August 2001<br />
146 The countries assessed were Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,<br />
Russia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and<br />
Armenia.<br />
147 see the IAEA website for these deta<strong>il</strong>s worldwide: http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb/<br />
225
Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants<br />
Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants are another type of nuclear power plant dealing<br />
with the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.<br />
They often generate the greatest concerns in connection with civ<strong>il</strong> nuclear plant<br />
safety because:<br />
i. Reprocessing is the only way to produce plutonium;<br />
ii. Reprocessing creates vast quantities of ra<strong>di</strong>oactive waste.<br />
The vulnerab<strong>il</strong>ity of spent nuclear fuel poses another significant danger from<br />
terrorist attack. Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to a former Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Energy<br />
Secretary:<br />
Although much of<br />
this ra<strong>di</strong>oactive waste is low-level, some waste is contaminated<br />
with plutonium and so is classified at the interme<strong>di</strong>ate-level and a small quantity of<br />
high-level (activity) waste is also created.<br />
Wh<strong>il</strong>st a small minority of nuclear power stations in the US store their spent fuel in<br />
dry-casks, the vast majority of commercial spent fuel is stored in water, or “pools”.<br />
These pools can contain over 40000 tonnes of highly ra<strong>di</strong>oactive spent fuel in<br />
approximately 137000 spent fuel rods.<br />
It has been noted that these fac<strong>il</strong>ities may be vulnerable to attack. In one scenario<br />
developed by Mycle Schneider, it is envisaged that a suicide attack using a<br />
commercial aeroplane on spent<br />
fuel pools, or a miss<strong>il</strong>e attack, might create<br />
tremendous ra<strong>di</strong>oactive fall-out which could affect not only the target country, but<br />
also its neighbours. 148 Schneider argues that many bu<strong>il</strong><strong>di</strong>ngs at nuclear plants and<br />
fac<strong>il</strong>ities are over fifty years old and that many of the older bu<strong>il</strong><strong>di</strong>ngs could not<br />
withstand an aircraft crash and subsequent aviation fuel fire. Furthermore,<br />
148 Large, J., Schneider, M., International Terrorism - The Vulnerab<strong>il</strong>ities and Protection of Nuclear Fac<strong>il</strong>ities, World<br />
Information Service on Energy, WISE, Paris, France, [Online] http://www.wiseparis.org/english/reports/conferences/030102NukeTerrorORGFinalJL.pdf<br />
[Last Accessed 5/06/05]<br />
226
edundant bu<strong>il</strong><strong>di</strong>ngs on-site have been “cru<strong>del</strong>y adapted” to store large quantities of<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials for which they are clearly unsuited. He also asserts that “the<br />
design<br />
of the most modern plants does not seem to provide that much defence (in<br />
terms of containment surety and segregation of hazardous materials) against an<br />
aerial attack.” b<strong>il</strong>ity of nuclear fac<strong>il</strong>ities could allow for<br />
149 These defects in the defensi<br />
serious consequences if an attack was mounted.<br />
This scenario has<br />
been described as being comparable to the Chernobyl nuclear<br />
power plant accident of 26 Apr<strong>il</strong> 1986. By March 1999, The Union<br />
of Concerned<br />
Scie ntists had already documented over 120 acts of sabotage at US nuclear plants<br />
alone. 150<br />
Professor Paul Rogers, a renowned nuclear terrorism expert, recently also<br />
highlighted the threat<br />
posed by param<strong>il</strong>itary attacks on nuclear plants as a form of<br />
“economic targeting” – the sister strand to mass casualty attacks. Rogers outlined the<br />
ad<strong>di</strong>tional danger whereby terrorists, or param<strong>il</strong>itary groups, could foreseeably<br />
target nuclear power plants for the primary purpose of waging economic warfare,<br />
with the secondary effect of causing widespread destruction, death and<br />
contamination. 151<br />
Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive waste products<br />
The sheer number of ra<strong>di</strong>oactive waste shipments across the European continent is<br />
the highest in the world, and concerns remain regar<strong>di</strong>ng the vulnerab<strong>il</strong>ity of such<br />
shipments to attack, with resulting ra<strong>di</strong>oactive fallout. Wh<strong>il</strong>e there are regulations<br />
pertaining to the security and safety arrangements of such shipments, vulnerab<strong>il</strong>ities<br />
st<strong>il</strong>l exist and are magnified when faced with a particularly determined attacker or<br />
149 Ibid<br />
150 Lochbaum, D., Three M<strong>il</strong>e Island’s Puzzling Legacy<br />
151 Rogers, P., “The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism in the UK”, Secure Energy: options for a Safer World, Factsheet 3<br />
(Oxford Research Group: 2006)<br />
227
saboteur. Attacks on ra<strong>di</strong>oactive waste in storage are also a valid concern. Most often<br />
there are too few waste <strong>di</strong>sposal sites to deal with the various types of ra<strong>di</strong>oactive<br />
waste (low, me<strong>di</strong>um and high-activity) and often the ra<strong>di</strong>oactive waste <strong>di</strong>sposal is<br />
carried out by the producers. This in itself presents concerns over the safety and<br />
security of storage of the waste, as there is far more waste than can be <strong>di</strong>sposed of<br />
quickly and fully which means that ra<strong>di</strong>oactive waste products must be stored at the<br />
fac<strong>il</strong>ity. 152 One solution to this is the development and maintenance of centralised<br />
storage fac<strong>il</strong>ities under <strong>di</strong>rect control of the government which would improve<br />
security by having all the waste in only a few places and under constant vig<strong>il</strong>ance.<br />
1.2.3 Nuclear smuggling<br />
In relation to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors, the issue is<br />
more complicated than simply examining the smuggling nuclear material, although<br />
this<br />
remains a problem. As already noted, perhaps the most efficient method for a<br />
non-state actor to acquire a nuclear weapon would be to <strong>di</strong>vert one from existing<br />
stockp<strong>il</strong>es. Such an act would<br />
then necessitate the weapon to be smuggled to its<br />
intended<br />
detonation point. Fortunately, there are few in<strong>di</strong>cations that the smuggling<br />
of complete nuclear weapon systems is currently a problem. The same cannot be said<br />
the <strong>il</strong>licit transfer of special nuclear material –a key element in any attempt to<br />
produce an IND. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported at<br />
least 18 confirmed seizures of stolen plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU)<br />
over the past decade. 153<br />
152 See: www.ananuclear.org/CARTYfactsheet.html<br />
153 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), "Facts & Figures: The IAEA's Database on Illicit Trafficking of<br />
Nuclear and Other Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive Materials" (press release, Vienna, Austria, October 8, 2002).<br />
228
Nuclear smuggling also incorporates the <strong>il</strong>licit transfer of the resources required to<br />
establish an independent production programme; intangible resources, such as<br />
knowledge, training or contacts; as well assorted other key technologies. The story of<br />
the Pakistani nuclear weapons programmes <strong>il</strong>lustrates many of the contemporary<br />
concerns over nuclear smuggling.<br />
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was headed for about 25 years by Dr A.Q.<br />
Khan. Dr Khan trained originally as a metallurgist. He worked in the Physics<br />
Dynamic Research Laboratory (FDO) in Amsterdam, from May 1972 to December<br />
1975. FDO was a subcontractor to a Dutch-German and British consortium<br />
(URENCO)<br />
specializing in the manufacture of nuclear equipment. It was during his<br />
time in Almelo (Netherlands), the consortium ‘s primary enrichment fac<strong>il</strong>ity, that Dr<br />
Khan<br />
is believed to have been requested by the Prime Minister of Pakistan to lead<br />
their national uranium enrichment programme. By 1976, Dr Khan returned to<br />
Pakistan, taking with him two blueprints for uranium centrifuges. Descriptions of<br />
Pakistan’s<br />
efforts to produce fiss<strong>il</strong>e material in<strong>di</strong>cate that they suffered from a lack of<br />
necessary resources. Dr Khan reportedly began to acquire the necessary materials<br />
and components <strong>il</strong>licitly through contacts obtained wh<strong>il</strong>st working for URENCO. As<br />
an example, two Dutch firms were reputedly involved in the export in 1976 of 6,200<br />
unfinished rotor tubes to Pakistan. Although initially working under the remit of the<br />
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Dr Khan was soon to be placed in sole<br />
charge of the uranium enrichment project and founded the Engineering Research<br />
Laboratories (ERL) on 31 July 1976. He reported <strong>di</strong>rectly to the Prime Minister’s<br />
office. Within five years the ERL (by then renamed the A.Q.Khan Research<br />
Laboratories (KRL)) had developed an in<strong>di</strong>genous capacity for the enrichment of<br />
uranium. It was the source material for the nuclear weapon detonation in May 1998.<br />
It is clear that, despite<br />
having developed an in<strong>di</strong>genous programme for the<br />
enrichment of uranium, a considerable number of ad<strong>di</strong>tional resources would be<br />
required on the road to acquiring a nuclear weapon. In hindsight it is also apparent<br />
that once more Pakistan lacked the national<br />
capacity domestically. Ad<strong>di</strong>tional covert<br />
229
acquisition and transfer operations must have been carried out. Intelligence records<br />
in<strong>di</strong>cate that suspicions of such activities developed in a number of western states<br />
during the 1990s. By the end of the century, a more complete picture had emerged.<br />
These proliferation activities appeared not to be isolated events. There were<br />
in<strong>di</strong>cations of the existence of an international proliferation network involving Dr<br />
Khan. For example, the Joint Intelligence Committee in the UK was reporting that<br />
they had information linking Dr Khan attempts to acquire uranium enrichment<br />
technology by one middle eastern country (believed to be Libya). Within a year, Dr<br />
Khan had been removed as <strong>di</strong>rector of the KRL but retained as a special advisor to<br />
