30-12-2020
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
WedNeSdaY, deCemBeR 30, 2020
4
Europe’s watershed year
Acting Editor & Publisher : Jobaer Alam
e-mail: editor@thebangladeshtoday.com
Wednesday, December 30, 2020
Sino-Indian rivalry
over Bangladesh
In Bangladeshi geopolitics, India has always been
at the center while the United States has had
leverage. Other regional powers such as China
used to be on the periphery. Historically Bangladesh
has more cultural and societal links with India.
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are collectively
known as a subcontinent. However, India's posture
and tactics created uneasiness among ordinary
Bangladeshis.
China's economic engagement with South Asian
countries - with the exception of long-time partner
Pakistan - only began to ramp up in the last two
decades. In this short period of time, China has
emerged as a top trade partner for Bangladesh. In
2015, ChinabecameBangladesh's top trading
partner, knocking India out of the position it had
held for 40 years. Imports from China represent 34
percent of Bangladesh's total.
As a member of China's Belt and Road Initiative,
Bangladesh has seen an influx of Chinese
investment in recent times. Beijing's support of
Bangladesh was evident in the 27 agreements for
investments and loans signed by the two countries -
worth some $24 billion - when President Xi Jinping
visited in 2016. Along with an earlier $13.6 billion
investment in joint ventures, those deals brought
Chinese investment in Bangladesh to a total of $38
billion, the largest sum ever pledged to Bangladesh
by a single country.
This large amount of Chinese investment in
India's most trusted, friendly neighbor made New
Delhi feel it was falling behind. Therefore, in
response, India announced $5 billion in loans for
Bangladesh in 2017, which is the largest amount
ever invested by India in Bangladesh.
As a rapidly developing economy Bangladesh is in
dire need of investment, while China and India both
see investment in Bangladesh as a way to extend
their influence. Bangladesh is seizing the
opportunity and using both China and India to fill
its FDI deficit.
There is also a strong security dimension to these
relationships. Bangladesh is surrounded by India
on three sides, and their shared 4096-kilometer
land border is the fifth-longest in the world. The Bay
of Bengal, located to the south of Bangladesh, is a
frontier that is watched over by the comparatively
powerful Indian Navy. Bangladesh also has a
maritime dispute with India in the strategic Bay of
Bengal.
China has become Bangladesh's top source for
arms imports; and Dhaka likewise is China's
second-largest arms export destination in the
world, behind Pakistan. Bangladesh accounts for 20
percent of all Chinese arms sales. Beijing has
provided Dhaka with five maritime patrol vessels,
two submarines, 16 fighter jets, and 44 tanks, as well
as anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles. Most
recently, in 2017 the Bangladesh Navy took delivery
of two Chinese submarines at a minimum price.
This agreement made India uncomfortable; thus
New Delhi expressed interest in offering submarine
training for the Bangladesh Navy. Again, while
China and India seek to expand their influence in
the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh is using both to make
necessary improvements to its military.
If the China-India strategic rivalry intensifies, both
countries will double down on their approach to
bringing strategically located Bangladesh into their
own orbit. China, along with increasing investment,
may also open its economy to billions of dollars in
imports from Bangladesh, which will help the
country to diversify its exports to a new destination
beyond North America and Europe. On the Indian
side, New Delhi may ramp up the diplomatic and
cultural ties with Bangladesh. India and China will
do their best to edge each other out in their
competition for dominance in the Bay of Bengal and
will try to squeeze an economically weak
Bangladesh.
However, Bangladesh should be aware that both
India and China will be primarily self-serving in
their investments. To avoid being a passive victim of
this geopolitical competition in the Bay of Bengal,
Bangladesh should use its strategic piston tactfully.
One way of getting the most out of India-China
competition is to remain elusive, without showing a
preference between the two giants. Maintaining
good working relations with both India and China is
crucial for an economically and infrastructurally
weaker Bangladesh.
In 2020, people around the world
experienced life in slow motion, even
as political developments accelerated.
For the EU, navigating the COVID-19
crisis has been challenging, yet despite
much naysaying, Europeans not only
stuck together but grew together, forging
a more cohesive bloc. In 2021, global
cooperation ought to make a strong
comeback, and the EU should continue to
pursue "strategic autonomy" so that it
can safeguard its citizens and interests in
the years and decades ahead.
