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empiriuli dasabuTeba, gansakuTrebiT kerZo seqtorSi, Sejamebulia naSromSi Paying for
Productivity: A Look at the Evidence ( Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990). Alan S. Blinder, ed.,
10. klitgardis naSromi `informacia da stimulebi instituciur reformaSi~ mogviTxrobs, rom
samuSaos Sefasebis sistemis gaumjobeseba saxelfaso politikis gansazRvraSi gvexmareba, rac
Tavis mxriv, waxalisebis sistemis Camoyalibebasa da riskis Semcirebas uwyobs xels. igi
agreTve aRniSnavs, rom optimaluri stimulebis Teoriuli modeli xSirad realur situaciaSi
ver muSaobs. Jan-Jak lafontisa da Jan tirolis cnobil Teoriul naSromSi aRniSnulia, rom
optimaluri wrfivi stimulebis sqema `irRveva, Tu gaviTvaliswinebT realuri situaciis
dinamikasa da politikur ekonomikas ~.
Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation ( Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), gv. 663.
11. Robert Klitgaard, "Institutional Adjustment and Adjusting to Institutions."
12. Thomas D. Thacher, II, "The New York City Construction Authority's . . ."
13. Robert H. Porter and Do J. Zona, "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Political
Economy. 101, no. 3 (1993). informaciis analizi cxadyofs, rom individualur kontraqtebze
dafuZnebuli kartelis SeTavazebebis SemTxvevaSi ganawileba naklebad gafantulia, vidre
`konkurentuli~ SemoTavazebebis dros. am SemTxvevaSi SesaZloa gakeTdes garigebaSi
eWvmitanili kompaniebis SerCeviTi kombinaciebis Semowmeba an gadamowmdes TiToeuli
kombinacia. avtorebi aRniSnaven, rom zogjer rTulia garigebisa da konkurenciis
erTmaneTisagan garCeva, radgan orive ekonomikur garemosa da momaragebis regulaciebzea
damokidebuli.
14. riordani da sapingtoni Teoriulad amtkiceben, rom mxolod erT momwodebelTan
TanamSromloba, Zalian bevr SemTxvevaSi, swor gadawyvetilebas warmoadgens. maTi
simulaciuri modelebi adasturebs, rom erTi wyaros mizanSewonileba izrdeba a) rac ufro
swrafad eqvemdebareba prototipi daZvelebas (mag. sabrZolo sistemebi) b) rac ufro
xangrZlivia ganviTarebis procesi g) rac ufro stabiluria mosalodneli sargebeli da d)
rac ufro maRalia xarjebis gadaWarbebis albaToba. ix. Michael H. Riordan and David E. M.
Sappington , "Second Sourcing," RAND Journal of Economics 20, no. 1, Spring 1989, gv. 42. Sesabamisi
diskusia ix. Michael H. Riordan, "Incentives for Cost Reduction in Defense Procurement," in J. Leitzel and J.
Tirole, eds., Incentives in Procurement Contracting ( Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).
15. Mollen et al, Commission Report (fn. 10 supra).
16. Gyawali, "Structural Dishonesty: Corruption Culture in Public Works."
17. Kelman, Procurement and Public Management.
18. ufro zogadad, sxvadasxva saxis momaragebis kontraqtebs, Tavis mxriv, sxvadasxva e.w. meore
rigis problemebi axlavs. fiqsirebuli Rirebulebis kontraqtebi riskis tvirTs kontraqtors
akisrebs, rac sakonkurso fasebze gavlenas axdens. meores mxriv, `fasi-plus~ kontraqti
fasebis momatebas iwvevs. `riskis ganawilebis~ kontraqtis gamoyeneba sxvadasxva formiTaa
SesaZlebeli (fiqsirebuli fasis kontraqtis SemTxvevaSi, mimwodebeli da myidveli garkveuli
zRvaris gadaWarbebis Semdeg inawilebs xarjs, Tumca aseve dadgenilia zeda zRvaric.) am
SemTxvevaSi warmoiqmneba Sualeduri efeqtebi, magaliTad moraluri zarali. Tumca, unda
aRiniSnos, rom ekonomikurad `optimaluri~ riski nebismier kontraqtSi arsebobs.
19. Heymann. "Dealing with Corruption," 1995, gv. 6.