Statut juridique, gouvernance et performance des institutions - CEREG
Statut juridique, gouvernance et performance des institutions - CEREG Statut juridique, gouvernance et performance des institutions - CEREG
• Jensen M.C. et Meckling W.H. (1976), ‘Theory of The Firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, J• Jensen M.C. et Meckling W.H. (1992), ‘Specific and General Knowledge and Organizational Structure’, in Werin L. et Wijkand• Kalika M. (1995), ‘Structures d’entreprises, réalités, déterminants, performances’, 2ème éd., Economica.• Kim D. et Santomero A.M. (1988), ‘Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation’, Journal of Finance 43, pp. 1219-1233.• Koehn M., Santomero A.M. (1980), ‘Regulation of Bank Capital and Portofolio Risk’, Journal of Finance 35, pp. 1235-1250.• Krashinsky (1986) ‘Transactiond Costs and a Theory of the Nonprofit Organization’, in ROSE-ACKERMAN S., pp.114-132.• Kranshinsky (1997), ‘Stakeholder theories and the non-profit sector ‘, Voluntas, 8:2, pp.149-161.• Labie M., (1998), ‘La Gestion de Proximité: une condition essentielle des mécanismes de garantie solidaire’, ADA Dialogue, nu• Labie, M. et Sota J. (2004) ‘Gouvernance et organisations de microfinance : de la nécessité de délimiter les apports d’un consei• Leland H. et Pyle D. (1977), ‘Informational Asymétrique, Financial Structure, and Financial intermédiation’, Journal of Finance, vol 32, N°• Lobez F. (1997), ‘Banques et marchés du crédit ‘, Presses Universitaires de France, collection FINANCE, 1997,195 p.• Markowitz H. (1952), ‘Portfolio Selection’ , Journal of Finance, March 1952, PP. 77-91.• Mayers D, Smith C.W. (1981), ‘Contractual provisions, Organisation structure and conflict control in insurance markets’, Journ• Mersland R. et Oystein Strom R. 2007, ‘Microbanks: Ownership, performance and social tradeoffs - a global analysis’, MPRA• MicroFinance Network. ‘Institutional Metamorphosis: Transformation of Microfinance NGOs into Regulated Financial Instit• Milgrom P. et Roberts J. (1995), ‘Complementarities and Fit : Strategy, Structure, and Organisational Change in Manufacturing• Mintzberg H. (1982), ‘Structure et dynamique des organisations’, Editions d’Organisation.• Modigliani I F. et Miller M. (1958), ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment ‘, American Econ• Modigliani, Franco et Miller, Merton [1958], ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment’, Ameri• Modigliani, Franco et Miller, Merton, [1963], ‘Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction’, The American E• Mordhuc J. (1999), ‘The microfinance promise’, Journal Of Economic Litterature 37 December: 1569-1614• Mordhuc J. (1999), ‘The microfinance schism’, World Development 28 4, April, 617-629.• Mordhuc, J. (1998), ‘Does microfinance really help the poor ? New evidence from flagship programme in Bangladesh’‘, Depar58
• Mordhuch, J. (1999), ‘The microfinance promise’, Journal Of Economic Litterature 37 December: 1569-1614• Morduch, J. (1990), J. ‘The rôle of subsidies in microfinance : evidence from the Grameen Bank ‘, Journal of economic developemen• Morduch, J. ‘The microfinance schism ‘, World development ; vol.28, No 4, pp. 617-629.• Myers S.C.[1977], ‘Determinants of corporate borrowing’, Journal of financial economics 5, 147-175• Nelson R. & Krashinsky M. (1973), ‘Two Major Issues of Public Policy : Public Policy and Organization of Supply ‘, in Public S• O.C.C (1988), ‘Bank failure : an evaluation of the factors contributing to the failure of national banks’.• Pankaj J J, Moore M. (2003), ‘What Makes Micro-credit Programmes Effective? Fashionable Fallacies and Workable Realities.• Pitt M.M. et Kandker S.R (1996), ‘Household and intrahousehold impact of the Grameen Bank and similar targeted credit pro• Platteau J.P. (1987) , ‘La Nouvelle Economie Institutionnelle et le problématique coopérative’ , Cahiers de la Faculté des Sciences E• Provan (1980), ‘Board Power and Organizational Effectiveness Among Human Service Agencies’‘, Academy of Management Journ• Rhyne, E. 2001. ‘Mainstreaming Microfinance: How Lending to the Poor Began, Grew, and Came of Age in Bolivia’. West Ha• Rock, R., Otero M., & Saltzman S. (1998). ‘Principles and Practices of Microfinance Governance’, ACCION International, Wa• Ross, S., 1977, “The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive - Signal- ling Approach”, Bell Journal of Economics 8, 2• Saunders A., Strock S. et Travlos N.G. (1990), ‘Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and banking risk taking,’ Journal of Finance 4• Sharma M. and Zeller, M. (1997). ‘Repayment performance in group-based credit programs in Bangladesh: an empirical analys• Sharpe, S.A. (1990), ‘Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: a Stylized Model of Customer Relationsh• Simon Y. & Tezenas du Montcel H. (1977), ‘Théorie de la firme et réforme de l’entreprise. Revue de la théorie des droits de p• Soulama (2002), ‘Micro-finance, pauvreté et développement’, Université de Ouagadoudou, Burkina Faso, Février, Miméo.• Stiglitz, J.E. (1990), ‘Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets’, World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 43, pages• Van Tassel E. (1999), ‘Group lending under asymmetric information’, Journal of Development Economics, vol 60 N° 1 p.3-26• Varian H. R. (1990), “Monitoring agents with other agents”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, pp153-174.• Weisbrod B.A., 1998, ‘Conclusions and Public-policy Issues : Commercialism and the Road ahead’, in B.A. WEISBROD, ed, T• Zeller M. (1998)., ‘Determinants of repayment performance in credit groups: the role of program design, intra-group risk pool59