It is a truism that 2020 marked a
watershed. In fact, the world has been
undergoing several tectonic shifts for
years now, including but not limited to
growing public distrust, polarization and
identity politics, tepid economic growth,
rising debts and deepening inequality.
We have witnessed the weaponization of
interdependence. Trade, technology,
investment, tourism and other former
venues of deepening cooperation have
become instruments of power and
domains of intense competition.
This was the big picture that we in the
EU leadership saw when we took office in
December 2019, just before conditions
became even more challenging. For
Europeans, it looked as though
everything we held dear was being
contested, be it multilateral cooperation;
solidarity between countries, generations
and individuals; or even basic respect for
facts and science. In addition to several
crises brewing in the EU's neighborhood
and the escalation of Sino-American
tensions, we were hit suddenly by
COVID-19, which has compounded all
the other longer-term challenges Europe
faces. There is no denying that the EU
struggled during the early days of the
pandemic. We were ill-prepared, and
many member states were initially
inclined to let everyone fend for
themselves. But genuine acts of solidarity
soon followed, with many countries
taking patients from, and sending
emergency equipment to, those most in
need. Then the EU-level measures kicked
in. The European Central Bank provided
massive liquidity, and the European
Commission authorized member states
to incur large deficits to support their
economies.
The discussion quickly turned to how
the EU could provide fiscal support to the
hardest-hit countries, and these debates
culminated in a historic "recovery fund."
An unprecedented €1.8 trillion
($2.1 trillion) was allocated for a new
"Next Generation EU" instrument and
the bloc's next seven-year budget.
Moreover, two longstanding economicpolicy
shibboleths were shattered. For
the first time, EU leaders agreed to issue
largescale common debt and allow for
fiscal transfers, provided that spending is
aligned with the twin priorities of
funding a green transition and securing
Europe's digital future.
On the international front, the EU's
position has been clear: A "pandemic
world" needs multilateral solutions. We
have lived by this motto even when
others were going it alone. Our May 2020
virtual pledging conference to raise funds
for vaccine research was a perfect
demonstration of the EU's unique
strengths. While the US and China were
proverbially at each other's throats,
Europe stepped up to lead on this critical
issue. Moreover, we did so in a
quintessentially European way (call it
"Multilateralism 2.0"), working with not
only governments, but also foundations
and the private sector.
Since the summer, Europe has suffered
a second wave of infections and struggled
with renewed lockdowns. Although we
have far more knowledge about COVID-
19 and how to treat it, "pandemic fatigue"
is widespread. Worse, the initial
economic rebound appears to be fading,
indicating that the crisis will continue to
dominate our lives for months - and
perhaps years - to come. As such, we
must keep mobilizing across all of the
relevant domains, from public health and
the economy to security and global
governance.
Revitalizing multilateralism will be a
top priority for the EU in 2021. Obviously
we cannot achieve this alone, but we
anticipate that we will have more
partners in the year ahead than we did in
2020. With Joe Biden succeeding Donald
Trump as president, the US is expected to
rejoin the Paris climate agreement,
JOSeP BORReLL
restore its support for the World Health
Organization, return to the Iran nuclear
deal and adopt a more constructive
stance within the World Trade
Organization.
America's return to the global stage will
serve as a much-needed shot in the arm
for multilateralism. We hope that others,
including China and Russia, will follow
suit in reversing their selective and selfserving
approach to multilateral
cooperation in the UN and elsewhere.
The pandemic has underscored the
need for European strategic autonomy, a
concept that originated in defense circles,
but that now extends to public health and
many other domains.
To be sure, pleas for "rules-based
cooperation" often sound less inspiring
than bombastic appeals to "take back
control." We must ensure that
multilateralism delivers tangible results
for citizens. No one will be safe until we
have a reliable vaccine, so the paramount
america's return to the global stage will serve as
a much-needed shot in the arm for multilateralism.
We hope that others, including China and
Russia, will follow suit in reversing their selective
and self-serving approach to multilateral
cooperation in the UN and elsewhere.