the government. He has been shielded ever since from <strong>di</strong>rect investigation by other<br />
states or the international community.<br />
Efforts to establish just what proliferation activities Dr Khan had or may continue to<br />
be involved in, however, managed to progress despite the lack of access to the man<br />
himself. Statements from US officials in<strong>di</strong>cate that they possess intelligence linking<br />
Dr Khan to the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. Dr Khan, it was later<br />
proven, helped to provide North Korea with centrifuge designs, complete centrifuges<br />
and lists of components for centrifuge production. 154<br />
Ad<strong>di</strong>tionally, in October 2003 links to Dr Khan emerged through the international<br />
inspections of the Iranian nuclear programme. In early March 2005, Pakistan<br />
acknowledged A. Q. Khan had provided centrifuges to Iran. 155<br />
Equally, a shipment of centrifuge parts destined for Libya, inter<strong>di</strong>cted in October<br />
2003, were also linked to Dr Khan. Surve<strong>il</strong>lance by the UK’s Joint Intelligence<br />
Committee revealed Dr Khan had expanded his activities to mass-produce the<br />
components for centrifuge cascades and had established his own production<br />
fac<strong>il</strong>ities, in Malaysia. Libya was also reportedly provided by the Dr Khan with<br />
154 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/khan-dprk.htm [last accessed 24.10.06]<br />
155 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/khan-iran.htm [last accessed 24.10.06]<br />
230
information on how and where to acquire ad<strong>di</strong>tional components for their<br />
enrichment program. 156<br />
These events were partly responsible for the IAEA contacting the government of<br />
Pakistan over possible proliferation concerns in November 2003. The national<br />
investigation which followed in<strong>di</strong>cated that Dr Khan and another senior figure in<br />
Pakistan’s nuclear programme, Mohammed Farooq, had both participated in a black<br />
market in nuclear resources. Some activities appear to have been particularly overt.<br />
A sales brochure from KRL included components critical for making centrifuges and<br />
which had been developed for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. President<br />
Musharraf denied any government involvement but acknowledged that some<br />
scientists may have acted for their own personal gain. In a later television interview,<br />
Dr Khan confirmed he had acted without authorisation and provided North Korea,<br />
Iran and Libya with nuclear technology. He in<strong>di</strong>cated that the network involved was<br />
truly global and stretched from Germany to Dubai and from China to South Asia. 157<br />
1.2.4 Organised Crime Networks<br />
Although terrorism and organised crime have<br />
tra<strong>di</strong>tionally been considered as <strong>di</strong>stinctly <strong>di</strong>fferent<br />
threats to international peace and security, there is a<br />
growing body of evidence to suggest that their<br />
interests, modes of action and even motivations<br />
might actually overlap.<br />
Organised crime networks already<br />
possess many of the resources<br />
sought by nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
terrorists, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng: mechanism<br />
for <strong>il</strong>licit transport; circumventing<br />
control regimes and access to<br />
prohibited goods.<br />
A prime example of such a confluence is evident in the activities of Dr Khan and the<br />
smuggling of nuclear materials as <strong>di</strong>scussed above. The information ava<strong>il</strong>able on this<br />
156 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/khan-libya.htm [last accessed 24.10.06]<br />
157 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm [last accessed 24.10.06]<br />
231
proliferation network in<strong>di</strong>cates that it might have been motivated by greed – the<br />
tra<strong>di</strong>tional motivation of organised crime (as opposed to the political motivations of<br />
terrorism). Furthermore, Dr Khan used false papers, front companies and transport<br />
arrangements put in place not by terrorists but by criminal contacts. One of Dr<br />
Khan's confederates was a Dubai-based Sri Lankan businessman, Buhary Ayed Abu<br />
Tahir. It was he that arranged for a Malaysian company to manufacture nuclear<br />
components for shipment to Libya and for Libyan technicians to be trained in the use<br />
of machines that were part of the nuclear program. Abu Tahir has also been<br />
implicated in the transfer of centrifuge units from Pakistan to Iran.<br />
It is becoming clear that both terrorists and organised crime possess resources which<br />
might be of interest to one and other. Terrorist groups realise that their activities are<br />
likely to be costly and commonly have access to financial resources large enough to<br />
interest organised crime, driven by greed. Terrorists can also be well versed in the<br />
use of a variety of <strong>di</strong>fferent weapons, counter-intelligence training, and other sk<strong>il</strong>ls.<br />
This<br />
knowledge might be equally applicable for criminal purposes. On the other<br />
hand, organised crime can often access both resources (such as weapons) and<br />
logistical mechanisms (such as smuggling routes) which could fac<strong>il</strong>itate terrorist<br />
activities. The practical alignment<br />
of the interests of both terrorists and organised<br />
crime might best be exemplified by the international trade in narcotics – an industry<br />
which<br />
involves both terrorist organizations and organised crime.<br />
This growing relationship between terrorism and<br />
ad<strong>di</strong>tional avenues to address nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
terrorism. It reinforces the<br />
necessity of ensuring counter-terrorism activities are conducted<br />
within the remit of<br />
the rule of law. It also justifies recent efforts to enhance<br />
efforts to combat corruption<br />
and the financing of terrorism. It also necessitates strengthening<br />
law enforcement.<br />
International cooperation<br />
organised crime opens up<br />
on extra<strong>di</strong>tion laws could also be strengthened to ensure<br />
those perpetrating criminal acts cannot eas<strong>il</strong>y elude arrest and prosecution. Most<br />
importantly, all these activities need to be carried out throughout the world – having<br />
effective measures in a limited number of countries would undermine the<br />
232
effectiveness of these efforts. As long as there are safe havens for the conduct of<br />
organised crime, terrorists w<strong>il</strong>l have easy access to many of their required resources.<br />
1.2.5 Ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity of ra<strong>di</strong>ological sources<br />
There are seven main sources of ra<strong>di</strong>ological materials:<br />
(i) Nuclear weapons;<br />
(ii) Commercial sources;<br />
(iii) Orphan sources;<br />
(iv) Nuclear power reactors;<br />
(v) Research reactors;<br />
(vi) Nuclear fuel processing plants; and<br />
(vii) Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive waste products.<br />
Despite the <strong>di</strong>fferences between these types of sources, there are two principles<br />
which appear universal: firstly, that small and insignificant (from their potential to be<br />
used in a malign manner) sources greatly out-number larger and more hazardous<br />
sources; and secondly, that fiss<strong>il</strong>e material (either in the form of nuclear weapons or<br />
nuclear power related materials) are under tighter controls at a much smaller<br />
number of sites than ra<strong>di</strong>ological sources. 158 The ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity of nuclear weapons and<br />
materials, the vulnerab<strong>il</strong>ity and widespread numbers of nuclear power plants,<br />
research reactors, nuclear fuel processing plants and ra<strong>di</strong>oactive waste products have<br />
158 Mullen, E., Van Tuyle, G., & York, R.L., “Potential Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Dispersal Device (RDD) Threats and Associated<br />
Technology”, ANS Winter Meeting, Washington D.C., November 18-20, 2002 [online]<br />
http://eed.llnl.gov/ans/2002/mullen/mullen_ans_2002.pdf [last accessed 07.04.05]<br />
233
een <strong>di</strong>scussed above. It therefore remains to address commercial ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources<br />
and so-called “orphan sources”. 159<br />
Commercial and industrial sources<br />
Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive<br />
sources have numerous commercial<br />
applications, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng in me<strong>di</strong>cal devices,<br />
healthcare products, pharmaceuticals, industry,<br />
geological activities, food preservation, cosmetics,<br />
emergency lighting and signage.<br />
As a result these<br />
Large numbers of sources are<br />
already<br />
in use for commercial and<br />
industrial<br />
applications –<br />
monitoring and verifying they are<br />
not <strong>di</strong>verted for malign purposes<br />
is a significant challenge which<br />
st<strong>il</strong>l requires<br />
further work.<br />
sources have been <strong>di</strong>sseminated<br />
around the globe with large numbers in use at this<br />
time and even more having been<br />
<strong>di</strong>scarded. The proliferation risk posed by<br />
commercial sources is dependent upon their size and ra<strong>di</strong>oactivity. Commercial<br />
sources can be characterised as either weak or strong. Weak sources (producing up to<br />
10 s ranging from smoke detectors to<br />
9 Bq) have been used in commonplace item<br />
me<strong>di</strong>cal <strong>di</strong>agnostic equipment. In<strong>di</strong>vidually<br />
these sources pose a minimal<br />
proliferation risk. High concentrations of weak sources could, however, pose a threat<br />
if <strong>di</strong>verted for malign use. Strong sources, tra<strong>di</strong>tionally used in me<strong>di</strong>cal therapies,<br />
although fewer in number pose a greater proliferation concern. There are over 10,000<br />
me<strong>di</strong>cal ra<strong>di</strong>otherapy units in current usage.<br />
Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources are also wi<strong>del</strong>y used for ra<strong>di</strong>ography of metallic parts, gauges<br />
and irra<strong>di</strong>ation of products in numerous industrial settings. Tens of thousands<br />
industrial ra<strong>di</strong>ography sources are used annually, the majority of which contain<br />
lethal quantities of iri<strong>di</strong>um-192, cobalt-60, selenium-75 or ytterbium-169.<br />
159 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (USA) definition of ‘orphan’ sources, see<br />
