2006. évi 1. szám - Jura - Pécsi Tudományegyetem

Boros János: Pragmatizmus és demokratikus jogalkotás
a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise
might be interminable.”
11
W. James: i.m. 26. „The pragmatic method ... is to try
to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical
consequences.”
12
Vö. uo. „beliefs are really rules of action … to develop
a thought’s meaning, we need only determine what conduct
is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance”.
13
W. James: i.m. 27. „There can be no difference in
abstract truth that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere – no
difference in abstract truth that doesn’t express itself in a
difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon
that fact”.
14
Vö. W. James: i.m. 30. „ideas (which themselves are
but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they
help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of
our experience … Any idea upon which we can ride … any
idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our
experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily,
working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so
much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally.”
15
W. James: i.m. 37. „truth is one species of good”.
16
Uo. „Ought we ever not to believe what it is better for
us to believe”
17
W. James: i.m. 39. „you see, how democrratic she
[pragmatism] is. Her manners are as various and flexible, her
resources as rich and endless, and her conclusions as friendly
as those of mother nature.”
18
W. James: i.m. 132. „It is by dropping it [the evil] out
altogether, throwing it overboard and getting beyond it,
helping to make a universe that shall forget its very place
and name.”
19
John Dewey demokráciafilozófiájáról részletesen írok
említett könyveimben.
20
J. Dewey: The Later Works. Carbondale, Illinois, 14.226.
„democracy is a personal way of individual life”.
21
Uo. „Instead of thinking of our own dispositions and
habits as accomodated to certain institutions, we have to learn
to think of the latter as expressions, projections and extensions
of habitually dominant personal attitudes”.
22
Dewey: i.m. 226-227. “Democracy is a way of life
controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human
nature. ... That belief is without basis and significance save
as it means faith in the potentialities of human nature as that
nature is exhibited in every human being irrespective of race,
color, sex, birth and family, of material or cultural wealth.
This faith may be enacted in statutes, but it is only on paper
unless it is put in force in the attitutes which human beings
display to one another in all the incidents and relations of
daily life. To denounce Naziism for intolerance, cruelty and
stimulation of hatred amounts to fostering insincerity if, in
our personal relations to other persons, if, in our daily walk
and onversation, we are moved by racial, color or other class
prejudice ... The democratic faith in human equality is belief
that every human being, independent of the quantity or range
of his personal endowment, has the right to equal opportunity
with every other person for development of whatever gifts he
has. The democratic belief ... is [a] belief in the capacity of every
person to lead his own life free from coercion and imposition
by others provided right conditions are supplied.”
23
Dewey: The Later Works. 14.227-228. “everything
which bars freedom and fullness of communication sets up
15
barriers that divide human beings into sets and cliques, into
antagonistic sects and fractions, and thereby undermines the
democratic way of life. Merely legal guarantees of the civil
liberties of free belief, free expression, free assembly are of
little avail if in daily life freedom of communication, the give
and take of ideas, facts, experiences, is choked by mutual
suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred. These things destroy
the essential condition of the democratic way of living even
more effectually than open coercion”.
24
Richard Rorty, a Stanford egyetem professzora, a Pécsi
Tudományegyetem díszdoktora. Mûvei magyarul: Esetlegesség,
irónia és szolidaritás. (Fordította Boros János és Csordás
Gábor) Jelenkor, Pécs 1994., Heideggerrõl és másokról.
(Fordította Barabás András, Beck András, Bujalos István, Kelemen
István, Vitézy Zsófia) Jelenkor, Pécs 1997., Megismerés
helyett remény. Jelenkor, Pécs 1998. Rortyról is részletesen
írok említett két könyvemben.
25
Dewey: Reconstruction in Philosophy. The Middle
Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Ann Boydston (szerk.),
Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1976–1983.
91–92. (Rorty idézése).
26
R. Rorty: Megismerés helyett remény. Jelenkor, Pécs
1998. 121–122.
27
J. Rawls: Az igazságosság elmélete. (Fordította
Krokovay Zsolt) Osiris, Budapest 1997
28
J. Rawls: i.m. 32.
29
A tömeg és a nyilvánosság, a politikai hatékonyság
kérdéseihez ld. a hivatkozott szakirodalmakkal együtt,
J. Habermas: A társadalmi nyilvánosság szerkezetváltozása.
(Fordította Endreffy Zoltán) Gondolat, Budapest 1971.
320–359.
30
R. Rorty: Philosophy and Social Hope. Penguin Books,
London 1999. 93. „pragmatism is banal in its application to
law”. A formalizmus-realizmus vitát Rorty írása alapján foglalom
össze.
31
R. Posner: What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law
Southern California Law Review, 1990, vol. 63. 1653, 1663.
(idézi Rorty) „formalism … the idea that legal questions can
be answered by inquiry into the relation between concepts”.
32
R. Unger: The Critical Legal Studies Movement. 1986.
vol. I. (idézi Rorty)
33
Vö. R. Dworkin: Law’s Empire. 1986. 176-275. (Rorty:
i.m. 94.)
34
T. Grey: Holmes and Legal Pragmatism. Stanford Law
Review, 1989. vol. 41. 814–15. (idézi Rorty). „Pragmatism
rejects the maxim that you can only beat a theory with a
better theory … No rational God guarantees in advance that
important areas of practical activity will be governed by
elegant theories”.
35
Az Európai Unió Alkotmánya demokratikus deficitjérõl
részletesebben írtam: Boros János: Felülrõl irányított demokrácia.
Az európai alkotmánytervezet a demokrácia félreértése.
Magyar Tudomány 2004. május 610–618.
36
J. Derrida: Otobiographies. Galilée, Paris 1984. 14. „Il
reste que j’entends bien vous entretenir … de la promesse,
du contrat, de l’engagement, de la signature et même de ce
qui les suppose toujours d’une étrange facon, la présentation
des excuses.”
JURA 2006/1.