Revue <strong>de</strong> Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro <strong>de</strong> la Prensa-Basm Öz<strong>et</strong>i arrested and tried for war crimes if they do. Although it rarely says so out loud, the Administration intends to kill Saddam-or capture him, if it must. Some In the Arab world say it might not be so easy: his inner circle will protect him, knowing they either hang tog<strong>et</strong>her or hang separately. But others say if Baghdad falls, someone close to Saddarri could step in to finish him off. In the end, Saddam could very well elu<strong>de</strong> all his enemies thanks to his doubles, his secr<strong>et</strong> hi<strong>de</strong>aways and his nomadic way oflife. 51FSADDAM DOES GO, WHAT BECOMES OF IRAQ? . TARGET A recent satellite. image of Baghdad with a suspect presi<strong>de</strong>ntial palace silhou<strong>et</strong>ted in red at left will bloom in Iraq as soon as the shooting stops. "In other times, the world saw how the U.S. dpfeated fierce enemies, then helped rebuild their countries," he said, calling to mind the wondrous effect of the Marshall Plan in Europe. The U.S., says Cheney, will shape an Iraq "that is <strong>de</strong>mocratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of every <strong>et</strong>hnic and religious group are recognized and respected."Y<strong>et</strong> Washington som<strong>et</strong>imes gives the impression that it isn't much worried what the next government will look like. Asked by TIMEabout the shambolic state of the Iraqi opposition, a senior Administration official replied, "Personally, I don't care." But the U.S. will have to care. Iraq has no expe'rience with <strong>de</strong>mocracy and no cohesive soci<strong>et</strong>y. The ,country has been dominated by Sunni Muslims, a minority, since well before the monarchy fell in 1958; meanwhile, the Kurds in the north and the majority Shi'ites mainly in the south have long sought autonomy, if not outright. in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce. The opposition in exile is an unruly assortment of factions with different objectives, rival patrons and geographically separate constituencies back home. There is no readyma<strong>de</strong> unifying figure whom the U.S. can install and no prescription for power sharing amorig the factions. Arab lea<strong>de</strong>rs are worried that ineffectual nation build~ ing would encourage separation into warring zones such as the enclaves that tore up Lebanon for 15 years. Iraq's neighbors are just as p<strong>et</strong>rified that a post-Saddam Iraq will. fly apart. The Kurds, now virtually autonomous un<strong>de</strong>r the protection of U.S. and British j<strong>et</strong>s, trouble Turkey. That faithful U.S. ally has its own restive population of Kurds, which Ankara fears might be attracted to join an in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt Kurdistan. At the same time, Iran might see an opportunity to make league with Iraq's 64% Shi'ite population in the south, especially since that territory is home to the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf. To ward off such consequences, the U.S. needs the sticking power for a long, rough occupation. That will almost certainly require stationing upwards of 50,000 troops in Iraq, as well as billions of dollars for reconstruction. Critics point to Washington' s historical fickleness when it comes to nation building. "Is America going to sit ,in Baghdad for five years to rebuild institutions?" asks a gulf diplomat. ''Washington won't have the stomach for it." 6 WILL THE MiDDlE EAST BE BmER OFFOR WORSE? WHENEVER THE U.S. INTERVENES IN THE Middle East, it's warned of the dangers of Arab reaction. The Administration seems . tp shrug that off. There were dire predictions that the Arab stre<strong>et</strong> would explo<strong>de</strong> during ~e first Gulf War and during the Afghan campaign, but it didn't, really, in either case. Still, diplomats and lea<strong>de</strong>rs in the Middle East say it would be wise to take such possibilities into account. There's anxi<strong>et</strong>y that a war would unite Arab nations against the U.S., especially in an atmosphere charged by the unresolved Palestinian crisis. Bombing, refugees and casualties will fill Arab television screens in a way that was not possible 11 years ago, when n<strong>et</strong>works like. al-]azeera did not exist. Some in the Administration, for their part, think that a <strong>de</strong>mocratic Iraq would act as a beacon of stability to the Middle East. The gravest concern in Arab capitals is that Israel will step in. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel ShaI;on has ma<strong>de</strong> no secr<strong>et</strong> of his readiness to hit back if Iraq strikes his country. That would "Zionize" the war and perhaps broa<strong>de</strong>n it to the whole region. 7 WHAT WOULD OSAMA BIN LADEN MAKE OF ALL THIS? TOPPLING SADOAM WILL l'!OT HAVE THE same.effect on al-Qaeda as ousting the Taliban from Afghanistan. But the Adminis- ' tration argues that Saddam's <strong>de</strong>parture will <strong>de</strong>prive terrorists of a potential source of unconventional weapons. Others think terrorists might more readily pick up the stuff amid the chaos of war. The Vice Presi<strong>de</strong>nt has suggested that a successful strike against Saddam would discourage Arab zealots from embracing terrorism: "When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace," he said. But images of Americans killing Iraqis, say expertslike Daniel Benjamin, a former National Security Council adviser on terrorism,' might "further the jihadist cause" by "confirming bin La<strong>de</strong>n's argument that the U.S. is at war with Islam." The first Gulf War, he adds, "was a catalytic event for the Islamists who formed' al-Qaeda" because it stationed U.S. troops permanently on sacred Islamic soil. . One si<strong>de</strong> argues this war could stanch terrorism, while another. argues it could breed it. The <strong>de</strong>bate is abstract for now. But it is b<strong>et</strong>ter to havé it, with all of its frustrating hypoth<strong>et</strong>icals, than to leave things unsaid. Bush may have handled the doubters masterfully so far. But he may find he needs thelll-and everyone else-in his comer if the war turns ugly: -Repotted by Masslmo Calabresl, John F. Dickerson and Douglas WaUer/Washlngton a".d Scott Macl.eod/Calro .' TIME, OCTOBER 14, 2002 66
.' '" 0 0 '" ... Cl< co 0IŪ0 :! is z::::l .... ~... J: u Z
Change language