www.nrc.gov/materials/miau/miau-reg-initiatives/orphan.html<br />
234
Orphaned ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources<br />
Far too many commercial or industrial sources are<br />
improperly <strong>di</strong>sposed of when they reach<br />
the end of<br />
the ut<strong>il</strong>ity – they are abandoned. 160 Other ‘orphan’<br />
sources<br />
may never have been subject to regulatory<br />
Orphaned sources pose one of the<br />
greatest proliferation risks – far too<br />
many strongly ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources<br />
are <strong>di</strong>sposed of improperly, lost or<br />
stolen on an annual basis.<br />
control. A number are also lost, abandoned, misplaced,<br />
<strong>di</strong>verted, or removed without<br />
authorisation. The exact scale of this problem remains unknown. Large numbers of<br />
sources are st<strong>il</strong>l believed to be orphaned every year<br />
preventing a spectrum of proliferation concern (ranging<br />
from minimal security<br />
concern to significant proliferation risk) – but all represent a safety and<br />
environmental problem.<br />
despite efforts to strengthen<br />
regulatory controls. Orphaned sources can also vary<br />
in size and ra<strong>di</strong>oactivity –<br />
Orphaned sources are also a truly global problem. In the USA, about 375 sources are<br />
reported lost or stolen each year. Around 70 sources are orphaned annually within<br />
the EU. 161 Furthermore, some 30,000 <strong>di</strong>sused sources in the EU could be in danger of<br />
becoming orphaned. 162 In the former Soviet Union, notable cases of particular<br />
concern include abandoned electricity thermogenerators containing powerful<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources of strontium-90. 163 Abandoned thermogenerators have been<br />
<strong>di</strong>scovered in Georgia, Tajikistan, and Belarus and are subject to varying degrees of<br />
security implemented by the IAEA. <strong>di</strong>tionally, Kolos ‘Gamma-ear-of-corn’<br />
164 Ad<br />
apparatus, manufactured in the former Soviet Union for agricultural purposes<br />
(containing large, high-activity sources) have also been <strong>di</strong>scovered to have been<br />
orphaned.<br />
160 Gonzalez, A.J., “Security of Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive Sources: Threats and Answers”, in Commercial Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive Sources:<br />
Surveying the Security Risks, p39-40<br />
161 Ferguson, C.D, Kazi, T., and Perera, J., “Introduction: Setting the Security and Safety Context”, in Commercial<br />
Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks, p.17<br />
162 Angus, M.J., Crumpton, C., McHugh, G., Moreton, A.D., and Roberts, P.T., “Management and Disposal of Disused<br />
Sealed Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive Sources in the European Union”, EUR 1886, 2000, p.3<br />
163 Lluma, D., “What the Russians Left Behind’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2000, p14-17<br />
164 A.J. Gonzalez, “Security of Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive Sources: Threats and Answers”, in Commercial Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive Sources:<br />
Surveying the Security Risks, Occasional Paper No.11, p.41-43<br />
235
The existence of these sources do not by and in of itself demonstrate a capab<strong>il</strong>ity to<br />
obtain them for malign purposes. There are a spectrum of factors which effect the<br />
ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity<br />
of such sources. Once again these factors w<strong>il</strong>l be dependent on the<br />
practicalities of the <strong>di</strong>fferent types of sources and the<br />
variety of locations and to<br />
deta<strong>il</strong> them here may be counter-productive. There is,<br />
however, a more in<strong>di</strong>cative<br />
dataset which demonstrates in actuality the capab<strong>il</strong>ity<br />
of sub-state actors to access<br />
these sources – deta<strong>il</strong>s of <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking.<br />
1.2.6 Illicit trafficking of ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources<br />
It is worth noting at the outset<br />
that data referring to trafficking incidents and seizures<br />
is at best partial and is often <strong>di</strong>fficult to interpret due to a paucity of information. A<br />
major problem with this approach comes in attempting to accurately categorize the<br />
type of material involved and the intent of the in<strong>di</strong>viduals involved. Despite these<br />
serious drawbacks, examining incidents of <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking may st<strong>il</strong>l be the best<br />
approximation of the real world capab<strong>il</strong>ity to obtain access to the sources deta<strong>il</strong>ed<br />
above.<br />
As an in<strong>di</strong>cation of the level of <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking which has occurred in the recent<br />
past, it is possible to examine a dataset made ava<strong>il</strong>able by the Nuclear Threat<br />
Initiative which deta<strong>il</strong>s Reported Nuclear, Ra<strong>di</strong>oisotope, and Dual-Use Materials<br />
Trafficking Incidents Involving the Newly Independent States.<br />
236
Substance<br />
Number of Reported<br />
Cases<br />
Plutonium 2*<br />
Weapons-Grade Uranium 0<br />
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) 0<br />
Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) 0<br />
Uranium (natural or form unidentified) 6<br />
Thorium and other nuclear materials 0<br />
Nuclear Related Dual-Use Materials 2<br />
Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive Isotopes 27<br />
Waste/ Scams/ Contaminated Materials 7<br />
Total 44<br />
*These two incidents both appear to have involved minuscule quantities of<br />
plutonium, as in smoke detector ionization sources, and are probably not of<br />
proliferation significance.<br />
TABLE 1: Reported Nuclear, Ra<strong>di</strong>oisotope, and Dual-Use Materials Trafficking Incidents Involving the NIS in<br />
2003, Categorized by Material Type, (January - December 2003) 165<br />
Deta<strong>il</strong>s are also ava<strong>il</strong>able for other, earlier, occurrences of the <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking of<br />
high-activity ra<strong>di</strong>ological sources. One example involved the<br />
<strong>il</strong>legal export of the<br />
isotope Iri<strong>di</strong>um-192 from Ra<strong>di</strong>oisotope Factory No. 45 at the Mayak Production<br />
Association to a company in the United Kingdom. The iri<strong>di</strong>um was exported under<br />
falsified customs documents that had been prepared by the factory staff. The scheme<br />
165NTI, Reported Nuclear, Ra<strong>di</strong>oisotope, and Dual-Use Materials Trafficking Incidents Involving the Newly Independent<br />
States, Nuclear Threat Initiative,<br />
[Online] http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/tables/2003%20by%20material.htm [Last Accessed 10/04/05]<br />
237
was uncovered when the factory sent a shipment of iri<strong>di</strong>um to St. Petersburg instead<br />
of to the local Kyshtym Customs Post. This led to the realization that the ra<strong>di</strong>ation<br />
level of the shipment <strong>di</strong>d not match the ra<strong>di</strong>ation level stated on the customs<br />
documentation. Investigations into the incident revealed that sim<strong>il</strong>ar cases of <strong>il</strong>licit<br />
trafficking had been occurring for a period of at least two years.<br />
Another example involved the export of over 100 k<strong>il</strong>ograms of LEU and other<br />
assorted ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials from the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in Ust- Kamenogorsk,<br />
Kazakstan. It was reported that a former employee of the site recruited a number of<br />
mid-level employees to <strong>di</strong>vert from their<br />
intended use a variety of ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
sources, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng: LEU, thorium, tantalum, and other ra<strong>di</strong>oactive metals. The<br />
material s were then sold on to a group which included a form er Customs agent who<br />
used his deta<strong>il</strong>ed knowledge of the export control regime to send the material<br />
abroad. Charges f<strong>il</strong>ed following the action of security forces to inter<strong>di</strong>ct some of the<br />
material specified the theft of 146 kg of LEU, 439kg of thorium, 58kg of thallium,<br />
20kg of in<strong>di</strong>um, and an un<strong>di</strong>sclosed amount of tantalum.<br />
It has been noted that recent incidents have involved a variety of <strong>di</strong>fferent sources<br />
which have,<br />
not since 1994, involved weapons-grade material.<br />
When considering weapons grade material, it is necessary to examine the period<br />
prior to 2003. Between 1992 and 1994, there were at least seven unambiguous cases of<br />
<strong>di</strong>version and recovery<br />
of weapons-usable nuclear material that appeared to be<br />
linked to the former Soviet Union. The Western nonproliferation community has<br />
referred to these as “significant cases” because they provided unequivocal evidence<br />
that it was possible for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the essential<br />
ingre<strong>di</strong>ents of nuclear weapons, to be stolen and traded on the black market. The first<br />
significant case involved the <strong>di</strong>version of 1.5 k<strong>il</strong>ograms (kg) of 90-percent-enriched<br />
HEU in 1992 from the Luch Scientific Production Association, a Russian nuclear<br />
research fac<strong>il</strong>ity located outside Moscow in the town of Podolsk. The last case<br />
involved the recovery of 2.72 kg of 87.7-percent-enriched HEU in Prague, Czech<br />
238
Republic in December 1994. In all of these cases, the perpetrators were brought to<br />
trial and convicted.<br />
Since 1995 there has not been a single confirmed case involving weapons grade<br />
material in the open source literature, but as described above trafficking does<br />
continue in high-activity sources and other dual-use equipment. It is possible that<br />
international assistance to secure nuclear materials in the NIS has achieved a<br />
significant success. It is also possible that an increased awareness of the seriousness<br />
of nuclear smuggling issues has pervaded the NIS and has helped provide a positive<br />
deterrent to nuclear theft and <strong>di</strong>version. 166 Alternatively, it is possible that this data<br />
is in<strong>di</strong>cative of a shift away from sub-state acquisition of weapons grade material<br />
towards an increased desirab<strong>il</strong>ity for high-activity ra<strong>di</strong>ological sources.<br />
FIGURE 2: Incidents confirmed to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database in 1993-2004 167<br />
