rbmbrfcj!

20. Kelman, Procurement and Public Management, gv. 22.
21. Kelman, Procurement and Public Management, gv. 121.
22. Marshall et al., "Incentive-Based Procurement Oversight by Protest."
23. Marshall et al., "Incentive-Based Procurement Oversight by Protest," gv. 51.
24. Kelman, Procurement and Public Management, korumpirebul qalaqebSi, sawyis konkursSi
damarcxebuli kompania gamarjvebul mimwodeblad cxaddeba da sawyisi konkursis
gamarjvebuli firmis identur SeTavazebas met fasad uzrunvelyofs. Sesabamisad, saxelmwifos
gacilebiT metis gadaxda uwevs, maSin rodesac kontraqtis realuri Rirebuleba ar icvleba.
(ix. Case Study 3, gv. 132-42). yovelive amis Sedegad, Marshall et al. amtkicebs, rom firmebs Soris
molaparakebebi unda aikrZalos, radgan isini arakanonieri garigebis identur Sedegebs
iwvevs. Robert C. Marshall, Michael J. Meurer, and Jean-François Richard, "Curbing Agency Problems in the
Procurement Process by Protest Oversight," RAND Journal of Economics 25, no. 2, zafxuli 1994, gv. 298.
25. Robert Klitgaard, "Healing Sick Institutions," Silvio Borner and Martin Paldam , ed., The Political Dimension in
Economic Growth. ( London: Macmillan, 1997).