- Page 7 and 8: Les associations sans but lucratif
- Page 9 and 10: de propriété ne sont en effet ple
- Page 11 and 12: élevés et les acheteurs potentiel
- Page 14 and 15: sur les inconvénients attribués
- Page 16 and 17: émunération de leurs dépôts, ou
- Page 18 and 19: Les institutions ont été sélecti
- Page 20 and 21: i) Les indicateurs de rentabilité
- Page 22 and 23: crédit/total actif. Une IMF qui pr
- Page 24 and 25: Tableau 2 : Corrélations entre les
- Page 26 and 27: Entre les ONG et les sociétés pri
- Page 28 and 29: ôle pour résoudre les conflits n
- Page 30 and 31: La relation testée se présente co
- Page 32 and 33: 2. L’importance du nombre de pers
- Page 34 and 35: collecte de l’épargne a sur la r
- Page 36 and 37: Tableau 7 : Les déterminants de la
- Page 38 and 39: On constate également une relation
- Page 40 and 41: IMF. Cette dernière explication ne
- Page 42 and 43: Tableau 8 : Les déterminants de l'
- Page 44 and 45: Tableau 10: Les déterminants de l'
- Page 46 and 47: enregistre des pertes sur portefeui
- Page 48 and 49: Tableau 12 : Les déterminants de l
- Page 50 and 51: Le ratio dépôts/actif présente u
- Page 52 and 53: Tableau 14 : les déterminants de l
- Page 54 and 55: - une confirmation de la réalisati
- Page 56 and 57: • Champagne (1998), ‘Les admini
- Page 61 and 62: 1.7. AnnexesAnnexe 0-1: Caractéris
- Page 63 and 64: Annexe 0-3 : Statistiques descripti
- Page 65: Annexe 0-5 : Corrélations entre va
• Mordhuch, J. (1999), ‘The microfinance promise’, Journal Of Economic Litterature 37 December: 1569-1614• Morduch, J. (1990), J. ‘The rôle of subsidies in microfinance : evidence from the Grameen Bank ‘, Journal of economic developemen• Morduch, J. ‘The microfinance schism ‘, World development ; vol.28, No 4, pp. 617-629.• Myers S.C.[1977], ‘D<strong>et</strong>erminants of corporate borrowing’, Journal of financial economics 5, 147-175• Nelson R. & Krashinsky M. (1973), ‘Two Major Issues of Public Policy : Public Policy and Organization of Supply ‘, in Public S• O.C.C (1988), ‘Bank failure : an evaluation of the factors contributing to the failure of national banks’.• Pankaj J J, Moore M. (2003), ‘What Makes Micro-credit Programmes Effective? Fashionable Fallacies and Workable Realities.• Pitt M.M. <strong>et</strong> Kandker S.R (1996), ‘Household and intrahousehold impact of the Grameen Bank and similar targ<strong>et</strong>ed credit pro• Platteau J.P. (1987) , ‘La Nouvelle Economie Institutionnelle <strong>et</strong> le problématique coopérative’ , Cahiers de la Faculté <strong>des</strong> Sciences E• Provan (1980), ‘Board Power and Organizational Effectiveness Among Human Service Agencies’‘, Academy of Management Journ• Rhyne, E. 2001. ‘Mainstreaming Microfinance: How Lending to the Poor Began, Grew, and Came of Age in Bolivia’. West Ha• Rock, R., Otero M., & Saltzman S. (1998). ‘Principles and Practices of Microfinance Governance’, ACCION International, Wa• Ross, S., 1977, “The D<strong>et</strong>ermination of Financial Structure: The Incentive - Signal- ling Approach”, Bell Journal of Economics 8, 2• Saunders A., Strock S. <strong>et</strong> Travlos N.G. (1990), ‘Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and banking risk taking,’ Journal of Finance 4• Sharma M. and Zeller, M. (1997). ‘Repayment <strong>performance</strong> in group-based credit programs in Bangla<strong>des</strong>h: an empirical analys• Sharpe, S.A. (1990), ‘Asymm<strong>et</strong>ric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: a Stylized Model of Customer Relationsh• Simon Y. & Tezenas du Montcel H. (1977), ‘Théorie de la firme <strong>et</strong> réforme de l’entreprise. Revue de la théorie <strong>des</strong> droits de p• Soulama (2002), ‘Micro-finance, pauvr<strong>et</strong>é <strong>et</strong> développement’, Université de Ouagadoudou, Burkina Faso, Février, Miméo.• Stiglitz, J.E. (1990), ‘Peer Monitoring and Credit Mark<strong>et</strong>s’, World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 43, pages• Van Tassel E. (1999), ‘Group lending under asymm<strong>et</strong>ric information’, Journal of Development Economics, vol 60 N° 1 p.3-26• Varian H. R. (1990), “Monitoring agents with other agents”, Journal of Institutional and Theor<strong>et</strong>ical Economics, pp153-174.• Weisbrod B.A., 1998, ‘Conclusions and Public-policy Issues : Commercialism and the Road ahead’, in B.A. WEISBROD, ed, T• Zeller M. (1998)., ‘D<strong>et</strong>erminants of repayment <strong>performance</strong> in credit groups: the role of program <strong>des</strong>ign, intra-group risk pool59
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