Data recently released by the IAEA (Figure 2) clearly in<strong>di</strong>cates that levels of incidents<br />
involving the <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking of nuclear material dropped sharply between 1993 and<br />
2004, wh<strong>il</strong>st during the same period sim<strong>il</strong>ar incidents involving other ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
sources stea<strong>di</strong>ly increased.<br />
Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials other than nuclear materials involved in the incidents reported<br />
to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database have mostly been in the form of sealed<br />
166 Em<strong>il</strong>y S. Ewell, “NIS Nuclear Smuggling Since 1995: A Lull in Significant Cases?”, The Nonproliferation Review,<br />
Spring-Summer 1998, Vol. 5, No.3, p119-125.<br />
167 Taken from: IAEA, The IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB): Fact Sheet for 1993-2004, International Atomic<br />
Energy Agency, [Online] http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/fact_figures2004.pdf [Last<br />
Accessed 17/04/05]<br />
239
a<strong>di</strong>oactive sources with various activity levels and applications. A large portion of<br />
incidents involving ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources <strong>di</strong>d not involve criminal activity. The<br />
Database has also recorded numerous cases of <strong>di</strong>scoveries of orphan sources.<br />
Whether or not this increase is related to a parallel escalation in the desirab<strong>il</strong>ity of<br />
developing a ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons capab<strong>il</strong>ity amongst sub-state groups w<strong>il</strong>l be<br />
considered along with other relevant trends in terrorism in the following section.<br />
1.2.7 The ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity of relevant nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological expertise<br />
There has been a great deal of debate over the issue of whether a terrorist group<br />
could actually bu<strong>il</strong>d a nuclear bomb having acquired the necessary materials. This<br />
question hinges on whether the terrorists possess the requisite technical know-how<br />
and expertise to do so. There is general consensus, however, that wh<strong>il</strong>st terrorists<br />
would face many challenges, given enough time, it could be achieved:<br />
In order to construct a crude nuclear weapon, a sub-national group needs to possess<br />
specialised expertise in areas such as nuclear physics, engineering, high explosives,<br />
chemistry, electronics and propellants; they must also possess knowledge of the<br />
physical and chemical properties of plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU)<br />
and obtained deta<strong>il</strong>ed drawings and plans of weapons components and final<br />
assembled device. If a group does indeed possess<br />
this knowledge and expertise, it is<br />
not impossible that the terrorists, even a small group, could design and bu<strong>il</strong>d a crude<br />
nuclear device. Furthermore, the rise of the internet and the world wide web has<br />
only served to make it easier to acquire the requisite knowledge.<br />
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) concluded in a 1977<br />
publication that “a small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the<br />
240
classified literature, could possibly design and bu<strong>il</strong>d a crude nuclear device.” 168 In<br />
1987, a group of former weapons designers calculated that “the number of specialists<br />
required [to construct a crude nuclear weapon]…could be scarcely fewer than three<br />
or four and might as well be more.” 169<br />
The manufacture of a ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapon is vastly less complicated than the<br />
assembly of a nuclear explosive device, and may be well within a terrorist groups<br />
capab<strong>il</strong>ity,<br />
although the handling and <strong>di</strong>spersion of highly ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials<br />
poses health and safety challenges that a terrorist group might not wish to risk for<br />
fear of incapacitation or <strong>di</strong>scovery. The quantity of ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials needed for a<br />
<strong>di</strong>spersal device is substantially less than the amount of plutonium<br />
needed to bu<strong>il</strong>d<br />
an explosive device. Nor would the terrorist group be limited to plutonium or HEU<br />
for<br />
source materials; any highly ra<strong>di</strong>oactive substance could cause contamination<br />
and necessitate an expensive clean up if <strong>di</strong>spersed effectively. 170<br />
Section 1 Conclusion<br />
The lesson from this section is that ultimately the threat posed by NR terrorism can<br />
only be gauged by looking at the convergence of the in<strong>di</strong>vidual elements involved.<br />
The intent and w<strong>il</strong>lingness of a terrorist organisation to perpetrate a nuclear or<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological attack is equally as important as the means by which they can obtain the<br />
technologies, materials and knowledge to do so.<br />
The means (or “supply-side”) by which terrorists can access potentially dangerous<br />
substances are becoming more numerous and the danger is real as<br />
shown by the rise<br />
168 Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (New York: Praeger Press, 1997), p141<br />
169 Carson, M.J., Taylor, T et al, “Can Terrorists Bu<strong>il</strong>d a Nuclear Weapon?” in Leventhal and Alexander, Preventing<br />
Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), p58<br />
170 NTI, Introduction to Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Terrorism, Nuclear Threat Initiative, [Online]<br />
http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/radtutorial/ [Last Accessed 17/04/04]<br />
241
in nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological smuggling and <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking networks. The example<br />
of the A.Q. Khan network demonstrates that a highly sophisticated smuggling<br />
network can exist and thrive in today’s nuclear climate under the nose of nuclear<br />
watchdogs such as the IAEA and other States.<br />
Sim<strong>il</strong>arly, organised crime networks are becoming increasingly involved in<br />
smuggling m<strong>il</strong>itar<strong>il</strong>y significant materials across borders and provide a easy route for<br />
terrorists to acquire such materials. No longer bound by the rules of a system of<br />
states, criminal and <strong>il</strong>licit networks flourish in the fac<strong>il</strong>itative environments of<br />
ungoverned spaces, cultural enclaves in strong states, and in weak and fa<strong>il</strong>ing states.<br />
These networks of criminals and traffickers, and the volat<strong>il</strong>e settings that enable their<br />
activities, create an entirely <strong>di</strong>fferent world from that which was originally<br />
envisioned by the crafters of WMD policies and institutions.<br />
The intersections between these major threats, added to the dangers<br />
posed by the<br />
weak<br />
border and policing controls of weak or fa<strong>il</strong>ed states – and their internal<br />
vulnerab<strong>il</strong>ity<br />
to theft or <strong>di</strong>version of dangerous materials and technologies – open<br />
new pathways and dynamics of NR proliferation that are, as yet, inadequately<br />
addressed at state, regional<br />
and international levels.<br />
There<br />
is, therefore, a real and present danger posed by the proliferation and use of<br />
NR terrorism to the international community. With the rise of terrorists w<strong>il</strong>ling to use<br />
such weapons, and of smuggling and trafficking networks able to supply the<br />
necessary material, this threat is significantly increased. Imme<strong>di</strong>ate and effective<br />
national, regional and international efforts must therefore be devised and execute to<br />
negate the in<strong>di</strong>vidual links of this chain. The following section w<strong>il</strong>l outline current<br />
efforts in these areas, and highlight areas that need further support and action. It<br />
must be noted at the outset that the fundamental <strong>di</strong>fferences between nuclear and<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons, and the threat posed by each, require <strong>di</strong>stinct control and<br />
counter-measures. There is no “one-size-fits-all” solution, and to attempt to do so<br />
would be <strong>di</strong>sastrous.<br />
242
2. International Efforts and Initiatives to Address the Threat<br />
The architecture of the U.S. response is termed “Layered defense.” The goal is to try<br />
to block terrorists at various stages in their attempts to obtain a nuclear weapon and<br />
smuggle it into the United States. The underlying concept is that the probab<strong>il</strong>ity of<br />
success is higher if many layers are used rather than just one or two. Layers include<br />
threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union, efforts to secure HEU<br />
worldwide, control of former Soviet and other borders, the Container Security<br />
Initiative and Proliferation Security Initiative, and U.S. border security. Several<br />
approaches underlie multiple layers, such as technology, intelligence, and forensics.<br />
These principles can be applied in a broader manner – a multi-layered<br />
approach is<br />
just as necessary whether efforts are at the international, regional or national level.<br />
Indeed, such an assertion underlies recent efforts by the United Nations Member<br />
States to develop a common strategy to confront the threat of terrorism, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng the<br />
use of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors.<br />
2.1 A <strong>Global</strong> Counter-Terrorism Strategy<br />
Throughout a series of Reports, the UN<br />
Secretary-General developed such a<br />
framework. In 2004 the High Level Panel<br />
on Threats, Challenges and Change,<br />
commissioned by the UN Secretary-General<br />
published the report of its fin<strong>di</strong>ngs, entitled<br />
A More Secure World:<br />
Our Shared<br />
243<br />
Counter measures should seek to: <strong>di</strong>ssuade<br />
non-state actors from seeking to acquire or<br />
use nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons; deny<br />
the means for non-state actors to acquire or<br />
use nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons; deter<br />
non-state actors from acquiring or using<br />
nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons; develop<br />
state capacity to prevent and respond to<br />
the acquisition and use of nuclear or<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons; and defend human<br />
rights.
