28.12.2013 Views

értekezés - Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem

értekezés - Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem

értekezés - Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

elated economic agency problems are greatest for firms with valuable risky projects.<br />

Therefore, the severity of agency problems is positively related to the fraction of a firm’s<br />

growth options. Thus, the magnitude of convexity in firms’ executive compensation plans<br />

is predicted to be positively related to the portion of growth options in their investment<br />

opportunity sets. 171 Guay [1999] brings empirical evidence for that, proving that firms<br />

provide managers with incentives to take risky projects when the potential loss from<br />

underinvestment in valuable risky projects is greater.<br />

171 See Smith/Watts [1992]<br />

172

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!