JaWed NaqvI
questions on vaccination are who will get
what, when and how. There is a serious
risk of "vaccine nationalism" or "vaccine
diplomacy," with rich and powerful
countries forcing themselves to the front
of the line. In early 2020, some countries
used "mask diplomacy" to extract
political concessions in exchange for
critically needed personal protective
equipment. The EU will insist on the
opposite approach: Vaccines must be
treated as a global public good and
distributed based on medical needs.
The second big multilateral priority for
2021 is climate change, another area
where the EU has shown leadership.
Having already set a 2050 carbonneutrality
target, we are close to an
agreement on a binding commitment to
reduce greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions
by 55 percent by 2030. Moreover, these
efforts seem to have inspired others:
China has signaled its intention to
become carbon neutral by 2060, and
Japan and South Korea have said they
will do so by 2050. We now need the US,
India, Russia, Brazil and other big
emitters to get onboard.
Climate change is the existential
challenge of our time. As with COVID-19,
the warning signs are visible for all to see,
and there is a solid scientific consensus
about what to do. The difference, of
course, is that there will never be a
vaccine for climate change, so we must
bend the curve of GHG emissions as fast
as possible. Finally, at the same time that
we pursue multilateralism, we must build
a capacity to act autonomously when
necessary. As I argued a year ago,
Europeans must confront the world as it
is, not as we wish it to be. The EU must
"learn to speak the language of power."
The pandemic has underscored the
need for European strategic autonomy, a
concept that originated in defense circles,
but that now extends to public health and
many other domains. We have learned
the hard way that there are costs to
depending on just a few suppliers of
critical goods, especially when the
supplier is a country whose value system
is fundamentally at odds with our own.
The solution to this problem is
diversification and, when necessary,
shorter supply chains.
This is not just about market failures in
medical supplies. Strategic autonomy is
about how Europe can address
vulnerabilities across a wide range of
areas, from critical technologies and
infrastructure (such as digital networks
and cloud computing) to rare earths and
the raw materials needed for the green
transition. We must avoid excessive
dependence on external suppliers in
these strategic sectors. The point is not to
embrace autarky or protectionism, but to
safeguard our political independence so
that we remain masters of our own
choices and future.
Some elements of this strategy were put
in place in 2020. Europe now has a
mechanism to screen foreign investments,
and we have begun to address the
distorting effects of foreign subsidies. We
are also boosting the international role of
the euro, and preparing additional
measures on issues such as government
procurement. As matters stand, the EU
procurement market is almost totally
open, while that of some others remains
almost completely closed. We must either
ensure reciprocity or take steps to restore
balance.
Source: Arab news
Land grab dressed as nationalism
THE Modi government has
proposed the setting up of a new
waqf board for Jammu and
Kashmir. Muslim waqf boards, or trusts,
are rich in land, and land is in heavy
demand by Indian corporates. The
tycoon who cobbled support for
Narendra Modi's rise as prime minister
himself bought waqf land in Mumbai for
a pittance to build a multistoried home
considered by many to be an aesthetic
eyesore.
On the other side of the bargain, the
bodies of fabled Muslim actors and
actresses, musicians and singers -
Madhubala, Naushad and Mohammed
Rafi among them - were removed from
their resting places to create room for
newer arrivals, such is the pressure on
waqf land.
The land where Babri Masjid had stood
belonged to a waqf. Now, the land
belonging to Kashmiri Muslims appears
to be in the cross hairs of corporate
conquests of fertile farmlands, virgin
forests, of rivers and mountains.
Kashmir is rich in all these.
This was how colonialism expanded in
India. From a wider lens, both
colonialism (British traders) and today's
nationalism (Indian traders) are/were
similar in their greed for land with both
asserting claim to what belonged to
others, one by flaunting the national flag,
the other with the help of the gunboat.
Nehru and Gandhi became nationalist
icons in popular reckoning and the
peasants the spoilers.
Nationalism curiously also reminds
one of the house servants of the Iranian
elite. The rich Iranians would nurture
this habit of leaving, say, a cooked whole
chicken wrapped in cellophane in the
kitchen garbage so that the cleaner in the
morning would admire the master's
affluence. The cleaner and the master
were both proud Persians.