Responsib<strong>il</strong>ity 171 . The concepts developed by the eminent experts were then<br />
incorporated into the preparations for the UN <strong>Global</strong> Summit in 2005, for which the<br />
UN<br />
Secretary-General released a report of his own, entitled In Larger Freedom:<br />
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All 172 . Although many of the<br />
issues presented in this report fa<strong>il</strong>ed to invoke consensus decisions when considered<br />
by world leaders, the underlying concepts were further refined. They formed the<br />
underpinnings of a further report by the UN Secretary-General, Uniting Against<br />
Terrorism: Recommendations for a <strong>Global</strong> Counter-Terrorism Strategy, released on 27<br />
Apr<strong>il</strong> 2006 173 .<br />
The framework developed by the UN Secretary-General seek[s] to both guide and<br />
unite… by emphasizing operational elements of <strong>di</strong>ssuasion, denial, deterrence, development of<br />
State capacity and defence of human rights. 174 It combines both the top down approach<br />
of what States can do in<strong>di</strong>vidually and collectively (thereby addressing supply) with<br />
the bottom-up approach of grass routes action (equally addressing demand).<br />
There are two principles which aid in <strong>di</strong>ssua<strong>di</strong>ng groups from resorting to terrorism<br />
or supporting it, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng:<br />
•<br />
•<br />
A clear, principled and immutable message that terrorism is unacceptable;<br />
Addressing con<strong>di</strong>tions conducive to exploitation by terrorists to create or<br />
increase their power base – such efforts should<br />
address:<br />
o<br />
o<br />
Extremist ideologies and dehumanization of victims;<br />
Violent conflict;<br />
o Poor governance; lack of civ<strong>il</strong> rights<br />
and human rights abuse;<br />
o Religious and ethnic <strong>di</strong>scrimination,<br />
political exclusion and socio-<br />
economic marginalization<br />
171 http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf<br />
172 http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm<br />
173 http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/60/825&Lang=E<br />
174 http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/60/825&Lang=E p2<br />
244
There are five principles which aid in denying terrorists the means to carry out an<br />
attack, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng:<br />
• Denying financial support;<br />
• Denying access to weapons, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng weapons of mass destruction;<br />
• Denying access to recruits and communication by countering terrorist use of<br />
the Internet;<br />
• Denying terrorists access to travel;<br />
• Denying terrorists access to their targets and the desired impact of their<br />
attacks.<br />
To be able to deter an actor from becoming involved in terrorism, a situation has to<br />
be created where there are real penalties for engaging in the activities it is desirable<br />
to proscribe. This necessitates two things – firstly an ab<strong>il</strong>ity to identify those planning<br />
or carrying out proscribed activities (the unresolved nature of the anthrax letter<br />
attacks in<strong>di</strong>cate how <strong>di</strong>fficult this can be even for those with the greatest resources);<br />
and secondly an ab<strong>il</strong>ity to reach<br />
those planning or conducting proscribed activities<br />
(the continuing fa<strong>il</strong>ure to be able to locate senior al-Qa’ida figures despite exhaustive<br />
efforts in<strong>di</strong>cate how <strong>di</strong>fficult this can be). As a result efforts have focused on<br />
deterring States from supporting terrorist groups. A<br />
factor which might have<br />
elevated relevance when considering nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons.<br />
Seven<br />
areas have been identified as requiring priority action under developing State<br />
capacity, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng:<br />
• Promoting the rule of law, respect for human rights, and effective criminal<br />
justice systems;<br />
• Promoting quality education and religious and cultural tolerance;<br />
• Countering the financing of terrorism;<br />
• Ensuring transport security;<br />
245
• Harnessing the power of the Internet to counter terrorism;<br />
• Improving the protection of soft targets and the response to attacks on them;<br />
• Strengthening State capacity<br />
to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear,<br />
biological, chemical, or ra<strong>di</strong>ological materials, and ensuring<br />
preparedness for an attack with such materials.<br />
better<br />
A scarce six months after the report was released; the UN adopted a <strong>Global</strong> Counter-<br />
lan175 Terrorism Strategy and attendant Action P . The Plan recognises a need for a<br />
multi-<strong>di</strong>rectional approach closely resembling the framework proposed by the UN<br />
Secretary-General. Member States have agreed to undertake:<br />
• Measures to address the con<strong>di</strong>tions conducive to the spread of terrorism<br />
• Measures to Prevent and combat terrorism<br />
• Measures to bu<strong>il</strong>d States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to<br />
strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard<br />
• Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the<br />
fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism<br />
2.2 A Counter-Nuclear-Terrorism Strategy?<br />
Many of the principles in the framework described above are not specifically ta<strong>il</strong>ored<br />
to addressing nuclear terrorism. They might be thought too broad and complex to<br />
deal with in any depth in this document. A number of principles <strong>di</strong>scussed, however,<br />
do carry a special poignancy when considering the non-state use of nuclear or<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons. They fit more comfortably<br />
into the tra<strong>di</strong>tional approaches to<br />
addressing this issue. By adopting<br />
175 http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy/<br />
this framework could it be possible to ta<strong>il</strong>or a<br />
246
counter-terrorism strategy against the acquisition and use of nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
weapons by non-state actors?<br />
It is certainly possible to identify a range of areas in which activities could be<br />
particularly important. Indeed it is possible to consider existing activities under these<br />
hea<strong>di</strong>ngs gap analysis as to the short-<br />
176 . Such an approach also provides for a basic<br />
falls of the current arrangements.<br />
2.2.1 Dissuasion<br />
To date, perhaps the most authoritative message of the<br />
unacceptab<strong>il</strong>ity of nuclear<br />
terrorism is the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear<br />
Terrorism (ICSANT) 177 . When they sign up to this regime, States solemnly reaffirm<br />
their unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of<br />
terrorism as<br />
criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng those<br />
which jeopar<strong>di</strong>ze the friendly relations among States and<br />
peoples and threaten the<br />
territorial<br />
integrity and security of States.<br />
2.2.2 Denial<br />
A prime example of ad hoc coalition bu<strong>il</strong><strong>di</strong>ng on this issue at the international level<br />
would be the work undertaken by the Group of Eight nations (G-8). At the summit<br />
meeting of the G-8 178 in June 2002 at Kananaskis, Canada, the participants adopted<br />
176 The <strong>di</strong>scussion of relevant initiatives in this paper is only in<strong>di</strong>cative – there are many other worthwh<strong>il</strong>e efforts<br />
undertaken in a variety of fora.<br />
177 http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/English_18_15.pdf<br />
178 The G8 countries are Canada, France, Germany,<br />
Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom and United States.<br />
247
the <strong>Global</strong> Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Weapons of<br />
Mass Destruction, stating:<br />
“We commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those who harbour them, from acquiring or<br />
developing nuclear, chemical, ra<strong>di</strong>ological and biological weapons; miss<strong>il</strong>es; and related<br />
materials, equipment and technology.” 179<br />
The goals of the <strong>Global</strong> Partnership include: the security and <strong>di</strong>sposition of weapons<br />
materials;<br />
physical protection of fac<strong>il</strong>ities; detection and deterrence of <strong>il</strong>licit<br />
trafficking; and the strengthening of export controls. These goals are implemented<br />
through a series of<br />
six principles, to:<br />
•<br />
Promote mult<strong>il</strong>ateral treaties that help prevent the spread of weapons,<br />
materials and know-how;<br />
• Account for and secure these items;<br />
• Promote physical protection of fac<strong>il</strong>ities;<br />
• Help deter, detect and inter<strong>di</strong>ct <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking;<br />
• Promote national export and transhipment controls; and<br />
• Manage and <strong>di</strong>spose of nuclear, biological<br />
and chemical weapons<br />
There<br />
have also been relevant b<strong>il</strong>ateral arrangements, for example, in 1991, the<br />
United States<br />
established a wide ranging security assistance initiative to help<br />
alleviate the adverse risks associated with many NIS nuclear related problems.<br />
Informally<br />
called "Nunn-Lugar" after its initial sponsors, Senators Richard Lugar and<br />
Sam Nunn, the program is sponsored by the Department of Defense (DOD),<br />
Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of State. Activities during the first<br />
seven years of its existence were funded with a budget of under $3 b<strong>il</strong>lion. 180<br />
179 G8, Statement by the G8 Leader: The G8 <strong>Global</strong> Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass<br />
Destruction, [Online] http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/globpart-en.asp<br />
[Last Accessed 12/04/05]<br />
180 Ellis, J.D., and Perry, T., Nunn Lugar's Unfinished<br />
Agenda, October 1997 [Online]<br />
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_10/nunnoct.asp [Last Accessed 17/04/05]<br />
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The goal of Nunn-Lugar is to lessen the threat posed by weapons of mass<br />
destruction, to deactivate and to destroy these weapons, and to help the scientists<br />
formerly engaged in production of such weapons start working for peace. The<br />
Defense Authorization Act (1997) defines CTR programmes as those which: fac<strong>il</strong>itate<br />
the elimination, and the safe and secure<br />
transportation and storage, of nuclear,<br />
chemical and other weapons and their <strong>del</strong>ivery vehicles; fac<strong>il</strong>itate the safe and secure<br />
storage of fiss<strong>il</strong>e materials derived from the elimination of nuclear weapons; prevent<br />
the proliferation of weapons, weapons components and weapons related technology<br />
and expertise; and expand m<strong>il</strong>itary to m<strong>il</strong>itary and defence contacts.<br />
Other relevant activities include:<br />
• UN Security Counc<strong>il</strong> Re solution 1540 - adopted on 28 Apr<strong>il</strong> 2004, this<br />
resolution decided that all States shall refrain from supporting by any means<br />
non-State actors that attempt to acquire, use or transfer nuclear weapons and<br />
their <strong>del</strong>ivery systems. It also necessitates<br />
that all States would establish<br />
domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such<br />
weapons and means of<br />
<strong>del</strong>ivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng<br />
by establishing<br />
appropriate controls over related materials, and adopt legislative measures in<br />
that respect. Further to counter the threat, it called upon all States,<br />
accor<strong>di</strong>ng<br />
to their national legislation and consistent with international law, to cooperate<br />
in preventing <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking in such weapons, means of <strong>del</strong>ivery and related<br />
materials.<br />
• The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) - a collaborative network of<br />
concerned States launched in 2003 to “impede <strong>il</strong>licit WMD related trade to and<br />
from States of proliferation concern and terrorist groups”. 181 . Under the<br />
