Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro
de la Prensa-Basm Özeti
.,
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draft proposes tough terms calling for Iraq
to comply in 30 days, opening everything,
including Saddam's highly suspect presiqential
compounds, giving the inspectors
armed guards to facilitate searches-and,
,most importan~ authorizing force if Iraq
makes a misstep.
, Washington says only such a definite
promise of force could make inspections
work. Critics see these terms as ones that
no mie could accept. France and Russia,
with veto power in the council, are leading
the campaign to tone down the terms
enough to give inspections a chance. Both
balk at writing in an advance approval for
war; France wants to reserve that for a second
resolution, in the event Iraq fails to fulfill
the first. The Administration now seems
resigned to working out a program that
most of the council-the U.S. needs' nine
yeses, no vetoes-can live with. But no
matter what the U.N. does to disarm Iraq,
it would be extraordinary if the U.S. were
to pause in its push to depose Saddam. In
very few instances has the Bush Administration
allowed the international
community
to change a core U.S. policy.
2HOW BADLYDOESTHE
U.S. NEm THE U.N.?
THE BUSH TEAM SAYSIT VERY MUCH wANTS
U.N. support but that it will go to war
alone if it has to. This is both true and a negotiating
posture. The Administration believes
only the fear that the U.S. will act
•alone can squeeze approval out of the Se-
,curity Council. But if the U.S. does not get
, a resolution that fits Bush's criteria, the
, Administration means it when it says it
will go to war anyway.
As .a practical matter, the U.S. wants
:and needs allies. U.N. approval confers
legitimacy that even a superpower, can't
.claim by itself, and such approval is essen-
. tial in the Middle East. Nations such as
,Saudi Arabia might not agree to serve as
staging bases without U.N. backing, and
Bush can't place all the troops hell need for
the war on aircraft carriers. Other friendly
Arab nations like,Jordan, Egypt and Qatar
need U.N. cover to deflect accusations that
they are party to an attack on a brother
Arab country. With U.N. sanction, it
will be easier to convince ordinary
Arabs that the war is legitimate and the
fault is Saddam's. If the U.N. doesn't come
through, the Administration is instead
preparing to lead a "coalition of the willing."
Italy, Australia, Poland, Spain, Qatar,
Kuwait and, of course, best-pal Britain
might all agree to take part in military action
without a Security Council mandate. '
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1FIT'SWo, WILLSADDAM
COUAPSEQUICKLY?
, THE ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS THE FIGHTing
should produce a swift, relatively painlessvictory,
with Saddam gone in weeks.
That's based largely on the presumption
that his power is brittle, large segments of
his army will surrender and his command
will be decapitated before he can unleash
his weapons of mass destruction. While
outside experts say the war will probably go
well, given U.S. air and technological superiority,
they warn that the U.S. can't assume
easy success.
Saddam lost about 40% of his conventional
force in the 1991 Gulf War. His current
375,000-man army is of uneven quality,
his air force mostly grounded and his
navy nonexistent. The CIA says Re can't
, project his power very far ,and has trouble
moving his tanks and artillery swiftly. Does
that mean Iraq will crumble on impact?
Not necessarily. ''You have to anticipate
the worst-case scenario-that it will be a vicious,
ferocious fight," says Nebraska's Re-,
publican Senator Chuck Hagel, a Vietnam
veterap. The outcome probably turns on
how vigorously the 60,000-strong Republican
Guard fights. Most experts say it would
be foolhardy to write off Saddam's most
loyal, best-trained troops, especially if the
fighting comes to the streets of Baghdad.
The dollar costs, meanwhile,
will be
pretty steep. The Congressional Budget Office
(cao) last week estimated it would cost
$9 billion to $13 billion to deploy forces,
$6 billion to $9 billion a month to prosecute
the war and then $5 billion to $7 billion to
transport GIs back home. Add a peacekeeping
mission that the cao estimates would
cost $1billion to $4 billion a month, and the
total for three months of combat plus five ,
years of occupation would be $272 billion.
4WHAT ARE THE ODDS OF
HIS RGHlING DIRTY? '
IN THE LAST WAR, SADDAM GUARANTEED
his survival by refraining from using his
weapons of mass destruction. But in a war
aimed directly at killinghim off, he would
have no incentive to play nice. He'lllose if
he doesn't use them.
Pentagon war plans assume that precision
air attacks with smart bombs can find
and safely destroy hidden caches of biochern
agents that inspectors have failed to
uncover. The plans also presume that this
can be done before Saddam unleashes any
of those weapons. The bombers also need to
take out Saddam's 20 to 30 Scud missiles
(which they were not able to do in 199Ü before
he can fire warheads loaded with conventional
explosives or perhaps chenucal
agents at Israel or his Arab neighbors. Even
if all these pre-emptive measure~ are taken,
Saddam could still try a crude pÎ'e-emptive
strike ofhis own, using chern or bio agents
against U.S. forces as they gather. But
chemical weapons are hard to control on the
battlefield; shifting winds could blow them
back on Iraqi soldiers. U.S. forces will go
, into battle in full protective gear. And the
Administration says it plans to warn Iraqi
generals and colonels who mi$t order the
'use of bio-chem weapons that they will be
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