Closer home, in the name of the
nation's progress, movie actor Shahrukh
Khan has been advocating online school
curriculum with a special app he claims
has all the answers to a schoolgoer's
queries, mainly targeting students who
are not able to leave their home because
of the virus. The poorer majority who
inevitably have little if any access to
electricity leave alone a laptop, that too
one with a costly app supported by a
smart guide like Khan, can smack their
lips in celebration of the new India that
excludes them. Nationalism is akin to the
Stockholm syndrome, with the
oppressed loving the oppressor.
It's a fact that nationalism is classdriven.
Gandhiji stopped Indian
peasants from going on the warpath
several times, once by calling off a civil
disobedience movement because the
peasants burnt down a British police
station. He dispatched Nehru to Rae
Bareli to rein in restive peasants fighting
British-backed zamindars. Gandhi once
got off the train in Ayodhya to chide
peasants for being ready for class
violence. Nehru and Gandhi became
nationalist icons in popular reckoning
and the peasants the spoilers, not
different from the way today's protesting
farmers are vilified daily as traitors by
TV anchors loyal to the rulers in New
Delhi. With Switzerland's ageing
population there would be no Swiss left
to run their country, I needlessly ribbed
a Swiss journalist once. "Who cares?"
was the tart reply, her tone closely
resembling the message of the 19thcentury
Urdu poem Banjaranamah, a
celebration of the gypsy worldview, a
close variation of essential Buddhist
thought. "Not an inch of our sacred land
will be conceded," proclaimed the Indian
soldier not long ago to a melee of very
proud Indian tourists at the Nathu La
border with China. His Chinese
counterpart seemed accustomed to the
earnest gush of nationalism from across
the barbed wire, which he too must have
vented occasionally but probably without
the need to remove his smile.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi
projected himself as an opponent of
expansionism he obliquely accused
With Switzerland's ageing population there would
be no Swiss left to run their country, I needlessly
ribbed a Swiss journalist once. "Who cares?" was the
tart reply, her tone closely resembling the message
of the 19th-century Urdu poem Banjaranamah, a
celebration of the gypsy worldview, a close variation
of essential Buddhist thought.
China of pursuing. Modi's fellow rightwing
nationalist, a former chief minister
of Maharashtra, however, was sanguine
the other day that he would soon make
Karachi part of India, staying on course
with the RSS idea of Akhand Bharat - unquartered
India - that goes beyond
Gilgit-Baltistan in its expansive quest,
east and west.
Be that as it may, the Nathu La pass
bordering Tibet was part of the
autonomous kingdom of Sikkim before
Indira Gandhi grabbed it in 1975 just
before declaring the emergency. Her
successor Morarji Desai apologised for it.
Her father Jawaharlal Nehru sent the
army to take Goa from the Portuguese
who had been in occupation of the
coastal enclave since 16 years before the
first Mughal ruler rode into Delhi. The
Portuguese represented colonial power,
and Nehru the nationalist end of the
stick for Goans. Like colonialism,
nationalism concocts its own history.
Consider the fact that the Portuguese
brought green chillies to India and
Indians have deluded themselves into
believing it was integral to ancient
Indian kitchens. Those who live in the
belief that the spicy nihari or qorma are
Muslim or 'Mughlai', therefore foreign,
need only look at the Uzbeks,
predominantly of Mongol or Mughal
extraction. There's no concept of hot
pepper, certainly not in the national
dish, the pilaf, which consists of bland
horsemeat sausages to garnish the beef
and rice dish. Indians corrupted it into
pulao - todaywith hormone-injected
chicken, mostly - as they did Uzbek
samsa, which became samosa.
Allama Iqbal wrote a popular
nationalist poem in praise of India but
the British knighted him. Iqbal's poem to
Lenin was overlooked, and the
description of colonialism as an
invention of Satan's capitalist conquests
wasmissed. Came Sahir Ludhianvi from
the leftist corner and turned Iqbal's
gushing patriotism on its head. "I am its
nightingale and India is my garden," said
Iqbal. Sahir, writing in postindependence
India noted the land grab
his country had become. "Jitni bhi
buildingein theen, sethon ne baant li
hain, footpath Bambai ke hain aashiyan
hamara." (Capitalists have cornered
every building in Bombay. Lesser ones
live on footpaths.)
The ongoing farmers' siege of Delhi is
of a piece with their heroic struggles
against colonialism and now they're
challenging an equally exploitative class
of state-backed businessmen whose class
interest is dressed as nationalism.
Source: Dawn