initiative, participating States undertake to <strong>di</strong>srupt <strong>il</strong>licit trade by inter<strong>di</strong>cting all modes of transport within their territory or territorial waters that are<br />
reasonable suspected of carrying suspicious cargo.<br />
181 Proliferation Security Initiative, Statement of Inter<strong>di</strong>ction Principles, [Online]<br />
http://www.dfat.gov.au/globalissues/psi/psi_statement.html [Last Accessed 5/06/06]<br />
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• The Megaport Initiative - a US programme to enhance the security of<br />
container-ports to prevent the <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking in ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material. It is<br />
part of the “Second Line of Defense” Programme of the Office of Defense<br />
Nuclear Nonproliferation of the National Nuclear Security Administration<br />
(NNSA) within the US Department of Energy. The purpose of the Megaport<br />
Initiative is to “safeguard global maritime trade by enhancing security at<br />
seaports worldwide in order to identify and examine high-risk containers as<br />
early as possible before they reach U.S. shores”. 182 To date, the Megaport<br />
Initiative has focused its activities within the EU and has installed detection<br />
capab<strong>il</strong>ities in ports in the Netherlands<br />
and Greece.<br />
2.2.3 Deterrence<br />
The International Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and<br />
United Nations Security Counc<strong>il</strong> Resolution 1540 underpin deterrence efforts. They<br />
require effective implementation – achieving this w<strong>il</strong>l challenge the international<br />
community and w<strong>il</strong>l in<strong>di</strong>cate whether the political w<strong>il</strong>l exists to truly confront the<br />
threat posed by nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism.<br />
The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism<br />
includes an article necessitating States to make the following activities criminal<br />
offences:<br />
• Possession of ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material or a device with the intent to cause death<br />
or serious bo<strong>di</strong>ly injury or to cause substantial damage to property or to the<br />
environment;<br />
• The use or threat of use of ra<strong>di</strong>oactive material or a device;<br />
182 NNSA, Second Line of Defense Program, Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security<br />
Administration, Department of Energy, United States of America [Online] http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-<br />
20/sld.shtml [Last Accessed 26/5/05]<br />
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• Attempting to commit or participating as an accomplice in the commission of<br />
the above acts.<br />
The UN Security Counc<strong>il</strong> Resolution 1540 has also acted towards this <strong>di</strong>rection. It<br />
states that all States shall refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors that<br />
attempt to acquire, use or transfer nuclear weapons and their <strong>del</strong>ivery systems.<br />
Because this resolution was adopted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, it leaves<br />
open all options (inclu<strong>di</strong>ng the use of force) for ensuring compliance with its terms.<br />
2.2.4 Developing State Capacity<br />
The week following<br />
the events of September 11, 2001, the General Conference of the<br />
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) met and requested the Director-General<br />
to “identify possible threats from acts of nuclear terrorism and to propose what the<br />
IAEA might do to help prevent them.” Accor<strong>di</strong>ngly a new Nuclear Security Action<br />
Plan was devised to upgrade worldwide protection against acts of terrorism<br />
involving nuclear and other ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials. The Action plan is focused on:<br />
Other relevant activities<br />
UN Security Counc<strong>il</strong> Resolution 1540<br />
G-8 <strong>Global</strong> Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Weapons of<br />
Mass Destruction<br />
IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Ra<strong>di</strong>oactive Sources<br />
IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS)<br />
IAEA International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ)<br />
The <strong>Global</strong> Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)<br />
The US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)<br />
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274/Rev.1,<br />
May 1980)<br />
IAEA Regulations<br />
for the Safe Transport of Ra<strong>di</strong>ological material EURATOM<br />
regulations on shipments of ra<strong>di</strong>oactive substances<br />
improving the physical protection of nuclear material and fac<strong>il</strong>ities, detecting<br />
malicious activities involving nuclear and other ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials, strengthening<br />
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State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSACs), strengthening the security of<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials other than nuclear material, assessing the security/safety<br />
vulnerab<strong>il</strong>ities of nuclear fac<strong>il</strong>ities, respon<strong>di</strong>ng to malicious acts and threats, ensuring<br />
compliance with international agreements and gui<strong>del</strong>ines and co-or<strong>di</strong>nating<br />
information on nuclear security. 183<br />
2.3 Basic Gap Analysis of Existing Initiatives to Counter Nuclear and Ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
Terrorism<br />
By comparing the areas covered by existing initiatives in the above <strong>di</strong>scussion to the<br />
list of activities identified as warranting attention as derived from the adaptation of<br />
the UN Secretary-General’s framework for counter-terrorism strategies, it is possible<br />
to identify areas in which further development might be desirable. These include:<br />
i) addressing con<strong>di</strong>tions conducive to exploitation by terrorists to win support for the use of<br />
weapons of mass destruction<br />
Wh<strong>il</strong>st States reserve the right to develop and use nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons,<br />
it w<strong>il</strong>l be<br />
hard to persuade everyone that their possession and use are anything but<br />
legitimat e. Terrorists could argue that they are a legitimate weapon as they are to be<br />
found in the arsenals of even the most powerful States. To counter this argument<br />
real<br />
progress would have to be made towards complete global nuclear<br />
<strong>di</strong>sarmament. This<br />
would send a clear message that nuclear terrorism w<strong>il</strong>l not be tolerated and go a long<br />
way towards<br />
undermining these arguments.<br />
ii) denying<br />
access to relevant intangible resources via the Internet<br />
183 Dodd, B., and Reber, E., “Initiatives by the International Atomic Energy Agency to Prevent Ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
Terrorism”, Winter Meeting, American Nuclear Society, Washington D.C., USA., 17-21 November 2002, [Online]<br />
www.ans.org/meetings/pdfs/2002/wm2002-final.pdf [Last Accessed 12/04/04]<br />
252
Although controlling the information ava<strong>il</strong>able over the Internet is practically<br />
<strong>di</strong>fficult. Significant efforts have been made in other fields to regulate certain content.<br />
The efficiency of such an approach can be debated. An alternate tactic would be to<br />
step-up outreach and education in an attempt to <strong>di</strong>ssuade those with access to the<br />
relevant information from making it so freely ava<strong>il</strong>able over the Internet.<br />
iii)<br />
denying nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorists access to their targets and the desired impact of<br />
their<br />
attacks<br />
In order to prevent a terrorist from being able to transport a device to the intended<br />
detonation site, it would be necessary to be able detect the material involved.<br />
Although such<br />
technology does exist and is currently being installed in numerous<br />
ports,<br />
it is very costly, too large to move and impractical for installation in so many<br />
locations. It is possible that developments in science and technology may correct this<br />
situation in the future.<br />
iv) ensuring the effective international criminalisation of nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism<br />
The primary international legal instrument in this area would be the Rome Statute of<br />
the International Criminal Court. This instrument makes it a criminal offence to use a<br />
variety of weapons, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng<br />
poison weapons. It does not currently cover nuclear or<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons. It could be expanded to cover them, even if it were necessary<br />
to include a ‘get out clause’ sim<strong>il</strong>ar to that found in the International Convention for<br />
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism – exclu<strong>di</strong>ng the use of these weapons<br />
by States.<br />
v) promoting education and awareness raising amongst those who might unwittingly be<br />
involved in proliferation<br />
Although nuclear physicists are generally<br />
aware of these considerations and<br />
commonly heralded as setting an example which should be replicated<br />
amongst other<br />
scientists, the same is not necessar<strong>il</strong>y true for all those who could be in a position to<br />
contribute to the acquisition of a nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons capab<strong>il</strong>ity. Many of<br />
the components which would be required are dual-use. It might be desirable to<br />
253
ensure that all those who work with such material are aware of the possible host<strong>il</strong>e<br />
uses to which they could be put. The types of in<strong>di</strong>viduals who could be targeted by<br />
such an effort might extend considerably beyond highly qualified scientists to<br />
include technicians, exporter/importers, machinists, manufacturing companies,<br />
me<strong>di</strong>cal personnel, industrialists with access to ra<strong>di</strong>ological sources, explosive<br />
experts, etc.<br />
vi) improving the protection of soft targets<br />
Efforts to protect soft targets are complicated by the same factors as denying access<br />
to target locations. Unt<strong>il</strong> scientific and technological developments permit the<br />
construction of cheap, reliable and portable detection systems addressing this issue<br />
w<strong>il</strong>l remain <strong>di</strong>fficult.<br />
vii) enhancing the consideration of human rights implications of efforts to counter nuclear<br />
and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism<br />
Beyond the ethical and moral necessity of incorporating such concepts into future<br />
<strong>del</strong>iberations, it might be desirable for practical reasons. Many of the issues dealt<br />
with under the chapeau of human rights enjoy considerably more grass-routes<br />
support than many security issues. These broad-based support can generate the scale<br />
of political w<strong>il</strong>l necessary to move forward on issues on which States have <strong>di</strong>vided<br />
opinions.<br />
2.4 The <strong>Global</strong> Initiative<br />
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)<br />
During the 2006 Summit of the G8 in St. Petersburg, the Presidents of the USA and<br />
the Russian Federation announced the creation of the GICNT as a joint initiative to<br />
tackle the threat posed by nuclear terrorism. Bu<strong>il</strong>t in the mode of the PSI, the GICNT<br />
has been described as an activity, conducted by a coalition of the w<strong>il</strong>ling, to:<br />
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“…prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and ra<strong>di</strong>oactive<br />
substances or improvised explosive devices using such materials, as well as host<strong>il</strong>e actions<br />
against nuclear fac<strong>il</strong>ities.” 184<br />
As with other counter-proliferation mechanisms developed outside of tra<strong>di</strong>tional<br />
mult<strong>il</strong>ateral instruments, it relies heav<strong>il</strong>y on the norms enshrined within these<br />
regimes to underpin its existence. The GICNT relies specifically mentions that it is an<br />
extension objectives reflected in the International<br />
Convention for the Suppression of<br />
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear<br />
Material and Nuclear Fac<strong>il</strong>ities as amended in 2005, the Protocol to the Convention<br />
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and<br />
other international legal frameworks relevant<br />
to combating nuclear terrorism.<br />
The fact sheet released during the G8 Summit outlines the activities which w<strong>il</strong>l be<br />
undertaken through GICNT,<br />
inclu<strong>di</strong>ng determined and systematic efforts to:<br />
• Improve accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear material and<br />
• Detect and suppress <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking or other <strong>il</strong>licit activities involving such<br />
• Respond<br />
to and mitigate the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism;<br />
•<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>oactive substances, as well as security of nuclear fac<strong>il</strong>ities;<br />
materials, especially measures to prevent their acquisition and use by<br />
terrorists;<br />
Ensure cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear<br />
terrorism;<br />
• Ensure that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven<br />
•<br />
to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear materials; and<br />
Strengthen our respective national legal frameworks to ensure the effective<br />
prosecution of, and the certainty of punishment for, terrorists and those who<br />
fac<strong>il</strong>itate such acts.<br />
184 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/69021.htm<br />
255
It relates solely to civ<strong>il</strong>ian nuclear fac<strong>il</strong>ities and notes these “remain strictly the<br />
national prerogative of the nuclear weapons state parties to the Non-Proliferation of<br />
Nuclear Weapons Treaty” 185 .<br />
The first meeting of the GICNT convened in early November 2006 in Rabat, Morocco.<br />
The meeting was attended by thirteen nations: the USA, the Russian Federation,<br />
China, France, the UK, Italy, Japan, Canada, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Australia,<br />
Morocco, and Germany. The participants committed themselves to improve<br />
accounting and security of ra<strong>di</strong>oactive and nuclear materials; enhance security at<br />
civ<strong>il</strong>ian nuclear fac<strong>il</strong>ities; improve detection of nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials to<br />
prevent <strong>il</strong>licit trafficking; improve capab<strong>il</strong>ities to search and seize unlawfully held<br />
nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>oactive substances; leverage response, mitigation, and investigation<br />
capab<strong>il</strong>ities in case of terrorist attack; develop technical means to identify nuclear or<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials that could be involved in a terrorist incident; and to prevent<br />
the<br />
provision of safe havens to terrorists and financial or economic resources to terrorists<br />
seeking to use nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>oactive materials.<br />
The next meeting of the GICNT is due to take place in February 2007 in Turkey.<br />
The GICNT is an important development – it provides a flexible forum for expanded<br />
and non-tra<strong>di</strong>tional activities targeted<br />
to reduce the threat posed by nuclear<br />
terrorism. It demonstrates both the seriousness of the threat and the de<strong>di</strong>cation of<br />
world leaders to address it. It bu<strong>il</strong>ds upon well established international norms in<br />
such a way maximise their strengths wh<strong>il</strong>st minimising their weaknesses. The<br />
GICNT incorporates all of the elements deta<strong>il</strong>ed in the strategy to counter nuclear<br />
terrorism and so provides a powerful new tool to complement the activities<br />
described in the previous sections.<br />
185 http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/7.html<br />
256
2.4.1 The GICNT and Dissuasion<br />
The very creation of the initiative sends a clear message that nuclear terrorism is<br />
completely unacceptable. The clear support it enjoys from many influential states,<br />
organizations and in<strong>di</strong>viduals reinforces this message. The GICNT also seeks to put<br />
in place national legislation with stringent penal provisions in an attempt to <strong>di</strong>ssuade<br />
non-state actors from perceiving nuclear terrorism as a viable option.<br />
2.4.2 The GICNT and Denial<br />
National legislation also acts to deny access to the resources which would be<br />
required to carry out an act of nuclear terrorism. This is most clearly demonstrated<br />
by the efforts to improve the accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear<br />
material. The inclusion of elements to address safe havens, financial and economic<br />
aspects also demonstrates the importance placed upon denial in the GICNT.<br />
2.4.3 The GICNT and Deterrence<br />
As described earlier, effective national penal legislation underpins deterrence efforts.<br />
The GICNT also identifies this as one<br />
key component and binds partner states to take<br />
action<br />
on this front. The initiative itself is a considerable step towards the effective<br />
international criminalisation of nuclear terrorism – one of the key elements of<br />
deterrence. The inclusion of all five of the permanent members of the UN Security<br />
Counc<strong>il</strong> in GICNT also sends a message to the international community that state<br />
257
support for nuclear terrorism w<strong>il</strong>l not be tolerated, which in and of itself w<strong>il</strong>l have a<br />
deterrent effect.<br />
2.4.4 The GICNT and Developing State Capacity<br />
This initiative contains a commitment for the provision of assistance in implementing<br />
its commitments. This helps to ensure that its terms w<strong>il</strong>l not remain purely political<br />
aims<br />
but w<strong>il</strong>l be translated into tangible actions with real security benefits.<br />
Ad<strong>di</strong>tionally, envisaged activities<br />
include multinational exercises, expert-level<br />
meetings to share best practices, all of which w<strong>il</strong>l contribute to developing state<br />
capacity.<br />
Furthermore, the stated aims of the GICNT are a reaffirmation of the<br />
“commitment to non-proliferation wh<strong>il</strong>e promoting legitimate cooperation in<br />
peaceful nuclear activities for the prosperity of all nations” 186 .<br />
2.4.5 The GICNT and Defen<strong>di</strong>ng Human Rights<br />
By placing the GICNT firmly within<br />
the remit of both international and domestic<br />
legal settings, it is in effect an endorsement of the fundamental principles of human<br />
rights.<br />
This legal framework w<strong>il</strong>l help to ensure that the rights of all parties who may<br />
fall under the remit of the initiative are treated in a manner consistent with the well<br />
established tenets of human rights, not least of which is the right not to suffer the<br />
prolonged and agonizing death which would likely follow the use of a nuclear or<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapon by a non-state actor.<br />
186 http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/7.html<br />
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Conclusion<br />
Although not all experts agree that nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism is a matter of<br />
‘when’ as opposed to ‘if’, it is clear that they do pose a clear and present danger to<br />
international peace and security - as long as nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological technology and<br />
weapons<br />
exist, so too w<strong>il</strong>l the risk of terrorist acquisition and use. The genie is well<br />
and truly out of the bottle. The potential for nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism to<br />
change the dynamics of global politics has ensured that the international community<br />
takes the threat seriously. The advent of the <strong>Global</strong> Initiative to Combat Nuclear<br />
Terrorism is an important development – it provides a flexible forum for expanded<br />
and non-tra<strong>di</strong>tional activities targeted to reduce the threat posed by nuclear<br />
terrorism. It demonstrates both the seriousness of the threat and the de<strong>di</strong>cation of<br />
world leaders to address it. It bu<strong>il</strong>ds upon well established international norms in<br />
such a way maximise their strengths wh<strong>il</strong>st minimising their weaknesses.<br />
It is to be<br />
hoped<br />
that a sim<strong>il</strong>ar initiative w<strong>il</strong>l be undertaken to confront the threat of<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism, or the existing regime can be expanded to effectively address<br />
this issue too.<br />
The<br />
last few years have seen a plethora of international initiatives to address the<br />
proliferation of materials and technologies related to nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
weapons. Wh<strong>il</strong>st this progress is admirable, it begs the question why now? Why is<br />
the threat suddenly so more deserving of attention at the start of the third<br />
m<strong>il</strong>lennium than it was in the middle years of last century when the horrific affects of<br />
the detonation of a nuclear weapon was st<strong>il</strong>l fresh in the collective memory? The<br />
answer, as argued in this paper, and as evident from the <strong>di</strong>scussions it contains, is<br />
that recent years have seen the convergence<br />
of a number of pre-existing factors. For<br />
example, the existence of nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons has combined with the<br />
w<strong>il</strong>l to inflict mass casualties and an apparent w<strong>il</strong>lingness to use any methodology to<br />
achieve this aim. Equally, the ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity the necessary materials has combined with<br />
means to obtain them and the knowledge to use them to create a weapon. There have<br />
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also been confluences in the international political environment: the end of the Cold<br />
War has coincided with a greater understan<strong>di</strong>ng of our collective weaknesses and<br />
feelings<br />
of vulnerab<strong>il</strong>ity and insecurity. This understan<strong>di</strong>ng provides a firm<br />
foundation to re-examine the assessment of nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism and<br />
counter measures found in this paper. This assessment ultimately leads to a series of<br />
conclusions which, it is hoped, w<strong>il</strong>l prove insightful and useful for addressing this<br />
frightening threat.<br />
Assessing Nuclear and Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Terrorism<br />
It is appropriate to address the two issues separately. Each weapon has in<strong>di</strong>vidual<br />
characteristics. Nuclear weapons manifest massive imme<strong>di</strong>ate damage to health and<br />
the destruction of property. They also have significant <strong>del</strong>ayed effects which can<br />
cause considerable health and environmental concerns. Ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons on the<br />
other hand have<br />
minimal imme<strong>di</strong>ate effect. Their primary threat comes from the fear<br />
their use would incite – more people would likely be injured or k<strong>il</strong>led in the panic to<br />
flee than by an actual device. Although they do share <strong>del</strong>ayed affects with nuclear<br />
weapons, they w<strong>il</strong>l be of a <strong>di</strong>fferent magnitude and w<strong>il</strong>l prompt <strong>di</strong>fferent response<br />
measures. Splitting up the two types of weapon in this manner allows for the<br />
identification of three scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons and three scenarios<br />
for the use of ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons.<br />
Nuclear weapon scenarios include:<br />
• The theft or purchase of a nuclear weapon;<br />
• The construction of an improvised nuclear device;<br />
• In<strong>di</strong>rect nuclear attack by damaging or sabotaging a nuclear fac<strong>il</strong>ity.<br />
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Ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons scenarios include:<br />
• The construction of a ra<strong>di</strong>ological <strong>di</strong>spersal device;<br />
• The construction of a ra<strong>di</strong>ological emission device;<br />
• Ra<strong>di</strong>ological assassination.<br />
As already <strong>di</strong>scussed, nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism require a confluence of<br />
various factors to create both the w<strong>il</strong>l and the way:<br />
•<br />
•<br />
The intention for a non-state actor to acquire or use a device (WILL);<br />
The ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity of the prerequisite materials (WAY);<br />
• The means to obtain these materials (WAY);<br />
• Access to the required knowledge and experience to create a weapons (WAY).<br />
Although both nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorists would share this confluence, their<br />
in<strong>di</strong>vidual factors might be <strong>di</strong>fferent. For example, they could both have a w<strong>il</strong>l to<br />
acquire a nuclear or a ra<strong>di</strong>ological device but nuclear terrorists would have to have<br />
the w<strong>il</strong>l to inflict mass civ<strong>il</strong>ian casualties – which a ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorist might not be<br />
required to have.<br />
It is argued in this paper that there are five factors which can converge to provide the<br />
w<strong>il</strong>l to acquire and use a nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapon:<br />
• A <strong>del</strong>iberate quest to acquire high impact weapons (shared by both nuclear<br />
and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorists);<br />
• A w<strong>il</strong>lingness to accept martyrdom (to some extent shared by both nuclear<br />
and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorists, although the latter might also have to be prepared<br />
for a very slow and agonising transition);<br />
• The only worthy au<strong>di</strong>ence is a deity (shared by both nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
terrorists);<br />
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• A belief that it is part of a higher plan (the particular revulsion reserved for<br />
nuclear weapons means that this would have<br />
amongst nuclear terrorists);<br />
to be particularly strong<br />
• A desire for the shock factor (once again the detonation of either a nuclear or a<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological device would cause<br />
extreme fear and incite a massive reaction).<br />
Such factors have already converged in a number of terrorist organizations and<br />
emerging trends seem to suggest that the number of groups<br />
which embody all of the<br />
factors is growing. This w<strong>il</strong>l influence the likelihood that terrorists groups<br />
might<br />
pursue nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons in the future.<br />
A sim<strong>il</strong>ar assessment of the way was also conducted.<br />
In this case there are three<br />
relevant factors identified as converging to provide for the acquisition or use of a<br />
nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapon. For each of these three in turn, a number of<br />
influential considerations have been identified.<br />
Elements influencing the ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity of materials include:<br />
• Nuclear weapons and materials security (relevant for nuclear terrorists) –<br />
security upgrades<br />
are incomplete at many sites and the challenges to effective<br />
security are daunting;<br />
• Commercial sources (relevant for ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorists)<br />
- large numbers of<br />
sources are already in use for commercial and industrial applications –<br />
monitoring and verifying they are not<br />
<strong>di</strong>verted for malign purposes is a<br />
significant challenge which st<strong>il</strong>l requires further work;<br />
• Orphaned sources (relevant for ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorists) - pose one of the<br />
greatest proliferation risks – far too many strongly ra<strong>di</strong>oactive sources are<br />
<strong>di</strong>sposed of improperly, lost or stolen on an annual basis.<br />
Elements influencing the means to obtain technology and materials include:<br />
• Nuclear smuggling (relevant for nuclear terrorists) - the confirmed existence<br />
of organised networks de<strong>di</strong>cated to the <strong>il</strong>licit transfer of materials, technology,<br />
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esources, knowledge, experience and training critical for the acquisition of<br />
nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons undermines all efforts to prevent non-state<br />
actors from acquiring them;<br />
• Illicit trafficking of ra<strong>di</strong>ological sources (relevant for ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorists) -<br />
occurs with <strong>di</strong>sturbing frequency and seems to be increasing continuously;<br />
• Organised crime network (relevant for both nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
terrorists) - already possess many of the resources sought by nuclear and<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorists, inclu<strong>di</strong>ng: mechanism for <strong>il</strong>licit transport;<br />
circumventing control regimes and access to prohibited goods.<br />
Elements influencing the means to gain access to the knowledge and experience<br />
necessary to create a weapon include:<br />
• Proliferation networks (relevant to nuclear terrorists) - the confirmed existence<br />
of organised networks de<strong>di</strong>cated to the <strong>il</strong>licit<br />
transfer of materials, technology,<br />
resources, knowledge, experience and training critical<br />
for the acquisition of<br />
nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons undermines all efforts to prevent non-state<br />
actors from acquiring them;<br />
• The simplicity of ra<strong>di</strong>ological devices<br />
(relevant to ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorists) –<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological devices require no deta<strong>il</strong>ed technical understan<strong>di</strong>ng beyond that<br />
required for the manipulation of the conventional explosives which would be<br />
used in the case of an RDD, or in basic aerial <strong>di</strong>spersal in the case of a<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ation emission device;<br />
• The ava<strong>il</strong>ab<strong>il</strong>ity of relevant experience (relevant to both nuclear and<br />
•<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorists) - obtaining the expertise to construct a nuclear weapon<br />
would be <strong>di</strong>fficult but not impossible. Gaining access to the<br />
expertise to bu<strong>il</strong>d<br />
a ra<strong>di</strong>ological device would be far simpler – well within the capab<strong>il</strong>ities of an<br />
organised international terrorist network;<br />
The potential for in<strong>di</strong>rect attacks (relevant to both nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
terrorists) - a deta<strong>il</strong>ed understan<strong>di</strong>ng of how to bu<strong>il</strong>d a nuclear weapon can be<br />
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ypassed by attacking or sabotaging a nuclear fac<strong>il</strong>ity. Such an attack would<br />
release ra<strong>di</strong>oactive fallout sim<strong>il</strong>ar to a massive ra<strong>di</strong>ological attack. A<br />
knowledge threshold st<strong>il</strong>l exists as a terrorist would st<strong>il</strong>l be required to<br />
understand how to bypass the relevant safety and security precautions.<br />
This summary demonstrates that the necessary materials, technology and knowledge<br />
are st<strong>il</strong>l ava<strong>il</strong>able and there are means for obtaining it. The factors, which converge to<br />
establish the way to acquire and use nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons, st<strong>il</strong>l exist<br />
despite considerable efforts to counter the threat posed by these weapons. It is<br />
possible to conclude that the threat posed by nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
weapons st<strong>il</strong>l<br />
exists in potential and may be greater than ever due to the converges in both w<strong>il</strong>l and<br />
way. It is necessary, therefore, to further develop existing counter measures in such a<br />
manner as to address both the w<strong>il</strong>l and the way.<br />
Countering Nuclear and Ra<strong>di</strong>ological Terrorism<br />
The five-point strategy outlined by the United Nations Secretary-General to address<br />
terrorism, and adapted in this paper to specifically address nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
terrorism, is of particular use in confronting the w<strong>il</strong>l and the way. This strategy was<br />
used to assess existing counter measures,<br />
accor<strong>di</strong>ng to whether they:<br />
• Dissuade non-state actors from seeking to acquire or use nuclear or<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons (effectively undermining their w<strong>il</strong>l) - the message that<br />
nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism is completely unacceptable needs to be<br />
constantly repeated and supported by actions in line with this principle;<br />
• Deny the means for non-state actors to acquire<br />
or use nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
weapons (addressing the way) - considerable progress has been made in<br />
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furthering non-proliferation objectives. Constant vig<strong>il</strong>ance w<strong>il</strong>l be required to<br />
ensure agreements produce tangible security benefits;<br />
• Deter non-state actors from acquiring or using nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological<br />
weapons (reducing their w<strong>il</strong>l) - the International Convention for Suppression<br />
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and United Nations Security Counc<strong>il</strong> Resolution<br />
1540 underpin deterrence efforts. They require effective implementation –<br />
achieving this w<strong>il</strong>l challenge the international community and w<strong>il</strong>l in<strong>di</strong>cate<br />
whether the political w<strong>il</strong>l exists to truly confront the threat posed by nuclear<br />
and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism;<br />
• Develop state capacity to prevent and respond to the acquisition and use of<br />
nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons (addressing both the w<strong>il</strong>l and the way) -<br />
numerous mechanisms exist for the<br />
development of state capacity –<br />
coor<strong>di</strong>nation w<strong>il</strong>l be the key to maximising their ut<strong>il</strong>ity. States must remain<br />
de<strong>di</strong>cated to supporting these mechanisms over the long term as the path to<br />
universal capacity w<strong>il</strong>l not be short;<br />
• Defend human rights (impacting on w<strong>il</strong>l) – creating an environment in which<br />
there are human rights for all undermines the justifications for the use of<br />
nuclear weapons by non-state actors. It would also help to minimise the<br />
support for any group prepared to resort to such extreme tactics.<br />
Using the aims of this strategy to confront both the w<strong>il</strong>l and the way for the<br />
acquisition and use of nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological weapons allowed a basic<br />
gap analysis<br />
to be conducted. This demonstrated that wh<strong>il</strong>st concerted action had been taken that<br />
there was st<strong>il</strong>l more to do.<br />
The gap analysis also identified a number of areas which could benefit from further<br />
development:<br />
• Addressing con<strong>di</strong>tions conducive to exploitation by terrorists to win support<br />
for the use of weapons of mass destruction;<br />
• Denying access to relevant intangible resources via the Internet;<br />
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• Denying nuclear or ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorists access to their targets and the<br />
desired impact of their attacks;<br />
• Ensuring the effective international criminalisation of nuclear and<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism;<br />
• Promoting education and awareness raising amongst those who might<br />
unwittingly be involved in proliferation;<br />
• Improving the protection of soft targets; and<br />
• Enhancing the consideration of human rights implications of efforts to<br />
counter nuclear and ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism.<br />
It is recommended that as consideration of how best the threat of nuclear and<br />
ra<strong>di</strong>ological terrorism is to be addressed, progresses in the future that efforts are<br />
targeted at addressing these shortcoming.<br />
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